JAMAICA: PROGRESS IN MARIJUANA CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R000800720004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of eer-et
Intelligence
Marijuana Control
Jamaica: Progress in
ZA CC,
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7G O7 (25)
GI 86-10051
July 1986
Copy 3 5 7
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Marijuana Control
Jamaica: Progress in
the Strategic Narcotics Division,
Imagery Analysis. Assistance was provided by
Narcotics Analysis Branch, 0
Analytic Support Group.
Strategic Narcotics Division,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Branch,
Secret
GI 86-10051
July 1986
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Jamaica: Progress in
Marijuana ControlF
Key Judgments Despite a generally poor early prognosis for success, the Jamaican
Information available Government has thus far made substantial gains in its recent heightened
as of 30 April 1986 effort to disrupt illicit production and smuggling of marijuana. Most
was use in this report
notably, analysis of data from combined Jamaican and US aerial surveys
conducted in the spring and fall of 1985 indicates that intensified Jamaican
manual eradication operations in the country's major cannabis-producing
areas destroyed substantial portions of the crop planted last year. We
calculate that growers harvested about 900 metric tons of marijuana, or
roughly half the amount that we estimated-on the basis of less extensive
photographic coverage-they harvested in 1984. Consequently, although
the island currently remains an important supplier of the drug to the
United States, prospects look increasingly good for large, sustained cuts in
the level of production and, hence, shipments.
In 1985 the government also successfully intensified efforts to interdict
shipments of harvested and processed marijuana entering the air and sea
smuggling chain. Military authorities tightened security at Jamaica's four
major domestic airfields and two international airports, and began a
methodical campaign to destroy the numerous makeshift airstrips in the
countryside. Kingston also increased naval patrols in coastal waters. These
measures caused at least temporary disruptions in some smuggling opera-
tions and forced many traffickers to change their methods. We estimate
that, by the end of 1985, two-thirds or more of the island's marijuana
shipments were leaving by sea routes-a major shift from the traffickers'
previous preference for air routes.-
Kingston had less success last year in cracking down on drug-related
corruption. Major traffickers generally were able to counter arrests and
dismissals of collaborators by quickly recruiting new ones. In our judg-
ment, the ease with which Jamaica's marijuana trade is able to use its
enormous earnings to corrupt some antidrug officials-particularly at
lower levels-will be hard to combat and is likely to remain a serious
problem for the drug control program. Honest members of the police and
the Army have tried to tighten the antidrug program's internal security,
but Kingston needs to substantially improve its ability to detect and punish
collaboration.
Secret
GI 86-10051
July 1986
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Another problem facing Jamaican authorities is how to cope with the
island's major trafficking syndicates. To date, the government's marijuana
eradication and interdiction gains have come almost entirely at the expense
of moderate and small-scale growers and traffickers. The crackdown still
has had no appreciable effect on the larger and more efficient operators
who in recent years have accounted for a substantial portion of total
marijuana production and export. This segment of the industry has
considerable financial and material resources with which to resist antidrug
measures. 7_
Despite the obstacles facing Kingston's narcotics enforcement program, we
believe the prospects are good for an effective marijuana control campaign
over the next year or so. Jamaica's tougher eradication program and the
destruction of illegal airfields in 1985 did not lead to the political backlash
Prime Minister Seaga predicted in 1984, and he probably is now confident
that he can push control more aggressively. As long as Seaga remains in
power, the Government of Jamaica at a minimum probably will continue to
eradicate marijuana at a rate of about 35 to 40 percent of production. If
US narcotics control assistance is increased-as it may be in the form of
transport helicopters-we estimate the added mobility would allow eradi-
cation teams to cut marijuana production by as much as 60 to 70 percent.
This level of reduction would drive many producers out of business and es-
sentially end Jamaica's role as a major exporter of marijuana to the United
States.F___1
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Cracking Down on Cultivation
The Fall Eradication Campaign 3
Disrupting Smuggling
Background 4
Impact 6
Combating Corruption
7
Maneuvering Against Interdiction
7
The Challenges Ahead 8
Prospects 9
Appendix
The Aerial Surveys 11
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Secret
Jamaica: Marijuana Cultivation Areas, Fall 1985
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Jamaica: Progress in
Marijuana Control
Cracking Down on Cultivation
Against most expectations, the Government of Jamai-
ca's marijuana eradication program improved steadily
through 1985 and achieved sizable reductions in the
quantity of marijuana harvested to supply the US
market.' We calculate that growers succeeded in
harvesting about 900 metric tons of marijuana, or
roughly half the amount that we estimated they
harvested in 1984. (For a description of the process by
which we reached our 1985 crop estimate, see inset.)
