ROBERT KUPPERMAN INTERVIEW/THE BEIRUT BOMBING
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01070R000301400004-8
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RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 14, 2010
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 27, 1984
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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RADIO N REPORTS, ~N~
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068
PROGRAM C r o s s f i r e
DATE September 27, .1984 7:30 P.M.
Atlanta, Ga.
Robert Kupperman Interview/The Beirut Bombing
ANNOUNCER: From Washington, Crossfire. Tonight, whose
mistake allowed the Beirut blast? The hosts for Crossfire: on
the left, Tom Braden; on the right, Pat Buchanan. In the
crossfire, Robert Kupperman, expert on terrorism.
PAT BUCHANAN: President Reagan yesterday suggested
that, quote, the near-destruction of our intelligence capability,
unquote, during the Carter years resulted in the lack of warning
of the murderous truck-bombing of.the U.S. Embassy Annex in
Beirut last week. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democratic Senator
from New York and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, called the President's charge false and reckless,
and threatened to introduce a motion to censure the President in
the U.S. Senate if an apology is not forthcoming. And there the
matter stands.
TOM BRADEN: Mr. Kupperman, as an expert on terrorism,
can you tell me what you think about the President's statement
that it was a failure, it was the gutting of the intelligence
agencies by Stan Turner that caused this,?
ROBERT KUPPERMAN: I think, like many things, it's
partially true. And that is, I think Stansfield Turner empha-
sized the technological side of intelligence collection, as
compared with the HUMIT, the spy side of the business.
BRADEN: Yeah, but now wait just a minute. President
Reagan accused him of gutting the intelligence agencies.
KUPPERMAN: I think what he was referring to, if the
President understood his own comment at all, was the human
collection side. You don't collect on terrorists through
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BRADEN: Look, Mr. Kupperman -- Pat, look, I simply have
to say something about this. Now, I don't want to -- you know,
I'm a human being and I know you're an expert on terrorism. But
you obviously don't know much about the Central Intelligence
Agency. I know those people. I know every one of those people
who was dismissed. I can tell you what their names were, I can
tell you where they live now. Now, those people were covert
action types. Most of them had been in the OSS. They were
getting along in years. They had done nothing. I hate to use
the term, but some of them were deadwood. And not one of them,
with one exception, out of about 700 people that Turner got rid
of -- and they've all been replaced now -- about 700 people, only
one of them was an intelligence expert. The others were covert
action types, which wouldn't have made any difference in Lebanon.
Now, I know that to be true.
KUPPERMAN: Then you've answered your own question,
haven't you?
BRADEN: Well, I just wanted to straighten you out. I'm
sorry but I had to straighten you out, because that charge is
just totally false.
BUCHANAN: Well, you're talking about the firing from
Jim Angleton's shop after Angleton left.
Did Stansfield Turner and Jimmy Carter gut or nearly
destroy, to use the President's phraseology, the intelligence
capability of the CIA?
KUPPERMAN: On the human side, the human collection
side, which is what is needed for the terrorism field, we have
done very poorly for quite some years. It certainly has been
argued, the case had been argued for quite some time, maybe
incorrectly...
BRADEN: We surely have done damn poorly, Mr. Kupperman,
but the intelligence side was never touched by Stansfield Turner.
The human intelligence side was not touched. The human covert
action capacity was, yes, was...
BUCHANAN: Question: Was the human intelligence side
nearly destroyed? Was the President right when he made that
statement yesterday?
KUPPERMAN: What I understand, not having been in the
intelligence community personally, but from those in the terror-
ism business at the CIA, that the field was decimated during the
Turner years.
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BUCHANAN: The anti-terrorism unit at the CIA was, from
your conversations with people in it, nearly decimated or
destroyed during the Turner...
KUPPERMAN: Seriously injured, whatever particular
adjective you want.
BUCHANAN: So the President's comment there about the
agency is fair comment and criticism. Now, all right.
