INTERVIEW WITH FIDEL CASTRO, PART I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301620002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
DATE February 11, 1985 7:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
Interview With Fidel Castro, Part I
ROBERT MACNEIL: Our major focus section tonight is a
newsmaker interview with Cuban President Fidel Castro. Last
month the U.S. and Cuba successfully negotiated an agreement
under which Cuba will take back 2500 undesirables who came in the
Mariel boatlift of 1980 and the United States will reopen normal
immigration procedures in Havana. Since then, Castro's said he'd
be willing to talk further about improving relations. Washington
has reacted coldly, saying Castro is saying nothing new, and it
wants to see Cuban deeds, not words.
How far Castro wishes to push his new effort has not
been clear. But in Havana, part of his motivation is obvious.
Havana today expresses the weaknesses of the Cuban
revolution. Its successes are in the countryside, where better
nutrition, health care and education have changed more lives.
Havana, the symbol of the decadent past, was neglected, with
little new building.
But with an economy still unable to meet all Fidel's
goals an acute need for hard currency, old Havana is getting a
facelift to attract tourists. Buildings and streets from the
Spanish colonial period are being refurbished, as is the square
of the old cathedral.
The bulk of the tourists are still people from the
Eastern Bloc, their presence symbolizing Castro's dependence on
the communist world for economic survival in the face of the
American trade blockade. That's been in force for a quarter of a
century and has been tightened by the Reagan Administration.
Cuba's lifeline is a procession of Soviet merchant ships
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bringing virtually everything, from oil and lumber to light
bulbs. They return taking Cuban sugar, citrus and nickel, but
recently not enough to meet the plan quotas.
So Cuban consumers have been asked to tighten their
belts again, to wait for more attractive consumer goods, while a
big drive is made to boost exports to the Soviet Bloc and to the
West, both to meet Cuba's commitments to her communist partners
and to earn hard currency to pay her Western debts.
This is the context for the growing suggestions that
Castro, 26 years after his revolution, would like to patch things
up with the U.S.
There is no slackening of revolutionary zeal. The
spirit that defeated the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 is con-
stantly nourished, and the symbols of Castro's rise to power are
a national shrine. The revolution is still young enough to enjoy
tweaking Uncle Sam's beard. This poster says, "Mr. Imperalist,
we are absolutely not afraid of you." It is located close to the
U.S. Mission, now called the U.S. Interest Section because there
are no full-scale diplomatic relations, where U.S. officials try
to read the signals that Castro is sending.
On Friday night President Castro sat down with me for
the first major American television interview in six years. With
a Cuban government interpreter, we talked for more than four
hours, first about relations with the United States.
Mr. President, every time that you begin to talk about
improving relations with the United States, Washington says,
"Show us deeds, not words." What actions or deeds are you
prepared to make to improve relations with the United States?
FIDEL CASTRO: You said, many times I speak of improving
relations. Actually, there are not many times.
Now then, I have read a few statements in which it is
said that they want deeds and not words. I believe that that is
a style of speaking. I would say a style of a great power. I
understand that it is not easy for the United States to change
its style. We are a small country. We cannot speak in those
terms. But we are also a country with a lot of dignity, and no
one can suppose that we would beg the United States for an
improvement of relations. We have never done so, and we shall
never do it.
My intention is not that they belive what we say; but,
rather, simply to analyze our ideas and to go deeper in them, to
make objective analyses of events. It is not a matter of faith,
of confidence. It is a matter of objectivity.
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MACNEIL: Let's go through an objective analysis. The
State Department and the White House always say that there are
three obstacles to improving relations between Cuba and the
United States, and they are your allegiance to the Soviet Union,
what they call subversion in this hemisphere, and the large
number of your troops in Africa. Sometimes they also mention
human rights in Cuba. The White House mentioned human rights in
Cuba this week again.
Can we discuss in detail each of these, starting with
relations with the Soviet Union?
Is there a formula by which you could keep your ties to
the Soviet Union and improve relations with the United States?
CASTRO: If the United States believed that there are
three obstacles, actually there are quite few -- quite little. I
thought there were much more.
Now then, if we analyze these three types of obstacles,
the first -- that is, the relations that we have with the Soviet
Union, with the socialist countries, and with any other country
are matters of our sovereignty, and in fact cannot be questioned;
or, at least, we are not ready to discuss that.
And this is always -- this is something that I always
say in a very frank way. If in order to improve our relations
with the United States we must give up our convictions and our
principles, then relations will not improve on those grounds. If
we are going to question our sovereignty, then they will not
improve, either. Relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union are
based in the most strict respect for independence and sovereignty
of our country. We have friendly relations, very close relat-
ions, and these relations cannot be affected in order to improve
relations with the United States.