Our analysis of cultivation and eradication levels
indicates that Kingston destroyed about 35 percent of
the spring plantings and some 30 percent of the fall
plantings, resulting in the elimination of approximate-
ly one-third of potential annual production. These
gains were achieved after Prime Minister Seaga
announced in September 1984 a marked expansion of
the government's marijuana control efforts. The most
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gram was a commitment to a greatly increased eradi-
cation program.F__-]
Marijuana thrives in Jamaica's mild, sunny cli-
mate. Growers can plant at any time of the year,
but harvests tend to cluster in the spring and fall,
with the fall harvest by far the larger. Aerial
surveys have revealed that cultivation occurs in
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The 1985 Crop Estimate:
Getting to the Bottom Line
Although Jamaica's marijuana farmers can plant
their crops throughout the year, harvests tend to
cluster around the spring and fall, with the latter
harvest substantially larger than the former. The
three consecutive aerial surveys of the island yielded
our most reliable information about the size of the
crop at the time of each survey.
The method of obtaining the crop estimate is a
statistical analysis of imagery-derived data, based on
the assumption that total production of marijuana
equals the area under cultivation times the average
yield. Multiplying the estimated number of fields by
the average field size provides the estimated area
under cultivation. Estimates of the average field size
and number of fields rely on imagery, while the yield
figures come from collateral reporting.
We assume that all eradication that occurs before a
survey is flown can be disregarded for purposes of
crop estimation, because its results are reflected in
the survey. We must account, however, for all eradi-
cation that occurs after a survey. We also assume, on
the basis of our experience with drug crop eradication
programs worldwide, that eradication estimates fre-
quently are exaggerated. Inflation in these estimates
often occurs because of the extreme difficulty of
estimating land area in irregular terrain, where mo-
bility is poor and visibility limited. Further, local
security forces often inflate their figures because they
want to show success.
In the case of Jamaica, we have deflated security
force estimates of eradication by one-third, a factor
based on our close observation of the island's eradi-
cation teams in the field and extensive experience
elsewhere. Further, this deflation factor results in an
estimate of crop destruction that is very close to
Jamaican security force estimates of the rate at
which their eradication teams were progressing
through 1985.
For the spring crop in 1985, we took the 410 hectares
revealed by the aerial survey about 1 May and
subtracted from this figure the 209 hectares the JCF
claimed its forces eradicated during May and June,
but deflated by one-third:
410 hectares-(209 hectares X .67) = 270 hectares.
We estimated the fall 1985 crop at 1,615 hectares on
the basis of a survey flown about 1 October. Jamai-
can security forces claimed that they eradicated 776
hectares between 1 October and the end of the year.
Using the same procedure:
1,615 hectares-(776 hectares X.67) = 1,100
hectares.
The total of both harvests, after accounting for
postsurvey eradication, thus came to 1,370 hectares.
Jamaican officers who have studied mar-
ijuana cultivation on the island have said that yields
range roughly between 540 and 770 kilograms of
dried marijuana per hectare, with a midpoint of
655 kilograms per hectare. This estimate of yield
times 1,370 hectares results in our figure of about
900 metric tons for the total marijuana harvest in
Jamaica in 1985.
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These Jamaican police officers are part of an
intensified marijuana eradication program that
began in early 1985 and became stronger through
the year. Better mobility remains the key to
improving the productivity of eradication
workers
The Fall Eradication Campaign. In our judgment,
the most important development affecting the overall
success of the crop control effort in 1985 occurred in
midsummer. At that time Kingston began to take
steps that would culminate in September in the first
direct participation of Jamaican military forces in
eradication operations. The increased manpower and
resources that this move made available gave the
government the capability to inflict on the larger fall
25X1 crop essentially the same proportional losses that it
was able to achieve against the smaller spring crop.
