AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200750002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 12, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Firing Line STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
DATE June 12, 1983 5:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Afghanistan
WILLIAM BUCKLEY: The figures are startling. Four
million exiles, the largest exile population in the world. One
million estimated killed since 1979. The torture and executions
at a rate that would have made Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin
sleep content with their day's work.
Historians will perhaps recall that the West rallied to
the aid of Afghanistan by depleting our representation at the
Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980.
A two-sentence reminder. In April 1978, Afghan strong-
man Mohammed Daoud was killed in a coup that ushed in a pro-
Soviet administration headed by Taraki. In December of 1979,
Taraki was ousted by the Soviets, executed, and Karmal was
installed. And Soviet troops rolled in and are there in force to
fight the insurgents.
Imagine Afghanistan within a triangle whose apex is
down. On top is Russia, to the left Iran, to the right Pakistan.
End lesson.
Under the sponsorship of the Afghanistan Relief Commit-
tee and of Freedom House, here in New York we have two resistance
leaders who will discuss the situation in their country. Abdul
Rahim is political officer of the Yamya Islami (?) Afghanistan,
probably the largest of the resistance groups based in Peshawar.
Mr. Rahim, Colonel Rahim is a civil engineer -- Mr. Rahim,
rather, is a civil engineer by profession.
Colonel Mohammed Assil, trained in Egypt and Japan, was
a police officer and professor at the police academy on the
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT* AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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faculty of law. At the request of resistance leaders, he
remained in place after the 1979 communist coup and witnessed
Soviet procedures. On a trip to Mecca last November, he defected
openly, and works now with a resistance group.
Our examiner today is Mr. Paul Kreisberg, Director of
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations since 1981, about
whom more in due course.
I should like to begin by asking Mr. Rahim to brief us
on the current situation. The Russians launched a great offens-
ive a few weeks ago. How is it doing?
ABDUL RAHIM: Actually, Russian, when they saw that they
failed in all their plans and they defeated in most of their
place from Mujahidin site and from the freedom fighters, they
changed their tactics and they changed their targets. Right now
the main target of the Russian soldiers are the civilians right
now, because the civilian and the people of Afghanistan, they are
the only supporter of Afghan resistance right now in the war. We
don't have any supporter, direct support from outside, and we
have the only supporter, they are the people of Afghanistan.
That's why the Russian have started, and right now the main
target is the civilian.
And beside this, they've increased their military
activities in bombarding the villages and destroying the crops,
the foods, and killing the women and children.
They are talking about negotiation to change the mind of
the world -- I mean change the idea of the world toward negotia-
tion, which is unhonest negotiation, and Russian have not ever
been honest in any negotiation in the history. So this is
another thing to bring the mind of the -- attention of the world
toward negotiation, and increasing their military activities
inside Afghanistan.
Right now, they have more than 180,000 forces, and also
-- soldiers. And also 20,000 Afghan army, which they are not
trusting on them. And the resistance right now have more than 85
percent of the area under control. And just the Russian, they
have control on their bases and the big towns, except during the
day. After four o'clock, the resistance have control on the
towns also. And they are doing their guerrilla activities.
Tell me this, Mr. Rahim. Assuming that they were in
negotiations, with whom would they negotiate, given that there is
not, in my understanding, an undisputed leader of all the
resistance forces? There is no Colonel de Gaulle, is there, in
the situation?
RAHIM: Right now, you know, the representative unit in
United Nation is talking with Pakistanis' representatives and
directly with Iran, and he did trip to Kabul to talk with the
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puppet of Russians. So they are not talking with those people
who are really fighting against the Russian.
So, any negotiation which the Mujahidin, the resistance
from one side, and the Russian, which are fighting right now on
the side, from other sides, will be useless.
BUCKLEY: Well, Colonel Assil, let me ask you this.
From your knowledge of the inside organization of the Soviet-
dominated Afghan situation, do you believe that the Afghans who
are working for the Soviet Union are reliably pro-Soviet, or do
you think that they would slide over to the insurgent side if
they were given an opportunity?
COLONEL AYYOUB ASSIL: In Afghanistan we have just about
between five and six thousand communist who are working now with
the communist regime. And the other Afghans are all against the
puppet regime and they are all against the Russians.
BUCKLEY: Well, I thought that Mr. Rahim gave slightly
larger figures for the number of Afghans who are under military
discipline of the Soviet Union.
RAHIM: I mentioned that 20,000 that the Russian, they
are not trusting on them. During the operation, during the day,
they are using Afghan Army as [unintelligible] force. In the
back of the army they are using tanks. When they escape, they
are trying to don't fight, they are shooting them by the tanks
and they're killing them.
