THE FRED FLAKE SHOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000201300003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 20, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM The Fred Fiske Show STATION WAMU-FM
DATE July 20, 1984 8:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
FRED FISKE: Among the things which I deplore is the
willingness on the part of so many people to see conspiracy be-
hind many of the dramatic events which occur these days,
especially when all the answers aren't immediately apparent.
That doesn't mean that plots and conspiracies don't exist. And
Paul Hensey, in his new book The Plot to Kill the Pope, re-
constructs the conspiracy behind the attempt to assassinate Pope
John II on May 13th, 1981.
Paul Hens"e was a key staff member of President Carter's
National Security Council, and a top expert on Turkey.
Very nice to have you with us.
PAUL HENtY: Thank you, Fred. Good to be here.
FISKE: You spent your career in the Foreign Service and
with the National Security Council. Is*that correct?
HEN&~g ': Yes, primarily. I spent nearly 30 years in
government by the time I retired, and that was almost four years
ago now. I spent about half of that time abroad in quite a
variety of places, but Turkey was one of the places where I spent
a considerable amount of time.
FISKE: And you are fluent in Turkish.
L E,
HEN4'r&i`: Yes, I speak Turkish, and have always managed
to keep it up. I go to Turkey quite often and know the country
quite well.
FISKE: How'd you develop your interest in Turkey and
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the Turkish language. I suspect there aren't a great many
people, even in our Foreign Service, who speak Turkish.
HENSEY: Well, there are more, I think, than most people
realize because we have had a large American presence in Turkey
ever since the days of the Truman Doctrine. And Americans who go
to Turkey tend to like the country, tend to like to go back. So
if you go to Turkey -- and I first went there in the mid-'50s
--you -- and you've learned something of the language and you
make friends, then you look for opportunities to go back. And
that happened to me on two different occasions I was able to go
back. I spent the mid-'70s in Turkey and actually left Turkey at
the end of the year 1976 when Dr. Brzezinski became President
Carter's National Security Council head, and came back to serve
with him directly from Turkey.
FISKE: Well, that certainly was a great advantage to
you. And you went back to Turkey for the purpose of research for
this book and were able to interview the mother of Ali Agca and
some of the other people who had known him.
HENSEY: Yes, it was definitely advantage. Because, of
course, during my time on the National Security Council, I'd also
worked on Turkey, and a great many other things. And I was quite
familiar with what had gone on in Turkey during that time.
And one of the things that intrigued me -- I can re-
member vividly I was having lunch with a friend in Georgetown the
day the news came that the Pope had been shot. And a few hours
later the news came that the assassin was a Turk. And then the
news came that the assassin was Mehmet Ali Agca. Well, that may
not have meant much to many people, but it meant a great deal to
me because I had known his first victim in Turkey.
FISKE: A newspaper publisher.
HENSEY: The prominent newspaper publisher Abdi Pecci
(7). And, in fact, I had spent an afternoon with Abdi Pecci when
I'd been in Turkey on an official mission just shortly before he
was assassinated. And that assassination was extremely myster-
ious, in itself. And that immediately led me to conclude that
there was something very peculiar about this attack on the Pope.
FISKE: He was sentenced to life imprisonment for having
assassinated Pecci..., and escaped from prison, and then shot the
Pope.
HENSEY: Well, yes. He was sentenced -- actually, his
full sentencing came after his escape, because he was caught only
five months after the assassination had taken place. He immedi-
ately confessed, which was rather peculiar. He seemed to enjoy
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the process. And in Turkey, there's a mandatory death penalty
for murder. And one would think that anybody who'd committed a
murder and confessed would be in rather depressed condition. But
Agca seemed to enjoy his interrogation and enjoyed the whole
process of becoming a prominent personality.
He had been promised, obviously, that he would be sprung
from prison. And he was. He was sprung from one of Turkey's
highest-security prisons.
FISKE: And you suspect that he may have been given the
same promise after shooting the Pope.
HENSEY: I think it's extremely likely, because that's
the only way that you can explain his behavior.
FISKE: I was interested to read that the Soviet pro-
pagandists have charged that you were involved in instigating the
attack on the Pope for the CIA.
HENSEY: Well, I think that's fascinating because it
shows how hard up they are to try to find any explanation of it
other than that they were involved. So they come up with some-
thing that really makes no sense at all.
I've never made any secret of the fact, of course, that
I did know his first victim. I knew a great many people in
Turkey, and I knew a lot of prominent people in Turkey. But that
hardly leads to the conclusion that I would want to have him
assassinated. And this is the strange story that the Soviets
have concocted. They concocted this story well over a year after
the assassination took place.
They were very high put from the beginning to try to
find an excuse that people would find credible. And in the very
first days after the attack on the Pope, the Russians tried to
blame it on the United States. Stories were put out that the
American Ambassador to the Vatican, Mr. Wilson, had had a meeting
with the Pope, and this meeting was allegedly very unsatisfac-
tory, and it supposedly had to do with questions relating to
Israel, Jerusalem, the PLO, and so forth. And supposedly, Mr.
Wilson went away from the meeting very unhappy. And, of course,
the Soviet implication was that that caused Washington then to
decide to do away with the Pope.
The stories the Russians have spread have never been
very consistent. It's typical of people who throw lies around,
who are so accustomed to lying and seldom get challenged on their
own ground, of course. Their lies abroad are frequently...
FISKE: Why did they choose you to charge with instiga-
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HENSEY: Well, I think they couldn't find anything else.
They've also zeroed in on Claire Sterling. She and I are one of
the foulest pairs on the international scene, according to Soviet
propaganda. I organized the Gray Wolves in Turkey and I found
Agca and I recruited him and organized him and got him to commit
his first assassination. And them, somehow, mysteriously, at the
orders of Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ronald
Reagan, I targeted him against the Pope.
I've had some very high-level employers, it's quite
true. But I have really never worked for all of those together.
FISKE: Well, the Soviets, if your conspiracy theory is
correct, chose a rather round-about way of accomplishing what
they set out to accomplish. The conclusion is that the Soviets,
who were concerned with the difficulties that they were facing in
Polant, that the Communist movement was facing in Poland, con-
cerned with the influence that the Pope was having on Catholics
and other religious people in the Soviet Union, had engineered a
plot, using a Turk managed by Bulgarians, to assassinate the
Pope. Now, isn't that a rather complicated, round-about way of
doing it, involving a great many people?
It would see, you know, to anybody who has read any
detective mysteries that there would be a much more direct, ef-
ficient way of doing it, that they certain must have some very
highly skilled, very efficient operatives in the KGB who could
have taken on that mission.
HENSEY: Well, reality sometimes is more dramatic than
fiction. And I think in this case we have a story that probably
if James Bond -- that is, if Ian Fleming had cast James Bond in a
role like this, 'it would have been regarded as really quite im-
probable.
But when one puts all the pieces together, it really
does make quite a bit of sense. And, of course, we have to re-
member that the Russians wanted the Pope out of the way, but they
certainly didn't want the world to be able to conclude that they
were the ones who had done it. So they contrived an extremely
complicated scheme. And the complicated scheme, in many ways,
was too complicated. They were too clever by half.
The scheme, when it was entrusted to the Bulgarians, in
effect, got somewhat out of the control of the Russians. It's
hard to believe that a scheme quite as amateurish would actually
be mounted by the KGB. But on the other hand, if we go back and
look at the history of what's been done at various times in the
past, we find that it's not as surprising as it seems. And it's
particularly not as surprising that the Bulgarians would be en-
gaging in something like this.
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Of course, the whole scheme was concocted to look as if
it weren't what it was. Supposedly, this was a fanatically
Moslem Turk who hated the Pope.
FISKE: And you found out that he wasn't.
HENSEY: Well, I found out that, like most young Turks
today, he hardly ever set foot in a mosque and had no interest in
it.
FISKE: His mother told you that.
HENSEY: And his mother told me that. And I think she's
a pretty good source. His mothers is a religious woman, and his
mother was really rather touching. When I asked her straight-
forwardly, she looked rather forlorn and said, "Well, no. He
hardly ever went to the mosque. Occasionally on holidays when I
asked him to." So you have there, I think, about as good proof
as you can get that this fellow was not a fanatic Moslem. In
fact, there was never any evidence that he was a Moslem during
his time in Turkey, during his time as a student.
FISKE: But they tried to create the impression that he
was. Before he went on to Rome, they sent him to Iran, didn't
they?
HENSEY: They sent him...
FISKE: ...the impression that he might have been a
Khomeini follower?
HENSEY: Well, that's the only explanation we have. That
business of going to Iran is one of the most mysterious aspects
of his background. It's never been fully explained. Now maybe
he's explained it to people in Italy, but it's never come out.
Well, this is one of the many things that we can expect
will be coming out now in coming weeks as Judge Martella in Rome
delivers his fully report.
But that is one of the explanations. The other possi-
bility, of course, which I allow for in the book and has not been
excluded, is that he simply went to the Soviet Union by way of
Iran. Because a known criminal, a prison escapee in Turkey,
everybody had seen his face in TV and newspapers, couldn't pos-
sibly cross the Turkish border into the Soviet Union. But he
could have gone the round-about route through Iran.
FISKE: Why would the Soviets have chosen him, given the
fact that he was a known killer?
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HENSEY: Well, obviously, they wanted a known killer. I
mean they wanted an efficient killer. And he'd proven himself to
be very efficient. He had not only stood up and kept his cool in
prison, but he hadn't revealed anything about his backers.
That's only coming out now in Turkey, in fact. There's a major
trial underway in Turkey now which is shedding a lot of light on
all of this, and it's showing that his backers in Turkey at the
time that he murdered the well-known newspaper editor were the
same Turkish Mafia figures who'd been associated with the Bul-
garians for the last 10 or 15 years, the drug traffickers, the
arms traffickers, the people that were sending arms all over the
Middle East, all over Europe, down into Africa. Mehmet All Agca
was picked up by people working for these people and they tried
him out. They tried him various ways and found that he was very
effective, very efficient. So, obviously, he was very attractive
as an assassin.
Now, I speculate in the book -- and we may never know.
But so far, many of the things I have put into the book have
turned out to be remarkably accurate, even though the information
was of complete at the time. But I speculate there may have been
other people. For a job this important, the Soviets may well
have pinpointed half a dozen people. And they many not all have
been Turks. Some may have been Arabs. They may even have tried
other nationalities in Europe. But in the end, Agca, obviously,
measured up best, and they decided he was the one that it was
most advantageous to use.
FISKE: You found, when you spoke to his relatives and
friends in Turkey, that he was a very, very bright youngster who
was interested in making money. He came from very humble, very
modest beginnings in Turkey. His people were herders, were they
not?
HENSEY: Well, his ancestors had been simple shepherds.
His father had gone to work for the railroad, but the family had
moved in from the country to a medium-sized town. The father
died when Mehmet Ali Agca, who is the oldest of three children,
was only six years old. So he had a pretty simple and difficult
life. His mother lived off a pension, made a little money here
and there. He made money during his time in school by doing
summer jobs and after-school jobs, but he certainly had no extra
money. So he learned very early that it would be very, very nice
to have money.
