AFGHANISTAN'S FOOD BALANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIME AND THE INSURGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R001201050003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Afghanistan's Food Balance:
Implications for the Re ime
and the Insurgents
A Research Paper
001/22,;/0020/0079c6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reverse Blank
Afghanistan's Food Balance:
Implications for the Regime
and the Insurgents
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues,
. It was coordinated with the
Agency for International Development.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Strategic Resources Division,
OGI
Secret
GI 87-10001
January 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of! December 1986
was used in this report.
Afghanistan's Food Balance:
Implications for the Regime
and the Insurgents
Since the Soviet invasion, Afghan farmers have generally been able to
maintain adequate food supplies, but the task is becoming increasingly
difficult. Only by drastically cutting production of cash crops?particularly
cotton and sugar beets in the northern provinces?and replanting the land
to wheat, have farmers been able to keep food output near prewar levels.
While this is a natural adjustment in a wartime environment, most of the
gains in food production that such actions can provide have already been
achieved. Consequently, it will become increasingly difficult to offset losses
in output from combat operations, or greater demand from population
growth, through increased indigenous production.
The war has had significant impacts on agricultural activities in Afghani-
stan, but our analysis indicates that direct losses from the fighting have
been important only in localized areas. These are generally along the
Pakistan border where much of the heavy fighting has occurred. Despite
numerous human-source reports to the contrary, we have strong evidence
that neither the Soviets nor the Afghan central government is engaged in a
nationwide "scorched earth" policy. little intentional
agricultural destruction of any kind even in areas where fighting has been
intense. Land abandonment because of the fighting is much more extensive
than intentional crop destruction. However, we believe that, in the worst
case, less than 5 percent of previously cultivated land on a countrywide
basis has been abandoned, and that the areas of greatest abandonment are
confined primarily to the eastern regions bordering Pakistan.
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While overall food production seems adequate, war-driven urbanization
and transportation difficulties are creating increasingly severe food supply
problems in the cities the transportation of 25X1
food, especially from the eastern and southern provinces to Kabul, is
becoming more difficult because of the fighting and destruction of the road
system. While the rapidly growing populations of Kabul and other cities
will most likely become more dependent on the Soviets for supplies, most
subsistence farmers?about 70 to 80 percent of the Afghan population?
should have sufficient food over the next few years, barring drought.
To maintain urban supplies over the next few years, the Soviets will have to
ship increasing amounts of food?primarily wheat?over roads from the
north. This transportation network has been better maintained and secured
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than the routes to the south and east because it also is the lifeline for mili-
tary supplies to the Kabul region. The economic burden of feeding the
cities has been relatively light for the Soviets?in particular because wheat
has been relatively cheap in the international marketplace in recent years.
Moreover, supplying food rather than the agrotechnology to increase
Afghan food output gives the government and the Soviets greater direct
control over the urban population.
Although food supplies are generally more ample in rural areas than in the
cities, the Afghan resistance also faces serious problems. Acquiring food
from farmers and local bazaars is likely to become increasingly difficult, at
least in the eastern provinces, because planted area there has been reduced,
and manpower is insufficient to maintain irrigation systems and produce
crop surpluses. Furthermore, in nearly all areas of the country, the
insurgents can expect temporary shortages of perishable nongrain and
livestock products?fresh vegetables and fruits for example?when the
fighting disrupts their movement to local bazaars.
While insurgent groups outside the eastern provinces have better local
sources of food, they face more difficult problems when the harvest is poor.
Because of the great distance insurgents in these provinces must travel to
friendly borders and supply sources, the transportation of perishable or
bulky foods, such as vegetables, sugar, and cooking oil, is more difficult. In
our judgment, periodic shortages of some of these foods are more likely to
occur than grain shortages in these regions because they cannot be stored
like grain in good years for use when the rains fail.
For all segments of the population, trends seem to point toward a
deteriorating Afghan food situation. Substantial investments are needed in
the agricultural sector in the next few years, but Soviet agrotechnological
trade and aid is not sufficient to reverse the trend toward falling, or at best
stagnating, agricultural output. Western experts believe that more exten-
sive use of chemical fertilizer alone could nearly double wheat yields, but
the Afghans have only one fertilizer plant, built with Soviet aid before the
invasion, and we believe it is operating at near capacity. The, inadequate
road network and high transportation costs make countrywide distribution
of substantial amounts of imported fertilizer nearly impossible. The effects
of military operations on transportation and the lack of investment funds
for new plants compound the problems.
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Even if peace were restored, Afghanistan would probably require at least a
decade of foreign aid?both food supplies and agrotechnology?to become
nearly self-sufficient again in food production as it was in the 1970s. Land
that was once productive will require extensive preparation before it will
produce at previous levels. Irrigation systems that have fallen into disrepair
will have to be rebuilt. Seed stocks and agricultural implements will have
to be provided, and farm villages will have to be reestablished. Moreover,
given the current rapidly growing population and stagnating agricultural
yields, any future Afghan government?no matter how well disposed?will
be unable to absorb the approximately 4 million refugees now living in
Pakistan and Iran without substantial food assistance.
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Contents
Page
Summary
Hi
Background
1
Trends in Agricultural Output
2
Maintaining Wheat Production
2
Cash Crop Production Falls
4
Livestock Output Little Affected
7
The Impact of Combat on Output
8
Trends in Food Availability
11
Rural Population Fares Better Than Urban
11
Transportation: The Weak Link in the Food Supply Chain
11
Food Prices Up
12
The Outlook
12
The Next Two Years
12
The End of the Decade and Beyond
15
Implications
16
For the Soviets
16
For Western Aid Donors
16
For the Insurgents
16
Appendixes
A. Road Conditions in Afghanistan
19
B. Developments in Food Prices
21
C. Population Trends
23
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Figure 1
Principal Crops and Cropland in Afghanistan
China
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r
Boundary representation
not necessarily authoritative\
' is
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6 Sugar beets c5 Citrus
Sugarcane s Cotton
11.? Grapes (for export)
T: Raisins (for export)
Irrigated agriculture
Dryland agriculture
0 150 Kilometers
1,
0 150 Miles
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Afghanistan's Food Balance:
Implications for the Regime
and the Insurgents
Background
The adequate performance of its agricultural sector is
critical to Afghanistan's economic well-being and to
the provisioning of the urban population. Since the
Soviet invasion in late 1979, population growth, the
flight of farmers from combat areas, stagnating food
production, and disruption of the internal transporta-
tion network have forced the regime to import sub-
stantial quantities of foodstuffs to cover shortfalls in
food supplies, especially in the rapidly growing cities.
