THE WALKER CASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301730007-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 2, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Face the Nation
STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network
June 2,
1985
11:30 A.M.
OW Washington, D.C.
LESLEY STAHL:
According
to the FBI, there are more
Americans charged with
espionage
today than ever before in
American history.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER: The Walker case
represents, I think it's fair to say, a serious loss, and it'd
gone on a. very long time.
STAHL: The most recent case, John Walker, his son
Michael, and his brother Arthur, all Navy men. John Walker and
his son have been indicted on six counts of spying for the Soviet
Union.
Navy sources fear the documents passed from the U.S.S.
Nimitz by son Michael, among other papers, have taught the
Soviets how the U.S. tracks their submarines. FBI officials
acknowledge they had no clue about the alleged spy ring till they
were tipped off six months ago by John Walker's ex-wife and one
of his three daughters.
How widespread is the Soviet spy network in the United
States? We'll ask the head of the Justice Department's Criminal
Division, Steve Trott. And we'll hear from Michael Walker's
lawyer., Charles Bernstein.
It's being said that ninety percent of the Soviet
diplomats in the U.S. spend time trying to recruit spies. Is the
government doing all it can to stop them? We'll ask former
Deputy Director of the CIA Bobby Inman and Senator Patrick Leahy
of the Select Committee on Intelligence. And a Soviet bloc
defector, Stanislav Rurarj, a former Polish diplomat in Washing-
ton, will tell-us how the Soviets go about recruiting
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average Americans to their cause.
Spying in America, an issue facing the nation.
STAHL: The Justice Department has been hinting that
there may soon be more arrests in the Walker case. We spoke with
Stephen Trott, head of the Department's Criminal Division, and
asked him if the case is bigger than reported.
STEPHEN TROTT: This case has been under intensive
investigation by the FBI for six months. And what I can tell you
is it is not out of the question that more arrests will be made.
The FBI is very thorough on these and they will make sure that
every possible lead and implication will be run down.
STAHL: When can we expect more arrests?
TROTT: Well, that I can't tell you.
STAHL: Monday?
TROTT: I can't give you a date.
STAHL: Okay.
Perhaps you can talk, then, about a report that the Navy
is trying to gain control of this case. They apparently have
some concern that if the Justice Department tries it, then
perhaps some of the naval operations will be compromised in the
trial as evidence comes out. Is the Navy trying to gain control
of this case?
TROTT: No. And it's never been a question of control.
We've worked very closely from the Navy -- with the Navy from the
beginning on this case to make sure that all of our options are
explored before we make decisions. As you know, we have the
military courts available, as well as regular federal court. And
the decision has been made at this point to pursue these cases in
federal court. We believe we can do that without compromising
any of the secrets that are involved in this case.
STAHL: So it's not true, then, that the Navy plans to
recall the two brothers, John and Arthur Walker, back into the
service so that they can be tried in a military court. You're
saying that's not going to happen.
TROTT: Well, all I can tell you at this point is that
the case is going to be tried in federal court, not in military
court.
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STAHL: Okay.
Let's talk about the FBI, then. Isn't it true that the
FBI wouldn't have known a thing about this case if Mr. Walker's
ex-wife hadn't come in and tipped the Bureau off?
TROTT: Well, this case did start with that type of a
tip. The FBI did its usual very good job once it got the
information some months ago in putting these cases together.
STAHL: Well, let's talk, then, about how the FBI can
spot someone when there isn't a tip. Is it impossible?
TROTT: No, it's not impossible. And as a matter of
fact, many cases are made by the good FBI surveillance that does
exist.
STAHL: But why didn't they get this case? It's gone on
for 18 years.
TROTT: Well, I'm not really sure. I can tell you that
some of the failures of our government of this country to find
out when this kind of stuff is going on is nothing more than a
byproduct of the liberty that we enjoy in this country. This is
not a police state. The presumption is that people.are innocent,
and we don't surveil every citizen in this country all the time
for everything.
