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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000100020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The Impact of Soviet Economic Problems
on Soviet Arms Control Positions
Summary
Soviet economic problems and priorities have created strong
incentives for Gorbachev to reduce the grorrth of defense spendiny below
the re atively low levels of recent years, but we are fairly confident
that he does not believe that it is imperative that he do so. This
judgment is based on our assessment of the performance of the Soviet
economy since Gorbachev took over, the nature of the resource allocation
decisions that will have to be made over the next few years, and the
benefits to be gained from an arms control agreement.
Since Gorbachev assumed power, economic performance has picked up.
GNP growth is headed for 3 to 3 1/2 percent in 1986, substantially better
than in recent years. Gorbachev's human factors campaign has had a
positive impact on productivity, while agricultural output will apparently
match or exceed the previous record achieved in 1983. At the same time,
our estimates show that defense spending, already at a very high level,
continues to grow, albeit slowly.
We also believe that the shifts in machinery demand implied by
Gorbachev's industrial modernization program will not have an immediate
impact on the level of weapons production. Our analysis indicates that
almost all of the weapons we expect to be produced through 1990 will be
manufactured in plants already operating. Competition for some basic
materials and intermediate goods used in the production process such as
high quality steel and microprocessors will be intense and could well
cause some delays in the production of certain weapons, but overall these
changes are likely to be marginal.
While we do not believe Gorbachev feels compelled for economic
reasons to sign an arms agreement or cut defense spending sharply in the
immediate future, important decisions involving resource allocation will
have to be made over the next two to three years. In 1y88-89, the Soviets
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will have to decide on production rates for major weapons systems in the
1990s, if planning for the 1991-95 Plan is to proceed on schedule. At
about the same time, Gorbachev will be in a much better position to assess
how his modernization program is faring. We believe the planned gains in
productivity and product quality will not be achieved. Gorbachev will
then have to deal with military leaders--who now appear to be backing his
modernization program--asking for more money, even as pressures for more
civilian investment increase.
We do not know what Gorbachev will do, but the state of the economy,
t'toscow's perceptions of the military threat, and Gorbachev's domestic
political standing would all come into play. Even if the economy is doing
poorly, however, there is no guarantee that Gorbachev will feel compelled
t o cut defense spending sharply, although it would certainly make an arms
agreement more attractive.
There is another view of how Soviet economic problems influence
ae~en~c ~~~~ -- - -- -
argue that that USSR s econor~~ c
stringencies are so severe that Floscow will have to conclude a strategic
arms-control agreement to lessen the defense burden. kJe believe, however,
that the near-term economic benefits to be gained from an arms control
agreement are often exaggerated by proponents of this view. Certainly,
there are major economic benefits to be gained from an arms control
agreement, particularly one limiting SDI, but they are mainly in the area
of cost avoidance and would be~reaped over the longer term. The immediate
benefit to Gorbachev's modernization program from reducing or even
eliminating particular strategic systems would be small. Production
facilities take time to convert, and spending on strategic offensive
di
ng.
systems represents only about 10 percent of total defense spen
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Measuring Soviet Economic Performance
When Gorbachev took over, the economy was mired in a decade long
slump. Overall GNP growth during the 1981-85 Plan was headed for its
smallest increase in any Five-Year Plan period. Moreover, GNP had
increased by less than 1.5 percent in 1984, and during the first quarter
of 1985, just before Gorbachev took over, production was essentially
f 1 at.
The USSR's economic performance should not be judged primarily in
terms of growth rates, however. Soviet economic growth since ly8U has
been as good or better than that of other major industrial countries
except for the United States and Japan (see table 1). What is more
important in analyzing Moscow's willingness to increase rates of military
spending is the size and the technological level of the Soviet economy.
Soviet GNP in 1960 was roughly half that of US. After closing the gap
during the 196Us and 197Us, Soviet GNP as a percent of US GNP fell from a
high of about 58 percent in 1982 to about 55 percent last year (see figure
1 for a comparison on Soviet GNP with the United States and other
developed countries).
Mo reover, although the Soviet economy is the second largest overall,
its relative technological standing is better captured by per-capita GIMP
comparisons. According to this indicator, both the USSR and its East
European allies lag far behind the major Western countries (see figure 2).
