MEDIASCAN TRANSCRIPT ABC THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200800002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 24, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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MEDIASCAN TRANSCRIPT
ABC THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY
24 July 1983
Sunday
AB01 PROGRAM BRINKLEY: What on earth is going on in Central America? And
INTRODUCTION what is the U.S. doing there with troop trainers, advisers, and
a fleet from the U.S. Navy lying off the coast? Is it a threat
to the U.S. if the Communists take over one country after
another? Or is the threat that the U.S. will again be bogged
down in a Vietnam-style guerrilla war? Our guests today: two
members of the new bipartisan commission on Central America,
Robert Strauss, former chairman of the Democratic National
Committee and Dr. John R. Silber, president of Boston
University; the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Anthony C.
Quainton; and Sen. Christopher Dodd of Connecticut of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The background on this
messy, difficult problem from James Wooten, and our discussion
here with George Will, Sam Donaldson and Hodding Carter. All
here on our Sunday program.
AB02 ISRAEL/LEBANON BRINKLEY: Today's news since the Sunday morning papers, and
there isn't much, the Israeli Cabinet met this morning and
announced President Reagan had asked its defense and foreign
ministers to come to Washington and to discuss with him the
stalemate on moving foreign troops out of Lebanon. They will
come to Washington tomorrow.
AB03 CANADA/ BRINKLEY: An Air Canada jet with 61 passengers aboard had to
AIRLINE MISHAP make an emergency landing on an old military airfield in
Manitoba. Some passengers were injured, but not seriously.
Either the plane ran out of fuel or something prevented the
fuel from reaching the engines.
AB04 EGG FARM FIRE/ BRINKLEY: And in Acme, Ind., there was a fire at a huge egg
INDIANA farm. Fourteen fire departments fought the blaze, but 210,000
chickens were lost. We'll be back with all the rest of today's
program in a moment.
AB05 U.S./CENTRAL BRINKLEY: President Reagan now has put more pressure on
Nicaragua
AMERICA and on the left-wing guerrillas trying to overthrow the
government of El Salvador, pressure in the form of maneuvers
by the U.S. Army in Honduras and the U.S. Navy carrier force
lying offshore. What does all this mean? And where might it
lead? Before we question our guests and bring you up to date
on what's happening in Central America, here's our background
report from James Wooten. Jim?
WOOTEN: Well, David, it's always difficult to measure these
moments, but it just may be that we have seen the stagnant saga
of Central America enter a brand new phase this week. First,
the president has decided to increase geometrically the
military pressure on the leftist government of Nicaragua and
the guerrillas in El Salvador, including a massive
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demonstration of American force and fire power both on land and
sea. That is a very significant turn in White House policy,
but it is no more important than Fidel Castro's contrasting
decision to encourage those same groups, the Sandinistas and
the Salvadoran rebels, to join in regional peace talks down
there as soon as they can be arranged. Well, from here at the
White House or from any other vantage point, it is impossible
to say just how this chapter will ultimately end, but there is
very little doubt that a very important page has now been
turned. Daniel Ortega speaks for the Nicaraguans and agrees to
multi-lateral negotiations that would address the efforts of
CIA-backed troops to overthrow his government as well as the
murderous civil war still grinding on in neighboring El
Salvador. And Guillermo *Ungo speaks for the Salvadoran rebels,
suggesting their willingness to take part in such discussions
as proposed last week in Cancun by the so-called Contadora
group whom the presidents of Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela and
Panama, all of whom have long advocated a negotiated settlement
to Central America's combat and conflict. The White House
response for now at least? A request for more military aid for
the Salvadoran government and more money to bankroll the CIA
operations against the Sandinistans and a big show of U.S.
power in the region, an eight-ship carrier battle group to be
anchored just offshore and perhaps as many as 5,000 American
GIs on maneuvers in Honduras adjacent to Nicaragua where, in
the president's view, the Sandinistas pose the most formidable
threat to eventual stability and peace. REAGAN: I think
it would be extremely difficult because I think they are being
subverted or they are being directed by outside forces.
WOOTEN: He means, of course, Cuba, the first Socialist state
in the Americas and, in Mr. Reagan's perspective, the root of all
unrest in the hemisphere. That is not a universal view, either
in Congress or in academia. Professor William *Rio Grande, a
American scholar. *RIO GRANDE: I think the Reagan
administration needs a Cuban threat to point to. It needs to
have a red flag to wave to convince, in fact frighten, Americans
into thinking that the Communists are coming, sent from Havana
and Moscow, and will take over the region unless we respond in
military terms.
WOOTEN: Which is precisely how the United States is now
responding, much to the chagrin of many on Capitol Hill,
including Congressman Kostmayer. PETER KOSTMAYER (D-Penn.): I
terribly serious mistake. It's the wrong signal at the wrong
time, the wrong kind of rhetoric, and I hope you'll send that
message to the administration. LANGHORNE MOTLEY (Asst. Secty.
State): The other countries from Nicaragua, other than
Nicaragua, that may be the recipients of some of this
exportation might view that U.S. force in a different light
than Nicaraguans might.
WOOTEN: Just as President Reagan now views Henry Kissinger in a
different light. REAGAN: Henry Kissinger's recent stewardship
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of U.S. foreign policy has coincided precisely with the laws of
U.S. military supremacy. The commission will be honored by a
very distinguished American, outstanding in the field of
diplomacy, a legion in that field. It will be headed by Dr.
