NEW YORK TIMES COVERS AND AIDS 1953 C.I.A. COUP IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1980
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
Vol.4 No-4 SPECIAL ISSUE -~.- SEPT./OCT. 1980 50
New Revelations:
New York Times
Covers
CIA and Aids
1953 . Coup
in Iran
Iranians of different socio-eco-
nomic strata and backgrounds vary
in their grievances against the
U.S. government but agree on the
event of greatest disdain: the CIA-
masterminded coup of August 1953.
The coup replaced the constitution-
al government of Mohammed Mossadegh
with that of a pro-Nazi named
Zahedi and marked the onset of 25
years of Shah-led dictatorial rule.
An event of such historic impor-
tance was. bound to generate contro-
versies and consequences even three
decades later. Indeed, Iranians'
fears that the October 1979 admis-
sion of the Shah to the U.S. for.
"medical reasons" signalled another
CIA-masterminded coup served as a
catalyst for the embassy seizure.
Following the embassy takeover,
several U.S. government statements
on the coup grabbed media headlines.
President Carter, scoffing at the
idea of apologizing to the Iranians,
dismissed the 1953 coup as "ancient
history". State Department spokes-
person, Hodding Carter, repeatedly
refused comment. The CIA officer
who ran the 1953 coup, Kermit
Roosevelt, disclosed his version of
events in his book, Counter-coup:
The Struggle for Control of Iran
issued by McGraw-Hill in October
1979 and withdrawn-in November 1979
(three days after the embassy take-
over) following strenuous--obiec-
tieons by the British Petroleum Com-
pany.
After all the official versions,
a number of questions remain unan-
New C.I.A. Bill:
Death to the
First Amendment
CounterSp3r magazine is issuing
the following special report be-
cause it poignantly illustrates
the devastating damage resulting
from collaboration between the
press and the CIA, and because it
addresses the present threat to
freedom of the press and the U.S.
Constitution posed by HR5615 and
S2216 pending in Congress. These
two bills make it a crime to name
undercover CIA and FBI officers,
agents, and informers or to pub-
lish information that could lead
to the disclosure of a CIA or FBI
name, even if all the information
is obtained from public sources.
This report is about Kennett
Love whose personal role in the
CIA's 1953 coup in Iran was de-
scribed as follcw;rs' by: Paul Nitze,
a former Secretary of the Navy
and an active member of the Com-
mittee on the Present Danger.
':'There was a tank battle, and
it wasn't going well, and the
four pro-Shah tanks-were in the
main square, stalled,_and Love
went to the tank commander,
knocked on the tank and asked
him why he didn't attack
Mossadegh's place. Love, who
was only a reporten', had-just
come out of there,Wand he had
noticed it was undefended. So
the tanks went rumbling towards
Mossadegh's and Mossadegh went:
over the back wall with some-
thing like six people, one of
whom. was a prominent professor
at Teheran University'."
Love's tide-tuning involvement
in the tank.battle and other" as.-
-ApprovedIFor(I4@1 &sre b4Abr1711 CIA-RDP88-01314R0.0010035006 fg"t. on pg. 6)
 swered. Roosevelt still claims that knowledge. In consenting or dis-
the cost O tthef d -~
the t h o u s an roo ~ o ~f'egOe ~Ob~m'f'0'~12 : CIA-R[~88r0W~L@0(i~i 0?35~01r6 and future
= U.S. policies towards Iran, Ame`ri-
CIA officer, Andrew Tully claims cans need to understand the moti-
the cost was more than $10 million. vations behind Iranian feelings
In addition to the cost, the CIA and actions. As essential compo-
personalities involved, with the nent of this understanding is
exception of Roosevelt and Allen knowledge of the 1953 coup since
Dulles, remain shrouded in mystery, it continues to motivate in part
and very little is known of the the actions of millions of Irani-
precise strategy and tactics em- ans. As Love himself stated: "The
ployed. relevance of information on the
New evidence, however, has American rescue of the Iranian
emerged from the Allen W. Dulles throne to an understanding of
papers, recently opened to a care- American-Iranian relations would
fully screened audience at Prince- appear to be unarguable." Thus,
ton University, which answers some we are presenting the following
of the questions. Dulles was CIA information and analysis which we
Director at the time of the August also feel is in the interest of
1953 coup. A 1966 file in the sec- world peace since an adequately
tion of his papers containing cor- informed American people cannot
respondence includes-a letter to be misled into war.