Well, let me move on, then. Look, what intelligence do
we really need, though, in Beirut when a truck bomb destroys the
embassy, a truck bomb blows up the Marines, to guard against a
truck bomb coming at the embassy annex? Do you need any great
intelligence to know that they might strike that way?
KUPPERMAN: You need two things. Clearly, if you can
cut them off at the pass because you've learned ahead of time,
that's all the better. In all cases, the host country is
presumed to provide a lot of help. In Lebanon they can't do it.
We have...
BRADEN: So we relied on the Lebanese guards. I don't
know what the intelligence capability has to do with that.
KUPPERMAN: The point I'm trying to make to you is that
the real failure here was security. The real failure, in many
cases when we know that this is the sort of problem we're going
to face...
BUCHANAN: Truck bomb.
KUPPERMAN: A truck bomb -- is we made no adequate
precautions.
BRADEN:. If the real problem was security, then the real
problem wasn't the intelligence, wasn't some people being fired
from the CIA back in the 1970s.
BUCHANAN: In other words, what the President said maybe
true, but it may not be relevant at all.
KUPPERMAN: I guess what I'm saying is that even if it
were entirely relevant, say three years ago, there comes a point
where it becomes irrelevant. It is now our problem. It is now
Reagan's problem.
BUCHANAN: All right. Then this calls for a political
judgment. In speaking to those kids out there, maybe he spoke
off the cuff, but did he try to pass the buck to Jimmy Carter
unfairly?
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KUPPERMAN: I think yes.
BUCHANAN: You think he did.
KUPPERMAN: I 'don't think that whatever happened four
years ago is a clean reflection of what is going on today.
BUCHANAN: All right. That clears that up. Let's get
into this.
Who, Mr. Kupperman -- why cannot we find out the group
or the office or the individual who, after these two massacres of
Americans in Lebanon because of truck bombs, who has responsibi-
lity at the annex for preventing or stopping that kind of attack,
so that we can say, "Look, Jones," or Smith, "you've been a good
employee, you've done your job, but you're responsible and a
horrendous failing has happened. And therefore, by order of the
Commander-in-Chief, Ronald Reagan, you're gone"?
KUPPERMAN: Pat, you can pick anybody you want and you
can find someone or some collection of people responsible for
security and you can dump them. On the other hand, you've got to
understand that the whole subject of terrorism varies from
apathy, to being treated with apathy to paranoia to apathy to
paranoia.
BRADEN: Well, let me ask you this. After this latest
bombing -- that was the third in 17 months during the Reagan
Administration -- we have Caspar Weinberger saying any terrorist
could hire a helicopter, you have George Shultz saying embassies
have to stay open, and you have the President talking about how
what a long time it takes to fix up the kitchen.
Now, the man who was in charge of security in Beirut had
advised against this move.
BUCHANAN: Whom did he advise and who made the move? I
guess that's the question, if you're talking about specific,
detailed responsibility.
KUPPERMAN: It's the Office of Security in the State
Department.
BUCHANAN: In the State Department.
BUCHANAN: George Shultz, the Secretary of State, tough
statement after the Marines were hit. He's talking with the
Israelis: We're going to go into preventive measure against
terrorists and we're going to take action beforehand, preemptive
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strikes. It was very tough. Now we've had these three massacres
in Beirut by one group calling itself Islamic Jihad, if it
exists. There has been no retaliation. There have been no
preventive strikes.
I mean is the Reagan Administration -- are they bluffing
over there, Mr. Kupperman?
KUPPERMAN: I think they're kidding themselves. I don't
think that they know about who these people are. I don't think
they have enough information about precise locations. And I
think they cannot get used to the notion that they may have to be
in the assassination business.
