ETHIOPIA'S FORCED RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM: MORE HUNGER AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R001201110008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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More Hunger Ahead
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ethiopia's Forced
Resettlement Program:
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GI 87-10007
February 1987
308
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
More Hunger Ahead
Ethiopia's Forced
Resettlement Program:
This paper was prepared b~
25X1
Office of
25X1
Scientific and Weapons Research. It was coordinated
with the Department of
25X1
State, and the Agency for International Development.
25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Strategic Resources Division,
OGI,
Reverse Blank Secret
G187-10007
February 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 February 1987
was used in this report.
More Hunger Ahead
Ethiopia's Forced
Resettlement Program:
The Mengistu regime's resettlement program-designed to remove villag-
ers from the insurgency-plagued northern provinces-is likely to resume by
March of this year, according to a variety of sources and Ethiopian
Government announcements. Analysis of agronomic factors, public health
issues, and population concentrations in Ethiopia indicates that the previ-
ous resettlement efforts-halted in 1985 after nearly 600,000 people were
relocated-made the plight of the villagers worse on all counts. The
resumption of the program-probably involving the resettlement of an
additional 500,000 people during the next two to three years-will only
add to the current misery, increasing the need for food aid in the already
overcrowded camps and risking the lives of those forced to resettle.F__~ 25X1
areas
Mengistu believes that collectivization is an important step in the making
of a Marxist state, resulting in improved agricultural production and the
technical and ideological reeducation of the peasants. While resettlement
was clearly part of Mengistu's long-term plan for the Ethiopian economy,
we believe he seized on the recent famine and drought in the northern
provinces as an opportunity to accelerate these resettlement efforts. In
addition, he obviously saw the added advantage of moving people from the
northern provinces to deny potential support to the insurgents in those
A comparative study of conditions in the northern provinces, from which
people were moved, and the southwestern provinces, where they were
resettled, indicates that these premature resettlement efforts are courting
disaster for the people involved:
? It is unlikely that Ethiopian farmers can adapt readily to the sophisticat-
ed agricultural practices needed for the southwestern soils. Without such
efforts, the relative advantage of the greater soil fertility in the southwest
will not be translated into increased food production.
? Contrary to Ethiopian claims, lack of rainfall in the north is not a serious,
long-term problem. Although the northern region has clearly suffered
during the recent drought, historical data show that, on the average, the
northern provinces receive sufficient precipitation for agriculture.
iii Secret
GI 87-10007
February 1987
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? High death rates, for both humans and livestock, will continue in the
camps until the Ethiopian Government provides adequate control mea-
sures for the many diseases endemic to the southwest. It is highly
unlikely that the government can afford the costly and complex measures
in the near future.
? Resettlement camps suffer from extensive overcrowding,) 25X1
F n contrast, analysis of official Ethiopian 25X1
census statistics indicates acceptable population concentrations in the
northern regions, which refutes the Ethiopian claim of overcrowding in
the north as one justification for resettlement. 25X1
Our analysis suggests that food production shortfalls will continue in the
camps for the foreseeable future and will be even more pronounced with
the introduction of new settlers. In Asosa-the most productive resettle-
ment camp we analyzed-the 1985 fall harvest provided enough food to
support only 16 percent of the camp's population for a year. The harvests in
the other camps provided even less food for the camps' occupants. Given
the growing conditions in northern Ethiopia in 1985, per capita production
would have been substantially higher had the resettled people been left in
their home villages. Some aid might have been necessary, but much of the
large deficit would have been avoided
The immediate future of those caught in the resettlement program remains
bleak. Little internal pressure exists to check the program; domestic
political costs of resettlement are essentially nil for Mengistu-especially
with continued Soviet military aid ensuring his regime's survival. Although
US aid is given through private voluntary organizations and its use in
resettlement camps can be prohibited, most Western aid is given directly to
the government without any controls imposed on it. Thus, the Ethiopian
Government is able to divert aid to the camps to relieve the more pressing
current problems. With that capability, Mengistu may well feel confident
about starting another round of resettlement in the near future.
Moscow has played a limited role in the resettlement program. Soviet
involvement is likely to continue to be primarily logistic support-
helicopters and trucks to move people to the resettlement areas. The
Soviets have indicated that they think Mengistu is moving too rapidly in
applying Marxist economics to Ethiopia's underdeveloped economy and
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have suggested a number of measures to improve agricultural productivity
similar to recommendations previously made by the World Bank and the
European Community. Moscow, however, has been unwilling to exert any
influence to help curb some of the excesses of the program, viewing
resettlement as an internal matter and US interest as an infringement on
Ethiopian sovereignty.
Our analysis suggests that population pressures in the rest of the country
may require settlement of the southwestern regions by the end of this
century. Movement of additional settlers now, however, would overburden
the limited resources available to support the program. A much better
strategy would be to focus on improving the public health and agricultural
conditions of the existing camps. Not only would these measures help
prepare the southwest for its long-term growth but, in the short term, they
would also help alleviate the suffering endured by those currently forced to
live in the camps.
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Background
Agricultural Conditions Show Little Improvement 2
Southwestern Soils Fertile, but Preparation Costly 2
Temporary Yield Reductions Likely 3
Length of Growing Season Unchanged 3
Human Health Risks High 6
Health of Livestock Herds Seriously Jeopardized 6
Population Pressures Still High 7
Resettlement Camps More Crowded Than Northern Provinces 7
Carrying Capacity of Land in Camps Is Less Than in North 9
Settlement of Southwest May Be Necessary by the Year 2000 10
Resettlement: Second Phase Coming 13
Looking Ahead 16
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Figure 1
Major Resettlement Areas in Ethiopia
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Resettlement Areas
Pawe
Asosa North
Asosa South
Jarso
Gambela North
Gambela Central
Gambela South
a Areas account for approximately
45% of all people resettled
to date.