And during the night, after operation, after attack,
they are making them disarm and they are planting mines around
them to not escape, to desert to the resistance.
So, I mean, they are not honest. I mean 20,000 army
doesn't mean that they like Russians. I mean the communist are
between five and six thousand that Colonel mentioned. Those
people who are the communist, I mean they are puppets. They are
working in intelligence services. They are working in torturing.
They are working in some other KGB activities.
BUCKLEY: Well, Colonel Assil, tell us something about
your own experiences when you were right there in the womb of the
enemy. How did the communists exercise control over their
puppets? Was it by threat, or by inducements, or a combination,
or how?
COLONEL ASSIL: After the invasion, Russian invasion in
Afghanistan, before I can talk after the Rus -- the communist
coup, they send hundreds of advisers. They call themselves
advisers, but they are not advisers. They're all KGBs. They
send to the Ministry of Interior, the ministry I was working
--the Ministry of Interior, that means the ministry of security
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in Afghanistan. In this ministry, after the invasion -- they
send at the beginning 50. After the invasion, they send more
150, with a Russian general. And this time they wanted to
control all the Ministry of Interior. And in this time, they
send about 150 other Russian advisers to the Ministry of Justice.
And in these two ministries, they wanted to change or to destroy
our legal proceeding.
BUCKLEY: One hears a lot about the Russian advisers.
Do they in fact take over, or do they always work behind front
men who are indigenous?
COLONEL ASSIL: They are ruling. I gave you an example.
The Ministry of Interior, Afghan Minister of Interior, an Afghan,
he cannot do anything without the permission of the Russians.
the Russians, they are ruling.
You know, in one ministry -- in each ministry there are
500 Afghans if there are 200 Russian advisers. So they are
ruling. In each department, there are two or three Russian
advisers. So they are always in the front. They are ruling.
They are giving the orders.
BUCKLEY: Well now, how did they achieve that dominance,
gradually or suddenly with the coup?
COLONEL ASSIL: When they came after the invasion, first
they, as I told before, they destroyed our -- they want to
destroy our legal proceeding. Before the communist coup, we had
legal proceeding which you has now in United States. But after
the invasion, they wanted to change, and they changed. Before
the invasion, our system was a very normal system. There was the
right of defense. There was...
RAHIM: Before communist coup.
COLONEL ASSIL: Before communist coup, we had our very
normal legal proceeding, which you has now in United States. We
had courts, three -- elementary court and secondary court and a
high court. And there were right of defense and there were
judgment.
But after the invasion, they destroyed all. Now there
is one court. The name of this court is the Revolutionary Court.
And there is no other courts. They collect -- they're always
collecting the people from their houses and sending to the jail
without any question. And they send hundreds of them and they
kill them without any trial.
BUCKLEY: Now, we hear a lot of figures about the number
of people who are tortured and executed. Do you have any
personal knowledge that this is correct, or might it be an
exaggeration?
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COLONEL ASSIL: After the Russian invasion until last
September '82, in which I left my homeland to Saudi Arabia, only
in the Ministry of Interior they killed and tortured more than
12,000 Afghans. And there are other places, like Pulacherhi (?),
which is very famous jail. From the beginning of the communist
coup until now, they killed more than 80,000. I mean between
80,000 until 100,000 they killed, tortured, many of them without
trial, without any judgment.
And there is a judgment they call the judgment of the
desert, which means they don't asking the question, and they are
sending for killing.
BUCKLEY: Well, you say it's reduced to a single court
called a Revolutionary Court. But you're saying that a lot of
people who are killed are executed without even a judgment from
that court.
COLONEL ASSIL: Yes.
BUCKLEY: Now, do you know this personally?
COLONEL ASSIL: Yes.
BUCKLEY: I see. You actually witnessed the executions?
COLONEL ASSIL: Yes. Yes.
BUCKLEY: And the procedure was what, simply to pull
them out of jail and execute them? No charges made?
COLONEL ASSIL: After the invasion, three months after
the invasion, there was a very big demonstration in Afghanistan.
All the Afghan people, they went to the roof of their houses and
they said, "Allah akbar," which mean that God is great. And
after this, in the morning -- or two days later, they collected
the peoples, hundred thousand of people, they collected and they
send them to the jails. Many of them, they went and we don't
know about them. They are unknown until now.
And some of them, they were lucky, or maybe, for them, a
little important. They asked them for the investigation in the
different places, in the Ministry of Interior, in the intelli-
gence service -- I mean the KGB of Afghanistan. And there are
other places like jails. And they begin to torture them and to
ask them why they made this big demonstration.
