DS&T RESPONSES TO THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE MODERNIZATION AND COMPENSATION TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01192R000100220009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 136
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MEMO

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tab 1: Cover Letter
Attachment B
to DS&T-606-87
,This section contains the cover letter for the DS&T
response to the HRMCTF.
Tab 2: Recommendations
This section contains the DS&T recommendations for each
feature proposed in the HRMCTF Preliminary Report.
Tab 3: Concerns
This section contains a sampling of concerns expressed by
DS&T employees.
Tab 4: New Features
This section contains a compilation of new features
suggested by DS&T employees.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Human Resources Modernization and
Compensation Task Force
FROM:
SUBJECT:
e
James V. Hirsch
Associate Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
DS&T Responses to the Preliminary Report of the
Human Resource Modernization and Compensation
Task Force
1. We commend the Human Resources Modernization and
Compensation Task Force (HRMCTF) for its efforts in producing the
Preliminary Report that was distributed last July. As indicated
in the report, the HRMCTF wanted employee reactions to the
various features of the proposed system at the conceptual level
before proceeding with more detailed design and implementation
plans. In general the DS&T employees responded positively to the
broad outline for a new personnel and compensation system. The
features presented are complex and, if implemented, would have a
profound effect on the Agency. Not surprisingly, the proposal
evoked considerable controversy and none of its features was
universally rejected or embraced. In reviewing the proposals,
employees made numerous suggestions, expressed a variety of
concerns, and identified some new features. These are provided
for consideration as we leave the concept phase and enter the
detailed design phase. Unlike the preliminary report, the next
report will require decisions. To be prepared for these, we will
need to have a fleshed-out system design, one that answers the
employees concerns and that has been strengthened by their
suggestions.
2. In the spirit of improving the design, we have
recommended changes to virtually every feature in the proposal.
We believe these changes are essential if they are to be
ultimately accepted by DS&T employees. The only two features we
recommend be significantly altered are the performance plan and
the performance evaluation (Features 3 and 4, respectively). We
wholeheartedly endorse their stated objective of improving
performance-related communication between the supervisors and
their subordinates, but disagree with the proposed approach for
accomplishing this. We recognize the importance of an effective
performance evaluation process to the Agency and have proposed an
approach which we believe will produce the desired improvement.
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3. One pervasive concern was that the proposed system taken
as a whole would produce an unmanageable administrative burden.
We request that you pay special attention to this issue during
the redrafting process and ask that you be as explicit as
possible about the administrative aspects of each feature.
4. Clearly the most controversial and visible changes
proposed are occupationally-defined bands and incentive pay. As
pointed out in the report, much of what is proposed can be
implemented within the GS structure. The redrafted report should
include h GS option parallel to the occupationally-defined
bands. Retaining the GS is an important option not only because
it would be less traumatic for employees, but because such an
option may improve our prospects for Congressional approval.
5. Even if none of the proposed features are adopted, our
employee population is much better educated on changes of this
type than perhaps employees in any other government agency. We,
however, will need explicit comparison with the legislation OPM
is submitting in this area, and will need to know which of the
features we are proposing have been implemented elsewhere. All
these legislative considerations will be necessary background to
our next step.
6. It is important that HRMCTF take the time necessary to
prepare the revised proposal. The decisions are too far-reaching
to be hurried by arbitrary deadlines. The Agency prides itself
on its ability to move out quickly. If, however, we produce a
proposal that does not address employees' questions and concerns
on each feature, the decision process will create unnecessary
apprehension and could well result in considerable lost time
"undoing" incorrect interpretations.
7. The table of contents for the DS&T response is attached.
If you have any questions, please direct them to the DS&T
representatives to the HRMCTF.
James V. Hirsch
Attachment:
As Stated
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RECOMMENDATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
This section contains the DS&T recommendations for each
feature in the HRMCTF Preliminary Report.
Feature/Description
Page
1 Occupationally-defined Bands 1
2 Incentive Pay 6
3 Performance Plan 10
4 Performance Evaluation 10
5 Occupational Career Handbooks
6 Individual Career Development Plans 3
7 Occupation-Specific Training 15
8 Improved Availability of Training 17
9 Dual Track 18
10 Promotion 21
11 Flexible Benefits 23
12 Leave Conversion 25
Annual Leave Payback
Optional Conversion to Sick Leave
Sick Leave Bank
Home Leave Use
13 Educational Assistance to Employees with Dependents 27
Leave Secured Loans
Thrift Loans
CIA-subsidized Student Loans
14 Staffing Management Tools 28
Early Retirement for SIS Managers/Experts
Involuntary Retirement
Retention Bonus
15 System Controls 29
16 Projection Tools 30
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Feature #1: Occupationally-defined Bands
Recommendation 1.1:
That an alternative be developed that includes as many of the
attributes of the proposed occupationally-defined band
feature as possible within the confines of the GS structure.
Recommendation 1.2:
That the proposed occupationally-defined banding feature be
reworked to clarify implementation details and administrative
requirements.
Recommendation 1.3:
That the mechanics of market linkage be more thoroughly
explained.
The term market linkage has created some misconceptions
about how the occupational adjustments will occur. Market
linkage as proposed had two purposes. The first was to
develop salary rationale for internal CIA occupations with no
practical private sector analogs by linking them to CIA _
occupations which do. The second purpose was to provide the
rationale for adjusting occupational salary levels. Many
reading the proposal were left with the impression that only
occupations with private sector analogs could be adjusted.
The intent of the proposed feature was to allow adjustment of
occupational salary levels based on either market or internal
values or a combination of both. The key aspect of the
proposal facilitating such adjustments was that
occupationally-based salary scales existed and thus
occupations could practically be adjusted relative to one
another. The choice of market linkage to describe both
interoccupational alignment and occupational adjustments
(whether for market or internal reasons) is misleading.
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Recommendation 1.4:
That the proposed system for interrelating occupations be
modified to better support the process of interrelating all
CIA occupations and adjusting individual occupations.
The proposed process employs factor analysis to link CIA
occupations. In factor analysis each job in each occupation
is scored on a number of factors, e.g., knowledge,
comNexity, contacts, lifestyle, etc. Each factor is
weighted and sum of the weighted factor scores determines the
ranking and ultimately the salary for each job. While the
proposed factors are somewhat different than those in the GS,
many of the unappealing aspects of the GS factor analysis
system are retained. While no single set of factors for all
occupations will ever seem natural to employees, the process
of identifying the best commonly acceptable set need to be
continued with the occupational panels.
In the proposed approach the same set of factor weights
are employed for all occupations. The need for this is
supposedly to comply with equal pay for equal work
legislation. It seems unlikely that this is the only way to
comply with the law. DS&T feels that it is essential that we
continue to explore alternatives because this approach
created a significant amount of apprehension for DS&T members
of occupational panels. To them it seemed illogical to
expect that all occupations in the Agency would place the
same weight on, for example, the lifestyle or knowledge
factors. Whereas lifestyle is a very important factor for
operational jobs, it is of minor significance to many DS&T
engineers and analysts. Conversely, knowledge was extremely
important to engineers and analysts but less so for
operational personnel. We recommend that each occupation set
weights that make sense to them. We further recommend that
we assume that today's salaries are a reasonable starting
point and that factor values and weights be recursively
adjusted so that upon initial conversion we start with
occupational pay scales where they are today. To reduce
employee concerns about conversion, we recommend that we
guarantee them that no one will lose salary in the conversion
process. In future years, when we have better market data
and established projection tools (Feature #16) we will be in
a position to propose and recommend occupational
adjustments. The objective now should be to establish a
system that facilitates such adjustments.
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Since the issue is ultimately a legal one--namely,
compliance with equal pay for equal work legislation--we
recommend that we obtain an OGC opinion on the recommended
DS&T approach outlined here and on the need for equal factor
weights in the approach proposed in the preliminary HRMCTF
report.
The proposed factor system must be further refined to
support occupational adjustments. As presently defined, such
adjustments are, at best, cumbersome and more importantly
will' serve to deter usage of the authority to make
adjustments. We recommend that each occupation be assigned a
factor which is unity when the initial conversion is made.
This factor would be a multiplier of the factor analysis
score obtained by summing the weighted factors. It would be
changed when an adjustment to that occupation's salary was
proposed. All such adjustments would be approved by the
ExCom and their rationale documented. This rationale could
be internal pressures, market forces or a combination of
both. The point is adjustments would not be restricted to
"market-priceable" occupations. Without this factor, the
only way to adjust occupational salaries is to argue the
nature of the job, as reflected in the factors and their
weights, has changed. While this will happen also and will
require adjustment of the factor and weights, such changes
are not the only reason occupational salary adjustments are
made.
Recommendation 1,5:
That the market survey for each occupation involve the direct
participation of the occupational panels and results be
subjected to review by the Deputy Directors with employees in
the occupation.
Our jobs are complex. It is not reasonable to expect any
external contractor who might perform the survey to be
acquainted enough with the occupations to develop meaningful
comparisons. When these contractors are teamed with the
occupational panels, we have demonstrated that meaningful
comparisons can be obtained. Conversely, we have
demonstrated that the contractor cannot perform a meaningful
survey without occupational panel participation.
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%-?
Recommendation 1,6:
That the proposed system should budget for and plan to
conduct a market survey annually for each occupation, at
least until we gain more experience.
Recommendation 1,7:
That occupational panel findings during the feasibility phase
not,be considered final.
For example, some DS&T occupational panel members,
blessed with hindsight, feel that the numbers of bands
developed in this initial phase requires adjustment. If
occupational banding is elected, ample time must be allowed
in the implementation phase to rework all that has been
prepared by an occupation to date.
Recommendation 1.8:
That the salary structure, particularly the proposed pay
scale, be modified to provide the flexibility intended for
the occupational banding system.
The proposed pay scale introduces significant
restrictions on flexibility for no apparent reason. First,
as proposed all bands will fall into a pay band that is 50
percent wide (the top of the band is 1.5 times the base
salary of the band). Given that occupational panels are free
to define meaningful bands and that not all occupations will
define the same number of bands for the same salary range,
any choice of a uniformly?wide pay band for all occupation
seems inconsistent. DS&T recommends that the salary range
for each occupation and each band of each occupation be
determined initially by the GS salaries of employees that the
band describes.
The second problem with the proposed pay scale is that it
greatly restricts the ability to adjust occupations. As
proposed, there is a 7 percent increment between pay bands.
Seven percent becomes the minimum adjustment that can be made
to an occupational salary structure and the next choice is 14
percent. While the increments between pay band can be
reduced by adding more pay bands, the fundamental question is
why are there such pay bands at all. If the above
recommendation is adopted, occupational salary structures are
independent and can be adjusted by any amount desired.
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Recommendation 1.9:
That the subject of comparability with other government
agencies in a system that is market linked be fully explained
in the revised proposal.
Included in the explanation are to be implementation
details and timing of CIA adjustments relative to the rest of
the Federal Government.
Recommendation 1.10:
That the process of obtaining funds to make Agency-wide or
occupation-specific pay adjustments be clearly explained.
While the proposed market pricing does give CIA the
flexibility to make occupational and Agency-wide adjustments,
it does not guarantee that money will be appropriated and
does not lift the cap. It is important that employees
recognize that our ability to exercise this authority will be
limited by the vagueries of the budget process just as the
fate of any other new initiative is.
Recommendation 1,11:
That the implementation details be greatly expanded in the
revised proposal on "funding control with classification
delegated to the directorates."
Specific examples of the use of funding-only control to
restructure a component are to be developed.
Recommendation 1.12:
That the revised proposal explicitly address how the non-GS
employee, e.g., Wage Board employees, will be incorporated
into the system.
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Feature #2: Incentive Pay
Recommendation 2.1:
That the proposed incentive pay feature be included with the
GS alternative to the occupational banding feature.
Under Feature #1: Occupationally-defined Bands, DS&T
recoTmended that a GS compatible formulation be developed
which incorporates as many of the improvements of the
proposed feature as possible, but within the confines of the
GS structure. The requested GS compatible formulation of the
proposed incentive feature would be the companion of this GS
alternative. In developing this alternative, the same level
of additional funding is to be assumed as is used for the
proposed incentive pay feature.
We recommend that consideration be given to streamlining
the bureaucracy for Special Achievement and Exceptional
Accomplishment Awards. While the system has been streamlined
to some extent, with DS&T offices having authority to
approved awards up to $500, higher value awards are
invariably long in the approval process and often require
tedious documentation. The net result is that the impact of
the award is lessened because of the long time that separates
the award from the event. Steamlining is accomplished by
delegation of the authority to approve higher award levels to
at least office level.
We recommend that consideration be given to streamlining
the award of QSIs. Ironically, QSIs take more documentation
than promotions. The QSI awards should require no more
documentation that a promotion. They should be treated as
part of the Career Service Panel deliberations and be
documented by list as promotions are. Authority to approve
OSIs should be delegated to at least the office level.
Recommendation 2.2:
That consideration be given to provide non-cash monetary
awards.
The concept is that employees be given credits that could
be applied in the benefits areas. If, for example, such
credits could be given on a pre-tax basis, the value of the
benefit to the employee would be larger than the actual
funding requirement for the Agency, thus permitting the
Agency to leverage its awards to the maximum advantage of the
employee.
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Recognition and feeling that one's efforts are
appreciated are among the most powerful motivators. These
must be an integral part of any incentive program.
Recomendation 2.3:
That the currently proposed incentive pay feature be reworked
to clarify implementation details and administrative
requirements.
Recommendation 2.4:
That the implied connection between the performance
evaluation ratings and the incentive award percentages in the
proposed feature be eliminated.
While the text and tables describing the incentive pay
distribution make it clear that the incentive pay is based on
a competitive ranking, the similarity of the words
(outstanding, superior, and fully satisfactory) on the
incentive pay distribution grids on pages 14, 15, 23 and 24
with the words associated with numerical rating on the
proposed performance evaluation system created considerable
ambiguity and concern. These words have no meaning on the
incentive pay distribution grid and should be eliminated from
the grid entirely and from the incentive pay section.
Incentive pay is distributed by a ranking process. The
process of creating the planning grid is purely budgetary and
in no way represents Agency management estimate of the
performance of employees associated with each percentage in
the grid. To use such descriptors can only create confusion
and miscommunicate the process.
Recommendation 2.5:
That the constraints on the distribution of incentive pay be
clearly stated.
While page 23 is explicit, these constraints need to be
prominently placed. Specifically, the only constraints on
incentive pay distribution by the panel are:
o that all employees judged to be performing
satisfactorily receive the incentive award specified
in the planning grid as the GS equivalent incentive
pay level;
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o that the panel award no more incentive pay than
provided in the pool; and
o that the maximum incentive award value be that
specified in the planning grid.
These constraints provide the panels the flexibility to
depart from the values employed in the planning grid. The
examples illustrating the incentive award process have been
inadequate to demonstrate the flexibility that the panel has
in dastributing the award pool. For example, some felt that
numerical ranking was critically important because the
individual who was, say number 51 of 100 (below 50 percent
line) would receive a subtantially different award than the
individual ranked 50. This level of distinction between the
performance of employees was properly viewed as unrealistic.
In fact, within the proposed constraints, no such unrealistic
demands are made on the ranking process. In practice,
ranking would involve blocking individuals who should receive
about the same level of incentive pay. If appropriate,
enough blocks can be defined to create a smooth transition
from the minimum to the maximum award. Furthermore, nothing
precludes the panel from awarding those in the bottom half
more than the minimum. The point is that more examples are
needed to demonstrate the flexibility.
Recommendation 2,6:
That the proposed incentive pay system is a competitive
process based ultimately on subjective judgments of panel
members must be more prominently displayed.
The intent of the feature is to award the
better-than-average performers with better-than-average
incentive pay. This is, of necessity, a comparative
process. While panel members will have an understanding of
the performance of the employees being compared, the ranking
and resulting incentive award determinations will ultimately
be subjective. Extreme care must be taken in preparing the
revised proposal that no language be employed which implies
unrealistic precision or ability to quantify the rationale
for award determinations. They will be subjective and
employees must know that and expect explanations that are
basically subjective.
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Recommendation 2.7:
That the term "pay-for-performance" be dropped.
It received a universally negative response in DS&T and
predisposed reviewers to argue. Most argue that we
pay-for-performance now but use promotion as the primary
vehicle.
Recommendation 2.8:
That the proposed additional bonus pool for MEIP be dropped.
Recommendation 2.9:
That a single incentive pay planning grid such as the one in
Table 3 (page 23 of the report) be considered for all
elements of the Agency population including members of MEIP
and SIS employees.
DS&T felt it was important to minimize differentiation
among the various segments of the employee population and
that the proliferation of special bonus provisions such as
the proposed MEIP and SIS bonus system has the appearance of Q
hodge podge. The fact that the incentive pool is based on
percentage of salary creates the desired effect without the
negative impact that special provisions can have on both
employees and Congress.