Boundary repreeenteilon is '
not necessa'ly xUthorlt8tlv?t
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Ethiopia's Forced
Resettlement Program:
More Hunger Ahead F-
In the fall of 1984, the Ethiopian Government an-
nounced the beginning of a massive program designed
to resettle 1.2 million people from the "agriculturally
depleted" northern region in Ethiopia to the "more
fertile" southwestern region. The program came un-
der considerable international criticism because of the
human rights abuses and widespread deaths that
accompanied it. In the face of drought and famine in
the north, however, many in the West accepted the
need for resettlement and the Ethiopian claims of
improved well-being for those resettled. Criticism that
the program was totally politically motivated-de-
signed to deny support to the northern insurgencies
and to force the independent-minded northern farm-
ers onto collective farms-was weakened by the lack
of concrete evidence to counter Ethiopian assertions of
a greater food supply and better health conditions for
the resettled population
Provinces. Nearly 98 percent of those resettled were
moved to Gojam, Welega, Ilubabor, or Kefa
Provinces.'
According to a former official of the Ethiopian Relief
and Rehabilitation Commission, the Ethiopian orga-
nization responsible for directing resettlement, two
approaches were used to implement the current reset-
tlement program-integration into existing villages
and establishment of new sites.' In the integration
approach, resettled people were moved into existing
villages, with the residents expected to provide land
and to erect housing for the newcomers. Under the
new sites approach, entire villages were established in
previously unoccupied areas. The goal was for settlers
to reach self-sufficiency within one year in the inte-
grated projects and within two years in new sites.F_
selection of northern villages for resettlement
This study examines the technical aspects of the
resettlement issue and provides a quantitative basis
for judging the viability of the program
we
surveyed the largest and best known resettlement
camps-which together account for approximately 45
percent of the total number of people resettled (figure
1)-and assessed the agronomic, health, and demo-
graphic conditions existing in each of the sites.
Resettlement efforts have concentrated on the move-
ment of farmers from the northern to the southwest-
ern provinces. According to Ethiopian Government
statistics, approximately 80 percent of the people
moved came from Tigray, Welo, and Gonder
was done by an interministerial committee, under the
direction of the Minister of Agriculture. The agricul-
tural productivity of a village was the major consider-
ation. If a village was deemed unproductive, the 25X1
25X1
' Although the Ethiopian Government claims that roughly 107,000
people-or about 18 percent of the total-were moved from Shewa
Province, we did not include an analysis of that province in this
study because the primary focus of the government has been on the
northern provinces. The government also reports that about 6,400
people were resettled within Gonder Province, but other reports on
resettlement in Gonder claim it was a source of resettlers for the
southwestern provinces. For the purposes of this study, all of
Gonder Province was evaluated as a source of resettlers and the
internal resettlement, if any, was viewed as insignificant. Only
those portions of Tigray and Welo Provinces that were thought to
be a source of resettlers were examined.
I Resettlement had previously been tried on a smaller scale. On the
basis of plans established by the United Nations-following the late
1960s/early 1970s drought-17 villages had resettlers integrated
into them in the Asosa area from 1979 to 1982. In addition, an
estimated 20,000 peasants were moved from the northern provinces
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villagers were called together under the guise of food Figure 2
distribution or censusi and were taken by force to the Ethiopia; Distribution of Soil Classesa
resettlers.
To facilitate resettlement, the Ethiopian Workers
Party organized six committees at all levels of the
party-national, regional, district, and local. The
committees oversee the various tasks associated with
resettlement, including site selection, motivation of
villagers to provide food and erect housing for new
settlers, physical security, and seed distribution to
plan, however, and according to
Near the end of 1985 the Ethiopian Government
halted the movement of resettlers, having moved
approximately 600,000 people. This study shows that
no particular gains have been accomplished by the
movement of these people. On the contrary, the
agricultural productivity of those resettled has been
greatly reduced, and considerable health risks have
been raised as a result of the relocation to the
southwest. The government remains committed to the
Ethiopian Government announcements-is
likely to resume resettlement by March of this year.
25X1
25X1
An assessment of the resettlement areas based solely
on agronomic considerations-soils, rainfall, potential
crops, and length of growing period-indicates that
no significant agricultural advantages have been
achieved by the program. In fact, our analysis sug-
gests that in the northern areas from which people
have been moved, improvement of local conditions-
introduction of soil and water conservation programs,
fertilizers, pesticides, and improved plant varieties-
would have provided more immediate and greater
gains in food production than can realistically be
expected from resettlement.
Southwestern Soils Fertile, but Preparation Costly
The claim by the Ethiopian Government that soils in
the southwestern region of the country are more
fertile than those in the northern region is generally
substantiated by a soil survey of both regions (figure 2
and appendix A). The southwestern soils, however, are
Based on USDA Land Capability Classification System. Classes
I-IV are most suitable for agriculture. No Class I or VIII soils were
found in the area surveyed.
b Northern Region. Includes the province of Gender and portions
of Tigray and Welo.
C Southern Region. Includes Gojam, Welega, Ilubabor and Kefa
Provinces.
not without their shortcomings; the majority are rated
as having severe to very severe limitations for agricul-
ture. Although each of the resettlement areas has its
own particular soil problem, all of the soils are
classified as deep and clayey and all have problems
with water drainage. The drainage problems could be
solved by planting in ridges 15 to 25 centimeters high,
or by creating ditches and providing for a gravity
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runoff. A more sophisticated and permanent solution
25X1 would be the installation of drainage tiles beneath the
surface of each field-a procedure that costs a roxi-
mately $1,000 per hectare by US standards.
