USSR REVIEW - IN THIS ISSUE: THE USSR AND CHINA JULY-AUGUST 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence
USSR Review
In this issue:
The USSR and China
July-August 1986
SOV UR 86-004X
July 1986
Copy 407
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR Review
July-August 1986
articles are welcome.
The USSR Review is published by the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the
Secret
SOV UR 86-004X
July 1986
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Contents
The USSR and China Perspective
Western countries that can be of help.
The Sino-Soviet relationship has evolved in recent years into a broad
range of economic, trade, and scientific contacts, although the
Chinese continue to avoid party-to-party ties. The Soviets have good
reason to be pleased because the progress to date has been made
without any Soviet give on China's "three obstacles" to normalized
relations. Moscow hopes that a normalization of relations will bring
improvements in the political/strategic dimensions of the relation-
ship but recognizes that China will be an adversary for a long time
to come. In the short term, the interest that both sides have in
building their domestic economies leads them to seek to reduce the
military tensions between them, to put their relationship on a more
sound economic footing, and, at the same time, to reach out to
Sino-Soviet Relations: The Gorbachev Policy
for granted.
The Soviets seem to be taking a more subtle approach toward
China-becoming a bit less heavyhanded in their direct dealings
with Beijing, while maneuvering within a number of triangular
relationships, including the Sino-Soviet-US strategic triangle, to
apply pressure on the Chinese to move their relationship forward.
Most of Gorbachev's top experts on China apparently still believe
they can work around Beijing's three obstacles to a significant
improvement in bilateral relations-Afghanistan, Cambodia, and
the Soviet military buildup along China's northern border-and
need not make any major concessions on those points. The Chinese
have become increasingly outspoken in expressing their irritation
with Gorbachev's inflexibility on those issues, but they also have
demonstrated that they are determined to keep Sino-Soviet tensions
within manageable limits. They want to have as much breathing
space as possible to pursue their economic reforms and to leave open
the possibility of a breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations, in part so
the United States does not take Chinese hostility toward the USSR
Secret
SOV UR 86004X
July 1986
Page
1
5 25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
China: Trying To Beat the Odds Along the Soviet Border) 11 25X1
Beijing has adopted a forward-defense strategy designed to deter a
Soviet attack by raising the costs of an incursion into northeastern
China. The Chinese intend to meet Soviet thrusts close to the border
where they hope to shock Moscow into reassessing its attack.
However, it will take years for China to field enough advanced
weapons to adequately equip its forces for this mission. We have
seen no signs that Moscow considers recent Chinese modernization
efforts an immediate threat.
Since Mikhail Gorbachev's election as General Secretary, the
Soviets have increased the frequency and the objectivity of their
media commentary on the reforms under way in the Chinese
economy. This shift, however, reflects the leadership's desire to
widen the boundaries of permissible domestic debate on economic
reform and to improve Sino-Soviet ties, rather than approval of
China's actions. Most Soviet officials and scholars are disturbed by
the political riskiness and ideological unorthodoxy of the Chinese
reforms, dismiss their applicability to the Soviet economy, and see
them as posing an implicit challenge to Soviet leadership of the
Communist camp.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
and the Third World
positions in the Third World.
In recent months the Soviets have used the term "neoglobalism" to
describe a supposed new US doctrine for the Third World. The
concept serves as a useful propaganda vehicle, an explanation of
recent events in the Third World, and possibly as an argument for a
Soviet external policy that concentrates on consolidating existing
Work Position Certification: Seeking Hidden Labor Reserves 35
evaluation of jobs and equipment.
Faced with slow labor force growth, the Soviet leadership is taking
measures to improve the utilization of labor. In an effort to reduce
labor hoarding and eliminate low-productivity job slots, Soviet
enterprises have been tasked with a comprehensive inventory and
that this issue probably holds on the Gorbachev agenda.
The Gorbachev regime's most visible move to promote women to
leadership positions was the appointment of Aleksandra Biryukova
to the CPSU Secretariat. To some extent, this move has been echoed
by the increased participation of women at many levels of party
leadership. These are token gestures for now, although perhaps the
beginning of a more significant trend. Because it is one means for
Gorbachev to revitalize party cadres, we can expect the trend of
increasing the role of women in party leadership to continue. The
pace, however, is likely to be slow, consistent with the low priority
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
39 25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
Viewpoint Moscow's Stake in the Berlin Access Challenge
The Soviets have exploited, in our judgment, the GDR's challenge to
Western access to Berlin even though they apparently did not
initiate it. Its timing, the diversion of attention from recent Soviet
setbacks in Chernobyl' and Libya, and the fit with the Soviets'
objectives in both their German and overall European policies
suggest to us that Moscow gave the East Germans a contingent go-
ahead for the challenge. By doing so, Moscow probably also hoped
to avoid Soviet-East German friction and to compensate the GDR
somewhat for Gorbachev's evident refusal to let Honecker visit Bonn
this year. We believe Soviet willingness to "intercede" with the East
Germans to modify some of the proposed control measures was
intended to seize the high ground of reasonable compromise and
portray the three NATO occupying powers as being inflexible
25X1
45 25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8 -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
The USSR and China
Perspective I 25X1
"socialist" state for the first time since 1966.
When China's leader Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Soviets made a bid to
improve relations that was quickly rejected by the Chinese as an attempt to
meddle in the uncertain domestic situation. The tables turned when
Chernenko died in 1985 and Gorbachev came to power: the Chinese
signaled their interest in improved relations by calling the USSR a
consulates in the other's country.
The relationship has evolved into a broad range of exchanges in the trade,
economic, and scientific fields. The two sides signed a long-term trade
agreement last summer, for example, and, despite the Chernobyl' incident,
China apparently sent a delegation to the USSR this summer to see
whether Soviet nuclear power facilities might be suitable for China's need.
Although the eight rounds of regularly scheduled discussions about
"normalization" of bilateral relations have gone nowhere, the two sides
have opened a separate set of discussions on international issues that so far
have covered Asia and disarmament. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu has
accepted an invitation to Moscow, and each side will be reopening
The Soviets have consistently exaggerated the pace of progress in the
relationship, while the Chinese have just as consistently expressed a
gloomier view-both sides with an eye on Washington's reactions as they
jockey for position in the Sino-US-Soviet triangle. Despite Soviet overstate-
ments, however, Moscow has good reason to be pleased with the progress to
date, especially because it has cost the Soviets next to nothing. The Soviets
have shown no give on China's "three obstacles" to normalized relations-
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Moscow's support to Vietnam for the
Cambodia intervention, and the military buildup along the border and in
Mongolia. The Soviets have long contended that the obstacles were
1 Secret
SOV UR 86004X
July 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8 -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
artificial barriers that the Chinese would ignore when it suited them, and
events to date have proved them right. The Chinese will undoubtedly
continue to cite the three obstacles as a statement in principle of their
concerns, as a way to reassure Washington that they remain wary of the
Soviets, and as a means of letting the Chinese domestic audience know that
they have not sold out to the Soviets. But the Soviets are confident that the
"obstacles" will not stand in the way
In any case, the Soviets undoubtedly believe the costs of making a major
move on any of the three obstacles would be too high. It is unlikely, for ex-
ample, that the China factor alone would lead the Soviets to pull out of Af-
ghanistan without securing a regime that is both receptive to Soviet
direction and capable of containing the insurgency. They would not
damage their important relationship with Vietnam-and risk losing their
base at Cam Ranh Bay-by stopping support for Hanoi's venture in
Cambodia without a political arrangement in Phnom Penh that is accept-
able to Hanoi and that brings an end to the resistance. Vietnam ties down
Chinese troops along China's southern borders, and the Soviets have no
interest in letting Cambodia's Heng Samrin regime fall to the resistance.
On the issue of Soviet troops and missiles along the border with China,
there is some room for maneuver, but this room is narrowing as China im-
proves its own forces in these regions. The Soviets could withdraw a small
number of troops, or pull them back farther from the border, with
relatively little risk. But the Chinese are modernizing their forces along the
border and are deploying them closer to the border rather than relying on
their old strategy of luring the enemy in deep. They have also improved
their capability to monitor Soviet activity along the border, reducing
somewhat the element of surprise. If the Soviets ever considered making
some adjustments along the border to placate the Chinese-and we have
no evidence that they did-there is less incentive for them to do so now that
the Chinese are becoming a more credible threat.
In fact, the Soviets have continued to modernize their own forces along the
border. Since the late 1970s, when the Soviets sharply increased the
number of troops in the area to coincide with China's invasion of Vietnam
and its establishment of relations with the United States, the troop buildup
has been gradual but steady. The Soviets continue to send better quality
equipment to the Sino-Soviet border after it has first been used by Soviet
forces in the west. The pace of Chinese force modernization along the
border will dictate to some extent the rate at which Soviet forces are
modernized, but for now the Soviets seem satisfied to modernize gradually.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8 -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
ideological war-of-words of the past.
With China not raising the three obstacles as consistently as in the past,
the prospects for the relationship would seem brighter. It is fair to ask,
however, what "normalization" would look like and whether in fact it
would be very different from the situation that obtains today. It might be
argued, convincingly, that for all intents and purposes, relations have been
"normalized," even if they are not cordial. Economic relations are
improving, with the Soviets set to help modernize a number of plants that
they built in China in the 1950s and the Chinese prepared to enter the So-
viet market with textiles and other products. Two sets of regularly
scheduled meetings at the deputy-minister level allow the Soviets and
Chinese to discuss numerous economic and political issues. Both sides
publicly acknowledge one another as "socialists," thus muting the fierce
For the Soviets, however, "normalization" would include several objectives
still not within reach:
? Establishing party-to-party relations with China, while more important
symbolically than substantively, would give Moscow an avenue that the
United States cannot duplicate in its relations with Beijing.
? Resolving the longstanding border dispute would reduce the need for the
military buildup on both sides of the border and could help lower tensions
in a concrete, rather than atmospheric, sense.
maneuverability within the Sino-US-Soviet triangle.
? Getting a formal commitment from China, in some sort of treaty, not to
engage in strategic cooperation with the United States at Soviet expense
is perhaps the least realistic objective, as the Soviets in effect are asking
the Chinese to abandon their "independent" foreign policy and limit their
for Deng to leave the scene.
For the short term, both the Soviets and the Chinese seem satisified with
the current state of relations. The Soviets, recognizing that the Chinese
have eased back from the three obstacles, can afford to be patient, waiting
for Beijing to make another move toward improving ties when it is ready.
In Moscow's eyes, Deng Xiaoping poses perhaps the most important
obstacle to further movement by Beijing, as the Soviets believe he is the
least enthusiastic of China's top leaders about better relations. Being well
satisfied with the progress in the relationship to date, the Soviets can wait
Personalities are an obstacle on the Soviet side as well. Some individuals in
the policymaking apparatus in both Beijing and Moscow probably see
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, a leading China expert,
3 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
as an impediment to improved relations. Kapitsa has repeatedly antago-
nized the Chinese and other Asian interlocutors with his arrogance and
heavyhandedness and has been rumored to be on the way out as Moscow
pays more attention to Asia
Soviet patience is probably reinforced by a realization that China is likely
to be an adversary for a long time to come, regardless of the formal state of
relations. Distrust and suspicion are deep rooted on both sides, fueled only
partly by ethnic animosities. The Soviets and the Chinese are competitors
for influence, particularly in Asia, and with China's modernization pro-
gram taking a path that breaks sharply with Soviet practice, the two offer
starkly different models for socialist development.
