USSR AND SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-00374R000100110006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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USSR AND SATELLITES
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A. Countries where service attache reporting is considered
adequate:
1. There is no Orbit country, where in our view, service
attache reporting can be considered adequate for in-
telligence purposes. This statement must immediately
be qualified, however, by observing that communist se-
curity restrictions are of such a nature as to pre-
clude adequate intelligence reporting. Therefore,
it is necessary to weigh the security restrictions
imposed by an individual country, against the number
of attaches in a given country and their current work
load, in order to determine the desirability of in-
creasing mission strength. While we do not have
first hand knowledge of the work load of each indi-
vidual mission, it is our general belief that most,
if not all have more than enough to do and that their
capability would be improved by additional strength.
(see C.)
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B. Countries where the number of US attach6s could be reduced:
We believe that there is no Orbit country where the num-
ber of service attaches should be reduced. In fact it
should be pointed out that representation in these coun-
tries is now at what we consider to be a bare minimum.
According to the Foreign Service list of 1 April 1954,
service representation in Orbit countries was as follows:
Albania 0
Bulgaria 0
Czechoslovakia 3
Hungary
5
Poland
4
Rumania
1
USSR
16
While comparison with service attache representation in
Western countries is not fully accurate since these per-
sonnel have many other duties in addition to intelligence
collecting it is interesting to note that the US has
15 service attaches in Spain, 7 in Portugal and 8 in
Thailand.
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C. Countries where the number of service attaches should be
increased:
In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary our service attaches,
who have considerable freedom of movement, have supplied
valuable military intelligence, as well as economic and
some political intelligence. In Rumania, there has been
some recent relaxation of travel restrictions which has
resulted in some improvement in our intelligence cover-
age. An increase in service representation in any of
these countries would increase opportunities for travel
and thereby our intelligence coverage.
It is our belief that Wregardless of security restric-
tions in any given Orbit country, US service representation
should consist of more than one attache per service, if
only to backstop one another in case of sickness, leave,
emergency or unusual intelligence opportunity, For
example if travel bans were suddenly lifted it would be
a number of months before additional service representa-
tion could be sent to take advantage of the situation.
According to the Foreign Service listing of 1 April 1954
there is only one army attache in Czechoslovakia and
Rumania, one Navy attache in Poland, and one air attache
in Poland. In addition there are no navy or air attaches
in Rumania, Of course the absence of diplomatic repre-
sentation in Albania and Bulgaria means that there are
no service attaches in either of these countries.
It should be pointed out that the foregoing is addressed
primarily to quantitative representation, The quality of
the representation has not been discussed and obviously
varies from country to country. For example, the quality
of air attache reporting from the USSR in the past year
has improved. Furthermore, aside from the collection of
military information, the service attaches also provide
valuable economic and in some cases political information
gleaned from trips, receptions, press etc.
While we have not discussed service attache representation
in countries bordering on the Orbit, e.g., Iran, Afghanistan,
Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, they provide us with some
military intelligence on the Orbit, Cutbacks, which might
result in the reduction of such intelligence would not be
desirable,
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1. At the following posts it is proposed that the strength
of Defense Attaches be maintained at present levels: Afghanistan,
Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, French West Africa, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tangier, Union. of South
Africa. The reporting from these attaches represents an essential
or useful part of the overall reporting for the area.
2. At the following posts it is proposed that the strength
of Defense Attaches be reduced:
Greece - Some overall reduction in reporting if possible.
Iran - - Some reduction in naval and air attache report-
ing.
Turkey - Some reduction of air attache reporting.
S. At the following posts it is proposed that the strength
of Defense Attaches be increased.
Algeria
-
No reporting at present.
Cyprus
- -
No reporting at present.
India
- -
A country of rapidly growing importance; an
increase of personnel might compensate for
the decrease in information available to
present staffs because of increasing Indian
security restrictions. At a minimum, staffs
should be maintained at present size.
Kenya - - No reporting at present.
Pakistan - 01 increasing importance to US.
Tunisia.: - No reporting at present.
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7 September 1954
1. Countries where Defense Attache representation should
remain unchanged:
Italy
Spain
Portugal
France
The Netherlands
Belgium and Luxembourg
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Ireland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
2. Countries where representation can be reduced:
None.
3. Countries where representation should be increased:
None.
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Ji'AR EASTERN DIVISION
.1 September 1954
SUBJECT: Comments on Attache ieporting.
1. Remain at present strengtii:
A. Australia and New Zealand: Reporting by all three
services, though not extensive, has been adequate
for our purposes. we would not like to see it
reduced.
B. Japan: Reporting is adequate for Japan's limited
rearmament. As Japanese forces expand, intelligence
requirements will be proportionately greater. At the
same time, the disappearance of other US military
agencies in Japan whica now supplement attache re-
porting would place a greater burden on the latter.
C. Malaya and Singapore: Coverage from Navy and from
Army Liaison Officer in Singapore is adequate.
D. Philippines: Cable reporting of significant events
with bearing on Philippine armed forces has been
quite satisfactory and often has provided the first
available report and comment. Army attache reports
especially have been prompt and helpful in commenting
on such events as surrender of Taruc, appointments
of key personnel in armed forces commands, and of
developments in connection with 1953 election.
Despatch reporting by all three services is less
useful. Comments on training developments are some-
times sparse, and fuller discussions of general
trends, such as rumored reorganization of army
organization and recent re-subordination of con-
stabulary units to army commands would be helpful.