Nearly 81 million hectares of US farmland are
similarly classified, but American farmers are able to
provide the sophisticated conservation practices need-
ed to ensure the soil's long-term stability and maxi-
mum productivity. Because of the lack of training and
resources, the Ethiopian farmer is unable to provide
such care. Without proper land use techniques in the
southwest, the resettlement program, in our view, is
unjustified solely on the basis of soil fertility. Al-
though the number of hectares of potentially useful
farmland is greater in the southwest, the resources
needed to settle and claim it could be spent more
effecti e reclamation of the northern lands.
Vacated Northern Areas Receive Sufficient Rainfall
Another argument used by the Ethiopian Government
to justify resettlement is that the northern region is
traditionally too dry. During periods of drought the
argument may seem valid; the northern region has
been much harder hit than the southwestern region
during the two major droughts of the last 20 years. A
generalized conclusion, however, that the north is too
25X1 dry for agriculture is not warranted on the basis of
historical precipitation data
25X1
On the average, Gonder Province and the western
portion of Welo-areas from which people have been
resettled-receive rainfall in amounts comparable to
that of the resettlement areas (figure 3). In fact, the
Asosa, Jarso, and Gambela camps are located along a
1,000-millimeter average annual rainfall line.' Por-
tions of Gonder and Welo receive more than that
amount. The argument does have some validity for
Tigray, but even there the average annual rainfall is
marginally sufficient for the more drought-tolerant
crops.
Temporary Yield Reductions Likely
Resettlement will require some changes in traditional
cropping practices. Most of the resettled were moved
' Average annual rainfall of at least 350 to 400 millimeters is
considered sufficient for agriculture.n
from regions well suited to growing teff and barley to
areas more favorable to growing teff and maize.4 (The
change in crop is primarily because of the differnce in
elevation between the north and southwest.) Although
the switch in crops does not present a major problem
for satisfying dietary needs of the resettlers, it does
present a potential problem for farmers having to
learn new agricultural practices associated with a
different crop. In addition to all the other constraints
on production, the need to learn new techniques could
result in a sizable reduction in yields for at least two
years.
Length of Growing Season Unchanged
The crop production problem will not be offset by
gains in the length of the growing season. A length-
ened growing season usually permits the growing of
two crops in one year. The length of the growing
period in the resettlement areas-roughly 200 days-
is, however, approximately the same as that in much
of Gonder and Welo. Most of Tigray has a shorter
growing period (figure 4). Even in the case of Tigray,
however, no significant advantage was gained by the
relocation; the number of growing days gained by the
move to the southwestern area is not sufficiently
increased to permit farmers to grow more than one
crop a year.
The high-altitude areas of Ethiopia experience an
early rainy season-the Belg (small) rains-from Feb-
ruary to May that does permit the growing of an
additional crop during the year. On a national scale,
the Belg crops account for only about 5 to 10 percent
of total production, but in regions where these crops
are grown they can account for up to 50 percent of the
food supply. The Belg crop is not a potential contribu-
tor to the harvest in any of the resettlement areas,
except for possibly Jarso. In fact, Welo-one of
Tel' is a cereal unique to Ethiopia. It is usually handsown in July
or August and resembles one of the grass varieties grown in the
United States as forage. The Ethiopians grow teff for its small seed,
which they grind into flour for a bread called injera. Although tell
requires considerable labor and the yields are low, it is preferred by
the Ethiopians for bread making. Injera made from teff stays
supple for two to three days, whereas bread made from other grains
hardens within a day. For those who eat it, teff provides two-thirds
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Figure 3
Precipitation in Ethiopia
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Average annual precipitation
(hundreds of millimeters)
25 or more
20 - 25
15-20
10 - 15
5 - 10
Less than 5
Resettlement Areas
Pawe
Asosa North
Asosa South
Jarso
Gambela North
Gambela Central
Gambela South
Boundary representation is
not nacasaarily authoritative
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Figure 4
Growing Seasons in Western Ethiopia
Length of normal
growing season
? 300 days or more
210 - 300 days
180 - 210 days
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Resettlement Areas
Pawe
Asosa North
Asosa South
Jarso
Gambela North
Gambela Central
Gambela South
Boundary rea~esomauon .a
not necessarily authontetly el
709478 (600338) 2-87 25X1
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the provinces from which people were moved-is the
country's most important Belg-producing area and
accounts for 35 percent of the nation's Bell; total
The medical consequences of resettlement are signifi-
cant for both humans and animals. The lower eleva-
tions of the southwest provide an environment for a
variety of diseases, mostly mosquito- and fly-borne,
that are not as common in the northern provinces. On
the basis of public health considerations, we therefore
believe that further resettlement in the southwestern
lowlands is ill advised until extensive mosquito- and
fly-control measures are instituted (appendix B).
the relatively poorer living conditions.'
Human Health Risks High
A variety of diseases are endemic to the southwestern
region, including malaria, yellow fever, schistosomia-
sis, African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), viral
hemorrhagic fevers, tuberculosis, epidemic typhus,
and cholera and other diarrheal diseases. All of these
disorders present a significant threat to the resettled
human populations. Overcrowding, inadequate sanita-
tion, lack of control of mosquito and fly populations,
and malnutrition all combine to increase the incidence
and severity of the diseases. Resettlers are most
susceptible when they are crowded into transit camps
during the move to their new locations. Those sent to
establish new villages continue to face a higher risk
than those integrated into existing villages because of
exposure to the disease.