So, in this time they constructed many chambers for
tortures. I mean chambers without -- soundproof. And they were
torturing peoples, women, children. They tortured the children
in front of their parents. They tortured the women in the front
of their husbands. They used, generally, the electric power
shock for the prisoners. Many who had heart troubles, they
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killed under these powerful shocks.
BUCKLEY: Is torture an Afghan institution? That is to
say, before the coup, was torture regularly practiced in Afghan-
istan, or not?
COLONEL ASSIL: Before the communist coup, we didn't
know anything about the torture. Just in criminal law, there was
-- they said, the criminal law said if at the time of the
investigation a detector torture anybody, imprisonment was
between six months until two years. If during the time of the
interrogation there is any injuries, the imprisonment was until
seven years. If there is, I mean, a murder, a dead, so there was
a death penalty for the detector who is asking.
But after the communist coup, they begin to torturing
the people.
BUCKLEY: Now, are the torturers themselves Afghans, or
are they Russians?
COLONEL ASSIL: The torture, they are Russian and
Afghan. I mean in each torture chamber there are Afghans, and
the torture -- the Russian who leads the torture.
BUCKLEY: And so the objective of that torture is simply
as an instrument of terrorism to suppress the insurgency move-
ment. Is that correct?
COLONEL ASSIL: Yes.
BUCKLEY: Now, to what extent has it been successful?
COLONEL ASSIL: It is not successful.
BUCKLEY: Mr. Rahim says that 85 percent of the people
are still opposed.
COLONEL ASSIL: Because many of people, they want to
die, but they don't want to...
RAHIM: No. I mentioned 85 percent of the area, not
the people. The people, 99 percent, more than 99 percent of the
people, they are against Russians. I mentioned just about the
area they have under control. That is more than 85 percent.
So, 5000 people between, you know, 16 million. They
cannot come in one percent, also.
BUCKLEY: Do you easily account for the fact that Hitler
was able to dominate France, and yet Russia is not able to
dominate Afghanistan? How would you account for that?
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RAHIM: You know, it depends to the resistance, the
morale and the [unintelligible] and the hope that the people
--they love their country, they love freedom. They should
reaction against the invasion aggressive. And they stop the
Russian, right now, for 3 1/2 years.
I mean the people, they don't like them. We have bad
impression from the previous history of the Russian in Central
Asia in Muslim countries. They fought for 20 years. They
changed the generations. And they, after that, they got the
control on that side.
So we understood the Russian [unintelligible] do in
Afghanistan. That's why everybody get up and shout reaction and
everybody are supporting the resistance inside Afghanistan.
BUCKLEY: Well, are you saying that because -- I'm sure
if I were a Frenchman, I would say, "Well, my people love freedom
just as much as your people." So there has got to be something
that accounts for the continuation of a 99 percent resistance
over against the relative tranquility in France after the fall of
Paris.
RAHIM: Actually, I don't know the exact situation of
that time in France. But, you know, our people have been
motivated due to the religious idea that they have, Islamic
ideology; and also due to their freedom. They are loving their
country. They have [unintelligible] the previous. They have
kicked out British forces from Afghanistan. They kick out
[unintelligible] at that time. I mean this kind of things have
repeated in Afghanistan because Afghanistan is -- due to the
--geopolitically, it is very important place. So that's why they
have faced different invasion in history.
And this is -- right now, this is the third time. And
they will succeed. And we hope and we believe in this succeeded.
We will win the war.
BUCKLEY: Let me ask you a question or two on the matter
of the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan. Here it is, of
course, right here, with a common border.
BUCKLEY: How long is this?
RAHIM: One thousand, five hundred kilometers, something
like that. And from here up to here, to the warm ocean, to the
Persian Gulf, Afghanistan is the nearest way for the Russian.
This is one important thing. And also, from here they can
surround China, also. And then from here, they can reach to the
Persian Gulf. And also they can hit all other strategic points
in Indian Ocean that the Western countries have. Diego Garcia,
for example.
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Right now they are establishing in Shindand, in this
area, a Shindand air base. The Shindand air base, they're
installing different kind of missiles that could hit from here,
you know, Diego Garcia.
So, that's why, you know, this is very important for
these people. And this is the way for them. If they get stuck,
they can Pakistan easily because Pakistan doesn't have such a
mountain, like our people, that could fight and take control of
those mountains. The Hindu Kush mountains can act as a wall
right now. But the resistance succeed because all the mountains
are under control of the resistance.
So, if they get out from this area -- I mean if they get
control of this area...
RAHIM: This area completely. I mean Afghanistan. I
mean if they pass through these mountains, so in this flat area,
in this flat area, those high-speed tanks like they have in this
area, nobody can stop them, and they can reach to the Gulf
easily. And they will have a control of the Middle East and the
import of the oil and everything. And they will succeed from
here on Middle East, on Western countries, on China.