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Features #3 and #4: Performance Plan and Evaluation
While we support the stated objective of improving
communication between the supervisors and their subordinates on
performance, we do not believe the proposed approach will produce
the desired result. The proposed approach makes an attempt to
simplify the administrative aspects associated with the forms and
to assist supervisors by making available to them a data base
which articulates the expectations and performance standards for
each occupation. In DS&T's opinion, neither the forms nor the
ability of supervisors to articulate expectations and to provide
performance feedback is the problem. DS&T believes the problem
is the attitude of both the supervisors and the subordinates, and
the proposed feature does nothing to address this. DS&T further
believes that even if the ability of supervisors to articulate
expectations was the problem, a data base of the type proposed
will not be specific enough to be relevant.
Recommendation 3.1:
That an aggressive training program be introduced which
instills and reinforces the proper attitudes in both
supervisors and subordinates concerning performance-related
communication.
This feature is to include a training program which is
mandatory for all employees entering the Agency (and provided
to all non-supervisory employees already on board). The
purpose of the program would be to change employee attitudes
about performance discussion. Employees would be taught that
it is their responsibility to clarify any doubts they have
about what they are being asked to do. Furthermore,
employees would be introduced to techniques to diplomatically
yet assertively request performance feedback from their
supervisors. The course would include suggestions on how to
prepare for a performance planning and feedback sessions with
supervisors. Perhaps most importantly, the course would
emphasize that performance evaluations are fundamentally a
subjective process.
This feature is also to include an equally aggressive
training program that is mandatory within the first year of
becoming a supervisor. The purpose of the program would be
to assure that supervisors understand their responsibilities
to provide clear tasking and honest, constructive feedback to
their employees. The course would contain recommended
techniques for providing such tasking as well as for
providing feedback. The course would include case studies,
particularly for problem cases.
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Recommendation 3.2:
That the current PAR system remain until it is clear that the
form, not attitudes, is limiting communication.
Recommendation 313:
That both these training courses be considered under Feature
#8 as candidates for VCR modules to facilitate wide
distribution.
Recommendation 3,4:
That formally required documentation of performance planning
sessions be a signature by the supervisor and subordinate
that such discussions were held.
This provision, in combination with Recommendation 3.1
above, will provide the opportunity for communication between
supervisor and subordinate in a manner that is meaningful and
free of the distractions formal documentation often
produces. If either the supervisor or subordinates are not
willing to have meaningful discussions, no formalization will
change their attitude. Additional documentation should be
developed at the choosing of either the supervisor or
subordinate. This most typically would occur for new
subordinates under normal circumstances.
Care must be taken not to have implicit in the design of
such a performance system, the necessary rigor to deal with
grievance situations. The design must focus on
communications between a supervisor and subordinate with
normal working relationships. Documentation adequate to
fully cover either the supervisor or the subordinate for
grievance cases is counterproductive for normal
relationships. Supervisors and subordinates ought to have
some awareness of what is involved in grievance cases and,
more importantly, know where to go to get counseling in how
best to proceed to obtain a resolution.
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Recommendation 3,5:
That the proposed performance planning data base, as
proposed, be dropped
and
that, if one is reformulated, it be evaluated by the
occupational panels for viability.
,The experience of supervisors in DS&T is that generalized
formulation of tasks even within their own component are
rarely relevant to performance planning or evaluation
sessions with specific subordinates. The concern with the
proposed data base is that it will divert attention from the
very specifics that ought to be discussed and, worse, raise
expectations that objective performance evaluation criteria
will be contained in the data base. The feasibility of
developing any such data base with relevance to specific
supervisor-subordinate performance planning and evaluation
sessions remains to be demonstrated. Further, it has the
potential of diverting energies from addressing the attitude
problem we feel must be changed to improve performance-
related communication between the supervisors and their
subordinates.
Recommendation 3,6:
That the performance rating scale proposed in the
implementation sections be clearly decoupled from the
incentive award grids.
This last recommendation is essential to prevent
misinterpretation of the relationship of the performance
rating and the incentive award. The proposed incentive
feature clearly indicates that comparative ranking--not
performance rating--is the basis of the incentive award
determination. The coincidental use of the same nomenclature
on the incentive pay grids and the proposed performance
evaluation form has created misunderstandings.
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Feature #5: Occupational Career Handbooks
Recommendation 5,1:
Recommend that a two or three tier system of handbooks be
substituted for the single Occupational Career Handbook.
DS&T believes that it will be difficult to create career
hanclbooks that are relevant but felt that there were
implementation alternatives that could be meaningfully
constructed. We feel that there is merit in pursuing this
objective at least through the redraft cycle for the proposal
'because inter-directorate and office mobility would be
affected and could potentially be enhanced.
The first tier would be an Agency-wide employee handbook
containing information on organizational structure, employee
assistance programs, OMS programs, educational programs, use
of the library, available automated tools, etc. This
handbook could contain a one page description of each
occupation developed by the occupational panels showing the
role of specific occupations within the Agency and indicating
where in the Agency the occupation is found. The second
tier, at the option of the directorate, could be a version of
the Handbook with directorate specific information. The
final tier could be an office level Handbook which could
contain the most relevant career development data. While
there are many examples, the NPIC handbook could serve as a
structural model for all three tiers. This three tiered
approach, if coordinated, could provide an employee the
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Agency-wide perspective while at the same time providing the
employee a source of relevant career development
information. For those occupations that span offices and
directorates, the occupational panels could serve the role of
assuring consistency where it is appropriate.
All DS&T is opposed to anything that remotely suggests a
templating or "ticket punch" attitude about career
development. We recommend that the handbooks be carefully
screened for any language that could imply "templating."
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Feature #6: Individual Career Development Plan
The proposed Individual Career Development Plan is an
optional vehicle developed by employees to discuss their career
development objectives with their supervisors. Included in the
plan would be desired training, future assignments, and
experience perceived to be important in achieving their
objectives. The format of the plan is not rigorous, and need not
even be,a formal document.
The feature was developed to address two issues. First, some
employees were perceived to feel that their supervisors were
managing their career development and to be frustrated by either
lack of development or development along lines they felt
inappropriate. This feature was designed to unambiguously
communicate to employees that they are responsible for their own
careers. To emphasize this they are charged with preparing the
plan in the proposed feature . Secondly, some employees were
perceived to feel that communication with supervisors on their
career plans was inadequate. This feature was designed to
provide a vehicle for such conversations if the employee felt a
catalyst was needed. Furthermore, if the employee enters such
discussions prepared with articulated goals and plans the
supervisor can be more effective in supporting the employee. He
can make the training time available, assist the employee in
getting the next assignment, and help the employee shape
realistic aspirations.
In the proposed feature it was stated that supervisors should
be rated on how well they assist in the career development of
their subordinates. Such a provision is inconsistent with the
premise of the feature, namely employees are in charge of their
own career and that with such a rating provision, supervisors
would feel compelled to demonstrate countable developmental
activities, training, and assignments for their subordinates.
This would then put supervisors in the position of dictating
training, etc to employees to meet measurement standards exacted
upon him rather than the employees generating such actions to
further their objectives.
It is presumed that the intent of the statement in the
proposal is to remind employees that their supervisors are
committed to support them in achieving realistic aspirations.
This is fundamental to the self?interest of an organization. If
the future leaders are not developed, the organization will
perish. The process of developing these future leaders is not
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entirely passive. To assure its future, the organization must
make sacrifices in the form of time for training, developmental
assignments, etc. In fact, deliberations about promotion and
performance evaluation of managers today include consideration of
how they manage people. A manager that has his best people leave
to find career growth and is continually unable to fill
management positions in his component is thought of differently
than a manager who generally maintains a string of effective
managers under him or her. The concern is that the statement
will be,aken literally and that managers will be required to be
rated on matters that are frequently out of their control. A
supervisor who effectively and conscientiously nurtures the
career of his subordinates can for a variety of reasons lose the
future managers he is grooming. In fact, some managers are well
known for training effective managers and are routinely raided by
their superiors.
Recommendation 6.1:
Modify the statement that supervisors being judged on how
well they assist in the career development of their
subordinates to better reflect the intent.
Specifically, it is recommended the following be
substituted: "The employee should recognize that their
supervisors have a vested interest in the career development
of their subordinates because the organization must
continually cultivate its future managers to survive. To be
judged to be effective a manager must have a continuous
stream of effective managers within his component.
Furthermore, effective managers recognize that to attract and
retain the best employees they must provide for their career
growth."
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Feature #7: Occupation-specific Training
Recommendation 7.1:
That the Occupation-specific Training include that provided
by OTE as well as other internal CIA (component- provided)
and external sources.
,While the feature may have been intended to include all
of these training sources, the cost estimates and the
description were not clear on this point. It is neither
possible nor appropriate for OTE to provide all, or even
most, of the training required for each occupation. Key to
making this feature viable is obtaining a meaningful estimate
of how much additional investment will be necessary to
meaningfully close the gap between what exists now and what
is needed. To obtain this estimate, it is recommended that
the Occupational Panels be reconvened to review what exists
and what is needed without regard to source. Clearly some
training already exists and the investments in some of the
existing training should be "cashed-in" and applied to higher
priority needs. OTE can serve the panels as a consultant to
help define and cost these occupation-specific training
programs. In defining these programs, the full range of
training needs are to be considered including that required:
o to support career development;
o to maintain or enhance present job performance; and
o upon assuming new positions.
Once these occupation-specific training programs are
defined and costed, the panels should prioritize them to
assist with the sizing of an overall cost for this feature.
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Recommendation 7.2:
That review and revision of the occupation-specific training
programs be institutionalized to assure continued relevance
and responsivness.
No matter how effectively these training programs are
designed, they will atrophy is they are not continually
reevaluated and revised. These evaluations and the
development of recommended revisions should be performed by
the occupational panels. These panels should annually
produce a prioritized set of enhancements for consideration
by the directorates. The directorates would then be
responsible for prioritizing the trianing initiatives for all
their occupations and presenting the case for these
initiatives to ExCom.
Recommendation 7.3:
That procedures be defined which minimize the bureacracy
associated with obtaining training.
The directorates must be given the tools necessary to
delegate enrollment in and selection for training to the
lowest possible level while assuring equity in the
distribution of the training and control of its costs.
Recommendation 7.4:
That, to the maximum extent possible, training be as
available to covert employees as it is to those who are overt.
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Feature #8: Improved Availability of Training
Recommendation 8.1:
That the training whose availability will be enhanced not be
limited to that provided by OTE.
While the intent of the feature may have been broader
than training provided by OTE, the description focused on OTE
and at least implied that only training through OTE would be
funded to be made more available. The cost estimates for
this feature also supported this interpretation. Funds
blocked for this feature should not be automatically put in
OTE's budget. The occupational _panels should make
recommendations through their directorates about which
training should be made more available, independently of its
source. Clearly OTE is an important participant in this
process of defining the training for each occupation but
should participate as a consultant to the panels. The panels
will develop prioritized recommendations for investments in
training for their directorate review. The directorate would
prioritize training investments among all occupations within
the directorate. Among the proposed investments will be a
mix of training provided by OTE as well as by external and
internal (component-provided) resources.
Recommendation 8.2:
That the costs of enhancing availability of training be
refined for the next review cycle.
In the end this feature will be funding-limited, as are
all initiatives. This review cycle has served to demonstrate
that the employees feel the need to improve availability.
What is needed is a mechanism to size the level of investment
required to make a meaningful impact on availability and
chart a course that will steadily improve availability. It
is recommended that the occupational panels be reconvened to
identify specific training for such an enhancement, cost the
enhancements and prioritize them. The results from these
representative occupations will provide insight into a
meaningful investment level and into the split between OTE
and other internal and external sources of training.
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Feature #9: Dual Track
Recommendation 9.1:
That the manager be responsible for selecting employees for
the expert track.
One premise of the dual track system is that paying
increased salaries to retain experts will create a more
effective organization. In fact, this must be the primary
objective because this is the principle that must be evoked
to determine the appropriate number of experts. While we
cannot rule out the possibility of obtaining additional
personnel dollars for a dual track, it will generally operate
on a budget neutral principle. If a manager can more
effectively structure his component by creating experts, he
must do so within a fixed personnel budget ceiling. This
judgement is properly the managers since he is accountable
for the performance of his component. The concept of
employees petitioning to be experts is not consistent with
the fundamental premise of a dual track system. An employee
wishing to be an expert is free to convince the manager that
such a restructing will produce a more effective
organization, but it is the manager who must make the final
judgement about how to use available resources most
effectively.
Recommendation 9.2:
That the implementation of dual track permit delegation of
the restructuring authority implicit in such a dual track
system to whatever level is deemed appropriate by each
directorate.
The number of experts in each component must be
dynamically adjustable. If the bureaucracy of selection and
restructuring is cumbersome, the dual track system will never
reach its potential. Implementation procedures are to be
developed for use by the directorates in delegating this
authority downward without losing control of personnel
dollars. With these tools the directorates can determine
appropriate levels of delegation.
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Recommendation 9.3:
That the opportunity that such a dual track system presents
to employees be made clear.
By not discussing numbers, employees can develop
unrealistic expectations of the opportunity such a system
provides. The restrictions on managers in creating an expert
position, i.e., within component personnel dollars, should be
made, clear.
Recommendation 9,4:
That the movement between management and expert tracks be
free of bureaucratic obstacles and at the discretion of
component managers.
While there will be individuals in both the management
and expert tracks that neither can nor wish to cross over,
the system should be structured to allow and, in fact,
facilitate such crossovers. Many managers in CIA are experts
and it may be decided it is appropriate to assign them to a
specific problem with essentially expert-like
responsibilities. Furthermore, interim assignments to either
expert or management tracks may be deemed appropriate for
career development or evaluation purposes. The system must
be implemented in such a way that such moves are
bureaucratically trivial.
Recommendation 9.5:
That the implication on the benefits associated with the dual
track system be clarified for those who move into and out of
the system.
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Recommendation 9.6:
That the relationship between managers within an occupation,
management track, and SIS be further clarified.
The problem does not exist if the salary structure is
independent of occupation such as the GS system is. If,
however, the occupationally-defined bands are employed, then
managers who have more than one occupation in their component
becOme difficult to fit into the system. Certainly office
directors, most group chiefs and many division chiefs in DS&T
manage employees in more than one occupation. More
importantly, they have no specific occupational identity so
there is a question about which occupation-specific
performance and promotion panels evaluate them. If the
problem is solved by calling such individuals members of the
management occupation with appropriate panels convened much
as they are today, a problem of definition is created because
one must now distinguish between the management track and the
management occupation. The management track would then
contain, for example, branch chief positions which are
occupation-specific and on occupational banding scales and
more senior management positions which are not occupation-
specific and which are on management occupational scales.
The bands for different occupations must then neatly dovetail
to the management occupational banding scales. Furthermore,
the management occupational bands must be reconciled with the
SIS bands. While these are implementation details, the next
iteration of the proposal should propose a solution.
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Feature #10: Promotion
Recommendation 10.1:
That the reference to the occupation-specific Career
Development Handbooks as guidelines be clarified to preclude
the possibility that employees view the promotion process to
be a "ticket punching" operation.
The recommended approach to achieving this is to make no
reference to these Handbooks in the Promotion feature
description. The Handbook feature, if adopted, is intended
to assist employees with their career development not to
guide the supervisors and managers serving on promotion
panels. While there is necessarily a'relationship between
the distinctions made in the Handbooks between the levels in
an occupation, any direct connection to the Promotion process
will at least imply the Handbook is a recipe for promotion.
In fact, the concept of such a checklist is contrary to most
promotion deliberations since the employee's potential to
grow into a new, higher responsibility position is very much
a part of the panel deliberation. In general, the employee
identified for promotion has not demonstrated the full set of
attributes of the employee that would be described in the
Handbook for the higher level. Supervisors and managers
serving on promotion panels will (must) know what the
Handbooks say and should periodically review and critique
them.
Recommendation 10.2:
That the language describing the feature be clarified to
preclude any possibility that the composition of the
promotion panel be interpreted as anything other than the
supervisors and managers of the employee.
While the table on Page 16 and the discussion on Page 48
indicate that the component Career Service will continue to
make promotion recommendations and decisions, the choice of
words "panels for each occupation" created ambiguity in the
minds of at least some readers.
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Recommendation 10.3:
That the competitive basis of the promotion process be
reemphasized.
It is recognized that the proposed promotion process
represents only a small change from what is done
today--namely, populations considered for promotion will be
by occupation. In fact, for much of the DS&T, even this is
alre0y the case. The proposal emphasized only those things
which changed and, therefore, left unstated many of the
principles of the current process which are intended to be
retained. The principle that the process will remain
competitive needs to be reemphasized. Mention of the
Handbooks and the distinctions in them being used as
guidelines creates the possibility of misunderstanding on
this issue. The lack of discussion of the competitive basis
of promotions coupled with the reference to the Handbook may
leave the impression with employees that there is a change in
this fundamental principle of the promotion system.
