PUBLICATION OF JEC AUTHORSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000200280004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 27, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Zl Februdry 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis
Publication of JEC Authorship
1. The time is approaching to volunteer articles for the next JEC volume
on the Soviet economy. We are apprehensive that CIA's current policy of
prohibiting publication of both the author's name and affiliation with the
Agency will substantially reduce the quantity and quality of effort
contributed. This will be the first volume initiated since the enforcement of
this policy. As you may recall-;` the articles for the China and Eastern Europe
volumes were already written before the authors learned that their names could
not be used. At that time, many of them vowed that they would not again write
articles for the JEC without attribution.
2. We believe that there are good reasons to reconsider this policy.
First, the analysts' explicit links with and standing in a coterie of experts
on the outside are necessary for their own self esteem--increasingly important
for recruiting high quality and academically oriented scholars. This factor,
moreover, is also important to the Agency because it establishes relationships
that can be tapped to enhance our analysis. Second, attribution only to an
unnamed CIA officer tends to give the distinct impression that the views
expressed are Agency policy. This is in sharp contrast with past volumes
that carried the author's name and also the caveat that "the views expressed
are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily represent the
position of their respective governments...."
3. There will continue to be some cases in which attribution is not
advisable--for example, where open identification with the Agency would
jeopardize future assignments or where it might prove a threat to personal
safety. We would take care to deal with each case individually. Still, in
most cases, we believe that the analyst should be allowed to publicly identify
his
h
ffi
or
er a
liation as a mattf idiidlhi
er onvua coce. We do not believe
that this is substantially different from such identification as a conference
participant or attendee.
2 25X1
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Memorandum to DDI on "Publication of JEC
Authorship" (dated 27 February 1986)a)
a. If
an
analyst chooses to be identified as the
author, his name
and
Agency affiliation will be specified along
with the caveat
"the
views expressed are those of the individual
contributors and
do
not necessarily represent$the position of the
Agency."h)
1. The DDI agreed with D/SOVA's proposal to return to the
earlier policy of giving individual DDI authors a choice as to
whether they will be given attribution for articles published in
the separate series of JEC volumes on the USSR, Eastern Europe
and PRC economies. At the behest of the DDI, we advised'D/EURA,
D/EURA elect and D/OEA of the revised policy and STAT
solicited their views on specific procedures. The three Office
Directors and agreed to the following procedures: STAT
b. In those cases where attribution is not advisable
the individual will be permitted to indicate that the article was
prepared "By an Analyst of the Central Intel l igence?Aency." c)
Deputy Director of Soviet Analysis
o
,
ox R-
( 4 O & d"' j, AUAVj- Al L~j
41 Al P'e ~' UAk.
b) Jh,, u)a 9
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- d
&~ AQ_ 0-mo C)LYW
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
STAT
p ~f/"'Tti Ir,S
/~-r~8fY6
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99th Congress
2d Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT (
S. PRT.
l 99-88, Vol. 3
EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES: SLOW
GROWTH IN THE 1980'S
VOLUME 3. COUNTRY STUDIES ON EASTERN EUROPE
h AND YUGOSLAVIA
SELECTED PAPERS
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee
U.S. GOVRRNMRNT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1986
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POLISH AGRICULTURE: POLICY AND PROSPECTS
By an Analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency
CONTENTS
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 450
I. Agricultural Performance and Policy, 1970-1981 .............................................. 451
11. Agricultural Trade, 1970-1981 ............................................................................... 456
M. Consumer Policies, 1970-1981 ................................................................................
....... 457
N. The Agricultural Sector After December 1981 ........................................... 459
V. Outlook for Agricultural Production and Trade ................................................ 462
SUMMARY
The agricultural sector has always been of great importance to
the Polish economy, contributing an average of 25 percent of na-
tional income and employing an average of one-third of the total
labor force during the last three decades. Until the early 1970s,
however, the sector generally was neglected by successive Commu-
nist regimes because of the push for industrial development and
ideological reluctance to support private sector farmers (who in
1970 tilled 80 percent of the land under cultivation). A major policy
change occurred in 1971, when the Gierek regime-eager to placate
disgruntled consumers-tried to boost output in the agricultural
sector by increasing farmers' incentives. Helped by good weather,
Warsaw succeeded in increasing output in the period 1971-1974.
The farming boom faltered after 1974 because of poor weather and
because the regime again slighted the development of agriculture
and slipped back into traditional habits of discriminating against
the private farmer.
Throughout the 1970s the government implemented policies to
boost consumption of food items and maintain low retail prices
even though domestic production stagnated later in the dee. Do-
mestic food supplies were supplemented by agricultural imports
from the West financed on credit, as well as by cuts in food ex-
ports. By the end of 1981, the hard currency deficit in the agricul-
tural-food trade account was almost $2 billion.