FISKE: And, of course, one of the things that inter-
ested you and was an important factor in the formulation of this
conspiracy theory was that he had some rather sizable bank ac-
counts to which money was deposited by other people, not by him.
HENSEY: Well, this is one of the most remarkable things
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about the case, and it's particularly remarkable -- would be
remarkable anywhere in the world, and certainly remarkable in
Turkey at the time.
He was a bright fellow and he qualified for university
entrance, at least into the university at Ankara. And he went
away to school. In Turkey it doesn't cost a great deal to go to
universities if you qualify and get a state scholarship. And
that's what he did.
After his first year, he suddenly became affluent.
Money began to flow into bank accounts. And during the period
before he committed his first murder in Turkey, the equivalent of
about $16,000 was deposited in at least four different bank ac-
counts. Now, nobody's sure, even today, that all the bank ac-
counts have been found.
FISKE: Is $16,000 as much money in Turkey as I suspect
HENSEY: Sixteen thousand dollars in Turkey at that time
is certainly equivalent of two or three times that amount here
today. And there's just no way that a student from a poor back-
ground could acquire that type of money.
Now, Agca himself never gave any real explanation for
the money. And when he was first arrested in Turkey, the exis-
tence of all of those banks accounts was, of course, not known.
It's only been uncovered gradually. And there may actually be
others still to be uncovered. But the trials and investigations
that are still going on in Turkey are finding that even more
money was floating around. He fell into hands where people had
money to throw around pretty freely.
FISKE: You expect that he may have been recruited for
this apparatus by his teachers at the university?
HENSEY: That, I think, is the most likely, because
teachers in Turkey -- this was a period in Turkey when the coun-
try was practically ripped apart by terrorism. Rightists and
leftists were both undermining society. They were both supported
from the outside. They were both supported by Bulgaria, Syria,
and, in the last analysis, the Soviet Union pouring in weapons
and arms. And one of the principal channels that was used for
encouraging students to riot and disrupt normal life was
teachers.
This isn't to say that all the teachers
were
supporters
of terrorists. But teachers and teachers' unions
and
organiza-
tions became a very convenient channel for this
type
of opera-
tion. And this is the most likely possibility.
In
fact, new
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information is coming out now in Turkey that indicates very di-
rect connections between Agca and teachers who were involved in
terrorism at the time.
FISKE: And he traveled rather luxuriously. He traveled
first class, stayed at the first class hotels. I think I have
read recently that some people think he was to have gotten a
total of $400,000 for the assassination. Is that...
HENSEY: Well, he was promised more than tha. He was
promised three million deutchemarks. Now, at that time, three
milion deutschemarks was somewhere up around a million, two or
three hundred thousand dollars.
There's other evidence of additional money. The cal-
culations that I made and a number of others made fairly soon
after we got some idea of his travels in the 18 months between
his escape from prison and his appearance in Rome, we calculated
that it would have had to cost a minimum of $50,000 to engage in
all that travel.
Now, anybody that goes to Europe knows that you can't
travel around Europe very cheaply these days, and especially if
you stay in fashionable hotels, eat in fashionable restaurants,
and do things like signing up for vacation tours to Spanish is-
lands and go off to Tunisia. It's remarkable how often Agca took
vacations. And it's all the more remarkable when you think that
this young Turk had never really been out of Turkey before. He
spoke a little bit of English and no other known foreign langu-
age.
FISKE: And had no visible means of support.
HENSEY: And had no visible means of support. So, ob-
viously, somebody was taking care of him all that time.
He never borrowed any money. He never stole anything.
He never turned up in any police records. It's quite an opera-
tion.
FISKE: The Pope, of course, is an extremely important
individual in this world. I wonder how he reacted when he heard
that the original plan was to kill Lech Walesa and that they
decided to kill the Pope when they figured it wouldn't be wise to
kill Walesa.
HENSEY: Well, I think they may have decided to kill
both. But they had better reasons for not killing Walesa than
they had for not killing the Pope, because the Pope, obviously,
was the key figure.
And the Walesa case is extremely interesting because we
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know now, which, of course, no one knew then, and Walesa himself
didn't know, that the prime Western link to Walesa, the Italian
Luigi Scricillo (?), a very respected young Italian labor leader,
about 35 years old, very much respected throughout Europe and in
the United States, had actually been a Bulgarian agent since
1976. This is a classic successful intelligence operation on the
part of the Bulgarians. They had got this Italian to work for
them. They had then got this Italian to go to Poland and develop
a close relationship with Walesa. He served as a channel for
sending help to Solidarity: money, mimeograph machines. He went
to Poland at least half a dozen times. And when Walesa came to
Rome to visit the Pope, this Italian, Luigi Scricillo, a Bul-
garian agent, was in charge of his security arrangements.
So, my conclusion is that somewhere along the way Scri-
cillo persuaded the Bulgarians, and perhaps the Russians them-
selves, that trying to do away with Walesa would not be a very
good idea.
That part of the whole story remains to be clarified.
FISKE: Now, what did they expect would be accomplished
by assassinating the Pope?
HENSEY:. Well, I think they must have concluded, in the
process that I reconstruct is, that as they looked at it, they
concluded that it would be much better to get rid of the Pope,
and then you'd have a much better chance of getting Poland in
hand. If you killed Walesa, you might just set the whole situa-
tion aflame, because Poland, of course, was very close to break-
ing itself completely free by that time.
FISKE: Incidentally, that also explains why they parti-
cularly would want to use third parties, a Turk and Bulgaria.
Exactly.
FISKE: Because if, in fact, their problem was Poland,
if it became known to the Poles, who were quite restive anyway,
that the Soviets had assassinated the Pope, given Poland's Catho-
licism and devotion to the Pope, why, they would have exacerbated
their problems rather than solved it, from their perspective.
HENSEY: Well, it goes back even deeper than that. The
Russians just couldn't believe it when the Pope was elected. And
as you'll recall, it was a great surprise to everybody because
the Pope's predecessor had only been in office a few weeks and
died unexpectedly. Then when this Pope, a Pole, was elected, the
world was truly astonished.
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The Russians were most astonished of all, and immedi-
ately concocted a theory that this couldn't have happened na-
turally; it had to be the result of a plot. It was a plot be-
tween Brzezinski, the American Catholic hierarchy, and the German
cardinals; and it was all designed to frustrate them.
Well now, it turned out to be very frustrating for them
because Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Wojtyla, is an unusually able
and talented man who knew a great deal about the Communist
system. But there isn't a shred of evidence that anybody plotted
to get him into that office.
FISKE: They were also disturbed because some of his
immediate predecessors had, in fact, sought accommodation with
the Soviets, and the indications were that this Pope would not.
HENSEY: Yes. This Pope, of course, had lived in Poland
during the Nazi occupation. He had, during that time, had begun
to study for the priesthood. He lived in Poland, then, during
the period it was being turned into a Communist satellite. So he
knew the system extraordinarily well. And he had risen not by
virtue of toeing the mark as far as the Communists are concerned,
but by virtue of being a real leader in the Polish church.
So, the Russians knew they had a tough man on their
hands here. They tried to intimidate him to begin with. They
discovered that that was going to be impossible. And meanwhile,
the mere presence of a Polish Pope in the Vatican inspired Poles
so much that the whole sequence of events which we know well, the
rise of Solidarity, the fact that Poles took matters very much
into their own hands, gave the Soviets reason to fear that their
whole empire might come apart.
FISKE: Interestingly, the plot to assassinate Lech
Walesa was built around a scheme to put a bomb in his automobile,
which probably would have not -- would not have involved Ali
Agca, because his thing is guns. Right?
HENSEY: Yes. As far as we know, Agca never had any
specialized training in bombing. Now, he may have, because that
aspect of his background is still a bit unclear. We know that he
went from Turkey down Lebanon, was smuggled across the border
into Syria, and the went to Lebanon to a PLO camp for training.
But there, it seems, he was trained in marksmanship and how...
FISKE: Was this before the first killing?
HENSEY: This was before his first killing. This was
before his first killing.
Now, what we don't know is the training he may have been
given in Bulgaria, or the training he may even have been given in
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the U.S.S.R., because there are stories and rumors that when Agca
went across the Turkish border into Iran, he was then quickly
spirited into the Soviet Union and trained at a KGB camp in the
Crimea. Now, I've never been able to track this down. And, of
course, it's a very difficult thing to track down. Only Agca
knows and only Agca can till. And it may be that we'll learn
this when Judge Martella puts his report out.
FISKE: You theorize that Bulgaria was involved in this
because she is a pliant and devoted and unquestioning Soviet
satellite. But you've also mentioned several times Bulgaria and
Syria. Are we to believe that Syria is as unquestioning?
HENSEY: Syria was certainly used for all sorts of ne-
farious purposes, is still being used today. After all, from
what I hear of the investigations of the bombing of the American
Embassy in Beirut and the blowing up of the Marine barracks last
year, it has very direct connections with Syria.
Syria was very much involved in the whole Soviet effort
to destabilize Turkey. Weapons went across the Syrian-Turkish
border, people were smuggled across. The Syrians offered facili-
ties to the PLO for training. In many of these training camps,
you had both leftists and rightists train together.
When the Israelis moved into Lebanon two years ago, they
discovered records and they discovered people still there. They
discovered a couple of dozen Turks still there.
This is the whole framework of the operation where Meh-
med Ali Agca himself was trained. Now, he probably wasn't re-
garded as terribly important when he was trained there. But what
they were doing, I think, at the time was testing out various
young men. They sent people down, they put them through train-
ing, they evaluated them, they saw how well they did. They sent
back with their report cards, so to speak. And on the basis of
their report cards and the evaluation of their trainers, they got
further assignments.
FISKE: Now, Paul, this was a very carefully construc-
ted, if complicated, plot. The way the plot was supposed to have
worked was that after Agca shot the Pope, an accomplice was to
detonate two panic bombs to distract the crowd, following which
both of them were to make their way to a van. Was it a Syrian
van?
HENSEY: No, it was a Bulgarian van.
FISKE: A Bulgarian van.
HENSEY: It was a great big Bulgarian international
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transport truck which the Bulgarians, as the Italians have now
discovered and told us, had asked special permission to have come
into Turkey just that very day.
FISKE: And that could cross the border without being
examined. And that's the way the plan had them escaping.
Now, involving professionals, highly trained profes-
sionals, as this plot did, how is it that his accomplice didn't
detonate those bombs?
HENSEY: Well, that, of course -- no chain of conspiracy
is any stronger than its weakest link. And here the man who was
with Agca turned out to be a fairly weak link. He was a weak
link, but it seems highly probable he was probably the only one
who was really saved in that whole operation, because the van did
leave Rome, it did make its way back to Bulgaria. Nobody knows
what was in it, but it may well be that Oral Celik (?), Agca's
companion, who had also been involved in Turkey in some of Agca's
activities, is living in Bulgarian today under a new identity, I
suppose, and feeling very comfortable because he's relatively
safe. On the other hand, being condemned to spend all your life
in Bulgaria I don't think would be anybody's idea of paradise.
FISKE: Do you suspect that they might have believed
that Agca would have been killed on the spot and, in fact, they
prefered that?