Without military participation, eradication in the fall
almost certainly would have fallen far short of the
level that was attainedF---]
If drug crops are at or near maturity when they
are eradicated, the marijuana must be burned to
prevent local farmers from collecting and selling
it.l
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These men are returning to a base camp in
western Jamaica after destroying drug crops in
the Sheffield area. About half of the JCF's
Narcotics Squad is continuously engaged in
eradication operations.
Prime Minister Seaga's insistence on manual tech-
niques-he says he fears that chemical eradication
might have serious environmental impact and serious
political repercussions-makes the eradication pro-
gram less efficient than it would be if drug crops
could be sprayed with herbicides from aircraft. The
abundance of low-cost labor in Jamaica, however,
allows even this relatively inefficient form of crop
destruction to make substantial cuts in production. In
late September, for example, an eradication team of
26 men using 15 gasoline-powered brush cutters was
able to cut down, collect, and burn about two-thirds of
a hectare in 45 minutes. At this rate, a work force of
about 125 men devoting only about half its time to
eradicating cannabis theoretically could have de-
stroyed the entire potential fall crop of 1,600 hectares
in about 100 days, assuming timely deployment.
UM
This JDF soldier is cutting down marijuana in
St. Thomas Parish. Direct participation in eradi-
cation operations by Jamaica's military forces
began in midsummer 1985 and strengthened
Kingston's campaign against the island's mari-
increased mobility through expanded use
of transport helicopters would aid eradication efforts
considerably. F__1
Disrupting Smuggling
At the same time that Kingston intensified the eradi-
cation campaign, it also ste ed up efforts to suppress
marijuana smuggling. 'nterdic-
tion measures caused at least temporary disruptions in
some smuggling operations and forced many traffick-
ers to shift from their previously heavy reliance on air
routes to substantially increased use of sea routes.
Background. The US Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) in 1981 estimated in its examination of
Jamaican marijuana smuggling routes that about
60 percent of the shipments to the US market were
coming by air, with most of this portion delivered by
general aviation aircraft and the rest transported
aboard commercial planes. DEA judged that the
remaining 40 percent was being exported by sea,
almost exclusively aboard privately owned vessels.
between 1981 and early
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1985 smugglers continued for the most part to favor
_
air transport over maritime shipment.
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Working out of a base camp near Yallahs Hill in
eastern Jamaica, JDF soldiers using US-supplied
equipment destroyed about 130 hectares ofmari-
juana in this area in late 1985. A spring 1986
inspection of the region revealed little cultivation.
This preference was due largely to the speed of air
shipment and the traffickers' wide choice of aviation
facilities for conducting operations. Jamaica has four
major domestic airfields and two international air-
ports, and security prior to 1985 was generally poor.
In addition, the island has numerous makeshift air-
strips. Overhead photography taken in the early 1980s
showed more than 69 such airstrips, of which 65 were
in suitable condition for use. More than half of these
airstrips were unregistered, and many had been built
solely for drug trafficking.
The Crackdown. Seaga in 1985 ordered a series of
strong measures to improve his government's control
over marijuana trafficking. In February the Prime
Minister shifted responsibility for security at Jamai-
ca's four major domestic airfields from the Civil
Aviation Department to the JDF. The government
also began efforts to improve security at Jamaica's
two international airports, in Kingston and Montego
Bay, and in March requested that Washington send
US Customs Service officials to inspect counter-
narcotics measures at these airports. Kingston also
sought to improve maritime interdiction by stepping
This clandestine airstrip was discovered under
construction west of Spanish Town in late Sep-
tember 1985. The JDF identified 40 such strips
in April and by June had destroyed 29. Traffick-
ers were able to repair many of the airstrips
quickly, but the campaign forced drug smugglers
to use maritime routes more heavily. Jamaican
authorities have asked for US help to mount a
similar interdiction campaign this yearF_~
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up coastal patrols shortly after the start of the fall
eradication campaign.)
A team of US Customs security experts examined the
airports in June and recommended a number of
improvements. The team also instructed several of the
Jamaican national airline's supervisory personnel in
Specific actions
? Dismissal in late August by Jamaica's national
airline of some 160 security guards and cargo
handlers at Kingston's international airport, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. Many of these workers were
eplaced by police and military troops. Airport
replaced
also tightened access to cargo areas.
? Comparable shakeups beginning in November at
the Montego Bay international airport.