BUCKLEY: Well, are there any preliminary indications
that they are accumulating military reserves in that southwest
section that could be used in Persian Gulf operations?
RAHIM: Yeah. Because usually they are not using too
much the forces which are based in Shindand. I mean the Shindand
air base is for their further purposes, establishing. And they
have increased -- they have more than 30,000 forces there. And
with the most modern aircrafts and tanks, the high-speed tanks.
And nobody can go there. And right now they have started to
install some kind of missiles there that we don't know how it is.
So for their further purpose, and because they are not using too
much those forces.
BUCKLEY: Well, now let's get into the question of what
you need to do and what you need in order to do it. Is it fair
to say that there is no reasonable way to suppose that Afghan-
istan can ever succeed in repelling the whole Soviet military
machine?
RAHIM: There are different ways. The first one belongs
to the pressure of the military pressure from the people of
Afghanistan side, from resistance side. And this pressure can
increase by the military. I mean war support -- arms support,
not manpower. Because the people of Afghanistan, they are enough
right now. Up to the end of war, we have enough manpower to
fight.
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The main thing is to have effective and sufficient arms
and ammunitions.
And the second thing is the economic support of the
civilian to stay in their land and support the resistance,
because of medicines, foods, and clothes, these things the people
need. Because the people, because of bombardment, they cannot
continue their agriculture activities.
So, if we could support the people to stay there and
support the resistance, and if we could get enough and effective
weapons, then we hope that we will speed the withdrawal of the
Russian forces from Afghanistan.
And beside that, the international political pressure is
needed. For example, the Russia right now, they are losing in
Afghanistan economically and militarily. They are losing. And
they are taking very advanced electronic equipments and spare
parts from Western countries. So it means that they are not
worrying about the budget for their economic buildup. So they
are spending all of their money for the military purpose. They
are producing -- their production is just tanks and MIG-25 for
the killing of people of Afghanistan. And from the other side,
they can get easily their electronic equipments and other
tradition from the Western countries, from other places.
So, then, economic -- surrounding economic of Russia --I
mean bringing political pressure and bringing economical pres-
sure, and also we resisting inside Afghanistan, bring them
military pressure. And they have to sit down and talk honestly
about their withdrawal from Afghanistan.
BUCKLEY: Well, is it correct that at this point most of
the weapons that you use are captured weapons from the Soviet
troops?
RAHIM: Yeah. The major weapons that right now we are
using are those weapons that we have captured in the fighting.
BUCKLEY: And do you have a problem in keeping ammuni-
tion in sufficient supply for those weapons?
RAHIM: Actually, you know, we have all our area under
our control. We are using the ammunition. And from the security
point of view, that is no problem. I mean we are fighting face-
to-face. We are not acting as guerrillas, except the big towns.
They have guerrilla activities inside, for example, in Kabul.
But around Kabul, we are facing face-to-face. We have fronts and
they have bases. They are attacking us and we are defending. So
we can keep our [unintelligible] weapons with ourself in that
area that we have under our control.
BUCKLEY: Well, Colonel Assil, in the conversations that
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you had with the Soviets, did you get an impression on the
question whether the West would come sufficiently to the help of
the resistance? Or did they assume that the West would just
sleep this one through?
COLONEL ASSIL: I heard many time from the Russian
advisers, and they said that the United States and other Western
countries, they are helping the resistance. This I heard many
time from them. And they said that the United States and amny
other Western countries, theyare helping the resistance and they
are giving them the arm and other things.
BUCKLEY: Now, are they saying that for the benefit of
their own morale, because they don't want to reveal that their
own weapons have been stolen? Is that why they're saying that?
COLONEL ASSIL: They are saying because I heard from the
Russian [unintelligible]. They are very strong to believe they
haven't [unintelligible]. And they said yes for their morale
also.
RAHIM: And you indeed bring the forces. First they say
that let's go to Afghanistan. We will fight with U.S. Army,
Chinese, and Pakistanis. So that's why they are repeating every
time at the site also. But they don't have any evidence because
we don't have any U.S. arms and people there to fighting. There
are just Afghan people. That's why they are so demoralizing, due
to the interview that we give with the captured prisoners that we
have, Russian prisoners that we have captured. I mean their
morale is very low. That's why they are not using any infantry
forces in the site, except in some special places their commando
force.
So, right now, exactly the fighting is between the
people who doesn't have arm with the weapons -- more than
weapons. Not -- I mean not the people with the people, not the
soldier with the soldier. The fighting is this armed people with
the modernist weapon. They are using helicopters, their tanks.
I mean they are not using infantry.
