THE SOVIETS AND THE DOWNED KOREAN JET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200860007-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 6, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
The Ron Eisenberg Show
September 6, 1983 4:37 P.M.
STATION WRC Radio
The Soviets And The Downed Korean Jet
Washington, D.C.
RON EISENBERG: We go to the WRC Live Line and a
gentleman who called us earlier today.
And I gather you used to work, caller, for the Defense
Intelligence Agency?
MAN: Yes, that's correct, Ron.
EISENBERG: You're not longer with them, though.
MAN: No, I'm retired.
EISENBERG: Why did you want to come on with us?
MAN: Well, I'd heard a question, probably during the
two o'clock hour, in your discussion. I was on the highway at
that time. When we ask the question about would it have been
possible, if we had all of this information regarding the
conversations between the Russian air defense fighter pilot and
his ground controller, and recognized very likely that what they
were talking about at the time, since we knew where they were
from radar and we knew where the Korean Air Lines plane was from
radar, the question was: Well, if we knew all of that, couldn't
we have done anything about it?
MAN: Well, there are basically three answers. The
first answer is it depends on how that information actually got
into our hands. There are -- you know, you have to remember that
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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these are conversations that anybody could have monitored on any
radio anywhere in the world if the radio just happened to be in
the right place, particularly since you're dealing with an
aircraft -- in this case, the Russian fighter aircraft -- that
are fairly high up, and therefore it's pretty easy to intercept
what they're saying.
EISENBERG: I would assume we do a lot of that.
MAN: I think all governments do, Ron. I don't think
that's any big secret.
EISENBERG: Right.
posture.
MAN: It's part of your basic strategic intelligence
And since it was obviously what we call clear text -- in
other words, they were speaking in Russian, there was no attempt
to disguise what they were saying. They weren't using any codes
or anything.
EISENBERG: Why do you think they weren't encoding?
MAN: That's probably standard procedure in a situation
like that. They may not have the sophistication in their radio
equipment. When time is of the essence, generally you direct
fighters into attack simply in the clear because it cuts through
a lot of the misunderstanding that can occur otherwise.
EISENBERG: Okay. Now, from the tapes we heard last
night and at the U.S. Security Council meeting today, it was
pretty clear that fighter was directed in, told to fire, it
fired, then went back home.
MAN: Okay. You know, to get directly to the question
at hand, which is, you know, was there time to pass a warning?
MAN: It depends on when we became aware that the Soviet
aircraft actually had hostile intent. If we just saw them go up,
which they do frequently when any aircraft comes near -- I think
the President mentioned that there was a KC-135 reconnaissance
aircraft of 'some kind that had been out on patrol earlier in the
general vicinity, you know, not really anywhere near the specific
point of the innocent.
EISENBERG: Right. And the statement from the Soviet
Tass news agency was that they sent fighters up to look at that
one too.
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MAN: I'm sure they did. And, you know, that's just
very standard procedure. And it wouldn't matter what kind of an
airplane it was. You know, they're so sensitive to that airspace
in that particular area, and other areas as well, that that would
have been a routine.
So, you know, so it's up there, you know. Now, the
question to whether we could have done anything about it hinges
on two things. One, at what point would someone really have
become aware of the intent of the Soviet fighters? And secondly,
what is the means of -- in many cases, because these sorts of
things are very routine and are routinely important, you may have
-- you know, all this may simply go on a tape recorder somewhere,
and then, in reviewing it all after the fact, we might have
become very aware of what was taking place.
EISENBERG: What do you think happened?
MAN: I think, from my own personal experience, it's my
guess that these broadcasts were monitored live.
EISENBERG: Okay. Now, your guess, for the WRC listen-
ers just joining us, is a pretty sophisticated guess. You used
to work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. And I gather you
left them rather recently.
MAN: Well, actually, I left them several years ago, but
remained active in the intelligence community up until my
retirement in 1978.
EISENBERG: Okay. So you've had your finger in the
intelligence pot.
MAN: Right. Okay, now...
EISENBERG: Now wait a minute. When you say your best
guess that these communications were monitored live, you mean
someone was sitting and listening while it happened?