Since Gorbachev came to power, however, Soviet media commentary on
the Chinese reforms has been more frequent and less critical. The Soviets
probably intend this as a signal to China of their desire to improve
relations. More important, it is a signal to the domestic audience that the
range of permissible discussion of the USSR's own economic moderniza-
tion program is getting broader. Indeed, the Soviets since Brezhnev's time
have sought to improve ties to China but did not see fit until launching
their own economic program to comment positively on China's reforms.
Although the Chinese undoubtedly believe their program could be a model
for the USSR, most Soviets find the Chinese approach too politically risky
and not suitable to conditions in the USSR. The interest that both sides
have in building their domestic economies, however, plays a large role in
their efforts to reduce the military tensions between them, to put their
relationship on a more sound economic footing, and, at the same time, to
reach out to Western countries that can be of help economically.
Moscow's revitalized interest in Japan, for example, fits into the latter
category and also could help to advance Soviet interests vis-a-vis China.
The Soviets want to show the Chinese that they have other options in Asia,
and their efforts to improve relations with Tokyo and with P'yongyang are
intended, in part, to serve that end. The Chinese, for their part, are
improving relations with Moscow's East European allies, also with the
same goal in mind. The Sino-US-Soviet triangular relationship, still
critical in the calculations of both Moscow and Beijing, has nevertheless
become only one of several triangular relationships that both the Soviets
and Chinese are trying to set up as they seek to put pressure on one another
even as they move closer together.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8 __
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Sino-Soviet Relations:
The Gorbachev Policy
same time, more dynamic manner.
There has been considerable speculation during the
past year about the possibility of a major shift in
Soviet policy, with the new Gorbachev regime making
a more determined effort to improve the USSR's
position in Asia. The replacement of Foreign Minister
Gromyko by Shevardnadze helped fuel thinking along
this line last summer, as did the hopes and aspirations
of a number of Moscow's would-be negotiating part-
ners in Asia. Recent personnel changes and rumors of
more to come at several offices dealing with Asian
affairs suggest that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
have indeed started to assemble a new "Asia team."
In the meantime, the Soviets have already become
more outspoken in expressing their unhappiness with
the extent to which they have been frozen out of the
action in East Asia and the Western Pacific, despite
their growing military presence in that part of the
world. The Soviets also have begun to deal with some
of their Asian neighbors in a smoother and, at the
New Approach to the China Problem
Soviet behavior toward China is a case in point. After
years of trying to force the pace at which their
relations with Beijing improved, the Soviets have
recently become somewhat less heavyhanded in their
courtship. This may be partly due to general Soviet
satisfaction with the extent to which the two sides
have expanded their contacts and their dialogue with-
out any concessions on Beijing's "three obstacles"-
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Soviet military
buildup along China's northern border. But it also
suggests that the Soviets now recognize that they have
made some mistakes with the Chinese over the past
few years and believe that a more subtle approach will
be more effective in getting Beijing to make the next
move.
More Adroit Management of Bilateral Relations.
Gorbachev reportedly made precisely that point in a
wide-ranging critique of Soviet foreign policy at a
conference held at the Foreign Ministry in late May.
Gorbachev
called for a more flexible and pragmatic approach,
better relations with all countries, and an improved
style of work in Soviet embassies.
=Gorbachev had specifically stressed the need for
better relations with the Chinese and had warned his
audience against unrealistic expectations that the
relationship could return to the golden days of the
1950s, observing that the Soviets must accept China
as it is today. A Chinese diplomat in Moscow told the
US Embassy that, according to his sources, Gorba-
chev also had spoken about the importance of recog-
nizing that mistakes had been made and must be
corrected.
By then, the Soviets had already shown a heightened
awareness of Chinese sensitivities on one or two
occasions. For example, the Soviets had a Central
Committee member-rather than a candidate mem-
ber of the Politburo-head their team at the first
session of the joint committee on economic coopera-
tion, held in Beijing in mid-March. The Chinese had
already turned down an invitation to the 27th CPSU
Congress, and Gorbachev and his colleagues must
have realized that to proceed with their original plan
to send First Deputy Premier Talyzin, who had
become a candidate member of the Politburo last
October, was likely to reinforce Beijing's opposition to
a resumption of formal party-to-party ties. First Dep-
uty Premier Arkhipov, who is only a member of the
Central Committee, was a much safer choice, and he
seems to have made a conscious effort to avoid
making any public statements that would add to
Chinese irritation over the way the Soviets have
exaggerated the progress that the two sides have made
on key political issues.
The Soviets have displayed similar caution while
taking advantage of an agreement reached while
Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa was in Beijing early
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
last December for more bilateral consultations on
international issues. Igor Rogachev-chief of the For-
eign Ministry department responsible for relations
with China, Mongolia, and North Korea-accompa-
nied Arkhipov to Beijing in March without any
fanfare. Both sides announced that Rogachev had two
meetings with the head of the International Organiza-
tions Department at the Chinese Foreign Ministry to
discuss the UN General Assembly session last fall,
and the Soviet media added that their talks had
focused on arms control issues. Neither side has said a
word about any other talks that Rogachev might have
had in Beijing, but he must have asked some questions
about Sino-US cooperation, especially in the military
sphere. He also would have been a logical choice to
explain any new Soviet "ground rules" for Chinese
relations with Mongolia or with certain East Europe-
an countries, or to answer any Chinese questions
about Soviet-North Korean relations.
Maneuvering With Third Parties. A second aspect of
the new approach toward Beijing has been the in-
creased attention Moscow has devoted to third parties
in triangular relationships that include China and the
USSR. The Soviets have worked hard to improve
relations with Japan, for example, and have stated
publicly that their current goal is to convince Tokyo to
put Soviet-Japanese relations on a par with Sino-
Japanese relations. Moscow also has taken additional
steps to strengthen its ties to P'yongyang. While these
contacts can be beneficial in their own right, they
remind the Chinese that Moscow has other options in
East Asia and that Beijing could be left behind if it
continues to drag its feet in dealing with Moscow.
They are, in that respect, part of a broader effort
aimed at getting the Chinese to move forward on
relations and not just an attempt to isolate and
encircle China, as the Soviets tried to do during the
1960s and 1970s.
Moscow has adopted a more balanced approach in its
maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet-US strategic tri-
angle, instead of just focusing on the development of a
"China card" to play against the United States. This
is clear from the Soviets' willingness to reopen the
Geneva arms talks in January 1985, to meet with
President Reagan in Geneva last November, and to
hold out the prospect of another Gorbachev-Reagan
meeting this year despite increased criticism of the
United States over the past few months. Moscow's
contacts with Washington go well beyond those that
the Soviets and Chinese have resumed to date, and
thus help underscore the extent to which relations
with the United States remain at the top of the Soviet
foreign policy agenda, with China a distant second at
best. The Soviets probably hope this strategy will help
them convince Beijing that, to maintain its leverage in
the triangle, it will have to move forward in its
dealings with Moscow.
The Soviets also are trying to appear more accommo-
dating and flexible, and for this reason have made
additional positive gestures within the past six
months. Although still determined to keep the Chi-
nese from acquiring too much influence in Eastern
Europe, especially with their ideas on economic re-
forms, Moscow has allowed the Chinese dialogue with
the East Germans and Hungarians to go as far as
Beijing wishes. The dialogue has even included a
discussion of the resumption of party-to-party rela-
tions, which the Chinese have not been willing to
explore with the Soviets. Moscow also apparently has
given the Mongolians a "green light" on seeking
further improvement in their relations with Beijing,
judging from the recent reports that the Chinese plan
to send a deputy foreign minister to Mongolia in
August, the first visit by a Chinese official at that
level in more than 20 years.
Working Around the "Three Obstacles. " Gorbachev
probably had several motives in receiving Vice Pre-
mier Li Peng at the Kremlin in late December. He
reportedly restated to Li his interest in party-to-party
ties and a Sino-Soviet summit. Gorbachev also appar-
ently used the occasion to make it clear that "third
country" issues such as those raised by Beijing's three
obstacles have nothing to do with Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. Nevertheless, his session with Li underscored
the Soviet leader's interest in improved relations with
Beijing and readiness to get directly involved in the
dialogue.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8 - __
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Kapitsa and a number of Moscow's other top experts
on China still insist in private discussions that Bei-
jing's three obstacles to improved relations are merely
artificial devices that Beijing uses to slow the normal-
ization of Sino-Soviet ties. Few experts seem to
question the prevailing Soviet wisdom that the Chi-
nese will abandon those issues in time and that
Moscow, in the interim, should try to work around
them rather than offer Beijing significant concessions.
That attitude may change to some degree now that
Gorbachev has said his piece to the foreign policy
professionals, but Kapitsa and many of the other top
experts on China probably will have to be replaced
before Moscow will offer Beijing more than rhetoric
or token gestures.
The Chinese Response
Chinese frustration with Gorbachev's smooth style
but inflexibility on the issues that matter to them has
become increasingly evident. Over the past several
months, Beijing has once more turned up the volume
of its criticism of Soviet policy and reemphasized its
demand for progress on the so-called three obstacles
as a precondition for normalizing relations. The down-
turn on the political side, however, has not slowed the
expansion in economic cooperation. This fact alone
demonstrates, in our view, that the Chinese are
determined to keep Sino-Soviet tensions within man-
ageable limits to give themselves as much breathing
space as possible to pursue their economic reform
program
Initial Courtship of New Soviet Leadership. China's
approach to the new Soviet regime has gone through a
number of phases. Beijing, anticipating a change in
the Soviet leadership last spring, was clearly anxious
then to give new impetus to Sino-Soviet relations, in
part, we suspect, to avoid losing ground in the Sino-
Soviet-US strategic triangle. Indeed, even before Gor-
bachev's accession, the Chinese had welcomed Arkhi-
pov to Beijing in December 1984 for talks on
economic cooperation, had begun playing down the
three obstacles, and had resumed referring to Soviet
leaders as "comrade" for the first time since the
1960s. Once Gorbachev had assumed power, the
Chinese expanded their efforts to ameliorate rela-
tions-agreeing to resume long-suspended trade union
and parliamentary relations and to exchange visits by
Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Wu this year.
We think Beijing offered such inducements to encour-
age Gorbachev to reassess Moscow's hardline policies
toward China's security concerns. The Chinese un-
doubtedly also saw an opportunity to increase their
leverage with Washington, especially if they succeed-
ed in inducing Moscow to be more accommodating.
Return to a Tougher Political Stance. The Chinese
probably have been disappointed-but not sur-
prised-by the continued Soviet intransigence. As
best we can determine, the discussions at the last
three rounds of Sino-Soviet consultations-which the
Chinese use as a forum for raising the three obsta-
cles-have been as sterile as previous rounds. More-
over, the Chinese probably are chagrined about the
way Moscow has tried to use the improved atmo-
sphere of Sino-Soviet relations to enhance the Soviet
position vis-a-vis the United States. Chinese officials
appear to have been particularly upset by Kapitsa's
efforts to do so in early January, a month after his
most recent visit to Beijing, by leaking a Soviet
proposal for a nonaggression treaty. Foreign Minister
Wu subsequently denounced Kapitsa as a "liar"
before a group of West European diplomats for
prematurely announcing that the two sides had agreed
on a date for Wu's visit to Moscow this year.