BUCHANAN: All right. That's exactly what I wanted to
get to, the assassination business. Look, we do know, I think,
that -- we might not know who the indivdiuals are who did this,
but we do know who has given them a measure of support -- and I
guess that's with the Marines. It was the Iranians, or whatever
it is, that moved the stuff in there. They're operating under an
area controlled by Syria. And as long as a group of terrorists,
a couple of them, as long as they have a state that's either
looking the other way or encouraging them or giving them a
benediction, is the state which supports terror not responsible
for the terror that's carried out?
KUPPERMAN: There's no question that they are respons-
ible. The question, I think, that we face is how far, under-
standing some degree of plausible deniability, how far we're
willing to go and what risks we're taking, and how capable are
we? Are we going to bungle it if we go in and find three or four
of our people caught and hanged?
BUCHANAN: Go in and assassinate whom, do you think?
KUPPERMAN: The leader of the -- the operational leader
or the planner in the intelligence agencies in Syria, for
example, or Iran.
BRADEN: Let me interrupt you both to tell you something
that I just found out because it was just handed to me. Jimmy
Carter said today, this afternoon, late this afternoon, that
Reagan's suggestions that the CIA budget cuts had led to the
embassy bombing is, quote, personally insulting and too gross in
its implications to ignore. He went on, "This series of trage-
dies has been brought about by the President's deeply flawed
policy and inadequate security precautions in the face of proven
danger." So, just to settle that one, what Carter thought.
BUCHANAN: What do you think of that statement?
KUPPERMAN: Look, we're clearly in an eara -- at a time,
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rather, of obvious political accusations. I don't think that
Stansfield Turner's actions four years ago, or whatever, make any
difference whatsoever now. We are faced with tremendous opera-
tional and intelligence questions, and we are faced with apathy,
disorganization within the government in terms of how we're going
to handle this problem.
BRADEN: Well, how would you handle it?
BUCHANAN: Why is there apathy?
BRADEN: Let me just ask -- you mentioned apathy.
Supposing -- you're an adviser to the White House, you're an
adviser on security to the State Department, you've adviced the
CIA, you've advised embassies. What would you tell them to do
right now? Because I think you've pointed out exactly what the
situation is.
KUPPERMAN: Let me tell you. Number one, in the case of
security, in those areas where you're in obvious high risk, which
obviously includes Beirut, you need big buffer areas, physically.
You need explosives dogs -- that is, dogs that have been trained
to sense explosives. If You can't come up with exotic defense
systems, such as pop-up barriers or whatever, you can come in
temporarily with a dump truck with sand just to block...
BRADEN: Well, wasn't it really an example of apathy
that, lacking a steel door because they'd ordered it and it
hadn't arrived, they didn't pull up trucks full of sand in the
way they did right here at the White House?
KUPPERMAN: Well, it was an act of negligence. It's
more than apathy.
BRADEN: All right, negligence is what we've decided
right now, so far, on the question of who's responsible for the
Beirut bombing. We're talking with an expert on terrorism,
Robert Kupperman of Georgetown University.
BUCHANAN: I want to go back, Bob Kupperman, to a point
you made. You mentioned the word assassination. Let me give you
some examples of what -- let's take Qaddafi. Qaddafi has sent
people into Western Europe to murder dissidents. Presumably, he
has sent them into the United States to do the same thing. There
was talk of hit squads out to kill the President.
Now, if -- this is hypothetical. If we found out that
Qaddafi is sending hit squads in to kill the President, certainly
you've got a moral right to retaliate against him. Would you
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recommend either an attempt on his life, Qaddafi's life, or use
of American planes, for example, to strike at Qaddafi in his tent
one night, or what? What I'm getting at is the idea of state-
sponsored terror. It makes no sense to run down the two or three
Shiites who are willing to go to their death, and take them out
and hang them, when a state is sponsoring and supporting it.
KUPPERMAN: Pat, there's no question in my mind that
we've got to be very careful about covert operations. I don't
think we do them well. If we bungle it, the public relations,
the international effects would be really very substantial.
BUCHANAN: Well, that's secret. Suppose you do it in
public.