Even with improvement in living conditions, the inci-
dence of disease among the resettled populations will
continue to be higher than the norm. Populations can
develop partial immunity to certain disorders, such as
some forms of malaria, but only after generations of
' According to US Embassy reporting, death rates in the Pawe
resettlement camp during December 1985 were between 25 and 50
percent on an annualized basis. In February 1986, during their visit
to Pawe, two Italian sociologists observed that the death rate had
declined but estimated that it was still between 15 and 20 percent
on an annualized basis. Although the actuarial data are at best
incomplete, World Bank data indicate a normal annualized death
rate of approximately 2.5 percent for Ethiopia. F_~
Health of Livestock Herds Seriously Jeopardized
Given the heavy clay soils in the resettlement areas,
agriculture is dependent upon some form of traction
power, with oxen being the most common choice. As
with the human populations, animals moved to the
southwest from the north are exposed to a variety of
diseases to which they are not immune. Rinderpest,
anthrax, and foot-and-mouth disease can be con-
trolled by vaccination, and anemia and emaciation
resulting from parasites and malnutrition can be
controlled with proper herd management techniques.
Although Ethiopia has a well-developed production
and distribution system for veterinary vaccines, the
country has a critical shortage of trained livestock
managers. In 1985, for example, 1,000 oxen were
moved into Pawe as draft animals. Almost the entire
herd was lost within a short period of time. Many
scientists argued that the deaths were caused by the
tsetse fly, but at least one agronomist working in the
area said that the deaths were the result of poor herd
management practices. Whatever the reason, the high
death rate underscores the difficulty of maintaining
animals in the region
The greatest threat to animals, however, is from
African trypanosomiasis-sleeping sickness-trans-
mitted by the tsetse fly. The primary reason the
southwestern region was previously uninhabitated,
and thus available for the resettlers, is the presence of
the tsetse fly. Drugs can suppress the clinical symp-
toms of sleeping sickness, but they do not prevent
relapses-which inevitably come within weeks, or, at
best, within months. The drugs would possibly have to
be provided four to six times a year for each animal,
at a cost of $1.00 to $1.50 per injection. Within limits,
control of the fly populations is also possible but
would require considerable technical assistance and
money, neither of which is likely to be available.'
`A 10-year UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) pro-
gram in West and Central Africa has spent $1 billion and used
175,000 tons of insecticides to control the tsetse fly. Many experts
believe the effort has been a complete failure, with more tsetse
25X1
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Consequently, we believe it is highly unlikely that
Ethiopia can establish livestock in the tsetse-infested
areas of the country within the near future.F_~
Population Pressures Still High
ment.
The Ethiopian Government claimed overcrowding in
the north as another major reason for the resettle-
sustained per hectare-of the settled lands.
population densities in the resettlement camps-as
measured by the number of persons per hectare of
arable farmland-greatly exceed those that probably
existed in the original villages in the northern prov-
inces. Moreover, our calculations suggest that the
number of persons able to be supported by a hectare
of land in the resettlement camps is considerably less
than the average for the rest of Ethiopia, including
the northern region. Consequently, overcrowding in
the new settlements is more likely to strain the
carrying capacity-the number of people who can be
Resettlement Camps More Crowded
Than Northern Provinces
On the basis of two separate Ethiopian reports, the
government has implied that there are 2.89 persons
per hectare in the northern provinces.' Using official
Ethiopian census statistics (figure 5) and estimates of
the available land suitable for agriculture-as deter-
mined from Landsat imagery-we estimated the pop-
ulation density for all of the provinces involved in the
resettlement program (figure 6). In all cases, our
estimates are well below the Ethiopian figure of 2.89
persons and serve to refute the claim of overcrowding
in the north. In fact, our estimates of population
density indicate that the present number of persons
per hectare in the north is within the range that the
current agricultural system can support (see following
25X1 section on carrying capacity).
The argument of overcrowding in the north seems
particularly unwarranted when considering the case
of Kefa Province, where large numbers were resettled.
' One report cited the available land in the north as 1 hectare per
family, and another reported the average size of resettled families
as 2.89 personsF__-]
Figure 5
Ethiopia: Estimated Population
in Selected Provinces, 19868
Northern Region b
Rural Population
a Population figures are based on the World Bank estimate of 3.1
percent national annual growth rate, applied against 1984 official
Ethiopian Government census statistics. No adjustments were
made for resettled populations or persons who died during the
famine.
b Northern Region. Includes Gonder, Tigray and Welo Provinces.
C Southern Region. Includes Gojam, Welega, Ilubabor and Kefa
Provinces.
Kefa has a rural population density higher than either
Gonder or Tigray, yet Kefa received resettlers from
the north-as many as 90,000 people, according to
some press reports.
The population densities of the resettlement camps-
25X1
indicates extensive overcrowding (table 1 and
25X1
figure 6). Ground photography from one of the camps
Southern Region C
Rural Population
Total Population
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Figure 6
Ethiopia: Ratio of Number of People to Land Area, 1986
Total Population
All Soil d
Northern Region a
Rural Population c
II-IV Soil d
Southern Region b
Rural Population c
II-IV Soil d
Total Population
All Soil d
a Northern Region. Includes the province of Gonder and portions
of Tigray and Welo.
b Southern Region. Includes Gojam, Welega, Ilubabor and Kefa
Provinces.
c The 1986 population figures are based on official 1984 Ethiopian
census statistics with World Bank annual growth rate estimate of
3.1 percent applied.
d Based on USDA soil classification system (figure 12).
e Does not include total land area in province (figure 12).
Current Agricultural Future Agricultural
Landa Landb
Jarso
Gambela N.
Gambela C.