Dulles from Kennett Love, a New We also feel justified in pub-
York Times correspondent in Iran lishing parts of Love's account
in 1953 and one of only two Ameri- as it was written for an universi-
can reporters in Teheran during ty course at an institution which
the coup. Along with the letter, claims that the free and open ex-
Love sent Dulles a 41-page paper change of ideas and research
entitled: "The American Role in should govern academic scholar-
the Pahlevi Restoration: On 19 Au- ship. So, let us begin.
gust 1953" which he wrote in 1960 First of all, according to Love,
while attending Princeton as a the U.S. government initially be-
Carnegie Press Fellow of the Coun- came involved in Iran for economic
cil on Foreign Relations. Appra- self-interests which, in turn,
priately enough, he wrote the pa- stimulated an unconstitutional,
per for T. Cuyler Young, a Prince- violent coup and subsequent CIA
ton professor covertly consulting repression.
for the CIA. "It was the dispute between Iran
The partially secret committee and the AngZo-Iranian Oil Com-
which oversees the Dulles papers pany which drew-the United
forbids publication of any mate- States toward its major involve-
rial from the collection without ment in the Iranian scene..."The
its prior approval. The committee experience prodded the United
is chaired by Dulles' long-time States toward its cloak-and-dag-
colleague and friend, Lawrence ger Persian adventure...Irani.an
Houston, who served as CIA Gener- leaders were aware that the
al Counsel from 1947 to 1973. We United States.was doing more for
have not received permission to their economy than Washington
publish.our report based on the would admit... It can be con
Love materials, but we are pro- eluded that Wash~rngton, wanted
ceeding with disclosure on the to joggle the Iranian premier
principle that the American public with a blunt assertion that he
has a right and a need to know the would have to settle his econom-
details of their government's for- is difficulties himself if he-'-'
eign policy operations. the U.S. remained intransient in the oil
Declaration of Independence re- dispute... It (Mossadegh's con-
quires that the government operate stitutional government) had
with the "consent of the governed", eliminated all constitutional or
Consent is meaningless without peaceable methods of removing
2''- counters roved-For Release 2004/10/12 CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350001-6 - -
 him from o fp&oeved.F,pr Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RRP~~~O?1Oa(1~3?g01l6ncZuding
"It is probable that the Ameri- many who faced forced retirement,
can role was decisive, that the and a reputation for decisive ac-
Iranians who participated in the tion without too many scruples."
royalist coup could not have (This is the same Zahedi whom
succeeded without American help. Allen Dulles would call "dis-
It is doubtful that the coup tinguished".)
would have been attempted with- The CIA's brutality was also
out American cooperation ... it seen in its assignment of George
was a consciously planned accom- Carroll, hot on the heels of plot-
plishment creditable to American ting violence in South Korea. Love
Federal employees... Washington related the following.
reacted, not by helping Mossa- "The organization of gangs,
degh, but by kicking him out." armed with clubs, knives and
"At the same time, the CIA stones, and occasionally a pis-
agents who blue-printed the coup toZ or rifle.., was candidly
against Dr. Mossadegh continued claimed by a CIA agent named
to furnish technical assistance George Carroll, a six-foot-four-
in quelling dissident movements inch 200 pounder who had arrived
that threatened the stability of in Teheran from Korea, where, he
the new regime. A year after the said, the CIA had been standing
coup, American cryptographic and by while the United States was
police experts'and a CIA agent organizing a popular uprising to
played an important part in root- oust Syngman Rhee."