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While Kingston was tightening security at the inter-
national airports, the JDF was ordering military
engineers to use heavy equipment to destroy make-
shift trafficking airstrips.
In addition, Kingston sought to improve maritime
interdiction. The JDF's small naval component
stepped up coastal patrols shortly after the start of the
fall eradication campaign. F__1
our analysis of drug seizures, production estimates,
and imagery of airfields, we estimate that by the end
of 1985 two-thirds or more of the island's marijuana
deliveries were traveling by private maritime vessels.
We do not have sufficient information to assess the
effectiveness of Kingston's increased naval patrols in
dealing with the expansion of maritime marijuana
smuggling. In our judgment, however, the government
does not have sufficient ships and funds to undertake
and sustain the high level of naval operations that
would be required to keep close watch on Jamaica's
1,000-kilometer coastline and seize substantial por-
tions of maritime shipments. We expect that the
Jamaicans will soon look to Washington for direct
assistance in tightening coastal interdiction.F
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Combating Corruption
Jamaican authorities have also attempted to counter
the drug traders' power to corrupt security officers
but are facing an uphill struggle. In our view, the
Jamaican drug industry's ability to use its enormous
earnings to gain the cooperation of some antidrug
officials who participate directly in the trade is a
particular problem
success or failure in devising more effective strategies
to address problems like these will have an important
impact on the antidrug program's long-term
prospects.
One way the government might be able to take more
forceful action would be to create a high-level watch-
dog organization empowered to investigate promptly
all reports of drug-related malfeasance and to dismiss
any official determined to be-or strongly suspected
of-aiding or engaging in drug activities. The anti-
corruption unit formed by JDF Deputy Commissioner
Sam McKay in July 1985 is a step in this direction.
Maneuvering Against Interdiction.
ibeginning in mid-1985, smugglers start-
ed taking steps to protect their activities from the
heightened interdiction efforts. Many began to dem-
onstrate greater caution and diversity in their smug-
gling procedures.
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Other traffickers started setting up ostensibly legiti-
mate business operations to serve as cover for their
smuggling activities.
Traffickers throughout 1985 also moved in increasing
numbers to diversify operations to include handling of
other drugs, thereby hedging their bets at a time when
they correctly judged the government's intensified
interdiction campaign to be focusing chiefly on mari-
juana. According to the DEA, during the first half of
the year some expanded their smuggling of hash oil, a
potent liquid cannabis derivative that is easier to
conceal than marijuana because of its much smaller
volume. In August the US Embassy reported that
Jamaican traffickers were continuing to expand their
involvement in transshipping South American-
produced cocaine, at least partly in a strategy to
compensate for the heightened risks of smuggling
marijuana. The seizure by Jamaican police in Febru-
ary 1986 of a single cocaine shipment of nearly 600
kilograms has confirmed the island's use as a trans-
shipment point for bulk loads of this drug.
The Challenges Ahead
The Jamaican Government's overall progress in 1985
against the marijuana trade was impressive, but to
achieve continued success it will not be enough simply
to sustain existing antidrug strategies. Kingston will
have to come to terms with the fact that its efforts in
1985 chiefly affected only the smaller producers and
traffickers and had little impact on the bigger organi-
zations that account for a substantial portion of total
activity this segment of the
industry has considerable resources and connections
to government collaborators by which to resist anti-
drug measures:
The government also continues to face the problem of
trying to identify and weed out officials at all levels
who are directly involved in cultivation and traf-
ficking either independently or as members of estab-
lished narcotics organizations:
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Even if the Jamaican Government were able to root
out drug-related corruption, the island's prolonged
economic downturn would strain enforcement re-
sources. US officials in Kingston and US observers
who accompanied eradication teams say that by late
1985 the intensity of crop control efforts had reached
the limits imposed by logistic constraints. Near the
end of the year, Kingston had only one operational
transport helicopter, and eradication teams had to
spend most of their time reaching growing areas on
foot. Mobility thus was greatly hampered both in the
flat western marshes and the rugged central and
Prospects
On balance, the outlook is more promising than we
thought it would be when the government embarked
on the new program one year ago. The US Embassy
believes that Jamaica has the capability with existing
manpower and resources to destroy up to 40 percent
of potential marijuana production this year. If the
current limited mobility of eradication personnel were
improved through increased use of a few transport
helicopters, and if the present seasonal crop control
measures were expanded to take place throughout the
year, we estimate that cultivation islandwide could be
cut by as much as 60 to 70 percent. This level of
reduction would essentially end Jamaica's role as a
major exporter of marijuana to the United States.