Henry Kissinger.
WOOTEN: That raised hackles all over the idealogical lot from
the right and the left. KISSINGER: Everybody is entitled to
his opinion.
WOOTEN: But in the opinion of some, including Sen. Dodd, the
president's commission on Central America, with or without Dr.
Kissinger, is merely a smoke screen. SEN. DODD: Basically what
we have here, I fear, is the same product being repackaged,
looking for a different public relations vehicle to sell if
(INAUDIBLE) policy.
WOOTEN: But the president insists his get tough policy is
working, especially on Mr. Castro and the Cubans. Otherwise,
why would they now be willing to negotiate? Reluctantly, the
professor agrees. Why? *RIO GRANDE: Because the Cubans
understand that without peaceful solutions to the conflict, the
danger of escalation and escalation which would draw them into
a conflict with the United States is very serious and they want
to avoid that.
WOOTEN: Which is not to suggest that with detente Castro
will soon be coming here to the White House for dinner, but
rather that as Mr. Reagan saw fit to change his mind about
Henry Kissinger, so Mr. Castro has altered his stance on
negotiations. Not that it's going to be all downhill from
here on out, but rather that those Contadora proposals now
seem to be a workable alternative to all that killing. David?
BRINKLEY: Jim, thank you. Coming next, two members of the new
commission on Central America, just appointed by President
Robert Strauss, former chairman of the Democratic National
Committee, and Dr. John R. Silber, president of Boston
University. And then, shortly, Anthony C. Quainton, the U.S.
ambassador to Nicaragua and Sen. Christopher Dodd of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. In a moment.
AB06 STRAUSS/SILBER/ BRINKLEY: Ambassador Strauss in San Diego and President Silber
of
INTERVIEW Boston University here in Washington, I'd like to thank both of
you for coming in and talking with us today, two members of
the new commission on Central America President Reagan appointed
this week. Mr. Strauss, first. You don't agree with the
Reagan policy on Central America, as I understand it, so why do
you think you were appointed? STRAUSS: David, I really have
no idea. I received the call from the White House, let's see, a
week ago tonight, about 10:30 or 11:00, woke me up, asked me if
I would accept appointment on this commission, and I told them
I would call them back in a few minutes. Helen and I talked a
little while about it, and I called back and said that, 'Well, I
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guess I have a responsibility to serve if you want me, under the
following conditions. Number one, I rather strongly disagree
with the administration's policies. Number two, I'm pretty
highly independent, as you know. And number three, I'm engaged
in partisan politics, recent chairman of the new House Caucus
Committee. So with all those qualifications, if you want me,
I'll serve.' The next thing I knew, a couple days later I got
appointed.
DONALDSON: And number four, Mr. Strauss, it's being suggested
that they put you on the commission precisely for the reasons
that you have just designated so they can say this commission
is independent and it doesn't necessarily agree with the
president. But the other members of the commission or the
majority of them do and therefore, the commission is loaded in
Ronald Reagan's favor. STRAUSS: I don't know anything about
the rest of the commission, but I do know this, Sam. If they
picked me thinking I was somebody they could roll easy, well,
they've made a bum choice.
DONALDSON: But you're just one man. STRAUSS: Wait a minute.
Wait a minute. Wait a minute here. If they picked me because
they wanted someone who would listen earnestly, who would not
bring partisan politics in there, and then say, all right,
whatever he thought and felt, then they got the right person.
That's what I'm going to do. I don't control the commission.
I think it would have been highly irresponsible for anyone
critical to refuse to join in a presidential appointment and
say what he thinks and try to find out what the facts are,
report them to the American public as I see them insofar as
I'm able to do. I appreciate....
WILL: Dr. Silber, you're rather less known than Bob Strauss
is. The president believes the problem in Central America is
one of Communist expansionism. Basically, so does Henry
Kissinger, according to his published views. Do you share that
view? SILBER: I think the view is that in part, but it's a
lot more complicated than that. I think a lot of it has to do
with what William Butler Yeats said in that great poem, 'The
Great Day,' when he said, 'Hurrah for the revolution and more
cannon shot. A beggar on horseback. Lashes. A beggar on
foot. Hurrah for the revolution and cannon come again. The
beggar's changed places, but the lash goes on.' And I think
that's a large part of what's wrong in Central America. There
has been revolution followed by revolution, dictatorship
followed by dictatorship. The beggars have changed places, and
the lash goes on, and it's time for some constructive, long-range
thinking on this problem about how to break the cycle of
poverty, about how to develop democratic institutions in a
part of the world where they're not very strong and how to
improve the economic well-being of that region.
BRINKLEY: Dr. Silber, it's a pleasure to have a college
president here to quote a little poetry on Sunday for us. I'm
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not sure this is necessary, but I forgot to introduce our two
questioners here, George Will of ABC News and Sam Donaldson,
ABC News White House correspondent. George, go ahead.
WILL: I take your point. There seems to be universal
agreement, Dr. Silber and Bob Strauss, that poverty, perhaps
untimely reforms or reforms not made have led to a semi-Soviet
satellite in Nicaragua and perhaps a civil war in El Salvador,
but that the truth may not be relevant. That is, how do you
have a Marshall Plan, as we hear talked about, in the midst of a
war? Once you have a war going on, how do you end a war with
social reforms? Don't you need a military victory? SILBER:
Well, I don't think this is the same kind of war we had in
Germany at the time of the Marshall Plan. Remember, we're
talking about a part of the world in which there are only 20
million people, if you take all of Central America, and I think
with the resources of the United States in with the
infrastructure that has been put in place there in the last 10
to 15 years, that we could do a great deal to upgrade the
economic life of that region and thereby reduce the tendency of
people to engage in guerrilla activity and thereby make the war
dissipate. You don't have a war of the kind we had before.