Gambela S.
a Includes all land presently under cultivation.
b Includes both land presently under cultivation and land being
prepared for future cultivation.
25X1
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Table I
Population and Arable Hectarage
in Selected Resettlement Camps
Camp Total Huts a Estimated
Population b
b Using an estimated count of five persons per hut (various esti-
mates range from 2.89 to seven individuals per hut). The number
5 not only provided a convenient midpoint but also resulted in
essentially the same total estimated populations for Pawe and
Gambela as those published by the Ethiopian Government.
Available Agricultural Additional Land Being
Land a (hectare) Cleared a c (hectare)
In most areas there is also evidence of personal plots being tended
by resettlers; the plots are probably used to grow vegetables.
Because the size of the plots varies from village to village, it was
difficult to uantif the amount of additional land being devoted to
agriculturel the original govern-
ment plan to provide each resettled family with a personal plot of
2.5 to 5.0 hectares was modified at the end of 1985. Home gardens
are now limited to 1,000 square meters, and cultivation of them is
restricted to hours outside the normal workweek.
further underscores the overcrowding (figure 7). Even
under the best case scenario-all cleared land is
readily available for agricultural production, and the
populations experience no growth-the densities are
much higher than those recorded for the northern
provinces (figure 6). Even using the inflated Ethiopian
far in excess of the situation in the north.
figure of 2.89 persons per hectare for the northern
provinces, the population densities in most of the
camps-some exceeding 12 persons per hectare-are
Carrying Capacity of Land in Camps
Is Less Than in North
A more telling measure of overcrowding than popula-
tion densities is the number of people that can be
sustained by each hectare of land-its carrying capac-
ity compared with the existing population densities.
According to an FAO study, when low levels of
agricultural inputs-basically traditional practices
without any improvement in technology-are used,
the majority of the land in both the northern and
southwestern regions can support between 0.1 and 0.5
I Low levels of inputs assume only hand labor, no fertilizer or
pesticide applications, no soil conservation measures, and cultiva-
persons per hectare (figure 8).8 Using intermediate
levels of agricultural inputs, including some use of
fertilizers and pesticides, the land can support be-
tween one and two persons per hectare (figure 9).9 In
general, Ethiopians probably farm at the low-to-
middle range of the intermediate levels of inputs,
meaning that the farmland supports about 1.0 to 1.5
persons per hectare. Because of disease problems with
draft animals and difficulties with deliveries of other
inputs, farmers in the resettlement areas are probably
able to support only about 0.5 persons per hectare,
which places them at the upper end of productivity for
a low-input regime."
' Intermediate levels of inputs assume the use of improved hand
tools and/or draft implements, some fertilizer and pesticide appli-
cations, some simple soil conservation measures, and cultivation of
a combination of the currently grown mixture of crops and the most
calorie- (protein-) productive crops.
10 less than 50 percent of the
needed agricultural products were expected to reach the resettle-
ment areas during 1986. Despite the soil fertility of the resettlement
areas, the lack of inputs greatly reduces the productivity potential.
25X1
2 A11
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Figure 7. A Gambela Camp
Note closeness of huts and gardens next to each dwelling
Carrying capacity estimates also provide a basis for
evaluating the potential for food balance problems.
The comparison of the rural segment of the popula-
tion with the amount of suitable. agricultural land
(figure 6) shows that all of the provinces losing
farmers have rural densities of less than 1.5 persons
per hectare." This density can easily be supported
with intermediate levels of agricultural inputs, or
levels that are somewhat above the present average
levels for Ethiopia. In areas in the northern region
that were suffering from agricultural deficiencies,
therefore, the government could have helped resolve
" Welo was not included in the comparison because the portion of
the province surveyed does not have soils suitable for agriculture.
The Ethiopian Government claims that more than 60 percent of
those resettled have come from Welo Province, but we cannot verify
production problems simply by encouraging improved
agricultural practices and by providing additional
inputs. Nevertheless, even with the maximum level of
intermediate agricultural inputs, the population densi-
ties of the resettlement sites far exceed the agricul-
tural capacity of the land, making chronic food
shortages likely.
Settlement of Southwest May Be Necessary
by the Year 2000
Although the present resettlement program was clear-
ly ill advised, resettlement in the long term may be
necessary. By the year 2000, the population densities
for the rural populations in the northern provinces
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Figure 8
Potential Population Densities, Given Low Levels of Agricultural Input,
in Western Ethiopia
0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
F I
0.1 -0-5,
0.1 - 0.5a
Less than 0.1
Resettlement Areas
1 Pawe
2 Asosa North
3 Asosa South
4 Jarso
5 Gambela North
6 Gambela Central
7 Gambela South
aThese areas can support the same
number of persons per hectare, but
have different temperatures during the
growing season, determining the types of
crops that can be grown. Many northern
farmers have been moved to different
temperature areas, causing them to switch.
crops and learn new agricultural practices
further reducing overall food production.
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritatiive~
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Figure 9
Potential Population Densities, Given Intermediate Levels of Agricultural Input,
in Western Ethiopia
200 Kilometers
1.0 - 2.Oa
1.0 - 2.0a
0.5 - 1.0
0.1 - 0.5
Resettlement Areas
Pawe
Asosa North
Asosa South
Jarso
Gambela North
Gambela Central
Gambela South
aThese areas can support the same
number of persons per hectare, but
have different temperatures during the
growing season, determining the types of
crops that can be grown. Many northern
farmers have been moved to different
temperature areas, causing them to switch
crops and learn new agricultural practices,
further reducing overall food production.