BUCKLEY: Well now, you both have been here under the
auspices of the Afghanistan Relief Committee and Freedom House,
and you've been to various parts of America. Before I complete
that question, let me ask you: Were you both in Paris in January
when there were all those witnesses from Afghanistan to the
torture?
RAHIM: No. We came after, two months after. We were
in Oslo...
BUCKLEY: You were in Oslo.
RAHIM: Yeah.
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BUCKLEY: Well now, is it your impresison that the West
is rallying or is not rallying to the cause of Afghanistan?
RAHIM: You mean they are taking interest or not?
RAHIM: [Unintelligible] much that we want, they have
not taken interest. But at least we have seen the feeling is
exist between the Western countries, between the freedom-loving
people. They like -- I mean they have sympathize with Afghan
people. But talking is not enough, you know. They should take a
part practically, to work together to do something for the
freedom.
And from another side, they don't know too much about
Afghanistan, what the Russian are doing there. When you talk
about the Russian, suddenly the people, they are thinking about
Vietnams. The Vietnam War is completely different from Afghan-
istan. In Vietnam the Russian and China, directly they helped
the Vietnamese. And the main targets in Vietnam were the
military posts and military bases, not the civilian. But right
now, Afghanistan -- the Afghanistan people, they are fighting
alone without any -- I mean they're alone in this war. And the
main target in Afghanistan -- this is the feature and the nature
of the Russian great army -- the main target is the civilian.
They are killing the civilian. So this is big difference.
When you talk about the support and these things, some
people, they are feeling like if we support, maybe the war will
be increased. So [unintelligible] the Russian to kill all the
world so they have control in all the world. What is the
responsibility of the [unintelligible]? That they are killing
the people without any reason and we should just stay and watch?
COLONEL ASSIL: And I said many time in different places
that the Russian, they are not coming in Afghanistan as tourists.
They are preparing for other countries. They want to reach as
soon as possible to the Gulf to cut the nerve of the oil.
BUCKLEY: Well, what has been the attitude of the
Ayatollah, given the fact that his country composes the whole of
your western flank?
RAHIM: You know, everything inside Afghanistan belongs
to our people will decide about their future and their system and
everything. And we appreciate the help of others that they are
helping for our refugees. But we are not letting anybody to
interfere in our cause. I mean...
BUCKLEY: No. But I'm asking, do you receive help from
Iran?
RAHIM: That much help for the refugees. We have more
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than one million. But direct help to the resistance, no, we are
not getting from any countries.
BUCKLEY: Is this a position that you need to take for
formal reasons?
BUCKLEY: Well, why would you -- you just finished
--you've just finished asking for help, and now you've just
finished telling me that you wouldn't accept help from any
country.
RAHIM: We accept, of course. You know, the first
responsibility is Islamic countries' responsibility. They have
to. You know, right now, beside that they attack on our life,
they attack on our religious too. The first responsibility is
the Muslim countries' responsibility. The second responsibility
is all the religous and believer -- I mean Christians, Judish,
all the believers. I mean this war right now is between the
religious people, between those who loves their country, who
fight for their god; and from other side, non-believer, the
Communist Party, the communist ideology, who wants to punish, who
wants to destroy everything: the religious, the culture, the
country, and the life.
So we accept all helps from every -- all peoples.
BUCKLEY: So, what you're saying is that you're not
receiving help, but you would be pleased to accept it if it were
offered.
BUCKLEY: And so let me ask you again. On the basis of
this trip, do you feel that there is a sense of identification
with your country by other people who have traditionally wanted
to help people against whom there was oppression?
RAHIM: We've not seen any change yet, and we are trying
to talk more to your...
BUCKLEY: Well, have you sought access to any senators
or congressmen or representatives of the State Department?
RAHIM: Yeah. We meet some of their assistants, and we
will have a program on the 7th of June to do a formal hearing.
And we did one formal hearing with, I think, the Foreign Relation
Committee.
COLONEL ASSIL: ...of Pennsylvania.
RAHIM: And Human Right Evaluation Committee. We have a
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formal -- we had prepared statements and we talked. We have
contacted and we like to contact and talk about Afghanistan.
BUCKLEY: So you are hopeful that there'll be a change
in the position, but you haven't yet seen concrete signs of it.
RAHIM: No, we have not seen. We hope that...
BUCKLEY: Well, Mr. Reagan said in January, "The U.S.
does not intend to forget these brave people and their struggle."
But your complaint is that you don't know in what way that help
is coming.
RAHIM: We think from Reagan and from all the people of
the United States that they have sympathy with the Afghanistan
people and Afghanistan cause. But we need more in concrete help.
BUCKLEY: Let's submit to our examiner. Mr. Paul
Kreisberg was born in New York, attended City College of New
York, got an advanced degree from Columbia in Chinese history.
