U.S./USSR/RELATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01070R000200960003-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 27, 2008
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 21, 1983
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP88-01070R000200960003-0.pdf | 197.86 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0
ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT
21 November 1983
U.S./USSR/ JENNINGS: ... Tonight, Pierre Salinger reports on the two nations'
RELATIONS principal intelligence agencies, the KGB and the CIA.
SALINGER: The KCB headquarters on *Drjinski Square in Moscow,
the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.--two powerful intelligence
organizations pitted in an unrelenting worldwide struggle--the
KGB, 500,000 employees, the CIA, 45,000. The KGB, with wide
powers operating in secret in a totalitarian state; the CIA,
much narrower powers and subject to constant congressional and
news media overview. The KGB experts and agents recruiting this
information, Internal Security Control; the CIA dominant in
electronic espionage, once again engaged in worldwide covert
operations. WILLIAM COLBY (Former CIA Director): The KGB
doesn't correspond just with CIA; it corresponds with CIA, the
FBI, the Board of Police, the state police of all our states,
the Treasury, the Secret Service, all of that.
SALINGER: More than that, the KGB controls the Soviet army, has-
its own army to deal with internal disorders, runs its own
prison, and has its own terrorist squad which led the invasion
of Afghanistan, murdering Prime Minister Amin and sowing panic
in Kabul. The politburo has given the KGB these extensive
powers so it can fulfill its primary objective--controlling the
internal life of the Soviet Union. LEOPOLD LABEDZ (Journalist):
The success of the KGB within the last year has been containment
first and then the disruption of the Soviet dissident movement.
SALINGER: The KGB also runs a worldwide network of agents
assigned to Soviet embassies--news agencies, airline offices,
and international organizations like the U.N.--their number one
target, the United States and its high technology. It is'an
easy target. A Soviet spy can get 95 percent of the information
he needs simply by reading publicly available technical
journals, many of them printed by the U.S. government. But
getting highly sensitive information requires recruiting
well-placed U.S. agents. A case study--James Durwood Harper, an
agent corrupted by money. According to FBI investigators,
Harper, for a long time a Silicon Valley technician, stole reams
of top secret military documents at Systems Control, Inc. in
Palo Alto, Calif. Harper then sold the documents for $250,000
to a Polish spy, who passed them on to the KGB. The
information: how the Minuteman missile could escape a Soviet
nuclear attack; the damage to U.S. security: beyond calculation.
Another KGB tactic--the use of illegals, or sleepers, highly
trained agents planted in Western countries in the hopes they
will reach positions of influence and authority. A case
study--*Gunther Guillaume, ostensibly an East German refugee in
.West Germany--in reality, a top-ranked East German intelligence
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agent. Guillaume fulfilled the KGB's highest dream--becoming
the personal adviser and confidant of German Chancellor Willie
Brandt. When Guillaume was unmasked, Brandt had to resign. A
KGB priority--disinformation, spreading false information to
confuse or influence public opinion outside the Soviet Union. A
case study--*Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a KGB agent operating as a Tass
correspondent in Tanzania in the '60s. Dzhirkvelov said his
assignment was to swing Tanzanian public opinion against the
? U.S. Peace Corps. He did it by bribing a Tanzanian journalist.
DZHIRKVELOV:? I can tell you, 'Ask me how much.' I said, '1,000
shillings. I'm made to pay.' He thought a minute, said,
'okay.'
SALINGER: The journalist published articles linking the Peace
Corps to the CIA; the Peace Corps was thrown out of Tanzania.
The European peace movements provide another example of how KGB
disinformation works. A case study--Alexi Dumov, a KGB agent
and head of the Soviet press agency, *Novesti, in Bern,
Switzerland. He was accused, among other things, of organizing
this anti-American demonstration. This spring, the Swiss
government expelled Dumov and closed the *Novesti office. Dumov
is but one of almost 100 Soviet spies who have been expelled
from countries around the world this year, 147 of them from
France alone. This, ironically, is due more to stepped up KGB
efforts to get high technology than to increase Western
surveillance. These expulsions have been one of the KGB's major
failures, as has the rising number of KGB defectors. The CIA,
like the KGB, runs covert operations, engages in disinformation,
and recruits agents. The last known high-level penetration of
the Soviet government here in 1962 when KGB Col. *Orlai
*Synchrovski provided vital information to the United States.
during the Cuban missile crisis. But in the 1970s, while the
then KGB director Yuri Andropov was vastly improving KGB methods
and personnel, the CIA's one secret operation was exposed by the
Congress. SEN. FRANK CHURCH (D-Idaho): Does this pistol fire
the dart?
SALINGER: Secret dart'guns were not the only thing the Church
committee revealed. The world heard of CIA covert operations,
including the efforts to destabilize the Allende government in
Chile, the assassination of *Patrik *Amunda in the Congo, plots
to assassinate Fidel Castro, and the CIA's participation in
'Watergate, and internal spying. The Church investigation
shattered the CIA. RAY CLINE (Former CIA Deputy, Director for
Intelligence): It destroyed its morale; it out its budgets. At
least a third of their people disappeared. Carter and Admiral
Stansfield Turner fired a great many of the men who were
experienced in overseas operations by the CIA. Along with this
weakening of the CIA came one of its greatest failures--its
inability to accurately analyze the crumbling situation in Iran
which led to the fall of the Shah and eventually to the.taking
of the American hostages. This humiliation of the United States
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and Jimmy Carter helped bring Ronald Reagan to power and
provided him with support for rebuilding the CIA. Today, the
agency has recovered much of its strength, and CIA covert
operations now stretch around the world. Some cases in
point--supporting the Moslem rebels in Afghanistan, aiding
anti-Khomeini Iranians, arming and training forces opposed to
the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, backing Pol Pot and
other forces seeking to overthrow the Vietnamese-backed
government in Cambodia. But it is in intelligence gathering,
not covert activity, that the CIA has had its biggest success.
The developments of U.S. intelligence satellites in cooperation
with the National Security Agency has dramatically improved the
ability to penetrate Soviet military activities. WILLIAM COLBY:
You can look down into some secret test center in Central
Siberia and look inside that place and see what kinds of weapons
are being produced at a... whereas, 10 or 15 years ago we
wouldn't have had the faintest idea even what it was.
SALINGER: So, what is the scorecard in the continuing struggle
between the CIA and the KGB? In a way, it is an unequal
contest. Because of our open, democratic society, we are easy
to penetrate and have more difficulty encountering KGB
disinformation around the world. But because of our technical
capabilities, the CIA is getting better and better in
penetrating the secret Soviet society. The country that
maintains the edge in the secret world of spies will have a
definitive advantage if there is ever an open conflict between
the two powers. Pierre Salinger, ABC News, Langley, Va.
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