Recommendation 10.4:
That the fundamental subjectivity of the promotion system be
reemphasized.
As with the competitive basis, this principle is a part
of the current system that is not mentioned since it is
unchanged. Again, the reference to the distinctions in the
Handbooks may imply to some employees a switch from a
subjective system to an objective one. It is critical that
this not be misconstrued.
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Feature #11: Flexible Benefits
Recommendation 11.1:
That undercover employees have the same latitude of selection
and access to the full range of benefits offered to overt
employees
Recommendation 11,2:
That the current government contribution to employees not be
reduced.
The spirit of the feature is to give the employee more
flexibility in using the government contribution. In
implementing this feature it is critical to employee
acceptance that the government contribution to each
individual employee not be reduced upon conversion. This
necessitates that the feature will have a net cost because,
for example, those employees currently not opting for medical
coverage, about 20 percent of our employees, will receive a
government contribution. The employee currently receiving
the full range of government contribution, e.g., for medical
insurance, must see traceability back to their individual
"purple book" benefits statements. Employees not currently
receiving the full spectrum of government contributions,
e.g., the approximately 20 percent not electing medical
insurance, would see an increase in their "purple book"
benefits statement.
Recommendation 11.3:
That implementation of this feature include the institution
of a board with directorate representation that oversees the
evolution of program.
The optimal use of tax law and the changes in the
benefits programs to respond, for example, to rapidly rising
medical costs require that our program adapt constantly. The
ability to adapt must not be left to chance but rather
actively pursued. The premise must be that change, perhaps
even annually, is necessary to best serve our employees'
interests. The board should be supported by a permanent
staff with expertise in the benefits and tax area. This
staff should have adequate funding to retain private sector
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expertise to support design, developmk-n, and mplemenaton
of the program revisions. Part of the charter cf this board
and its supporting staff will be to monitor the operation of,
and identify improvements in, the existing benefits program.
They are to be independent of the component charged with
operating the program to assure objectivity.
Recommendation 11.4:
That theimplementation plan (and costs) include the
necessary staffing and funding to assure timely processing of
benefit claims and both initial and ongoing education of
employees on the program.
Recommendation 11,5:
That the program, or at least one option for the program,
include the full spectrum of benefit choices permitted under
existing tax law.
The medical, dental and life insurance elements of the
program including the flexible spending accounts are
attractive features. However, the design is to be as all
inclusive as possible. Special emphasis is to be given to
including provisions for annual leave buying and selling and
dependent care. It is further requested that the 401(K)
element of many private sector flexible benefits programs be
evaluated for our program. It is recognized that the
recently introduced Thrift program essentially accomplishes
what inclusion of a 401 (K) element would have in our
program. Nonetheless, design of a CIA flexible benefit
program should include consideration of this element if only
to administratively integrate Thrift deduction selection with
other program choices.
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Feature #12: Leave Conversion
Annual Leave Buy Back
Recommendation 12.1:
That the provision be liberalized so that buyback is not
strigtly limited to that leave which cannot be taken because
of the exigencies of official business.
If the term "because of the exigencies of official
business" translates into a manager's signature on a form
certifying that the employee was required to cancel scheduled
leave, then the feature is of minimal value. The spirit of
the feature is to provide the employee a choice but if the
provision is as interpreted above, the employee does not
really have a choice. It is recognized that the full
flexibility of annual leave buyback is obtained if it can be
incorporated in the flexible benefits package. If the
"exigencies of business" could be interpreted differently
(and more liberally) than described here, the value of this
feature would be significantly enhanced.
Recommendation 12,2:
That provisions be considered which offer better control over
cost.
Some of the restrictions to be considered are:
o cash-in on an annual basis be restricted to
number of days, e.g., five or ten, and can
only after the employee has taken a prescribed amount
of leave, e.g., ten days.
o cash-in of large blocks of annual leave be restricted
to, for example, one time only. This provides an
avenue for employees to use leave for major expenses,
e.g., college education, yet notAas open-ended as the 4606vi-
proposed, feleettene-T. 210-us Akii taw).
flt*St el% ,
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Optional Conversion to Sick Leave
Recommendation 12.3:
That the costs of the feature be estimated.
As noted in the report, the cost should not be
substantial but clearly will result in employees having more
sic leaveupon retirement. Even though the converted annual
leave does not count in calculating retirement benefits, the
fact that converted leave can be used before drawing on
normal sick leave will result in generally higher sick leave
balances at retirement.
Sick Leave Bank
Recommendation 12.4:
That the proposal be modified or an optional version
developed and costed, to restrict the top salary at which an
employee can draw from the bank.
This restriction on top salary, while perhaps adjustable
with experience, will serve to keep the cost of this feature
down while retaining its value to employees.
Home Leave Use
Recommendation 12.5:
That the Home Leave Use feature be retained as proposed.
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Feature 13: Educational Assistance for Dependents
CIA Subsidized Student Loans
Recommendation 13.1:
That the CIA Student Loan feature be retained.
Recommen6tion 13.2:
That the cost estimates be refined to account for increases
in loan applications over that experienced today by the
Credit Union due to the better rates that would result from
this feature.
Recommendation 13.3:
That an option be developed with the loan being made to the
employee and that an estimate of the decrease in default rate
and overall program cost for such loans be made.
Thrift Loans
Recommendation 13.4:
That, as proposed, CIA maintain contact with Thrift managers
as they develop the loan terms for Thrift loans and that
employees be periodically updated on progress.
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Leave-secured Loans
Recommendation 13.5:
That the provisions for such loans as they would be submitted
to Congress for legislation be included in the redrafted
report.
Recommehdation 13.6:
That there be no restriction on the use of accrued leave
balances transferred to the Agency from service in other US
Government agencies.
Recommendation 13.7:
That the use of the actuarial value of accrued sick leave be
evaluated as security for such loans.
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Feature #14: Staffing Management Tools
Early Retirement for SIS Managers and Experts
Recommendation 14,1:
That specific implementation provisions be developed for the
early retirement option for SIS officers.
The premise for the early retirement for SIS managers and
experts and the other elements of Feature #14 (Staffing
Management Tools) is that an effective personnel system must
contain the necessary mechanisms to meter the flow of senior
officials through the organization. The metering must
include both the ability to retain and move out senior
officials. The organization must be able to "do" the
metering to serve its interests. This ability to focus this
benefit on individuals and at times of the organization's
choosing is a key provision for such tools.
Early retirement is one tool to meter the flow of senior
officials. Perhaps ironically, the thrust of the early
retirement proposal is retention. While early retirement
could be justified as a generic staffing management tool, its
inclusion as a feature was motivated by a specific current
problem. Several factors have combined to create this
problem. The first factor is our ability to compete for
senior managers. Many surveys have been done to compare the
wages of government employees to those of their private
sector counterparts. Whereas there is often debate about
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whether the average government employee is underpaid and by
how much, there is little debate that senior managers in
government are disadvantaged relative to their private sector
counterparts. The result is that many senior managers have
the opportunity to move to the private sector at any time and
significantly improve their income. The second factor is
that as a result of the baby boom, we can foresee a prolonged
period in which our senior managers are young, many becoming
SISers around 40. The third factor is a derivative of the
secoad factor. People in the 40 to 50 age bracket are
typically the ones undergoing the peak demands for money, for
example, to pay for their children's education. Whereas many
of these senior managers would not consider leaving for the
private sector simply to improve their lifestyle, the
potential to earn more to assure their children an education
can outweigh their attraction to the challenges offered by
their job at CIA. The proposed early retirement is targeted
at this 40- to 50-year-old age group of senior managers and
experts. While it does not solve their cash flow problem, it
offsets the financial advantages of leaving for the private
sector and thus becomes an inducement to remain.
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DS&T does not see early retirement being offered to all
SIS officers as a permanent fixture in our benefits system.
We feel its use can and must be focused to produce the
desired effect. For example, if CIA management judges that
retention of 40- to 50-year-old SIS officers is currently a
problem, they can offer such early retirement options. If it
is judged to be a more localized problem, e.g., for specific
occupations, it can be restricted to these. Furthermore,
when the demographics change, the early retirement option can
be lifted. Of course, this would be done so that those
employees, or population of employees, to whom it was offered
would remain eligible. The point is that CIA will have the
authority to control who it is offered to and when. While
use of early retirement for retention of young SIS officers
necessitates announcement ahead of time, such an early
retirement option can be announced and made available for a
limited time to "make headroom." Such an announcement can be
timed by management to a period when there is a problem and
it is perceived that early retirement could relieve it.
Again, DS&T believes that it is important to have this tool
so that CIA management can pick the appropriate time rather
than have it determined outside on a government-wide basis.
At present CIA does not have the latitude to offer such
inducements. The primary objective of the proposed feature
was to bring the authority to do so into CIA. The details of
the use of this authority were not specified. In the
redrafted report examples of the applications of this
authority are to be provided and costed.
33
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Feature #14: Staffing Management Tools
Involuntary Retirement
Recommendation 14.2:
That the provisions for the involuntary retirement stated in
the'System Summary be revised, or an option developed, to
make use of such retirement for staffing management more
readily available.
Specifically, the provisions which restrict use to
reorganizations or a reduction in force are to be eliminated.
Retention Bonus
Recommendation 14.3:
That the retention bonus feature be dropped.
Recommendation 14.4:
That a feature be developed that provides the DCI the
authority to provide financial assistance to employees under
exceptional circumstances.
The emphasis of this feature is not to be retention but
rather assistance during catastrophic or extraordinary
circumstances such as medical expenses. Included in this
feature is to be not nly the authority to provide cash to an
employee but also su4 provisions as, for example, the
authority tolcash?in ome or all of2,041.empa-exteezfr leave.
afrAa..44,ot -Ziis .3k rovelak- IAA^ u-rps._c_ILe.,?
7
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Feature #15: System Controls
Recommendation 15,1:
That the proposed System Control feature is to be defined in
greater detail.
The need for the System Control feature is driven
primarily by two other features of the proposed
design--namely, incentive pay and funding only control (with
delegation of authority for position structure adjustments to
the component level). In revising the proposal, specific
attention is to be given to:
o How the controls are to be implemented at each level
in the organization.
o What is the availability of the System Control tools
will be to managers at each level in the organization.
o What are the plans to educate managers on the use of
each of the appropriate System Control tools.
35
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Feature #16: Projection Tools
Recommendation 16.1:
When the system design is resubmitted to the employees for
comment, the Projection Tools included in this feature are to
be itemized and described in detail.
ipicluded in these descriptions are to be not only what
type of projection data a manager can request but also the
nature of the data base used to develop each type of
projection. In defining the data base, it is to be specified
what data source will be used, who will be charged with
preparing and maintaining the data base, and how the data
base will be validated.
Recommendation 16.2:
That the managers at all levels are to have ready access to
the appropriate tool's included in this feature.
In describing each tool, it is to be specified who will
have access and how access will be made available.
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
3
4
5
Feature/Description
Page
Occupationally-Defined Bands
Incentive Pay
Performance Plan
Performance Evaluation
Occupational Career Handbooks
1
13
19
22
26
6
Individual Career Development Plans
28
7
Occupation-Specific Training
30
8
Improved Availability of Training
32
9
Dual Track
34
10
Promotion
37
11
Flexible Benefits
39
12
Leave Conversion
41
13
Educational Assistance to Employees with Dependents
47
14
Staffing Management Tools
50
15
System Controls
56
16
Projection Tools
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
This section of the DS&T Response to the HRMCTF Report
contains a sampling of employee concerns and/or suggestions for
each of the proposed features.
This section is organized by feature and presents the
employee's concerns and suggestions in essentially the form in
which they were received.
Beyond the feature-specific level there were some generally
recurring themes. Among these were:
o the revised report must contain much greater
implementation detail than this first report if
decisions are to be made;
o the administrative burden will be unmanageable;
o the costs need to be refined;
we need a better understanding of how HRMCTF proposal
compares to the changes OPM is planning and to those
other Government agencies have made;
o we need to better explain what aspects of proposal
can be accomplished under the GS system.
DS&T requests that in drafting the revised report, careful
consideration be given to the suggestions employees have made and
to addressing the concerns they have expressed.
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FEATURE #1: OCCUPATIONALLY-DEFINED BANDS
CONCERNS/SUGGESTEAS
1. The report is too general and does not answer the basic, most important
question; HOW MUCH MONEY WILL I MAKE???
2. It would have been nice to have included some information of the lower
levels of pay, which most employees are in. This information starts out
in the second quartile ($32,000). It will take me years to get up to
that pay range.
3. All for it, but will this inhibit movement from one career field to
another--i.e., once a programmmer always a programmer?
4. Four bands with many steps are not much different from many GS grades
with few steps--semantics.
5. I generally agree with the objectives and many of the detailed provisions
of the report. The most drastic change, in which I urge caution, is the
enhancement of the power of immediate supervisors to award bonuses or
re-classify positions; in short, to profoundly affect careers. Many
first-line mangers in the Agency are not that good and they change
frequently. The free market model has limited applicability to Agency
work, since there is no bottom line (profit) independent of management
judgment. Many people, and some of the most valuable, are here because
they function best in an environment where the transients, pressures, and
fluctuations of the private sector are muted. Carried far enough, this
change will result in a private sector work environment, and absolute
head-on competition for the same type of employee, which we may not want
anyway. The system requires some safeguards from arbitrary managers and
arbitrary job reclassification. The personnel problems of an
intelligence agency are unique. Is there anything in the plan taking
this uniqueness into account?
6. It's very unrealistic to let low-level supervisors, operating freely
within overall annual budget guidelines, make personnel decisions which
have long-term fiscal impact.
7. I'm concerned.. .a rob Peter to pay Paul philosophy could develop with
salary reviews causing more discontent than benefits.
8. It appears to me that the useful changes proposed could be easily
implemented into the existing GS system. As was pointed out, the govern-
ment will never be able to compete with private sectors for benefit pack-
ages (I'm not sure why not), so why spend our time in a sweeping change.
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
9. Most of the really desirable benefits could be implemented without
changing?the GS system. These include annual leave buy back, sick leave
conversion, educational assistance, loans, and early retirement.
10. Seems like a good effort to get Agency pay scales even with those of the
contractors who work for us.
11. The new system might open the door to a loss of the employee's protection
under civil service and mean a return to the system that government
employees had prior to civil service.
12. There was concern that the morale of local hire employees would be
affected when "after years of hearing about the possibility of their
salary system breaking away from the FSN/Embassy systems, they now see
instead their bosses breaking away from their own government-wide system."
(:) 13. Has anyone considered putting this much effort into the old system?
Aside from dual track and flexible benefits program as new features, what
else is wrong with the old system?
14. Implementation will lock people into a career and prevent cross-training
in new fields of interest, decreasing the flexibility of the organization.
15. We are concerned that the HRMCTF report makes no mention of the great
number of Agency employees who are not part of the GS system. In OTS, we
have Wage Board employees whose salaries are not tied to the General
Schedule. There is already a sufficiently pervasive but erroneous
perception that Wage Board employees are "second class citizens" in the
Agency. The absence of consideration of these individuals from this new
compensations system can only serve to reinforce this perception to the
detriment of the Agency and its ability to achieve its objectives. We
urge senior Agency management to refrain from any decisions regarding
Agency compensation restructuring without a thorough review of Wage Board
employees and their equitable treatment. We cannot emphasize too
strongly that this is not a detail to be considered at the eleventh hour.
16. The report states: "Ceiling constraints are manifested to managers in
many forms including tne cumbersome process associated with today's
position audits that are driven by average grade and promotion headroom
constraints." These constraints are self-imposed; occupational bands are
not required to remove them, and should not be linked to such removal.
2
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
17. I don't,think line managers should make position decisions. Someone more
experienced with a broader view needs to do this.
18. We believe that it is very important that representatives from the
occupations work directly with the contractors who do the market
surveys. The experience of the electronic tech occupational panel, which
recently worked with TPF&C during the occupational panel pricing
exercise, argues strongly for a continuing interface.
19. There is concern in areas where details are not available such as actual
pay band data in each occupation and details on how career track changes
will be made.
20. If there is the thread of a principle which drives my specific ratings on
each feature, it is the concept of distributive management with maximum
local control. In some measure it is what has made the Agency effective
in relation to other Government components. Over the years, though,
there has been some erosion in the concept as various centralized focal
points and staffs have begun to take over. We need more line components
and fewer staffs, more management and less administration, more
individual concerns and less enamor with the digital computer. With that
in mind, I think most of the good intentions of the Task Force report can
be accomplished without turning the system upside down. One may debate
specific provisions but the central need is for the Agency to get its own
control on non-budgetary personnel issues and in turn internally
redelegate downward as much of the authorities and responsibilities as
possible.
21. From an FBIS perspective, another major concern is that such features as
banding and market linkage would work to the distinct disadvantage of
occupations such as analyst, editor and language officer, since the
unique features of these occupations within the Agency context cannot
readily be compared to the marketplace. There is the fairly widespread
perception that while engineers and scientists would benefit by market
linkage and comparability, other occupations would suffer as an
increasingly constrained budget pie is recut to favor the technical
specialties.