He has been with the State Department. He's been in Tanzania, in
New Delhi, with the policy planning staff of the State Depart-
ment. And as I mentioned, since 1981 he is the Director of
Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.
Mr. Kreisberg.
PAUL KREISBERG: I understand, Mr. Rahim and Colonel
Assil, that you both represent different groups among the
resistance elements. I wonder if you could explain why it is
necessary for there to be so many rival resistance groups
operating in Afghanistan and out of Peshawar, Pakistan, and
whether it might not be more effective, in terms of resisting the
Soviets and forcing them out, if there were a single resistance
organization rather than a whole collection of different ones.
RAHIM: First of all, the being of different groups,
this is the natural thing in every society. But especially in
every revolution, there are some difficulties. But that much, it
doesn't mean that we don't have cooperation and we are not
unified in most of the things. The resistance inside Afghani-
stan, they have good cooperation. They are helping each other
and they have relation with -- and right now, from political
point of view, all parties right now, they are trying to have one
unity. Right now, at least, they have one unity. And practic-
ally, inside Afghanistan, from six major parties, five parties,
practically, they have unified and they're fighting together
against Russian.
And also in Peshawar, the headquarters they have right
now, they have made two alliance. And right now the activity is
going on to bring these two alliance to one alliance and to have
one spokesman and one high council for the leading of the
resistance.
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KREISBERG: And so there is no difference of agreement
-- there are no differences on how weapons, for example, will be
allocated and who will receive ammunition and who will receive
weapons between these different groups?
RAHIM: If we get a weapon in our nation, there will be
no problem, because all fronts are known, commanders are known,
and everything is known. So, of course, our weapons and ammunit-
ion will go to those people who are fighting. So there will be
no problem in that.
KREISBERG: There was a story in the American press in
the last few days that alleged that of the equipment that was
coming in from outside, through Pakistan, that the Pakistanis
were skimming off, were taking away some of the best equipment
for themselves. Is that true?
RAHIM: Actually, we don't know the source of that,
which kind of weapons that come. But to understand, they have
given us how much of which kind. But we didn't have seen any
change in the policy of the Pakistan. We [unintelligible] from
them, and they are helping for the refugees and for the people of
Afghanistan.
KREISBERG: Some of the Mujahidin, some of the groups in
Peshawar, at least, are in favor -- appear to be in favor of an
Islamic state that sounds, at least to some of us in the West,
very much like the kind of regime that the Ayatollah Khomeini has
established in Iran. Other groups appear to be in favor of a
much more secular and democratic type of regime in Afghanistan.
Do you think that it's necessary to have some kind of
clear reconciliation or understanding before there were to be a
withdrawal or before the Soviets could be expelled? What would
Pakistan -- what should the United States think of a potential
Afghanistan that was ruled by another Khomeini?
RAHIM: You know, the people of Afghanistan, we have two
things, two hopes. The first is the freedom of Afghanistan. The
second, the governing which is elected by the people of Afghani-
stan, which they respect that one. So the people of Afghanistan,
they will choose their government. So we will have such a
government that the president will be chosen by the people by
election. There will be free election. And we will have a
parliament. The parliament is responsible for making constitu-
tions. And our foreign relation, we will keep our relation with
all those countries who wants to have relation with us, and
specially those countries who have been helped us during the hard
time, and we will remember those people. And also we'll run our
economy to reach the life of our people to the standard life
which exists in the world.
And such a government that we want, we are not seeing
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the model of that in the world yet. And to show you which model,
I don't think that the government that we want it be the same as
the government that is in Iran right now. And the Iran, they
know, religiously, they are Shiite groups and we are Sunni, and
principally in governments. So there are some technical differ-
ence. I mean beside the general principle that I discussed
before, religiously, also, there are some difference. And I
mentioned that we don't have any model yet to show you.
KREISBERG: Mr. Buckley, do you -- you've looked at the
Soviets in a wide range of their activities around the world. Do
you see any reason to think that the Soviets are going to be able
to withdraw or would be willing to withdraw or can be forced out
of Afghanistan by force?
BUCKLEY: It seems to me unlikely that they could be
repelled and unlikely that they would elect any peace, save one
that gave them substantially what they wanted. All the more so,
it seems to me, since if my intelligence is correct, the economic
effort to sustain this offensive is being generated largely by
the dissipation of local assets. They're getting gas, they're
getting minerals, they're getting experts. So that the two or
three billion dollar cost of this war is one that's being paid by
the Afghan people. Which is one of the reasons why I tend to be
pessimistic at that level.
KREISBERG: But if that's your assessment, do you see
any end to this except, potentially, ultimately, the extermina-
tion of the Afghan people?