KUPPERMAN: What I'm saying is I think it ought to be
done overtly, if we decide to do it at all.
BUCHANAN: Overtly.
KUPPERMAN: Overtly.
BUCHANAN: All right. What would you recommend...
BRADEN: Assassinate Qaddafi openly? You couldn't...
BUCHANAN: You could do it overtly by an air strike.
KUPPERMAN: Air strikes or whatever.
BUCHANAN: Air strikes on Qaddafi.
What would you do now? Look, three times we've been hit
by people, all of them, presumably, operating under control of
the Syrians in occupied Lebanon. The Israeli didn't allow these
people to operate. The Falange didn't, the Lebanese didn't.
Presumably, it was the Syrians. Are not the Syrians responsible?
KUPPERMAN: In part, certainly yes. They clearly did
the planning for the incident involving the Marines. They
clearly were the only of the two nations invovled with the
technical capacity to supply both the explosives and -- you know,
setting off a multi-ton bomb is not a trivial matter. It takes a
bit of geometry and electronics.
BRADEN: So that you feel that the Syrian's had to know
that it was coming in and had to approve it. All right. Then
why is our Secretary of State saying Syria has been helpful in
the Middle East?
KUPPERMAN: I think that he's got a broader agenda, and
I think that business of terrorism is occasionally...
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BRADEN: You wrote what seemed to me an extremely
interesting article not long ago -- I've forgotten in what
newspaper I read it -- that said, look, we're going to have
--this is coming home to the United States, or there's a very
good chance that it will. Now, what kind of a life would we be
leading here in this country if in every city we had to protect,
I suppose, the [technical difficulties], we'd have to protect all
our -- Washington would certainly be a different place.
KUPPERMAN: Tom, I believe that, largely, what I'd like
to use is overt means, as overt means as we could, that we've got
to make some countries and some terrorist groups that' are
harbored by those nations feel vulnerable. There have to be some
public, rather unpleasant, even violent examples of what can
happen to them.
BRADEN: Aren't we taking a chance -- and I think you
mentioned it when you were talking with Israel's former Defense
Minister Arens -- we take a chance if we make a mistake. Suppose
that our diligent press corps finds out that those guys weren't
responsible at all after we've just delivered a bomb on them.
KUPPERMAN: Tom, you know, we do the best job we can.
We're going to have to make -- we're going to be in the business
of making mistakes occasionally.
I'm sorry, Pat, hold on.
KUPPERMAN: There's an important point here. We have
got to understand that we not only can make mistakes and that
terrorism may strike here, but we're a large great country with
liberal values to uphold. And it seems to me that if we're going
to do anything, we're going to have to do it abroad as overtly as
we can, justify as best we can the intelligence and political
reasons why we did it, and we're going to have to suffer the
consequences in some cases.
BRADEN: We now have three car-bombings in 17 months,
and we've had both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Shultz saying that we would
take some vengeance about that, we would do something about this.
And we've done nothing. What would you suggest we do now?
KUPPERMAN: If you wait long enough and you can't
identify the people, you better wait for the next incident.
You've got to be able to do it very quickly afterwards.
BUCHANAN: Bob Kupperman, look, let me list you groups,
organizations and states which have supported or endorsed terror:
the PLO, Syria, Libya, North Korea, South Yemen, Iraq, Iran,
Cuba. Bulgaria and Romania have sent assassins into Western
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Europe. Now, all of those, with the exception of Iran, which the
Ayatollah operates his own shop, all of those are client states
of the Soviet Union.
Now, what I would like to know is which of those states,
if any -- let's take North Korea, for example, which blew up half
the South Korean Cabinet last year in Rangoon, ax-murdered a
couple of Americans a few years ago, captured the American Pueblo
and shot down an American plane in international waters. It
seems to me that North Korea and other states do this because (A)
there's a great benefit to it and (B) there's no punishment
whatsoever.