I believe that the United States would not respect a
country that would do such a thing. The countries that do those
things simply are not respected. And actually, we are not going
to change neither our flag nor our ideas. And our relations with
the Soviet Union and our friendship will be maintained intangible
[sic]. I say this being fully frank and fully sincere. And it
is necessary that this be understood.
MACNEIL: The Director of Cuban Affairs in the State
Department, Kenneth Scoog (?), he said in a speech in December,
"What Cuba could not do and still retain Moscow's favor is to
alter its fundamental commitment to unswerving support for Soviet
policy."
And so my question is, isn't that unswerving support for
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Soviet policy the price of the Soviet aid that keeps the Cuban
economy going?
CASTRO: Well, we coincide in many things with the
Soviet Union because we have a community of political principles.
It is a socialist country. We are a socialist country. We do
have many things in common with the Soviet Union. And in many
international problems, we have our common stands. That is based
on political ideas and principles. It is a friendly country of
whose friendship we will not reject and of which we cannot feel
ashamed of. Because, actually, we are not going to fight with
our friends to become friends of our adversaries. That we shall
never do. And the Soviets have never imposed any conditions on
us, on their assistance. And they have never attempted to tell
us what we should do, what we must do, with which countries we
ought to trade, and with which countries should we have relat-
ions.
So, I simply can't understand where these theories come
from -- that is, that our relations with the Soviets are an
obstacle. And if someone thinks that we are going to sell out or
that we are going to give up our banners or our flags or that we
are going to change our ideas, that is in error. Cuba is a
country that cannot be bought. And countries that are bought are
simply not respected.
MACNEIL: I think what the United States Government is
saying is that your economic dependence on Moscow makes you
automatically a part of the Soviet camp, in having to agree to
policies like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Would you, Fidel Castro, who values the independence and
integrity of a small country, would you alone have approved the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan if you had been free to make
your own choice? Did you, privately and personally, approve of
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan?
CASTRO: When it was put forth at the U.N. -- that is,
the question, the issue -- we said clearly that in that conflict,
in that attack, that tremendous attack against the Soviet Union
led by the United States, we were not going to be on the side of
the United States, simply not. And we were then on the side of
the Soviet Union. In otherwords, we did not deal or delve on the
topic. That is what we said: This is our position because of
this.
MACNEIL: But isn't that the point, that your friendship
and dependence on the Soviet Union makes you part of the camp,
and therefore take positions which Washington regards as anti-
American positions?
CASTRO: You establish this dependency, or something,
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that is actual. In fact -- but in today's world, in the economic
arena, no one is absolutely independent, not even the United
States, nor Japan, nor Western Europe. They depend on oil, raw
materials. And from many other countries, they need markets,
they need trade. That is, no country is totally independent
economically.
MACNEIL: Is it not true that your role, in return for
all the aid you get from the Soviet Union, is to be a thorn in
America's side?
CASTRO: If that were true, we would not be talking
about improving relations with the United States. If our role is
to be a thorn, then it would not be convenient for us.
Actually, it does not bring us great benefits, either.
That is, we are based on a conviction and it is the necessity to
struggle in our area, in Central America, throughout the world.
It is a duty, actually a duty that we have in order to lower
tensions and to achieve relations of peace as well. And I say
this sincerely, although I am a revolutionary, I was a revolut-
ionary, I am a revolutionary, and I shall always be a revolution-
ary, and I will not change a single of my principles for a
thousand relations with a thousand countries like the United
States.
MACNEIL: Will the Soviet Union continue to provide you
with the aid and support it does, do you believe, if you have
good relations with the Soviet -- with the United States?
CASTRO: Look, our relations with the Soviet Union, with
the socialist countries are solid things based on principles and
have absolutely nothing to do with our economic and political
relations with the United States.
I will say one thing, though. The Soviet Union and the
Soviet people feel great appreciation and great respect toward
Cuba. But it is -- they respect Cuba because they admire us,
others people do, the courage of Cuba, Cuba's staunchness, and
Cuba's capability to resist for over 26 years the aggressions,
the economic blockade, and the brutality of the United States.
MACNEIL: Would the Soviet Union like it if you had
better relations with the United States, the blockade perhaps
were lifted, and the economic burden on the Soviet Union were
shared or lessened?
CASTRO: The United States will pay us for our sugar at
the price of the Soviets, or will they be buying the nickel, and
they will be maintaining the type of relations and trade that we
have with the socialist countries? But I believe the idea
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that we have any needs to trade with the United States should be
totally eradicated. Everything we have done during these 26
years, we have done it without trade with the United States. And
our future has been conceived without trade with the United
States.