Although agriculture is the most important sector of
Afghanistan's economy, supporting as much as 80
percent of the nation's population and accounting for
about one-third of all exports, the country is largely
unsuitable for farming. Mountains, deserts, and forest
extend across most of the country and only about 12
percent of the total area is arable. Furthermore, less
than half of the arable land is cultivated because of
the limited availability of water.' Approximately 85
percent of Afghanistan's agricultural production is
from irrigated crops, and approximately 90 percent of
all cropland is sown to grains?wheat, corn, rice,
barley, and millet. Fruits, vegetables, and cash crops
including cotton, sugar beets, oilseeds, and poppies
account for the remainder of the planted area.
Wheat, the staple of the Afghan diet, comprises 60
percent of the grain production. Wheat yields in
Afghanistan are low by world standards and are only
two-thirds those achieved in adjacent areas of the
Soviet Union.' Despite low yields, Afghanistan's tra-
ditional wheat varieties tend to produce stable yields
' We estimate that some 3.3 million hectares of Afghanistan's
agricultural area are irrigated. Dryland crops, mostly located in the
foothills of the northern plains, are estimated at 900,000 hectares.
'In recent years irrigated wheat crops in Afghanistan have aver-
aged about 1.6 to 1.7 metric tons per hectare and dryland crops 0.5
to 0.6 tons per hectare. By comparison, winter wheat in the area of
the USSR adjacent to Afghanistan averaged 2.4 tons per irrigated
hectare and 1 ton per hectare on dryland during 1976-80.
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Increasing Opium Poppy Cultivation
The amount of land devoted to poppy cultivation has
increased dramatically in recent years. However, in
1985 total planted area still amounted to only about
10,000 hectares, and the number of farmers involved
in growing the plant was relatively small compared
with the number growing food crops. Nonetheless,
opium poppies are an ideal cash crop for subsistence
farmers when wartime conditions disrupt commerce
in traditional crops. Profits from poppies are as much
as two to three times more than the next most
profitable crop, yet cultivation costs are low. Poppies
are a hearty, multipurpose crop that yield a variety of
products besides opium gum. The seeds can be eaten
whole or processed into poppyseed cake or edible oil,
the seed pods can be used for medicines or liquor, the
straw for fuel, and the resulting ash for soap. Because
opium does not spoil, it can be stored or stockpiled
indefinitely.
because they are well adapted to the harsh environ-
ment. As a result, grain production does not show
wide fluctuations from year to year.
Two-thirds of the Afghan population rely on livestock
raising for a major portion of their income and food
requirements. Sheep and goats are the principal
sources of red meat, and wool, hides, and pelts are
important export items. Cattle (oxen) are the major
source of draft power for agriculture. Milk and milk
products from cows, sheep, and goats are the chief
sources of animal protein and a significant portion of
the diet of many families. Meat, however, is generally
considered a luxury except among the nomads. UN
statistics for the last 10 years indicate that on average
livestock herds consist of about 80 percent sheep and
goats, 13 percent cattle, and the remainder beasts of
burden?such as camels, horses, and mules.
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Wheat and Livestock Outlook for 1986
Afghan farmers should harvest a slightly-above-
average wheat crop in 1986. Analysis of meteorologi-
cal data indicates precipitation during March 1986?
a critical month for winter wheat in Afghanistan?
averaged about 75 percent higher than during March
1985.
We do not know how
much precipitation fell during the remainder of the
year, but rivers and
streams flowing at normal levels all during the
summer. Water in the Ghazni and Kabul reservoirs
was also observed at normal levels during
the summer. early-to-mid-May
indicated vigorous crop growth throughout the coun-
try.
In the border provinces of Nangarhar, Paktia, and
Konarha, where fighting has been very heavy and
abandonment of agricultural land the greatest, grain
crops looked healthy
throughout the growing season. Fair to good yields?
based on the number of grain shocks a stacked in the
fields this year compared with previous years?were
observed at harvest time in these three provinces.
Elsewhere yields at harvest time, on average, ap-
peared equal to or better than last year:
? Good irrigated winter grain yields were observed in
the eastern provinces of Parvan, Vardak, Ghazni,
Lowgar, and Kabol.
? In the northern provinces near or along the border
with the Soviet Union?Badakhshan, Takhar, Kon-
duz, Baghlan, Balkh, Badghis, and Jowzjan?
yields of dry/and and irrigated winter grains
a When grain is hand harvested it is placed upright in small
piles?"shocks"?to dry.
appeared to be good to excellent. Late season
crops, principally corn, but to a lesser extent also
rice, could have been damaged by a reported late
summer drought.
? In the western provinces we observed good yields in
Farah and excellent yields in Herat at harvest time.
Light-to-heavy grain lodging?generally another in-
dicator of excellent yields?was also seen through-
out Herat before the harvest.
? We believe growing conditions in Bamian were
representative of those in the central provinces of
the country this year, and the yields observed in the
province ranged from good to excellent.
? Good-to-excellent yields were observed in the
southern provinces of Helmand and Qandahar.
Continued fighting around Qandahar City has ad-
versely affected agriculture near the city, but good
yields were observed beyond the area of intensive
fighting.