22. Many employees questioned the need to replace the GS system. They noted
that we already have an incentive pay system which could be altered if
necessary to fit our specific Agency needs, and that other proposed
3
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
changes could be implemented within the GS system. A typical comment was
that the proposedsystem is only "just slightly better than the status
quo."
23 There was considerable skepticism that the new system could be
implemented as proposed. Funding and Congressional and OPM approval were
frequently cited as obstacles to implementation. Beyond that, there was
concern about the Agency's ability to administer the system, given the
need to make fundamental changes in bureaucratic and management thinking
in order to implement the proposed system fairly and without favoritism.
Several employees commented on the increased authority and accountability
the proposed system would place on managers, but criticized the proposal
for not addressing this issue directly or providing a concrete system for
developing managers to handle their expanded role. As noted by one
employee, "the proposed system is far superior to what we have but will
require an enormous educational effort to make it work better than the
present system."
24. Too broad banding could reduce market comparison.
25. How to handle those who transfer to new career occupations.
26. This has been tried in government before and failed.
27. Quartile system seems to penalize people as they move up.
28. Proposed levels/quartiles too complicated.
29. Time in band?
30. Provide for more flexibility within professional levels.
31. Need means of giving credit for outside experience.
32. Salary should reflect actual responsibility, not lcngevity.
33. Series of "perks" tied to grade and responsibility level.
34. Should be flexible to a chingirl market environment.
(:) 35. Agency should do their cwr with CMB approval.
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? CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
36. Incorporate within present GS system.
37. Consider regional differences in market comparability.
38. Market surveys should be annual.
39. Delegate funding control to the office level.
40. Managers do not have background to properly adjust position
classifications.
41. Line managers tend to overhire.
42. Seems a large burden on managers.
43. Market survey validity with respect to Agency skills.
44. How on earth do you do a market survey of comparable jobs for the DO or
the DI? There are unique job features in all Directorates tht do not
exist elsewhere.
45. To impose this system, we must convice Congress that CIA is unique and
requires a unique personnel system. To implement this feature, we assume
that every job in CIA has some counterpart in the outside world. These
two assumptions are contradictory.
46. I would hope that Offices such as ORD, OD&E, and OTS would have
substantial input as to the companies that are selected for the market
surveys. The Project Management Engineer category should be of critical
interest to these Offices.
47. Market linkage is major negative for new people.
48. The report asserts: "...Continued linkage to the GS system and the
governmentwide salary survey process constrains our ability to structure
and pay our work force in an optimum manner...." This statement is not
substantiated and I do not agree with it.
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
49. Care should be exercised that job (or career program) classification does
not beconie as much of a straitjacket at the GS grade system. Also, some
comparability with the GS system should be established, to facilitate
comparative ranking for inter-agency activities and also for inter-agency
personnel moves.
50. Proposals for the banding system are good although the transfer mechanism
must be closely looked at -- the conversion should include not only a
person's grade but their experience and knowledge of an occupation.
51. GS is universal and should be maintained. Real problem is pay cap and
limited number of SIS slots.
52. Four groupings are a bad idea. The main problem is: why stay after
topping out in pay?
(1) 53. Market pricing can only be done for a small number of occupations and
will favor engineers and technical occupations, resulting in a
"second-class citizen" payscale for nonscientific and nontechnical
employees.
54. When the internal ranking of occupations is done, unique and relatively
small groups of nontechnical specialists may not carry much weight when
compared to other, more visible occupations within the Directorate, such
as engineers.
55. FBIS IO-Foreign Documents officers ("linguists") are unique and should
not be "banded" with translators and language instructors in other Agency
components.
56. I generally favor the proposal, particularly if it is tied to the GS
system to allow "in-band" progressions and psychological benefits of
movement from grade to grade.
57. Banding could foster a "we are better and more important than you"
attitude within the Agency. Competition by internal components for
bonuses and higher occupational positions could get intense and be more
politically than practically based.
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
58 I'm concerned how banding will affect my occupation. As is the case with
nurses arfd teachers, librarians' salaries have been traditionally low due
to the preponderance of women in the profession. I hope that if
librarians' salaries outside the federal government are reviewed for
comparison, those of corporate librarians (whose jobs compare most
closely to CIA librarians). are reviewed, rather than public or college
librarians.
59. I fear the tendency to overcompensate engineers, computer types, and
other high visibility personnel, while lumping all support people into
the low achiever class.
60. I'm afraid the intelligence professional, the analyst, will suffer.
Computer people are paid well in the private sector and will be paid well
under the new system, as will tech people. But who will the intelligence
analyst be compared to--writers, teachers, college professors, and
general liberal arts types? Those are traditionally low paying in the
private sector. So will those that produce a vital intelligence product
be paid low too?
61. Whose wages will be reduced at the expense of raising those occupations
that are currently significantly below market, such as engineers?
62. How can salaries, especially those for engineers, computer programmers,
etc., be made competitive with only a 2- to 3-percent budgeted payroll
increase?
63. For the new system to work properly, I believe the market pricing of
occupations must be done yearly. This is a non-trivial task that must be
funded and established in an objective, unbiased manner.
64. Market linkage: is it possible for a position to be paid less?
65. When job classification is left to the individual manager, uniformity and
fairness may be lost.
66. Market linkage should include a benefits package--e.g., paid insurance,
bonus pay, etc. It should also include the value of a CIA security
clearance, which is worth upwards of 10 percent of salary in the
contractor world.
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CaNCERNSISUGGESTIONS
67. How is it possible to pay half the population the same rate and half at a
greater friate without increasing the personal services budget?
68. Banding is fine for occupations with direct counterparts in the private
sector. Not enough data for Agency-unique occupations. How, for
instance, can the entry level case officer band change without disrupting
the mid-level case officer band?
69. Lot of changes for very little benefit and some disadvantages. On the
whole, I'm against it. Current GS scheme is better for management and
employee. The pay comparability issues has been resolved via the GSS
scale. Will not ultimately make much difference due to caps on total
cost and Congressional control on personnel costs.
70. Major concern developed around the fact that many Agency jobs do not lend
themselves to industry and the fact that industry works on profit and/or
generates a saleable product while the Agency does not.
71. Page 47 that states "legislative pay increases would increase the amount
of personal services monies available for distribution to employees as
part of the incentive pay system." Which is it? Would all employees get
the federal workers pay increases automatically or not?
72. How do we accurately budget for a system with such unknowns--what happens
if an office exceeds their office portion of personal services $s and, by
default, cannot pay incentives or annual increases due to the fact that
they are grossly overstrength to begin with?
73. Banding and generic job descriptions may result in "loss of identity."
74. Dividing the Agency's compensation funds into two components (salaries
and bonuses) runs one very great risk. At present, the whole sum is
labeled "salary" and is considered by Congress as Entitlement - something
that is owed and has to be paid. By splitting it up into salary plus
bonus money, you make it very easy for congress to see the second figure
as something which is not an Entitlement - and a very obvious target for
budget cuts in the future. (after all, why should they get bonuses when
money is so tight? And we are not cutting their pay, only holding down
bonus money, which we are not obligated to pay anyway.) The result is
going to be that, as a group, we will receive substantially less pay.
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
75. A concern expressed by a number of people who did not respond to the
questionffaire was whether the pay cap was going to be raised. If it is
not, few of the proposed changes will really mean anything significant in
terms of actual take home pay.
76. Banding offers only temporary solutions. With a fixed amount of money
each year, we won't all be winners, many will lose. Proposal gives
additional flexibility to shift money from those doing well to those who
are favored. It's all the same in the long run.
77. Who determines which pay band an employee is assigned to (upon
implementation of proposed system)? With salary overlap between bands,
it may be a popularity contest.
78. It is far from clear that the most benign effect will be "no change;"
that each officer, at whatever grade, will still benefit from
Congressionally approved pay raises--whether they are called "catch?up"
or "inflationary adjustments." My impression is that the increase will
be used to extend the upper limit of individual bands but not necessarily
show up as an immediate raise for people in the band. If this is wrong
the committee should clarify it as soon as it can. If true, it should be
corrected. The expectation and anticipation of a raise, no matter how
small, is deeply ingrained; the majority of the CSS employees will remain
on the GS and be favored with this benefit on 1 Jan. Our people will
feel betrayed if they lose this.
79. There are several reasons why I object to the banding scheme:
? The loss of career milestones provided by the GS system. The
distinction between GS levels in narrower, more achievable, than the
divisions between the fewer bands. The steps between GS grades become
large leaps between bands.
? Banding is not consistent with the way we develop people for positions
of greater responsibility. The proposed scheme requires deliberate
changes in a person' status instead of subtle and gradual growth.
? Banding favors specialties. It works for armies of secretaries; it
works for armies of electrcrics techs. The Agency does in fact employ
armies of specialists, tu*., it also employees an army of generalists
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CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
and bandipg penalizes (us) those people that the system developed to fill
the need for versatile generalists. The compromise may be to define a
generalist job category which will measure performance by the number of
components an officer manages to work in.
80. Instead of the proposed occupational banding, I think the present GS
system should be cleaned up in respect to its application within the
Agency. The GS system has some inherent advantages, namely a broad
spectrum of grades over a given person's career as well as ready internal
comparability with the Agency system, things that banding would obscure.
I think the real grade problem lies not in the GS concept but in the
patchwork of constraints which over the years have been added to it.
These should and can be eliminated without recourse to banding. The Task
Forces' recommendations for autonomous market linkage (by the Agency)
will help establish the proper levels. So will removal of OMB and PMCD
for the process by delegation of classification to individual
components. The important thing is to remove the external headroom,
slotting and comparability restraints and leave only funding as the
driving force. GSE's, GSS's, GSM's or whatever simply become GS's of
whatever rank needed. For forms' sake one could argue in favor of taking
the Federal pay matrix and renaming it with our own digraph such as
IS-12, etc. The control and constraints, not the particular pay matrix,
that is our villain here. Witness the plight of the secretaries.
81. An alternative to pay-for-performance. Instead of starting the pay
reform by looking at pay-for-performance, we should start by ensuring we
have pay new comparability with our external counterparts, at a minimum.
(Full comparability is not necessary; "government job security" with its
attendant lower risk, is worth something.)
82. The market pricing already done may be able to serve as the start for
comparability pay. If not, it would be necessary to do a detailed
survey, by occupation, of salaries in private industry, comparing at
least the following attributes:
A. Level of responsibility
B. Experience
C. Academic credentials required
D. Length of service (optional)
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CONCE.BSISUGGESIIONS
83 Comparability pay should be phased in as soon as possible, with
pay-for-performance instituted during the following year. Since many
occupations are probably not too far behind outside pay, the initial cost
for the entire Agency would probably not be outlandish. However, in
those cases where the pay has lagged far behind, it may be necessary to
phase in comparability pay over a multi-year period before change to
pay-for-performance.
84. Rationale for banding (i.e. grade distinctions) is weak.
85. Is there sufficient Agency personnel to determine
qualifications/requirements of the various occupations to adequately
monitor the bands? Conceptually, the idea is workable, but would require
additional, perhaps vast amounts of, money to operate.
86. Don't really need banding. Can expand GS grades to 12-14 steps ingrade,
but without present mandatory time for each step increase. Base steps on
performance (a better incentive). Base step increase on present CER and
PAR. Each person with a CER of I would get an x percent increase; those
with a CER of 2 would get a smaller percent increase. Thus, we'd have
less variability between employees, but still a stronger incentive to
excel than with the present, almost automatic step increase.
87. The conversion process does not seem to solve any of the low salary
problems and the examples given aren't any better than a promotion under
the present GS system.
88. I believe a market survey should be conducted prior to a decision to
adopt the program so that an informed decision can be made with actual
figures.
89. The biggest problem to be found here is one of education. I don't think
people will sign up to this until they understand what it means to them
personally. It's a good idea and will provide a lot of flex'bility but
people will have to be weaned away from system they are fami'iar with.
90. Organizations, including the CIA, need to develop strong generalists as
well as experts in particular occupational specialities. Internal
mobility is an important element in bringing this about. The proposed
:-0 ?J
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FEATURE #1: OCCUPATIONALLY-DEFINED BANDS
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
creation of fairly narrow stereotypical occupations within the Agency and
the production of career plans for individuals to advance within those
occupations runs counter to the more important objective of encouraging
individuals to broaden themselves by moving across occupational lines. I
believe retention of the GS job classification system is important in
fostering mobility and that shredding the workforce out into a whole set
of specialized occupations would be a serious mistake. The problem of
market pricing is real, but the proposed cure is worse than the disease.
The Agency already had considerable leeway in choosing the GS step at
which a person is recruited and this has been used de facto to achieve a
degree of market pricing at time of entry. The key question should be
what similar measures could be taken that don't impair the good features
of a common classification system. (Trying to foster mobility without GS
Grades or the equivalent could be likened to trying to engage in commerce
without money).
12
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FEATURE #2: INCENTIVE PAY
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
1. Incentive pay can be accomplished within existing system; we need to make
existinq,system work better.
2. Before changing system, consider applying recommended concepts to current
system.
3. How do you get rid of a non-performer to allow room for a high-performer.
4. Lots of opportunities for favortism.
5. Incentive Pay - understand commo incentive pay is a sham--in OC very low
number of people last year did not receive equivalent of 2 1/2 steps.
Pay for performance not in effect so no belief system could be
implemented properly.
6. Incentive pay is a very poor idea for what is essentially a service
(i) organization. The concept depends entirely on the ability of the
organization to offset resources and costs against results and some form
of "profits", and do this down through the organizational levels to the
little person. I don't think we've ever done this very well and since
we're more of a service organization than we are a manufacturer with
identifiable profit centers, I don't think we ever will. The other issue
is funding. I think any form of award money should come out of its own
pool, separately allocated as such, and not derive in any way from any
form of taxation against current pay grades or ingrade levels. This in
turn may create budgetary problems in obtaining funds but Its necessary
for--again--the sake of credibility. Finally, from a more gut-level
feeling I think most of us feel we recognize individual excellence when
we see it and would like to see it rewarded. But, I think the
recognition process is inherently too subjective to institutionalize. I
think a better solution would be to streamline the present centralized
and paper-intensive QSI and awards process by bringing it further down
the organization, with, of course, the necessary funding.
7. Fifty percent award system will be very destructive. Better would be a
107. accomplishment award for 107. best performers or nothing for bottom
107.. Do not punish 507. of the staff when 907. are necessary to the
organization.
13
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FEATURE #2: INCENTIVE PAY
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
8. Concerned about equity of increment award system and how the system will
vary within the organization.
9. The ranking system is less preferred to a system in which mid-level and
lower managers have the authority and responsibility to evaluate
employees and determine pay bonuses and incentives, with an appeal
process through the supervisory change for employees who believe they
have been treated unfairly.
10. Recommends that some existing incentive programs be retained, such as the
language incentive program and hazardous duty pay. The panel also
recommends that the awards program, which recognizes signficant
accomplishments, be retained. Cash awards to recognize significant
accomplishments have been used extensively in OSO in recent years and the
panel believes that eliminating that program would be a mistake. It is
more effective to recognize individual accomplishments when they occur.
11. The panel is concerned with the potential delay in receiving legislative
pay increases and recommends that all employees receive legislative
increases with the rest of the federal government. The legislative pay
increase is viewed as a COLA and the panel recommends that all employees
receive the increase.
12. A number of employees have asked if the bonus will be counted in the high
three for retirement purposes.
13. Individuals will concentrate on work that gives quick results.
14. Higher paid employees could get all the bonuses.
15. Inequitable distribution of awards due to less capable supervisor.
16. Awards for IS-01 and IS-02 secretaries.
17. Increase office-level approval awards to $2,000
18. The PAR should be grounds for awards.
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FEATURE #2: INCENTIVE PAY
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
19. Set up orjteria for incentive increases.
20. Supervisor should decide on incentive pay allocations.
21. Management should have flexibility to give awards any time of year.
22. I can't see financial improvement for 507. of employees with only 27
increase in cost.
23. Questions such as who determines the recipients of bonuses and the
amounts, and how often pay would fluctuate, have not been adequately
addressed.
24. Bonuses and incentive pay may give rise to serious problems and cause
more harm than good, e.g., divisive competition and a large number of
employee grievances.
25. If funding limits are set, what happens as more people progress in the
bands? Will this mean less money available to hire entry-level
employees? Will the allotment be fixed or can it be flexible with
justifiable funds available?
26. More needs to be said about handling poor performers and underachievers,
since according to the proposed plan virtually everyone will continue to
do at least as well as they do under the current system.
27. Will linguists continue to receive language use pay under the Language
Incentive Program?