The USSR's failure to modernize its industrial sector is partly_
responsible for the USSR's relatively weak technological base.
equipment in the early 1980 was 2U years
old on average. In contrast to the West where the rapid introduction of
advanced manufacturing technologies has sparked large efficiency gains,
the combined productivity of labor and fixed capital in the USSR has
declined in absolute terms over the past decade.
Soviet leaders have been especially worried about the implications of
these trends for military competition. They recognize that in most
advanced manufacturing technologies--technologies critical to future
weapons development--the USSR remains years behind the United States (see
figure 3). Indeed, even before SDI, Soviet military authorities had
expressed concern about the level of technology embedded in such US
programs as the D-5 SLBM, the Stealth Bomber, "smart" conventional
weapons, and cruise missiles. SDI, by concentrating competition in those
high tech areas where Moscow is weakest, has beeri viewed as a new and even
greater threat. Although they claim they can counter the US SDI, the
Soviets are clearly worried by the technological challenge posed by SDI
and the possible spin-off of new technologies in other areas.
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Table 1
Real Avera a Annual Growth Rates of GNP
percent
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
1976-80
1981-85
USSR
5.0
5.3
3.4
2.3
1.9
US
4.7
3.0
2.5
3.4
2.4
Japan
10.0
11.0
4.3
5.0
3.9
France
5.8
5.4
4.0
3.3
1.21
West Germany
4.8
4.2
2.1
3.3
1.2
Italy
5.2
6.2
2.4
3.8
0.81
UK
3.2
2.5
2.1
1.6
1.71
1Data are for gross domestic product (GDP). The difference between GNP and
GDP, net factor income from abroad, is small.
Note: Growth rates are measured in national currencies.
Sources: 1961-80, OECD, National Accounts
1981-85, IMF, Internationa Financial Statistics
4
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Gross National Product, 1985
Billion dollars
3989
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
~~ vSc,Q~ JaQat~ FP~~a~ce v~Z~.a1Qo1a~a1a~dy GOP Gc,So~a~~ J~gac 1?~a~ia
ae,~re P ~ 0~
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Per Capita GNP, 1985
1985 Dollars
i6, 710
16,
000
14,
000
12,
000
10,
000
8000
6000
4000
2000
v5 FP~~a~ce JaQarla~~~ v~~~a1~ GOQ' G55P~9ac~ v55Qola~d9a~:~a~~a~:~a
ae~ ~ ~~ P
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Figure 3
Selected Advanced Manufacturing Technologies:
The United States Versus the USSR
Approximate length of US lead in years
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Microprocessors
Computer-operated machine tools
Minicomputers
Mainframes
Supercomputers
Software
Flexible manufacturing systems
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t
Gorbachev's Economic~Agenda and the Competition for Resources
Gorbachev's commitment to revitalizing the country's economic base--
and hence future military modernization--has been evident since before he
became General Secretary. Essentially, he has adopted a two-step
approach. Initially, Gorbachev is relying on a combination of measures to
strengthen party discipline, improve worker attitudes and weed out
incompetents--what he refers to as the "human factor." Over the longer
term, Gorbachev is counting on achieving major productivity gains as a
result of organizational changes, reform initiatives, and, most
importantly, an extremely ambitious campaign to modernize the country's
stock of plant and equipment.
Addressing the Human Factor
Gorbachev's first and most accessible target in his program to boost
productivity has been his campaigns for discipline and against corruption
and alcoholism. These efforts--like those pushed less vigorously by
Andropov before him--have received widespread public support and yielded
positive results. At the same time, Gorbachev has removed an
unprecedented number of senior economic managers, including the Chairman
of the Council of Pinisters, the Central Committee Department Chiefs
responsible for the machinebuildiny, construction, and trade and services
sectors, and over two dozen of'the country's economic ministers and heads
of state committees.
Gorbachev has moved only somewhat more slowly on the organizational
front. During the past year, he has established new bureaus to oversee
the machinebuilding and energy industries and embarked upon major
reorganizations of the agro-industrial and trade bureaucracies. Gorbachev
also has overseen the enactment of a series of measures designed to
increase the autonomy of Soviet enterprises and improve workers'
incentives. He has openly complained about the bureaucracy's resistance
to his efforts, however, and the decrees that have emerged thus far appear
to be the products of political compromise and not the "radical" reforms
he has said are needed.