Although overall growing conditions in Afghanistan
have been good this year?excluding the impact of
the war?potential yields are limited nationwide by
poor quality seed and a lack of agrochemicals. As a
result, a crop exceeding the record production of 1976
by more than a few percent is highly unlikely.
Since the 1985186 winter was not abnormally severe,
and because we have received no information indicat-
ing above-average losses due to disease, we believe
the size of the livestock herds is probably little
changed from last year.
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Figure 2
Afghanistan: Share of Agricultural
Land by Major Crops
Percent
Industrial crops 4
Fruits and
vegetables 6
Other grain
crops 30
Wheat 60
311377 1-87
Trends in Agricultural Output
Our analysis indicates that production of food staples
in Afghanistan has held up remarkably well since the
Soviet invasion. Given a wartime environment, we
attribute this performance primarily to the subsis-
tence nature of Afghan agriculture: the Afghan farm-
er places a higher priority on food self-sufficiency
than on the production of cash crops. The output of
most cash crops has fallen well below prewar levels,
despite the urgings of the central goverment to in-
crease production.
Maintaining Wheat Production. Subsistence farmers
in Afghanistan have maintained wheat output even
though some traditional wheat-growing areas have
been taken out of production by the fighting. They
have done so by growing wheat in areas usually
reserved for cash crops such as cotton and sugar beets.
this
displacement is most pronounced in the northern
provinces. This assessment is generally consistent with
reports from visitors to the region and with published
Afghan statistics that indicate that average annual
wheat production increased slightly during 1980-84
while cotton and sugar beet production declined sub-
stantially.
3
Figure 3
Afghanistan: Changes in Major Crop
Production, 1975-79 Versus 1980-84
Percent
Wheat
Maize
Rice
Barley
Cotton
Vegetables
and melons
Fruits
Sugar beets
-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40
311378 1.87
Wheat production has been maintained at the expense
of these industrial crops because:
? The first concern of Afghan subsistence farmers is
to provide sufficient food?wheat?for their own
families. Most of their other essential needs can be
met by bartering food crops.
? Wheat production is less labor intensive than the
production of industrial crops.' Thus it has been less
affected by men being conscripted for military duty,
volunteering to fight with insurgents, or emigrating.
For example, cotton production in the United States during 1960-
64 required 16 times more man-hours per acre than wheat;
moreover, US cotton agrotechnology during the period was much
further advanced than cotton agrotechnology in Afghanistan today.
Source: Agricultural Statistics 1985, United States Department of
Agriculture.
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Table 1
Afghanistan: Selected Crop Production, 1975-84
Thousand metric tons
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1975-79
Average
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984 a
1980-84
Average a
Wheat
2,850
2,936
2,652
2,813
2,663
2,782
2,750
2,850
2,862
2,900
2,860
2,844
Maize
780
800
760
780
760
776
797
798
800
806 a
790
798
Rice
435
448
400
428
439
430
461
475
473
480 a
479
473
Barley
384
400
300
325
318
345
321
330
329a
336a
332
329
Cotton (unginned)
160a
159a
137a
132
105
139
65
60
55a
50a
68
59
Vegetables and melons
720a
736
660a
766a
804a
737
828a
865a
912a
93?
932
893
Fruits
880a
795
692a
824a
836a
805
891a
913a
920a
930a
940
918
Sugarcane
60a
68
64
64
64
64
70
70
72a
73
73
71
Sugar beets
100 a
91
97
73
70
86
35
20
45
16a
26
28
a Data provided by the Afghan Central Statistical Office to the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
b Estimate provided by Afghan Government to UN FAO.
All other statistics were provided by Afghanistan to the UN Food
and Agricultural Organization.
? The price of wheat rose relative to cotton from 1979
to 1984, leading Afghan farmers to reduce the area
planted to cotton in favor of wheat.
? Wheat price increases also have probably led Af-
ghan farmers to shift some of the best cotton land to
wheat production and the poorer wheat land to
cotton. While this tactic leaves the amount of land
devoted to both crops unchanged, it enhances wheat
yields at the expense of cotton.
Higher wheat yields in northern Afghanistan also
may have helped keep wheat production up because
fields there may have received a disproportionately
high amount of fertilizer. This is possible because the
areas where cash crops are likely to have been
replaced by wheat are relatively near Afghanistan's
only fertilizer plant, the Mazar-e Sharif urea plant.
The roads are also generally in good condition in the
northern provinces, allowing relatively easy movement
of agrochemicals and farm equipment.
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Cash Crop Production Falls. Analysis of export/im-
port statistics indicates that the production of other
cash crops besides cotton and sugar beets is also
down:4
? International Sugar Organization and FAO statis-
tics show that Afghan sugar imports have increased
about 20 percent between 1976-79 and .1980-83,
indicating that cane production is probably drop-
ping. The figures understate actual imports because
they do not include Soviet grant aid, which the
Afghans indicate amounted to 49,000 tons during
the 1981-83 period alone. Cane is grown only in
Nangarhar Province, which borders Pakistan in
In some cases, we had to resort to the use of export/import
statistics for indications of production trends because of the
unreliability of official production statistics. For example, in some
years official Afghan sugarcane statistics indicate the impossible
situation of constant area planted, rising yields, and unchanged
production
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Table 2
Afghanistan: Sugar Imports
Metric tons
1976
1977
1978
1979
1976-79
Average
1980
1981
1982
1983
1980-83
Average
Imports a according to:
International Sugar
Organization
60,000
58,000
60,228
91,226
67,364
61,785
64,979
147,390
67,076
85,308
United Nations FAO
55,200 b
47,200
81,157
92,226
68,946
56,315
72,000
135,792
55,600
79,927
a Not including grants.
b Provided to FAO by Afghanistan as an estimate.
