VIEWS OF SOVIET ELITES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000200180002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 17, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/06: CIA-RDP87T01145R000200180002-5
DATE 2 4 DEC 1986
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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CISZI -D
STAT
Executive Secretary
22 Dec 86
Date
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United States
Information ?"'c` ?''"e Direct?f
Agency
DEI 171986
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligenge Agency
FROM: Charles Z. Wi-ck
Director
SUBJECT: Views of Soviet Elites on Foreign Affairs
The attached memorandum from the USIA Office of Research reveals
some telling divisions of opinion among Soviet elites. While
Soviet officials, of course, tend to support government policies
and propaganda, Soviet artists and intellectuals often resist
official Soviet propaganda.
According to the estimates of Westerners steeped in Soviet
society, half of the Soviet intelligentsia is thought to regard
the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as shameful.
Despite constant official propaganda to the contrary, about a
third of the intelligentsia believe that the USSR seeks to
achieve military superiority over the U.S. One fifth of
officials and two fifths of the intelligentsia do not accept a
basic tenet of Soviet propaganda -- that SDI is an offensive
system.
The longer report on which this research memorandum is based is
available directly from the Office of Research (485-2965).
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United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547
December 13, 1986
SOVIET ELITES DIVIDED ON KEY FOREIGN-AFFAIRS ISSUES
Summary
This memorandum summarizes a USIA research report on Soviet
elite views of U.S policy toward the USSR and other foreign-
affairs issues. The longer report* is based on interviews with
more than 50 Americans and West Europeans who have had exten-
sive recent contact with the elites. Interviews were conducted
from spring to fall 1986, the most recent in October shortly
after the Chautauqua Institution-sponsored meeting in Latvia.
Among the key findings, according to surrogates' estimates:
o The Soviet intelligentsia (intellectuals and cultural
figures) is even more inclined to criticize the Soviet
government's role in Afghanistan than are persons in the
political establishment.
o Only half the official elite is thought to support the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
o Despite constant official propaganda to the contrary,
about a third of the intelligentsia believe that the USSR
seeks to achieve military superiority over the U.S.
o One fifth of officials and two fifths of the intelligentsia
do not accept official propaganda that SDI is an offensive
system.
o Few are aware of Soviet research on strategic defense.
End summary
Elites Divide on Military, Afghanistan, and Other Issues
In surrogates' estimates, intellectuals and members of the
creative professions, unlike officials, attach little impor-
tance to keeping up with or exceeding U.S. military might. A
few intellectuals go so far as to strongly endorse President
Reagan's efforts to build up U.S. power and to oppose Soviet
expansionism, asserting that Soviet leaders only understand
demonstrations of strength.
*Richard B. Dobson and Steven A. Grant, "Soviet Elites Split
Over U.S. Policy and Other Foreign-Affairs Issues," USIA
Research Report (R-23-86), December 1986. This report is
available from the USIA Office of Research (485-2965).
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/06: CIA-RDP87T01145R000200180002-5
Artists and intellectuals are also more inclined to criticize
their government's role in Afghanistan than are persons in the
political establishment. Even at that, only half of officials
and other members of the Political establishment are thou ht to
support Soviet government policy in Afghanistan. In contrast,
one third of the artists and intellectuals are believed to
endorse the regime's policy. Half of the intelligentsia is
thought to regard the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghani-
stan as "shameful." One quarter of officials are thought to
agree to this strong statement. Because dissenting views are
seldom expressed outside a close circle of family and friends,
however, opposition to the war remains passive and fragmented.
Soviet elite members view the -U.S. as the USSR's chief interna-
tional competitor and consider negotiations with the U.S. on
arms control issues extremely important. Artists and intellec-
tuals are more likel than members of the political establish-
ment to a art from official policy positions and to a o t a
more favorable view of the U.S. and -U.S. polio Acig to
surrogates' estimates, artists and intellectuals arecmuchnless
likely than officials to feel that the U.S. and the USSR have
basically conflicting interests. They are also less likely to
regard the U.S. as an unreliable trading partner.
Many Elites Reject Key Points of Official Pro aganda
According to a simulated poll, the great majority of elite
members are thought to believe, in keeping with Soviet propa-
ganda, that the U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority over
the USSR. Most are also thought to accept the official view
that the USSR does not seek superiority over the U.S. It is
noteworthy, however, that despite constant official propaganda
on this subject about a third of all elites a arentl believe
that the USSR seeks to achieve superiority over the U.S.
Moreover, the regime has clearly not been fully successful in
instilling the view that SDI is an offensive system. Surrogates
estimate that about a fifth of the officials and two fifths of
the intelligentsia do not accept a basic tenet of Soviet
propaganda: that SDI is an attempt to gain a first-strike
capability against the USSR. Even these critics, however, tend
to regard SDI as undesirable, believing that it will stimulate
the arms race and impose a heavy burden on the Soviet economy.
Aside from arms specialists, however, few have knowledge of
Soviet research on strategic defense.
Prepared by USIA Office of Research: M-12/13/86
Steven A. Grant, Analyst
Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director of Research
485-2965
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/06: CIA-RDP87T01145R000200180002-5