BUCKLEY: Well, I think that, to a certain extent,
depends on the momentum, if any, that's gathered up by the West.
I don't know who would have brought up the subject of acid rain
if the Wall Street Journal hadn't happened on it. Not our State
Department, so far as I can see. Not the White House, so far as
I can see. The Wall Street Journal developed a case against the
Soviet use of acid rain in Afghanistan, and of course in South-
east Asia. And that now is pretty well accepted.
Is that your judgment, Mr. Kreisberg?
KREISBERG: Yes.
BUCKLEY: It's widely accepted.
Now, given that this is beginning to erode certain
levels of communist self-professions in diplomatic conferences,
they might find that this gets a little bit antsy as they build
up to their great show of force next fall when they ask people to
take their word that they will abide by disarmament treaties.
So whether or not there can be a concatenation of
psychological pressures sufficient to cause them to reconsider, I
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don't know. A lot -- that answer is, to a certain extent,
dependent on one's knowledge of Andropov's character, of which I
know very little.
KREISBERG: Colonel Assil, given what Mr. Buckley has
just said, how encouraged can you be that even over the next
three or five or ten years the Mujahidin will be successful? I
mean suppose the Soviets bring in another 50,000 or another
100,000 or another 150,000. Are not the Mujahidin fighting
against almost insuperable odds? Is not all of this simply going
to be paid for in the blood of the Afghan people?
COLONEL ASSIL: You know, our people, my people decided
to fight until there will be on Russian soldier present of my
homeland. We decided that we are fighting -- that is true that
the Russian -- the continuing of the war will be for the benefit
of the Russian. We know that. But, you know, since three years
and half year resisting with bare hands, with hundreds of
difficulties, but the morale of our people is very high. And as
I told you before, we decided we will be free or we will be die.
That's our decision.
KREISBERG: Suppose the Russians were to simply decide
the cost is too high and they were to negotiate a withdrawal,
first with the Pakistanis and then, conceivably, bringing in
members of the Mujahidin as well. Would you be prepared, would
the two of you be prepared to see an amnesty in Afghanistan for
all those who have worked with the Soviets over the last three
years?
RAHIM: You mean the puppets which...
KREISBERG: All of those people who have -- the people
that you describe as puppets, the people in the army, the people
in the Kalq and the Parksham (?).
RAHIM: You mean -- you know, I mentioned before that
the negotiation, if the Russian really and honestly, they be
ready to talk about their withdrawal -- and they have to talk
about the security of their force, how do they withdraw their
forces from Afghanistan. So except talking with Mujahidin,
nobody else has power in Afghanistan. And at that time, we are
ready to sit with the Russian and talk about the withdraw of
their forces only.
So, about what we do with our people, what our people
will decide about those puppets, that belongs to our own country,
and our people will decide about that one. So there is no need
to talk with the Russian. Why we should talk with the Russian
about our Afghans?
BUCKLEY: You haven't quite answered his question,
though, Mr. Rahim. Mr. Kreisberg is asking you, would you grant
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amnesty to people who are traitors right now? Would you be
willing to forgive them if the Soviet Union withdrew and a
settlement was sought?
COLONEL ASSIL: You know, we lost more than one million
people. And we have more than three million refugees. You said
for the people who helped the government. That belong of the
future judgment. That's belong to the trial.
KREISBERG: But you, personally. Do you see these as
war criminals that would need to be punished? I'm asking,
really, for your own opinion.
RAHIM: They are not punishing like the Russian are
torturing. But at least they should answer to the people. That
is the normal thing, you know. But we won't torture anybody
like what the Russian are torturing. So there will be an
investigation. There will be a talking. There will be interro-
gation. And the people will judge about that.
KREISBERG: Now, you were commenting before on the
negotiations between the Pakistanis and the U.N. and the Rus-
sians, and you appeared to be quite critical of the Pakistanis
for engaging in these discussions. Have you expressed your
concern to Pakistan? Have you asked that they discontinue these
talks?
RAHIM: Yes. We have mentioned that to our friends in,
especially, Pakistan that we appreciate their political activi-
ties about the withdrawal of the Russian from Afghanistan, but
they should consider that, you know, the KGB, and especial
Andropov, he spent a lot of his time and he's smart enough to act
as a KGB chief. So they should take [unintelligible] two purpose
the Russian have in this negotiation: one to recognize, somehow,
their puppets; and the second is to bring the attention of the
world toward a negotiation and increase their [unintelligible]
inside Afghanistan.
So, for this purpose, we have mentioned to Pakistanis
that they should take care that the resistance opinion, and the
resistance opinion is that they should sit with the Russian and
talk about Afghanistan.