HENSEY: Well, that's the other possibility. I specu-
late in the book that that is a distinct possibility. And I
think Agca himself, from what I've learned, fears that that may
well have been the plan. And Agca was promised that he would be
rescued. But, of course, that was beyond the capabilities of the
Bulgarians in Italy. If they tried it, they were unable to pull
it off. We know that in Turkey they were able to pull it off.
But even there, there were a couple of attempts before it finally
succeeded.
After Agca had waited six months and found that he was
not going to be rescued, he obviously began to think things over
and to look back at what had happened, and that was what led him
to begin to talk.
FISKE: Okay. Our telephone number is 966-8850....
Good evening.
MAN: I have a question for your guest. How much do the
Poles know about this whole assassination attempt? I know the
Soviets are good at jamming broadcasts. I'd like to know exact-
ly, you know, what's going on. You know, how do they know what's
going on?
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HENSEY: The Poles know a great deal. I've talked to
Poles from Poland who told me that, of course, the day the Pope
was shot, a great many Poles immediately suspected that the Rus-
sians must have been behind it. They had no evidence at that
point, of course, but evidence began to accumulate quite rapidly.
The Poles learn of all this from Western broadcasts.
They learn not only from broadcasts that are directed particu-
larly at them by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and
the BBC and the German radio, and so forth, but great numbers of
people in Poland, of course, understand German and French and
other languages, and they listen to those radio stations too.
I suspect, and the evidence I have from talking to
people who've been in Poland and come out of Poland over the past
three years, is that the Poles are probably among the best-
informed people in the world on all this. A great many people
are following everything.
And, of course, a great many Western publications go
into Poland. I know that my book is in Poland. I know that it's
been widely read in Poland already.
MAN: What about the Soviet people themselves now? Are
they aware of what's going on, what their own government's doing?
Or does the Soviet have an even tighter control over what they
can here?
HENSEY: They have much tighter control. But neverthe-
less, they can't prevent people from learning a great many
things, and people learn in a great many ways.
I'm sure that my book is in Poland. I know, for ex-
ample, that it's in Bulgaria. And people, particularly in the
Western parts of the Soviet Union, in the Ukraine and Lithuania
and the Baltic states, listen to Western broadcasts, do manage to
travel out, get information from people who come in. And there's
a very large Catholic population there.
FISKE: The Soviets are particularly concerned about
Ukrainians.
HENSEY: Very much so.
FISKE: Their problem area.
I sent to the Soviet Union some seven or eight years
ago, and we had a group of Ukrainians from the United States who
were going back there for a visit. And when we landed at Moscow,
all of us went through Soviet customs without any difficulty at
all. They examined us. But they gave those Ukrainians a
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terribly thorough going over.
HENSEY: And what they were afraid of, I'm sure, is that
those Ukrainians were carrying literature in Ukrainian on them,
and they would spread it in the Soviet Union. The KGB, the
Russian authorities are scared to death of this sort of thing.
FISKE: Literature generally scares them. The only
question they asked us was whether we had any books.
HENSEY: Exactly. They're frightened of the printed
word. It's very hard, I think, for many people who live in free
societies to understand that. We're so surrounded by printed
material, we can get it anywhere, any time. It really has very
little value to us. To understand the value it has, you have to
experience one of those societies.
MAN: You are right about how the Soviets are not only
afraid of literature, but they're also afraid of broadcasts get-
ting into their country and the Iron Curtain countries. To give
you an example -- and I'm going to hang up after this -- a friend
of mine who was from Estonia told me that it is now against the
law to possess a TV antenna because you could pick up broadcasts
from Finland and some of the other surrounding countries, and
they don't want you to do that.
FISKE: Good evening.
WOMAN: Mr. Hensey, I'm a Catholic, and we're very tired
of hearing that it was the KGB that attempted the assassination
on the Pope. We don't believe it. We believe that the story is
not yet told and will take many, many years.
Now, number one, no, it was not Syria. Syria has good
relations with the Vatican. No, it was not the PLO. Cardinal
Cesaroli (?) had met with a member, a Palestinian member, because
we are interested in the plight of the Palestinians.
Also, how come you keep saying -- I'm tired of hearing
Miss Sterling and Mr. Kalb insinuate that Mr. Casey knows who did
it and is covering it up. Mr. Casey happens to be a good
Catholic, and he would not cover it up. But I don't doubt that
he doesn't know.
I would remind you that prior to the assassination of
the Pope, he was put down by various people from Israel, from the
Mosad. How come you never mention the Mosad?
HENSEY: I have never mentioned the Mosad because I
don't think the Mosad had a thing to do with it. I find your
interpretation grotesque.
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WOMAN: Well, why don't you ask some of the Catholics,
like the Catholic cardinals, the Catholic bishops?
HENSEY: I've asked enormous numbers of Catholics. I
don't know what gives you the right to speak for Catholics.
WOMAN: What do they say to you?
HENSEY: There is no difference. I wouldn't expect all
Catholics, any more than all Jews, all Protestants, all
Buddhists, or anybody else, to have the same views.
WOMAN: You have to admit that because the Pope met with
Arafat, because the Pope -- Cardinal Cesaroli met with Pales-
tinians, he was put down. Now, he is a man of peace. He has the
right to meet with...
HENSEY: I don't think your interpretation makes much
sense. It doesn't correspond to anything I know. You seem to be
talking in terms of your emotions and not in terms of any facts.
WOMAN: I am a Catholic and I have heard it from many,
many Catholics.
HENSEY: Well, the fact that you're a Catholic doesn't
seem to make any difference. I've heard a great many things from
a lot of people of all kinds.
WOMAN: Why do you say the Syrians? Why do you say the
KGB when you're not sure?
HENSEY: Well, why do you say -- what makes you so sure?
WOMAN: But you're not sure either.
HENSEY: I can't comment on what you say, nor will I
comment on what Mr. Casey allegedly believes or doesn't believe.
I've made no comments to that effect whatsoever.
WOMAN: ...and you ask the Pope. Okay?
FISKE: Thank you.
WOMAN: All right.
FISKE: We're talking to Paul Hensey. His book is
titled The Plot to Kill the Pope.
You're on the air.
MAN: You sound very agitated and nervous and defensive.
Why is that, Mr. Hensey?
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HENSEY: I sound agitated, nervous and defensive? I
don't feel agitated, nervous and defensive. I think the lady who
just called in sounded agitated, nervous and defensive.
MAN: Well, I've listened to the program for the last 40
minutes. You know, I'm not talking just about that last call.
HENSEY: Well, all right. If from your point of view
I'm nervous and defensive, I'm nervous and defensive. From my
point of view, I'm not.
What's your question?
MAN: Well, my question is, how long did you work for
HENSEY: That's not a relevant question. I'm not inter-
ested in answering that question. That's a have-you-stopped-
beating-your-wife question.
Who do you work for? Why are you asking that question?
MAN: Because I recently read that you worked for the
CIA. I think it was in Turkey.
HENSEY: If you've read what the Bulgarians send out,
you've read that I also organized the plot to kill the Pope.
But, you know, that really doesn't have much relevance.
MAN: I haven't read the book yet, but I think Claire
Sterling is like your protege, isn't she?
HENSEY: Who do you work for? Claire Sterling is in no
sense a protege of mine.
MAN: Oh, I see. Okay. Thank you.
FISKE: Sir, where do you get your information con-
cerning this entire matter?
MAN: Just from my reading.
FISKE: Of what?
MAN: Well, I read an article in the Daily World about
it, a few articles.
FISKE: Oh, that's the Marxist publication.
MAN: Yes.
HENSEY: I suggest you read something a little more
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objective. Try the Wall Street Journal.
MAN: Well, I've read the Washington Times, also.
HENSEY: Well, the Washington Times? There's a wide
range of things. Anybody who wants interesting information
should read a wide range of them.
MAN: Yes, and I have.
HENSEY: And you should also read my book. I think
you'll find it extremely enlightening.
MAN: Thank you.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: There have been some allegations recently the
Cuban secret service is involved in an awful lot of plots around
the world. What, if any, involvement did you find in this in-
stance?
HENSEY: I found none whatsoever. The Cubans don't seem
to have had a thing to do with this. There are things the Cubans
don't get involved in. In fact, there's a fascinating division
of labor. Bulgaria is sort of the Cuba of Europe and the Middle
East. The Soviets use the Bulgarians for a lot of the dirty work
there that the Cubans perform in other areas, like Africa and the
Caribbean.
FISKE: You speak about an ambassador to Bulgaria who
had been ambassador to Cuba, where he performed something of the
same sort of work.
HENSEY: Well, that doesn't represent a Cuban link, of
course. But the...
FISKE: Tell that story, will you?
HENSEY: Yes. One of the most interesting aspects of
this case, and a measure of how important Bulgaria obviously is
to the Soviet Union, is that the Soviet ambassador to Cuba from
1970 to '79 -- and anyone who even thinks back on that history
briefly will realize all the things the Cubans did for the Rus-
sians 1970 to '79, active all over Africa (Angola, Ethioia),
active in the Middle East, active in the Caribbean. Mr. Tolo-
bieyev (?), who was the Soviet ambassador to Cuba from 1970 to
'79, and who, incidentally, happens to be a friend of the current
head of the KGB, recently promoted to marshal Chebrykov (?), Mr.
Tolobieyev was moved to Bulgaria in 1979 and was ambassador in
Bulgaria from 1979 till 1983. He went back to the Soviet Union
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about a year ago. I haven't heard what he's doing there now.
Maybe was in slight disgrace because the plot to kill the Pope
came apart and a lot of the other Bulgarian activities came a-
part.
But the Soviets are usually pretty good with their
people, even when they have trouble. So I suspect after a period
of disgrace he'll turn up somewhere else. But any country he
turns up in should certainly be wary.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: Mr. Hensey, I have read several articles in the
American media which completely refutes word-by-word every one of
these various stories by Claire Sterling and others. And they
state that Agca was a member since his childhood of the Turkish
Gray Wolves and the National Action Party, which are right-wing
fascists. And he attempted to kill the Pope because of religious
and political purposes having to do with wars in the Middle East,
and that had nothing at all to do with the Russian Communism or
the KGB. He confessed to all these KGB connections while he was
in jail only to get lenience for himself and to protect his
right-wing Gray Wolves and National Action Party. He is known to
be a right-wing fascist terrorist, very efficient, a murderer,
and a notorious liar.
HENSEY: Well, you, sir, seem to be working for the
Soviet Union, because you're spreading the Soviet line. You
should...
MAN: This is confirmed by one of your own men, former
CIA officer Ralph McGee. In Deadly Defeats, he states that the
CIA has lied continuously and that disinformation is a large part
of covert action responsibility.
HENSEY: Well, I'm glad you're so convinced of what you
think you've read. I must say I haven't read those articles in
the American press. I've read them in stuff the Bulgarians have
circulated.
FISKE: Why would a right-wing organization want to
assassinate the Pope?
HENSEY: Well, this gentleman is simply peddling the
Moscow line. Moscow's not been able to come up with anything
else. This gentleman seems to know a great deal more than I
know. After all, I've looked into all these things in Turkey,
know Turkey well, have investigated the case. That is a great
deal of what my book is about. But he obviously is only inter-
ested in peddling a contrary view.