By then, the Chinese were almost going out of their
way to single out one or another aspect of Soviet 25X1
foreign policy for criticism. Wu, for example, took
Moscow sharply to task over Afghanistan and Indo-
china in a speech at the Chinese National People's
Congress in mid-January. Chinese foreign ministry
officials subsequently dismissed Gorbachev's renewed
expressions, at the 27th Congress, of a desire for
better relations with China, characterizing them as
nothing new and mainly "tactical."
the Chinese privately turned
down an invitation to the 27th Congress from Gorba-
ence would be seen as a major concession to the
Soviets and only encourage the Kremlin to continue to
refuse to discuss their security differences.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
The Chinese have been equally negative in responding
to Soviet overtures for a summit of some kind without
any preconditions-that is, without Soviet concessions
in advance on the obstacles, especially on the Cambo-
dian problem. At a press conference in Beijing only
one day after Deputy Foreign Minister Qian had
returned from the April round of political talks, a
Chinese official said it would be "unrealistic" to hold
such meetings while the obstacles to a normalization
of relations remain. The Chinese have taken the same
line on a number of occasions since then, both publicly
and in their private talks with US representatives and
officials of other interested third countries
on Foreign Minister Wu's visit to the USSR.
the two sides did agree in
early December on a general time frame for the visit
this spring, and on a Shevardnadze visit to China
toward the end of this year. We believe the Chinese
subsequently backed out of the deal for a number of
reasons-involving leadership politics as well as Bei-
jing's position within the Sino-Soviet-US triangular
relationship. In late December, soon after Gorbachev
had seen Li at the Kremlin, Chinese officials began to
insist in private that Wu would not go to Moscow
until there had been some Soviet movement on the
three obstacles, and General Secretary Hu Yaobang
made the same point in an interview in late January.
The Chinese have stuck to that position over the past
few months and apparently plan to hold the exchange
of foreign minister visits hostage until they believe the
visits will serve Chinese as well as Soviet purposes.
In our view, the Chinese have adopted a tougher
stance to try to disabuse Moscow of the notion that
China will eventually drop its political demands and
move incrementally toward a normalization of party-
to-party as well as state-to-state relations. Even more
important, perhaps, the Chinese do not want to
jeopardize their growing economic links to the West,
and thus feel compelled periodically-in our view-to
reassure the United States and its allies that Beijing is
not prepared to cut a deal with Moscow at the expense
of Western security interests. The Chinese also want
to encourage their Pakistani and Thai allies to contin-
ue to resist the Soviets and their Afghan and Viet-
namese clients.
the Vietnamese and their Soviet patron.
Keeping the Doors Open in Other Channels. Beijing
has not, however, let the impasse in political relations
stand in the way of expanding economic ties. Bilateral
trade increased to almost $2 billion last year-the
highest level since the late 1950s. (This figure still
represents less than 3 percent of China's total foreign
trade and slightly more than 1 percent of Soviet
foreign trade.) Beijing also welcomed Arkhipov for the
first session of the new joint commission on economic
cooperation. At the same time, however, the Chinese
received a group of Cambodian resistance leaders and
endorsed their latest negotiating offer in an obvious
display of solidarity with the resistance forces against
The Arkhipov visit reflects Chinese as well as Soviet
interest in keeping the relationship on track. Indeed,
we believe the Chinese-despite continued Soviet
unwillingness to address their main security con-
cerns-see the steady expansion of economic ties to
the Soviet Union and its East European allies as
serving their interests in several ways. It helps to
reduce Sino-Soviet tensions somewhat, and thus
makes it a bit easier for top Chinese leaders to
subordinate military modernization to their broader
economic modernization drive. It leaves open the
possibility at some point of a breakthrough in Sino-
Soviet relations, in part so the United States does not
take Chinese hostility toward the USSR for granted.
Finally, it gives China access to Soviet and East
European markets and technology.
The USSR and China have already agreed to work
together on modernizing 17 factories built with Soviet
help in the 1950s and on the development of seven
new projects-including coal mining, thermal energy
production, and possibly railroad electrification. The
Chinese also sent some of their experts to Moscow this
summer to look at Soviet nuclear power technology,
despite the accident at Chernobyl'. An agreement to
double the civilian flights between Moscow and Beij-
ing might be even more significant, if there is any
basis to the story-said to have originated with East
European diplomats in Beijing-that the extra Soviet
flights will continue to Hanoi and Vientiane, while the
Chinese flights will go on to Warsaw and Berlin.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8 __
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Moreover, the Chinese-according to one Soviet dip-
lomat in Beijing-were already pushing in early May
for yet another visit to China by a Soviet deputy
premier, to reciprocate Vice Premier Yao's trip to the
USSR in July 1985. The Chinese position reportedly
was that Arkhipov had not paid the debt with his visit
in March, because that was strictly in connection with
the first session of the joint economic committee. The
Soviet diplomat also told the US Embassy that the
most likely candidates to visit Beijing this fall were
First Deputy Premier Aliyev, a full member of the
CPSU Politburo, or First Deputy Premier Talyzin, a
candidate member. The Chinese have said nothing
about the possibility of such a visit, but they might see
it as a way to raise the level of the Sino-Soviet
dialogue without abandoning their terms for a visit to
Moscow by Foreign Minister Wu, a resumption of
formal party-to-party ties, or some kind of summit.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
China: Trying To Beat the
Odds Along the Soviet Border
Beijing has discarded the Maoist strategy of luring
Soviet forces deep into Chinese territory-trading
land for the time needed to organize large guerrilla
assaults on overextended Soviet forces-in favor of a
more forward, conventional defense plan for industri-
alized northeast China. This change in strategy was
apparently driven by the impressive buildup of Soviet
forces in the Far East and Chinese determination not
to yield readily key industrial areas to the Soviets in
wartime. Prior to 1964, 11 active Soviet ground-
combat divisions with fewer than 3,500 tanks and
armored vehicles were positioned opposite China.
Today, there are 49 active Soviet ground-combat
divisions and over 30,000 tanks and armored vehicles
along the Sino-Soviet border
Beijing now labels the
Maoist strategy as inadequate and unworkable, and
today's strategy of "active defense" holds that any
invasion must be met early and repulsed to preserve
the national government and prevent the occupation
of Chinese cities. By embracing active defense,
China's leaders have abandoned the long-held belief
that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could stage
a strategic retreat from the northeast and form a new
defensive perimeter south of the Huang He River in
the initial stages of a conventional war with the Soviet
Union.
Aware that Soviet strength and China's new strategy
require far greater levels of readiness in the standing
army, Chinese military leaders-led by Military
Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping-have moved
decisively to restructure the PLA for modern combat
by:
? Reorganizing maneuver armies into more powerful
combined-arms armies-called group armies.
? Strengthening border-defense forces by creating
more divisions and increasing their armor and artil-
lery holdings.
? Renovating defense industries by acquiring foreign
technology to build more advanced weapons.
? Acquiring selected advanced armaments from the
West.
? Trimming the armed forces by dismissing at least 2
million redundant personnel from military payrolls.
? Promoting younger officers with recent combat
experience against Vietnam to prominent positions
in regional and national commands.
The Active Defense Takes Shape
Eleven of the 17 field armies in northern China were 25X1
reorganized into group armies in 1982 and 1983.
Notably larger than the field armies, group armies 25X1
added previously independent artillery, armor, and
garrison divisions. This change enhances combined-
arms operations and training, and forces infantry
commanders to learn to use armor and long-range
artillery support effectively. In the 1979 war with
Vietnam, infantry commanders often failed to take
objectives because they lacked contact with, or were
unaware of, available fire support.
In 1985 Beijing completed the transition to group
armies, disestablishing some field armies and redis- 25X1
tributing their manpower and equipment to group
armies. In northern China, four of the 17 armies were
abolished, and those not converted to group armies in
the period 1982-83 were upgraded to group army
status. Although still in the formative stages, most of
the 15 group armies in the north now have over
70,000 men-compared to some 50,000 prior to reor-
ganization-and control four instead of three infantry
divisions. 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
On the basis of geograph-
ic considerations, we expect that the group armies
would fight as cohesive units. If a Soviet attack
appeared imminent, group army divisions would prob-
ably move forward to prepared defensive positions,
blocking likely avenues of approach-such as those
opposite Soviet troop concentrations near Vladivostok
or along the rail line from Mongolia. Forward deploy-
ment of other group armies would depend on the
scope, direction, and success of a Soviet incursion.
The Need for New Weapons
Hardware shortcomings add to the significant risks
imposed by a more aggressive defense posture, and
Beijing is attempting to solve them with largely
indigenous weapon programs and some foreign assis-
tance. In order to redirect the limited defense budget
into research and development, Beijing has ceased
production of many obsolete weapons and trimmed
the PLA from perhaps 7 million soldiers in 1980 to
about 5 million today. Over the past six years, many
defense plants have produced almost exclusively for
export, reaping sizable profits from over $6 billion in
sales.
this emphasis on
weapons development is paying dividends in areas of
greatest need:
? The most critical deficiency the Chinese face is the
inability to counter Soviet tanks and armored vehi-
Iles arrayed against China.
in mid-1985 the Chinese began produc-
ing an improved tank. It is equipped with a British-
designed 105-mm main gun and an advanced fire-
control system-both probably acquired from
Israel. If, in the next three years, China builds some
1,000 tanks as expected and begins to retrofit its
remaining 6,000 Type 59 tanks with the new sys-
tems, it will help to reduce some of the qualitative
armor edge now held by Soviet forces along the
border.
Before 1978, 11 poorly equipped and severely under-
strength border-defense garrison divisions provided a
first line of defense in the mountain passes along the
most likely Soviet invasion corridors. Today there
are 15 such divisions, and most have been converted
into five-regiment divisions-with a tank and artil-
lery regiment as well as three infantry regiments-
similar to firstline, main-force divisions. In the past,
Soviet forces could expect to meet only token resis-
tance in northeastern Shenyang until they reached
Harbin. Now there are garrison divisions at Bei'an
and Jiamusi with well-constructed defensive positions
just south of the cities 25X1
25X1
Strengthening border garrisons and consolidating
units into group armies have not, however, redressed
the glaring imbalance in combat power between Sovi-
et and Chinese units. The Chinese thus are beginning
to mechanize their armies to give them a rapid
striking power. In 1980, China created its first mech-
anized infantry regiment, armed with 120 armored
personnel carriers. Since then, Beijing has mecha-
nized another full division, as well as other selected
units deployed in the border region. According to
articles in China's military newspaper, the Chinese
envision using these elite units to isolate and annihi-
25X1
25X1
late a single Soviet unit, hoping to shock Moscow int25X 1
reassessing its attack. Completely equipping one 25X1
group army with mechanized infantry divisions, how-
ever, will require over 1,400 armored personnel carri-
ers-more than China now produces in two years.
The majority of Chinese main-force units, therefore,
will continue to plan to fight from positional defenses
in advantageous terrain.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
? With severe weaknesses in fighter-interceptor, fight-
er bomber, and ground attack aircraft, the Chinese
are hard pressed to overcome Soviet air superiority.
In 1985, however, Beijing stepped up production of
its best fighter aircraft, adding 60 F-7s (MIG-21s)
to the 190 F-7s based at airfields opposite the Soviet
Even if we can have 10 to 20 years to modernize our
armed forces, our weapons and equipment will remain
inferior to those of our enemies. For this reason, if war
should break out, we must continue to defeat the
strong with the weak. It has always been our experi-
ence to defeat a superior enemy with inferior equip-
ment, for we wage a righteous war and a people's war.
