INTERVIEWS WITH FIDEL CASTRO AND SECRETARY DAM, PART III

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301620004-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 13, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-01070R000301620004-4
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
DATE February 13, 1985 7:00 PM CITY Washington, DC
Interviews with Fidel Castro and Secretary Dam, Part III
ROBIN MACNEIL: Cuban President Fidel Castro predicts
there will be political explosions in large Latin American
nations like Brazil, Argentina or Chile if a solution is not
found to their large debts.
Castro made the statement in the latest segment of an
extended interview with this program. He said it would be
necessary to give the debtor nations a grace period of up to 20
years just on the interest on their debts.
FIDEL CASTRO [Through Translator].
TRANSLATOR: It is the most critical and serious
situation that history has ever learned up -- the history of this
hemisphere. I firmly believe this. And, if a solution is not
found on the problem of debts these Latin American societies will
explode because there is a situation of fear among the workers,
among the middle strata and even in the oligarhy.
In our first focus session after this news summary, we
have an amplified version of Castro's remarks and a U.S. offici-
al's response.
MACNEIL: For our lead focus session tonight, we return
briefly to our interview with Cuban President Fidel Castro. Then
we have an official State Department response.
Our four-hour conversation with Castro in Havana last
Material supplie Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-01070R000301620004-4 d or exhibited.
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
weekend touched on many subjects.
In our Monday program, we covered relations with the
U.S. Last night, human relations -- human rights in Cuba.
Castro kept saying ask me anything, and one of the few questions
he refused to answer directly concerned El Salvador. I asked him
specifically what aid Cuba was giving to the guerrilla groups in
El Salvador.
TRANSLATOR: I do not want to make any declarations or
any commitments about that. I'm not saying yes. I'm not saying
no.
In reality, it is almost impossible to spend for
military supplies to reach these revolutionaries in El Salvador.
That's what I say, because it is practically impossible to have
military supplies reach them. The revolutionaries in El Salvador
have the capabilities to resist indefinitely if they would not
receive any military supplies. Even if they would not receive
any supplies, even a single bullet, they are in a position to
resist indefinitely.
They are also in a position to issue supplies -- that
is, the way we did in our struggle -- with the weapons that
belong to El Salvador. And I believe I am absolutely convinced
about the fact that the revolutionaries in El Salvador can
indefinitely resist without receiving any other supplies of
weapons. And that is not the essential issue.
MACNEIL: I also asked the Cuban leader -- looking at
the hemisphere as a whole -- which countries he considered ripe
for revolution right now.
TRANSLATOR: I would say that from the point of view of
social positions, and objective conditions [sic] -- objective
conditions, not only in Central America, but actually and more
important South America. In that area, a situation has been
created from the objective point of view that is a pre-revolut-
ionary situation. I am absolutely convinced of that.
I'm not wanting to say that this hemisphere will
unavoidably explode, but I am absolutely convinced of that, that
the problems are very serious, that the social problems have
tripled, that the calculations have doubled and that they face
situations in which you find no way out.
During Kennedy -- when Kennedy put forth [words unin-
telligible], he thought -- he thought he could try to avoid a
revolutionary situation. He believed that by injecting 20
billion dollars for certain social reforms the problems of Latin
America could be solved.
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
Twenty-four years have elapsed. You understand that the
populations have doubled, and so the social problems have
tripled. The debt is 350 billion, and only in interest they must
pay 40 billion dollars per year, double that of what Kennedy
thought was going to solve the problem. To this we must add the
flight of capital, the repatriation of profits and other prob-
lems. And, in my opinion, it is the most critical and serious
situation that this hemisphere has ever learned of --this
hemisphere. I firmly believe this.
And, if a solution is not found on the problem of debts,
I am convinced that the Latin American societies will explode
because there is a situation of fear among the workers, among the
middle strata and even in the oligarhy. But, in this case, the
problem is general. It's a general problem, and it may explode
in one country. I believe that the debt makes it. They cannot
pay for the debt. It's not that they don't want to pay for it.
No, they can't pay it.
But I'm not only referring to the debt -- the interest,
the 40 billion in interest -- they cannot pay for it, even if
they wanted to, they cannot pay for it. And the experts who are
in a position to force them to pay for it will actually bring
about a social convulsion and a revolutionary explosion. I
believe that it would be necessary, at least to have a 10-to-20
years of grace that would include interest.