Table 3
Afghanistan: Export Statistics for Dried Fruit, 1977-84 a
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Value
(million US $)
84.2
100.3
175.4
169.5
171.4
154.0
192.0
NA
Quantity
(thousand metric tons)
79.7
58.2
93.6
89.1
100.5
96.9
111.3
80.5
Price
(US $ per ton)
1,056.5
1,723.4
1,873.9
1,902.4
1,705.5
1,589.3
1,725.1
NA
Source: Central Statistical Office, Kabul. Data extracted from
IMF reports.
a Figures vary slightly from source report because of rounding
procedures.
east-central Afghanistan. We believe that the
heavy fighting there has probably caused a signifi-
cant decline in production.
? Exports of citrus fell sharply after 1979. Although
reliable statistics on citrus output are not available,
we believe, on the basis of declining export volumes,
that production has dropped dramatically. Accord-
ing to official Afghan statistics, average annual
exports of oranges fell from about 5,000 tons per
5
year during 1976-79 to about 1,500 tons per year
during 1980-84. Like sugarcane, citrus is grown
primarily in Nangarhar Province.
The only major success story in Afghan agriculture,
excluding opium, is the upward trend in the produc-
tion and export of dried fruits, mostly raisins, which
have been a major export item for many years.
Average annual exports of dried fruits increased from
77,200 tons during 1977-79 to 95,500 tons during
1980-82. Dried fruits have probably made a good
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Figure 4
Estimated Sheep Density by Province in Afghanistan, 1985
Sheep per square kilometer
0 20
50
80
110
140
170
0 52
130
207
285
363
440
Sheep per square mile
720,500 Number of sheep in province
0 150 Kilometers
I
150 Miles
Iran
Iran
BacIghis
796,600
Herat
433,000
Farah
527,600
Faryab
1,106,200
Ghowr
433,000
Helmand
336,600
Nimraz
720,500
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1,1Balkh
90,100
Jowzgan
527,600
Ortizgan
433,000
Qandahar
191,000
Soviet Union
Samangan
,299,10
B??
673,200
Zabol
onduz
16,90
Badakhshan
Takhir 624,000
13,400
Baghlan
1,442,800
arvan
240,200
Vardak
240,200
Ghazni
160,000
1,060,900
Bp s
720,
Kabol
80,300
Lowger
336,00
Paktika
416,600
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
6
Paktia
527,600
Konarha
720,500
,000
Nangarhar
287,400
Pakistan
China
India
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Figure 5
Summer and Winter Sheep Pastures in Afghanistan
China
-pasture=
Gealg:Fnv Ltfie
?
(1
(d
India
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
showing because they are easily stored, less suscepti-
ble to damage on poorly maintained roads, and suffer
less spoilage when delayed en route to market?very
important characteristics in a wartime environment.
Livestock Output Little Affected. We believe?in
large part on the basis of official statistics and foreign
trade data?that the size of sheep and goat flocks has
remained relatively stable during the fighting. Sheep
are raised in all of the Afghan provinces, with goats
more prevalent in the rugged topography of the
provinces east of Kabul. The most important breed of
sheep, the Karakul, is raised almost exclusively in the
7
Eastern nomads
Southern and western nomads
Limit of winter pasture
Probable limit of winter pasture
Direction of spring migration
to summer pasture
150 Kilorneters
It
150 Miles
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northern provinces. The Karakuls, which account for
30 percent of all Afghan sheep, are wintered in the
lowlands and moved to mountain pastures for the
summer. The breed is an important meat source.
Karakul wool, moreover, is used in the village carpet
industry, and Karakul pelts (Persian lamb) have been
a major source of export earnings for decades. About
50 percent of the remaining sheep are owned by
nomads and transhumants who also migrate with
their flocks from lowlands to summer grazing lands in
the mountains. Thus, 80 percent of the sheep are
located in remote mountain pastures?for the most
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Table 4
Afghanistan: Livestock Numbers and Wool Exports
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Sheep (thousand head).
19,075
18,400
18,700
18,900
18,900*
18,900*
18,950*
Goats (thousand head) a
3,000
2,885
2,850
2,900
2,900
2,950 *
2,950 *
Wool (metric tons)
Exports b to USSR
2,980
2,839
2,572
5,540
4,943
3,150
4,390
To all importers
3,900 *
4,800 *
5,600 *
9,900 *
9,000 *
9,000 *
8,300 *
a Numbers with asterisks were provided by the Afghan Government
to the IMF. They are based on the Islamic year that ends on
20 March. All other numbers for sheep and goats are taken from
statistics provided to the UN by Afghanistan and are based on the
Gregorian calendar year.
b Statistics on Soviet wool imports from Afghanistan were extracted
from the annual publication Foreign Trade USSR published by the
USSR.
part safe from the combat during the summer months
when the fighting is most intense. The rest are kept
near owners' villages.
Providing feed for sheep and goats has apparently not
been a major problem. The country's 65 million
hectares of rangeland provide as much as 80 percent
of the feed. These lands are primarily natural pas-
tures, and their continuing productivity is determined
by the fertility of the soils, rainfall, and herd size.
Crop residues, mostly from the wheat and barley
harvests, are also an important part of animal diet
during the winter, although they are only a small part
of total feed.
The Impact of Combat on Output. Combat is directly
affecting agricultural trends by forcing the abandon-
ment of agricultural land and by causing the destruc-
tion of crops and cropland. Because it has created
labor shortages, the war is indirectly causing the
irrigation system to deteriorate.
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The most serious agricultural problem caused by the
fighting is land abandonment.' From the study of
Afghan agricultural practices, it 25X1
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is evident that:
? Abandonment of cropland has occurred primarily in
irrigated regions where combat has been heavy,
generally within 65 kilometers of the Pakistan bor-
der, such as the Konar Valley. We estimate as much
as 50 percent of the arable land along this border
has been abandoned.'
s We define abandonment as farmers leaving all farm fields unat-
tended. When it occurs, land becomes weed covered, irrigation
systems are not maintained, evidence of livestock can no longer be
found on pastures, and villages fall into
disrepair.1
It was not possible to measure precisely how
much land has been abandoned in the border areas since the
requisite coverage is not available.