But I also think that the success of any policy that we have
there depends upon having a bipartisan foreign policy. I
believe that I'm as independent of cooptation (sic) as Bob
is, and I think at the same time that America got into a
disastrous foreign policy under Wilson when the Republicans,
not being brought into his confidence, repudiated the League of
Nations. I think we have the same problem with the isolationism
of the Republicans, and I think we did much better under
Roosevelt and under Truman when the Republicans and the
Democrats got together on a foreign policy, because one nation
needs to express its point of view with one voice to the world
and we must not be divided internally.
DONALDSON: Well, gentlemen, let's look at the policy as we
perceive it to be at the moment. The president is ordering a
fleet to go down, not only to the Pacific Coast but to the
Caribbean, of course. This is, obviously, meant to be pressure
on Nicaragua. We are going to hold maneuvers with Honduras.
There's going to be a contingent of U.S. soldiers in Honduras
on maneuvers. Again, pressure. Is this the right thing to do,
Ambassador Strauss? STRAUSS: Well, in my judgment, it isn't.
In my judgment, it's over-reaction in one direction. I think we
ought to be doing many things down there that we're not doing,
and probably less of what we are doing. Note that we certainly
haven't made the right kind of effort, I think, to build our
hemisphere support down there. I think, as Dr. Silber said,
the social, economic and the political problems down there have
not been addressed properly. And I think we need to tie to our
friends. I think we need to build the support of our friends
in that hemisphere.
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dissenting
DONALDSON: Dr. Silber, let me just ask you about the use of
military force as the administration is now going forward with
it. Is that the right thing to do? SILBER: Well, I want to
reserve a conclusion on that until I've had time to study the
materials that will be available to the commission. I don't
want to preempt a conclusion that I'm prepared to make after
I've studied it, but not prepared to make it in advance.
BRINKLEY: Well, Dr. Silber, on your point about a Marshall
Plan, if that's the term to be used, the distribution of food
and medical care and so on, as an answer to the military
difficulties, it is, of course, not, as you say, World War II.
But it is a war, and there is trememdous confusion, and there is
blood, and there is death. Would this kind of private help,
Marshall Plan kind of help, really work in a place like that at a
time like this? SILBER: Well, the argument is being made that
we're driving the Nicaraguans into the Soviet camp by trying to
cut off all their economic aid. Now, somebody talks about
developing some economic aid. Then they say that can't help.
That's just to impose another catch 22. I think we ought to
examine the entire region and see how the economic aid can be
given and what concessions and what conditions can be gained
with the promise of economic aid and the promise of the
enhancement of democratic opportunites for the people of that
region.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Strauss, what are your thoughts on that?
STRAUSS: Well, David, I'd like to address another subject if I
could for a second and say this. I think it's wrong, first,
for people like me to begin to prejudge the results of what
they might find in a commission action to begin with. I think
it's also wrong to prejudge totally this commission. I don't
know what the administration's motives were, but I'm going to
give it a chance to work. I think it's a responsibility of
people like me to participate in this. I think it's our
responsibility not to prejudge it, and that's where I'm going
into it. Just as I said, independent with the prejudice
against what they're doing, but I'm going to do my darndest on a
nonpartisan basis to participate in the work of this
commission and try to make it worthwhile, maybe help find a
few facts.
WILL: Mr. Strauss, do you think it's important that this
commission reach unanimous conclusions, or would you be quite
content to, in your role, perhaps, if you had to file a
minority opinion? STRAUSS: I wouldn't be concerned about
filing a minority opinion nor would I be fearful of it. I
think it would be better if we would find, of course, a
unanimous decision. Now, let me say this. A lot of that
depends on what the scope of this commission is going to be.
If we keep it narrow enough, if we try not to reinvent the
wheel, but just make a little bit of progress, then possibly we
can contribute something worthwhile. If we try to solve all
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the problems of the world, then this commission is going to
fall on its face.
DONALDSON: Let's talk about a narrow issue but a very
important one, covert action that the United States is
carrying on in Central America, specifically against
Nicaragua. STRAUSS: I'm sure it is...
DONALDSON: Go ahead, sir. STRAUSS: I was just going to say
it doesn't seem to me to be anything covert now. It looks to
me like it's very overt, what's going on.
DONALDSON: All right. Do you think this commission will have
the courage and the mandate and the ability to go in, look
at the action, either come out at the end by December 1 and
say, 'Yes, we should be doing that,' or 'No, we shouldn't be
doing that.'? And if it's no, do you think the president will
follow through and take your advice? STRAUSS: I have no idea
about that. SILBER: I don't think anyone should underestimate
the courage or the independence of that commission. I think
cynicism should be held in abeyance until the report is in.
DONALDSON: I'm not talking about cynicism. I'm not cynical
about your work, but I'm asking you whether you have the
mandate, as you understand it, to be able to look at covert
action, and if you advise something that now runs contrary to
administration policy, do you think the president will take
your advice? STRAUSS: Sam, the mandate has not been spelled
out at all. It's impossible to answer that question. SILBER:
I was not asked to agree to anything in advance, and I don't
believe any other member of the commission was.
