MILITARY COUPS: LIKELY THIRD WORLD TARGETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R000500430008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ?Secret?
Intelligence
Military Coups:? -
Likely Third World Targets
A Research Paper
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Military Coups:
? Likely Third World Targets
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, OGI,
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GI 86-10022
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 January 1986
was used in this report.
Military Coups:
Likely Third World Targets
On the basis of extensive research of past military coups and discussions
with academic specialists, we have identified four key groups of factors?
the sociopolitical environment, the predisposition of the military (toward
coup plotting), motivation, and precipitating events?for determining a
country's vulnerability to military intervention. Our research showed that
the most significant conditions in the environment are the lack of strong
political institutions and eroding regime legitimacy. We also discerned that
the key factors in a military establishment predisposed to coup plotting are
its self-image as the protector of the country's values and an active
involvement in the political process. The primary motive, according to our
research, is the existence of major policy differences between government
and military leaders. Actions taken by the government, such as the sudden
imposition of unpopular socioeconomic measures or a major purge of the
armed forces, and the leader's departure from the country have been the
most common precipitating events.
By weighting the factors in each group?according to their frequency and
degree of applicability in past coups?we have sought to determine which
Third World countries are most vulnerable to a military coup. At the
beginning of this year, the following countries stood out as the leading
candidates because they rated high in coup-prone environmental condi-
tions, military predisposition, and motivation:
? Bangladesh. Senior military officers are becoming increasingly con-
cerned over Martial Law Administrator Ershad's indecision, corruption,
and vacillation in confronting civilian opposition groups.
? Central African Republic. President Kolingba presides over a personalis-
tic and factionalized political system as well as a military disposed to
intervene; the French, however, virtually can dictate whether a coup
attempt will be successful.
? Guatemala. Although the military?with a long history of political
involvement?at present has few grievances against newly elected Presi-
dent Cerezo, it will be paying close attention to his attitude toward
protecting its professional autonomy and corporate interests.
? Guinea. President Conte's position has improved in the past several
months, but continued support for his government will hinge on his
ability to implement his economic reform program and balance compet-
ing interests among military and tribal groups.
? Honduras. The Armed Forces remains the key institution and probably
will allow newly inaugurated President Azcona a grace period, after
which the decision to intervene will depend on its ability to shape policy
behind the scenes.
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? Liberia. Civilian discontent with Head of State Doe is growing over his
arbitrary and corrupt behavior, especially since his arrests and executions
of numerous followers of popular General Quiwonkpa, who led the
abortive coup in November.
? Sudan. The Transitional Military Council has not resolved any of the key
problems that led to its intervention last year, and, despite elections
scheduled for April, political forces remain in disarray.
Regional analysts rated each country on the basis of data available in
December 1985. Since then, the insurgent National Resistance Army has
toppled Uganda's government, and a military-led rebellion has unseated
President Marcos in the Philippines. Elements of the military in South
Yemen, moreover, have overthrown the President after his failed attempt
to remove leaders of the opposing faction. There also has been an irregular
regime change in Haiti, although it did not constitute a military coup. A
detailed explanation of the methodology appears in the appendix.
By focusing on each specific group of factors, we also can identify countries
where the likelihood of military intervention would dramatically increase if
changes occurred in the environment, the armed forces, or the motives.
Four countries?Bolivia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Panama?display most of
the critical environmental and military conditions conducive to coup
plotting but rate low in motives. In our view, these "sleepers" already have
a propensity toward coup plotting, and the addition of more motives or
precipitating events could provoke the military to intervene. Four other
countries?Libya, Mozambique, Peru, and Suriname?already rate high
in motivation but lower in coup-prone environmental conditions and
military predisposition. Thus, the prospects of intervention in these coun-
tries would appear less likely. We surmise, however, that only marginal
changes in the environment or armed forces would significantly raise the
probability of a "surprise" coup.
We believe events in two other countries?Uganda and the Philippines?
have confirmed the assessments we made based on their ratings at the end
of 1985. Uganda then ranked as the most vulnerable of 81 countries to mil-
itary intervention because it rated extremely high in every group of
indicators. Indeed, General Okello's government was toppled in January by
insurgent leader Yuweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army. In
December the Philippines was our leading "surprise" candidate, in that its
coup-prone environmental conditions and motivation rated high, but the
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armed forces then displayed little proclivity to intervene. The predisposi-
tion of reformist elements in the military, however, shifted significantly
during the recent election campaign, and the blatantly fraudulent results
prompted them to move against the Marcos government.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
Scope Note
ix
Introduction
1
The Historical Record
1
Establishing the Sociopolitical Environment
1
Outlining the Predisposition of the Military
2
Assessing the Motives
3
Identifying the Precipitating Events
3
Countries Vulnerable to Military Coups
4
The Indicators as Warning Signs
4
The Leading Candidates
6
Bangladesh
6
Central African Republic
6
Guatemala
7
Guinea
7
Honduras
7
Liberia
8
Sudan
8
The "Sleepers"
8
High Environmental and Military Ratings
8
Low Rating in Motivation
9
The "Surprises"
10
High Rating in Motivation
11
Low Environmental or Military Ratings
11
Possible "Long Shots"
12
Appendix
Military Coup Indicators Methodology
15
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Scope Note
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This paper applies a new methodology based on a set of more than 30 indi-
cators to assess whether and under what circumstances military coups are
likely to occur.
The indicators then were used to analyze more than 100
military coups that have occurred over the past three decades and further
refined on the basis of that research. This paper discusses the key findings
of that historical study and then assesses which Third World countries are
most prone to a military coup attempt.