Boundary repres entatlon is
not necessarily author) tatlvel
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Table 2
Harvest Figures for Selected Resettlement Areas,
September 1985-March 1986
Total Grain Harvest
(metric tons)
Approximate Number of Estimated Camp
People Sustainable for One Year Population
(198 kilograms/year/person)
4,040
may approach the maximum number of people that
can be maintained on the available land without
dramatic increases in agricultural inputs. Because the
intensification of farming is likely to increase little
over the next decade, the redistribution of portions of
the population, as a program to accommodate future
growth, does have some longer term merit. However,
there does not appear to be an immediate need for
resettlement to relieve population pressures in most of
the regions.
Following the intense international criticism of the
resettlement program, the government ceased the
movement of people in late 1985 and entered a
"consolidation" phase.
we believe the resettlement
that is likely to start in March will involve the
relocation of an additional 500,000 people during the
25X1 next two to three years.12
25X1
25X1
situation
the harvests in the resettlement areas have
been woefully short of the required levels to sustain
the populations in the camps (table 2). These short-
ages will continue for the foreseeable future, and the
introduction of new settlers will only exacerbate the
We believe that the Ethiopian Government will pur-
sue the second phase of relocation, despite the in-
creased food shortages and the potential for further
international criticism. Within Ethiopia, the move-
ment of additional people will provide Mengistu with
an opportunity to demonstrate his control of the
situation in the north and deny the seccessionists the
potential support of another 500,000 people. Also,
resettling the farmers in the southwestern camps fits
Mengistu's plans for the eventual collectivization of
all agriculture in Ethiopia.
Mengistu will continue to defend himself against
international criticism of the resettlement program,
no doubt arguing that the program is designed pri-
marily for humanitarian purposes. Mengistu has
already taken steps to improve conditions in some of
the camps, probably in response to previous criticism
of resettlement. During early 1986, for example,
8,000 families were reportedly moved within the
Gambela resettlement area because of poor drainage
in their first site 25X1
E::Jimilar internal relocation is taking place there 25X1
(figure 10) and that a considerable number of tractors
have been shipped to the area (figure 11)." Another
indication of Mengistu's efforts to improve the settle-
ment camps is the substantial increase in the percent
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of the country's budget earmarked for resettlement-
up from 0.7 percent to 6.2 percent-in the current
fiscal year's budget. Lastly, Mengistu has avoided
widespread starvation within the resettlement camps
25X1 by diverting aid from some of the Western nations to
the camps.
We believe the Mengistu regime will proceed as
planned with the second phase of resettlement. Al-
though the extent of the resettlement in the second
phase is likely to be on a smaller scale than that
witnessed during 1985-500,000 people during a two-
to-three-year period versus 600,000 people resettled in
1985-it nevertheless represents a major effort. In
our view, undertaking the second phase of resettle-
ment will result in a considerable loss of life in the
transit camps. In addition, a sharp and rapid increase
in the size of the populations within the resettlement
camps themselves would create serious shortfalls in
available food supplies, increasing the level of hunger
and misery already present in the camps.
The Mengistu regime may press for more Western
agricultural assistance to ease the problems inherent
in attempting another phase of resettlement. Consid-
erable agricultural assistance is already being provid-
ed to Ethiopia by the West and more than $250
million is pledged for the next few years. None of the
aid has been linked to resettlement, but even if the aid
is not shifted to this effort, it provides the Mengistu
regime with some flexibility to pursue the resettle-
ment program. Although the United States makes its
aid available through private voluntary organizations
and can stipulate that it may not be used in the
resettlement areas, most other Western aid is given
25X1 directly to and is controlled by the Ethiopian Govern-
ment.
Although the establishment of settled areas in the
southwestern provinces will serve to strengthen
Mengistu's political control over the population and
will aid his plans for collective agriculture, our analy-
sis suggests that, within the next 10 to 15 years,
population pressures in the rest of the country may
make the settlement of the southwest inevitable.
Given that considerable development is needed before
the region can support the numbers of people that
Ethiopia receives more Soviet economic aid than any
other Sub-Saharan African country. Some $600 mil-
lion has already been given to Ethiopia, with pledges
made for another $700 million. The Soviets have also
played a major part in helping the Ethiopians develop
a 10 year economic plan.
Despite these efforts, the Soviets have been somewhat
critical of Mengistu's overall efforts to collectivize
agriculture, of which resettlement is one part. Believ-
ing the Ethiopians are moving too rapidly in applying
Marxist economic measures to their underdeveloped
economy, the Soviets have recommended a number of
reform measures similar to those suggested by the
World Bank and the European Community. Empha-
sizing the need to increase the productivity of Ethio-
pian peasant agriculture, the Soviets have also sug-
gested improving credit for the farmer and increasing
access to consumer and industrial goods, as well as
establishing flexible pricing for farm produce. F_
The Soviets have not ignored the resettlement pro-
gram, however, and have provided substantial logistic
assistance-mostly helicopter and truck support to
move people to resettlement areas-and some medi-
cal aid in the camps. Perhaps the Soviets' largest
contribution to resettlement has been their unwilling-
ness to exert any influence on Ethiopia to help curb
some of the excesses of the program. According to US
Embassy reporting, the Soviets view resettlement as
an internal matter for the Ethiopians and US interest
in the program as an infringement on Ethiopian
sovereignty
may eventually have to live there, we believe the
consolidation phase should be continued. Rather than
increasing the population of the existing camps
and/or establishing new camps, an upgrading of the
existing resettlement camps-at their present popula-
tion levels-would not only help prepare the south-
west for its long-term growth but, in the short term,
may help alleviate the suffering endured by those now
forced to live in the camps.