Qn the basis of published reports that indicate 12 percent of
the country on average is arable, we estimate the 50-percent
abandonment in the 65-kilometer strip would amount to only 2 to 3
percent of the country's arable land.
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? Abandonment of cropland has also occurred in a
few other areas of heavy fighting, such as the
Panjsher Valley, around Jalalabad Airfield, and
near the cities of Herat and Qandahar.
To a limited extent, some abandonment has been
offset by the development of new land. We have
identified newly developed farm fields in areas im-
aged near Herat, Towraghondi, and Mazar-e Sharif
in the north, and Lashkar Gah in the south. We also
see occasional references in open source literature to
modest efforts to expand existing irrigation systems.
Such expansion may be occurring, but we have not
identified it thus far. We estimate
that about 2.5 million hectares of irrigated land were
sown annually prior to the war. Assuming the worst
case abandonment?no more than 5 percent?total
sown area would be reduced by only about 100,000
hectares.'
In areas of heavy combat, irrigation systems are
deteriorating as the result of a lack of maintenance.
The deterioration is not currently having a dramatic
impact on total national agricultural production be-
cause of its localized nature. For example, mainte-
nance on the kareez systems,' at least in the eastern
provinces, has been greatly reduced, but agriculture in
these provinces is now supporting a much smaller
population base. Moreover, open source literature
indicates that the kareez systems are used to irrigate
less than 15 percent of the cultivated land country-
wide.
while water in secondary
canals continues to flow, the canals are weed choked
in many areas. Manpower, however, is apparently
sufficient to maintain primary canals, because on
satellite imagery they appear to be clear of weeds and
water can be seen flowing into secondary canals and
fields.
Our analysis indicates that the occurrence of crop
destruction in Afghanistan?both intentional and
nonintentional?is quite limited. We believe in many
'Cultivable irrigated land in Afghanistan totals 3.3 million hect-
ares, but each year approximately 25 percent of the cultivable land
is left fallow.
g A kareez system consists of a series of wells connected at the
bottom by a tunnel, dug and maintained by hand labor. The system
can extend over many kilometers.
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Indicators of a Scorched Earth Policy
We specifically
look for:
? Wide-scale burning of crops?particularly at har-
vest time. This type of crop destruction cannot be
mistaken on imagery because individual shocks
must be torched to ensure destruction.
? Widespread destruction of irrigation systems with
explosives or munitions.
? Destruction of crops and/or irrigation systems by
tracked vehicles in areas where there is no evidence
of intense combat.
? Establishment of bivouacs, vehicle parks, gun or
other types of emplacements on active cropland
when fallow or nonagricultural land could be used.
war damage to Afghan
farms decreases in direct proportion to their distance
from the eastern borders, principal urban centers, and
the primary roads. While heavy combat has devastat-
ed some agricultural areas and undoubtedly forced
some farmers to abandon their land for the duration
of the war, in many cases we observed farm activities
resuming shortly after the fighting had ended.
cases that reports that the military intentionally de-
stroy crops and irrigation canals are accurate descrip-
tions of very localized events. There is no
evidence to indicate that either the Soviet army or
the Afghan central government is conducting a na-
tionwide "scorched earth" campaign.9 Our analysis of
at least 80 percent of all irrigated land and
9 The term "scorched earth" refers to a military policy of devastat-
ing all land and buildings so as to leave nothing salvageable to the
enemy. In the context of this paper the term refers not only to the
destruction of crops, livestock, irrigation systems, farm equipment
and supplies, but also to deliberate interference in normal agricul-
tural activities?plowing, sowing, and harvesting.
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about 30 percent of dryland agriculture revealed
fewer than 200 fields that appeared to have been
intentionally burned by the military.
Trends in Food Availability
We believe that per capita food supplies have been
generally adequate since the Soviet invasion because
of near stable domestic production of grains and
continuing wheat imports, which have been used to
offset localized changes in wheat production. There is,
however, ample reporting from refugees indicating
that disruption of the distribution system has led to
localized shortages, some of which have been severe.
Food prices have also risen steadily since the Soviet
invasion?another indication of growing shortages or
distribution problems (see appendix table B-1).
Rural Population Fares Better Than Urban. Our
analysis indicates that the grain crops during the
postinvasion years have been sufficient to feed most of
the estimated 70 to 80 percent of the Afghan popula-
tion living on farms or in farm villages. These farm
families sell only that portion of their production that
is surplus to their needs. In contrast, urban food
supplies?particularly in Kabul?are heavily depen-
dent on supplies shipped from the hinterland and
abroad and are much more susceptible to interruption.
On the basis of trends since 1979, we estimate that
approximately 290,000 to 375,000 tons of grain?
mostly wheat?was exported to Afghanistan in 1985.
Approximately 150,000 to 200,000 tons arrived from
the Soviet Union, of which 50,000 to 100,000 tons was
purchased and approximately 100,000 tons was pro-
vided as grant aid. The remainder?about 140,000 to
175,000 tons?arrived through unofficial channels
from Pakistan, primarily as supplies for the insurgents
or the remaining population in the eastern provinces.
On the basis of our estimate of the in-country popula-
tion, per capita wheat and flour availability when
combined with other foods?cereals, meats, vegeta-
bles, and fruit, for example '??should have been
adequate to prevent serious malnutrition. On a per
According to USDA estimates, wheat makes up about 49 percent
of the Afghan diet, rice about 7 percent, and corn about 16 percent.
An annual supply of traditional foods of 230 to 240 kilograms per
person would meet minimal nutritional standards.
11
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capita basis livestock numbers actually appear to be
higher now than during 1977-79 because of the
extensive emigration since then."