28. The pay-for-performance goal requires an objective measure of
performance... .We have very diverse activities, such as routine medical
examinations, covert action support, research and development projects,
political assessments, etc. What common denominator can be used to
measure successful performance in each of these endeavors? In business
the common denominator is profit, regardless of the kind of business. We
have no equi?,alent universal measure of successful performance.
15
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FEATURES #2: INCENTIVE PAY
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
29. The concept of "at risk" salary may be a good incentive system for
executives. It will be less well received by middle and low rank
employees who need more income security.
30. No one can be duped into believing that bonuses, one-time-only benefits,
are equivalent to promotions or steps, which are permanent and longterm
benefits.
31. Career boards or home Directorate oversight has to be built into the
system to give everyone an opportunity for appropriate recognition. If
the bonus system is to be fair and not a sham, controls are going to have
to be developed to protect rotational employees.
32. I feel that the percentage system doesn't work all the time. There is a
time when the person doing superior work will actually be getting less of
a permanent raise than someone doing satisfactory work. I also believe
that everyone-should get the entire cost of living raise as a permanent
part of salary, not as a percentage.
33. This looks wonderful in theory, but considerable planning, education, and
supervisory effort will have to be made to insure that this does not turn
into a system like DIA's--i.e., bonus averaging by weak managers.
Supervisors will need to articulate their criteria for awards and
exceptional performance clearly, on paper. Before the system is put into
place, extensive training will be needed to teach supervisors to think
like private sector supervisors; to consider the ratio of employee
compensation to production as a factor of doing business. This kind of
management control over compensation and reward will have to be taught.
34. How will there ever be an across-the-board cost-of-living increase if
that money is thrown into the incentive pay pot?
35. Personnel ranking at too high a level will cause a lot of people to miss
out on promotions, etc., because the ranking will be done by people who
do not know the employee.
36. If we have a limited pot of money and we are to give some people more,
others will get less. BOO! If 507. fare better and all doing acceptable
work will do as well as currently, then the pot will have to grow. The
arithmetic defies logic.
16
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FEATURES #2: INCENTIVE PAY
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
37. Those employees who do not totally agree with their supervisors will
suffer even more than they do now.
38. Competition by internal components for bonuses and higher occupational
positions could get intense and be more politically than practically
based.
39. Past experience with PARs has shown me that the tendency is to bunch all
evaluations near the top. I wonder whether the system as proposed will
be able to distinguish, and therefore, reward the above-average employee.
40. The Agency will not have enough money to maintain the system at
meaningful pay levels if, for example, 807. of the employees are rated
superior. If strict quotas are established, then you are not paying for
performance.
41. Completely misses one very important point: of 1,000 people who apply to
the Agency, only a very small portion are offered jobs and cleared to
work. This selection process eliminated the average and less able who
are hired by others, but the pay system assumes the average and below are
employed by the Agency.
42. From a supervisory point of view, one tends to be apprehensive of the
potential for increased grievance actions - employees who are receiving
less or no incentives, genuinely believing themselves victims of system
inequity. A system in which up to fifty percent of our employees qualify
for special or incentive pay will have a divisive influence on
organizational harmony. The current GS system, on the other hand, has
long engendered a broad perception of 'equal pay for equal work,'
encouraging all employees to harbor pride in themselves and in their
contributions to the organization.
43. The idea of tying salary to ranking could only have come from someone
ignorant of the statistics and the selection process and the work ethic
at the CIA. When you purposely select the best and imbue them with the
expectation that they will do the best work, the imcosition of a
distribution such as the one proposed is stupid.
17
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FEATURES #2: INCENTIVE PAY
(continued)
CONCERNSISUGGESIIONS
44. Tying cpmpensation more closely to performance is definitely a step in
the right direction. The thing that is lacking in government is
substitute for the financial bottom line that exists for a private-sector
concern. The profit and loss statement for a business (or a profit
center therein) provides tangible evidence as to whether or not it is
successful, and the financial prospects of those who work for successful
firms are generally brighter than those employed by their less successful
competitors. Is it possible to capture some of this same healthy
competitive atmosphere in the CIA? I think so. Suppose the incentive
pay pool was allocated in some degree to favor organizational elements
that had met or bettered their organizational objectives during the
year. For example, at the time of a Meritorious Unit Citation, an
organizational element could be provided 5 to 10 percent bonus
compensation to be allocated by its managers to those they judged to have
made the greatest contribution to the unit's extraordinary
accomplishment. Such a scheme would reward the most important aspect of
organizational success in today's workplace -- building and sustaining
effective and productive teams.
18
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FEATURE #3: PERFORMANCE PLAN
.CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS ?
1. Advance work plans rarely work due to dynamic environment.
2. Automated data base for performance plan is "nuts."
3. I am apprehensive of pre-packaged, automated data-based formulas for
writing performance appraisals; all that an employee has to show for a
year of labor is pay and a PAR. The employee is entitled to a meaningful
appraisal focused on his or her individual performance, rather than a
comparison to organizational norms.
4. A frequently repeated comment was that the proposed performance plans and
career handbooks are bound to fail. Under the new system too great an
administrative burden would fall on first line supervisors. We will be
spending much more of our time on 'performance and career related'
communication with employees and in meetings to rank employees for
incentive pay awards.
5. It is nonsense to state that an automated performance plan will make the
evaluation process less complicated or to believe that it will improve
communications between supervisors and employees.
6. This feature involves a lot of effort (data base building and
maintenance, paperwork) that avoids the real issue -- managers don't talk
to employees about expectations and performance. This exercise will not
solve that problem.
7. Performance plans are good for some people but should-be left to the
discretion of the individual manager.
8. Giving every employee a road map to success is asking for trouble. The
proposal places too much emphasis on the handbook, "look-up" approach,
and not enough on regular communication and interaction between the
supervisor and the employee.
9. For most occupations, the .actual work is too unpredictable and denies
detailed advance planning, and a detailed list of assigned duties could
undermine the highly desired emoloyee initiative in dealing with newor
ad hoc tasks.
10. What is an automated perforTance 'an?
(:) 11. This is scary. Managers w',.o rely on a data base to define their
expectations could find the7:e!'.es in trouble.
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FEATURE #3: PERFORMANCE PLAN
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
12 The panel agreed that some positive action must be taken to improve
communications between employee and supervisor. There was a good deal of
support for the performance plan concept.
13 There is some concern that the written performance plan would increase
the supervisor's workload and skepticism that meaningful performance
plans can be derived from a data base. The performance plan is very
similar to the AWP.
14. A minority believes that a written performance plan should not be
required if both employee and supervisor agree that one was not needed.
An optional performance plan system must be available, however, and it is
important that an employee be able to easily request one without
prejudice. The minority would prefer a system in which employee and
supervisor were required to discuss progress and expectations at six
month intervals, at a minimum, and that they signed a document which
acknowledges that the discussions took place.
15. One proposal which may be worth consideration would be to use generic job
description data as the basis for employee/supervisor discussions as to
what specific duties are to be performed and the level of performance
expected. The information would be used primarily as a vehicle to
improve communications, but could be used as a basis for formulation of a
formal "agreement" between supervisor and employee.
16. Automated plan probably will result in nobody planning.
17. Cannot forecast challenges/problems that will be encountered in the
intelligence business.
18. Can only capture minimally acceptable performance.
19. Automated feature a really bad idea, looks like they tried to make it a
"no-think" process (cookbook approach).
20. No provision for arbitration in the event of disagreement between
supervisor and subordinate. The only recourse to an erroneous apprasai
is a written rebuttal with evaluation of merits left to an uninfomred
reader.
20
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FEA URE #3: PERFORMANCE PLAN
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
21. Does not. address employee-supervisor communication problem.
22. Supervisors will not do their part to make this work. The proposed
feature does not have adequate safeguards against this.
23. Will not prevent supervisors from playing favorites.
24. I feel the automated plan is restrictive. A job might evolve into
something unexpected due to employee turnover or new responsibilities.
At the end of the rating period, a person might be doing an excellent
job, even though it doesn't encompass original plans.
25. The current system is not bad, just poorly executed. The proposed
changes won't work well either if poorly executed.
(:) 26. Since the supervisor, is free to disregard the information in the
performance plan, I don't see what help this would be to the employee.
27. Jobs change too often and have too many hidden factors to use such a
rigid system.
28. The performance plan must be customized for the employee. For more
experienced employees, the key elements of the last PAR may be
satisfactory, while new EODs and transferees would require a full fledged
performance plan. The automated plan is not a good idea because the data
base cannot have enough substance.
29. What is the impact of the plan on the amount of time management will
spend evaluating personnel? How much time will individuals spend on
personnel matters in the new system?
30. Not much different than present AWP/PAR procedures. Proposed automated
support may be difficult to implement in the field. Do not believe
proposed system would significantly improve employee-supervisor
communications.
31. It is not clear that this is much different that the present AWP/PAR
structure. While tne present system is cumbersome and time consuming, I
fail to see how an "automated" performance plan can adequately define
what is expected of the employee.
21
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FEATURE #4: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
Never use the word "average" when evaluating or promoting. An employee
should be evaluated against the standards of his/her position and not
against another employee. An employee should be seen as "above
standard," and not as "above average."
2. For performance evaluation of employees, there is no need for a major
rework of the existing PAR system. No need for tailored PAR for managers
and supervisors. Interim discussions are a good idea and apparently are
held extensively now.
3. Concept of performance evaluation is good. Improved communications would
solve many problems, but this is dependent upon people and not
organizational structure. Have reservations about the pragmatic reality
of trying to define job requirements in such a diverse organization.
4. Little advantage to proposed automated system. It's still subjective.
(:) However, if it requires less time to use and still address an employee's
performance, it should be adopted.
5. Use of automated data bases will allow weighting of supervisor's bias
toward severe or lenient evaluation, thereby providing some equity to
employees assigned different types of supervisors.
6. The proposed system requires more detailed and constantly updated AWPs.
Automating system will not make system simpler than present system.
Management personnel and overhead time will increase with the proposed
system.
7. Believe that the present PAR system is satisfactory and that the OSO
panel system is working well. Therefore, no general changes to the
current PAR are needed.
8. I fail to see the advantage of a 5-point scale over a 7-point scale. The
number on the PAR is the least significant factor in the CER exercises,
when they are fairly run in an open panel.
9. I see the potential here for a much greater abuse of the system by
supervisors who give personal agendas or personality conflicts more
impact than they deserve.
10. What happens to the "average" worker--one who comes to work religiously,
gets the job done, has a good attitude, but just isn't "outstanding?.'
22
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FEATURE #4: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
11. Basing Vngentive/bonus increases on PARs will really put pressures on
evaluating officers. Supervisors will be subjected to new pressures by
employees who will see them as directly responsible for how they fare in
contest for bonus percentages.
12. I'm all for streamlining the present appraisal process but I don't belive
in the sort of centralized control depicted in the proposal. I have to
note that in my 20 years here I've seen the paper process evolve in
various forms of FR's, LOI'S, AWP's and PAR's-. All of the changes at
their times represented contemporary thinking of ways to ensure
uniformity and "fairness". I think those goals are futile. Since
appraisal reports are inherently subjective, I see those qualities as
directions, not realistic goals. While many would privately acknowledge
this, it's probably also time to officially move the PAR to a lower
pedestal. One way, as described, is to make it easier to complete with
the essentials and little or no narrative. In the present system,
diligent managers do and should spend a lot of time getting the
narratives right to satisfy the very internalized promotion and appraisal
process. Much of this pressure can be taken off if the Agency succeeds
in Feature 1 (realistic grade and pay levels).
13. Don't see much difference in what is supposed to occur now.
14. Any performance evaluation system that is "automated" will not be
accepted by manager or employees. Such a system may not allow for enough
substance in the evaluation. The use of the AWP should be flexible
except for most new or reassigned employees who need to have some
official means of identifying their repsonsibilities.
15. A new system that more closely ties money to performance means more
documentation, not less.
16. If favoritism exists in the present PAR system, this new system will
exacerbate it.
17. Such a system would undoubteldy improve communications between supervisor
and employee if properly managed. However, fill-in-the-blank PARS are a
little too easy for the manager looking for shortcuts and perhaps don't
require as much thought as the narrative-tyce PAR we now have.
18. The numbering system should be abolished; tne narrative section should
reflect performance.
19. The lack of employee-supervisor communication is the real problem--the
proposed system does not resolve it.
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FEATURE #4: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
20 Fewer ranking levels create broader levels which do not measure
performance within the range (i.e., 5 vs 7) and will make it harder to
distinguish one employee's performance from another's.
21. If we believe that the current system is broken because people have not
tried to make it work, what in the new system guarantees that it will be
any different?
22. Works as well as managers are trained to make it work.
23. Present system more than adequate if correctly utilized.
24. All formal performance evaluation systems are inadequate. (We pay Harry
Levinson and his cohorts a lot of money for senior manager training. Why
don't we listen to his wisdom?) The current system seems as good as it
can get. The goodness or badness is in the execution of the day-to-day
process.
25. This feature involves too much standardization. The criticism of the
lengthy comments on PARs is unjustified: supervisors write about the
qualifications that are most important to them.
26. Management training is at the heart of this evaluation system and needs
to be addressed much more thoroughly.
27. The present PAR categories seem to be sufficient, and-the PAR narrative
often helps panels to make a better decision and should not be limited.
28. Dropping back from 7 to 5 rating levels is probably a good idea.
However, without forced distributions among the levels there will always
be inflated evaluations. The idea that supervisors should be required to
sit down one-on-one with their subordinates and talk about performance
more frequently than once a year is a good one. Evaluation against
tightly structured written objectives (such as LOIs and AAPS) often fails
because our business is a dynamic one and those things that seem most
important at the beginning of an evaluation peridd rarely turn cut to be
those that were in fact most imcortant when viewed retrospectively. In
effective organizations ind'viduals are trusted and emcowered to seize
the initiative and reset tne,r priprities as the occasion demards even
when this means that someth'ng ,Nhich previously seemed highly important
24
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FEATURE #4: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
(Continued)
? CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
is neglected. A system could be adopted which required semi-annual or
more frequent reviews of detailed performance plans and written revisions
and amendments or certifications that the plans as written were still
current. However, I believe this would be a mistake; in my eqerience,
when an organizational element is carrying a heavy work load and being
most effective, there is little time to follow such cumbersome practices.
25
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FEATURE #5: OCCUPATIONAL CAREER HANDBCCKS
. CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
1. The handbooks would be as good as the panels that draft them and the
process ,tpat keeps them updated.
2. Career handbooks seem a good way to stifle a career by requiring a person
to conform to the mold. A person can decide (or his supervisor can guide
him) on the training he wants or needs. Training is available to those
who make the effort; just provide easy access to it.
3. Why do new books? Why not update and validate those which already
exist? Having "occupational representatives" design, develop, and
deliver training is similar to the group that came together to design a
horse and ended up with a camel! What are their skills? Anybody can be
a training officer.
4. Career handbooks are a bad idea because they imply that the path is black
and white.
5. The panel generally accepts this feature. The panel recommends that
Occupation Career Handbooks contain generic position descriptions and
occupation specific training which are generated by occupation panels
6. The only drawback is that it appears that the system would be less
flexible for cross training and developmental assignments in other career
areas.
7. Handbooks will promote "ticket punch" promotions.
8. I do not believe the proposed occupational handbooks will be "living"
unless a mechanism (read bureaucracy) is established for periodic review
-- like PMCD.
9. The Occupational Career Handbooks should explicitly state the steps open
to a manager in dealing with a chronic underachiever. The characteristic
and consequences of poor performance must be fully understood by everyone
concerned.
10. I suggest that the career handbocks be kept unclassified so that
employees can take them home.
11. While a handbook can be a good reference tool, it cannot be "at the heart
of the career development improvements in tre proposed system." People,
specifically managers and employees acting together, must be at the heart
of any system.
26
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FEATURE #5: OCCUPATIONAL CAREER HANDBOOKS
(continued)
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
12. Appoint office advisors for career planning.
13. Include appendices for specific offices.
14. Succession planning is a better tool.
15. Need to avoid ticket punching and rule books.
16. I am strongly in favor of most of the items proposed here. However, the
career handbook approach smacks of some "cookbook" methods requred to
progress up the ladder. Linking promotion to this "cookbook" I feel may
be dangerous since the intangibles like personality, ability to work in a
group, etc. cannot be covered. The quality of the handbook would be a
big swinger in my case.
17. An excellent idea, let the employee know what has to be done to be
promoted.
18. Handbooks and specific training requirements are good, but, in some
assignments, finding time for essential training is difficult.
19. If handbooks are used as guides and not rigid cookbooks, it would provide
a good baseline.
20. Career handbooks would give the employee information about the location
of other similar jobs in the organization. The occupation-specific job
descriptions are handy for employees and recruiters. But the information
must not be allowed to become too specific because of the problem
involved in continually updating such a document.
21. A career isn't a ticket-punching experience. To standardize the system
would be an inaccurate portrayal of what is an individual experience.
Where do you factor in politics and personality?