In this, we must have full confidence.
Military Commission Chairman
Deng Xiaoping
December 1977
? Beijing also needs to upgrade its ground-based air
defenses and improve its early warning capabilities.
By 1984 the Chinese placed their copy of the Soviet
SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile in series
production, providing some protection to group ar-
mies from attack helicopters and slow-flying air-
craft. Beijing also is
trying to develop a mobile surface-to-air missile
based on a French Crotale battery acquired from
Pakistan in 1981.
In addition to these programs, Beijing is shopping for
Western technology to produce more advanced mili-
tary hardware. Last fall, the Chinese held an armed
helicopter flyoff near Beijing to compare US and
French attack helicopters and helicopter-borne anti-
tank missiles. The Swiss recently conducted live-fire
demonstrations of their mobile, radar-guided antiair-
craft guns in China as well. This summer the Chinese
are expected to sign a foreign military sales agree-
ment to equip 50 of their F-8-2 fighter aircraft with a
US avionics package and are exploring the possibility
of mounting the Italian Aspide 57-km-range, radar-
guided, air-to-air missile on this aircraft as well.
Although funding for foreign purchases is severely
constrained, China's dealings with the Israelis show
that Beijing will spend to procure selected advanced
systems from the West, particularly if the sales
Improving Deterrence Without
Increasing the Risk of War
Even in the best of circumstances, however, it will
take years for the Chinese to aquire the needed
quantities of advanced weapons to ensure that they
can halt a Soviet assault before Beijing is overrun.
China's leaders acknowledge this weakness (see inset)
and continue to see talks with Moscow as the key to
managing tensions. Indeed, Beijing faces a major
balancing act in bolstering its deterrent-in part
through military cooperation and arms acquisition
from the West-without unduly increasing friction
with its powerful adversary. To this end, we expect
Beijing to continue to exchange visits and sign eco-
nomic and technical agreements with Moscow-with-
out fundamentally altering its assessment of the Sovi-
et threat or significantly slowing the pace of military
modernization.
China clearly believes that the possibility of a major
conflict with the Soviet Union is small and will
remain so for at least the 10 years needed to modern-
ize its armed forces. In the interim, we believe Beijing
has made an impressive start, implementing a new
military strategy that adds to the deterrence value of
China's large but dated ground army. Such a strategy
ensures that the Soviet Union would be faced with a
include transfer of the production technology.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
protracted conflict if it made any incursion into
northern China. The strategy has already revitalized
the discussion of tactics in the PLA and forced
officers to think realistically about war on the modern
battlefield. Moreover, the strategy and new force
structure are well suited to the incorporation of new
weapons as they become available, and ongoing train-
ing will ensure that units understand the combined-
arms requirements of modern warfare.
The Soviet Reaction
The Soviets probably have a reasonably accurate view
of China's progress toward modernizing its armed
forces because the Chinese have publicly announced
their plans to increase the war-fighting abilities of
their army and have openly displayed their new
weapons developments for the export market. Still, we
have not detected any shift in Soviet force trends in
response to these developments, nor is there any
evidence that Moscow perceives these Chinese pro-
grams to be a grave threat to its security in the
immediate future. The Soviets have recently tried to
avoid direct confrontation over military issues in their
foreign policy toward China, and are attempting to
accelerate their rapprochement with the Chinese by
calling for meetings between high-level officials and
greater economic cooperation. Although Moscow has
been critical of the military aspects of China's "Four
Modernizations" in the past, it is currently directing
its attacks mainly at the United States-alleging that
Washington is promoting anti-Soviet sentiment in
China and aiding Chinese military modernization for
economic gain.
The Soviets have viewed the Chinese as a potential
offensive threat throughout the past 20 years and
have structured their forces in the Far East accord-
ingly. Their forces opposite China are positioned to
protect the territorial integrity of the USSR and to
deter the Chinese from attacking developed areas and
lines of communication (LOCs) near the border. Given
the proximity of Soviet LOCs and other important
installations to the border, the fact that most LOCs
run parallel rather than perpendicular to the border,
and the vast length of the border itself, defense in
depth is not a viable strategy. Thus, Soviet strategy in
the Far East probably is to respond to any Chinese
offensive with a counteroffensive. Because the Chi-
nese forces lack mobility, the Soviets have been able
to rely upon having early warning and a relatively
long reaction time to mobilize their forces before any
Chinese attack. Until now, they could also expect
weak initial Chinese opposition to Soviet offensive
operations in northern China because of China's
"luring deep" strategy. Therefore, Moscow will seek,
at a minimum, to maintain forces along the border
strong enough both to mount effective counterattacks
to push back any surprise Chinese incursions and to
launch preemptive attacks into Chinese territory to
destroy offensive troop concentrations and secure
buffer zones near the border.
The Soviets would react more dramatically toward
Chinese military modernization if they believed the
Chinese were becoming more offensively oriented-
through the positioning of large numbers of mobile
units closer to the border where they would pose a
greater threat to Soviet LOCs or strategically impor-
tant population centers such as Vladivostok. They also
would perceive the situation in the Far East as more
threatening if the Chinese began to modernize their
military forces at an accelerated rate that threatened
the effectiveness of Soviet border defense strategy.
Chinese plans do not currently call for garrisoning
new divisions near the border, only for strengthening
the few that are already there. Despite recent pro-
gress, Chinese modernization programs also have not
yet placed large amounts of modern equipment in the
hands of Chinese soldiers. Thus, the Soviets have been
able to maintain their overwhelming offensive superi-
ority over the Chinese in recent years. If current
Chinese equipment production programs proceed at
the relatively slow rate we project, Moscow should be
able to prevent the balance of forces on the Sino-
Soviet border from being radically altered. Given
their continuing qualitative superiority, plus their
manpower and equipment constraints, the Soviets
probably will defer any further major buildup of their
forces opposite China-at least for the next 10
years-and instead continue to follow the pattern of
moderate growth and equipment modernization that
has characterized their force development in the Far
East in the 1980s
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Iq
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
Moscow's View of China's
Economic Reforms
Since Mikhail Gorbachev's election as General Secre-
tary, the Soviets have increased the frequency and the
objectivity of their media commentary on the reforms
under way in the Chinese economy. This shift, howev-
er, reflects the leadership's desire to widen the bound-
aries of permissible domestic debate on economic
reform and to improve Sino-Soviet ties, rather than
approval of China's actions. Many Soviet economists
privately express admiration for the ambitiousness
and determination of the Chinese reform effort, but
few advocate Beijing's actual policies. Most Soviet
officials and scholars are disturbed by the political
riskiness and ideological unorthodoxy of the Chinese
reforms, dismiss their applicability to the Soviet econ-
omy, and see them as posing an implicit challenge to
Soviet leadership of the Communist camp.
"Socialism With Chinese Characteristics"
The Chinese leadership has described its reform
program as an effort to "bring the superiority of the
socialist system into full play" by aligning it more
closely with conditions unique to present-day China.
The reform effort's primary focus initially was on the
agrarian sector. In late 1978, a "contract responsibil-
ity system" was introduced that gave farmers effec-
tive control but not ownership of most of the land. By
the mid-1980s, communal farming had disappeared in
China. The same period witnessed a revision of state
procurement practices that allowed farmers to sell
above-quota production at negotiated prices to the
state or in free markets. Because of such changes,
agricultural production grew at an average annual
rate of 8 percent between 1979 and 1983.
After this initial success, the Third Plenum of the
12th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October
1984 instituted a broad set of measures aimed at
similar improvement in industrial performance (see
inset). Greater use of wage and bonus incentives,
partial decentralization of the foreign trade appara-
tus, and reform of the banking system to allow state
banks greater autonomy in lending decisions have also
been important facets of the reform program.
Measures approved at the Third Plenum of China's
12th Party Congress included:
? Reduced use of mandatory production plans and
more emphasis on "guidance" plans that enable
enterprises to respond to changing market
conditions.
? Reduced use of administered prices and the intro-
duction offloating prices for some products to bring
supply and demand into balance.
? Less involvement of the government and the party in
day-to-day business operations.
? Encouragement of many enterprises to compete
against each other for profits, but with the state
still controlling production and distribution of es-
sential commodities and making major investment
decisions.
? Allowing enterprises to retain a larger share of their
earnings and giving the management of industrial
enterprises greater control over wages, bonuses, and
investment spending.
The initial results of China's industrial reform effort
have been mixed. Growth in output and productivity
have been impressive. Figures on last year's economic
performance released by the State Statistical Bureau
show a spectacular 18-percent growth in industrial
output and a 12-percent rise in national income.F_
But this economic success has exacted a price. The
yearend statistical report also acknowledged 9-percent
inflation (triple the rate in 1984) and, according to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
CIA estimates, China had an $8.2 billion trade deficit
in 1985. The drive to make the economy more
efficient has resulted in widening income disparities
and consumer grumbling over rising food prices.
Relaxing economic controls and opening the economic
system to foreign trade and investment have sparked
widespread economic corruption.
All of these "negative phenomena" have been meticu-
lously chronicled by "in-house" critics of the reforms
and openly acknowledged by Deng and his fellow
reformers. But self-criticism and periods of retrench-
ment have not been allowed to obscure the ultimate
goal. The current throttling-back of the reform drive
was decreed late last year to allow the economic
system to adjust to the reforms already introduced,
but Beijing has made it clear that further reforms are
in the offing. The session of the Sixth National
People's Congress that ended on 12 April endorsed
further ambitious reforms to be implemented from
1987 to 1990 and generally enhanced the political
position of proreform party leaders.
The Soviet Perspective
Gorbachev's election as General Secretary brought a
qualitative and quantitative change in Soviet media
treatment of the Chinese economy. According to a
noted Soviet political commentator, predominant
"conservative thinking" under Chernenko had led to a
virtual ban on publishing assessments of the Chinese
reforms. The new General Secretary's calls for im-
provements in the Soviet economy and his evident
interest in economic changes made by other Commu-
nist countries effectively lifted that ban.
Soviet commentary on the Chinese reforms since
March 1985 has been comparatively plentiful and
fairly balanced, at times noting with apparent envy
the impressive growth figures of Chinese industry and
agriculture. On occasion media comment has gone
even further-to draw vignettes of a happier and
more prosperous Chinese population or to treat con-
troversial subjects such as the growth of the private
sector without negative comment
Usually, however, Soviet media focus on inflation,
unemployment, and the other "negative phenomena"
produced by Beijing's sweeping economic reform
drive. Widening income disparities, in particular, have
figured prominently in Moscow's appraisals; one arti-
cle even warned of imminent "kulakization" (unjust
enrichment of certain peasants at the expense of
others) of the Chinese countryside.
In appraising the Chinese scene in their media, the
Soviets employ the familiar tactic of quoting indige-
nous critics rather than expressing criticism them-
selves. In this way, Moscow can register a negative
opinion without incurring risks to the bilateral politi-
cal atmosphere. The Chinese leadership's willingness
to permit open debate on economic and ideological
issues provides Soviet critics with much grist for their
mill.