BRINKLEY: Ambassador Strauss, President Silber, thank you very
much. We enjoyed having you with us today. We hope you'll
come again. Coming next, Anthony C. Quainton, U.S. Ambassador
to Nicaragua who is there in the thick of it. In a moment.
AB07 QUAINTON/ BRINKLEY: Ambassador Quainton, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua,
INTERVIEW thanks very mcuh for coming in to talk with us this morning.
First, I would like to ask you, suppose the U.S. and Central
America did nothing, simply left it alone. What, in your
judgment, would happen? QUAINTON: Well, on the basis of the
18 months that I have had in Central America, in Nicaragua, it
seems to me doing nothing is the worst of all possible
options. The Sandinistan revolution is a revolution which is
committed to a whole series of revolutionary propositions,
concerned to bring about revolution throughout Central America,
and for us to sit back and assume that the problems in Central
America would resolve themselves would be folly, I think.
WILL: Ambassador, do you believe that the statement by Ortega
recently indicating a six-point peace plan is a substantial
move on the part of the Nicaraguans, and if so -- I know it's
hard to connect cause and effect in the world -- but does that
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effect have something to do with the appearance in the region
of an American Naval force? QUAINTON: I was sitting there in
the stands when Daniel Ortega made his speech, and I've been
following his speeches over a number of months, and some of the
points he made are indeed extremely significant relating to
Salvador and to the problems of the region. The other agendas,
which have been spelled out at Cancun by the Contadora
countries and by the other Central Americans in their meetings,
bring together the full agenda which has to include such issues
as democracy and more effective winding down of the arms race
in Central America. And so Ortega's speech, while it has some
interesting elements, is not the whole answer in my view, but
it is an important statement and it's one that's obviously
going to receive a lot of study in the future. The reasons
that have brought the Sandinistas to make this statement? One
can only speculate. Obviously, they feel themselves much more
isolated in the world from their European friends and from
other countries. They have felt pressures of various kinds and
they've obviously begun, I think, to reflect on their situation
and on what they might do about it.
DONALDSON: Mr. Ambassador, the president said the other day
that he thought it would be extremely difficult to reach any
sort of settlement in that area as long as the Sandinistas
control Nicaragua. Some people think he was almost saying
openly what a lot of people say privately, and that is our
policy is to topple the Sandinista government. What is our
policy? And do you think it's possible to reach a settlement
even if the Sandinistas remain in power? QUAINTON: Our basic
policy throughout the last year has been to get the Sandinistas
to go back to the original goals of their revolution which they
publicly proclaimed an offer to the Organization of the
American States, goals which were a political pluralism and
democracy, early elections, a mixed economy, and a truly
non-aligned foreign policy. Now, if the Sandinistas could go
back to those objectives, that would be an enormous step and
would be of great significance. Whether that is achievable
remains to be seen. It's going to be very difficult. We have
not given up on the process of dialogue, and the whole Contadora
effort is going forward which will look at many of those agenda
items.
DONALDSON: Mr. Ambassador, my question really was let's assume
the Sandinistas do not meet our objectives and the goals that
you have outlined. Will we be able to deal with them on a
settlement? That means give and take on both sides. Or was
the president saying we simply are not going to deal with them,
which means they're going to have to disappear? QUAINTON: We,
obviously, do deal with them. The fact that I'm accredited in
Nicaragua is part of that process of dealing with them. But we
and the other Central American countries were so preoccupied by
the totalitarian tendencies of the Sandinista government
believe very strongly that the only solution over long term to
the problems of Central America is a democratic evolution in
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each and every one of these countries, and particularly
beginning in Nicaragua itself.
DONALDSON: Mr. Ambassador, let me ask my question directly
again in other words. Is the United States making an attempt
now to topple the Sandinista government either directly or
through indirect aid to the contras who are fighting in
there? QUAINTON: Our policy is not to topple the Sandinista
government. Our policy is to modify its behavior in some
substantial ways which are consistant with our interest and our
vital security concerns throughout Central America.
BRINKLEY: Well, Mr. Ambassador, the Contadora group, which is
the presidents of four Central American countries, Mexico and
others, Daniel Ortega, the leader of the junta in power in
Nicaragua, and now Fidel Castro. They've all taken to talking
about peace and negotiations and so on. How seriously do you
take this and how are we going to respond and when? QUAINTON:
Words have to be taken seriously, but much more important will
be acts, will be signs that the Sandinistas and their friends
outside the region have actually changed their policies. The
next steps in this process come within the framework of the
Contadora meeting. The nine countries involved, the five
Central Americans and the four outside the region, will be
meeting again at the end of the month, will be going over this
very complicated agenda, and that is for us, I think, the
obvious next step as we look to see whether there is more
substance behind the words of Commandante Ortega.
WILL: How important, Mr. Ambassador, and how visible are the
Cubans and other advisers from outside the region, and what can
you tell us, what do you know about the kind of acts they're
doing if they would stop doing them would make the progress
you're talking about, specifically the transhipment of arms
from outside the regions to Nicaragua to El Salvador?