Actually, we have not asked from the Soviet Union.
Generally, we don't ask their opinion on our economic or politic-
al relations in an international arena. But I know the Soviet
Union very well and I know the policy of the Soviet Union. And
the Soviet Union would never be against Cuba's developing its
economic relations with the other capitalist countries, including
the United States.
MACNEIL: So, to move on to the second point that
Washington says is an obstacle to better relations, what the
White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, called this week your
subversion in the hemisphere.
Let me quote you again Mr. Scoog of the State Depart-
ment. "It is Cuba's striving, with Soviet support, to introduce
Marxist-Leninist regimes throughout the hemisphere which still
lies at the heart of our differences."
Would you comment on that?
CASTRO: Well, I could also accuse the Pope of practic-
ing subversion in Latin America and preaching Christianity and
Catholicism. He has visited the countries even recently. He met
with natives and said that the land had to be given to the
natives, and the land properties. And he declared that schools
were necessary for the children, jobs for the workers and for the
families, medicine and doctors for the ill, and also foodstuffs
or housing.
What we preach is more or less that. And besides, it is
what we have done in our country.
So then, we will continue being Marxists and we'll
continue being socialists. And we will always say that our
social system is more just. But we have said also, because we
are convinced about it, we have said the following, and which is
my answer to that: Neither can Cuba export revolution, because
revolutions cannot be exported. And the economic, social
factors, the cultural, historical factors that determine the boom
of the revolution cannot be exported.
The external, the huge external debt of Latin America
cannot be exported. The formula applied by the International
Monetary Fund cannot be exported by Cuba. The unequal trade
cannot be exported by Cuba. Underdevelopment and poverty cannot
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be exported by Cuba. And that is why Cuba cannot export revolut-
ion. It is absurd. It is ridiculous to say that the revolutions
can be exported.
But the United States cannot, on the other hand, avoid
them, either. The United States accuses us maybe of wanting to
promote change. Well, we would like to see changes occur. But
changes will come whether the United States likes it or not,
whether or not Cuba likes it.
I could answer by saying that the United States wants to
maintain an unjust social order that has meant for the people's
of this hemisphere poverty, hunger, underdevelopment, diseases,
ignorance. And the United States wants to maintain that.
And we could also say that the United States wants to
avoid change. We are accused of wanting to promote change. We
can also accuse the United States of wanting to avoid change and
of wanting to maintain an unjust social regime.
But actually, neither can we export it, nor can the
revolution avoid it -- nor can the United States avoid it.
MACNEIL: In supporting militarily the Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua, is Cuba not helping to sustain and introduce a
Marxist-Leninist regime?
CASTRO: In helping Nicaragua, by offering military
cooperation? Well, we are helping an independent country. We
are helping a just revolution to defend itself. That's simply
what we're doing. In the same way that, for example, the United
States has also sent their weapons to this hemipshere to other
people. It sent weapons to Somoza. It sent weapons to Trujillo
when Trujillo was there. It sent weapons to Pinochet. It sent
weapons to all of the repressive governments of Latin America,
governments that murdered, tortured dozens of thousands of
people, governments which disappeared tens of thousands of
people. They had no moral obstacle in giving any economic,
financial, and military assistance to these governments.
So, with what moral grounds can it be questioned -- that
is, can our right be questioned to help Nicaragua, and Nicarag-
ua's right to receive that aid?
I ask the following: Can the United States help the
counterrevolutionary bands, supply weapons to them, explosives to
fight inside Nicaragua, something that has meant the lives of
thousands and thousands of people, and on the other hand question
Cuba's right and Nicaragua's right for us to give them economic,
technical aid, and even some cooperation in the military field?
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MACNEIL: So you would not stop giving such aid as a
condition of improved relations with the United States.
CASTRO: We shall not make any unilateral decision in
our relations and cooperation with Nicaragua. What we have said
is that in Central America a political negotiated solution is
possible. What we say is that we support the effort of Contadora
to seek solutions of peace in Central America, that we support it
staunchly, sincerely, and that we believe that political solut-
ions exist and peace solutions exist that are convenient for
Nicaraguans, for Central America, and for the United States
itself. And we are ready to struggle for that. And also, in
fact, the agreements that are reached shall be complied by us in
a determined way. That is, any agreement reached between
Nicaragua and the Contadora framework shall be complied by us to
the very limit.
MACNEIL: How hopeful are you that -- now that some
political settlment can be reached in Central America?
CASTRO: I am absolutely convinced. I have a lot of
information about the work of Contadora effort or the discussions
of the burning issues there, the positions of the United States,
Nicaragua's positions. And I am convinced, fully convinced, that
it is possible to find formulas that will be acceptable by all
parties, or to all parties. I have that conviction. I'm
convinced about that.