MAN: I'm quoting only American sources and ex-CIA
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agents, and so on.
HENSEY: You aren't quoting any American sources at all.
There have never been any articles to that effect that haven't
come out, been planted by somebody on the other side. I'm total-
ly unaware of them. And I'm sure that if they...
MAN: Well, these articles were in Mother Jones magazine
and Covert Action Bulletin and several other...
HENSEY: I wouldn't even call those American sources.
MAN: Yes, they are. And Deadly Defeats is written by
your former officer, Ralph McGee.
HENSEY: I have no further comment on the disinformation
you're peddling.
MAN: Of course you don't. You're all part of the whole
conspiracy yourself, and Claire Sterling and all the others.
That woman that called up first is perfectly right.
HENSEY: I love to be labeled that by the likes of you.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you.
You mentioned disinformation. And in your book you
argue that the Soviets really mounted a large, varied campaign of
disinformation. They were creating several different pictures of
Ali Agca. Now, why would they want to do that? They painted him
as a right-winger. They painted him as a member of the George
Habash Popular Front Party for the Liberation of Palestine. He
was presented as somebody concerned with the freedom of El Sal-
vador, and so on. Wouldn't a disinformation campaign be better
served if they chose one line, even though it might be a false
line, and to emphasize it?
HENSEY: Well, the Soviets are still operating their
disinformation campaign, and I think we see evidence of that in
some of these calls tonight. Whether these people know what
they're doing or not, they're simply peddling the disinformation
line.
The disinformation line is very confused because it's
very difficult to put together any kind of coherent explanation
of this plot that doesn't lead back to Moscow. You have to end
up slinging slanders around. You have to do the kind of thing
that these recent callers have been doing.
Disinformation is not something that is automatically
successful. It's a way of life with the men of the Kremlin and
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with many of the people who work for them. It's very easy to
pull apart when you have it as a whole. But unfortunately, there
are a lot of people in the world who like to believe this sort of
thing. There are a lot of other people who like to peddle it for
money or for whatever other advantage they seem to get out of it.
FISKE: But wouldn't their purposes be better served if,
for example, they -- what is it, the Gray Wolves you call them,
the right-wing organization?
HENSEY: Well, Agca was never a member of the Gray
FISKE: I know. From the Soviet point of view, assuming
that as part of their disinformation campaign they wanted to
paint him as a member of this right-wing organization, why would
they concoct other stories as well? Because that only would make
HENSEY: Well, obviously, they've been running hard to
try to get the -- to try to deflect the suspicion from them-
selves.
The one thing that the Soviets have never done, never
for one moment, is try to look at this thing objectively and try
to figure out what really did happen. There hasn't been a single
article in the Soviet press, a single initiative taken by the
Soviet Union, under any circumstances -- they've never cooperated
with anybody's investigation. They've never cooperated with any
journalist's activity, with any governmental activity. All
they've done is simply heap up invective, diatribes, slanders
against other people. And that goes on and on.
They're desperate because they really can't come up with
a story that makes any sense. This, to me, is one of the most
convincing pieces of circumstantial evidence...
FISKE: You think that if, in fact, they had no involve-
ment, then it would have served their purposes to cooperate.
HENSEY: If they had no involvement, they wouldn't ap-
pear as neurotic as they do.
I'm sure that when the Soviets hear that I'm talking on
a program like this, they set people to work calling in. And
I've had this happen time and time again in many comparable situ-
ations.
WOMAN: ...I'm Turkish. I'm relatively young. I am not
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a Communist. And your guest was very irate at the last caller.
But I want to make the point that Agca is known as a registered
member of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party, which is a
fascist party. And that is the line that is adopted by the
government of Turkey, that has been adoopted by the government
officials. And the head of the party is in jail, at present.
And I was there following it all.
Now, if your speaker is as well accustomed to Turkish
political scene as he claims to be, now, how would he account for
Agca's accepting training by the KGB in the Soviet Union?
Thank you. This is my point and my question.
FISKE: Listen, hang on with that.
WOMAN: I can't hang on. I'm paying too much.
FISKE: Well, invest another 25 cents and let's discuss
HENSEY: Again, you're awfully dogmatic in what you say,
but you simply happen to be wrong. That's the only comment I can
make no what you say.
WOMAN: I think you're the one who's dogmatic. I am
from the country.
HENSEY: Well, the fact that you're from Turkey doesn't
make you right about everything in respect to Turkey, any more
than the fact that I'm from America makes me right about every-
thing in respect to America.
I have no further comment on that observation.
WOMAN: Well, explain how to me how do you think that
Agca, being the rightist he is, accepted training in the...
HENSEY: You obviously aren't familiar with what's going
on in your own country, if you've managed to stay in touch with
it at all. There's a fascinating trial going on at the present
time which demonstrates that Agca had no significant political
connections, but that he had extensive connections with the
Bulgarian-supported Turkish Mafia.
FISKE: Let me say this, ma'am. From your speech, I
would judge that it's been some time since you've been in Turkey,
since you lived in Turkey. How long has it been?
WOMAN: Just one year ago I was there.
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FISKE: Well, where were you born?
WOMAN: In Turkey.
FISKE: Where'd you learn to speak such fluent English?
WOMAN: Pardon?
FISKE: You speak rather fluent English.
WOMAN: Yes, I do.
FISKE: Well, I would suspect that your English was
acquired through long years of living in the United States.
WOMAN: You would be very, very wrong to assume that.
FISKE: I detect no trace of accent at all in your
speech.
HENSEY: I question whether you're Turkish. You don't,
to me, speak with a Turkish accent.
WOMAN: Well, I'm flattered.
FISKE: One year? You mean you've lived all your life
in Turkey except for the last year that you've been in the United
States?
WOMAN: I lived in other countries too. But, yes, I've
only been in the States for one year.
FISKE: Where did you learn English?
WOMAN: In Turkey.
FISKE: Well, I'm sorry. I don't believe you.
HENSEY: You're not convincing.
WOMAN: You've got to be kidding.
[Conversation in Turkish]
WOMAN: Now tell me who's dogmatic. Okay?
HENSEY: All I said is that your information is incor-
WOMAN: Now wait a minute. You also told me that you
did not believe me.
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HENSEY: Well, I simply wanted to check to see if you
were a Turk.
FISKE: I'm a speech person. I don't dispute that you
may be a Turk. But I am a speech student and former speech
teacher, and I don't believe that anybody who learned to speak
English in Turkey would speak English the way you do. Who taught
you English in Turkey?
WOMAN: Americans did.
FISKE: American? How did that happen?
WOMAN: Did you know that there -- well, your guest
should know about the schools in Turkey.
FISKE: Are there many people in Turkey who speak
English the way she does?
HENSEY: She speaks English as if she'd been speaking
English for a long, long time.
WOMAN: Yeah, sure. Since I was 14.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you.
You're on the air.
MAN: I am very interesting in knowing -- I think the
integrity of your guest is compromised by the fact he was a CIA
agent.
And secondly, I'd like to know how he defines American,
since he says Mother Jones is not an American magazine. And as a
matter of fact, I guess I'd just appreciate it if you'd get this
sleaze-ball off the air before my...
FISKE: Listen, we can have arguments, but I won't have
insult or name-calling.
MAN: Yeah. Well, he's a sleaze-ball.
FISKE: You're off the air.
You're on 88.5-FM.
MAN: It's just amazing how many extreme left-wing
callers you have lined up tonight. It's quite incredible.
My question is, would -- their response, of course, is
predictable. But another question would be this: Claire
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Sterling, at least, has alleged that not only has -- there has
been reluctance in many quarters to accept the Bulgarian, and
thus Soviet, involvement in the assassination plot. Not just in,
you know, the lunatic fringes of the left, but also in some of
the establishment -- you know, among the establishment in govern-
ments in Western Europe, and even in the United States, the CIA,
etcetera, etcetera.
Has this been your experience, Mr. Hensey? And if so,
what do you think the reluctance is?
HENSEY: I'm happy to be able to comment on that because
I have not had the experience Claire Sterling had. I was looking
into this plot considerably before she began to. No one dis-
couraged me. No one in the U.S. Government ever told me that I
shouldn't look into it. I would have welcomed a lot more people
looking into it. I wish the journalistic profession had been
more energetic. I think it's kind of a sad commentary on the
journalistic profession that Claire Sterling and I and just a
handful of others are the only ones who've ever investigated it
seriously.
But as to whether it has been deliberately suppressed or
covered up in the U.S. Government, I personally don't think so.
I didn't expect to find much information in the U.S. Government
on this, because after all I'd been in the U.S. Government a long
period of time. I knew the U.S. Government wasn't in a position
to be able to uncover this kind of information in great detail.
MAN: One follow-up. Do you think -- and I mean this is
quite a strong possibility. Do you think the American Government
really has been refusing to comment on the case until the work by
the Italian prosecutor and the Italian Government was finished?
In other words, they want to have more of a certain case before
they make a comment.
HENSEY: I think that will continue to be the position
of the Administration. That doesn't mean that a great many
people in the government don't have their own ideas on the case.
And I must say I have yet to meet in the government anybody who
is profoundly skeptical. I've met infinitely more people who
share the views that I have and who recognize the significance of
the work that Claire Sterling, I, and a few others have done, and
particularly recognize the significance of the work the Italians
have done.
FISKE: I haven't heard anybody charge that the Italian
judge is working for the CIA.
HENSEY: [Laughter] Yes.
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MAN: I just wanted to ask an open-ended philosophical
question. And that is, what can you conclude about the media in
America, in its ignoring this issue? I'm interested in the
facts. I think the facts point in the direction of the
Bulgarians and the Russians. But why is the media ignoring it?
HENSEY: Well, I wouldn't say the media was ignoring it.
Two of the most prominent media organizations in America, which I
worked for and which without whose support I really wouldn't have
gotten into this the way I did, Reader's Digest and the National
Broadcasting Corporation, have done distinguished work. And a
good many other media organizations, including the New York
Times. After all, the New York Times devoted more than a full
page to this story only a month ago, asking Claire Sterling to
summarize the Italian prosecutor's report. The Wall Street
Journal devoted a very substantial article only this week to the
Turkish trial that is currently underway.
I don't know any reason to expect the media to deal with
it every day. What I do say and what I would have appreciated,
myself, is that some of our journalistic and media organizations
might have assigned more people to work over a longer period of
time and done work comparable to the work that Claire Sterling
and I were able to do. But I have the highest regard...
FISKE: Their role, really, is to report the findings
when they become clear.
HENSEY: Well, they've been doing that, I think.
FISKE: They are not in a position to conduct long-term
investigations of this sort of thing. There are organizations
and investigators and nations and officials who are charged with
this, and the media reports on their findings.
HENSEY: Well, if the Reader's Digest hadn't asked me,
and then asked Claire Sterling, and asked us both to work on it,
I don't suppose -- I didn't have the means to go work on it,
myself. And if NBC hadn't mounted an enormous effort which re-
sulted in its White Papers...
FISKE: There are two prominent members of the media.
Is there any reason why everybody in the media should do the same
thing?