MACNEIL: Let me understand you. You're saying that to
prevent an explosion in Latin America, that the the international
banking community needs to give them 20 years of grace on
interest. Is that what you mean?
TRANSLATOR: Correctum. I am absolutely convinced that
under the present circumstances they are obliged to pay not the
debt, because they could postpone the debt for 10, 15 years, and
it could actually as long as up to 25 years. The interest on the
debt, they cannot pay for it. And if they continue demanding on
the payment of these interests, an explosion will take place.
As long as it's a question of social changes in small
countries, in Grenada and Central America, you think it can still
be made up in madness by solving them through invasion. But, one
day as the change takes place in South America, in Brazil, in
Peru, in Chile, that I forgot to mention, which is really one of
the countries where in my opinion there's a pre-revolutionary
suspicion, the United States knows now -- at least understands
that -- that if the situation in Chile continues, in the not-to-
distant future they might face in Nicaragua or either somewhere
else than Nicaragua another problem. This is the situation that
we see.
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
How will they solve it?
Will they send in a battalion of the 82nd Airborne?
Anybody understands that that cannot be. And in those respects,
I think it will be convenient for the United States to change its
condition on this hemisphere stop being the strong enemy for
special interests and learn to coexist with us. That's my
reasoning.
JIM LEHRER: Now, to an American response to and
comments on what Fidel Castro had to say in our extensive
intereview. They will come from the number two man at the State
Department, the Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam.
Mr. Secretary, welcome.
Let's begin with what he said tonight and work backward.
First of all, do you agree with his assessment that
South America is in a pre-revolutionary situation and the whole,
all of Latin America is about to explode?
SECRETARY DAM: I don't agree with that. I do believe
that there is a debt problem. But, frankly, I think a lot of
progress has been made on that. I think the program of the
United States and of the International Monetary Fund and other
creditor countries have provided an approach which as relieved
the pressure. But there remains a serious economic problem.
We really need more growth in Latin America in order to
provide jobs for the populations of those countries.
LEHRER: What about his suggestion of a 20-year grace on
the -- on the debt, the international debts to these Latin
American countries?
SECRETARY DAM: One of the things that has been done for
those countries that have been willing to help themselves by
getting their own house in order has a negotiation on multi-year
debt rescheduling. That is rescheduling of the principle of the
debt.
I think that if there were to be a moratorium on
interest that would simply result in the countries not being able
to -- to borrow anymore and, frankly, they need more capital in
order to expand. Now, most of that capital, it's true, is going
to have to come from domestic savings in those countries, and
that will require some economic reforms in many of the countries.
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
LEHRER: What about his final point that the United
States has always positioned itself in opposition to social
change, that we should get out in front and help social change?
What's your response to that?
SECRETARY DAM: I don't really think that that's true.
There have been a number of countries that have moved from
authoritarianism to democracy in the last five years, as we saw
earlier on this program. The United States has strongly support-
ed that kind of change and supports that kind of change in Latin
America today.
We are on the side of democracy development, human
rights and the like.
LEHRER: The specific point on El Salvador -- do you
think the Cubans are supplying direct military aid to the rebels
in El Salvador?
SECRETARY DAM: I think there's not much question about
the fact that the rebels in El Salvador are receiving a good of
assistance. Some of it is military equipment. A lot of it is
command control and the like. I think there's no doubt at all
that the Cubans are contributing greatly to the Nicaraguan
ability to do that.
Now, I'm not prepared to say that the Cubans are
shipping directly into El Salvador, but you notice that Mr.
Castro did not deny that there was assistance going from Cuba to
the guerrillas in El Salvador.
LEHRER: What about his point that the -- the rebels
could holdout forever, you know, even without any more military
aid?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, we have pointed out that they have
received a great deal of equipment in the past. They have
captured some. Undoubtedly, they have an ability to withstand
battles for a time without any additional assistance. All of our
intelligence indicates that there's been substantial flow in the
past and it continues to this day.
LEHRER: In a general way, in the piece that we ran the
other night, he told Robin -- Castro told Robin that it is
impossible for Cuba to import revolution into any of these Latin
American countries, and that it's equally impossible for the
United States to stop a revolution if in fact the situation on
the ground is there.