Industrial Modernization
But the heart and soul of Gorbachev's drive to accelerate
productivity is his industrial modernization program or, in his words,
"the structural transformation of the economy." In laying out his
program, Gorbachev has proposed:
-- Doubling retirement rates of capital stock to accelerate
the replacement of obsolete capital by more efficient,
largely state-of-the art machinery.
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-- Modernizing the nation's capital stock so that by 1990 more
than a third of the machinery portion will have been
installed within the preceding five years.
-- Increasing capital investment in the civilian machine
building sector in 1986-90 by 80 percent compared with
investment in 1981-85.
Achievement of these goals would require extremely rapid growth in
the machinery allocated for Soviet plant and equipment. Because the
machinery needed for industrial modernization is produced in the machinery
and metalworking sector--which is also the primary source of military
hardware and consumer durables--the competition for resources will, of
necessity, increase.
Leadership Attitudes Towards Defense Spending and Arms Control
The competition for resources for plant modernization certainly
creates incentives for Gorbachev to hold down current military spending
and to reduce the need for future programs through an arms control
agreement, but we do not believe that Gorbachev feels that it is essential
that he do so. Recent improvements in the economy's performance and the
momentum of ongoing military programs weigh heavily in this judgment.
Since Gorbachev assumed power, economic performance has picked up.
GNP growth is likely to be about 3 to 3 1/2 percent in 1986, substantially
better than in recent years. Gorbachev's human factors campaign has had a
positive impact on productivity, and agricultural output this year
apparently will match or exceed the previous record level achieved in
At the same time, our estimates show that defense spending--already
at a very high level--continues to grow, albeit slowly. In this
connection, we believe the shifts in machinery demand implied by the
industrial modernization program will not have an immediate impact on the
level of weapons production. Our analysis indicates that almost all of
the weapons we expect to be produced through 1990 will be manufactured in
plants already operating. Competition for some basic materials and
intermediate goods used in the production process, such as high quality
steel and microprocessors, will be intense and could well delay production
of certain weapons, but these adjustments are likely to be marginal.
In short, we believe Gorbachev's commitment to industrial
modernization will not significantly impede the major deployments of
strategic weapons that the Soviets have programmed for the next decade.
In the absence of a major arms reduction agreement that limited the
deployment of new systems by the early 1990s, we expect that a
F
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comprehensive modernization of the USSR's strategic forces will have been
completed with the widespread deployment of new generations of land- and
sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles. Strategic defensive force
improvements, although less substantial, also will permit sustained
improvements in capabilities with the fielding of the SA-10 and SA-X-12
strategic defense missiles.
Longer Term Pressures
While we do not believe Gorbachev feels compelled for economic
reasons to sign an arms agreement or cut defense spending sharply in the
immediate future, important decisions involving resource allocation will
have to be made over the next two to three years. In 1988-89, the Soviets
will have to decide on production rates for major weapons systems in the
1990s, if planning for the 1991-95 Plan is to proceed on schedule. Based
in part on these decisions, the Soviets will also have to accelerate
renovation of their defense industries, as the start preparing to produce
the next generation of weapons.
Meanwhile, Moscow will be trying to gain a better understanding of
the outlook for US military programs and the potential for derailing these
programs politically. It has already launched a massive active measures
campaign against SDI aimed at influencing public opinion in the United
States and Western Europe. Interestingly, Foreign Plinister Shevardnadze
commented after the recent US Senate elections that the loss of control by
the Republicans could be viewed as a public referendum on the President's
SDI policy. While his remarks are obviously self-serving, the Soviets
may, in fact, believe--though they cannot be sure--that budgetary
pressures, as well as mounting public opposition, will force the next
President to go more slowly on SDI.
Equally important, in a few years Gorbachev will be in a much better
position to assess how his modernization program is faring. Despite the
economy's better performance this year, in our judgment the improvements
in productivity needed to accelerate growth during the 1990s will not be
f orthcoming without some major economic reforms and even greater
investment in technology and civilian industry. If, in fact, the planned
gains in productivity and product quality have not been achieved,
Gorbachev will have to deal with military leaders--who now appear to be
backing his modernization program--asking for more money, even as
pressures for more civilian investment increase.