The private views of Soviet officials, economists, and
scholars on the Chinese reforms, not surprisingly,
cover a far broader range than those presented in the
media. Some are openly enthusiastic about the pro-
found changes taking place in China. Last December,
for example, Fedor Burlatskiy, a Soviet journalist well
known for his reformist stance, made a trip to China
and afterwards gave US Embassy officials a
"glowing" description of the results of the reforms,
noting the candor with which Chinese officials ac-
knowledged problems and their strong commitment to
pursuing reform. Other Soviet scholars, however, have
been scornful of the Chinese reform program. Last
October, for example, a Soviet sinologist described it
as "a mad rush into an unmanageable economic
mishmash."
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
Recently, however, most Soviets
economic reform and, if successful, could further
discredit the Soviet model of a planned, centralized
economy.
25X1
25X1
2~DAI
have stressed the gulf between the two countries'
levels of economic and social development (China's
population is still 60 percent rural, for example,
compared with the USSR's 35 percent) and other
significant differences. A China scholar at the USA
Institute in November 1985 noted that while China
had too little land and too many workers, the Soviet
Union had the opposite problem in land and too few
workers in areas where they were most needed. Other
experts have referred to the less highly skilled Chinese
work force, the predominance of the agricultural
sector in the Chinese economy, and other obstacles to
borrowing directly from the Chinese
Historical and cultural differences between the two
societies and the political risks posed by Chinese-style
reforms are also frequently cited as barriers to Soviet
emulation of China. A prominent Soviet journalist
told US Embassy officials, shortly after Gorbachev's
accession, that reforms of the type introduced by
Beijing were possible only because China was a
"relatively new socialist country."
Indeed, adapting Chinese reforms to Soviet conditions
would require a significant reduction in political
control over economic decision making, overhaul of
official ideology, restructuring of key institutions, and
a radical change in managerial attitudes and behav-
ior. Any one of these would be a tall order for such a
well-entrenched, essentially conservative elite.
Many Soviet sinologists,
have contended that, given the "backwardness" of
China's economy, the Chinese would profit more from
following the Soviet example than vice versa. Soviet
diplomats and other officials have also made this
point, in part apparently out of irritation that the
Chinese may have stolen the Soviets' thunder on
~Ve
Chinese believe Gorbachev is afraid that if China gets
ahead of the Soviet Union on economic reform, the
confidence of other "socialist" countries in Soviet
"socialism" will be weakened.
The Soviets clearly are unwilling to make the psycho-
logical leap of granting China's reformed economy
the status of a "model" that they or other Communist
countries might emulate. From the Soviets' viewpoint,
the scope, speed, and nature of the changes in China,
the world's most populous Communist state, and the
attention given these changes by foreign media must
make Beijing's reforms appear a more formidable
challenge to their own economic model and to their
role as the leading Communist state than Hungary's
20-year-old reform program.
Another aspect of Moscow's attitude toward Beijing's
reform program may be fear. The possibility that the
Chinese could make a great success of their experi-
ment, not only discrediting Moscow's more measured
approach but also building up even more formidable
economic and military strength and moving closer to
the West, almost certainly is disquieting to the Sovi-
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Other Topics
Neoglobalism: New Soviet
Formulation on the United States
and the Third World
Since mid-December Soviet journalists, international
affairs specialists, and, on at least two occasions,
General Secretary Gorbachev have used the term
"neoglobalism" to describe what they assert is a new
American philosophy and doctrine for the Third
World. Neoglobalism is defined as the US adminis-
tration's design to promote its interests by exploiting
and initiating regional conflicts using a variety of
political, economic, and military instruments. Extend-
ed discussions of neoglobalism have focused on the
challenge that a more activist US Third World policy
poses for Soviet efforts to consolidate their own Third
World gains.
The Soviets use ideological formulations of this kind
for several purposes, including integrating separate
propaganda themes, defending positions staked out in
internal policy debates, rationalizing policy decisions
for internal and external audiences, and explaining
their assessments of the outside world. In this in-
stance, the concept of neoglobalism is, at the very
least, a useful propaganda vehicle and an explanation
of recent developments in the Third World. Taken
more seriously, it could be intended as an argument
for a cautious Soviet external policy designed to
complement domestic economic revitalization and
lower growth in military spending.
Evolution of Soviet Assessments
Over the past decade, Soviet formulations describing
the US approach to the Third World have gradually
evolved away from the generally optimistic assess-
ments of the late 1970s, which emphasized the
relative decline of US ability to influence events in the
Third World due to growing military, economic, and
domestic political constraints. More recent discussions
have focused on the difficulties affecting Soviet pros-
pects for exploiting openings in the Third World and
on the challenges presented by a US administration
intent on building its military strength and playing an
active role in regional disputes. Such shifts in the
Soviet line usually result from a variety of factors,
including changes in Soviet views of the outside world,
internal political debates, and the desire of new
leaders to put their own stamp on theory and policy.
The last of these factors probably played an important
role in the recent gestation of "neoglobalism."
Neoglobalism Defined
According to Soviet commentators-who suggest that
the term was taken from New York Times columnist
Anthony Lewis-the basis of neoglobalism is a re-
newed US insistence on defining the US sphere of
interest as the entire world. To promote its "imperia-
list" interests, the Reagan administration is said to be
ready to prolong existing regional conflicts that
threaten "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" govern-
ments, such as Angola and Afghanistan, and to
initiate new confrontations with countries that do not
suit US preferences, such as Libya and Syria. The
administration is said to justify these activities in
terms of supporting democracy, antiterrorism, and
anti-Communism.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
Soviet propagandists have produced a steady stream
of articles picturing the United States as ready to use
a wide variety of instruments in pursuit of its neoglo-
balist objectives, including:
? Economic leverage that exploits Third World under-
development and debt to increase dependency on the
West.
? Political pressure intended to remove rightwing
dictators who have become counterproductive to US
purposes in favor of more respectable, but still
pliable, leaders who may be able to deflect pressure
for revolutionary change.
? . Covert and open military assistance for "bandits,
terrorists, .and counterrevolutionaries."
? Direct US military intervention with Rapid Deploy-
ment Forces, "light divisions," and other power-
projection forces.
Expanded Discussions
Izvestiya political: observer Aleksandr Bovin has used
the notion of neoglobalism as a point of departure for
an extended political analysis of specific international
situations that create openings for US policy. He
notes that a variety of factors, including economic
backwardness, the strength of tradition and religion,
and the errors of vanguard revolutionary leaderships,
have nurtured counterrevolution against "socialist-
oriented" Third World states and pushed a proportion
of the "workers and peasants" into the counterrevolu-
tionary,camp.' Bovin claims that these developments
provide the United States with opportunities to exploit
the difficulties of the socialist-oriented states through
propaganda, psychological and economic warfare, and
military backing, for counterrevolutionary forces. C
Bovin repeats the obligatory argument that US efforts
are ultimately futile "in principle" since the forces of
history cannot be reversed. However, he points out
that US strength can, in some circumstances, retard
or even.roll back revolutionary gains, as occurred in
' Moscow's list of "socialist-oriented" states changes from time to
time but currently includes among its most prominent members
Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South
ultimate defeat of counterrevolution.
Chile and Grenada, and warns that "we cannot yet
exclude the possibility of its happening again." A
socialist-oriented state must thus be vigilant and
"know how to defend itself," a process that will be
difficult and drawn out. He concludes optimistically
that over the long haul imperialist interference will
promote the consolidation of revolutionary forces and
the buildup of internationalist aid, leading to the
Another, extended treatment of neoglobalism was
provided by Maj. Gen. (Reserve) F. Gontar in a
March 1986 article in the Soviet military newspaper
Red Star. Gontar observes that US security aid for
reactionary regimes and counterrevolutionary forces
is "one of the most effective and cheapest ways" of
promoting imperialist interests. He claims that to
cover its "aggressive" regional policies the United
States seeks to blame the USSR for promoting re
gional tensions and then uses these charges as an
excuse for lack of progress in bilateral relations with
the USSR on disarmament and other critical East-
West issues. He asserts that the USSR believes that
any local conflict "is fraught with the danger of
escalating into a clash on a major, even global, scale"
and calls on the United States to abandon its neoglo-
balist policy and join in a collective search for settle-
ments to regional conflicts.
Gorbachev and Neoglobalism
General Secretary Gorbachev has publicly mentioned
neoglobalism on at least two occasions. First, he used
the term in a speech during the March visit of
Algerian President Bendjedid to tie together criticism
of US policy in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, Mo-
zambique, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Libya. The
second reference appeared in an interview in the
Algerian publication Revolution Africaine, in which
he defined neoglobalism as a "hastily devised" doc-
trine used by the United States to "crush the liberated
countries and halt the forces of history." He noted
that neoglobalism "in general terms" represents noth-
ing new, reflecting rather an attempt to return to the
"classical brigandage" of imperialism.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Significance of Neoglobalism
At one level, the concept of neoglobalism offers the
Soviets a useful vehicle for integrating many of the
propaganda themes they have been using in recent
months to try to discredit US policy in the interna-
tional arena, notably accusations against Washington
of promoting "state terrorism" and the export of
"counterrevolution." Gorbachev's speech on the occa-
sion of the Algerian President's visit to Moscow is one
example of how the charge of neoglobalism is used in
this context. Also, recent Soviet press coverage of US
actions toward Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Libya
has prominently featured neoglobalism as an explana-
tion of alleged US aggression against these states.
The timing of neoglobalism's advent as a propaganda
theme suggests it is in part a counter to the US
emphasis on regional issues before and during last
year's Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. Mos-
cow has used the theme to castigate the alleged
insincerity of US proposals on Third World issues,
portraying Washington's underlying policy as one of
interference and aggression. Moreover, at least one
Soviet commentator has used the concept to criticize
the United States specifically for elevating Third
World issues to the same level of importance as arms
control on the US-Soviet agenda and for claiming
that there should be linkage between progress in these
areas.
While Soviet commentators have dealt with various
aspects of these themes individually in the past few
years, collecting them all under the neoglobalism
rubric may, in part, reflect Soviet responses to several
relatively recent developments in the international
arena. For example, the intensification of Third
World debt problems, especially in Latin America,
has presented Moscow-as well as Havana-with a
lucrative target for political exploitation. Soviet per-
ception of US adroitness in preempting radical change
in Haiti and the Philippines, the high-profile Ameri-
can debates over military aid to antigovernment
forces in Nicaragua and Angola, and the growth of
official US interest in the problems of low-intensity
conflict in general also probably contributed to the
focus on the instruments of neoglobalism.
Against the background of these developments, Soviet
discussion of neoglobalism may also reflect a measure
of genuine concern over US intentions and capabili-
ties to challenge Soviet interests in the Third World.
By contrast with more optimistic Soviet writings on
the Third World from the 1970s and early 1980s,
current analyses keyed to US neoglobalism paint a
more problematic picture for Soviet interests. They:
? Portray the United States as holding a high degree
of initiative in the Third World, as opposed to
previous analyses that showed "progressive forces"
to be in the ascendance.
? Acknowledge the growth of US military forces that
could be used in Third World conflicts, where
earlier writings focused on post-Vietnam limitations
on US use of force abroad.
? Say relatively little about the domestic constraints
on the US administration noted by many commen-
tators in the 1970s: "realistic elements" of US
ruling circles, public opinion, and Congress, for
example.
? Fail to depict the Third World economic crisis as a
source of easy opportunities for Soviet gains, a
theme previously sounded by some Soviet observers
of the debt problem.
Between the lines, writings on US neoglobalism sug-
gest that, at least for the moment, the global correla-
tion of forces may not be running in Moscow's favor
and that the Third World is going to be a difficult and
potentially treacherous arena for Soviet interests for
the next few years.