Kingston now lacks the aircraft it would need to
conduct such operations
In the meantime, the Seaga regime continues to move
ahead despite equipment shortages and lack of a fully
reliable enforcement apparatus. In late February
1986 the JDF military intelligence unit surveyed the
island's customary growing areas and reported mari-
juana cultivation below the level of spring 1985. A
visual survey by US officials in late May confirmed
that the spring 1986 marijuana crop was about the
same size-400 hectares-as the spring 1985 crop.
This spring survey is to be followed in fall 1986 by an
extensive fixed-wing aerial photographic survey com-
parable to the one that took place in fall 1985. By the
end of 1986 we should be able to determine whether
the Jamaican Government is indeed achieving the
substantial cuts in marijuana production that it
showed the capability to attain last year.
Over the next year or two, prospects are likely to
remain good for an effective marijuana control cam-
paign in Jamaica, provided Kingston gets the help it
needs to solve its aircraft problems and continues to 25X1
demonstrate the political resolve it displayed last year.
The measures Seaga took in 1985 did not lead to the 25X1
backlash he predicted in 1984, and this can only
increase his confidence. Moreover, we judge that the
Prime Minister values US aid and a sympathetic
hearing in Washington more than he fears the conse-
quences of a strong counternarcotics program.) 25X1
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Appendix
The Aerial Surveys
Three consecutive Jamaican and US aerial surveys,
conducted in fall 1984 and then spring and fall 1985,
of Jamaica's known and suspected cannabis-
producing regions shed considerable light on the
extent and location of cultivation and greatly im-
proved our understanding of the comparative amounts
grown during the two seasons. Our analysis of the
extensive photographic coverage that was acquired,
along with other information, indicates that Jamaican
marijuana production last year-after accounting for
losses to eradication-was about 900 metric tons, with
most of the output taking place in the fall. This is a
sizable drop from the roughly 2,000 tons that we
estimated was harvested in 1984. Our assessment for
1984-although based on the best information avail-
able at the time-probably overestimated production,
and the difference in output for 1985 compared with
1984 partly represents refinements in the estimative
process. Most of the drop in production, however, is
due to improved eradication. F__1
The surveys showed that cannabis is grown in all 13 of
the island's parishes, with considerable activity taking
place in the interior highlands and western wetlands
that we identified in 1984 as being primary producing
areas. We estimate that in 1985 growers planted over
2,000 hectares, resulting in a harvest of some 1,370
hectares after accounting for the estimated loss of
more than 600 hectares-or roughly a third of poten-
tial output last year-caused by eradication opera-
tions.
The approximately 900
tons that we believe the industry produced last year
thus is a midpoint reflecting an estimated production
range of between 740 and 1,060 tons=
The Spring 1985 Survey. Fixed-wing aerial reconnais-
sance missions were flown in late April and covered
about 30 percent of the island west of Kingston.
Correct identification and pinpointing of cannabis
fields on the imagery obtained from this survey was
assured by extensive followup helicopter missions
conducted expressly to acquire on-site "ground truth"
confirmation of our findings. The helicopter missions
also permitted close examination of cultivation tech-
niques and served as a means of monitoring the
progress of eradication operations.F-7
This survey provided the first clear indication that
considerably less cultivation takes place in the spring
than in the fall. The large fields that were found to be
widespread in the Negril and Braes River wetlands in
the survey of fall 1984 were absent in spring 1985;
numerous furrows that previously were lush with
seedlings were overgrown with weeds and foliage. In
addition, US officials who participated in the fall
1984 survey noted major reductions in the amount of
land in the interior highlands devoted to cannabis
cultivation in spring l985.F__1
Our analysis of the spring imagery indicated that as
of 1 May 1985 cannabis growers had a total of
410 hectares under cultivation.
estimated net spring cultivation to have been
about 270 hectares. This modest level of cultivation
led us to anticipate that the fall would be the more
intense period of activity, and suggested that particu-
larly aggressive eradication operations late in the year
could have a marked impact on total annual output.
