THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01070R000301760009-4
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 21, 2010
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 26, 1985
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068
FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM
CBS Morning News
STAnON
WDVM-TV
DATE
June 26, 1985
7:00 A.M.
CITY
CBS Network
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT
The Hostage Crisis
BOB SCHIEFFER: American ships in the Eastern
Mediterranean suggest one U.S. option in the hostage crisis, a
naval blockade of Lebanon. Even among the most experienced
foreign policy experts, there is a dispute over military action
and whether it would be wise. Three such experts are with us
this morning: In Washington, the Former CIA Director, Admiral
Stansfield Turner; and Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, now with the
Center for Defense Information. And here in New York, Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, retired Chief of Naval Operations.
When we invited all of you to be here, gentlemen, we
were going to talk about what President Reagan said yesterday:
Is, in fact, it possible to carry out something like a blockade
or something? But we've had these developments overnight, so
let's start talking about that just a little bit.
Can this help, Admiral Zumwalt, what Nabih Berri has
said this morning, that he's now willing to move these people to
another embassy in Beirut, or to Damascus, if some kind of
promise can be made that they will stay there until the Shiites
in Israel are released?
ADMIRAL ELMO ZUMWALT: Well, this represents progress.
I would hope that no public promise will be made, because that
would be a backdown by President Reagan.
I think the significant point to be made about military
power is that it is being effective. The military power, the
presence of it there is, in part, the reason that Nabih Berri has
been brought by Syria and Moscow to be more reasonable.
SCHIEFFER: So you see this as a direct response to what
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President Reagan said yesterday.
ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Oh, I think it's very clearly.
SCHIEFFER: Gentlemen down in Washington, what's your
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Well, I think that this is
good progress. If we can just get the hostages into the hands of
someone not as unscrupulous as are these hijackers, that's real
progress because the hostages themselves will be more safe.
I agree with Bud Zumwalt that it's very difficult for us
at this point to fully accede to the request to release all
700-and-some prisoners. But it's just a matter of nuances now on
how that gets worked out. I think the makings for an agreement
are certainly moving along nicely.
SCHIEFFER: And Admiral Carroll, would you agree with
REAR ADMIRAL EUGENE CARROLL: I definitely agree that
we'll all feel better if we have those hostages in hands other
than the Shiites.
On the other hand, the motives for them to move the
hostages into safer surroundings seem to me to be something other
than military. I suspect that strong voices are coming through
the diplomatic channel, through Syria particularly, to the
Shiites to be more forthcoming. I don't believe that anyone
really considers that the Nimitz task group is going to go into
action, because that would doom the hostages.
ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Well, you know, the key thing that
brought Syria to lean on Berri is the presence of the Sixth Fleet
there. The Syrians don't want to have to see it get into a
situation where they would lose their airpower as a result of a
strike by the U.S.S. Nimitz. The Soviet Union doesn't want to
have to come to the assistance of Syria. And therefore the
presence of our task force is serving as it ought to: a
deterrent which is bringing about a peaceful solution.
SCHIEFFER: Let me ask all of you, as military men, is
it in fact possible to do what the President suggested yesterday,
and that is to blockade, cut off the Shiite areas of Lebanon? Or
was it -- should we take this in another way, that the President
was simply saying, "We're going to get tough"? Did he really
mean that literally, what he said literally? Is that possible to
carry out?
ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Well, I think the President did mean
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to convey a signal and a symbolic message.
It would be an extremely difficult thing to blockade a
specific piece of territory in Lebanon. In order for a blockade
to be effective, you'd reallly have to include Syria and you'd
have to get some cooperation from Israel and Jordan, as well as
Turkey. And you've have to not only do it by sea, but by land,
through all those allies.
SCHIEFFER: Is it something that is possible to do, or
is there at least a chance of carrying it off? Should we in fact
try something like this, or is it just too hard?
Admiral Turner and Admiral Carroll.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think it can be done if we go
back to something Bud Zumwalt helped arrange during the Vietnam
War, and that's through mining. We mined Hanoi quite
effectively. You can cut off Lebanon from the sea by mining.
And it has the beauty that it puts the onus on the other side to
take the first action that would be lethal -- that is, running.-
over the mines.
But as Bud's just pointed out, you cannot isolate
Lebanon entirely because of all of the land routes into it.
You're not going to actually make them starve, but you can run
their economy down somewhat.
SCHIEFFER: There was also some suggestion, Admiral
Carroll, that the airport be closed. Do you think that's
feasible?
ADMIRAL CARROLL: Well, that's entirely feasible. That
could be closed in a matter of moments, either by gunfire or by
air attack. However, the question remains, why are you going to
close the airport? That's kind of like bombing a bank after it's
been robbed in order to punish the criminals. There's nothing to
be gained by closing that airport, other than to insure that the
hostages become vulnerable.
ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: At some point it may be wise, in this
or in other crises, to close that airport, so that it can't be
used as a landing and take-off point for terrorists in possession
of an aircraft. That's something that would be quite feasible,
and something that if it were done quickly could have some
impact.
SCHIEFFER: Well, I want to thank all of you for being
here this morning.
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