This image of the United States and the Third World
may serve Moscow as a useful rationalization of Third
World policy in a period in which, as evidenced by the
recent 27th Soviet Party Congress, Soviet leaders
have apparently decided to concentrate on domestic
economic revitalization and East-West relations and
have warned of the limits to Soviet economic aid. In
this context, "neoglobalism" could be used to justify
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
to both internal and external audiences a relatively
low-profile Soviet approach to the Third World-an
approach that would not demand a major increase in
military or economic outlays or cut across Soviet
efforts to appeal to Western opinion on SDI, arms
control, and other issues.
Implications for Soviet Policy
Neoglobalism probably will continue to be a central
theme of Soviet propaganda activity in coming
months. Soviet comments both on US policy toward
particular countries or regions and on US foreign
policy in general will play up alleged US neoglobalist
intentions and the threat they supposedly pose to both
Third World stability and progress in East-West
relations. This message will be aimed not only at
Third World audiences, but at European and Ameri-
can ones as well. Moscow will try to use the theme to
influence Western debates on aiding anti-Soviet in-
surgents and on the relative priority of regional, as
opposed to arms control, issues. In addition, we expect
the Soviets and their Cuban allies to feature the
concept prominently in their attempts to influence
Third World organizations, including this summer's
meetings of the Nonaligned Movement in Zimbabwe,
and in materials they seek to place in the Third World
media. Finally, Moscow will probably continue to put
forward regional proposals of its own from time to
time to polish its image and influence Western delib-
erations on Third World questions, contrasting its
initiatives with alleged US neoglobalist behavior.
The implications of neoglobalism for Soviet operation-
al policy in the Third World are as yet unclear: the
concept is still quite "young" as a theoretical formula-
tion, and the positions of Bovin, Gontar, or, for that
matter, Gorbachev in any internal debates that may
be under way over Soviet Third World policy cannot
yet be fixed with precision. We believe, however, that
the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn:
? The Bovin analysis echoes the arguments of one
school of Soviet theorists that the securing of Soviet
gains in the Third World is likely to be a lengthy
process subject to occasional reversals.
? The image of a US administration currently bent on
belligerent assertion of US interests implicitly cau-
tions against near-term Soviet risk-taking in the
Third World.
? There is no implication that the USSR ought not try
to exploit Third World opportunities should they
arise, particularly if risks are perceived to be low
and payoffs substantial. There seems to be a warn-
ing, however, that the benefits of new interventions
in the Third World should be carefully weighed
against the expected costs of defending new clients.
On a broad scale, the neoglobalist focus on the
problems of defending the revolution in "socialist-
oriented" regimes against an activist Western chal-
lenge suggests that at least some Soviet leaders
believe that Moscow's Third World policy should
presently be keyed to consolidation and incremental
advancement rather than militant expansion. Implicit
in this argument is the tactical prescription that the
USSR concentrate its material resources on the mili-
tary defense of existing Third World allies such as
Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia, while deflecting
Western involvement in these areas by trying to
influence international organizations and Western
political processes.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8 __
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Work Position Certification:
Seeking Hidden Labor Reserves
The Soviet Union is experiencing an abrupt decline in
labor force growth. The average annual increment to
the civilian labor force fell from 2.1 million in the
1970s to 1.2 million during the period 1981-85 (see
graph). During the 12th Five-Year Plan period (1986-
90) the labor force is expected to increase by only 4.1
million workers, or an average of 0.8 million per year.
Moreover, much of this increment will come from the
Central Asian republics, which have a labor surplus,
rather than from the highly industrialized western
regions of the country with the greatest demand for
new labor.
Despite declining labor force growth, the Soviet lead-
ership maintains that there is an adequate supply of
workers and the problem is poor utilization of labor.
In his report to the CPSU Central Committee on 26
February 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev criticized "plan-
ning and economic bodies that permit creation of
excessive numbers of jobs" as well as enterprises that
have "the same volume of work as similar organiza-
tions abroad [but] have a significantly larger number
of workers." According to an estimate recently pub-
lished by the State Committee on Labor and Social
Problems (Goskomtrud), in 1985 the number of job
slots in industry exceeded the number of available
workers by 12 percent. A new policy attempts to
discourage the creation of excess job slots and to
curtail the pervasive practice of hoarding labor and
obsolete equipment. This policy-work position certi-
fication-will compel enterprises to carefully and
systematically document their workers' jobs and
equipment.
Why Soviet Managers Hoard Labor
Enterprise managers hoard labor as a hedge against
steadily rising plan targets and normal disruptions in
work activity associated with erratic supply of materi-
als and equipment, a problem inherent in the Soviet
system. When overdue supplies finally arrive at pro-
duction facilities, surplus workers are needed to make
up for lost time. They also help in meeting require-
ments to supply labor for the harvest or special civic
projects.
USSR: Average Annual Increments
to the Civilian Labor Force, 1971-95a
1971-75 76-80 81-85 86-90b 91-95b
a The estimates for 1986-95 assume that labor force participation rates
remain roughly constant and that military manpower increases gradually
from 6.1 million persons in 1985 to 6.3 million in 1995.
b Projected.
The resulting high labor costs generally are not
viewed with concern by managers. In practice, any
savings in labor achieved by an enterprise is likely to
be taken back by planners the following year. More-
over, since the number of workers partly determines
the size of wage and bonus funds, management has
another incentive to hoard labor. An experiment 25X1
aimed at easing this problem, begun at the Shchekino
Chemical Combine in 1967, has achieved only limited
success (see inset on next page).
To justify high staffing levels, enterprise managers
often hold on to obsolete equipment, as well as
compete for new machinery and construction. This
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
In 1967 an experiment was initiated at the Shchekino
Chemical Combine. Under the terms of the experi-
ment, the combine was allowed to cut its staff while
maintaining a fixed wage fund and was given the
right to use a percentage of wage fund savings to
reward workers who participated in laborsaving prac-
tices such as combining jobs or taking on more
machines. The Shchekino method scored quick suc-
cesses. Hundreds of jobs were eliminated, productivi-
ty and output increased, and wages rose above the
national average. The experiment enjoyed official
favor and spread to hundreds of other enterprises,
albeit often in diluted form.
After these initial gains, the Shchekino Combine ran
into problems. The ministries began to change the
rules. New instructions were issued a number of
times, and some of the wage fund savings were taken
back. Bonus money dwindled, and workers began to
leave the plant on their own accord. A decade after
the start of the experiment, the Shchekino Combine
failed to meet its planned targets. Nevertheless, the
Shchekino method and new variations of the method
continue to be promoted by the leadership and offered
as an option to all enterprises.
tendency to accumulate plant and machinery to justi-
fy holding on to labor is reflected in several key
indicators:
? A decline in the shift coefficient of equipment-the
average number of shifts worked on a piece of
machinery in 24 hours. (Because of the relative
shortage of highly skilled workers, the more sophis-
ticated the machinery, the lower its level of
utilization.)
? The increasing gap between new work positions and
increments to the supply of labor.
An Early Attempt To Curtail Labor Hoarding
Rising Soviet concern over poor utilization of labor in
the 1970s led to remedial measures under a compre-
hensive 1979 decree on planning and management.
First, ministries and enterprises were given personnel
ceilings and targets for the reduction of manual labor
positions. Second, regional authorities were tasked
with drawing up balances in supply and demand for
workers. Soviet press reports indicated, however, that
the effectiveness of these measures was minimal,
largely because reliable, detailed information on labor
resources and labor requirements was not available.
In large part, the work position certification program
is designed to fill the information gap.
place.
Work Position Certification
After several years of preparation, including experi-
mental application in the Ministry of Agricultural
Machine Building, a decree on work position certifica-
tion was issued in August 1985 by the CPSU Central
Committee and the Central Council of Trade Unions.
The decree tasks enterprises with preparing a compre-
hensive inventory and evaluation of every "work
position"-defined as the work area, materials, and
equipment associated with the labor of one or more
workers. The worker's skill level and the technical
level and condition of machinery are to be evaluated
along with health and safety conditions in the work-
Enterprises themselves are tasked with carrying out
the actual survey, evaluation, and upgrading of work
positions. Certification committees, composed of en-
terprise, party, and trade union representatives, are to
be set up within each enterprise for this purpose.
The decree envisions that certification data will:
? Allow identification of obsolete equipment that can
be scrapped to free up valuable floorspace, lowering
requirements for future construction and making it
harder for managers to justify overstaffing.
? Give republic-level government and party officials
the data needed to plan regional labor balances.
? Allow identification of work positions that could be
converted to part-time or home work for pensioners,
women with children, and the handicapped.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
? Provide information to be used in planning new
construction and reconstruction to match plant ca-
Problems in Implementation
The work certification program has run into a number
of administrative problems, including foot-dragging
by managers and poor communications. There have
been several complaints in the Soviet press about the
failure of enterprises to conduct work position certifi-
cation properly. Some enterprise managers have false-
ly reported completion of the process. Others have
skipped over auxiliary work positions, which are diffi-
cult to certify because such workers often do not use
equipment or have a fixed work station.
pacities with future labor availability.
Existing placement bureaus are to relieve the enter-
prises of much of the burden of retraining and placing
workers. While workers are not required to accept the
services of the bureaus, the number of workers placed
through this system has increased steadily in recent
years. If successfully implemented, work position cer-
tification should accelerate this trend.
Implementation
We have only limited information about the process of
implementing the work certification program. Ac-
cording to Goskomtrud, it was to be extended first
throughout the machine-building industry, reflecting
the sector's increased priority under Gorbachev. The
program was then to move on to other industrial
enterprises and be fully applied throughout the rest of
the economy by the end of 1987. According to the
decree, enterprises must conduct the certification
process at least twice during each five-year plan
period.
In February 1986 Goskomtrud reported that 38 per-
cent of industrial enterprises had completed, or nearly
completed, work position certification. According to
the same report, the program has been successful in
enterprises where certification "is conducted in a
businesslike fashion, and not as a mere formality." It
is not clear what percentage of enterprises fit into this
category. No other figures have been given to indicate
the overall progress of the program.
The Soviets have published information on the pro-
gress of implementation within some ministries. The
Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building was cited
as a positive example for having eliminated 25,000
work positions, released 35,000 workers, and retired
60 million rubles' worth of equipment. The Ministry
of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and
Fodder Production achieved far less success. Only
25.5 percent of the work positions in this ministry
were surveyed, and of the 22,500 positions surveyed,
only 250 were eliminated. Moreover, some press
articles charge that many of the workers reportedly
"freed up" by the elimination of work positions were
moved to another shift or to other jobs within the
same factory.
Enterprise managers find it disadvantageous to carry
out the certification process properly for a number of
reasons. The process itself is labor intensive. The
inventory and evaluation, if done according to the
rules, takes weeks to complete. Workers serving on
certification committees are taken away from their
regular duties. Once the inventory is complete, there
are further problems. Substandard work positions
must be upgraded, new equipment and parts ordered,
and construction workers and assemblers engaged.
Here, again, there are delays and shortages of materi-
als and equipment.
According to press articles, the flow of information on
the certification program between enterprises, minis-
tries, departments, and research institutes has been
anything but smooth. There have been complaints of
confusion, conflicting and incomplete guidelines, and
missing documents. Plans to improve communication
and ease the administrative burden by automating the
processing of certification data are not likely to be
realized in the near future. Finally, there has been a
lack of coordination between the planners who are
supposed to use the results of certification and the
administrators who draw up guidelines for the pro-
gram in each industry. The specifics of how planners
are to use certification data have yet to be worked out.