22. Good--needs rework. Need more published regulations, more published
career progression plans, and more succession planning.
23. This is do-able anytime that we can devote the manpower/resources to it;
it isn't tied to a new program. It won't be any easier than it is today
(:) but documenting the intention to do it may give it the impetus it needs.
24. The employee handbooks should contain generic and specific information
relative to the operational and training requirements necessary to
progress from one level to the next. Sufficient infomation and
guidelines should be available for an employee to set personal goals.
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'
iT
t"C":r1c/SHI.(;n11'0.)
LuALAvi
ol,7:ciAL CN.-{
1ni"AL NE=
. a.i?,v,
1 Supervisors need to be more committed to career delelopment and training
and not ,worry primarily about losirg "a body' for training or allow
understaffing to become an .excuse for denjing training.
2. Career Development: Must almost exclusively .be the province of the
employee and local management.
3. Here it was suggested that more emphasis needs to be focused on career
planning than on pay issues.
4. The Panel recommerds that general Career Development Plans for each
occupation be written during the next phase. We are looking for examples
here. Younger employees like this feature. Older employees like it less.
5. Training is not the way to success at CIA; sustained high-quality daily
performance is. An individual's career development plan would need to be
counterweighed by the Agency's assessment of an individual's skills
relative to other employees. All the career development plans seem to
have training courses as a basis. Many Agency training courses require
only sustained breathing for successful completion.
6. Only one person commented that each individual is responsible for his/her
Own career.
7. .Individual career development plans would be very helpful for new people,
to set themselves some goals, and also for people already- on board to ?
recognize their potential and strive toward it.
My experience is that ?the career plans, being optional, will, if actually
written, be merely a compendium of whatever is relevant to satisfy the
career handbook. I don't really think employees will make -these career
plans in writing and because of this the supervisors should not be
evauated on them.
This feature is a waste of time to Placate and mislead emolojees whc are
not being orcmcted. I: wil' make tPen tnirk .,,ere is a ticket-puncning
formula for ad,,ance-lent.
10. I cuestion whether goals, e5petially -:em ones, can be seHed out.
23
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FEATURE #6: INDIVIDUAL CAREER OEVELOPMENT PLANS
CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS
11. It would be a mistake to try to map out a career in great detail. If an
employee concentrates on doing the best job possible in his current
position; he will naturally--I hope--be considered for positions at the
next level.
12. The listing of duties could become a mechanical exercise and a substitute
for direct communication between employee and supervisor.
79
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FOR CF CIA-. USE ONL';'
CEW FEATURES
This section of the DS&T response to the HRMCTF report
contains a compilation of new features suggested by DS&T
employees. The Task Force is requested to consider each for
incorporation in the revised report. The new feature
descriptions in this section are passed along in essentially the
same focm in which they were received from employees.
The new suggested features are organized into the following
categories:
1. Frequent Travelers Benefits
2. Undercover Benefits
3. Overseas Service Benefits
4. Quality of Life
5. Professional Society Fees
6. Retirement Benefits
7. Miscellaneous Suggestions
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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FOR OFFICIAL ;;;E uNLY
1, FREQUENT TRAVELERS BENEFITS
1. An employee who travels extensively pays a family and social
price for that travel. Most of the people who travel
extensively do so in order to discharge their assigned duties
at the level of performance demanded of them--and most
fortunately at the level they have come to demand of
themselves. We propose the following benefits for extensive
travelers:
a. Granting of Administrative Leave to be taken by the
employee after long periods away from home. The amounts
of leave and the triggerpoints for its granting need to
be studied in detail before a complete system can be
specified. We believe that the amount of leave should
depend on the fraction of time in travel status and on
the duration of the individual trips and that there
should be levels of leave benefit based on escalating
amounts of travel.
b. Travelers should be reimbursed for lost and damaged
luggage to its full replacement cost where claims against
the carrier involved are impractical or leave the
traveler paying out-of-pocket costs.
c. Travelers should be reimbursed for annual flight
insurance up to $100,000.
d. For travelers who spend most of their travel status in
foreign countries with less than perfect airport
amenities, the Agency should reimburse the costs of
membership in airline clubs such as the Ambassador Club.
e. For domestic travelers, the Agency should seek a flat
rate per diem to avoid the myriad hassles and approvals
imposed by B&F for travel accountings.
2. Cash incentives for TDYs in excess of six months.
3. Increase annual leave ceiling to 360 for individuals serving
TDY,
4. Frequent flyer clubs - I think we should be able to use the
mileage credits we accumulate. Accumulating mileage is a
by-product of official travel. It doesn't cost the
government anything (we all report to someone and the idea
that we will start making up trips to accumulate mileage is
not only wrong, it is insulting). I am gone from home over
100 days each year and getting a free airline ticket for it
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doesn't seem like overcompensation or waste/misuseof
government resources. How much time is spent looking after
airline coupons. I spoke to someone in Central Travel who
said that many coupons it in desk drawers until they expire
and are then thrown away.
5 Travel and per diem - Under the travel regulations if I go on
a two-day TDY which gets extended to two weeks (or any length
of time), I am not authorized to call home at government
expense unless I am calling for someone to meet me at the
airport, and now that comes out of MI&E. I think a phone
call every few days on a domestic trip of more than a few
days would be reasonable.
The new per diem regulations are supposed to benefit the
traveler as well as reduce the administrative costs of
processing travel vouchers. It would be far easier on
everyone to just give the traveler the established maximum
rate and only account for the incidentals, which should
include laundry and phone calls. Currently there are many
$25 MI&E locations and there are many places where that
doesn't go too far. When that has to include laundry and
phone calls, it get worse.
(I) As for the "non-established" areas, the $25-a-day motel is a
thing of the past.
6 When traveling, count time worked over eight hours per day as
overtime, up to the limit for all employees.
7 Change per diem requirements for more than three-day trips
where transportation carrier does not cover all meals.
Problem exists since the current allotment is one-half a full
day's per diem on those trips where the traveler travels to
destination point as well as one-half full day's per diem on
return trip. This allotment does not cover expenses incurred
when more than one meal is necessary on these days.
Recommendations - base per diem allocation on the number of
meals required--if traveler has two meals, provide two-thirds
of per diem allocation; if traveler has three meals, give
full per diem.
8. There was general disappointment that none of the proposed
benefits program changes addressed any of the unique
contributions made by specific Agency populations. In the
case of OD&E, program management engineers routinely spend
40-60 percent of their time TDY away from their families and
regularly travel after normal business hours. Other specific
Agency populations make similar contributions. In
compensation one could, for instance, consider granting
CIARDS for TDY time.
2
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FOR OFFIC:AL :SE
9 Long overdue! Should be implemented as soon as possible.
Many government rules and procedures tend to degrade the
professional, e.g., travel restrictions which require stayIng
at cheaper hotels, driving the cheapest cars, flying on the
cheapest flights. Removal of these restrictions may
encourage more professional work force.
10. We believe that additional compensation is needed for those
employees required to travel extensively. Examples that
shoqld be considered are:
a. Agency-provided travel insurance;
b. Agency-provided luggage;
c. Reimbursement for membership costs of red carpet airline
clubs for employees who travel extensively to Third World
airports;
d. A means by which employees may use the frequent flyer
benefits for personal use;
e. Two hours of compensatory leave for each day of TDY
travel to recognize the fact that a large percentage of
TDY travel is conducted on the employee's time.
3
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STAT
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R
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
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4. QUALITY OF LIFE
1. We believe that an initiative should be developed that
addresses the issue of quality of life in the workplace. The
working environment and the tools provided to the employees
are key factors in recruitment, retention, and overall
productivity of the work force.
7
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
5, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY FEES
1. We believe that consideration should be given to paying for
membership in professional organizations that are directly
related to the employee's occupation.
8
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FOR OFFIcl.:-.L USE ONL.:
6. RETIREMENT BENEFITS
1. In addition to the retirement options mentioned,
consideration might be given to phased-in retirement, perhaps
part-time employment for a year or two. Also, increased
hiring of retirees on a contractual basis might have merit.
2. People who spend years working a rotating 24-hour, 7-day
shift should be given at least the same retirement
considerations as those persons assigned to overseas posts.
Night shifts impact on life styles, personal health,
marriages, and employees enduring these hardships should be
compensated.
3. When SPS personnel are deployed on training, this time should
count towards CIARDS.
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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STAT
liSE ONLY
7. MISCELLANEOUS SUGGESTIONS
2. Create appropriate spouse awards (to be awarded when deserved
and not after the employee's retirement).
3. Routine eye examinations and glasses for imagery analysts
should be paid for by the Agency.
4. The Agency should pay employee insurance costs, as much as
private industry does.
5. Overtime - How about real paid overtime for all?
6. Job sharing should be considered with one employee working in
the morning and another in the afternoon.
10
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? -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB ? CONTENT
A Introduction
Communications Process
Best Feature; Worst Feature
OP - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
OTE - Summary Assessment.& Recommendations
OMS - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
OIT - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
OC - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
OS - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
OF - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
OL - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
0/DDA - Summary Assessment & Recommendations
Issues & Concerns
Perspectives & Recommendations
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INTRODUCTION
In November 1986, a Task Force was formed consisting of senior
representatives from each Directorate and the DCI area. This effort was
chaired by a senior DDA officer.
Under the general guidance of the Executive Director of the Agency this
Task Force set out to construct and design a Proposal for establishing an
improved compensation and benefit system for this Agency and its people. The
genesis of this effort began in the summer of 1986 when the-then DCI informed
our oversight colleagues on the Hill of his intentions to develop a CIA pay
and benefit system which served the needs and requirements of this unique
Organization.
Among the features that this effort intended to develop included, but
were not limited to;
? A pay and classification system that better relates pay to
performance;
? A competitive total compensation package that allows employees more
choice than met their personal needs;
? A career development policy that expands the concept of dual career
tracks for substantive managers and;
? A comprehensive review of the appeal, automation, and training
required to implement and support the proposed new system.
After eight months of intensive deliberations, the use of recognized
consultants in this field, and substantial intra-Agency coordinations and
soundings, the Task Force produced a preliminary proposal and system design
which were circulated to Agency managers and employees in July 1987.
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Under the guidance of the DDCI, every employee was to have an opportunity
to comment on the proposal and submit comments and recommendations on any
portion of the proposal as each saw fit. This action has now been completed.
Since July, the undersigned have been involved in assuring that the substance
of this proposal: has reached every level of the Directorate of
Administration. Using the Deputy Directors as focal points within each
office, we have encouraged and supported the communication of this Proposal to
one and all. After two more months of auditorium informational briefs, and
individual/group discussions on the Proposal, the data are before us. What
follows is a compilation of employee and Office management opinions, comments
and recommendations. We have synthesized these data and have endeavored to
present for your consideration what we believe is a fair and objective
assessment of our findings and perceptions.
The next step in the overall process is to have each Directorate by 30
September report its findings including reactions and recommendations on how
to proceed to the Task Force. The following document provides a basis for the
DDA submission to this next phase of the review process.
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THE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESS TO EMPLOYEES IN THE DDA
1. Before the various DDA offices could begin to gauge their employees'
feelings toward the Human Resources Management and Compensation Task Force
Proposal, they had to first inform the DA work force. The Offices provided
Proposal details and information to DA employees by several means in order to
obtain feedback.
2. Initial dissemination of the Proposal was accomplished through the
following means:
Distribution of
Directorate personnel;
Distribution of
personnel;
copies of the abbreviated 16-page version to
copies of the System Design to Directorate
Work sessions with the Deputy Directors serving as focal point
coordinators for each office;
Auditorium presentations by the Chairman of the Task Force and DDA Rep
directed to individual office populations and allowing unlimited time
for gue?tions and answers.
WWSB was sent to inform domestic/overseas locations describing the
Proposal and soliciting comments and recommendations.
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STAT
STAT
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3. In addition to the initial dissemination efforts, many DA office-1.
Managers and Supervisors held group and/or individual meetings with their
employees to explain the process within the Proposal. They de-emphasized the
"predetermined" perception people tended to make about this new initiative and
invited them to give their sincere reaction to the Proposal on or off the
record, confidentially or openly. Feedback to the Task Force Reps from each
Deputy Director wai required.
4. Each office also used a survey to ascertain the population's reaction
and comments to each feature of the Proposal. In 8 of 9 offices, response to
the survey was not mandatory although some offices closely monitored response
to the Survey. Attribution of the survey response was at the employee's
option. In this manner we hoped to assure that everyone had the opportunity
to not only rate every feature of the proposal, i.e. favor, strongly favor,
against, strongly against, etc., but also to suggest enhancements or
modifications or even to reject the entire proposal without any substitution,
all without attribution if they so chose.
5. Employees were encouraged by their management to attend one of the
three HRMCTF explanation sessions held in the auditorium during August. The
purpose was for the employee to gain a feeling for the content of the Proposal
and how it could affect their professional lives in the Agency. These
sessions were designed to be "straight talk" sessions with ample time for
questions and answers. (As you will note in the survey comments, these
sessions were considered "promotional" by many of the attendees even though
there was-a conscious effort to present the facts clearly and objectivety.)
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6. Throughout this communications process which lasted approximatelf-60
days, meetings were held within most offices and at the Directorate level to
monitor the progress and to assure that questions were being given timely
responses. Toward the end of August each component began aggregating its
survey data and compiling a synopsis of both employee and office management
opinions and recommendations. On 9 September each Deputy Director presented
his office's position verbally and in hardcopy to the Directorate
representatives. Two three-hour sessions were held to complete this process.
Notwithstanding these efforts, many
employees
chose not to respond to the-.
STAT
survey for whatever reason.
Of the
Directorate employees to whom a
STAT
survey was sent only
responses
were
received. In some offices the
percentage of responses was good, others were fair, and some poor. On
balance, approximately 37 percent of the personnel surveyed responded. These
responses represented 31 percent of the entire Directorate of Administration
personnel.
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oc
SURVEYING TECHNIQUES
COMMUNICATION OF PROPOSAL
The following three communication techniques were used by DA Office
Management to ensure the distribution of surveys to DA employees.
A. Survey form with limited or no
personal contact with employee.
(3 Offices - OIT, ODDA, OL)
B. Survey form with personal contact
with employee. (2 Offices - OMS/OF)
C. Survey form with employee contact
and follow-up/follow through.
(4 Offices - OP/OC/OTE/OS)
NOTE: Six offices employed an all-employee type survey. Three offices used
selective sampling survey techniques. One office tried a mandatory approach
for responses while the remaining eight offices used an "optional" response
technique.
RESPONSES
STAT The DA Offices surveyed roughly
SIWIDproximately
employees.
employees and received
This translates into 31% of all DA
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SUMMARY OF SOME OF THE BEST FEATURES
(AS REPORTED BY OFFICE MANAGEMENT)
FEATURES
1. Occupational Banding
2. Incentive Pay
3. Performance Plan
4. Performance Evaluation
5. Occupational Career Handbooks
6. Individual Career Development
7. Occupational-Specific Training
8. Improved Availability of Trainin
9. Dual Track
10. Promotion
11. Flexible Benefits
12. Leave Conversion
13. Educational Assistance
14. Staffing Management Tools
15. System Controls
16. Projection Tools
OFFICES
I
OP OTE OMS
OIT
OC OS
OF OL 0/DDA
-
0
0
.
?
0
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0
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0
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0
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o
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0
0
0
?
?
?
? ,
II
0
?
'
1
J
1
"
,
1
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SUMMARY OF LEAST ATTRACTIVE FEATURES
(AS REPORTED BY OFFICE MANAGEMENT)
FEATURES
1. Occupational Banding
2. Incentive Pay
3. Performance Plan
4. Performance Evaluation
5. Occupational Career Handbooks
6. Individual Career Development
7. Occupational-Specific Training
8. Improved Availability of Training
OFFICES
1
OP OTE OMS
OIT OC OS
_
?
OF OL 0/DDA
_ .
1
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
I
i
0
0
?
I
4
.
0
,
?
?
9.
,Dual Track
10.
Promotion
11.
Flexible Benefits
12.
Leave Conversion
13.
Educational Assistance
?
?
14.
Staffing Management Tools
?
15.
System Controls
?
?
16.
Projection Tools
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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
OP employees and careerists are very sensitive to the impact of the new
system on themselves as well as the components in which they serve. Their
concerns relate to:
the ability of the Agency to provide sufficient ADP and human
resources to successfully support a new system.
IRO
how supervisors/managers are trained and how adaptable are they to the
new system.
taking care not to make implementation any more complex than
absolutely necessary.
assuring that occupational equity in our Agency culture be maintained
to ensure an esprit de corps at a high level.
ensuring that incentive pay be administered, and perceived, as
credible and fair.
taking care to proceed with caution but not lose sight of the need to
ensure that the Agency has the most modern, up-to-date personnel
systei-possible.