QUAINTON: Well, there are at least 6,000 Cubans in Nicaragua
today, some of them in developmental activities such as health
and education, but a very substantial number, several thousand
at least, engaged in direct training for the security service,
for the military forces of Nicaraguan government, and that's a
very important and direct contribution to the military
capabilities of the Sandinistas at home and in their ability to
project their power throughout the region. We've expressed on
a number of occasions our concerns about the training which the
Sandinistas provide to revolutionary groups throughout the
region, not only the Salvadorans, to the fact that the command
and control center of the Salvadoran guerrilla movement is in
Managua, and of course, to the flow of arms by a variety of
different channels from Cuba, through Nicaragua and on into
Salvadora and elsewhere in the region. So those are the areas
that have been of greatest concern to us.
DONALDSON: Do you think, Mr. Ambassador, that it would be
helpful down the line to attempt a naval quarantine of
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Nicaragua? QUAINTON: I wouldn't want to speculate about the
circumstances in which such a step might or might not be
useful. There are a whole range of other programs going on,
contacts, discussions and the Contadora process, and I think
it's all together premature to speculate about a naval
quarantine.
WILL: Let me follow Sam's question with this one. Knowing
what you know, being on the ground down there about what is
happening, if we had a quarantine in place today, what would
get caught or stuck in it? QUAINTON: Well, that again gets
into an area which is highly speculative. You can stop or
control whatever categories of items, of goods that you wish to
control, and it could be very limited, it could be very
extensive. I don't think it would be helpful to speculate on
details of what a quarantine might or might not....
WILL: But is it merely... I guess what I'm asking is this.
Is it merely speculative to say that if we had a quarantine, we
would be stopping small amounts, medium amounts or large
amounts of arms going into El Salvador? QUAINTON: Well, it's
speculative....
WILL: What do we know? QUAINTON: ... to speak about what a
quarantine might achieve, but what is clearly the fact is that
the guerrillas in Salvador are receiving substantial amounts of
aid, of military equipment, of ammunition and that comes in
through a variety of channels and substantially through
Nicaragua, and whatever measures we might be able to take to
diminish that flow is clearly going to be very significant to
the outcome of the war in El Salvador.
BRINKLEY: Ambassador Quainton, thank you very much. Thanks
for coming ~in and talking with us. Good luck to you.
QUAINTON: Thank you.
BRINKLEY: Coming next, Sen. Dodd of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. In a moment.
AB08 DODD/INTERVIEW BRINKLEY: Sen. Dodd, you're in New Haven, Conn. Thanks
very much for coming in. DODD: Nice to be...
BRINKLEY: Delighted to have you with us today. DODD: Nice to
be with you.
BRINKLEY: The U.S. Navy, cruising off the coast of,
the coasts, both of them, of Nicaragua. Mr. Reagan was asked
this week if there might be a blockade. And he said he hoped
not, but he didn't promise there would not be. Suppose there
were. What would you think about that? SEN. CHRISTOPHER DODD
(D-Md.): Well, I would even question whether or not the
action taken already isn't a possible violation of the War
Powers Act. There's been no consultation with Congress on this
at all. It's clearly a threatening act. There seems to be
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little justification for it, other than trying to intimidate in
the region. At the very hour we're setting up new commissions
and new special ambassadors and all sorts of talk about
supporting the Contadora group and new peace initiatives, it
seems to me to be quite contradictory to the statements. The
rhetoric says one thing. Our actions say something entirely
different. So I find it to be counterproductive.
WILL: Senator, the ambassador who was just on was, say no
more, very diplomatic, but he did say that he thought that were
there a quarantine effectively stopping all the flow of arms,
that would make the situation in El Salvador a lot easier.
Now, do you disagree with that? Do you dispute the fact from
your intelligence sources that Nicaragua is a substantially
important source of the military supply for the insurgents in
El Salvador? DODD: Well, I'm waiting to hear that, to see that
evidence. And Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Mr. Michaels testified before the foreign relations
committee only a few weeks ago in open hearing, and I asked him
if he could quantify the amount of weapons coming from
Nicaragua to El Salvador. He said he could not. My first
reaction was he would not in open session. And I asked him if
it was just a matter of intelligence. He said, 'No, we just
don't have any idea. We don't know if it's a small amount or a
large amount.' Despite the rhetoric, the words, substantial or
massive, we have no idea whatsover. And I can only assume,
that if, in fact, the administration were to discover a
substantial quantity of arms coming through, that ABC would have
good photographs of that by the six o'clock news to demonstrate,
in fact, that that umbilical cord between Nicaragua and El
Salvador was alive and that the insurgency in El Salvador would
not survive were it not for that line of support. Now I don't
question that there is a clear connection. But I think it's a
rather, but the quantum leap to say there's a connection and
then to suggest, as we heard again this morning, that the
insurgency in El Salvador is totally dependent upon a line of
supplies coming from El Salvador....
DONALDSON: Senator, you said a moment ago that you thought a
quarantine would be counterproductive. Spell that out. What's
wrong with a little gunboat diplomacy..? DODD: Well, first of
all...
giving
DONALDSON: ...as the mossbacks might say, what's wrong with
'em a whiff of the grape? DODD: Well, a number of reasons.
First of all, you haven't established the justification for
it. We have not proved nor have we substantiated in any way
that these massive amounts of arms are coming into El
Salvador. That's number one. Number two is, of course, all of
our allies in the region, principally the Contadora group, only
a few days ago suggested a different route to follow if we
truly wanted to bring some stability and some peace to the
region. By setting up military quarantines, massively
increasing the number of arms coming into the region, we run
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directly contrary to that suggested advice, which I think is a
far wiser way to go. So rather than deescalate, we have a
tendency to escalate the, at least the likelihood of an
expanded conflict.