One of the byproducts of that, one of the prices that
you pay is occasionally you're going to get a seam in that type
of liberty and somebody, for money or for other reasons, will
take advantage of it and become a spy.
STAHL: It seems -- am I wrong? It seems that more
people are becoming spies. When I was young Americans didn't spy
against their country. Why are we hearing about more? Is it
that there are more, or that you're catching more?
TROTT: Well, between 1966 and 1975 we had no federal
prosecutions for espionage. Why, I really can't tell you. But
between 1975 and now we've had 37 prosecutions, 27 of which have
involved the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc countries. As I said,
last year was our most productive year in terms of catching
espionage activities.
I believe, and the people with whom I've consulted
believe, that there both is more espionage going on now, number
one; and number two, we've gotten a lot better in detecting it.
STAHL: Why is there more now? And who are these people
who are selling out their country?
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TROTT: A profile of an individual is fairly hard to
describe. There's a certain amount of amorality involved in it,
and usually you do find some variety of financial involvement.
It's a way to make money.
STAHL: You know, there's sort of an assumption by, I
think, some conservatives in the country that these spies, people
are left-wingers who sort of grew up in the Vietnam era and sold
out their country because they're not patriotic. But what we
seem to be finding are more traditional middle-class Americans
who work for the military, or work for the FBI.
Do you see something unusual in the fact that so many
people come out of the government itself?
TROTT: No. I think it really -- they, in a sense, defy
the type of precise characterization that we always tend to look
for in these cases. And I think if you start saying, "Well, this
type of person is a spy, and that type of person is not," you're
making a massive mistake, in terms of investigating these cases.
Unfortunately, spies come in all different sizes,
shapes, colors, backgrounds, philosophies. And anybody who has
access to this type of information, who has some sort of a
strange personal situation going on or a shaky financial situat-
ion going on is liable to be this type of person.
STAHL: Well, if we know, as we're told, that 90 percent
of the Soviet diplomats in the United States are here basically
to recruit spies, why isn't there more, or is there, a lot of
attention, eavesdropping, whatever, on them?
TROTT: There is attention paid to these people. And
that, as a matter of fact, explains some of the cases that have
been made in recent years. The FBI has spotted this going on and
picked it up before it happened.
STAHL: Well, let me ask you on that front, then, why
the Soviet diplomat who was apparently Mr. Walker's contact was
allowed to leave the United States. Was there a deal with the
Soviet Union?
TROTT: Oh, absolutely not. But beyond that, it's not
appropriate for me to comment on those kinds of interior matters
inside a case that's not yet gone to trial.
STAHL: But you are denying that there was a deal with
the Soviet Union to let him slip out of the country.
TROTT: There was absolutely no deal with the Soviet
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STAHL: Tell me about plea-bargaining. I understand
that one of the concerns the Navy has is that you might let the
Walkers plea-bargain so that you could catch some bigger fish.
How much plea-bargaining do you do in these kinds of cases? And
might you plea-bargain in this case?
TROTT: None. And we won't, in the sense that I think
you're using that term. Will we allow these people to get off
light in order to get information from them? The answer is no.
STAHL: Will you allow them to get off lighter than they
otherwise would?
TROTT: No. And I think all you have to do is look at
some of the sentences that have come down recently in these kinds
of cases and you'll see, as I said, in the Cavanaugh case a life
sentence, in the Harper case a life sentence. We regard these
cases as extraordinarily serious, and we intend to pursue them to
the full limit of the law.
STAHL: But we hear that there are many more spies that
are caught and not prosecuted in the country, many. That would
seem that some immunity is given in return for information. Is
this not true?
TROTT: There are a number of ranges of activity that
are available to us, meaning the Federal Government, when
somebody is caught in this type of a situation. And it is clear
that sometimes the choice is made to turn that person around
against the person who is paying him in the first place. The old
double agent game. And on occasion it makes more sense in the
long-range national security interest of the country to do
something like that than prosecute.