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OP MANAGEMENT POSITION
If and when Agency employees/management agree on a proposal, we recommend
incremental implementation within an occupation or component where the
acceptance of change is judged to be high, thus optimizing the chance of
success. ADP, human resources, management, and other necessary support
(handbooks and PAR tools) must be in place before any component or occupation
enters the new system. We recommend that we begin by evolving into the new
integrated system, and then use the transition period to implement those
aspects where we have the authority to do so. After obtaining additional
legislative authority, the balance of the system can then be put in place.
change is Traumatic. Employees are comfortable with the current system.
They understand it and the status it provides. We must remain sensitive to
the loss and *pain" caused as we move to a new system. We must also remain
sensitive to the expectations we have built and both maintain momentum and
insure we are prepared to implement change. Lastly, we recognized that
potential large system change (even a demonstration project) comes on top of
extraordinary change taking place across the Agency (moves to new Hqs Building
and Reston, retirement, leadership).
7."
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Cony
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail of Trng
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
Performand*.Eval
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf, MOmt. toolr
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools"
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OFFICE OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
OTE people are generally openminded about the proposal. They are
sympathetic to the view that CIA is a unique place to work and that we should
pursue a separate system that reflects that uniqueness. Somewhat
inconsistently, however, there is a strong perspective--although not
necessarily a majority one--that many of the Task Force's recommendations
could be implemented within the GS system.
There are many unresolved questions and concerns about;
how market pricing would actually work;
whether pay for performance will be fair to the poorer performer;
the difficulties of implementation;
and the effect of banding on CIA's unique culture.
OTE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
Implementation of a banding system will, at least in the short term, make
it harder for OTE to recruit quality rotationals from the Directorates. A new
system will cause individuals to hunker down until they understand how it ?
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works. This is particularly true when a mistake could directly affect an
individual's take-home pay. This is a problem that is particularly important
for OTE because of our dependence on a significant number of rotationals to
help us conduct quality training.
We are also very concerned about the support required for the system
described in the Proposal. We, and our support people, are not convinced that
enough thought, planning and anticipation have been given to the resources
needed to support the system. Financial counseling, career counseling, panel
support and ADP support are just some of the features that will need to be in
place before the system can function properly. We are also concerned that
implementation at too fast a pace could swamp OTE's ability to provide quality
training in a timely fashion.
Therefore, for the above reasons, OTE recommends an incremental,
evolutionary approach to the occupational groups so that we can learn and cope
as we go.
Our specific recommendations are as follows:
Proceed with Flexible Benefits, Leave Conversion and Educational
assistance for Dependents.
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Implement as many of the Career Development Features (3 thru 9) as
possible. All of these items, some with Modifications, seem to be
possible with or without occupational groups.
Complete definition of occupational groups for remaining 25% of
employees.
Implement occupational banding for a limited number of occupations
(suggest maximum of 3) in FY 1988. Further recommend that the
occupations chosen be ones to which market pricing applies and which
are having demonstrable problems recruiting and retaining personnel.
Reassess for FY 89.
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Cony
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail Trng.
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
Performande Eval
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf Hgmt tools
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools-
--
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. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
The majority view within the Office, both among the rank and file and
management, was that the data presented was either insufficient or too
complicated to allow successful assessment. This was compounded by a -
promotional presentation aimed at selling the product rather than preparing
listeners or readers to make an informed decision. The result is that the
majority of the office either responded skeptically or with great
qualifications.
So far as an overall office response, most of our employees seem to prefer
either to remain with the GS system as is, or with modifications that still
retain the present general structure. In both cases they feel that many of
the goals proposed by the Task Force still can be achieved. They endorse an
effort to gain unique additional benefits, but do not favor a significant
change in management structure. A unique pay structure is endorsed if it
means more pay, and only if there are not offsetting costs because of
associated management changes.
VIS tasked those professionals qualified within the Research and
Information Systems Division (RISD) to prepare a tactical critique of the Task
Force. Their review was favorable to the proposed system with expressed
concerns relating almost exclusively to implementation issues. Among other
points, they aoncluded:
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a. Given the array of choices presented in the Report it seems reasonable
to make a change which would break totally from the GS system.
b. Changing the pay system to one of performance-and-rewards does reflect
current management wisdom in the private sector.
c. The proposed career development system does make necessary inroads in
this area and, perhaps can serve the Agency requirements for a career
work force well.
See Tab , for the RISD analysis which conveys the positive and negative
aspects of the whole Proposal.
OMS MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
OMS Management holds essentially the same opinion as expressed by the
overall office. In the absence of any meaningful indication of the costs of
this proposal--in manpower, money, or management terms--we feel that any
wholesale shift in the Agency system would be unwarranted and likely
counterproductive. We support seeking additional benefits and increased pay,
but are not persuaded this is impossible within our present basic structure.
Any movement in the direction of a new structure should be only experimental
and involve highly selective and carefully studied subgroups to allow a better
evdluation of the costs and benefits before proceeding to the Agency on a
larger scale. if it is intended that the Agency proceed with Task Force
roposals, and if rank-and-file input is genuinely sought, a more
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sophisticated tutorial
and questionnaire should be prepared for
insure that credence can be placed in the responses obtained.
Phase II to
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Cony
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail of Trng
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
Performance Eval
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf. Mgmt. tools
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools -
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OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
The proposed system is viewed with little interest by the majority of
OIT. However, of the 25% responding to a survey, 85% favored the proposed
system and 75% believe they were sufficiently informed. Feature 1 (52%) and
Feature 2 (60%) were the only features favored by a majority of the
respondents. Market pricing is considered beneficial. Features 9, 11 and l2
werepreferred by 38%, 35% and 33% of respondents, respectively. The
remaining features found little support among the troops; there was even a few
negative responses. A modified Health Benefit Proposal received some
support. There was very little enthusiasm for the Educational Assistance
Benefit (9%).
OIT MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Managers and supervisors were generally positive about the proposed system
and chose the same features as the employees but with slightly higher
ratings. Movement away from GS system seems justified but in a selective,
non-disruptive fashion. Management is highly supportive of pay-for-
performance as tools of line management, and recommends Incentive Pay
decisions be left to supervisors, and promotions be the responsibility of
career panels. Management is skeptical that Performance Plans, Performance
Evaluation and Projection Tools will produce the desired results. The
expanded training concept is considered unrealistic because of the needed
increase in resources. In summary, consideration should be given to
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-
implementing 4-5 most desired features and not undertake the entire proposal
all at once.
*Features:
1. Occupational Banding
2. Incentive Pay
3. Performance Plan
4. Performance'Eval
5. Occ. Career Handbks
6. Indiv. Career Dev. 11.
7. Occ-Specific Trng. 12.
8. Improved Avail of Trng 13.
9. Dual Track 14.
10. Promotion 15.
16.
Flex Benefits
Leave Cony
Educ. Asst.
Stf. Mgmt. toolsr
System Controls
Project Tools -
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. OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
Employees are very positive about Features 1, 2, 11 and 12 with nearly an
83 percent endorsement. Feature 2 was endorsed with reservations on how it
may be implemented. Features 5, 9, 10, and 13 were received less
enthusiastically but with a majority favoring the proposal. Remaining
Features 3, 4, and 6-8 received an endorsement from nearly 73% of the
respondents but each with some reservation. Features 14-16 were also
favorably received but with less enthusiasm.
In sum, although the overall proposal was favorably received by a
significant majority of those responding, it is expected to require
coasiderable additional resources to implement and manage. Is was recommended
that the benefits package, with minor revisions, be implemented regardless.
Educational Assistance as proposed is considered inequitable by a vocal
majority since a portion of the Agency population cannot avail themselves of
this benefit.
OC MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Feature 1 seems workable with some concern over the optimum levels within
a band. Feature 2 was endorsed, with Home Office and Career Panels making
final decisions vice the Host Component and first line supervisor. Feature 3
and 4 require heavy management investment with little expected return.
Feature 5 is deemed useful but will also require additional resources.
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Features 6, 7 and 8 are good goals but overemphasis will create unrealistic
expectations of advancement and must also be weighed with needs of the
Office. Feature 9 is attractive but has limited application; must retain
flexibility to move back and forth. Features 10-12 endorsed with the latter
two features receiving universal acceptance. Strong positive reaction to
Feature 13; however it is viewed as inequitable by a vocal minority for the
same reason cited under the Summary Assessment. Feature 14 received strong
eniorsement. Feature 15 acceptable provided funding controls are allocated CO.
offices vice directorates. Features 15 and 16 are necessary if the total
proposal is to be successful.
In sum, the OC Population, like the Agency's, is unique in processing,
cover, and job requirements; and, therefore, can justify a unique pay and
benefits system. While GS Schedule is inflexible and mechanistic, the
proposed system is extraordinarily complex. Recommend modular approach to
both its presentation. and implementation. The Benefits package should be
implemented regardless.
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Cony
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail of Trng
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
Performande Eva].
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf. Mgmt. tools
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools
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OFFICE OF SECURITY
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
Many of our careerists provided general comments which were very
supportive to the Proposal. With regard to Occupational Banding (1*), this
was one of the Features with the least employee support in the Office of
Security. Loss of identity and status which has classically been provided in
the GS system, was usually given as the reason. Incentive Pay (2*) fell in
the middle of the pack with doubts dealing with a potential for favoritism, if
left to first and second line supervisors. Some cautioned that managers will
be heavily burdened by this proposed system. Some feared the absence of
crucial ADP support and availability of training. A number of people believed
the flexible benefits enhancements could be accomplished within the GS
system. Some expressed concern that covert employees would not enjoy the same
benefits as overt employees and that the Proposal favored persons in grades
GS-11 through 15 over those GS-10 and below. There was a belief the change
should be managed gradually to ensure success of the proposal.
OS MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
OS recognizes that many of its employees have a concern about leaving the
GS system for occupational banding and the concerns stem from several things;
emotion, the potential for an identity crisis, and fear of something big, new
and different. Even with the foregoing, OS Management does not believe there
is reason enouijh to forego proceeding with a modification of the GS system and
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accordingly endorses the proposal with the following caveats:
Agency management must;
present a stronger and more convincing case for conversion from GS to
something else.
provide a firm feeling as to what market linkage means to each of the --.
occupations.
ensure that the "Proposal promises" can be carried out and especially
within the 2 percent funding limit.
ensure that controls will be in place to manage the complex
incentive-pay equitably for all.
Without the above, the Proposal will not meet with employees support. OS
management endorses the proposed performance evaluation (4*) and the
individual career development (6*) systems as steps to take ambiguities out of
how people develop and progress through their careers. We are concerned
however that the design must not over burden managers as they administer the
.program. We must remember that history shows that "getting the product out
takes precedence over individual career development, if and when a conflict
over the two exists. We also believe that dual track (9*) can offer a
legitimate career path for experts and thus endorse this as well. However, in-
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? eon
OS we describe only a narrow segment of our employees as experts.
Every
employee does not become either a manager or expert, as some see it. It is
not an either-or situation. We felt there was some confusion on this point.
OS supports the proposed flexible benefits (11*) concept and urges that
even if all else fails, we proceed with this useful feature. Lastly, we share
the concerns with our people about covert employees receiving and enjoying the
same or equivalent benefits. This is essential to us.
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Conte
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail of Trng
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
PerformanCe'Eval
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf. Mgmt. tools-
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools-
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OFFICE OF FINANCE
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
There is a broad based willingness to accept the overall proposal.
However, a cautious approach to implementation is strongly recommended
regardless of the final design. Feature 2 received the most positive
response, Features 5-9, 11, and 12 received very strong support. Feature 14
received a luke warm reception as the younger set was "put off" by the idea of
involuntary retirement. Remaining features received moderate to strong
support. More information is needed on Banding particularly its
implementation. There seems to be some support for a modified GS system as
opposed to Banding, particularly if the benefits package can be incorporated.
Feature 10, although universally endorsed, was not viewed as an improvement
over the present system.
In sum, although the proposal received generally favorable support, more
planning and details need be known prior to final acceptance. The Proposal is
very complex and will require 'herculean management effort" to implement and
administer. Total Proposal may not be required.
OF MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Office of Finance management ran concurrent with employee opinions and
recommendations with following added comments. For the incentive pay awards
to be handled equitably, OF management believes all MF positions within
external compohents should be transferred to OF. OF management must have ther
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final decision on incentive pay awards for personnel assigned externally to
the main office as well as those assigned within the main office. Management
is also of the opinion that any Market Pricing of finance functions be
contingent upon management acceptance of the pricing criteria.
experience with market pricing was less than desirable.
OF's initial
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Cony
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail of Trng
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
Performancb-Eval
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf. Mgmt. tool
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools -
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00
OFFICE OF LOGISTICS
?
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
OL respondents were generally supportive of the overall proposal. While
not strongly favoring any feature, they were moderately approving of features
5-12, with Features 13 and 14 receiving slightly less than moderate approval,
and the remaining Features, 1-4, 15 and 16 receiving little more than a
neutral rating. A great deal of skepticism exists with regard to Banding and-.
particularly the Market Pricing aspects. More information and explanation on
the overall implem&itation plans and processes seemed in order. There is also
an underlying feeling that breaking with GS scale is desirable but not
entirely.
OL MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Features 11, 12 and 14 were favored. There was little enthusiasm for
Feature 2 principally because of arbitrary 50% annual eligibility. No support
for Market Pricing as a function of Feature 1 pending establishing its
credibility with Agency occupations. Feature 1 is considered to have limited
application and should not be imposed on everyone. If implemented, several
levels of promotion are recommended. Management believes that the current
system accommodates Performance Planning and Evaluation. It is recommended
that the 0/L Education Assistance Plan be substituted for the proposed plan.
Why a new system? 0/L's Plan encourages Agency longevity and fosters the
"Agency Family concept. OL management recommends that the Home Office vice
Host ComponenE.Make the decision on Incentive Pay.
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In sum, sum, implement the best features with existing DCI authority but in a
go?slow, modular approach. In addition, the best system would seem to be a
combination of the GS System and some portion of the Banding concept.
?????
*Features:
1.
Occupational Banding
6.
Indiv. Career Dev.
11.
Flex Benefits
2.
Incentive Pay
7.
Occ-Specific Trng.
12.
Leave Cony
3.
Performance Plan
8.
Improved Avail of Trng
13.
Educ. Asst.
4.
Performanae Eval
9.
Dual Track
14.
Stf. Mgmt. tools
5.
Occ. Career Handbks
10.
Promotion
15.
System Controls
16.
Project Tools
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATION
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
The key to this new system is the manager. Will managers be;
allowed to manage?
willing to manage?
rewarded for managing?
?????
If these answers are no, we should seriously reconsider whether we want to
do anything at all. If yes, we are undertaking a major departure from
tradition and from Agency culture; a departure not adequately addressed in the
Proposal.
Under the proposed system, managers now will have to be prepared to play
roles that we traditionally have not asked them to play, i.e., serious
decisions about peoples' careers, and then be willing to live and continue to
manage those affected by their decisions. Employees who do not wish to manage
or who simply are not good managers should be allowed to go back to their
previous status or the "expert track without penalty.
We further recommend that the Agency create a cadre of people who, from
the end of their probationary period, are groomed to serve as Agency,
managers. This would include rotationals from different Directorates to
develop a "corporate" view of the Organization. There is no guarantee that
they will stay managers. They can opt out of the program.
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0/DDA MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
A recommendation from the Office of the DDA is not appropriate here prior
to review of the Office submissions within the DDA.
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ISSUES AND CONCERNS
This section of our paper is somewhat controversial. It is included only
as a meter to show the kinds of concerns and uneasiness out there and where
they are felt.
Over the course of the last year the Task Force Representatives (Reps)
have heard many kinds of concerns and issues troubling our people in various
degrees. These concerns have come to us in a variety of ways. We have
received written comments and papers stating these concerns. We have had
scores of conversations with DDA careerists who simply wanted to question the
proposal and ventilate their personal concerns. Additionally, in every Deputy
Office Director's submission (herewith attached), there are a variety of
issues and concerns expressed.
The controversy in this part of our paper relates to our developing a
summary listing of all the concerns, major and minor, and asking the Deputy
Directors to indicate if they had a sense of these concerns either within
their employee ranks or among their senior management. Some Deputies believed
that their inputs (only on a sense of the employee's and management's
concerns) would have little or no usefulness or importance. Nonetheless, each
Deputy participated in this effort. The results are compiled below.
What follows therefore is a random presentation of employee and
management concerns and issues which we have received during the review
process. In the left and right margins is a graphic presentation showing
which offices determined a sense of the stated issue or concern and whether
the sense was felt by the people, by the management or both.
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MGMT
DOD
DOI
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
?
ISSUES AND CONCERNS
There appears to be a lack of confidence in supervisors and
managers.
Pay for performance over-emphasizes money as a reward which is the
wrong incentive for Agency people.
Many employees expressed a concern over the process, and Agency
support to the process, is a great deal of skepticism that we can
pull this effort off as proposed.