10 to 20 percent of sheep flocks and
20 to 30 percent of the goat population were marketed
each year in the 1970s. Assuming these marketing
rates have not changed in the 1980s?and given the
current stable size of herds coupled with the decreas-
ing population since the Soviet invasion?per capita
meat supplies should also have increased somewhat.
Because the Soviets have provided grain to make up
for most deficits, urban food supplies appear to have
been adequate for most of the population in cities
throughout 1985 and 1986, especially in Kabul. In
March and again in November 1985, for example, the
US Embassy reported that food supplies in Kabul
were generally plentiful. As long as the Soviets are
willing and able to send large amounts of wheat to the
capital, food supplies should be adequate there.
Wheat from the USSR, however, only supplements
supplies from local sources, and, in times of drought
or when the transportation system to the south and
east is disrupted, the Soviets will have to ship in-
creased amounts of wheat to Kabul.
Transportation: The Weak Link in the Food Supply
Chain. The food supply chain remains fragile, and
distribution of food could easily be disrupted by
adverse weather or by the combatants. The vast
majority of farms and farm villages are located great
distances by foot from any road and are isolated from
the principal cities, especially during the winter and
spring. Although most agricultural products are con-
sumed on the farm, the nearest village bazaar usually
serves as the collection point for surplus production.
" Unlike other breeds, most male Karakul lambs and up to one-
third of the female lambs normally are slaughtered shortly after
birth for their pelts. But, when the price of wool and/or mutton
increases relative to pelts, the lambs are raised to maturity like
other breeds. The price of mutton and wool has increased continu-
ously relative to pelts since 1979, and the quantity of pelts sold has
fallen. This implies that either more of the Karakuls are being
raised for meat or the pelts are being smuggled out of the country.
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Produce is moved from the bazaar by animal to the
closest road, and from there it is trucked to city
markets. Collateral, open sources indi-
cate that food shortages occurred in 1985 and 1986?
primarily in some localized areas in the eastern and
northern provinces?when combat operations broke
this fragile supply chain.
Afghanistan's poorly developed transportation net-
work is among the most vulnerable links in the food
distribution chain and a continuing source of prob-
lems. All food supplies must be moved by trail, road,
or air because there is no rail system. The sparsity of
all-weather roads makes it very difficult to move food
from areas with surpluses to those with deficits and
from border crossing points to the cities. Furthermore,
with supplies channeled onto a few roads, they are
more easily interdicted
we examined approximately 40
percent of the hard-surface (primary) road running
from Sheberghan and Mazar-e Sharif in the north to
Kabul and Qandahar in the east and southeast and to
Herat in the west.
evidence
of combat could be observed on nearly all segments,
indicating that it is difficult at times to move farm
produce to market, or from surplus-producing areas to
deficit areas, even when the roads are serviceable.
conditions of the roads varied
widely, but in general the roads from the northern
provinces to Kabul are better maintained than the
roads leading south from Kabul (see appendix A and
figure 7).
Food Prices Up. Changing food prices can suggest
how well the distribution system is meeting the popu-
lation's needs. Food prices in Kabul have increased
steadily since the Soviet invasion, but somewhat less
than in important provincial cities where smaller food
surpluses are probably available for sale and food
subsidies have less of an impact. The only price index
for Afghanistan, provided by the Afghan Central
Statistical Office to the World Bank, indicates that
the rise in prices in Kabul averaged about 20 percent
annually for the period 21 March 1979 to 20 March
1985 (see appendix B). It appears that the price
increase is having a significant impact on food
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availability for the poorest portion of Kabul's popula-
tion. in 1986 many of
the poor, who have fled to Kabul to escape the
fighting in the countryside, are malnourished. While
food supplies are generally adequate in the city, these
refugee families cannot afford balanced diets because
wages are low and have not increased sufficiently in
recent years to keep pace with rising prices.
The Outlook
Agricultural output and food availability will be
generally adequate for the majority of the population
over the next two years?given favorable weather and
no significant expansion of the fighting. The longer
term outlook for Afghan agriculture is less favorable,
indicating an increasing need for aid.
The Next Two Years. The Kabul regime can maintain
wheat production at the current level or even increase
it slightly at the expense of other crops, providing the
weather is favorable and fighting does not expand
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Shortfalls in Agrotechnology
Since the mid-1970s, with some Soviet assistance,
Kabul claims to have taken several steps to improve
Afghan agriculture through technology measures.
Available evidence, however, indicates that these
steps have had virtually no impact on agricultural
productivity. The most important of the agrotechno-
logy measures include: the setting up of agrochemi-
cal, soil science, and livestock insemination laborato-
ries in Balkh, Kabol, and Nangarhar Provinces; the
construction of the urea fertilizer plant at Mazar-e
Sharif; and the establishment of mechanized farming
and tractor stations in nine provinces.
Thus far, there has been no improvement in crop or
livestock output that we can attribute to the work of
the laboratories, although in 1983 the Soviet newspa-
per Selskaya Zhizn reported that the Soviet veteri-
nary service was shipping 2 million doses of cattle-
plague vaccine to Afghanistan annually. Shortages of
well-trained personnel have always been a problem,
and it is unlikely that the laboratories will have an
appreciable effect until this fundamental problem is
solved.
According to a mid-1970s World Bank study, the
greatest improvements in agricultural production
could be achieved by rapidly expanding the use of
fertilizer. Grain yield increases of 50 to 100 percent
would not be unreasonable according to the study. In
spite of the fact that the Afghans need much more
fertilizer than they produce, they continued to export
large amounts of urea from their only plant at
Mazar-e Sharif to the USSR until 1983. The amount
exported dropped dramatically in 1983 and 1984,
and, at the same time, the Soviets, apparently realiz-
ing that it is cheaper and easier to ship fertilizer than
food, began to ship limited amounts of phosporous
fertilizer to Afghanistan. However, Afghan fertilizer
consumption as late as 1984 was still extremely low,
even compared with that of its South Asian neigh-
bors. In our judgment, the fertilizer situation cannot
be improved substantially, except in the northern-
most provinces, as long as the fighting continues
because the bulky products could not safely be
distributed over the poorly developed and partially
destroyed road network.