DONALDSON: Well, do you think if we don't put some military
force down there, some restraint which is visible and which
like Daniel Ortega can understand, that someday as Mr. Reagan
suggests, they'll be in El Paso? DODD: Well, that.... First
of all, that, that's the domino theory at work, and the domino
theory is only as good as each of the dominoes. And clearly, we
have good strong allies in the region who are more than capable
of taking care of themselves. Secondly, I don't think anyone
questions the ability of the United States to respond should
our national security interests be threatened. But I don't
think that's been established either. What are those security
interests and how are they presently being jeopardized? And
clearly, I think you have to establish that basis before you can
start taking the action such as the administration is taking
now.
WILL: Well, let's start establishing it, Senator. Do we have a
vital interest in preventing the spread of Sandinista-style
regimes in Central America? DODD: Well, I would like to think
we could. But the question is once it's established in
Nicaragua, a government established there, do we then have the
right, contrary to the Rio Treaty, the OAS charter, to go in
and overthrow that government? We were told a few weeks ago
that the only reason we were supporting the then-covert
activity, now overt activity was to interdict arms coming from
Nicaragua to El Salvador. We're now told this morning by the
ambassador that our purpose or reason is to modify the
Sandinista behavior. I begin to question whether or not we
have the right to do that, to go around trying to modify
governmental behavior. We can have relations with them or not.
We can certainly suggest things we'd like to see. But to have
a direct plan, using military force, to modify governmental
behavior, I think, goes far beyond what the law would allow us
to do.
WILL: Dr. Kissinger's response to that seems to be that that
makes us also the enforcer of the Brezhnev doctrine, which says
that the process of becoming a Soviet satellite is
irreversible. Why should it be the case that a Communist
regime is somehow immune to overthrow? DODD: Well, I don't
think it.... First of all, it's a violation of law to go in and
overthrow these, overthrow these governments. That's clearly
the law of the land. Clearly the treaties we've signed
prohibit that kind of actiivity. Dr. Kissinger, of course, has
a global view of things, which is going to be, I think, one of
his difficulties in dealing with this part of the world. That
you can modify governments, certainly. We decide we're not
going to trade with them. We're going to ask our allies, for
instance, to be restrained in their ties with the Nicaraguan
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really, thei
&r
government. Clearly that might be a signal to them that they
ought to modify their behavior. I think that's a far wiser way
to go than by putting aircraft carriers off their borders or
supplying Contra, counter-revolutionaries with arms to try and
destabilize or overthrow their government. That clearly is
going to, I think, politicize the situation, make it far more
difficult to achieve that degree of modification that
Ambassador Quainton talked about.
DONALDSON: Senator, Ambassador Quainton said we are not doing
anything to directly try to overthrow the Sandinista
government. As you know, it would be a violation of the law of
the land if we were. Do you believe that? DODD: Not at all.
And I don't think there's any, I (inaudible) was somewhat
surprised would say that. We've been, the administration has
now come out in the open on this and has made it clear that
we are, in fact, supplying training, supporting those counter-
insurgents along that border. And really...
DONALDSON: But they...DODD: And really, their intention, and
intention,
as we've heard them say ad nauseum, is to overthrow the
Sandinista government. Now, to, it's been rather disingenuous
for us to suggest somehow that because their intentions are
one thing and ours are something else, that we are not, in fact,
supporting that effort.
BRINKLEY: Sen. Dodd, what about the commission the
president's just appointed with Henry Kissinger as its
chairman, and a number of other members, all of whom you know?
DODD: Well...
BRINKLEY: Sen. Byrd, in the Senate, minority leader, has
already denounced it as a smoke screen, so on, so on. What is
your view? DODD: Well, I think commissions can be
worthwhile. But it need, it should be a court of last resort
when all else has failed, when you've been unable to develop a
consensus in Congress. The Social Security Commission was a
good example.
BRINKLEY: Well, by that standard, all else has failed. Hasn't
it? DODD: No, it hasn't. Not at all, in fact. And this is a
major point. The administration has yet to really try and
develop any kind of consensus in dealing with the Congress. A
few short months ago, Sen. Kassenbaum and I made a concerted
effort to bring together a group of members of Congress who
represented a broad spectrum, I might add, of views, to meet
with the secretary of state and administration officials. We
did it quietly and privately. We asked them if they would meet
with us. And we were turned down flatly. Now that's earlier
this year. I'm somewhat skeptical, all of sudden, of an
administration that has refused to really try and develop the
kind of Vandenburg relationship, if you will, using that
example of the Truman administration, with the Congress. That
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effort has not occurred. Secondly, no one from the leadership,
the Democratic leadership of the House or the Senate was
called or asked about this commission at all, asked to make
recommendations as to the membership to it. The spectrum is
rather narrow. Now I don't know the views of some of the
people who've been put on this commission. Many of them, by
their own admission, have no background or any expertise at
all, in the area. Frankly, what it is is an effort to buy
time, and I think that's a mistake. We've got so many levels
of activity already, special ambassadors, a new assistant
secretary of state, a new ambassador going to El Salvador, the
Contadora group, military activity. There is total confusion in
Washington as to what this administration's policies are.