HENSEY: No, I suppose there isn't. I would say here,
you know, none of these things is terribly simple or entirely
black and white. What I do feel a little annoying is a great
part of the media, each time the story breaks open again, then
has to go back over it all again. But after all, that's one of
the reasons I wrote my book. It's a handy thing for people to
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have at hand. If they want to find out what some of the back-
ground is, they can pick it up and learn.
MAN: You certainly wouldn't say the story has been
spiked, so to speak.
HENSEY: I don't think it would be fair to say the story
is spiked. If any new development occurs, it immediately gets
attention. I'd certainly say this from my own personal exper-
ience. After all, I've been involved, off and on, for over three
years in researching this story. Whenever something comes into
the headlines, or even on page 3 or 4, I'm deluged with phone
calls, deluged with requests to appear on radio and TV programs
and have reporters practically shaking my phone off the wall.
WOMAN: I would just like to say a couple of things. I
think that your guest has kept it together pretty well. It's, I
guess, a little startling to have people call and be so boiling
inside, and you can hear their voices shake and all. I'm just a
little surprised. I guess there -- I realize there are people
with all kinds of different thoughts out there. But, boy, they
really come out from under the rocks. And I was just a little
surprised. But I thought it was all handled very well, and I
just wanted to say that.
HENSEY: Well, thank you, ma'am. I appreciate that very
much. What you're seeing here, I think, is a marvelous example
of what I've experienced several times, but is always more note-
worthy here in Washington itself. And that is, people know that
I'm going to talk, or they know that Claire Sterling is going to
talk. And you have an awful lot of people scattered around Wash-
ington working in places like the Soviet and the Bulgarian Em-
bassies. And they mobilize their forces in order to deliver
harassing questions and to accuse others of exactly what they're
doing themselves.
WOMAN: It almost seems obvious. I'm not quite sure.
And the one fellow who said the CIA -- I realize a lot of people
don't think, you know, a great deal of the CIA, and there are
parts of it that are changing and whatnot. But I think maybe we
ought to be glad that we do have -- as long as there have to be
something like that, that we have it. And hopefully it will try
to be on the up-and-up, though some things have to be so that
everybody doesn't know, I think, what they're doing, exactly.
By anyway, I just wanted to say that.
HENSEY: Well, those are very wise observations, and I
thank you.
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WOMAN: Well, I hope so.
FISKE: You're on 88.5-FM.
MAN: ...At the time that this was hatched, assuming it
was hatched from the KGB, Andropov was head of it, I believe.
Would the probably have been extremely high, then, that he must
have known about it?
HENSEY: Absolutely. Andropov was head of the KGB from
1967 until he took over as head of the U.S.S.R. in 1982. So
Andropov had 15 straight years. An awful lot of the things that
became major problems in the world (terrorism, subversion, de-
stabilization, disinformation, violence of many kinds) increased
markedly after Andropov became head of the KGB.
It's inconceivable, from what we know of the way the KGB
works -- and we have a great many defectors from the KGB on whom
we can rely -- that the head of KGB wouldn't have known this.
FISKE: Paul, can you stand by? We have five minutes of
news coming up, and then we'll talk some more.
FISKE: Good evening.
WOMAN: I am a listener of 88.5 quite frequently, and a
donator. And as a member, I feel horrified by the way you
treated the woman from Baltimore. I think that a radio show
should -- especially hosts. I've heard quite a few hosts on your
radio, and I think that being impartial is a very diplomatic way
to handle it. I felt offended that you would attack somebody
personally on a radio show, even though...
FISKE: Well, I appreciate your point of view. However,
I do not pretend to remain impartial. This is a talk show, a
conversation show in which I voice my opinions, and I'm expected
to. And I don't take back anything I said to her. I do not
believe that that woman has spent only one year of her life in
the United States and the rest of her life in Turkey. And I say
that as an expert in speech.
And you can differ, and I respect your right to differ.
So I'll be happy to leave it at that.
WOMAN: I respect your right.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you.
You're on the air.
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MAN: I've got a broad generic question for your guest,
and probably for you too. And I certainly don't disagree with
your ability to speak and say whatever it is that you feel like
saying and sharing your opinion with us. And I've been a sub-
scriber to WAMU for a long time.
FISKE: Well, anybody who listens to this program knows
that that's the way I do it. On our news programs, we try not to
present opinion. On this program, one of our purposes is to
present opinion.
MAN: Yeah. And I think we all understand that down
deep. I have a broad generic question. The question is basi-
cally this: We have all, I think, been pretty well scared to
death about the writings of Mao and the writings of
Marx-Leninism, and we see the onslaught of terrorism as another
phase of Communism throughout the world. But there's something
good, too, about the way our country came to be through revolu-
tion from Great Britain a long time ago. What sort of signposts
do you look at and do you weigh and do you measure to make sure
that you're not getting some revolutionary fervor being expressed
by the people of a country, as opposed to some concerted dia-
bolical plot for terrorism to implmenent Communism throughout the
world?
HENSEY: Is that a question for me?
MAN: Yes, it is.
HENSEY: I'm not quite clear what your...
MAN: The question basically is, at what point do you
leave the nationalistic fervor, or whatever it is, from the
people in a country, what point do you leave that and ascribe
that then to a Communistic terroristic activity kind of thing
that spreads Communism throughout the world?
HENSEY: Well, there's an enormous difference between
situations where people can express themselves relatively freely
or where, even where they can't express themselves freely, but
don't resort to terror. And I think the most striking example of
that is Poland itself. You have countries like Turkey and Italy,
free democratic countries, open societies allied with the West.
They were practically ripped to pieces by terror in the 1970s.
You have Poland, clamped down on tightly by the Russians, never
able to really express itself. Poland hasn't known freedom since
the Nazis and the Russians marched in in 1939. And still, all of
the things that happened in Poland over the last several years
involved no violence at all. Remarkable self-control.
There you have a people that really knows the value of
freedom. There's an enormous difference. And that, I think,
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tells us all something very important about the nature of the
world we live in.
MAN: Really. But if you were to look at the presump-
tion that is made that the Bulgarian threat against the Pope were
really a manifestation of the Communistic effort, through the
KGB, what would be, in your estimation, the outcome for Communism
of such an act?
HENSEY: Well, Communism is a bankrupt system. It's
been bankrupt a long time, but it's more seriously bankrupt now
than ever because it simply can't deliver. If Communists thought
they could trust free institutions for a moment, they'd have
genuinely free elections. Instead they have sham.
MAN: But if they were to kill the Pope, wouldn't that
galvanize Christianity throughout the world, as a barbaric act
that was likely done under Communistic tenets?
HENSEY: Well, I'm not saying that trying to kill the
Pope is a good idea, even from their point of view. I think,
from their point of view, trying to kill the Pope was a bad idea.
MAN: Really.
HENSEY: And the best evidence we have that it was a bad
idea is that it backfired on them. It's causing them terrible
embarrassment and it's causing them to react with an emotional
frenzy.
FISKE: Your theory, anyway, is that they realized it
would reflect badly upon them, and that's why they had such an
involved plot.
HENSEY: Well, exactly.
FISKE: Using a Turk who's handled by Bulgarians.
HENSEY: That's why they wanted to try to give the im-
pression, and why some of the people that are still trying to
take their side are trying to give the impression, that it was a
fanatic fascist Turk, or it was the Jews, or it was the Masons.
You have all these strange notions floating around. You have a
whole new book alleging that this Pope's predecessor was murdered
as a result of some fiendish plot. That book, itself, shows all
evidence of being disinformation deliberately concocted to draw
attention away from the actual crime plot.
MAN: Well, I look forward to reading your book. And I
guess I'll leave it for tonight with the thought that not every
terroristic act that I've looked at over the last five or six
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years of reading the news, to my mind, is a Communistic terrorist
kind of thing.
HENSEY: Well, they certainly are not. The majority of
terroristic acts probably aren't. But some terribly important
ones are.
MAN: And it would be nice to know if the United Nations
or some world government body could bring to bear some controlled
investigation and correction of these kinds of things, because --
I guess I'm naive because I believe that's what the United Na-
tions was really for.
HENSEY: Well, it may have been when it was formed, but
it's been corrupted by an awful lot of people. I would have very
little hope the United Nations...
MAN: You think there's no hope whatever for the United
Nations doing anything with international terrorism with respect
to any kind of Communistic motivation?
HENSEY: None whatsoever.
MAN: Okay. Thank you very much.
FISKE: Good evening.
WOMAN: ...I have a big favor to ask of your guest. I'm
a former Foreign Service officer and I have worked a long time on
disinformation. I'm in full agreement with him with regard to
the role of Moscow and the existence of a plot. But I have a
different thesis because I approach it from the disinformation
point of view. It is much too long to discuss it and present it
to him over the phone, and I would like to leave my name and
phone number and ask him to call me collect sometime in order to
discuss it. Is that possible?
HENSEY: Thank you. I'd be very happy to do that, if
you leave your name and phone number.
FISKE: I would suggest that you not give it on the air,
however. I will put you on hold....
WOMAN: Thank you very much. And I think it is a very,
very interesting discussion. And I agree fully with the KGB
approach.
HENSEY: Thank you.
FISKE: You're on the air.
WOMAN: I actually started out to make a comment on the
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subject tonight, but I'm not going to take up too much of your
time. I, instead, would like to just comment and say that I find
your guest very -- well, actually, I'd like to protest. And I
find it very absurd and ludicrous that he argues over the callers
-- with the callers over the issue that, you know, what nationa-
lity they are.
I happen to be raised -- was born and raised in Turkey,
have only been living in this country for the last 16 months.
But just because anybody speaks, you know, fluent English, you
question their nationality and ask if they're Turkish or not. I
just find that very, very -- just very absurd.
HENSEY: Well, I have no comment.
WOMAN: All right. Fine.
FISKE: Hello. You're on the air.
MAN: I don't find it absurd. But on to my question.
I've not read your guest's book, but I shall certainly
make a point of doing so. But I have read Claire Sterling's
book, and it seems to me that that establishes, in my mind, cer-
tainly, without much question, that there is indeed a connection
between Agca, Bulgaria and the KGB. Okay, fine. No argument.
The question, as I recall, in Claire Sterling's book
--and I'm not sure, since I only picked up about 15-20 minutes
ago on your program, whether your guest has addressed himself to
this point -- the question that she raises is why the United
States is so reluctant to speak out on this issue. As I recall
her arguments -- I read the book a couple of months ago -- was
that it was simply too explosive, as far as U.S.-Soviet relations
might be concerned, if the United States would take a position
that linked the KGB with Bulgaria and with Agca.
I don't know if your guest has addressed himself to this
question. But I would ask why. I mean how does he explain the
fact that we -- when I say we, I mean the United States Govern-
ment has been so, as best I can understand it from what I've read
in the news reports, so reticent, so reluctant to speak out on
this issue.
HENSEY: Well, I don't know any reason why the United
States Government should speak out, in the first place. After
all, the crime was not against us and it didn't occur in this
country, and we have absolutely no connection with it. It just
happens that two Americans, Claire Sterling and myself, have been
the people who've done perhaps the greatest amount of research in
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depth on it, next to the authorities in places like Italy and
Turkey who are pursuing it officially. And it's their job. And
I have every reason to believe, from all that I know, that
they're doing a very good job. And we see that in the prosecu-
tor's report that came out in Italy recently and in the work that
continues in Turkey to probe into Agca's background.