It also seems clear that little progress is being made
in the mechanization of Afghan agriculture. On the
basis of trade statistics, it appears that the Soviets
have sold the Afghans less agricultural equipment
since the invasion than they did before. According to
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade statistics, during
1975-79 the USSR on the average annually exported
$484,000 worth of tractors to Afghanistan. During
1980 to 1984, tractor sales averaged only $431,000
annually. The dollar figures represent relatively
small numbers of tractors, on the basis of a 1976
transaction in which the Afghans paid $322,000 for
109 tractors. Furthermore, we do not believe the
Soviets are providing tractors to the Afghans as
'fraternal aid," for such gifts would almost certainly
be trumpeted in the press.
greatly. By adjusting the price paid for cotton, sugar
beets, and other crops, the central government can
induce farmers to change their crop mix to include
more foodgrain. An increase in livestock production
will be more difficult because of the lack of manpow-
er, the limitations of unimproved natural pastures,
and endemic diseases that tend to increase with herd
size.
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the greatest damage
to agriculture has occurred in the eastern border
provinces, difficulties caused by the reduction of food
supplies has been lessened by the refugee exodus. The
crop outlook is at least as good this year as last, but
localized food shortages will probably continue to
occur in these provinces because food stocks are
limited and can be quickly depleted when farmers do
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Table 6
Afghan Fertilizer Exports to the USSR
Metric tons
Granular Urea
1976
29,729
1977
18,281
1978
7,288
1979
20,700
1980
75,500
1981
51,600
1982
43,000
1983
21,400
1984
10,000
Source: Foreign Trade USSR, 1984.
not have access to their fields as a result of combat
operations. Recent reporting from refugees continues
to indicate that there are pockets of serious food
shortages, especially in the eastern border areas where
fighting is the heaviest. In Kabul, low wages and
increasing prices can effectively prevent the poorest
segment of the population from acquiring food even
though supplies are generally plentiful.
The End of the Decade and Beyond. We believe that
the overall outlook for Afghan agriculture and food
availability will generally worsen as time passes.
Because of combat, lack of investment, and growing
population (see appendix C), per capita agricultural
output in Afghanistan is likely to fall slowly or at best
stagnate during the next few years, compounding the
problems of food availability:
? Large increases (more than a few percent) in wheat
production are unlikely. Harvested area and yields
have not increased appreciably since the mid-1970s
when Afghanistan was self-sufficient in food
production.'
12 Yields averaged 1.22 tons per hectare during the three-year
period 1974-76 and only 1.23 tons per hectare from 1982 to 1984.
15
Table 7
Soviet Agricultural Equipment Sales to
Afghanistan, 1975-84
Thousand US $
Tractors
Plows
Small
Agricultural
Implements a
1975
298
11
32
1976
322
23
28
1977
973
51
92
1978
805
214
85
1979
20
0
55
1980
0
0
65
1981
282
o
14
1982
722
1983
0
0
17
1984
1,151
0
35
Source: Foreign Trade USSR, 1985
a This category most likely covers a wide variety of nonmechanized
farm equipment.
? While the population decreased during 1979-85
because of the refugee exodus, it is now increasing
at a faster rate than grain production and could
reach the preinvasion level in the early 1990s.
? Where the fighting has been most intense, the
irrigation systems are deteriorating and the capacity
of the land to produce food has been reduced. If the
refugees should return, the land could not immedi-
ately support the population levels before the
exodus.
? If irrigation systems are allowed to continue to
deteriorate, repairs will become more difficult each
year and the impact of periodic droughts will be
exacerbated.
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adequate to maintain urban food supplies, but Sovi-
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Urban food supplies depend on the Soviet/Afghan
effort to keep the roads open from the USSR to
Kabul, and the Soviets' determination to provide
adequate food supplies for the city. For the most part,
the rural farmers representing 70 to 80 percent of the
total population, grow their own food and raise their
own livestock. As a result, unless precipitation fails or
the fighting prevents them from tending their fields
and flocks, they should produce adequate food for
their own use. This subsistence approach to farming,
however, limits their ability to increase yields and
produce surplus food for the rapidly increasing popu-
lation of the cities, particularly Kabul.
Implications
For the Soviets. The longer the war continues, the
more food aid the Soviets will have to provide,
because the urban population?particularly in Ka-
bul?is increasing at a faster rate than agricultural
output in the surrounding regions. Although the Sovi-
ets have provided the Afghans with substantial
amounts of military aid, they have provided little
agrotechnology to improve the agricultural outlook.
There are, however, several reasons why the Soviets
may prefer to provide food rather than technological
aid:
? Grain and sugar, the most important foods provided
by the Soviets, are relatively cheap in the world
marketplace, whereas agricultural equipment and
some agrochemicals are in short supply in the
USSR.
? The application of agrotechnology requires an in-
vestment in infrastructure and personnel?for ex-
ample, maintenance equipment, storage facilities,
and instructors?and the costs/risks in providing
these could be considered prohibitive in a wartime
environment.
? Most of the countryside is accessible to or under the
control of the insurgents and the Soviets may
believe that any new technology introduced would
be used to the insurgents' advantage, wasted, or
destroyed.
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? Supplying food rather than improved agrotechnol-
ogy gives the Afghan Government and the Soviets
at least limited control over the urban population.
For Western Aid Donors. Western nations attempting
to provide humanitarian relief will find it increasingly
difficult to identify food deficit areas and to deter-
mine the amount of food aid required. While crop
production can be assessed , sizing
localized food shortages is very difficult because of
the lack of reliable provincial population statistics.
We believe a combination of factors, including the
partially destroyed road system, the inability of the
farmers to perform field work in areas of intense
combat, and periodic droughts, will create a continu-
ing need for food aid in localized areas of Afghani-
stan?particularly in the eastern provinces?as long
as the fighting continues.