Generally, do you agree with him?
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
SECRETARY DAM: I don't agree that he can't play a role
in turning revolutions into authoritarian situations. It -- it
is certainly true that local conditions are very important,
economic conditions, social conditions and so forth. But even
when there is a revolution, there are several ways in which
things can go. That was true at the beginning of the Sandinista
revolution.
LEHRER: In Nicaragua.
SECRETARY DAM: Yes, in Nicaragua. And the United
States government did support the Sandinistas, you will recall,
at the beginning. But, certainly Cuba used its influence and its
equipment and so forth to turn that Sandinista revolution into
one which did purport to and -- as well as actually doing it
--export revolution into neighboring countries and made it into a
more authoritarian regime. I think he can -- at the very
minimum, Cuba can have a tremendous impact on what happened in a
situation of -- of uncertainty.
LEHRER: Now, what Castro said was that all he's doing
is helping Nicaragua defend itself from the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas that the United States is arming. What is your
comment on that?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, I think it's important to look at
the historical records there.
First of all, the Cubans were helping the Sandinistas
even before they ran the government. At the beginning -- and at
the beginning of the Sandinista government, the United States was
helping the Sandinistas. In fact, we were the major donor.
From the very beginning, the Cubans were starting the
military buildup there, cooperating with the Soviets and Eastern
Bloc countries. And while we were -- at the end of the Carter
Administration -- helping the Sandinistas on the economic side,
the military buildup was going on. Now, there were no conquer-
ors. The United States was supporting to Sandinistas.
So, I don't think historical records will support what
he's saying.
LEHRER: A direct charge he made is that the United
States would never be interested in a peaceful solution to the
Nicaraguan situation, to negotiating a way out until they were
convinced a military way could be -- a military way could not be
used to get rid of the Sandinista government.
SECRETARY DAM: I think that just turns our position on
its head. What we've been trying to do is to find a peaceful
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
solution. We've done that in a variety of ways. We have met
with the Nicaraguans. We have supported the Contradora process.
So it seems to me that that's just the inverse of the truth.
LEHRER: He says he supports the Contradora process. Do
you agree that he supports it?
SECRETARY DAM: I don't see much evidence of that. As a
matter of fact, insofar as his support for Nicaragua, I think
we're seeing the contrary, because the Nicaraguans have been
taking a very hardline position. They want to sign the first
draft. They don't want to have any improvements. They don't
want to have things on verification and the like, and through
their actions with respect to the Costa Ricans who've sought
asylum in Nicaragua it appears that maybe the Contradora process
will be solid. I'm not exactly sure how that's going to work
out, but I think that indicates the [word unintelligible] benefit
to the Contradora process.
LEHRER: So, he was wrong when he says the U.S. purpose
is to get rid of the Sandinista government?
SECRETARY DAM: That is not our purpose. We want to see
a peaceful solution. We want to see reconciliation as the -- in
Nicaragua between the various factions that the government and
the opposition and indeed the Nicaragua bishops have called for.
We would like to see a regional solution.
LEHRER: Now, speaking of reconcilation, our first
segment that we ran on Monday night dealt almost extensively with
reconciliation between the United Sates and Cuba. He says he's
ready. Is the United States ready?
SECRETARY DAM: We are ready. But the question is,
realdy for what?
We are prepared to talk to the Cubans. We have a way of
doing that. If he wants to talk to us, we're there. We have
what you call an "Interest Section" in Havana, and they have an
"Interest Section" in Washington. These are diplomatic estab-
lishments fully equipped for diplomatic dialogue. So, he doesn't
need to talk to visitors to Cuba. He can talk to the U.S.
Government. He doesn't have to talk on television. It's, of
course, his privilege, but he can talk directly to us. And, as a
matter of fact, we have tried to talk.
And I would say the second point to bear in mind is that
the historical record is very bleak in this respect. The Ford
Administration tried it. The Carter Administration tried it, and
this Administration has tried it.
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
In the Ford Administration, they tried and it ended when
they moved into Angola. The same thing happened in the Carter
Administration when they moved Cuban troops into Ethiopia. And
we've had several occasions in this Administration where we've
had high-level talks with the Cubans -- one by Secretary Al Haig
and another involving Vernon Walters.