KREISBERG: But now, if you go back a long time in
Afghan history, certainly back to the 19th Century and back into
the 1920s, when the treaty was signed with the Russians, and then
after the Second World War, there's been an image that Afghani-
stan has always had a special relationship with the Soviet Union.
I mean for many years the Soviets were the only ones to provide
arms to the Afghan Army, and many Afghan soldiers were trained in
the Soviet Union.
Would you see the possibility of an agreement or a final
conclusion which gave full account to the Soviet interest in
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having a friendly country on their borders?
RAHIM: Actually, the people of Afghanistan won't let
Afghanistan to be under interest of any power. This is the
decision of our people. But if they don't interfere in our
internal -- I mean inside Afghanistan, so as a neighbor we can
have relation with them. It's no problem.
KREISBERG: Colonel Assil, you were asked by Mr. Buckley
a few minutes ago about what happened with the Soviet advisers
and the Soviet people in the police. In your conversations with
the Soviets, did you get any feeling from them as to how long
they thought it was going to take them to win in Afghanistan?
COLONEL ASSIL: They didn't say that. But generally,
they said that we came as a friend, according to the request of
the puppets -- I mean the president. And we will leave this
country when there will be any security for the...
RAHIM: Their puppets.
COLONEL ASSIL: Their puppets and their other interest
people, you know, and the member of the Communist Party of
Afghanistan.
KREISBERG: Mr. Buckley, do you think that the United
States and the West should provide more direct and more substan-
tial military assistance?
BUCKLEY: Absolutely. I see no reason at all why our
commitments to international peace and international integrity of
other nations aren't served by attempting to make repression
costly. It seems to me that we have an obligation, under our
treaty of the United Nations, to help people in situations like
that. I think it's consistent with whatever's left of the
doctrine of containment.
So my answer is a most emphatic yes.
By the way, Mr. Kreisberg, I think we should acknowledge
this: that a month or two after the Soivet troops came down, we
were told -- at least I was told, and perhaps you were also
--that we must not compare the longevity of Afghan resistance to
the longevity of Vietnam resistance, because Vietnam had an
actual cover; whereas the Afghans would be totally exposed on
their mountain peaks, to be picked off just like that by Soviet
helicopters. In point of fact, nobody would have predicted -- at
least nobody did in my presence two years ago -- that in June of
1983 there would be so virtually successful, in terms of longevi-
ty, a resistance movement.
Does that square with your...
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KREISBERG: I think that's right. I think that no one
really envisaged that the Soviets, in part, were going to be as
inefficient at carrying out guerrilla warfare as they have. Now,
there's a general acceptance, I think, that the Soviets have
learned a great deal. They've learned a great deal about
fighting this kind of war, and they've also learned...
BUCKLEY: Chemical warfare helps.
KREISBERG: Chemical --
managed to test a fair number of
provides a very useful test base
and they've learned -- they've
their new weapons. In a way, it
for the...
KREISBERG: Torture's not new. That's old. And I don't
know that they're using any new techniques there, either.
I was going to ask whether either of your visitors have
any sense of what happens when these young Afghans who've gone to
the Soviet Union for training -- the U.S. Government estimates
perhaps six to ten thousand are sent off to the Soviet Union for
education of various sorts every year. So there must be 18 or
30, or even more, thousand who've returned. You were estimating
before that the number of puppets were really very small, under
10,000, perhaps. You don't see these people who go off to the
Soviet Union as coming back more deeply committed to the Soviets?
RAHIM: You know, before they send those young boys to
Russia, they say that the best society in the world is Russia.
When they go and see, practically, what is going on in Russia,
they are coming back with such an impression for the benefit of
the resistance. That's why they come back they are joining with
the Mujahidin instead of helping the Russian, because they have
seen, practically, what the Russian really doing for their own
people. Such a dictatorship is present there and the life
standard is very bad and the condition is very bad. That's why
when they come back they reverse, you know, all they have heard
in Afghanistan about the Russia.
So, they have not succeed too much in this command,
their programs.
KREISBERG: Colonel Assil, I wonder if you could tell us
perhaps a little bit about what kind of an internal network the
Afghan resistance has inside both the government and inside the
Soviet force structure.
BUCKLEY: You have just 15 seconds, Colonel.
COLONEL ASSIL: I can say in every place, in every
where, in every ministry there are many Afghans who are helping
the Mujahidin. They inform -- if there is movement, military
movement, they inform the Mujahidin. If there is any danger for
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20
the Mujahidin, they inform the Mujahidin to escape from this
place.
So, we haved always, in every place, our friend in every
intelligence. Maybe in Cabinet also.
BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Colonel Assil. And thank
you, Mr. Rahim. Both resistance leaders here under the auspices
of the Afghanistan Relief Committee and Freedom House.
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