Now then, for it, it is necessary for the United States
to want to really cooperate in finding a political solution. I
believe that as long as the United States is convinced that it
can destroy the Sandinista revolution from within by combining
the ef.fectof the economic measures against Nicaragua with the
economic difficulty inside Nicaragua and the actions of the
counterrevolutionary bands, as long as they're convinced that
they can destroy the revolution from within, it will not be
seriously ready to seek a political solution to the problems of
Central America. Because if it believes that it will destroy the
revolution, why negotiate, then? Why reach agreements?
Now then, now, when the United States becomes persuaded
that it shall not achieve that goal, that the Nicaraguan revolut-
ion cannot be destroyed from within -- because of the questions I
mentioned, problems I mentioned, I believe that they can face the
economic problems with what they produce and with the aid they
are receiving, the economic aid they're receiving. If they
handle it correctly, efficiently, they can face the economic
problems. I'm convinced of that.
I am also convinced that they can defeat the bands, and
that the bands will never be able to defeat...
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MACNEIL: Excuse me. By "the bands" you mean what are
called in the United States the Contras.
CASTRO: Yes. The counterrevolutionary bands. That
will be defeated -- they will be defeated.
So, then a situation will come up before the United
States -- that is, the United States will have no other altern-
ative but to negotiate seriously to seek a solution, or invade
Nicaragua. And since in my view, in my criteria, a U.S. invasion
in Nicaragua is unconceivable, since it would mean such a serious
mistake, a terrible mistake, that I do not simply think that the
United States would really get to the point of making that
mistake. I cannot assure you that it might not do it, but I say
that it is unconceivable that under the present circumstances in
Latin America, under the present circumstances of crisis, with
the present feeling on the part of the Latin American peoples, at
the times we're living in, the aggression and invastion against a
Latin American country would be as catastrophic, in political
terms, it would mean such a political cost, and not only a
political cost, but also in terms of U.S. lives.
MACNEIL: Let me turn to Africa. The third of those
obstacles that Washington sees to improving relations with you,
your troops in Angola. You talked recently about circumstances
arising which would cause you to bring them home. What would
happen -- what would have to happen to start bringing the Cuban
troops out of Angola?
CASTRO: What is needed there? Well, discussions have
taken place, with the participation of the United States. The
United States has had dialogues, talks with Angola's leadership.
We are informed, through the Angolans, about these negotiations
or talks that have been held, with our support and with our full
cooperation. That is, they have carried out these negotiations
in close contact with Cuba.
MACNEIL: Could you withdraw any of your troops before
there is agreement?
CASTRO: No. No. The Angolans would not agree with
that. And from our point of view, it would be a mistake. And
the Angolan proposal -- that is, if those circumstances come up,
then Angola commits itself, then Cuba, of course, would support
it, to withdraw in a period of three years what is called the
grouping of troops in the south, which is made up by approximate-
ly 20,000 men. And even the figure was given.
This is the bulk of our troops, actually. But there are
still troops in the center and to the north of Angola, including
Cabinda. The Angolans have not included these troops in the
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negotiations, these present negotiations. And their position is
that to withdraw those troops, it will be something that would
have to be discussed between Angola and Cuba, whenever it is
considered that they can dispense of these troops.
MACNEIL: Do you think that this projected settlement of
the Angola situation, does that erase Cuban troops in Angola as
an issue between you and the United States?
CASTRO: Before, there were no troops in Angola, and
relations were very bad with the United States. Today, were
there no troops in Angola, or in some other place, or there are
no advisers in Central America, maybe the United States might
invent something else.
MACNEIL: Just to sum up our conversation about improv-
ing relations with the United States, why is this the right time
to raise this? And realistically speaking, how hopeful are you
that it can happen?
CASTRO: Whether this is the right, best moment, I
believe that if the United States is objective, if it is realist-
ic, I would say that it is the best moment for the United States.
Not for us. Actually, we can go on for five, 10, 15, 20 more
years.
The only obligation on our part, really, is toward
peace. If there's peace here and in other areas, we will feel
more pleased. If the relations are normalized, even more
pleased. Because it would be, then, a progressive progress.
Peace is convenient for all. But from the political point of
view, I'm convinced, and I'm saying this frankly, I think that
the United States benefits most than us. We can sit here and
wait calmly and see what happens in the coming years.
MACNEIL: Tomorrow night Fidel Castro talks candidly
about human rights in Cuba, political prisoners, dissent, the
controlled press, and the mistakes of his revolution. He also
discusses what he sees as an explosive economic situation in
Latin America.
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