ing out an extensive conspiracy Love also said that a colleague
of Army officers that was close- of his described Carroll as "too
ly linked to the Communist Tudeh unrestrained" but as the type the
party." CIA uses "where they really don't
In short, the U.S. government, give a damn...". Love's colleague
using methods that were not "cony- also told him of the following
stitutional or peaceable", con- post-coup involvement of Carroll.
sciously intervened to install an "In the days immediately follow-
undemocratic, royalist regime. The ing the overthrow of Mossadegh,
raw cynicism and callous indiffer- Ardeshir Zahedi came to see
ence of this operation is seen in Carroll, daily..."
the CIA's reason for choosing "Carroll was also a buddy of
Major General Fazlollah Zahedi to Gen. Farhat Dadsetan, Zahedi's
lead the coup and the new govern- first military governor of Tehe-
went. ran. I believe Carroll worked
"General Zahedi had all the re- with Dadsetan on preparations
quisites. He had been Minister for the very efficient smother-
of Interior in Dr. Mossadegh's ing of a potential dissident
first cabinet in 1951. He had movement emanating from the`ba--
been interned by the British in zaar area and the Tudeh in the
Palestine during World War II first two weeks of November,
because of pro-Nazi activities 1953."
under Reza Shah. He had been As Love summarized: "There can
twice accused of plotting be no dispute over the fact that
against the Mossadegh regime, Mr. Carroll made an .Mportant con-
the first time in October 1952, tribution to the royalist success
when he escaped his arrest be- before, during and after the
cause of his parliamentary im- coup." We should mention here the
munity as a senator, and the sec- following statement by Love, viz,,;-
ond time in April 1953-in con- "It was the prospect-of Soviet-
nection with the murder of Gen- controlled communism becoming dom-
eral Afshartoos by a group of re- inant in Iran that prompted the
tired officers... Thus, he pos- United States to intervene." How-
sessed adequate credentials as ' a ever, the credibility of ' t.h.is as-
nationalist, useful contacts .?sertion was undermined by these
observations f"LLo a self.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314RO 01003500 t e rS
py -- 3
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350001-6
"The communist threat was defi- in Teheran believed that there1
nitely secondary..." were only 15,000 to 20,000 Tudeh
"He (Mossadegh) had been an anti- members in Iran in 1953. In a
communist throughout his career." country of 25 million, this was
"In the July 1952 crisis... the hardly a serious threat.
Nationalists (Mossadegh's group) Love's doublethink, if you will,
rebuffed the Tudeh and balked which shadowed his public report-
Red plans in the streets, dis- ing at the time, stemmed from his
playing a degree of organization personal participation with the
and tactical ability." CIA in the coup. ,-love admitted
"The Mossadeghists, then firmly his participation as a propagan-
allied with Ayatollah Abol- dist and as a militarist in the
ghassan Kashani's religious fac- following passages.
tions of the National Front, "My first observation of the as-
such as Dr. Mozaffar Baghai's sociation of the United States
Toilers Party, occasionally or- with the royalist cause began
dered attacks on communists at with a telephone call to me at
public gatherings. Groups far the Park Hotel from Joe Goodwin,
to the right such as the Pan- a CIA man attached to the em-
Iranists and the fascist Sumka, bassy as a political officer.
followed a policy of constant Mr. Goodwin called shortly af-
attacks on the Tudeh. This pot- ter the 7 A.M. news broadcast
icy met with only occasional and asked if I wanted to meet
government (Mossadegh's) inter- General Zahedi to get the real
ference. " version of what happened."
"There was no real abatement of Love was taken in tow by
Dr. Mossadegh's anti-communism Goodwin to see Zahedi on August
until after his appeal to Pres- 17, two days before the coup. At
ident Eisenhower." (only 2'~ the rendezvous, Love met instead
months before the coup.) of General Zahedi, his son,
"It is conceivable that the Ardeshir,who knew Goodwin.