Prospects
The work position certification program will continue
to face substantial implementation problems, which
may even increase as the program spreads into work
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
activities inherently difficult to define, such as those
in consumer services and agriculture. Although enter-
prises can be denied access to investment funds if they
do not certify work positions, the absence of effective
penalties for failure to conduct the process properly
threatens not only the pace of implementation but also
the quality of the information collected. Clearly,
unreliable data would be of little use to planners in
determining labor requirements and could even lead
to decisions that would increase the misallocation of
labor. Moreover, even if the program were to lead to
the release of substantial numbers of workers, it is not
clear that they could be effectively reallocated. The
workers released are likely to be the least skilled and
least motivated. Placing them in new jobs may be
difficult without extensive retraining and an improved
system for matching jobs with workers.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
Soviet Leadership?
Many new, energetic workers of the modern mold
have recently been put forward into responsible
posts ... Women are being more actively brought
forward into leadership positions. There are now
more of them in party and soviet organs.
Mikhail S. Gorbachev
at the 27th CPSU Congress
Historical Legacy
Since the revolution, Soviet women have made up an
increasing percentage of the work force and the party
apparatus; they have not, however, managed to play
more than a token role in the top leadership. Lenin's
wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, was the first Soviet wom-
an to hold a position of power, serving briefly as a
member of the Secretariat of the Bolshevik Party.
Krupskaya remained essentially an adjunct of Lenin
during his lifetime, and, after his death, retained
prestige but little power. Yekaterina Furtseva, a
favorite of Khrushchev, was the only woman ever to
serve on the Politburo, and she was relegated to the
less vital duties of the ministry of culture. Her career
ended ignominiously with charges of corruption and
her sudden death.
A Matter of Policy
The issue of promoting women to leadership positions
has been raised as a matter of policy by the Gorba-
chev regime in a series of official documents and
speeches. The CPSU Program adopted at the 27th
Congress called for the party to "more actively nomi-
nate women for leadership work." This phrase put an
official stamp on a concern that Gorbachev had
expressed previously at the April 1985 plenum, name-
ly the need to engender "more active movement of
leading cadres" by means that would include promot-
ing women "to responsible posts with greater bold-
ness." In the February 1986 Political Report of the
Central Committee, Gorbachev again addressed this
matter in speaking of "invigorating the party leader-
ship," claiming that "women are being more actively
brought forward into leadership positions" and adding
that "there are now more of them in party and soviet
organs."
goods, domestic trade, and labor affairs.
Biryukova: A Member in Her Own Right
The regime's most visible move to expand the number
of women in the leadership was the promotion to the
Secretariat of Aleksandra Biryukova.' Although Bir-
yukova will undoubtedly be expected to serve as a
spokesperson on women's issues, she also has an
important portfolio. Her responsibilities appear to
include light industry and the production of consumer
In addressing women's issues, Biryukova breaks no
new ground. She praises Soviet women for their
progress and achievements to date. She promises no
more than what already has been outlined in the latest
five-year plan. She compares favorably the conditions
faced by Soviet women with those faced by women in
other countries, specifically lauding the Soviet
woman's supposed equal opportunity in education, her
right to work, and her right to equal pay. Finally, as
befits Soviet tradition, Biryukova reserves her greatest
praise for the Soviet woman in that "lofty and fine
mission-to be a mother."
Since her appointment to the Secretariat, Biryukova's
only public speeches have been made on International
Women's Day and, therefore, have centered around
women's issues. However, she has taken part in a
fairly wide range of public activities. In a recent
Moscow radio interview, Biryukova credited herself
with a role in the development of a "new economic
mechanism" designed to dramatically improve the
quality and assortment of consumer goods and ser-
vices but described her main task in the Secretariat as
overseeing the "technical retooling of the sector."
' It is possible that Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, has influenced her
husband in his deliberations regarding the appointment of women
to leadership positions. She herself has a doctorate in philosophical
science from the prestigious Moscow State University. Also, since
Gorbachev became General Secretary, she and the wives of other
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryu-
kova (Phonetic: beeryooKOvah)
Secretary, Central Committee
CPSU (since March 1986)
Biryukova has boasted of her humble origins, saying
that her ancestors for many generations were "peas-
ants of the lowest rank. " She herself grew up learning
farm work.
Her future took a more urban turn as she graduated
from the Moscow Textile Institute, wrote her doctor-
al dissertation, and joined the ranks of the engineer-
ing profession. In 1964, at the age of 35, Biryukova
became chief engineer at the Trekhgornaya Moscow
Cotton Combine. In 1968 she became a secretary of
the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
(AUCCTU), and in 1985, its deputy chairman.
Biryukova was elected a candidate member of the
Central Committee in 1971, and a member in 1976.
She has participated in many conferences on women's
issues, including a 1984 meeting in New York of the
UN Commission on Elimination of Discrimination
Toward Women and the 1985 UN Decade for Women
Conference in Nairobi.
Competition for the Top Spot
There were apparently few contenders for the top spot
accorded to Biryukova. According to the US Embassy
in Moscow, a Soviet correspondent claims that Gorba-
chev demanded that a woman be represented in the
Secretariat, and Biryukova was his choice. There were
reportedly two other candidates: Valentina Shev-
chenko and Valentina Tereshkova. Before the 27th
Congress, Shevchenko was the highest ranking Soviet
woman because of her position as chairman of the
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Teresh-
kova's claim to fame was her role as cosmonaut, a role
to which she was propelled on the basis of her
experience as an amateur parachutist. According to
the correspondent, Gorbachev personally picked Bir-
yukova over Shevchenko and Tereshkova because
Biryukova was more "dynamic and aggressive."
Getting the Numbers Up
The regime also has taken steps below the level of the
Secretariat to demonstrate that it intends to fulfill its
promise to place more women in senior positions. In a
report to the CPSU congress, Georgiy Razumovskiy,
the new CPSU secretary in charge of personnel
appointments, described the increasing number of
women in party leadership positions:
The number of women in the party increases
from year to year, from congress to congress;
there are more of them within the elective party
bodies; more of them are rising to the leader-
ship of various sectors in the building of Com-
munism. Their number among the delegates of
the party congresses, too, is increasing constant-
ly: 1,352 women have been elected to the 27th
Congress; this is 27 percent of all delegates.
This is the highest number-in absolute as well
as in percentage terms-in the whole history of
the CPSU.
barely enough to justify the claim of progress.
On the basis of figures cited at the 26th Congress by
Ivan Kapitonov, then secretary for party personnel,
the number of female delegates shows an increase of
1.7 percent from the 1,329 female delegates in 1981,
This increase in the number of female congress
delegates reflects in part the expanding but still
limited number of women in the party. According to
published data, 8 percent of party members in 1920
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Female Full Members of the Central Committee
(Elected at the 27th CPSU Congress)
Biryukova, Aleksandra Pavlovna
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Cherkashina, Valentina Nikolayevna
Spinner, Kamyshinskiy Cotton Combine (Volgograd
Oblast)
Golubeva, Mariya Arkhipovna
Brigade leader, State Breeding Farm Khatun
(Altay Kray)
Golubeva, Valentina Nikolayevna
Weaver, Ivanovo Worsted Combine imeni V. I.
Lenin (RSFSR)
Gromova, Mariya Sergeyevna
Milkmaid, Kommunarka, Leninskiy Rayon
(Moscow Oblast)
Karpova, Yevdokiya Fedorovna
Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers
Kruglova, Zinaida Mikhaylovna
Chairman, Presidium, Union of Soviet Societies for
Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries
were women, 15 percent in 1934, 19 percent by the
end of World War II, and 20 percent two decades
later, in 1965. As of 1983, the share of women in the
party stood at 27 percent, although women represent
51 percent of the national labor force (excluding
collective farmers) in the economy.
Closer to the center of power, the new Central
Committee also shows an increase in the number of
women. Indeed, Razumovskiy might have boasted of
the 63-percent increase in the number of female full
members of the Central Committee in 1986 over
1981; by doing so, however, he might have drawn
attention to the fact that, even in the new body, only
Pereverzeva, Nina Vasil'yevna
Team leader, Kolkhoz Put' Lenina (Rostov Oblast)
Pletneva, Valentina Nikolayevna
Presidium member of All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions
Shevchenko, Valentina Semenova
Chairman, Presidium, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
Tereshkova, Valentina Vladimirovna
Cosmonaut; Chairman, Committee of Soviet Women
Udalaya, Raisa Silant'yevna
Riveter, Novosibirsk Aviation Plant (RSFSR)
Yershova, Neli Mikhaylovna
Toolsetter, Perm' Machine Building Plant imeni
F. Ye. Dzerzhinskiy Production Association
(RSFSR)
13 of the 307 full members are women. Six of those
female full members are newly raised from their 1981
candidate status or from their role in the Central
Auditing Commission. Since all six of these are
workers-milkmaids, spinners, riveters-the promo-
tion of these women to full membership status sug-
gests a hasty effort to show results.
At the regional level as well, there is evidence of a
similarly hasty effort to promote women. Looking at
the representation of women at the republic bureau
and secretariat levels for example, we find, first of all,
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Table 1
USSR: Higher Educational Attainment by Sex
Number With Higher Education
(per 1,000 population 10 years of
age or older)
Females Males Female-to-Male
Ratio
very few women: eight in 1981 and nine in 1986. For
the most part, the same women who held positions at
this level in 1981 continued to do so in 1986, the
difference being that in 1981 most of the women were
simply candidate bureau members, whereas in 1986
most became full bureau members and/or members
of the secretariat.
Women in the Labor Force
The dearth of women of substance at various levels of
the party structure or in management positions in the
labor force is a reflection of the role of women in
Soviet society. Soviet women have enjoyed substantial
achievement in terms of education and participation
in the labor force. About 85 percent of women 16 to
55 years old work, probably the highest rate in the
world. However, despite the achievements, there tends
to be an inverse relationship between rate of pay and
the proportion of women in a particular occupation or
sector. Women tend to predominate in sectors with
relatively low pay.
Soviet women are expected to be mothers first and
foremost, and to work all the while. Party propaganda
reinforces the characterization of women as mother-
workers, with the purpose of fostering an increase in
the labor supply. Statements on the rewards of moth-
erhood, in particular, are much more voluminous than
the few references to women in leadership. Moreover,
the persistence of traditional male attitudes toward
women is likely to restrict their advancement. Soviet
Table 2
USSR: Pay in Selected Sectors, 1985
Females as a Average
Share of Monthly
Salaried, Salary
Workers (in rubles)
(percent)
25X1
25X1
Trade and public dining 83 145
Health, physical culture, and 82 131
social security
males generally expect women to take full care of the
home and the family, while holding less prestigious
and less powerful positions in the work force.
Outlook: Tokens at the Top
The regime has taken concrete, if limited, measures to
expand the role of women in the leadership. If the
issue of the promotion of women were being raised
simply in the context of improving the lot of women,
we might easily assume that the talk was propaganda.
But the fact that the promotion of women is described
as one means of achieving a revitalized party cadre, a
cadre that is to invigorate the economy, suggests` that
we may be seeing the beginnings of a new policy
approach.