E. South Korea: Service attache reporting from Korea
has been sparse, and concerned principally with
routine personnel transfers and organizational
changes. In terms of its potential value and
capability to cover subjects of particular interest,
attache reporting has been inadequate. We believe
the capabilities of the present attaches are not
being fully utilized.
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F. Thailand: Attache reporting from Bangkok is adequate
an should remain so as long as Thailand remains
firmly pro-Western in its political orientation.
Therefore, the chief concern from an intelligence
point of view lies in the field of indications that
may indicate a shift in Thailand's orientation.
II. Where attache strength can be reduced:
A. Burma: Attache reporting from Rangoon has generally
been adequate in view of the handicaps under which
they have had to operate. With improving US-Burmese
relations such routine information as OB and opera-
tional reports should become increasingly available.
Both Air and Navy Attaches' reporting appear to be
more than adequate.
III. Where attache strength should be increased:
A. China (Hong Kong): Attache comments in Hong Kong
joint weeks are very valuable. More information
is desired, however, and more complete coverage of
Communist activity north of the 25th parallel in
China is desired. Air: Reporting on Communist
activity in southern China is good but more informa-
tion is desired. Army: Reporting for southern
provinces is good, more from further north is wanted.
Navy: Reporting is good, considered sufficient.
B. China (Taipei): Air: Volume of air reporting on
Nationalist air is small, material is generally
highly detailed and technical. Would appreciate
more coverage with broader scope, especially on
current air OB and capabilities. Army: Volume
and quality of reporting on Nations ists adequate.
Reporting on Communists good. Navy: Volume and
quality of Alusna reports on Nationalists very good.
Reporting on Communists could be more timely. There
is apparent tendency to consider too many Nationalist
reports, particularly those dealing with Communist
air developments, as unworthy of immediate reporting
by cable.
C. Indochina: Army: The difficulties inherent in the
system of French handouts are understood but make all
the more necessary the attache's frequent comments
on the information given him. We would like to have
increased reporting on the indigenous forces, developed
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if possible independently of the French. More on-the-
spot intelligence derived from frequent field trips
would be appreciated. Navy: The reporting is
generally adequate, except-that more information on
the extent of illegal coastal traffic would be useful.
D. Indonesia: Navy and Air coverage appear adequate:
Army coverage is generally good. More detailed re-
porting on military-political situation, however,
would be helpful particularly during present period
when certain army factions are among principal
deterrents to government's leftist trend.
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7 September 1954
1. Countries where Defense Attache representation should
remain unchanged:
Argentina Cuba
Brazil El Salvador
Chile Guatemala
Uruguay Honduras
Peru Mexico
Ecuador Nicaragua
Venezuela Panama
Colombia
2. Countries where representation can be reduced:
None.
3. Countries where representation should be increased:
1. Bolivia: There are no service attaches in Bolivia at this
time. It is recommended that an Army Attache be stationed
in La Paz because of the importance of the Army and Police
in maintaining the stability of the government and their
importance as a source of political information. Such in-
formation can best be obtained by an Army Attache who can
fraternize with the Bolivian military. The current admin-
istration is constantly threatened by the right as well as
the Communists who exploit the government's many difficulties.
2. Paraguay: There are no service attaches in Paraguay.
Paraguayan stability is constantly threatened by revolu-
tions and the changeover in governments is comparatively
rapid. Since the army is in effect the arbiter of Paraguayan
politics, an Army Attache would have the best opportunity
for collecting information on the personal loyalties of im-
portant military elements and prospects for stability as
well as routine military information. At present such in-
formation is not available. The seriousness of this lack
of information is demonstrated by current reports that a
powerful and opportunistic politician, considered by many
to be a Communist, is planning a coup against the Stroessner
administration.
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3. Venezuela: The staff of the Army Attache in Venezuela
should be increased, because reporting is now wholly in-
adequate for a country governed by a military dictator.
The embassy periodically refers to "rumors" of dissension
within the armed forces, but the OARMA staff appears un-
able to shed much light on them. The staff also appears
inadequate to provide factual background for new personnel
assigned there. The staff of the US Air Attache should be
increased for the same reasons and also because of the
need. for added US prestige in the field of military avia-
tion. Venezuelan Air Force procurement of considerable
British equipment has made it especially vulnerable to
British influence.
4. Colombia: The staff of the US Military Attache in Colombia
should be increased, because it is apparently unable to
furnish routine reports on guerrilla and other disturbances,
except on a requirement basis. It has also been unable to
provide information on the nature of the friction between
the former war minister and the commander of the armed
forces and similar "power clash" situations within the
government which is run primarily by the armed forces.
5. Costa Rica: Given the state of tension between Costa Rica
and caragua and armament plans of both governments, the
assignment of an Army Attache to Costa Rica is suggested.
The Army Attache in Managua is currently accredited to
Costa Rica.
6. Dominican Republic: Because the Dominican Navy has suffered
budget cuts and general impairment of efficiency and morale
in the last two years, and because reporting on the
Dominican Army's acquisitions of equipment appears. to be
incomplete, a change in the service representation is
suggested. An Army Attache should be assigned, whether in
addition to or in replacement of the naval representative.
Army and Air Attaches at Havana are now accredited.
7. Haiti: The appointment of an Army Attache might be de-
si able if the Haitian application for a military assist-
ance agreement is accepted. Army, Naval, and Air Attaches
at Havana are accredited.
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