Tudeh could have turned the Ardeshir told Love that the Shah
fortunes of the day against the had issued two decrees. One ap-
royalists. But for some reason pointed Zahedi as prime minister,
they remained aloof from the and one dismissed Mossadegh.
conflict. " After witnessing the photocopy-
"My own conjecture is that the ing of the decrees, Love took a
Tudeh were restrained by the "handful" of the one declaring
Soviet Embassy because the Zahedi prime minister and distib-
Kremlin, in the first post- used them at the Park Hotel in
Stalin year, was not willing to Teheran. In distriburing these
take on such consequences as decrees, Love, a New York Times
might have resulted from the reporter, consciously served as a
establishment of a communist- propagandist for an dn-going, un-
controlled regime in Teheran." democratic CIA coup. We say un-
Given these observations, it is democratic because the Shah by
all but impossible to accept that royal fiat was appointing Zahedi
the coup was motivated by genuine and dismissing Mossadegh.
fears of a Soviet-controlled com- Love's dual role as a propa-
munist takeover. Not surprisingly, gandist was as unacceptable In
the Shah did hold up the spectre 1953 as it is today. The incom-
of communism. But, even Love, who patibility of the two roles waa,-
recounted that "My life was saved highlighted by the-fact that Love
by the driver, a card-carrying was the main source of informa-
-Tudeh member...", claimed that tion to the American people at
the Shah's threat was used as the time. How could-the-American
"bait" to solicit U.S. support.. -people get independent-news cov-
On e final pRPPI-6v l:& sb . O 4 / 0 / 1 2 2: CIA-RDM&4F3'f A01300gaQM t& r a c f-in-g at
rdporting that the U.S. Embassy the direction-of the CIA ? Indeed;.
_4 - CountbrSpy
 a.reading of Love's articles of down there where they would be
August 1953 p Appmlated Fb - RereaS O04/10/12: CIA-FdPW--6f31 ~~ d00~ _ f s 2 t tin g
-version" a la Zahedi and the CIA. idle at the ra 1~a station, They
Love never mentioned any CIA in- declared my suggestion to be a
volvement; glossed over Zahedi's splendid idea. They took their
undemocratic appointment and did machines in a body to Kokh Ave-
not mention his unscrupulous, pro- nue and put the three tanks at
Nazi nature; and portrayed Dr. Mossadegh's house out of ac-
Mossadegh as increasingly suscep- tion after a lively duel with
tible to a Soviet takeover. armor-piercing 75 millimeter
Love himself was apparently shells."
aware of his compromising as he
lied about his involvement 25
years later. According to the New
York Times: "... Mr. Love said
that shortly after the over-throw
of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in
Iran in 1953, he helped the CIA
distribute copies of a declaration
declaring Ardeshir Zahedi as Mr.
Mossadegh's successor." But
Kennett Love said he had not known
at the time that the man who had
asked him for help, "had been a
CIA man and that he had never know-
ingly done anything else for the
CIA."
As we saw, Love referred to "Joe
Goodwin, a CIA man". It seems
highly unlikely that Love did not
know at the time that Goodwin was
a CIA officer. This is particular-
ly so since the CIA made Love
privy to intimate details of the
coup including the identification
of "dirty tricksters", George
Carroll and Howard Stone. Love was
even told that Ayatollah Behbehani,
one of the most influential reli-
gious: leaders, "was the key figure
in enlisting and organizing the
bands of 'chaqu kashan' or 'knife
drawers' who carried out Carroll's
dirty work.
Love's denial is further under-
mined because he did do something
else for the CIA in addition to
his propagandizing.
"Incidentially, I, myself, was
responsible, in an impromptu
sort of way, for speeding the
final victory of the royalists...
I told the tank commanders (one
of whom Love said was named
Ehteshamee or:Ekhteshamee) that
a lot of people were being get-
ting killed trying to storm Dr.