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Appendix A
Assessment of Soils in
Ethiopian Resettlement Areas
On the basis of our analysis of maps prepared by the
US Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation
Service (USDA SCS), we assessed the soils in each of
the Ethiopian resettlement camps as follows 14 (figure
12):
Pawe
The soils in the Pawe camp (Gojam Province) are
rated as severely limited, susceptible to erosion, and
only moderately fertile. Their internal drainage is
rated as slow to very slow, meaning that added water
flows away so slowly that free water lies on the
surface for long periods.
Asosa
The soils in the Asosa camp (Welega Province) are
severely limited, with a moderate to moderately high
level of fertility. The area is rolling, with slopes of 8 to
15 percent. Internal drainage is slow to very slow.
Because of the slope, excess water can run off and
cause erosion. In addition, some of the area may
require supplemental irrigation.
Jarso
The soils of Jarso (Welega Province) are generally
rated as severely limited, but with approximately one-
fourth of the land rated as very severely limited. The
" The areas selected for mapping were those areas considered most
likely to be the source of resettlers. Consequently, only a portion of
Tigray and a portion of Welo were mapped. The maps were
prepared on 1:1,000,000 base maps, with slope determinations
derived from interpretations of 1:500,000 topographic maps, SCS
1:1,000,000 soil maps, and Landsat imagery.
severely limited land has a high degree of fertility but
cracks when dry and swells when wet. Not only can
such shrinking and swelling damage roads and build-
ing foundations, but it also can cause serious injury to
plant roots. In addition, the permeability of the soil
(rate at which water enters the soil) is slow, as is the
internal drainage. These factors could lead to stand-
ing water at times.
The portion of Jarso rated as very severely limited is
considered moderate to moderately high in fertility.
The land is rolling, however, with slopes of 3 to 15
percent. The internal drainage is slow to very slow,
which increases the susceptibility to erosion. Supple-
mental irrigation may also be required in some areas.
Gambela
The soils of all three camps in Gambela (Ilubabor
Province) are classified the same as the soils in the
larger portion of Jarso. Although the soils have a high
degree of fertility, they are severely limited by shrink-
ing and swelling actions, as well as by slow rates of
permeability and internal drainage.
A detailed USDA map that rates the soil at the major taxon
level is available on request. The USDA SCS Land Capability
Classification System map is included with this study because it is a
highly generalized scheme and provides the user with a quick
evaluation of the soils. It is most convenient for a study such as this,
which compares large areas of land. The system is principally
associated with machine agriculture in the United States but is
nevertheless applicable to most parts of the world. In areas where
hand labor is readily available-as it may be in parts of Ethiopia-
it is possible that intensive use of erosion-control measures may
make some soils usable for cropland that would normally be
suitable only for hayland or pasture. Nevertheless, the user should
not fail to consider the basic features that led to the initial poor
classification.)
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Appendix B
Health Factors in the
Ethiopian Resettlement Areas
Numerous human and animal diseases are endemic in
the southwestern resettlement areas of Ethiopia. The
following is a brief description of the major diseases
that new settlers and their livestock are likely to
encounter:
Malaria is a mosquito-borne parasitic infection that
destroys the red blood cells and other components of
the blood-forming system. Of the various types of
malaria, falciparum is the greatest potential threat to
the Ethiopian resettlement populations. Drug-resis-
tant falciparum strains have been reported in coun-
tries bordering Ethiopia, and it would not be surpris-
ing for these strains to appear in the resettlement
areas. Control of malaria is achieved by suppressing
the transmitting mosquito populations by drainage
and insecticides; by installing physical barriers to the
mosquitoes, such as bed nets and window and door
screens; and by identifying and treating infectious
cases.
Yellowfever is a mosquito-borne viral infection that
causes acute illness, with severe liver damage and
hemorrhaging in fatal cases; mortality rates vary from
5 to 50 percent. Control is achieved by a combination
of mosquito suppression and immunization. The hu-
man vaccines are highly effective and provide at least
10 years of protection.
Schistosomiasis is a parasitic infection communicated
to humans from water inhabited by the parasite's
snail host and containing the microscopie free-
swimming form of the organism. In Ethiopia, surface
waters that drain into the Nile and Omo Rivers are
known to be widely infected. The resulting disease can
be either acute or chronic. The schisto species of the
Nile basin typically cause urinary bladder problems,
often complicated by secondary infection from other
organisms. Kidney damage may occur with long-
standing infection. Acute responses to heavy infection
can be severe, including spinal cord injury and/or
fatality. Control of schistosomiasis can be attained by
avoiding exposure to infected water, by eradicating
snail hosts with molluscocidal chemicals, and by
identifying and treating cases. Extensive effort is
required for adequate control and has rarely been
achieved in heavily infected regions.
African tyrpanosomiasis is a parasitic infection trans-
mitted by the tsetse fly and is a danger to both
humans and livestock. Untreated humans succumb
after months to years, depending on the infecting
species of parasite, to a wasting illness often accompa-
nied by progressive brain injury signaled by mental
deterioration-colloquially termed sleeping sickness.
Control of trypanosomiasis is by eradication of the
tsetse fly through brush clearing, spraying, or trap-
ping. Treatment may be successful if begun early.n 25X1
Viral hemorrhagic fevers of various types could affect
populations in southwestern Ethiopia. Rift Valley
fever is mosquito borne. A mild and self-limiting flu-
like illness results from most infections with this virus, 25X1
and about 1 percent of the cases is fatal. Crimean-
Congo is a much more dangerous virus; fatality rates
of up to 50 percent have been reported. Lassa fever is
passed directly to man by wild rodents and results in
fatalities in 20 percent of the cases. Lethality rates of
about 60 percent have been caused by Ebola fever.