MAN: Yes. And this person would have been a Russian
linguist and would have been able to pretty well discern what was
happening.
Now, this still doesn't mean we could have done anything
EISENBERG: Why?
MAN: Perhaps the time element just wasn't there. Very
frankly -- and one of the things I probably should have found out
before I offered to speak on the subject -- is I have no idea
over what period of time these conversations took place that in-
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dicated that these Soviet fighters really had hostile intent.
EISENBERG: Well, from the...
MAN: It could have been that the whole thing tran-
spired, let's say, over a 10-to-15-minute period.
EISENBERG: Well, that's about right, in terms of what
MAN: ...no way, even if someone had had the authority
to do it, there would have been no way that the reaction could
have been that quick.
EISENBERG: Okay. Don't go anywhere. I want to come
back and ask you who these Russian linguists are who are listen-
ing, and whether, from your knowledge, these kinds of things
happen more often than we have been told, commercial jets and the
potential danger.
EISENBERG: We have on the line a gentleman who called
us earlier today. He used to work for DIA, Defense Intelligence.
He's been in the intelligence business up until 1978, you said.
I want to move along, but let me ask you this. In terms
of what you know, there's no way, in your view, that the U.S.
could have warned somebody and didn't.
MAN: I just think that the time factor was too close,
Ron. And then you've got what we call the Coventry syndrome,
also, that you have to work with.
MAN: This is the well-known anecdote about World War II
intelligence operations where we had obtained a copy of the
Engigma cipher device that the Nazis were using, and Churchill ws
informed in advance about the Nazi raid on Coventry and had the
very, very difficult decision of compromising the intelligence
by, you know, doing something that might tip the hand to the
Nazis that we knew about the raid in advance or going ahead and
letting the raid take place, with the subsequent very tragic loss
of life there in Coventry.
EISENBERG: Yeah, but what you're saying by that is we
may have known, may have been able to stop it, but didn't?
MAN: I would say even if we had been, there would have
been that further obstacle to a quick reaction.
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EISENBERG: What level are the -- you said it would have
been a Soviet analyst sitting and listening to those...
MAN: A very low level.
MAN: Yeah. This would probably have been at a very
low-level position. There would have been many layers of -- you
know, in spite of whether the person actually listening to the
conversations was fully aware of what was taking place, there
would have been many layers of -- in fact, it probably would have
had to go to the President to get released. And that, obviously,
would be an impossibility.
EISENBERG: But it would have taken a while, I suspect.
How often do these kinds of incidents happen that don't
end as tragically?
MAN: Well, I think they happen probably much more
frequently than even I was aware of. And I think, you know, of
interest to that, I was talking to your producer before I came on
and I had heard a commentary earlier about the so-called conspir-
acy theory. And I think the thing that really puts the end to
that is that there was no way we could have guaranteed it.
Because I have a feeling it's very -- I would say it's relatively
unusual that this would have happened. You know, there's no way
you could have guaranteed in advance that this would happen.
EISENBERG: Okay. I've got to run. Thanks.
MAN: One additional thing I might want to pass on.
It's another theory. I have no basis for this whatsoever. It is
probably the thing that novels are better made out of than news
commentaries.
But take an example that perhaps a major power on some
occasions in the past might have actually used another country's
civilian airliners for some sort of surveillance or intelligence
mission. Let's say a third major power had been aware of this
for some time and was getting more and more irked by the pract-
ice, and decided one day, "This is a good time to send a message
that we don't want this to continue."
EISENBERG: Now, what do you mean? Is there any way
--no one has said to us that there's anything useful you could
get from a commercial 747 flying at night at 35,000 feet in terms
of intelligence advantage.
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MAN: Well, I can't comment on that, Ron.
EISENBERG: Do you think there could be a use?
MAN: I won't comment on that.
EISENBERG: Well, how could you lead us all the way to
the edge of the cliff and then stop?
MAN: Well, I said this is a -- you know, this is a
conjecture that novels are better made of than news commentaries.
EISENBERG: All right. Well, we're going to leave it at
that. And maybe you'll go write the novel and we'll find out.
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