Since December 1981, the regime has had to cut agricultural im-
ports drastically because of its financial problems and has tried to
adjust by increasing production and government procurement and
been avergagce~ above average because of good weather, liveestock
production has declined because of cuts in Western feed imports. In
1983, the government procured sufficient amounts of grain to cover
human needs, but livestock procurements dropped. Meanwhile,
budget subsidies for food fell in 1982 but rose in 1983 because retail
prices did not rise enough to cover the increased prices the regime
(450)
ing in 198:8 to unplanned purct
diversion to domestic markets
export.
By 1990, Poland plans modern
consumption and balanced agri
Warsaw claims that it will is
boost economic incentives to pr
and other food and agricultura:
The government so far has no
The regime has already cut b
sector from originally planned
ment prices enough to keep 1
higher taxes on private farmer,
forts to placate consumers led t
some agricultural imports in 19
I. AGRICULTURAL PERPOR]
During the early 1970s, Gier
farmers by increasing purchase
ing land taxes, abolishing coml
vats farmers national health
Gierek's efforts-together with
short-lived agricultural boom t
postwar development. Between
production in by 4.7 per(
by an average of 9 0 percent a
and hogs by 12.6 percent (Table
such as milk, vegetables, and I
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99th Congress
2d Session
S. PRT. 99-149,
Vol. 2
CHINA'S ECONOMY LOOKS TOWARD THE YEAR 2000
VOLUME 2. ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN MODERNIZING
CHINA 11
SELECTED PAPERS
SUBMITTED TO THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee
50-531 0 WASHINGTON : 1986
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CHINA: ENERGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Overview ...........
Introduction ..............................................................................................................
China's ..............................................................................................
Energy..S..upply ...................................... ................ ...................
Coal-China's Energy Foundation ......................................................................
Petroleum-Depending on Offshore Discoveries ..............................................
Natural Gas-Unknown Potential ............
Electric Power-Strong Growth But More.Sho ............................
China's Demand for Energy ees .....................................
Demand for Coal ................. .......... ..................................
Demand for Petroleum m .......... ............. .....................................................................
....................
Demand for Electric Power ... ................ ......
...............................................
Implications ........... ................................
.. .............
Beijing- ................................................
Tough Choices Ah ...
Implications for the ead.. ........................................................................
United States
......................................................................
Paso
22
23
25
28
29
34
35
38
42
47
52
54
54
58
OVERVIEW
China, in the past six years, has made exceptional progress in
improving the efficiency with which its economy uses energy. This
has allowed fairly rapid economic growth and a large increase in
energy exports despite erratic growth in the production of energy.
Unlike most countries, China has done this without sharp in-
creases in energy prices.
Energy conservation has not come without costs, however. Use of
capital equipment is down sharply because of fuel and electricity
shortages. Some indexes of economic progress, such as the share of
farmland plowed mechanically, have actually declined. Moreover,
in terms of energy consumption, China's vast rural population re-
mains one of the most impoverished in the world.
Pressures upon China's energy supplies caused by growth are likely to increase through the rest of the 1980s.~onomic
Offshore oil Production may not be available soon enough to
offset an expected decline in production from the country's
large but mature onshore oilfields--especially Daqing.
Coal, because it is being counted on to substitute for oil
wherever possible, will be hard pressed to provide the energy
needed to fuel economic growth.
Electricity shortages, caused by insufficient investment in
recent years and surging demand, may be the most critical
short-term bottleneck to economic growth.
.Office of East Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency.
STAT
i~, iiin, i~ currtntk f,icbn,r a host c
energ policy that have long-term is
economic growth pattern. Two import
are whether to reduce oil exports-21
eign exchange earnings-and how to
that is needed to raise domestic energ
The government's strong control m,
ity placed on energy conservation sh(
crease at a modest 4- or 5-percent
1980s-slower than in the past ba
planned by Beijing. The much faster ?
the 1990s is unlikely to be achieve
undue strain on both energy producer
A key decision made in 1978 to for
sector and bring in foreign investmer
cial opportunities for US energy coin
to expand and help to strengthen pc
countries.
The depth of such cooperation-an
meet its energy requirements-is cri-
discoveries being made in China's of
posits are not found-and so far th
China may have to decide between i
great expense to the country's interr
returning to the more self-reliant an(
of the past.
INTRODUCT
Six years ago China sharply redu,
for energy production-particularly
dress a problem of energy shortage
seen as an obstacle to economic grow
were an important factor behind De
"readjustment" of 1979, when it beer
growth led by heavy industry-witl
energy resources-could prove disast:
Beijing's economic "readjustment'
energy problem on three fronts. Firs
try's wasteful energy consumption
try , closing inefficient plants, and plr
litical considerations and a lack of
have prevented China from raisin
single most effective measure take
energy consumption. Nevertheless t
ful. Energy consumption increased
tween 1978 and 1983 while industria
percent. In the first three decades
consumption rose at a faster rate thr
Secondly, China has tried to corrE
industries to most short-term produc
veloping the resource base. Higher
been given to exploration and infra
has probably not been completely
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