ARKADY SHEVCHENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301580006-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Good Morning America STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network
DATE February 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Arkady Shevchenko
DAVID HARTMAN: In the spring of 1978 an important
Soviet diplomat, who at the time was serving as Undersecretary
General at the United Nations, defected to the United States.
Arkady Shevchenko was the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to
defect since World War II. Well, now he's written a book about
why he defected, about how he spied on the Soviets for the CIA,
and much about the inside workings of the Soviet government. His
memoirs are entitled Breaking with Moscow.
Arkady Shevchenko joins us this morning from Washington.
Good morning, Mr. Shevchenko. Welcome back.
Why'd you defect?
ARKADY SHEVCHENKO: I defected, of course, for several
reasons. But first of all, I beloned to the elite. I occupied a
high position in the Soviet Union. But let me tell you, the
elite also doesn't have a personal freedom. We live in a kind of
golden cage, entirely controlled. We cannot speak freedly, do
freely what we want to. We have all the material benefits,
chauffeur-driven cars, dachas, and so on and so forth. But we
didn't have this little thing which sometimes Americans do not
appreciate: to do what we want and to think what we want -- what
we would like to do.
HARTMAN: How surprised should all of us be that more
Soviets don't defect?
SHEVCHENKO: Oh, to begin with, there is quite a lot of
the prominent Soviet people who defected. There is a lot of
writers, artists, dancers, and musicians. There's not too many
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politicians. And let me tell you, because they are not certain
how they can adjust to a society in the West. There is a lot of
unknown things.
I was lucky to know more about the West because I lived
for a very long time in the United States and I can compare, that
I was sure and I knew what I can expect.
So -- and there are people, for sure, even in the
political elite in the Soviet Union, people who share my views.
But there is a lot of problem. To leave your country is some-
thing which, as you know, it's a hard decision. You always will
have a pain in your heart. You always will miss your country.
You'll always miss your former friends. It's a big problem with
the family. Some of the member of your family may not join you.
This is something which is really a decision which could be made
only once in your life. You know it's irreversible decision, and
you have to face all the consequences of that.
I had also, on top of that, a serious disagreement with
the policy of my government. And it was very difficult for me to
defend a position in which I'd entirely lost face [sic]. It was
extremely difficult.
And if you would like to find a last straw -- Americans
always would like to find out what is the last straw, what really
pushed you at the last moment. I was Undersecretary General of
the United Nations, assumingly an independent international civil
servant. But actually, Soviets dictated me what I have to do. I
mean I received almost every day orders from Moscow, which is, of
course, contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. And I
looked like an idiot. My colleagues in the United Nations had no
respect for me because I was just a puppet, not a really inde-
pendent man who performed my duty.
But it was, as I would repeat again, a last straw.
First of all, it's really a matter of freedom. There's a lot of
people who really -- the Soviet Union and Russia have to be proud
of them -- who left the Soviet Union. Rostropovitch and Barysh-
nikov, a lot of them. They also had lack of freedom. They had
lack or artistical freedom. I have a lack of freedom to influ-
ence any way, political way, the Soviet system. It was abso-
lutely useless for me to continue to be with the Soviet govern-
ment, because I could not change anything. And I lost a belief
that the Soviet Union is really, is a champion of peace, in which
I believe initially, it's for disarmament, and so on and so
forth. I saw the reality. And the more I rose in ranks in the
Soviet Union, the more I knew what is going on behind the scene.
I saw the hypocrisy which has absolutely penetrated the top of
the Soviet leadership.
HARTMAN: Let me ask you -- let me interrupt. Let me
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ask you, briefly, a couple of questions about Soviet policy.
Many people here in our country would like to improve
the relationship between our country and the Soviet Union. Many
people in our country believe it's up to us to make that happen.
Realistically, realistically, how much can we do right now to
improve the relationship with the Soviet Union?
SHEVCHENKO: I think that we have to have a normal
relation, what I would say, with the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union and the United States are the two major country of the
world, with enormous military might. They can destroy each other
or they can destroy the whole world.
HARTMAN: We are going into the arms talks right now.
Realistically, what can we achieve in these arms talks without
giving up the store?
SHEVCHENKO: We can achieve something. But you're
absolutley right. We cannot give the store. We should not make
any kind of a unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union to give
up all the military programs here now before, I mean, any kind of
negotiation or without any kind of giving anything in return from
the Soviet Union. And we have to be very careful in negotiating
with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union -- first of all,
we should not accept any kind of ambiguous formulation, because
the Soviets will use all loophole not to obey. We have to have
only the agreements with the Soviet Union which can be verifi-
able. Because if we conclude unverifiable agreements with the
Soviet Union, they will cheat for sure.
But the Soviet Union also has some interests. The Sovie
leadership also don't want to have a nuclear war, which, as you
know, can blow them -- they can burn themselves in a nuclear war.
So that there are some common interests between the
Soviet Union and the United States. And if these interests are
coincidable and parallel, we can achieve something. We can avoid
unnecessary risk of a nuclear war.
HARTMAN: Let me interrupt you again, in the interests
You are quoted as saying in your book that over half the
Soviets in New York City are KGB agents. Briefly, realistically,
again, what can the United States do, if anything, about that?
SHEVCHENKO: What we can do, only one thing, is to watch
them as carefully as possible. And unfortunately, some of the
people here in Washington, they don't like to pay enough atten-
tion to have enough personnel to follow the Soviets which are in
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the United States. We have no control over them because,
unfortunately, they are at the United States and they have as
much people as they want there at the Soviet mission to the
United Nations. There is no reciprocity, let's say, because the
U.N. allows to have as many Soviets as possible.
So the only way is to not to -- you know, Congress
should really seriously think about that, to have enough people
to watch carefully what the Soviets are doing.
And secondly, American should not be so naive as to
believe that the -- to believe that a lot of Soviets are really,
I mean, good, that these people are real diplomats or real
scholars, and so on. They have to be extremely cautious about
that. I don't say that there is no real diplomats or real
scholar and good people who come from the Soviet Union here. But
we have to be on alert all the time and to try to find out who is
who before being frank, open with them.
HARTMAN: Mr. Shevchenko, let me interrupt. We also
want to discuss the economy this morning. It's good to have you
back with us, Arkady Shevchenko.
Thank you, sir.
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