Now, I think much too much has been made of the alleged
reticience of the United States Government. It's true that Pre-
sident Reagan...
MAN: You think that Miss Sterling overstates the case?
HENSEY: She certainly overstates -- her experience has
certainly been different from mine. I don't know if you heard me
say that earlier. I never had anybody in the United States
Government discourage me or threaten me or tell me that I should-
n't pursue this. In fact, I had considerable help when I asked
for it. I didn't ask for a great deal. But when I wanted help,
I got help.
MAN: All right.
WOMAN: Mr. Fiske, I trust that I have impeccable cre-
dentials. I'm an American citizen and do not have a single
foreign person in my ancestry since before 1800. And I also have
lived abroad a great deal and I've been to Turkey and I have been
married to a Foreign Service officer. And I know something, a
little something, you know.
But I would say that putting people on the air who want
to make accusations of this kind is a very questionable kind of
thing unless you do allow the debate, because the United States
itself has been involved in so many operations of the same sort.
I mean I remember when Mossadegh, back in the 1950s, and in
Pakistan, with all their revolutions, and in Turkey itself, in
Italy and in Greece, all all the money where the CIA has been
involved, in Argentina, and this and that and the other thing.
FISKE: Well, I, for one, am willing to grant that we
have been involved -- hang on a minute -- that we have been in-
volved in assassinations, the CIA. And I think the CIA itself
has acknowledged that.
Now, what does that lead you to now?
HENSEY: What's your point, madam?
WOMAN: The point I want to make is this: I do not have
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any proof of what I say at all, but it has seemed to me from my
observations of Europe, what little I know, is that what happened
in Poland could hardly have taken place without a substantial
influx of money from the CIA. I mean that whole Solidarity move-
ment must have had substantial support of some kind.
HENSEY: You seem to be an addict of conspiracy
theories, madam.
WOMAN: Well, no. I think you're more the conspiracy
theory. I mean I just tell you what I'm just looking at. And I
mean I certainly think...
FISKE: Do I gather from what you're saying that you
accept the thesis that Paul Hensey puts forth about the killing
of the Pope, that you are attempting to justify it by the fact,
by your argument that the United States has been involved in
assassinations in the past? Is that what you're saying?
WOMAN: I don't justify anything.
FISKE: Do you accept his thesis?
WOMAN: Well, I do not think that the whole story is
given as to -- I mean I don't think that -- it will be some
years, just like the...
HENSEY: Well, so do I. I couldn't agree with you more.
Getting to the bottom of something like this takes a long time.
We've only begun the process.
WOMAN: And I feel that today, with the tension in the
world what it is, that it would be much better to try and say,
"Well, look. We've done bad things. You've done bad things.
Let's stop."
HENSEY: So one shouldn't look into questions like this?
The Pope is shot and nobody should investigate how it happened?
WOMAN: Well, I hardly think it becomes an ex-CIA agent
HENSEY: You really don't make very much sense, madam.
Here you are again slinging accusations instead of -- you say you
want to talk about things objectively, and you're doing quite the
obvious.
WOMAN: Well, I'm just saying that if you want to make a
good impression on the American people as for your credibility,
it would be just as well to accept the fact that you might just
not know everything.
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HENSEY: Who said I knew everything?
WOMAN: Well, then you come out and make...
HENSEY: You're putting words in my mouth. Again, your
approach is...
WOMAN: ...that you have irrefutable evidence.
HENSEY: I didn't say I had irrefutable evidence.
FISKE: Hang on. Let me say that having read Paul
Hensey's book today, he says several times that the missing
pieces will be provided by Soviet defectors who probably will
emerge in the next few years. In his book, at least, he makes
very clear that there are lots of missing pieces, that not every-
thing is known, and that he expects it will be a number of years
before these things come out.
WOMAN: Well, then I think it's a little premature to
come out with this book.
FISKE: Thank you.
Good evening.
MAN: I'm trying to find out if your guest has ever
known a person named Romi Nazar, or Ruzi Nazar, R-u-z-i
N-a-z-a-r, under that name or other names -- for example,
Nazarov, N-a-z-a-r-o-v.
HENSEY: Well, where? Have you known somebody by this
MAN: No. I'm trying to find out if the guest, Ruzi
Nazar has ever -- if the guest has ever known him or worked with
him.
HENSEY: Why does that interest you?
MAN: I'm just trying to verify some credentials.
HENSEY: I've never known him and have never worked with
him. And this is part of -- the question you're acting, whether
you're doing it consciously or not, goes back to the disinforma-
tion that the Russians have been spreading about this story. I
have no further comment to make on it.
FISKE: You've heard that name before, then?
HENSEY: That name has come up in tails out of Moscow in
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booklets that the Bulgarian embassy is passing around in a magni-
ficent concoction of disinformation that tries to put the blame
on Americans.
MAN: Well, I'm trying to find out if the guest ever
worked for Radio Free Europe about 1959.
HENSEY: If I worked for Radio Free Europe? I worked
for Radio Free Europe from 1952 to 1958. That is very well
known. And what significance does that have to you?
MAN: Again, I'm just trying to verify some of the...
HENSEY: Well, you could -- there are other ways of
verifying my background if you want. But I'm perfectly happy to
supply information.
MAN: I'm just tracking credentials, then.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you.
You're on 88.5-FM.
MAN: ...I'm a regular listener of your program, and
occasionally I will make comments. And I think anybody who re-
cognizes the sound of my voice will know from past comments that
I've made that I'm no friend of the Soviet Union. I believe that
it's capable of anything in its attempt to destroy the West.
Additionally, I agree with most of the things that the CIA does.
I'm glad it exists.
But I find that your treatment of the earlier caller who
was claiming to be Turkish, and I believe eventually established
the fact that she was through speaking the language to your
guest, I found the treatment of that woman incredibly boorish.
And I don't know whose pay your guest is in. But I
don't trust the man either.
FISKE: Okay.
MAN: Okay. Thank you.
HENSEY: I have no further comment.
MAN: You wouldn't comment on any of the questions that
you haven't liked tonight.
HENSEY: The questions -- your technique seems to be
very similar to the others.
MAN: Oh, sure. I'm guilty of Soviet disinformation...
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HENSEY: You seem to be very easily aroused, sir.
MAN: Just like the old fellow who called you tonight,
who's a regular caller, whom you accused of Soviet disinforma-
tion.
HENSEY: Who's getting nasty?
MAN: Sir, if you do work for the CIA, you're certainly
no credit to them.
Thank you.
MAN: I'd like to ask a question, going back to a point
that was raised by the woman from Baltimore, which seems to have
been lost. And her point was that as far as the Turkish Govern-
ment was concerned, what is their position? I always thought
that they always assumed that Agca was a rightist-leaning in-
dividual. And I was over in Turkey at the time most of this was
going on. And at that time, inside the country, I never heard
anything about a Communist plot of any sort or any KGB ties. And
if anybody would want to bring this out, I would think it would
be the Turkish Government themselves.
HENSEY: The Turkish Government is conducting at the
present time a major trial in Istanbul on the basis of very ex-
tensive investigations, and the results of that trial are ex-
tremely interesting. You can read a good summary report of it in
the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday of this week.
Your comments seem to beg the answer. You seem to be
implying that the information that I've given is faulty. I think
any objective Turk -- and I know a great many -- would support
the views I've stated.
MAN: But what about the government? Are you saying the
Turkish Government itself is not objective? Because as far as I
know...
HENSEY: The Turkish Government is very objective. The
Turkish Government is investigating the case, just like the
Italian Government.
MAN: Yes, they're investigating. But I have never
heard while I was there...
HENSEY: When were you there?
MAN: I was there up until almost a year ago.
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HENSEY: Well, if you were paying much attention to what
was going on, you wouldn't be as much in the dark as you seem to
be.
MAN: Well, I'm not in the dark. I mean can you speci-
fically tell me at any time when the Turkish Government has ever
commented that there's a possible KGB association between Agca...
HENSEY: Yes. The Turkish Government has put out vast
volumes of information on terrorism and destabilization in
Turkey. There's a great deal of it available, and I'm sure you
can get it.
MAN: ...I'm asking in the specific case about Agca and
HENSEY: The Turkish Government is investigating the
MAN: Yes, they are investigating it. But has anybody
ever, within the Turkish Government, an official, implied or
suggested there was a tie?
HENSEY: Yes.
MAN: Who?
HENSEY: I'm -- numerous people on numerous occasions.
MAN: Can you give me one example?
HENSEY: I really don't care to press this discussion
any further because, obviously, the purpose of your question is
harassment, not the elicitation of information.
MAN: It's not harassment. I would like the informa-
tion. If I'm wrong, I'm willing to admit it. Some of our
readers might be interested.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you, sir.
You say Istanbul. I thought they gave up that. Don't
they call it Ankara?
HENSEY: No, no, no. They are two very different
FISKE: Are they really? Isn't that funny? I was under
the impression that -- they changed capitals? Is that what they
did.
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HENSEY: Istanbul is the old capital. Istanbul is the
old Constantinople.
FISKE: I was under the impression that they changed the
name of the capital.
HENSEY: Not the name. They're both very lively, inter-
esting cities.
MAN: I would like to make a couple of comments. I'm a
long-term listener and supporter of the station. And although it
is perhaps not all that relevant, given what I have to say, I
have had the experience of working in elements of our government
who have been concerned and conducted investigations of political
assassinations within the United States. That has given me oc-
casion to spend a good time not only as a homicide investigator,
but also as someone who has watched the reactions of the American
public and numerous call-in shows from various investigations
over the years of political assassinations. And I can sympathize
that these forums have a lot of inherent difficulties. Not only
are you in the position of dealing with a lot of shadows and
smoke, but you do have a lot of callers who are somewhat off the
wall and the have their own pet theories. And I think there was
a reference made to people who are bent toward conspiracies, and
whatnot.
I wish that all of the experience that I had would put
me in a position to make some sort of a positive comment with
respect of where do we go from here with this investigation. I
have not read the book and I'm not an expert or at all informed
about the facts of the case with regard to the Pope. But I do
have some experience on the way that these things go, and have
been an avid listener. And I would like to make this one comment
about the way that I see the show going tonight.
I am very disappointed with the rude and short treatment
and the defensive attitude of your guest tonight. And Fred, I
think that, frankly, it would be incumbent upon you to listen to
this program and go back and realize there are some very reason-
able people who have raised reasonable objections tonight with
respect to their treatment and the treatment of earlier listen-
ers.
For what it's worth, I just want to make that comment
and wish you well with this case. Thank you.
FISKE: Thank you for your call.
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MAN: Fred, I'm both Turkish and I'm also a regular
listener. And I was calling for two reasons. And you just added
a third one while I was on hold.
The first reason is that I wanted to illustrate that
Turks are capable of speaking good English. And, you know, I was
also disappointed in the way that the lady was treated on the air
just a while back.
country?
FISKE: Can I ask you how long you have been in this
MAN: Oh, I've been here about ten years, so I am dif-
ferent. Yes.