There's total confusion in Central America as to what our
intentions are when we speak with so many differnt voices.
WILL: Sen. Dodd, in your speech, when you speak in response to
the president's speech to Congress, you said we, and I guess
you meant the Democratic Party, are fully prepared to defend
the security of the Americas, this meaning all the countries, I
gather, in the hemisphere, and to use military means if
necessary. DODD: Correct.
WILL: Now, can you tell me where, give me an idea of where it
might be necessary, where you would draw the line and say here,
we too support military means? DODD: Well clearly, let's
assume, George, if we had a situation where the Cubans or anyone
else, for that matter, tried to cut off the sea lanes to the
Panama Canal, clearly jeopardizing the national security
interests of the region and the United States, there would be
in my mind a clear example of where U.S. military force, if all
else had failed, should be used to protect our interests and
the interests of the Americas.
WILL: Would it reach that scale of threat, one by one, having
attacks on individual countries, however? Can you envision
that requiring military means? DODD: Well, you'd have to
understand.... What are the attacks? Is there a civil war going
on? Is it outside aggression? What is the nature of it before
you decide you're going to go in unilaterally and to try to
overthrow that government or to prohibit what would be an
indigenous civil strife in that nation, a nation seeking its
own future. Those are the kinds of questions that ought to be
examined. And one way you ought to do it, is, of course, to
have a good relationship with your allies. One of the key
things that President Kennedy did in 1962 in the Cuban missile
crisis, was to make sure he had the support of the membership
of the Organization of American States. He didn't go off
unilaterally. And that's been one of our major errors in
trying to formulate a policy in the region. We've been
basically going it alone. If we would work with the Contadora
group, work with Felipe Gonzales of Spain, work with Prime
Minister Soarez of Portugal, all of whom have good
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relationships in the region, I think we could formulate a far
better policy than acting as the Lone Ranger.
BRINKLEY: Sen. Dodd, thank you. DODD: Thank you.
BRINKLEY: Thanks very much for coming in and talking with us
today. DODD: Thank you.
AB09 REPORTERS' BRINKLEY: Coming next, our more or less uninhibted discussion
DISCUSSION here, and joining us will be commentator Hodding Carter. In a
moment.
BRINLEY: During this past week, we've had some very reassuring
pleasing, economic news. Even those who were doubtful,
skeptical in the beginning, seem now to admit that the recovery
is well underway and is substantial. And of course we all hope
it will continue. Is it, the recovery, the result of Mr.
Reagan's economic policy, Reaganomics, they used to call it?
Or what is it? Is it just..? What caused it? CARTER: You'd
have to say, as one who criticized the policies all the way
through, that if he was going to be criticized for the
recession, he can now be said to have no credit for the,
credit for the recovery. On the other hand...
BRINKLEY: That's very generous. CARTER: That's the last
generosity I'm gonna give him. But on the other hand, if the
question is have his policies produced what has occurred now,
I'd say no. You have a recovery, as you have in every
recession, coming at about the same time, a little weaker than
some, about the average for others. The policies called
Reaganomics, whatever they were, are not what's producing
this. Consumer spending, that old Democratic give them the
money and they'll spend it themselves, is what's producing this.
DONALDSON: But Hodding, Mr. Reagan's policy, as you know, was
supply-side economics. Cut taxes, that would generate more
money, because of the base therefore being able to operate, and
the revenues would be there and the deficits would shrink. In
fact, Mr. Reagan is running the highest deficits in peace time
history of this country. And he has not been able to close
that, and there is nothing projected in his budget that would
suggest he's going to close that. I agree with you. He should
get the political credit because when it goes bad, we're gonna
give him the political blame. But it was not his policies so
much as Paul Volcker's policies, I think, that helped reduce
inflation and helped, then, put us on the road to recovery.
WILL: 'Cause Hoover didn't cause the Depression, but it was
known ever after as the Hoover Depression. DONALDSON: That's
right. He didn't cause the Depresson.
WILL: And, arguably, Reagan didn't cause the recovery, however
long it lasts. But it will ever after be, at the polls, the
Reagan recovery. Donaldson and Will withdrew their imprimatur
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a long time. We said that cars were wearing out. People were
going to buy cars. Pent-up consumer demands. You can't hold
this economy down forever. You're gonna have a recovery. But
remember when you were in your freshman logic class, there was
something called the post hoc, prompter hoc fallacy. The
rooster crows and the sun rises; therefore, the crowing of the
rooster causes the sun to rise. BRINKLEY: After this, because
of this.
WILL: That's right. And that is the principle on which
political credit is allocated in this country.
DONALDSON: But, you know, George, what the worry is now,
that interest rates are beginning to creep up. This economy
is being spurred by consumer spending for housing, for
automobiles, and if interest rates creep up, and if you have to
get seven, eight, nine points for a mortgage loan, that's going
to dry out. And then the smokestack industries, not having
recovered, the whole bottom falls out again. CARTER: Mr.
Volcker made us all happy this week on that, of course, which
is why the market went up so much, of course, when he said, 'I'm
not gonna worry too much about that excess money out there
right now.' Which means, 'I'm not gonna tighten up on the
interest.
BRINKLEY: Why do you have to pay a bank seven, eight, nine
points, as you've mentioned, Sam, in order to borrow money at
13.5% interest? Will you explain that to me? DONALDSON: So the
banker can go out and buy a big house himself. The bank....