Mossadegh's house and that they,
the tank commanders, ought to'go
Thus, it was through Kennett
Love (and Associated Press corre-
spondent, Don Schwind who worked
with Love and Goodwin) that the
American people were kept in the
dark about a CIA operation - car-
ried out in their name and through
their taxes - which resulted in
what Love himself called a "police
state". Little surprise then "that
Iranians are well aware of the
American role although the Ameri-
can public is not", as Love later
cynically observed.
The message is that the people
in the U.S. should demand that the
media sever its ties with the U.S.
government, particularly the CIA
in order that America will have
the knowledge to function as a de-
mocracy, i.e. with the "consent of
Israel's
Pentagon Papers . .
Israel's Sacred Terrorism
"a valuable service ... to those who are
interested in discovering the real world
that lies -behind 'official history.'
-From Pioam Chomsky's Introduction
MosheSharett, Israel's first foreign minister and prime minister
from-1953 to 1955, kept a personal diary-a day-to-day candid
record of how key Israeli policy decisions were made. Long kept
unpublished, the diary reveals how Israel's "security establish-
ment," men like David Ben-Gurion, Arik Sharon and Moshe
Dayan, sought to destabilize neighboring Arab countries
through covert military operations and terrorist activity, and
plotted the takeover of South Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza.
Italian journalist Livia Rokach'stpt~rought1ul analysis of the
Sharett diary and other key docutn nts shatters longstanding
myths about Israel and its security needs. Israel's Sacred
Terrorism lays bare the political trend in Israel that. in the words
of a troubled Moshe Sharett, raises terrorism and "revenge" toa
"moral ... and even sacred principle."
Order from:
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350001-6
the governed". This is especially
needed at the present time with
President Carter reportedly plan-
ning other military action against
Iran in the near future. This time
if the American people are kept in
the dark while covert operations
and military actions are carried
out by presidential fiat and in
their name, there just may be a
World War III.
(cont. from pg.l)
pects of the 1953 CIA coup are'
detailed in CounterSpy's special
report. At the same time that
Love was participating in the CIA-
directed coup, his articles were
receiving front-page coverage in
the New York Times and most major
U.S. newspapers. Not one of the
stories mentioned,tlie CIA's in-
volvement in the coup. Indeed,
before Mossadegh was overthrown,
Love reported that Mossadegh had
been toppled and his story was
transmitted through the U.S. Em-
bassy and was broadcast over Ra-
dio Teheran.
If Kennett Love had exposed the
1953 CIA operation; or if he had,
at least, not fed CIA propaganda
about an imminent Soviet takeover
of Iran to.the U.S. public, the
coup and the subsequent Shah-led
"police state" (Es even Love
called it) might have been pre-
vented. Likewise, the present CIA
precipitated tensions between the
U.S. government and Iran may also
have been averted.
CounterSpy is publishing the
Kennett Love story at the present
time because Congrees is prepar-
ing to enact what Representative
Robert Drinan has called on offi-
cial Secrets Act. If this CIA
written law (HR5615 and S2216)
were in effect now, it would be a
crime punishable by three years
in prison to write or talk about
Kennett Love and his role as an
agent for the CIA. This is the fu-
ture for press coverage-of CIA
operations if HR5615 and--S2216 are
made into law.
? The Kennett Love story shows
that the pending Official Secrets
ests and a threat to national-se-
curity. This is because it will
not allow the exposure of present
and past CIA operations, such as
the 1953 coup in Iran, which, in
the-long run, did not enhance U.S.
security as exemplified in the
present tensions between the U.S.
and Iran.
CounterSpy is thus issuing this
special report in order to alert
the American people to organize
actions to prevent the passage of
HR5615 and 52216. We are also is-
suing the report at this time,'be-
cause in our opinion, it will be
next to impossible to publish
CounterSpy under the pending law
even though all the information in
Counterspy has been obtained from
public sources; and CounterSpy's
stories have been in the interest
of national security and world
peace.
In conclusion, we urge our read-
ers to disseminate this report to
activate people into stopping the
CIA's rape of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The CIA must not be allowed
again to carry out its actions
against peoples of other coun-
tries without any scrutiny from
the U.S. media at. all.
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