FISKE: Interestingly, you've been here for about ten
years, and I detect evidences of a foreign accent in your speech,
which you must be aware of. The woman who called earlier said
she had been here for only one year, and there was no evidence of
any foreign accent in her speech, which made me, you know, wonder
about that. It's highly unlikely. And my suspicion was and is
that she learned to speak English in the United States.
MAN: Yeah. I won't hold that you against you forever.
I think I'll still continue to be a regular listener. And in
fact, I think you should have bumper stickers that say "Fred
Fiske for President."
[Laughter]
MAN: Anyway, the second point is I think -- I agree
with your guest today that the Russians were probably behind this
whole thing and they were basically fostering this terrorist
group through Bulgaria. But I think one would be smart to look
back at how the group Gray Wolves actually developed in Turkey.
Because in the early '70s, there were only left-wing terrorists
in Turkey, and they were just trying to be heard of and they were
just starting in the business, basically. And one of the things
that was thought by the right-wing people at the time was that
they said, "If the government tries to antagonize those left-wing
terrorists, it's going to be as if the people are fighting the
government, and vice versa." And instead of that, what they did
was to foster right-wing groups and arm them so that they could
actually fight the left-wing terrorists.
So, it really was that group Gray Wolves really started
out that way, and it was a baby, I guess, or a child, or whatever
you call it, of the right-wing people in Turkey. And I wouldn't
really be surprised if I found out that they would have some
outside contacts or assistance in fostering that group of people.
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Now, eventually, the Russians, I think, wanted to capi-
talize on this because all they care about is to have chaos in
Turkey so that they can fractionate the country and get their
hands on a piece, which will put them in a strategic location.
So, basically, it's something that really backfired and eventual-
ly was exploited by the Russians to their advantage.
Now, the shooting of the Pope, obviously, is another
example of how this thing really misfired, or whatever, so to
speak. I mean it basically illustrates how this geopolitical
power play between large countries and major powers, or super-
powers, can really influence smaller countries like Turkey and
lead to some freak accidents or some other plots like the shoot-
ing of the Pope. And I think we have a lot to learn from this
type of an incident.
HENSEY: You make some very, very good observations,
sir. And you clearly have a good grasp of what happened in your
country during that time. The fact is that all sorts of people
were playing around in the situation. And the Russians found
that the Gray Wolves served their purposes, the extreme rightists
served their purposes. Most of the extreme rightists, obviously,
didn't know that in the end they were getting support and arms
and money from sources that were ultimately backed by the Krem-
lin. But I suspect that some did.
This is one of the misfortunes. When politics, in any
country, become split into extremes, everybody in the middle
suffers, and the extremes become more extreme, and the whole
system is in danger of collapse. And this is clearly what did
happen in Turkey in the '70s.
FISKE: Thank you for your call.
WOMAN: I wanted to ask Mr. Hensey if he has noticed in
the recent Soviet press, particularly in [Russian expression],
articles saying that they have mounted a real campaign for the
release of Mr. Antonov. And it seems to me that it's a possi-
bility that they may have been kind of -- or they may be angling
for an exchange. What do you think of that possibility?
HENSEY: That's definitely possible. [Russian expres-
sion] has continued to be preoccupied with this case over a long
period of time.
It's interesting to note, for example, that the Soviet
Government, itself, has almost never said anything about this
case. Obviously, they're extremely embarrassed by it. But
they've given the job of spreading propaganda and agitating to
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[Russian expression], with Pravda and Izvestia and other papers
occasionally weighing in as well.
The possibility of an exchange was foreseen very, very
early. When the Italians first came out with clear-cut evidence
of a Bulgarian connection, you may recall, the Bulgarians ar-
rested two unfortunate Italians, a young lady and a young man,
who were traveling in Bulgaria at the time and accused them of
espionage, allegedly photographing military installations. They
carried out a sham trial and put these people in prison. They
were obviously just, in effect, taking hostages, hoping to trade
them. The Italians have never responded to this kind of cheap
gesture.
WOMAN: I had one more other brief question, which was:
Has the Catholic Church mounted an investigation?
HENSEY: Oh, I suppose it has. It's certainly interes-
ted. The Catholic Church doesn't dispose of the same kind of
investigative and judicial power that the Italian state does. The
Lateran Treaty of 1929 between the Government of Italy and the
Vatican provides that any attack on the head of the Vatican
--that is, the Pope -- will be treated in the same manner as an
attack on the head of the Italian state. It's on that basis that
the responsibility for investigating this whole case rests with
Italy.
FISKE: Since the shooting attempt, since the assassina-
tion attempt was made, has the Pope altered his direction any?
It seems to me, if anything, he has intensified his efforts to
spread the word in Poland and to some of the religious groups in
the Soviet Union, and so on.
HENSEY: There are pople who argued in the first year or
so that the Pope had softened up, that he'd been frightened, and
so forth. I see no evidence of that. In fact, the Pope went
back to Poland, of course, after the assassination attempt.
People were very apprehensive about it. That visit to Poland
was, in its way, just as significant as his earlier visit had
been.
The Pope continues to be extremely interested in
Catholics throughout the world, but particularly Catholics in
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. I don't believe the Pope has
altered his views or his policies in any respect.
FISKE: You're on the air.
WOMAN: I am enjoying your program very much this
evening. And I've also heard Claire Sterling on Diane Rehm's
earlier show during the day on WAMU.
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I wanted to, first of all, compliment both Mr. Hensey
and Claire Sterling for their personal efforts to bring and to
continue to keep this in the eye of the public. I think it's
very, very critical, as this story continues to evolve, that
we're being kept up to date on this. So that's my first comment
that I'd like to make.
HENSEY: Well, thank you very much.
WOMAN: Secondly, I'd like to say also this evening that
as an American and deeply interested -- I've read Claire
Sterling's book and I've also followed through with great inter-
est the Reader's Digest articles that came before the actual
completion of her book. And early on -- and I happened to also
catch the NBC, one of the White Papers. And there was some men-
tion very early on that there had been an Italian magazine pu-
blication at one point of time where a leader of the Armenian
community perhaps [unintelligible] had commented, in his efforts
to attack Turkey and the Turks and the history of that antagon-
ism, that he felt that he was so strong, this Armenian leader
felt that he was so strong and the community was so strong that
they could even get a Turk to kill the Pope.
I was wondering, has there been any additional infor-
mation on that possibility and where that has led to? I have not
read anything more on that lately.
HENSEY: I don't know of any evidence that there have
been any Armenian connections in this whole operation.
Curiously enough, when Agca was first arrested, immedi-
ately after attacking the Pope, there were reports that he was an
Armenian. But this, of course, was clarified very quickly.
It's quite true that Armenians have been involved in
particularly vicious terrorism against Turks, shooting Turkish
diplomats, attacking Turkish offices around the world. There's
fairly good reason to believe that the KGB has been supporting
these efforts. It's certainly not been doing anything to inter-
fere with them in any way.
WOMAN: The other comment that I'd like to make, also,
is recognizing the extremely large, and perhaps, I understand,
the largest minority in the Soviet Union today being of Turkish
descent, that there would be a definite interest in putting down
anything Turkish in the Soviet Union, even to the point of,
again, an interest in destabilization of Turkey, because I under-
stand that in Russia, in the Soviet Union today there still is a
great fearing of [unintelligible] Turk. And with, you know, this
downplay and this attack on Agca, and also destabilization of
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Turkey, it seems to be very much of a total program.
HENSEY: Well, you're quite right. And it isn't so much
that there's a Turkish minority in the Soviet Union as that there
ae a great many people in the Soviet Union who are Turks, who are
closely related to the Turks of Turkey. There are probably today
50 million people who are Moslem and Turkish and who live in the
Caucuses and in Central Asia.
WOMAN: You hear a lot today about the American Jewish
population being concerned about the oppression of Soviet Jewry,
but you hear very little about what's happening today in Russia
regarding the suppression of the Turkish minority there.
HENSEY: Well, you hear very little about the oppression
of Moslems in the U.S.S.R. In the U.S.S.R. the Moslems do not
lead a free life at all. While the Soviets abroad, in trying to
cater to people in the Middle East and Africa, like to pretend
that they're great friends of Moslems. It's a very duplicitous,
hypocritical approach.
FISKE: Well, nobody in the Soviet Union leads a free
HENSEY: Absolutely nobody.
FISKE: Why would we expect the Moslems would?
HENSEY: Well, the Moslems, of course, are disadvantaged
in some ways. In some ways, however, they've learned how to take
advantage of the system.
But you're very right in making the observation that you
make, that the Soviets are deeply worried about Turkey. This is
one of the reasons why they want to sow hate between Turkey and
the rest of the world.
WOMAN: Yes. I want to congratulate you and Mr. Fiske
on being brave enough. And I apologize for my fellow Americans
who have been very rude this evening.
HENSEY: Well, it's a pleasure to hear someone who is
open and objective and interested in learning, rather than to be
continually a victim of comments by people who seem to be in a
state of emotional frenzy at the mere thought of trying to look
at this whole question with some degree of open-mindedness.
WOMAN: Well, again, I congratulate you and Claire
Sterling for keeping this in front of the American public, and
also the Western World.
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HENSEY: Thank you. I hope you have a chance to look at
my book. You'll find some very interesting things there.
WOMAN: I'm sure I will. Thank you very much.
FISKE: And it's titled The Plot to Kill'the Pope. It's
by our guest, Paul Hensey.
WOMAN: I had several points to make. One is that your
guest said that he was very active in Radio Free Europe in the
'50s. Ambassador Davies, who was the Polish ambassador up till
'78, he said Radio Free Europe was funded by the CIA and run by
the CIA in those years. So I think when he's an expert on dis-
information, he might also be an expert at dishing it out.
And I wanted to mention a book called The Eyes of the
KGB. Fred, you had that author on here. He was with the CIA for
20 years, and he completely...
FISKE: The Eyes of the KGB?
WOMAN: Yes. And he completely refuted Claire Sterling
and threw out the things, her hypothesis.
FISKE: I think you've got somebody -- you heard it on
somebody else's program.
WOMAN: No, it was your program, Eyes of the KGB. And
he made the point that the Soviet Union does not indulge in as-
sassinations. They work in a vastly different way.
And being on the side of bread and justice, as Barry
Goldwater said, the Soviet Union and the Communists have won more
territory in the world without a shot, just by their philosophy.
And the thing is that I think it's very interesting
because your guest completely dismisses this book about the
murder and assassination of this former Pope. And I guest read
the Book of the Month Club News, and they have about three pages
with all the pictures of the people in that Mafia Vatican bank.
They were on the enemies list of the former Pope and he was about
to prosecute them when he mysteriously died of a -- you know,
died. And then this new Pope came in.
And as a matter of fact, I think he may have been pre-
ferable because he was more willing to deal with the drug smug-
gling people, and therefore he was involved with some very
scummy...
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FISKE: Where are you taking us? Can we discuss --let's
discuss the subject we have on the table.
WOMAN: Okay. What I'm saying is that Claire Sterling,
she would constantly get back to her hypothesis that the Soviet
Union would have liked to see this Pope out of the way because of
the role of the church in Solidarity. However, I often heard
during those days that it was the Pope who mediated the situation
and gave the Government of Poland the most hope. So I think that
that is a very alternate hypothesis.