That's why I say whenever we get one of these cases we
explore every option to make sure that the outcome essentially is
in the best overall interest of the United States.
STAHL: Stephen Trott of the Justice Department.
The court appointed attorney Charles Bernstein of
Baltimore to represent the 22-year-old son, Michael Walker. We
spoke with Bernstein briefly yesterday.
CHARLES BERNSTEIN: He's specifically charged in five of
the six counts, and the counts involve various allegations of
attempted delivery or unlawfully obtaining national defense
information. And if you will forgive me for being a lawyer and
saying so, this is of course a charge. It merely is a means of
bringing the lawsuit and tells everyone what it is the government
has to prove in this case to make.its case.
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STAHL: Now, you are going into court on Tuesday, and
you will be offering your plea.
BERNSTEIN: Yes.
STAHL: How will Michael Walker plead on Tuesday?
BERNSTEIN: He will plead not guilty to all counts.
STAHL: He'll plead not guilty to spying for the Soviet
BERNSTEIN: The charge is not specifically spying. But
as to all counts in the indictment, the plea will be not guilty.
STAHL: But let me ask you something. As we've been
told by the indictment and by the other papers that have been
filed in the case, 15 pounds of documents were found near his
bunk, and there were these incriminating letters. Isn't it going
to be awfully hard to plead not guilty?
BERNSTEIN: Well, what you're asking me to do is comment
on the evidence. And various legal rules and ethical considerat-
ions prevent me from doing that at this time. But we will plead
not guilty-on Tuesday.
STAHL: And I assume by what you say you feel the
government is going to have a difficult time proving the charges.
BERNSTEIN: I didn't say that. I hope they will have a
difficult time. It will be my job to try and give them a
difficult job. Whether they will or they're not -- or won't,
we'll find out in court.
STAHL: Can you tell us something about your client's
state of mind at this point?
BERNSTEIN: To the extent that I'm allowed to comment on
these things, his state of mind is consistent with what you would
expect with a young man, a newlywed facing these very serious
charges.
STAHL: Is he depressed?
BERNSTEIN: I don't know if I'd say depressed. He's
concerned, as he should be.
STAHL: Attorney Charles Bernstein.
We'll be back with a look at how Soviets recruit spies.
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STAHL: With us now from Austin, Texas, the former
number two man at the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman. From Los
Angeles, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont. And here in Washing-
ton, former Polish diplomat Jiswav (?) Rurarj.
Senator Leahy, let me ask you a question first. We are
beginning to get the impression that the major concern may not be
that the Soviets have learned very important secrets from the
United States, but really that the Navy has been embarrassed
because they let this spy situation go on for 18 years.
As you sit on the Intelligence Committee, which do you
think is the major concern here?
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Well, I think that the Navy has
a lot of reason to be embarrassed, but I would hope that that
wouldn't be the driving factor here.
As a former prosecutor, I'd like to see them just get on
with the prosecution. Let the FBI, let the Justice Department
prosecute. They're well set up to do that. What the Navy ought
to do is go back and find out what it was that allowed this to go
on for so many years.
And the reason I say that is that this is one case. But
if anybody thinks that this is the only case of-espionage that's
sitting out there, they make a terrible, terrible mistake. The
Soviets have close to a thousand agents in this country actively
trying to put together cases of this nature. The Walker case is
only one of them. There are others out there. And I would
think, instead of everybody trying to figure out who gets credit
or who gets blame -- and I'm not prepared to levy either -- but
instead of doing that, they ought to go out and find the rest of
these cases, because they're there, it's damaging this country,
and we are in a very, very serious problem.
STAHL: How serious do you hear the information that the
Soviets got out of these -- out of the Walkers has been?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, just based on what has been in the
public press, it has to appear to be very, very serious; in fact,
one of the more serious breachess of our security.