For each of the viruses, the only strategy for control is
to avoid exposure to the known animal reservoirs, to 25X1
insect vectors, or to infected cases. There is no
effective specific treatment for any of these illnesses,
and support care may be ineffective in severe cases.
Tuberculosis is believed to have been present in many
unrecognized cases in Ethiopia, even before the fam-
ine and resettlement crises began. This infection often
produces relatively stable debilitating chronic illness
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in well-nourished adults, but is frequently fatal in Rinderpest is a viral disease that affects cattle, buffa-
children, pregnant women, and those who are mal- loes, game animals, sheep, and goats; the mortality
nourished or stressed by other illnesses. Because of rate is between 50 and 100 percent. It can be
both man-to-man and animal-to-man infection chains, controlled through vaccination
control depends on finding and treating human cases
simultaneous with eradicating the infection from Anthrax is a bacterial disease, that can infect cattle,
milk-producing animals. 0 buffaloes, sheep, goats, pigs, horses, and elephants. It
results in high fever and sudden death in 100 percent
Epidemic typhus is a rickettsial disease transmitted of the cases. It can be controlled by annual
by the human body louse. The disease produces a rash vaccination.=
and fever, with death seen in 10 to 40 percent of
untreated cases. Early treatment with tetracycline- Foot-and-mouth disease can be cauged by several
type antibiotics is quite effective, and a single tablet different strains of viruses that affect cattle, sheep,
of a long-acting form (doxycycline) is curative. These goats, and pigs. The rate of mortality is usually low,
drugs can also be used as a prophylaxis to control an except in young animals. The diseases can be con-
outbreak. Vaccines have been developed but are not trolled through vaccination every four to six months.
currently in production, nor is their safety or efficacy
fully established. Louse eradication with insecticides
is an effective alternate form of control, although
louse resistance to some common insecticides has been
observed. Cultural practices of dressing hair with
animal dung may make louse eradication difficult.
Diarrheal diseases, including cholera, could pose a
constant threat to resettled populations in areas that
do not have sufficient fly control, access to clean
water, and adequate waste disposal. Under such con-
ditions, diarrheal diseases, such as bacterial and
amoebic dysentery, toxigenic E. coli infection, chol-
era, and rota virus infection of infants and children
can take a terrible toll. Although not always fatal,
these diseases can contribute to general loss of resis-
tance to the other diseases described, and all interact
with malnutrition to give increased lethality.
African trypanosomiasis is a systemic parasite of all
domestic animals that can be transmitted to man. It is
transmitted between hosts by the tsetse fly. The
common acute form usually results in death, but some
animals survive and develop a lifelong chronic form
that causes weight loss and reproductive failure.
Control of the transmitting fly is the only protection
for livestock; there is no vaccine or treatment.
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 Figure 12
Soils in Western Ethiopia
Resettlement camps
1 Pawe
2 Asosa North
3 Asosa South
4 Jarso
5 Gambela North
6 Gambela Central
7 Gambela South
Boundary representation is not
necessarily authoritative.
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USDA Land Capacity Classification System
Primary classes a
*Addis
Ababa
Class II
? Some limitations.
? Restricts type of plants or requires easily
applied and moderate conservation practices.
? When cultivated, needs careful soil management,
including conservation practices, to prevent
deterioration or to improve air and water
relationships.
? Safe for cultivated crops, pasture, range,
forest, or wildlife habitat.
Class III
? Severe limitations.
? Restricts type of plants or requires special
conservation practices, or both.
? Conservation practices usually difficult
to apply and maintain.
? Safe for cultivated crops, pasture, forest,
range, or wildlife habitat.
Class IV
? Very severe limitations.
? Restricts type of plants or requires very
careful management, or both.
? When cultivated, careful management required.
? Conservation practices difficult to
apply and to maintain.
? Safe for crops, pasture, forest, range,
or wildlife habitat.
Class V
? Limitations restrict use mainly to pasture,
range, forest, and wildlife habitat.
? Cultivation impractical: little or no erosion
hazard and nearly level, but soils wet, frequently
flooded, stony and climatically limited,
or some combination of these.
? Severe limitations.
? Generally unsuited to cultivation.
? Mainly suited to pasture, range, forest,
or wildlife habitat.
? If needed, physical condition can be improved
for range or pasture with seeding, liming,
fertilizing, and water control by contour
furrows, drainage ditches, diversions,
or water spreaders.
Class VII
? Very severe limitations.
? Unsuited to cultivation.
? Mainly suited to grazing, forest, or wildlife
habitat, but characteristics and local climate
may reduce suitability for growing trees.
? Physical condition makes pasture or range
improvements, as cited in Class VI, impractical.
Subclasses
Erosion hazard. Consists of soils for which
susceptibility to erosion or past erosion damage
is the dominant problem or hazard.
Excess water. Consists of soils in which
excess water is the dominant hazard or
limitation. Poor soil drainage, wetness,
high water table, and overflow are criteria
for classification.
Other unfavorable soil conditions. Consists
of soils in which the characteristics of
the root zone soils are the dominant
limitations. These characteristics include
shallowness, stoniness, low moisture-holding
capacity, salinity or sodicity, and low fertility
or acidity, which are difficult to correct.
Climate limitation. Consists of soils for which
temperature and lack of moisture are the major
hazard or limitation.
Even if two limitations that can be modified or corrected are nearly
equal, assignment of subclasses must retain the e, w, s, c order of priority,
a Classes I and VIII do not occur in study area.
150 Kilometers
0 150 Statute Miles
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/07 : CIA-RDP87T01127R001201110008-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/07: CIA-RDP87TO1127R001201110008-4
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/07: CIA-RDP87TO1127R001201110008-4