Now, what should we have done in the case of North
KUPPERMAN: The case of North Korea? We may very well
have had to use, since it didn't affect us directly -- that is,
the case in Burma, the South Koreans -- I think all we could do
under those conditions was to encourage covert operations, or,
behind the scenes, even an overt case, aid the South Korean
government in doing the job. We can't do it for everybody else.
BUCHANAN: You mean a tit-for-tat thing. You mean if
they kill our Cabinet minister, we kill one of theirs?
KUPPERMAN: Maybe.
BUCHANAN: But it seems to me a great power like the
United States cannot behave like we're in some Italian city-state
in the Fifteenth Century, stabbing them in the back when they
stab us. We're a great nation.
KUPPERMAN: You're right. The point is, if we do
anything of that nature, that's got to be extremely covert. We
can't bungle it to the point that it comes out that we were
involved.
On the other hand, if one of our embassies gets hit, as
just did happen, and if we can reasonably justify that it was
some particular group harbored by Iran, harbored by Syria,
whatever, then I think we ought to go in with F-15s.
BUCHANAN: Hit, in other words, Iran.
BRADEN: Hit Iran or hit Syria.
BUCHANAN: Who would you hit in Iran?
KUPPERMAN: Cells, locations, training camps for the
Revolutionary Guards, for example.
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BRADEN: And in Syria?
BUCHANAN: Do you think that would pay off?
KUPPERMAN: I think it's a little risky, but in the long
run it's going to pay off for one reason. It'll look as though
the home team can win occasionally.
BRADEN: Doesn't the Reagan Administration, which has
touted itself as something very strong and stand up tall, doesn't
it look a little weak, in view of the fact that we've now had
three in 17 months?
KUPPERMAN: Tom, I personally think -- and since you
know the intelligence business and have been in it, and I've not.
I think that you would agree that you try to keep the business
fairly quiet, and the last thing you need is a lot of machismo
about it. It seems to me that...
BRADEN: All right. Well, I bet -- the problem is when
this thing first happened, I bet Pat that President Reagan would
retaliate, and he was a little doubtful. I thought he would. I
thought something would happen in the next few days. Now, it may
be that something is in the wind, something is in the works. I
don't know.
KUPPERMAN: Tom, it could happen, you know. But the
longer you wait, the less excusable, the less justifiable your
raids become, particularly because we're a great nation.
The only thing is, let us suppose that we hit the wrong
people, let us suppose that an Iranian cell operating here
decides to get very active, let us say that they set off a large
bomb somewhere.
KUPPERMAN: Here. Or they hit some key transformers and
blacken the Northeast for a week or so.
BUCHANAN: That's an act of war.
BRADEN: Well, all right.
KUPPERMAN: It's easy to do.
BRADEN: It looks bad ahead.
Mr. Kupperman, Pat and I want to thank you for being our
guest on Crossfire.
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BUCHANAN: Tom, I don't think Ronald Reagan's statement
out there in Ohio was deliberate. I think it's just something he
fired off the cuff. I don't think it's going to sell. It looks
unpresidential. More important than whether or not the agency
was gutted by Jimmy Carter is not the important thing. It looks
like he's sloughing off the blame on somebody else. It's not the
way Ronald Reagan is supposed to lead.
BRADEN: Yeah. Except the only problem, Pat, is he did
exactly the same thing nearly a year ago when all those Marines
were killed. President Reagan said, well, it was the fault of
the previous Administrations and the way they handled the
intelligence agencies. So I don't think it'll play the second
time, any more than it did the first.
But somebody ought to be responsible. Somebody's head
ought to roll. Somebody should be fired.
BUCHANAN: Somebody's head should roll. Somebody ought
to be fired. But last time -- I'll give the President credit
--he did stand up and say, "Look, the buck stops here. Ulti-
mately, I'm responsible. It's me." He didn't do that this time.
BRADEN: Well, let him go to the American people and say
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