But the thing that we somehow seem to ignore in this
country is that these same kind of attempts are going on all the
time. We want to have arms control, and that's proper, of
course. We want to have detente with the Soviet Union. That is
also proper. But somehow we lose sight of the fact that the
Soviets have for generations worked very hard at this espionage
game. They are seeking to penetrate everything from our defense
industry to our people to the military. And we are just not
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prepared to cope with it. We are not doing an adequate job.
STAHL: Let's turn to Admiral Inman and ask him, why
now? We did not have spies in this country, as Stephen Trott
said, up through 1975. Why now?
ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: Well, first, I think we did have
them in those years in between. We were not successful in
catching them.
But as you look back at the change in the nature of
spying, most of the cases in the '30s and the '40s, those who
spied for foreign powers did it for ideological reasons. I don't
know of a single case in the last 15 years where ideology had any
role at all. People are selling secrets for cash.
And unfortunately, in the early '70s we began opening up
this country for -- for good bipartisan reasons: improving
trade, trying to improve-foreign relations. But in that process,
we more than doubled the number of prospective case officers to
recruit spies from hostile foreign countries.
In that same time frame, unfortunately, we also drew
down the manpower in the FBI, in the military services in the
counterintelligence area.
I was told several years ago by and old FBI hand that
the desire in the early days was to have four FBI agents for
every prospective foreign case officer. By the end of the '70s
we had two prospective case officers for every single FBI agent
on the counterintelligence field.
STAHL: Well, let's turn to Ambassador Rurarj, who was a
Polish diplomat here in Washington and who has defected.
We understand now that there are a thousand, at least,
Soviet intelligence agents in this country. Who do they pick out
to recruit and how do they go about it?
AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Well, there are different methods.
First of all, a case officer coming to this country may sometimes
know in advance on who he could be closing on. Or sometimes it
is left to his discretion, that he himself would be looking for
the prospective, let's say, agent. And it is, of course, up to
him to pick up such a person and to close on him. Rather on him,
not on her, because this is mainly the male business, unfortun-
ately.
STAHL: How do they go about the recruiting?
AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Well, the recruiting could be a
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long, long process. As Admiral Inman says -- I think he's right
-- that sometimes it could be just a one-shot business. You are
quite simply buying something. Many people are coming, unfortun-
ately, to the Soviet or to other missions with certain materials
to sell. And you are buying.
Of course it's much better to have a more permanent
contact with such a person because such a person would be
disciplined, could be blackmailed and so on. And later, even, if
such a person would be not willing to sell something, it could be
exposed, so that such a person would be doing anything.
But unfortunately, this is -- well, the Soviet system is
very rigid. But when it comes to spying, it's extremely flex-
ible. Extremely.
STAHL: Is 90 percent -- when we say 90 percent of the
Soviets in this country are out here recruiting and doing
intelligence work, is that an exaggeration, or is that the right
number?
AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Well, when I was on foreign assign-
ment, I hardly knew anybody who was not an intelligence or
counterintelligence officer. I mean when it comes to Soviet bloc
countries.
STAHL: Well, let me turn to Senator Leahy.
If this is true, why don't we expel more of these
Russian diplomats in this country?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, I think that we're going to have
to have parity. Senator Cohen and I have an amendment, the
Leahy-Cohen Amendment, which would do a great deal of that. It
would at least limit the Soviets to the same number of people
with diplomatic immunity in the United States as we have in the
Soviet Union. That at least seems a step forward. Because I see
no reason at all why we should allow them to have these large
number of people, and yet they limit the number of people we have
in their country. Weseem to bend over backward to do their job
for them. And I don't know if it's naivete on the part of the
United States or what, but I don't think that we should be
helping them the way we are. And obviously, they've been very
successful with that help.
STAHL: Admiral Inman, what about security measures in
this country? You know, Christopher Boyce, who was the subject
of that novel The Falcon and the Snowman, he testified recently
that when he worked for a defense contractor, someone who was
wearing an identification badge with a monkey's picture on it
gained access to this security area.