This proposal is scary to our managers at the junior and senior
levels in that it creates new demands on their time, adjustment to
their style and a requirement for training or (re-training) for
the new system.
EMPL
DII
DID
IMO
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ONO
DON
DOD
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
?
The Agency never says no to additional requirements and thus
continues to put additional work on its people without eliminating
existing duties. Embracing the Proposal means more pressure for
the work force.
Many mid-level managers may have great difficulty changing their
stripes.
New managers will have to be groomed differently right from the
start to function well in a pay-for-performance system.
Much more information is needed to make a good informed decision.
The absence of detail is worrisome.
This is a time of enormous change, e.g. new DCI, FERS, THRIFT, New
building, Reston, Medical insurance uncertainty. Change equals
pressures and stress.
?????
EMPL
CIOCI
IMO
DIG
DOD
DII
COO
ONO
MOO
DOD
CDI
0011
ODD
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*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
24CMT
CICICI
COI
CND
CHM
CHIN
There is real concern over the process and the mechanics.
This Proposal is probably too large and too time-consuming.
The Proposal is felt to be a fait accompli.
The Proposal presentation was reviewed as a strong sales pitch.
Why change? If it's not broken, don't fix it.
Recruitment and retention as stated in the Proposal are the wrong
reasons for coming up with a new system.
Who says the Agency will get the money?
EIIPL
Ca]
mom
CUD
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HQ4T
CICICI
000
GIN
OCICI
DII
DID
II
DII
CHM
III
??????
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
Who says the Agency will get the money each and every year?
Who says well get the political approvals?
"Training" will become mandatory and turn into ticket-punching
exercise.
An ADP system probably will not be devised in time to support a
system of this magnitude.
I'm "something under the GS; I lose identity under a Banding
System. Identity is very important.
There are so few promotions under a Banding System. This will be
frustrating.
EMPL
CIE
DID
LIMO
DID
CHM
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CHM
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t?IGHT
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
Is there an appeals process for perceived unfair performance
appraisal and unfair bonus determinations?
Market pricing - it seems impossible to get a reliable gauge.
Adopting this Proposal equals considerable disruption at a high
price.
When contrasted with each other, i.e. sound management versus
operational results, the latter always wins out in this Agency.
Under this system the employee must have training but often can't
be spared. This can therefore turn into a career disadvantage
under the Proposal.
The survey results have generated false impressions as to levels
of-acceptance of the Proposal.
?
??????
EMPL
MID
01311
OCIGI
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Dii
DIP
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00
MGMT
- ? -
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
Work ethic will change under this Proposal. Now it will be what's
good for me rather than what's good for the Organization.
Training seems to be offered now to be at the convenience of the?.*
employees. This goes too far.
If not a Manager then I surely will be an Expert.
Money will now be our motivation instead of excellence, as it has
been.
There is a fear of Market Pricing.
There is a real risk of mismanagement of the funding controls by
managers at all levels.
EHPL
DID
DID
IDI
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MGM'
10C11:2
GCE
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
It is of concern that careerists are granted bonuses by the "host"
components versus the parent service. The bonuses should be
considered and given by the parent service.
^
There is skepticism that Congress will be in support of this
Proposal.
This Proposal raises expectancies without any real assurances that
it will be approved and implemented.
Employees may be ranked by a computerized (automated) process
rather than by human beings.
"Early outs" as. suggested by the Proposal appears to be a drain on
experienced talent.
EMPL
DIM
CII
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K:MT
Dill
Mal
MID
DID
VIII
111011
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
?
Components with a heavy population of lower-graded personnel feel
the proposal favors senior-graded employees.
Many raised doubts that the Agency (read: OP) will be unable to
accomplish the conversion due to its magnitude and heavy
dependence on additional resources.
The data presented was either insufficient or too complicated to
allow for thoughtful assessment.
There is little mention or reference on how adequate training in
the new system will be implemented.
A working mechanism for addressing employee concerns about pay and
career decisions must be established, supported, and functioning
prior to implementation.
_
EMPL
DU
CND
11011
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*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
ICHT
COO
gOU
The evaluation process of this Proposal was done differently by
each Directorate. This has led to very different feelings and
results. Bad process. Should have been the same survey
Agency-wide.
In Banding there is considerable concern about one's initial
placement and one's progression through the individual bands.
SIS'ers seem to get too much in this Proposal.
Educational Assistance is inequitable in that everyone doesn't
need it or want it. THe money for this benefit would be better
used if applied to Benefits that all can use.
Retention Bonus is detrimental to our esprit de corps.
There is now less of an incentive to achieve SIS.
DIP L
CCM
DID
IDI
ONO
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PIGHT
CCM
CCM
DIM
31111
PRE
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
The Proposal is very resource intensive. I feel uncertain that
the resources will ever be there to support it.
This Proposal has an overly ambitious schedule.
This Proposal unfairly favors managers.
Cashing in A/L for dollars leads to the potential for abusing
one's S/L.
We do not seem to be proceeding with caution.
The tremendous effort to implement this Proposal, or any
reasonable facsimile, does not seem worth the gain.
EMPL
no
on
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*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
tIGMT
A major shortcoming in the Proposal is the lack of implementation
information and actual system detail.
There is no mention of additional staffing for an effort of this--:
magnitude. I fear there will not be sufficient human resources to
make it work, as hoped.
Congressional scrutiny may mean our losing some current benefits.
We really need to improve management and not necessarily improve
the system.
Make more changes now by using the existing DCI authorities more
liberally.
EMPL
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oo
*See Office graphics on opposite leaf.
MCMT
GCE
HIE
DID
Ill
The GS system is a part of the Agency culture - don't jeopardize
it.
Be sure we can implement before we promise.
'Bad idea but with good packaging.
Shouldn't we be looking beyond "banding" since most of Government
is heading there?
Wait until OC banding and the secretarial systems are fully
operational - learn from these "test beds".
It is bad timing to propose a new pay system change on the heels
of the new secretarial pay system which was disappointing.
The GS system is obsolete.
EMPL
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PERSPECTIVE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Perspective
There is a great deal of activity and change in the air these days for our
people in the Agency:
a new Director of Central Intelligence,
? an investigative atmosphere in the Agency,
retirement decisions being reconsidered for participation in the Civil
Service Retirement System vs. FERS,
? decisions on making THRIFT plan contributions, or not,
disturbing medical insurance premium increases,
o new buildings in Hqs
now,
to move into over the next months, and SI-AT
the very unusual Compensation and Benefits Proposal...
This time of change is requiring an unusual amount of decision-making on
issues outside of the sphere of our employees' normal day-to-day work. Right
now, there is probably a need for some stability and settlement in the
Agency. Presenting a Compensation and Benefits Proposal (Proposal) such as
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ours with the implications for affecting professional lives and livelihood,
represents a significant added pressure with which they must deal.
The Proposal asks a lot of our people; but it will also give a lot. It
asks them for a period of serious consideration, eventually their acceptance,
their willingness to "educate" themselves, their adjustment from old ways to
new, their patience as implementation unfolds, and requires them to manage and
be managed in very different ways. Under the Proposal we will now pay for
performance, allow a benefits choice, consider one's career more than before,
and focus on overall emoluments for careerists of this Organization.
We are finding strong support in the Directorate for those Proposals which
enhance the well-being of our people:
flexible benefits, by far a front runner,
leave conversion which allows tangible recognition for the high
degree of dedication found in our employees,
the dual track system, considered innovative and long overdue.
We are finding some support in the Directorate for:
occupational banding, with caveats concerning the reliability of
market-pricing which will compare our occupations with
"equivalents" (if there are such things) in the private sector
marketplace,
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incentive pay, with serious concerns as to the fair and equitable
handling of this by supervisors and managers,
promotions,
occupational-specific training,
educational assistance.
We have found only limited support for:
individual career plans since most employees feel that their
careers are largely their own responsibilities,
staff management tools,
performance plans, since most harken back to the discomfort and
dislike for the former AWP and WI exercise,
occupational career handbooks.
We found little or no interest in:
system controls, and
projection tools.
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0
The lack of interest for these last two came mostly from employees and not
from management.
Our people perform. And usually well. It has even been said that an
acceptable level of performance in this Organization equates to strong
performance in many large firms and in some components of local and federal
government. Adopting our Proposal may not produce a demonstrably big
difference in performance levels by out people, however it allows us to
recognize and reward the good, the great, and the outstanding performances in
new and exciting ways.
There is skepticism out there. Many of our people do not feel an inherent
trust in the system nor that its management is really looking out for their
interests. They comment that our managers, junior and senior, are often
ineffective on the people-side though effective on the production-side. The
people-side is the concern here. The statement that production overcomes the
professional needs of the worker, has an almost universal ring throughout the
Directorate (and probably throughout the Agency).
Our employees gratify themselves in an unusual way. Suffice it to say
that government employees do not join government service to become wealthy.
Money isn't the motivator; and our Proposal does have money as one of its
incentives. It really has to. That frankly has triggered certain adverse
reactions within the DA. Accomplishment, and especially accomplishment with
excellence, excites, sustains, and gratifies our people. Simply said, it
turns them on and they consistently accomplish to the outer limits of their
potential.
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co
STAT
We complain about excessive tasking and unreasonable workloads but these
complaints are not really from the heart. We react in completely predictable
ways in our Agency when confronted with the "very difficult" or even "the
impossible". We go right at the problem without hesitations This scenario is
played out day after day in each and everyone of our Offices. It has come to
be termed the "Agency work ethic". It is incredible and we are justifiably
proud of it.
We ask very special kinds of "extras of our employees. Not only was it a
rigorous and onerous ordeal initially to join this Organization but once in,
we tend to stay with more regularity than perhaps any major institution or
organization in America. Once you are here you are likely to want to stay;
and we want to keep it that way.
The Agency puts some
of its work force under cover,
unquestionably a stressful condition of employment. We are asked 'to live a
lie" and are expected to follow convincingly and unswervingly a scenario
which, though false, is essential to the effectiveness of our intelligence
mission. The limitations on us are many. We have no civil service status; we
serve at the pleasure of the Director; we do not travel internationally, nor
publish, face the courts, develop relationships with foreigners, nor embrace
certain private life styles or habits, without notification and/or approvals
from our own "system." We are constantly under review for employment
suitability and subject to lie detector testing over our whole career. Yet
all of this somehow draws us together as "family" even more. We are proud,
have exceedingly high personal standards, work incredibly hard, and
unfailingly take on everything we are asked to do-- then do it well.
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Our employees serve in very unusual capacities. We are positioned in some
of the most remote, backward, dangerous and unhealthy places around the
globe. Our range of expertise and skills ranges from paramilitary to the
highly scientific. We have a work force that includes all levels from
clericals and laborers to senior professional academicians, scientists,
engineers, system analysts, weapons specialists, case officers,
administrators, general managers, educators, physicians, project engineers,
and many others. One-quarter of this Agency is engaged in the most anomalous
mission in the US Government, that of collecting by human sources essential
intelligence about the intentions and plans of foreign governments around the
world.
Our compensation and pay Proposal recognizes all this. /t is our intent
and focus to improve the lot for the hardworking, dedicated And resilient
people we describe above. If it does not improve their lot, then it should
not be adopted - much less even be designed in the first place.
So what's missing? Some might say nothing. We say sufficient and
meaningful recognition is missing. We say we can "care* more by creating
programs which deliver benefits and services to improve the private and
working lives of our exceptional people and their families.
Over time we have watched the private sector providing new and better
things for their work force. Once the forerunner in this arena, the U.S.
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Government, formerly the "most appreciative" employer in town, has now sadly
slipped to one of the less appreciative. Until this new initiative, no major
Agency effort has been proposed to improve the situation. We suggest that now
is the time. We now can care for our work force in ways better than before.
We are unique and we deserve unique handling. The Task Force Proposal offers
some challenging and exciting ways to attack this.
We now wish to make our recommendations.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing is intended to provide a basis for the following
recomendations and how we proceed from here. Our sense of the Directorate is
that the majority of its people are receptive to some change. As we stated
above, the degree of change and the manner of implementation appear the
greatest cause for concern. Our people are concerned that the entire Proposal
cannot be implemented without unacceptable disruption in their daily routine.
Management and employees alike echo a cautious, go slow phased approach. We
do as well.
We earlier addressed the uniqueness of this Agency and its people, It
follows therefore that we should have a pay and benefits system to match this
uniqueness. The base pay of our people in the present system does not seem to
be a factor of real discontent. Rather, there is a general feeling of
fairness for the most part. However, the benefits side of the present system
leaves much to be desired. Since the benefits and their income tax
consequences can affect "take home pay", and improvement will be beneficial to
an individual's pay. We therefore recommend that Features 11 (Flexible
Benefits) and 12 (Leave Conversion) be included for immediate action in the
DA's recommendations regardless of whether the remainder of the Proposal is
accepted. This recommendation was echoed throughout every office within the
Directorate.
Next, we recommend that Feature 1 (Banding) be implemented but in a "test
bed" mode. We recommend selecting only components which are willing to be
banded and observe carefully the results including employee reaction. We are
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of the belief that the concept of Banding has been negatively received by some
offices in the Directorate due to the inclusion of Market Pricing and the
perceptions that market-pricing makes unfair and inequitable comparisons of
Agency support functions with those of industry and other routine USG
agencies. As said earlier, we are different. Thus, we must find a way to
assure reliable Market Pricing before undertaking Banding. We also recommend
accepting the use of personal services funds to control the structure of the
work force and the delegation of classification authority. However, to
minimize the impact on management, we recommend these two elements of Feature
1 be retained at the Office Director level where some centralized control can
be used. At a later date when Banding has stabilized, the redelegation of
these authorities to a level of management below Office Director, if desired,
can be considered.
Feature 2, Incentive Pay, is recommended. This feature of the Proposal
receives some support and is believed to be generally acceptable to the
Directorate population as a whole. However, there are some major concerns
with the implementation of Incentive Pay. First and foremost for DA
careerists is the concern for fair and equitable treatment when incentive pay
decisions are rendered by the host component vice the parent service. This is
a two-edge sword. In one respect, there is concern that the "support"
employee will receive less equity by the host component than if the employee
were rated by the parent career service. On the other hand, the individual
may find "a home" i.e. treatment is superb: annual bonuses, etc. Thus, when
the time comes to rotate the employee, that individual may prefer to remain
with the host component. Thus, we recommend that the parent service have
final approval authority on incentive pay for externally-assigned personnel
with the host component recommending the incentive award.
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00
Another concern voiced particularly by various managers within the DA
offices is determining at what level the decision on incentive pay will be
made. There is considerable concern that the first line supervisors should
not have the final say although he/she should have significant recommendation
input. However, there is an anomaly here in that preparation of the PAR by
the supervisor will directly affect the incentive pay decision under the
current Proposal. This revision will leave the final decision to some level
above the supervisor offering somewhat of a minor "appeals process and an
objective assessment of the incentive pay recommendation as a result of the
PAR rating. If career panels are chosen as the level of decision, it is our
recommendation that this be a temporary situation with a view toward bringing
the decision back down "near the action ? in the next 2-3 years at the
outside. Thus, we caveat our recommendation on Incentive Pay to include
parent office vice host component approval and that the final decision be made
above the first line supervisor level.
Feature 9, Dual Track, is also included in our recommendation. Dual Track
was included by five of the nine offices as among the Proposal's best
features. There has long been a concern in almost every corner of the Agency
that to "get to the top" an individual has to become a manager. Under the
Dual Track Feature this concept is abolished. The 'expert" will be able to
rise to the top of the pay ladder and still remain within his/her field of
expertise. An added benefit to the Agency is that we won't force into
management someone who neither wants to manage nor cannot manage. Thus,
acceptance of Dual Track bodes favorably for retention of an employee who is
happy, well paid, and doing the real job for which he/she was hired.
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icD
Another benefit, Feature 13, Educational Assistance for Dependents is
included in the Task Force Proposal. However, as presented this feature lacks
application to all Agency employees because of its very nature. We recommend
a modified version of this Feature as proposed by the Office of Logistics as
Appendix III of their submission be substituted and included in the DA
recommendations. This substituted version has Agency-wide application and
involves credits for either Dependent Education or other non-dependent related
benefits earned based on years of Agency service. It espouses the "Agency
family" concept.
In summary, we believe the heart of the DA recommendations should include
Features 1 (Banding), 2 (Incentive Pay), 9 (Dual Track), 11 (Flexible
Benefits), 12 (Leave Conversion), and 13 (Educational Assistance - 0/L
version). These will offer, we believe, the most to our people In the design
of any unique pay and benefits package.
It suffices to say that the remaining Features proposed by the Task Force
cannot be disregarded. Criteria for career advancement are directly relatable
to Features 3 through 8 while Management's ability to monitor and control this
"new" system involves Features 15 and 16. Making these latter statements is
not a "cop out" but rather testimony that the total Task Force Package was
designed with thoughtful and careful consideration.
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Co
Prepared and submitted on 18 September 1987 by:
k Force Member, terna e
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STAT
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