We do not know what Gorbachev will do, but the state of the economy,
Moscow's perceptions of the military threat, and Gorbachev's domestic
political standing would all come into play. Even if the economy is
doing poorly, however, there is no guarantee that Gorbachev will feel
compelled to cut defense spending sharply, although it would certainly
make an arms agreement more attractive.
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Arms Control Leverage: Different Perspectives
Our conclusion that Gorbachev wants but is not desperate for a
reduction in the defense burden has been challenged by some. One view
held by a few experts outside of government is that the Soviet economy is
currently in such bad shape that the leadership will have to find ways to
reduce the defense burden. It is based on a much more pessimistic view of
recent Soviet economic performance and prospects, a higher estimate of the
burden, and a more optimistic assessment of the benefits to be reaped from
an arms control agreement.
Soviet GNP may have actually declined in the late 1970s
spending.
Nor do we believe that Soviet economic prospects would be markedly
improved by a reduction in support for insurgencies abroad or a withdrawal
from Afghanistan. While Soviet leaders continue to express frustration
over the protracted nature of the war in Afghanistan--and may have good
political reasons for wanting to get out--the economic costs of the war
have not been a substantial drain on the economy. We estimate the Soviets
are currently spending about 3 billion rubles per year on the conduct of
Afghanistan, or about two and one-half percent of total defense
arms as some Soviet military leaders are currently urguing.
small. Production facilities take time to convert, and spending on
strategic offensive systems represents only about 10 percent of total
spending for defense. Moreover, even if a strategic arms control
agreement were reached, the Soviets might not reduce defense spending.
Rather, Gorbachev might choose to devote more resources to conventional
The immediate benefit,-however, to Gorbachev's modernization program
from reducing or even eliminating particular strategic systems would be
Soviets place a high premium on planning certainty.
Moreover, we believe that the near-term benefits to be gained from an
arms control agreement are often exaggerated. Certainly, there are major
economic benefits to be gained from an arms control agreement, particularly
one limiting SDI, but they are mainly in the area of cost avoidance and
would be reaped over the longer term. The Soviets want to avoid draining
off scarce high technology R&D resources to near-term weapons development
applications. In addition, for both military and economic reasons, the
analytical approach and the results of our analysis.
and early 1980s and that the defense burden currently stands at over 20
percent of GNP (vice the 15 percent we are currently estimating for a
comparable set of activities). MJe do not agree with 0 figures.
Indeed, an independent panel commissioned by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board three years ago generally gave the Agency good
marks for its estimates of Soviet economic performance, noting that they
were somewhere in the middle of the s ectrum between those with a much
rosier picture of the economy Similarly, the
DCI's P~ilitary-Economic Advisory Panel--consisting of experts outside of
government--has reviewed our defense spending estimates and endorsed our
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SUBJECT: Soviet Approaches to a "Conventional Arms Race"
Summary
A transfer of the primary arena of superpower competition
from nuclear to conventional forces--and, therefore, from
intercontinental to theater forces--would shift the focus to an
area of current Soviet strength but would raise the prospect of
great uncertainties in the future for Soviet planners. The
Soviets probably view NATO's superior industrial and economic
potential as being brought to bear during a war rather than in
a peacetime arms race. For the West to replace its reliance on
an economical defense based on the threat of use of nuclear
weapons--to deter and to terminate a conflict--would require a
substantial increase in resources devoted to conventional
forces. The Soviets probably question whether or not most
Western countries would make the necessary investments in
peacetime. Nevertheless, they will remain deeply concerned that
Western technological developments will produce weapons that
could threaten the viability of their armored forces.
1. For more than a decade Soviet doctrine, planning, and
force development for theater warfare have moved increasingly in
the direction of preparing for more intense and longer
conventional war. This period has witnessed a gradual growth in
the size, modernization, combat capabilities, and sustainability
of Soviet ground forces (see figures). These gains are partially
offset, however, by what the Soviets regard as an unfavorable
shift in the relative capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact air
forces. Another Soviet concern is the lagging modernization of
their allies' forces. With the single exception of the East
Germans, all of their allies' forces are falling increasingly
behind the Soviet standard. Moreover, the Soviets see NATO
conventional defenses as having grown stronger and more difficult
to crack. In the Soviets' view, the greatest potential threat to
their ability to prevail in a conventional conflict--a parallel
to their concerns about SDI--is the possibility that new
technol ogical developments ma_Y render infeasible operations by
their large armored forces.