Biryukova conceivably could be moved up further, to
the Politburo, if Gorbachev wants to show he means
business. There are few women at the top, however, in
a position to ride on her coattails. Outside of Shev-
chenko and Tereshkova, the only other. women who
are full members of the Central Committee and
whose jobs have some political substance are Yevdo-
kiya Karpova, Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR
Council of Ministers, and Valentina Pletneva, a Pre-
sidium member of the All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions (AUCCTU), Biryukova's former work=
place.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
government/party apparatus.
At the Central Committee level, we have so far
witnessed largely token efforts to increase the partici-
pation of women. If the regime is to take up the
banner of the advancement of women, it will need to
do something more substantial than adding a few
milkmaids and spinners. After all, membership in the
Central Committee is largely contingent on holding
leadership positions in the ministries of the regional
long-term problem.
If Gorbachev were seriously to tackle the issue of
promoting women to the leadership, he would need to
address the root of the matter, which is societal in
nature. Constrained by the demands of work, family,
and household duties, Soviet women have little time
or energy left to devote to the party. One recent Soviet
survey shows that working women spend more than 30
hours a week on shopping and housework, while on
average men spend only 15 hours a week on household
chores. Two steps which could be taken to alleviate
some of these burdens would be to increase the
availability of consumer goods and foodstuffs and
improve child care facilities. However, the signs point
in the opposite direction. The yardstick for the econo-
my continues to be that traditionally male bastion,
heavy industry, while light industry and consumer
matters are left in the hands of a woman, Biryukova.
As for child care, rather than lessening the demands
on women by improving child care facilities, the new
five-year plan promises more maternity leave to allow
women to stay with their newborn a little longer,
thereby providing only a temporary respite from a
mote women only where it serves that purpose.
Overall, the prospects for moving beyond the token-
ism of women in the leadership are limited by the
relatively low position that the issue probably holds on
Gorbachev's agenda. Gorbachev's priority is to im-
prove the economy, and he can be expected to pro-
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Viewpoint
The views expressed in the following article are the authors' and do not
necessarily represent a CIA consensus.
Access Challenge
The Soviets have traditionally welcomed, if they have
not initiated, GDR probes to erode Allied rights in
Berlin, granted in wartime, in immediate postwar
agreements, and under the Quadripartite Agreement
(QA) of 1971. Nevertheless, they have customarily
avoided letting events approach a crisis.
The current challenge to Western rights in Berlin
began on 21 May 1986, when the East Germans
announced that as of 26 May accredited diplomats
crossing to and from West Berlin would have to
present their passports instead of identity documents
("red cards") from the GDR Foreign Ministry. All
diplomats not accredited to the GDR entering East
Berlin after the 26th would have to have an East
German visa unless there was a prior agreement it
was not needed. Ambiguous wording in the GDR
announcement left open the possibility that the three
Western QA military missions in West Berlin and
their embassies in East Berlin would be exempt from
the new controls. On 23 May, in response to a US
demarche, a Soviet spokesman noted that "military
administrations" would not be affected.
The new controls went into effect on the 26th.
Western military mission access was not affected, and
US, British, and French diplomats accredited to the
GDR were allowed to cross sector boundaries in
Berlin using their red cards. They were warned,
however, that they would have to show passports in
the future. All other diplomats were turned back
unless they showed passports. On the 29th the East
Germans formally exempted US, UK, and French
officials stationed in both East and West Berlin from
the new passport controls. To avoid showing passports
at Berlin sector crossings, nonexempt NATO diplo-
mats began to take circuitous routes through recog-
nized East German territory to enter East Berlin. The
Soviets stated that they had interceded with the East
Germans to the extent they were able and that the
GDR was competent to decide the documentation it
required for travel into East Berlin.
On 7 June, in a major retreat, the East German
Foreign Ministry announced that it would issue new
"forgery-proof" diplomatic ID cards to replace the
red cards and would drop the passport requirement.
The announcement, however, did not explicitly re-
scind the visa requirement for Allied officials other
than US, British, or French traveling from West
Berlin-most notably from military missions and
consulates accredited to the Allies there. Recently the
East Germans allowed military officers from Den-
mark and Belgium to cross sector points without visas,
a concession that suggests they will also compromise
on these remaining controls. The GDR announce-
ment, however, continued to refer to the sector cross-
ing sites as "border crossing points," upholding the
East German view that East Berlin is part of the
GDR rather than part of a greater Berlin subject to
the QA.
We do not yet have sufficient evidence to reconstruct
Soviet-East German handling of the Berlin access
challenge. Privately, representatives from both coun-
tries provided the disingenuous explanation that the
new controls were only an effort to meet Western
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
concerns about terrorists crossing between the sectors.
It is more likely that the GDR seized the opportunity
offered by the La Belle discotheque bombing in West
Berlin and intense US pressure regarding Libyan
activities in East Berlin to assert its long-claimed
sovereign right to demand formal travel documenta-
tion at the Berlin crossing points. We believe the East
Germans received approval for a challenge during
talks between Gorbachev and Honecker during the
latter's visit to East Berlin in late April. We also
believe that the decision to act on the access question
became increasingly attractive in both Moscow and
East Berlin because of their growing isolation on the
terrorist issue as West European states took action
against the Libyan People's Bureaus.
Moscow and the Germanies
The timing of the recent challenge, following earlier
Soviet willingness to defuse a dispute involving man-
agement of the Berlin traffic air corridor in February
1986, supports that the East
Germans took the lead in instigating the current
confrontation. Embassy reporting
also indicates a growing sense of
East German assertiveness in the Bloc, which the
Soviets themselves have inadvertently fed with public
praise of Honecker's economic policy. East German
self-congratulation reached a new peak at the East
German Communist (SED) Party Congress in April,
which Gorbachev attended.
Gorbachev's presence signified Moscow's strong sup-
port for Honecker and the East German "model."
Nevertheless, Gorbachev's harsh public criticism of
the FRG at the party congress suggests he also
carried the deflating message that the Soviets had
decided not to permit Honecker to visit Bonn this
year. Such a message would have deprived Honecker's
regime of a politically important gain and would have
diminished the impact of Gorbachev's visit to the
GDR. Further, by implication, Gorbachev's criticism
of the FRG suggested that Honecker, whose criticism
had been much milder, had been too friendly with the
other Germany. By pushing the new controls, the East
Germans may have hoped to convince Moscow that
they too could be hard on Kohl.
We speculate that, to placate ruffled East German
feelings, the Soviets probably gave Honecker the
green light to push for recognition of East German
sovereignty by the West at a traditional pressure
point-West Berlin-
going to take the lead
We doubt, however, that
Honecker and Gorbachev would have discussed the
actual details of this challenge, and almost certainly
neither anticipated an evolution leading to a signifi-
cant GDR retreat. A general discussion, however,
would fit well with Gorbachev's new leadership style
in Eastern Europe, which combines firmness in laying
down markers in face-to-face bilateral talks with
restraint regarding micromanagement of detail. He
probably also told Honecker that, while the Soviets
would rhetorically support the GDR, they wanted no
crisis in Berlin that could call into question their own
privileges under the QA. The implication would have
been that the GDR would have to take the political
consequences of its action.
Moscow probably also saw the GDR challenge as a
chance to create mischief for the Kohl government.-
The Soviets had already stiffened their criticism of
Kohl for support of SDI and the US binary chemical
weapons program. They undoubtedly welcomed a new
opportunity to embarrass him by underscoring West
Germany's lack of leverage in Berlin and by forcing
him to choose between rigid support for the QA or ar
"reasonable" position on control of terrorism.
Moscow might also have calculated that the challenge
had the potential to create political problems for Kohl
during an election campaign. He is already under fire
by the opposition SPD for an unimaginative German
policy. Moscow must indeed have been cheered by
public assertions by senior SPD opposition politi-
cians-principally Egon Bahr-that the current pass-
port issue could have been resolved, essentially on
GDR terms. Thus, from Moscow's view, the current
challenge in a single stroke promised to bring discom-
fort to Kohl while permitting the SPD to line up on
the side of the "angels," in opposition to the CDU and
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8
Secret
locutor.
its US "sponsor." Furthermore, while not threatening
to cut off the intra-German dialogue so important to
the East Germans, the challenge enhanced the impor-
tance of the SPD as East Germany's principal inter-
claims and drive wedges into NATO.
Moscow's West European Policy
and the Berlin Question
Under Gorbachev the Soviets have emphasized to the
West Europeans that they share a common home-
with continental interests, apart from those of the
United States. Moscow, however, remains aware that
the Berlin question is a two-edged sword and, if
allowed to develop into a crisis, tends to solidify
NATO in defense of the status quo. By emphasizing
"technical" issues during the challenge rather than
fundamental principles governing Berlin's unique sta-
tus, East Germany sought to avoid a crisis while
attempting to undermine NATO's position on move-
ment within Berlin. In the past such "technical"
challenges have indeed caused disarray in NATO.
Doubtless, both the USSR and the GDR thought they
had a similar chance this time to slice away at Allied
sovereignty within the divided city.
The current challenge has magnified the status differ-
ences between most NATO members and the three
NATO occupying powers. The latter were initially
"exempted" from the new passport controls, thus
creating awkward "hierarchies" for NATO. Travel
hardships were greatest for nonexempt NATO mem-
bers-those who traditionally have had little stake or
input in codifying the technical rites embodying the
"Berlin theology." Meanwhile Moscow's intercession
to exempt US, British, and French personnel from the
use of passports was portrayed by the Soviets as a
reasonable attempt to find a compromise that would
uphold respect for the QA-but one which, neverthe-
less, would underscore Moscow's position on GDR
The challenge also has reminded the West Germans
how uniquely vulnerable they are in Berlin. Indeed,
since the GDR actions, some prominent West Ger-
mans have advocated the use of passports for "identi-
fication" purposes only, illustrating the extent to
which some elements in the FRG view their Berlin
interests as divergent from those of the three Allied
powers. The challenge also reminded the three powers
how vulnerable they are to an Eastern probe designed
to divide them from Bonn. Both the USSR and GDR
apparently misjudged the potential depth of a split
between West Germany and the other Allies over the
challenge. Had either the Soviets or East Germans
realized the extent of Bonn's apparent wavering, they
might not have backed off so quickly or so far.
Implications
The recent Berlin access challenge apparently sought
to harmonize separate Soviet and East German inter-
ests in the transcendent objective of weakening
NATO solidarity over Berlin and dividing West Ger-
man opinion. Moscow probably meant to provide a
demonstration, for the Bloc, of Gorbachev's ability to
dovetail competing Soviet-East European interests
rather than to simply ride roughshod over East Euro-
pean sensibilities.
For the Soviets, the GDR challenge apparently com-
bined opportunity with low risk. They probably made
it clear to Honecker that any East German equities in
a challenge could not threaten Moscow's broader
East-West concerns. This would explain both Mos-
cow's rather low-key backing of its ally during this
challenge and its efforts to convince the West that it
was not responsible for East German actions in the
GDR's "sovereign" capital. The Soviets probably also
remained wary of appearing too supportive of East
German assertions of sovereignty that ran counter to
Moscow's own demands for increased Bloc unity on
foreign policy matters. While appearing to moderate
the most extreme of the GDR's original demands by
securing exemptions for the three Allied powers, the
Soviets still subtly reminded Washington that they
retain leverage at Berlin and can create or ameliorate
troubling challenges there to the West almost at will.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100070002-8 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100070002-8