Bankers, as you know, look at the underlying rate of inflation,
the underlying rate, and they project in the future what they
think it's going to be, and then they're going to have to make
a?return on their money and they jack it all up. But the
excessive points -- and I'm not an expert, so I'm not very well
qualified to talk -- the excessive points seems to me to be
gouging and nothing more than that.
BRINKLEY: Seems so to me. George? WILL: Spoken like a home
owner. But the government is subsidizing all of this anyway by
allowing us to deduct half of it.
DONALDSON: Do you think, George, we ought to really start
reducing that interest deduction from income taxes? WILL: It
seems to me it ought to be capped, and it's certainly arguable
to me that you do not need to subsidize through a tax deduction
for interest payments on a condominium in Aspen.
DONALDSON: Well, you know, when I buy any goods.... WILL:
Now I've got to stay out of Aspen.
DONALDSON: ...the government does pay for it, but if I buy
money, the government says it'll pay for half of it.
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BRINKLEY: Capped in the sense that... what? Mortgages over a
certain amount, you wouldn't allow them a deduction? WILL: Up
to X dollars. I'm going to Aspen in three weeks, and I take it
all back, everyone who's out there, but....
DONALDSON: Well, the single home, but not the vacation home.
Well, I think the law has some provision in it. BRINKLEY:
Well, there aren't enough vacation homes in this country to
amount to anything for tax collection purposes, are there? I
don't think there are. WILL: No, but you could cap it.
Indeed, frankly, the Reagan administration, or some people in
it, early on, as a political gesture, wanted to have what they
called a 'mansion tax,' lovely title, and it would have been
simply capping the amount you can deduct in terms of your
mortgage interest. It doesn't raise a lot of revenues, but it
establishes a principle that there are limits to what the
government ought to do in the way of irrational incentives.
BRINKLEY: Well, there's another event that I want to bring up
here. There was a vote in the House on the MX msisile, and the
MX survived, but barely. What was it, a margin of 13 votes?
So what does it mean? Are we going to spend X billion
building the MX missile? WILL: It means that since the Soviet
Union has 636, I believe, of this kind of missile, and we have
none, we believe, not for military means -- let's be blunt --
but for diplomatic reasons it is probably a good idea to begin
building it in the hope that we can use that as an incentive
for them to lower the number of weapons, their weapons being,
like ours, destabilizing, vulnerable.
CARTER: But to hear George say that is to know the nonsense of
what happened in the House. That's exactly what we're doing.
We're going out there and building a weapon, and we're going to
build it, because we've now embraced it. We're going to build
a weapon which we all know has no military meaning whatsoever
probably has no meaning in terms of its own vulnerability when
you get right down to it, though they're going to keep trying
to find some way to make it supposedly invulnerable, and when
we build it, it's going to be, as George has described it.
They are building it simply as a diplomatic tool, which is only
a diplomatic tool because we've convinced ourselves that it's a
diplomatic tool.
DONALDSON: Hodding, I don't think.... CARTER: It's
militarily not a tool.
DONALDSON: I don't think we are going to build it. If you
analyze that vote.... CARTER: Why not, Sam?
DONALDSON: If you analyze that vote, you find the forces
against the MX picked up 40 votes. They won by a 13-vote
margin, the administration, on the basis what you two have
outlined, that we need it for arms control, but time is running
out for that argument. There's no movement at Geneva. Our own
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negotiators said that just this week, and if there's no
movement within several months, I think the next votes in the
House, certainly, if not the entire Congress, will be against
the MX. CARTER: The profile of gutlessness among enough of
the Democrats in the House and the Senate on this issue is such
that there will always be just enough votes for the
administration to proceed with this. Waiting for that majority
to mobilize itself is a little bit like waiting for the tide
to quit moving up and back. It's not going to happen.
DONALDSON: That would sort of be madness. I don't think
they're all mad up there. CARTER: They are not going to
reject it.
BRINKLEY: But they're gutless, you say. CARTER: Yes, they
are gutless, because for the most part, those who've supplied
the margin of victory for this vote this last week know full
well that the missile has no meaning.
BRINKLEY: George, I'll give you the final word. Time is about
to run out. WILL: Well, this big missile packing 10 warheads
demonstrates why some of us 11 years ago were opposed to the
first SALT treaty because it limited launchers, not warheads,
and put a premium, then, on the few launchers you have being
very big with all kinds of destabilizing effects.
BRINKLEY: Okay. Thank you very much. We'll be back with a
report from a very sad day for all of us here at ABC News in a
moment.
AB10 COMMENTARY BRINKLEY: That's ABC's This Week program. Before we go, Frank
Reynolds, who for years did ABC's 'World News Tonight,' now lies
in Arlington Cemetery. Tonight at 7:00, Eastern Time, ABC will
have a special program called 'A Man Who Cared.' Among those
at the funeral at St. Matthews Cathedral were all of us from
ABC and President and Mrs. Reagan, and there were eulogies by
two of his sons, one using the words of Shakespeare, and the
other using his own. JOHN REYNOLDS: When he shall die, take
him and cut him out in little stars, and he will make the face
of heaven so fine that all the world will be in love with night
and pay no worship to the garish sun. TOM REYNOLDS: And I am
most afraid o
&f
my life and your death. I am healed, though, now and always,
Dad, because I knew you, and you knew me, and we will always
know each other.
Linda Hallett and Betty Turner, Transcribers
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