The fact that your guest was with the CIA, Radio Free
Europe for so long -- I think this is being used to rally
Catholics in this country in the three months before a vastly
different government might come in, to rally them against the
Soviet Union with his shadowy allegations.
FISKE: Okay.
HENSEY: The lady seems to have all the answers. I have
no comment.
WOMAN: I want to thank tonight's guest for really beau-
tifully and clearly laying out this very complicated situation.
And it's one that we all should know about. And I'm so glad he's
written a book about it.
HENSEY: You have read my book, have you?
WOMAN: No, I haven't. But I'm dying to after hearing
HENSEY: Well, I hope you have the opportunity to be-
cause I think you'll find it very interesting. Actually, it
seems to me tonight, in the course of the discussion, that we've
had very little opportunity to talk about what's actually in the
book. So I do appreciate your comments.
WOMAN: Well, I must add that I'm appalled at the rude-
ness of the callers. You haven't been rude at all. And I do
think that the Communist embassies have been very active in get-
ting these people to call tonight.
HENSEY: Indeed they have.
WOMAN: I feel sorry for you.
HENSEY: They're more efficient that they were the last
time I appeared on this station with Diane Rehm. Then they had
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people calling in who had East European accents. I noticed that
all the people who called in tonight have native American
accents, except a couple who have Turkish accents.
WOMAN: Yes, I noticed that too. I do feel sorry for
you. But you're doing a wonderful job, and please keep it up.
HENSEY: Well, thank you very much.
FISKE: You're on the air.
MAN: Just a comment to Mr. Hensey there, if I might.
FISKE: Go ahead.
MAN: Yes. I believe you may be damaging your own case.
You seem to have laid out fascism and Communism as opposite
poles. But might it not be true...
HENSEY: I certainly haven't done that, under any cir-
cumstance. I have known from childhood that fascism and Com-
munism are essentially the same thing. Facism is essentially a
heresy of Communism, and Communism is a heresy of facism.
They're both totalitarianism.
MAN: I'm glad to agree, because commentators than I
have laid them out as meeting on the arc of the circle.
HENSEY: Well, where did you get the impression that I
considered facism...
MAN: Only because some of your earlier callers, with
whom I'm not in agreement with, seemed to be pushing you towards
the Gray Wolves explanation rather than the other. And I
wonder...
HENSEY: Well, that's not my explanation. Agca was made
to look like a Gray Wolf. He never was a Gray Wolf.
MAN: That's an irrelevant argument, really.
HENSEY: The experience of terrorism in Turkey, though,
demonstrates how close facism and Communism are. It's the people
who argue from the left who always want to pretend that the Gray
Wolves are something totally different from the Communists.
Actually, the Gray Wolves and the Communists were simply two ends
of the same extreme spectrum.
FISKE: Were the Gray Wolves something like the Black
Shirts, that kind of organization?
HENSEY: The Gray Wolves were a youth organization of
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the Nationalist Party. They've been painted to be far more
vicious than they really were, but they weren't a very nice or-
ganization. They don't exist anymore. They were dissolved when
the military took over in Turkey and brought terrorism and de-
stabilization to an end.
Agca, however, was never a Gray Wolf. The people that
recruited Agca and prepared him for his brief but spectacular
career in international crime tried to make him look like a Gray
Wolf. They've tried to befuddle the situation since. You've
heard what some of the callers tonight, the kinds of information
that are being spread, the kind of distortions, the kind of emo-
tional, frenzied intensity. One of these ladies, who maintained
that she was a Turk, tried her best to spread this type of thing.
But your basic observation is very correct. Fascism and
Communism are simply -- are essentially the same kind of problem.
It's the extremes against the center. The real problem in the
world today is that those of us who are trying to maintain and
operate free societies find ourselves attacked from all sides.
MAN: Well, good. If you made the point earlier, I'm
sorry I missed it. I did tune in late.
HENSEY: If you have a chance to read my book, you'll
see a very clear exposition of these problems.
MAN: I'll certainly do that.
MAN: A remarkable show that you've got tonight. I
think that this is just one of the best shows you've ever put on.
FISKE: I'm glad you're enjoying it.
MAN: The thing that fascinates me is the tremendous
opposition that's being raised. I've listened to you for years.
I've never heard anybody get attacked the way that this Mr.
Hensey has been attacked.
HENSEY: It's not accidental, you can be sure. The
attacks on me tonight have been organized.
MAN: Well, but then I'm beginning to realize for the
first time that the Soviet Union is frightened.
HENSEY: You see a good example of that tonight.
MAN: The fact that they would go to such an extreme as
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 to arrange to seek to assassinate the Pope tells me several
things. One, as I understand it, in Poland something like 90
percent of the population, or better, are Catholic; that the men
all go to church and they bring their sons with them; and it's a
very virile, tough church. And that maybe they're scared that
now that their leadership is aging in the Soviet Union, that
there's a similar type of underground church in the Soviet Union,
and that this might be the thing that they're terrified of, that
they're going to be -- if there is an overthrow in the Soviet
Union and they're going to go belly-up and the Communists are
going to be kicked out, that the people that will do it are
people who are willing to go to their death and be martyrs to
save their country because of their belief in their church.
Is there a chance that the Catholic Church can -- there
can be a revival underground in the Soviet Union...
HENSEY: Well, it isn't only the Catholic Church that
the leaders in the Kremlin are afraid of. It's all religion.
It's the Orthodox Church. It's the Moslems. It's Protestant
churches, Baptists and so forth.
It just happens that the Catholic population of the
Soviet Union has been given special hope and special inspiration,
has experienced a real sense of exultation by virtue of having a
Polish Pope.
MAN: What percent of the people of the Soviet Union are
Catholics?
HENSEY: Only a very small percentage, probably no more
than five or six million out of a population of about 260 mil-
lion.
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HENSEY: The great majority of Russians are at least
nominally Orthodox. And we have a good deal of evidence that the
Orthodox Church, though it's been oppressed and distorted and
subjected to regime controls over a long period of time, still
enjoys the support of a large number of people?
people?
MAN: Would you say 50 percent are Christian church
HENSEY: Possibly that high. Among Moslems in the
Soviet Union, the sense of devotion to their own religion, I
think, is much higher because they've been interfered with some-
what less.
MAN: What percent are they?
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49
HENSEY: Of the population of the Soviet Union?
MAN: Uh-huh.
HENSEY: Rapidly approaching 20 percent.
MAN: So you're talking about 50 and 20.
HENSEY: Well, you're talking about a very sizable num-
ber of people. The real problem with Communism and religion is
that Communism is a substitute religion, but it doesn't satisfy
people the way religion does. It doesn't provide what religion
provides.
MAN: The question I ask you is this: It seems to me
that they're, at least at the very minimum, afraid that Poland
may revolt and that could lead to a similar kind of revolt in
other countries, perhaps Czechoslovakia and some of the other
satellite countries that are leaning westward, and that ultimate-
ly it might blow up in the Soviet Union. What do you think about
that?
HENSEY: I couldn't agree more. It has to do not only
with religion, but nationalism. It has to do with the fact that
people really do want to be free. And the system in the Soviet
Union really offers no freedom, doesn't respect human rights, and
tries to lock everybody into an old empire that's shakier and
shakier.
FISKE: Thank you, sir.
WOMAN: I was listening to this tonight and I was of two
minds. And I kept saying to my husband, you know, "This is a
strange call-in program." I mean, you know, I listen every
night. But the callers were so different.
And then Mr. Hensey said that there were people calling
in from strange places. That scares me out of six-weeks growth
to think that this could happen. Because every night when I
listen to you, people call in very openly and speak their minds.
But tonight it was very strange.
HENSEY: I don't know if the places were strange. Some
of the people were strange.
FISKE: We probably attracted -- I don't disagree that
it's possible that some of those calls may have been orchestrated
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and planned. But on the other hand, when we're talking about a
subject of this sort, it's likely that people, for example, who
are of Turkish extraction would be motivated to call who might
not on other subjects.
WOMAN: Well, I understand from Mr. Hensey that they
weren't all Turkish.
FISKE: Well, okay.
HENSEY: Well, we have a free society. It's one of the
great virtues of a free society that we can all talk freely, we
can all call in. In the Communist world, this would be incon-
ceivable.
FISKE: You're on 88.5-FM.
WOMAN: There are two things I want to say. One, I just
want to congratulate you for having such a wonderful guest on
your program. And I hope that you invite either him or somebody
like him back in the future.
There was another point that some one of you made on the
program, that saying that a lot of people that called in tonight
were very rude. And one of you commented that they -- or one of
the callers that called in made a statement that she wants to
apologize for the Americans that were rude. Well, I noticed from
reporters interviewing Russians and people from Eastern Europe,
you really cannot tell whether they're Americans or not by their
accent, because they sound just like an American until the re-
porter would say, "Where did you pick up your American accent?"
So, I really do not think we should think that all those
people with American accents that called in were really Ameri-
cans.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you.
MAN: I have a point and a question, please. Let me say
that you might be a speech expert, but obviously you are not an
expert on the human capacity to excel, judging by what I have
observed tonight.
And let me ask you a question. Are you continually
studying speech, or have you just decided that, being an expert,
you can stop now? Are you still studying?
FISKE: Well, of course. My work and my life are all
bound up in it every single day.
Thank you.
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MAN: I am just calling to confirm one point that your
guest made about the organized effort by the Soviet agents in
this country whenever a program like this comes, where the Soviet
policy is condemned and evidence is given for that. A couple of
weeks ago there was a program in New York City where the current
Soviet situation in Afghanistan was discussed, and we were sur-
prised that all the people who called in, they were all pro-
Soviet and there was no evidence given, nobody supported the
Afghan cause.
This is done very nicely. All the people, when a pro-
gram like this is publicized, the pro-Soviet people, they or-
ganize and they call first and they always try to discredit the
person who gives the evidence.
HENSEY: That's a very cogent observation, and it's very
pertinent. I think Americans need to recognize how often our
free institutions are abused by these people. They're willing to
go to almost any lengths to try to justify their own repressive
system and attack those of us who try to expose it.
MAN: This is very true.
I come from Afghanistan and I've been here for many
years. I've yet to see a person who has the views that are ex-
pressed over and over again against a person who speaks, you
know, on the radio or on TV against the Soviets.
HENSEY: Yes. I understand very well your problem be-
cause I'm, of course, very familiar with your situation as well.
And it's part of the whole vast Soviet imperial problem.
One of the great concerns of the men in the Kremlin has
been Poland, and another one of them has been Afghanistan. And
they both demonstrate what a bankrupt, but vicious, system this
is.
MAN: Anyway, it's been very enjoyable to listen to you.
HENSEY: Thank you.
FISKE: And I want to thank you so much for coming.
HENSEY: Thank you, Fred. It's been a pleasure. I'm
accustomed to being assaulted by frenzied, emotional people who
are not attacking anything that I've said, but who always try to
attack me, my background, and the fact I've looked into it.
FISKE: Well, good luck to you.
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Paul Hensey. His book titled The Plot to Kill the Pope.
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