Over the longer term, should a peace settlement be
achieved and the refugees return, we believe humani-
tarian aid will be required at least until farm villages
are rebuilt and abandoned land can be made produc-
tive again?probably for as long as a decade. The
country has made little progress in improving yields
over the last decade, has little unused arable land, and
is faced with a high population growth rate. The
backwardness of Afghan agriculture suggests that in
a peacetime environment the interests of both West-
ern nations and Afghanistan might best be served by
supplying the country agrotechnology. For example,
Western experts believe that wheat yields could be
doubled by the appropriate application of fertilizer
alone.
For the Insurgents. The insurgents are likely to find it
increasingly difficult to acquire food from local farm-
ers, particularly in the eastern provinces. Lack of
manpower to maintain irrigation systems and to meet
labor requirements during periods of peak demand?
the sowing and harvesting seasons?will limit the
ability of local farmers to produce even small surplus-
es. In addition, unless the insurgents can assure them
that they will regularly purchase their crops, these
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farmers, in our judgment, will have less incentive to
increase output because the fighting and the failure of
the transportation system limit their access to other
markets.
reports from travelers indi-
cate that the insurgents should have less difficulty
acquiring food staples in the interior of the country
and in the western and northern provinces. However,
even there weather and the fighting can also be
expected to create periodic agricultural and transpor-
tation problems. For example, dry conditions late this
summer in the northern provinces did not reduce the
1986 wheat crop, but probably caused shortages of
late season vegetables and fruits. In addition, some
essential products are derived from secondary crops?
for example, cooking oil from cotton, sesame, and
sunflower seeds?and output from these crops has
turned down since the invasion. Some of these prod-
ucts must be imported or transported long distances
and, in many cases, are more likely to be in short
supply than staples.
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Appendix B
Developments in Food Prices
The central government attempts to limit price in-
creases of consumer goods through subsidies and price
controls. According to a 1985 IMF report, direct
budgetary subsidies rose from 3.6 billion afghanis to
4.9 billion afghanis-a 36-percent increase-in the
Islamic year ending 20 March 1985. Although 75 to
85 percent of all internal Afghan trade is still carried
out in the private sector at the bazaar, government-
controlled food procurement department stores sell a
limited assortment of items at subsidized prices to the
general public. Additional discounts on selected items
are given to civil servants through a system of coupons
distributed by their employers. This system applies to
bank employees and most public enterprises; however,
any public-sector employee excluded from this system
is compensated in cash for the difference by the
government.
The only available price index on Afghanistan is for
the city of Kabul (table B-1). This index, supplied by
the Afghan Central Statistical Office to the World
Bank, is based on the prices of 50 commodities and
uses weights based on a 1960 survey of household
items. The index is biased downward because of
special conditions in Kabul that do not exist in the rest
of the country-special subsidies and stores for public
employees. According to the index, Kabul's rate of
inflation has increased steadily since the invasion with
the exception of 1982 when it dropped to 16.6 percent
from 22 percent the previous year. During the next
two years, 1983 and 1984, it continued to climb,
reaching 19.5 percent and 27 percent, respectively.
For the five-year period 1980-84, inflation averaged
nearly 20 percent.
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Table B-1
Price Index for Kabul,
1979-84 a
Index: 1978=100
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Total index
109.9
123.7
150.3
175.2
209.5
266.9
Cereals
117.8
119.8
133.9
157.2
171.2
264.2
Meat
102.1
121.3
171.6
230.1
251.3
280.7
Fruits/nuts
106.6
103.9
123.5
163.3
190.9
243.4
Vegetables
110.1
107.7
169.2
195.4
244.4
278.4
Other food
100.1
100.7
108.0
120.2
190.9
195.0
Nonfood
111.8
139.2
161.5
176.2
206.7
269.6
Table is based on the
1979 covers the period
Islamic year ending on 20 March; that is,
21 March 1979 to 20 March 1980.
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Appendix C
Population Trends
We estimate from the extrapolation of prewar census
data that the current population of Afghanistan is in
the range of 13.5 to 14 million, still well below the
preinvasion level of approximately 15.5 reported in
the 1979 census. We believe the current population
consists of 11.5 million settled inhabitants and 2-2.5
million nomads.
Our assessment indicates that the settled population
fell from about 13 million in mid-1979 to about 11.5
million by mid-1985?a reduction of about 12 per-
cent.? The reduction would have been even greater
except that during the refugee exodus Afghanistan
was also experiencing a natural population growth
rate of about 2.6 percent?according to United Na-
tions reporting.
the greatest reductions have occurred in the
eastern and western border areas. Our estimates
indicate, for example, that the total settled population
of the seven eastern border provinces '4 and the three
western border provinces fell 30 to 40 percent from
mid-1979 to mid-1985. Most of the refugees have
been from the agrarian and pastoral sectors, which
made up 85 percent of the population prior to the
Soviet occupation.
Unless the exodus begins again on a large scale, the
country's 2.6-percent growth rate will cause the popu-
lation to reach the preinvasion level in the early
Badakhshan, Konarha, Nangarhar, Paktm, Zabol, Paktika, and
Qandahar
Nimruz, Farah, and Herat
Reverse Blank
23
1990s. The movement of refugees within the country
has also resulted in a large population increase in
Kabul. According to the US Embassy, the population
of the city reached about 2.5 million in 1985, whereas
Afghan statistics indicate that the 1979 population of
the city was only 919,000. We calculate that only
slightly more than 230,000 of the approximate in-
crease of 1.6 million persons was the result of natural
population growth.
The 1979 census also indicated that the nomadic
population of 2.5 million given earlier by the govern-
ment was "much exaggerated." With a nomadic
population of 2-2.5 million, our calculations show that
the total population of the country?settled and no-
madic?is in the range of 13.5-14 million.
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