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2. Nevertheless--barring such a disjunctive development--
reliance on conventional forces would favor the Soviets'
traditional strengths--mass and staying power. Although they
view the cost of breaking through NATO defenses as having
increased, NATO's continuing lack of operational reserves in the
crucial Central Region of NATO's Allied Command Europe leaves the
West vulnerable to irretrievable defeat if a Warsaw Pact
breakthrough can be achieved. To that end, the Soviets have been
developing new formations and operational methods aimed at
maintaining a rapid tempo of offensive operations. By using such
methods, the Soviets would aim to avoid a protracted war, which
they view as permitting some Western advantages--primarily
superior economic and industrial potential--to come into play.
At the same time, Soviet military writers--notably Marshal of the
Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov--have emphasized the need to prepare
to apply the full resources of the USSR in a protracted
3. The Soviets probably view their primary advantages in
conventional arms competition as including:
-- Centralized planning for themselves and their allies,
provided by a General Staff operating from a national
perspective.
-- Continuity of effort that is not subject to the
fluctuations inherent in democratic systems.
-- Dominance over their allies, enabling them to establish
doctrine and standards for force development (although
their allies continue to fall short of Soviet goals).
-- The massive structure and firepower of their ground
forces, which give them a large secure base on which to
build.
Moreover, in the Gorbachev era, they probably will be more adept
at avoiding clumsy and provocative actions that would galvanize
the West into greater cooperation and a sustained commitment of
greater resources to defense. Sensing that many of the West
European members of NATO seek to avoid an increased defense
burden, they may choose to pursue dramatic arms control
initiatives to forestall a large investment in high-technology
defenses. To date, however, such dramatic proposals as the
Atlantic-to-the-Urals Budapest appeal seem directed more toward
political effect than genuine arms reductions.
4. The Soviets perceptions of their own economic and
demographic problems and their desire to avoid an open-ended
competition in high technology where they see themselves
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permanently at a disadvantage pose opportunities and dangers for
the West. Such fears could lead to significant concessions by
the Soviets in negotiations for reductions in conventional
forces; but, paradoxically, they also could lead to an increase
in the threat to the West. The Soviets' perception that they
must get an early start to have any hope of keeping up with
Western developments has often led to long-term commitments to
programs that have not been cancelled when the West failed to
carry through on its own initiatives. For example, the MIG-25
interceptor was developed to counter the B-70 bomber, which was
cancelled. The Soviets already are working on technical and
operational countermeasures to developmental programs such as
Assault Breaker and FOFA, which are still largely in the
conceptual stage.
Elimination of Ballistic Missiles
5. The US proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles--
especially if extended to include short-range systems--would pose
great difficulties for the USSR.
-- Strategic deterrence would be based on bombers and
cruise missiles, where they probably perceive the United
States has more experience and technological advantages.
-- They would be concerned about potential US development
of strategic air defenses using advanced technologies
that could result from SDI.
-- An increased requirement for strategic air defense
systems, conventional forces, or interim modernization
of ballistic missile systems could cancel any potential
saving from the elimination of strategic and
intermediate ballistic missiles.
-- Elimination of short-range systems would create severe
problems for nuclear or conventional operations by their
theater forces.
6. In recent years, Soviet theater forces have become
increasingly dependent on short-range ballistic missiles. As is
the case for the Soviets' strategic forces, ballistic missiles
are an area of comparative strength and one seen by Soviet
planners as a means of making up for the shortcomings of their
air forces. In nuclear or conventional operations, they plan to
use such missiles to strike heavily defended targets, to open
corridors through NATO air defenses, and to hit targets that must
be engaged quickly. The advent of new, accurate systems (SS-21
and SS-23) with improved warheads is making the SRBM force
genuinely capable for conventional. operations.
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7. Elimination of SRBMs would place a nearly impossible
double burden on the already strained Soviet air forces.
-- A 1 arger portion of the ai r forces woul d have to be
withheld in readiness for nuclear operations.
- The air forces would assume the entire burden of
conventional strikes beyond the range of cannon and
rocket artillery and attack helicopters.