But, in every case, when the chips were down, not only
was there no substance there but usually there was a slap in the
face, like the Mariel Boat mess which ended the Carter Admini-
stration's second try.
LEHRER: Is there any -- is there any indication from
your point of view that this particular initiative -- and it's
clearly an initiative on his part -- is anything different from
the prior ones?
SECRETARY DAM: We haven't seen anything. We will
examine very closely what he has to say, and we will have to see.
But, we don't see any evidence, and the historical record is not
encouraging.
LEHRER: Well, specifically, he said that one of the
United States conditions for better relations is that he turn his
back on Marxism and Socialism. Forget it. He isn't going to do
that. Is that a condition?
SECRETARY DAM: We believe that if you interpret that as
the following, if that is a condition, we don't believe that he
can continue to be a conduit toward supporting Marxist-Leninist
movements in this hemisphere. We believe that that....
to stop that?
SECRETARY DAM: We want him to stop that. And we think
if it's really -- if his position is really bona fide, he will
separate himself in some way from the Soviet foreign policy. In
vote after vote, for years and years and years, he has never
deviated one inch from the Soviet position.
LEHRER: Well he says -- he told Robin that the Soviet
Union is his ally. Why should he turn his back on a friend after
26 years?
SECRETARY DAM: We're not asking him to turn his back.
We're just simply telling him if he really is serious then he has
to have some kind of an independent foreign policy. He certainly
has to give up on trying to produce other Cubas in this hemi-
sphere.
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
LEHRER: What would he have to do to prove his independ-
ence from the Soviet Union to the U.S. satisfaction?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, I think he can start behaving
differently, and particularly with regard to using this massive
Soviet economic and military assistance to him as a way of
financing the kinds of activities that have been going on in
Central America, in Angola, in Ethiopia and other places where
there are Soviet troops and Soviet military advisers.
LEHRER: He told Robin that he was willing to talk about
the Angola situation. Is the United States willing to talk about
that?
SECRETARY DAM: The situation is this. We're very
actively invovled. It's a regional problem to begin with, and
one aspect of it does involve Namibia and its independence. And
part and parcel to that is some solution to the problem of Soviet
troops in Angola. And he has said that he is prepared to
withdraw the Cuban troops but, of course, only if the Angola
government asks him to, and he seemed quite reluctant at that.
We're working very hard with the parties in.that area to
trying to bring about a resolution to that situation.
LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, what is your own feeling about
whether or not anything is really going to come of this -- of
this latest initiative of Castro's? Do you think that it's
possible there could be some kind of lessening of the tension
between the two countries?
SECRETARY DAM: I think that it's prudent for us to
examine carefully what he has to say, particularly what he has to
say to us diplomatically where it isn't just a big public blitz.
We have been able to -- on small things deal with Cuba. Of
course recently we had the negotiations about the return of the
Mariel Boatlift people, the so-called excludables, and they will
be going back to Cuba and we will be permitting political
prisoners and other immigrants into the United States, according
to the agreement. That's a small agreement.
But, to go beyond that into large subjects having to do
with the general political positions....
LEHRER: Trade -- lifting the trade boycotts, diplomatic
relations, et cetera, that's not in the cards anytime soon?
SECRETARY DAM: No, until there is some change in the
behavior of Cuba.
LEHRER: Finally, let me ask you this. Fidel Castro's
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4
 been in power for 26 years. Every administration, going back to
the very first one -- Eisenhower's Administration -- has been
essentially trying to get rid of him one way or another, and yet
he is still there. What is your own analysis of why he's been so
successful just in terms of having staying power ninety minutes
from here -- ninety miles from here, I should say?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, first of all, he has an authori-
tarian state. It's a little easier to stay in power whenever
there's an opponent who speaks out he's thrown in jail, or he can
have massive depression of the normal civil liberties. That's
point one.
Point two is he, as we've seen, a personality, and no
doubt that helped particularly in the earlier part of his career
to stay there.
And, thirdly, he's determined to stay. He more or less
said in one of these segments that he's going to stay in power
until he felt like leaving.
LEHRER: O.k., Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Approved For Release 2010/01/06: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301620004-4