The Fall 1985 Survey. More extensive flights took
place between 26 September and 2 October, and
provided the best imagery we have obtained thus far
of Jamaican cannabis cultivation. The survey consist-
ed of 16 north-south and two east-west flightlines that
photographed about half of the known cannabis areas.
The flightlines also covered a comparable portion of
potential growing areas that we defined, on the basis
of various reports, as including all land west of
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87T01127R000800720004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87T01127R000800720004-7
Secret
Marijuana Cultivation in Jamaica:
Fall 1985
Region
Hectares
Cultivated
The interior highlands (St. Ann, Clarendon,
St. Catherine, St. Mary, Manchester, and
Trelawny Parishes)
800
Western Jamaica (Westmoreland, Hanover,
and St. James Parishes)
510
St. Elizabeth Parish
155
Eastern Jamaica (Portland and St. Thomas
Parishes)
150
Range at 95 percent confidence interval
? 360
Range of estimate for fall 1986
1,255 to 1,975
Kingston-except the extremely rugged and agricul-
turally unsuitable central cockpit country-and the
lower elevations of Portland and St. Thomas Parishes.
As in the spring, our findings were corroborated by
extensive helicopter reconnaissance operations. F_
The fall survey enabled us for the first time to base
our estimate of annual production on an examination
of both seasonal crops. It also provided our first
opportunity to make a clear determination of the
comparative size of spring and fall production, and to
compare cultivation levels at the same point in the
growing cycle for two successive years. In addition, we
now have sufficient data to rank production levels by
region (see table).-]
Our analysis of the fall imagery indicated that exten-
sive cultivation took place in the island's known
growing areas and confirmed reports that plantings
had spread to new locations. Growers focused their
efforts in four general regions, including:
? The interior highlands. This traditional growing
area accounted for about half the cannabis planted
in fall 1985. Most of this cultivation consisted of
comparatively large fields concentrated in southern
St. Ann Parish. Numerous concentrations of smaller
fields also were found, however, in the parishes of
Clarendon, St. Mary, Manchester, Trelawny, and
St. Catherine. Moreover, in northern St. Catherine
Parish southeast of Guys Hill we discovered more
than 100 fields covering a total land area of about
4 or 5 kilometers.
? Western Jamaica. Cultivation in the traditional
marijuana-producing western parishes of West-
moreland, Hanover, and St. James accounted for
about 30 percent of total fall plantings. Of this
portion, nearly 40 percent was concentrated in the
low-lying Negril wetlands and adjacent hills. Fields
were numerous in the Negril Morass, where in April
cultivation was observed to be sparse and had
largely been destroyed by eradication operations in
May. Average field size in the wetlands was smaller
than in the interior highlands, and the wetlands'
heavy concentration of seedbeds suggests that some
farmers may use this area as a "nursery" to grow
seedlings for transplanting elsewhere.
? St. Elizabeth Parish. Known growing areas in the
Black River and Upper Morass and in the Santa
Cruz Mountains accounted for about 10 percent of
fall cultivation. The crop was concentrated south of
the Broad River and in the lower western slopes of
the mountains in this region.
? Eastern Jamaica. Imagery of this area confirmed
reports that plantings had spread to the eastern
parishes of Portland and St. Thomas-neither of
which had been photographed prior to the fall 1985
survey-and indicated that this region accounted
for about 10 percent of fall production. We specifi-
cally were able to confirm reported heavy concen-
trations of fields around Yallahs, where Jamaican
military personnel subsequently estimated some
130 hectares to be under cultivation.
We determined from the fall survey that as of 1 Octo-
ber 1985 growers had planted a fall crop of about
1,600 hectares.
We thus calculated net fall plantings to
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87T01127R000800720004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87TO1127R000800720004-7
Marijuana seedbeds like this
one are common in the Negril
Morass of western Jamaica.
The heavy concentration of
seedbeds in these wetlands sug-
gests that farmers may use this
area as a "nursery" to grow
seedlings before transplanting
them elsewhere.
have been about 1,100 hectares-representing nearly
80 percent of total net annual cultivation and account-
ing for about 720 of the estimated 900 tons of
processed marijuana produced in 1985.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87TO1127R000800720004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87TO1127R000800720004-7
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP87TO1127R000800720004-7