-- Western air forces are already heavily committed to
tactical nuclear missions, and, relatively speaking,
would be less encumbered by picking up non-nuclear
targets from eliminated SRBMs.
8. The elimination of US INF systems and all NATO SRBMs
would relieve the air forces of a large number of high priority
targets. The resulting gain probably would be offset by
requirements to attack heavily defended targets that otherwise
would be struck by SRBMs.
9. Thus, the elimination of SRBMs would put more emphasis
on air forces--and probably short-range cruise missiles--where
the Soviets see themselves at a permanent technological
disadvantage. Advanced combat aircraft and highly accurate
cruise missiles require production techniques with which the
Soviets have had great difficulty. Increases in the rate of
production of modern combat aircraft would require large new
investments.
10. In the near term, the elimination of ballistic missiles
would free a large portion of the Soviet SSN force for offensive
operations such as interdiction of US reinforcements for NATO.
Unless the Soviets could develop a sea-launched cruise missile
with very long range, however, their sea-based nuclear deterrent
would become much more vulnerable.
E1 imi nati on of Nuclear Wea ons
s We as a istic Missiles)
11. The Soviets would view the elimination of nuclear
weapons (or their reduction to levels so low that they could
serve only for mutual deterrence) as leading to great uncertainty
and potential instability. The greatly reduced potential of both
sides to attack each other's national territory would make Europe
the prime focus of competition. The Soviets seem confident that
they can maintain their preponderence in ground forces, but they
surely would be concerned that Western Europe, deprived of its
nuclear umbrella, might react by developing more cohesion and a
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12. E1 imi nati on of nuclear delivery missions woul d 1 essen
somewhat the burden on the air forces, but the Soviets probably
see little prospect that they could catch up to Western
capabilities. To make substantial changes would require not only
expensive improvements in the aircraft industry but also the
development of advanced standoff munitions. They probably would,
however, further increase their field artillery firepower; and
with the potential for greatly protracted conventional
operations, they might begin creating the structure to support
mobilization of even larger ground forces.
13. Elimination of nuclear weapons would result in further
emphasis on interdiction of shipping between the United States
and Europe and would leave a larger portion of the Soviet SSN
force free to pursue this mission. The Soviet surface navy,
however, has little capability for sustained operations.
Moreover, to develop the capabi 1 ity for surface operations away
from the USSR would require a large new investment of
resources.
14. In sum the Soviets probably see advantage in a
conventional arms race as dependent primarily on two factors:
-- The potential development by the West of advanced
technology systems that would negate their advantage in
armored forces, which they fear.
-- The willingness and resolve of the West to make the
sustained investment necessary for a strong conventional
defense, which they doubt.
They would approach a "conventional arms race" as an integrated
political-economic-military competition. They would seek to
compensate for their economic and industrial shortcomings--with
the aim of outperforming the West by making more efficient and
sustained use of their smaller resources. They would endeavor to
maintain their current superiority in ground forces and to avoid
having their air forces fall farther behind those of the West.
Confident of their superior staying power, they probably would
follow a non-confrontational approach to avoid prodding the West
into greater efforts. They would continue to use political
initiatives to attempt to fragment the West and seek to use arms
control as a means of forestalling commitment of greater Western
resources to conventional forces, especially in areas of high
technology.
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TRENDS IN THE READINESS OF SOVIET
MANEUVER DIVISIONS, 1975-1985
80
"INCLUDES ALL MOTORIZED RIFLE, TANK, AIRBORNE;
AND TWO NEW ARMY CORPS
85
Legend
~ READY
~ NdT READY
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TRENDS IN COMPOSITION OF SOVIET
TANK FORCE, 1975-1985
80
85
Legend
~ T62 & OLDER
~ Tb4
~ T72
~ T80/64B
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TRENDS IN COMPOSITION OF SOVIET
TROOP CARRIERS, 1975-1985
Legend
~ APC
~ IFV
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TRENDS IN THE COMPOSITION OF SOVIET
ARTILLERY, 1975-1985
75
80
85
Legend
~ TOWED
~ SELF-PROPELLED
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TRENDS IN COMPOSITION OF SOVIET
ATTACK HELICOPTERS, 1975-1985
80
85
Legend
~ MI-24 HIND A/D/E/F
~ tJl-B HIP E
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