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I mean do we have to do something within our country,
ADMIRAL INMAN: The level of professionalism in the
security services is not what it ought to be, and it's deterior-
ated over the last 15-20 years. We've replaced Marine guards
with contract hire, but we don't pay a salary that offers the
prospect of getting people who already have a substantial level
of professionalism. So you've got to work at it a long time.
And frankly, we also tend to allocate the existing
talent we have against the problem that's got the greatest
current headline. I'm told that there are three times as many
naval investigative service agents out looking for waste, fraud
and abuse, the $600 ashtray cases, as there are looking for
counterintelligence cases.
STAHL: And you think this problem is so widespread --is
that what you're suggesting? -- that we have to reverse our
priorities here?
ADMIRAL INMAN: I think we really have to relook our
priorities.
You're never going to be able to surveil the 4.3 million
Americans with security clearances. So you begin with absolutely
blanketing every legal -- that is, accredited -- prospective case
officer in this country.
STAHL: Okay. If we start doing that, Senator Leahy,
don't we begin to erode the very freedom that we are trying to
protect when we are in this cold war with the Soviets?
SENATOR LEAHY: No. We can do this totally consistent
with an open society. We'll still have all the exchanges,
cultural, educational, trade, everything else, with the Soviet
Union, as we need in the area of detente.
STAHL: But aren't you talking of surveiling Americans
SENATOR LEAHY: No. What we do is, first, be careful
where we give the security clearances. We have four million
people in this country with security clearances. That's crazy.
We have far too many people with access to secrets. If we even
went back right today and said, "Okay. Let's just do a recheck
on those people with security clearances. We won't give any
more. Weil just check those who have it," it would take ten
years to do it all.
People apply for security clearances. Ninety-nine
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percent of them get it. I can't believe that that's showing
enough care.
I think what we have to do is take a very serious,
hard-nosed look at it, realize that the Soviets are going to
exploit every advantage that they can. And we give them advant-
ages. We give them advantages in where we allow them to put
their embassies. We give them advantages in not using secure
telephone lines. And we give them advantages in just letting too
many people have access to secrets in this country.
STAHL: Okay. Let's turn to Ambassador Rurarj and ask
him aboaut the Walker case again.
How important, as you read this case, how important do
you think the Walkers were to the Soviets? Were they a major spy
network?
AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Oh, definitely yes. The very fact
that they could place their agent in such a sensitive area like a
nuclear submarine, or his son in a nuclear aircraft carrier, must
be extremely gratifying to the Soviets, that they can place their
agents in such sensitive areas. It doesn't matter what kind of
information they were getting from them. The very fact that he
is there is something which is extremely important.
STAHL: Let me ask all of you what you think this is
saying to the Soviet Union about the state of morality in the
United States?
Bobby Inman.
ADMIRAL INMAN: Lesley, it's one of my great worries. I
think where we really start is not with surveillance of Americ-
ans, it's trying to raise the sense of all of us about ethics.
These are people selling secrets for cash. And it must give the
Soviets a very cynical view of this society, that they're able to
find so many people who are willing to sell them the country's
secrets for cash.
STAHL: Senator Leahy?
SENATOR LEAHY: Lesley, I can't understand how anybody
could either betray their family or betray their country. And as
an American, as a Senator, I'm greatly saddened by it. I think
it's a blot of shame on this country.
STAHL: And in this Walker case, John Walker did both,
didn't he?
SENATOR LEAHY: He did both.
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STAHL: Because he brought his son into this, and his
son now faces a life sentence.
SENATOR LEAHY: He did both. And I just have to hope
that this is not at all typical of the people that we have in our
government. I hope it's not.
STAHL: Thank you very much, Senator.
I'm sorry, Mr. Inman, we've run out of time.
I want to thank you all for being with us.
We will be back with a cartoon.
STAHL: Finally, Jeff McNelly of the Chicago Tribune
eavesdrops on a conversation aboard the aircraft carrier Nimitz:
"Our security problem is worse than we thought. There goes that
new Soviet carrier."
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