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Figure 1
Comparative Weights of Military Coup Indicators
High
Med urn
Low
The Political and
? Personalistic politics rather
? Chronic economic
? Widespread chronic civil
Socioeconomic
than strong political
difficulties,
disorder, other than
Environment
institutions.
? Ideological divisions
insurgency.
? Lack of popular respect for
between government and
? Ethnic or tribal conflict.
government leadership,
? Weak civilian elite support
for the government.
one or more elements in
society.
? Exogenous complications.
? Country-specific indicator.
? History of nonconstitutional
or nondemocratic transfer
of power.
? Uncertain succession
procedures.
The Predisposition
? Self-image among the
? Power unchecked by
? Country-specific indicator.
of the Military
military of its role as
protector of the country's
values, interests, or
constitution.
? Active involvement in the
political process.
? Disdain for civilian
politicians and political
institutions.
? Military factionalism and
coalition building (classes,
generations, training).
regime (unified command,
longstanding field
assignments).
? Absence or weakness of
functional rivals (national
guard, popular militia,
security force).
? Close ties between some
military leaders and
opposition groups.
? H istory of participation of
coup plots and attempts.
The Motives
? Major policy differences
? Inability of government
? Extension of the government's
between government and
leadership to co-opt or
power into constitutionally
military leaders,
suppress opposition groups,
? Public perception of gross
government mismanagement
as responsible for economic
problems.
? Public discontent over flagrant
corruption.
? Difficulty in maintaining public
order.
prohibited areas; arbitrary
application of law.
? Perception among military of
incoming government
leadership as antithetical of
military's interests.
? Government interference in
military's professional autonomy.
? Government attacks against
military's corporate interests.
? Retention of power by
government leaders beyond
constitutional time limits or
attempts to do so.
? Difficulty in containing
terrorism or insurgency.
? Country-specific indicator.
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Military Coups:
Likely Third World Targets
Introduction
Our research shows that a military coup rarely is a
random event but grows out of a complex interplay of
political, socioeconomic, and military factors. We
believe the mere desire of a general (or sergeant) to
seize power is insufficient to ensure a successful coup;
certain conditions in the society and the armed forces
seem to be necessary prerequisites. Specific motives or
grievances that would prompt the military to plot a
coup, in our view, are additional critical factors in this
equation. Finally, we believe a precipitating event?or
trigger mechanism?usually is necessary to spur the
conspirators to act. This paper examines the signifi-
cance of the factors that historically have motivated
the military to intervene and then assesses the current
likelihood of a military coup's occurring in 81 Third
World countries (see figure 8, a foldout).
The Historical Record
Establishing the Sociopolitical Environment
We believe a society must exhibit coup-prone condi-
tions for the military even to consider intervention.
Thus, we first examine a country's predisposition in
terms of its political, economic, and social systems as
well as its historical record of leadership change.' Our
research suggests that several conditions reflecting
the nature of the regime consistently have ranked
high before the military intervened ,(figure 1). Key
factors have been the lack of strong political institu-
tions and eroding government legitimacy.
Specifically:
? The leadership's use of personal ties and influence to
operate the political system.
? The lack?or loss?of popular respect for the gov-
ernment leadership.
' Our conclusions as to the role and significance of specific environ-
mental conditions, military factors, and motives in military coups
are based on analysis of their frequency and degree of applicability
in more than 100 past successful coups. A detailed explanation of
the overall methodology appears in the appendix.
? Weak support for the government from the civilian
elites.
We found, moreover, that the pattern of leadership
change has played a critical role in contributing to a
coup-prone environment. In most instances of military
intervention, the country has had a history of noncon-
stitutional or nondemocratic transfers of power as well
as uncertain or untested succession procedures. Also
influential, but less significant, in creating coup-prone
environmental conditions have been the presence of
chronic economic difficulties?usually reflected by
spiraling inflation, balance-of-payments problems,
and cuts in government spending?as well as deep-
seated ideological divisions between the government
leadership and one or more groups in the society.
Other conditions that contributed only marginally
include:
? Widespread chronic civil disorder.
? Ethnic or tribal conflict.
? Exogenous complications, such as severe drought or
an international oil or debt crisis.
Our research pointed up one political factor?a go-
vernment's patron-client relationship with a super-
power?that applied infrequently but in some cases
contributed significantly to a coup-prone environ-
ment. In these cases, the loss?or potential loss?of
the superpower's protection or financial aid undercut
the government's perceived legitimacy and ability to
rule. On the other hand, a strong relationship with a
superpower on occasion has proved to be the key
factor prohibiting a military takeover, in that the
superpower's presence has been viewed by potential
conspirators as posing too great a risk.
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Military Versus Civilian Regimes
Our research on past military coups suggests many
similarities in assessing the likelihood of intervention
against military and civilian governments. Nonethe-
less, we observed two important differences:
? Military-led countries generally displayed more
coup-prone conditions, and members of the armed
forces required less motivation to conspire against
their leaders.
? Countries with military governments previously
had experienced at least one military coup; in many
instances, the military leaders who were overthrown
had seized power themselves through a coup.
In addition to a history of nonconstitutional transfer
of power, military governments generally exhibited
the same key coup-prone sociopolitical conditions
before a coup as civilian governments?notably the
lack of strong political institutions and eroding re-
gime legitimacy. The predisposition of the armed
forces in the two regime types also was similar, rating
high in previous coup plotting, politicization, praetor-
ianism, and factionalism.
As with civilian governments, moreover, those factors
that proved most likely to spark a coup against a
military government were major policy differences
between the rulers and the conspirators and the
inability of the government to deal with its opposi-
tion, often including factions in the armed forces.
Other important motives involved the failure to main-
tain order, manage the economy, and refrain from
corruption. In many cases, however, these motives
rated low at the time the conspirators overthrew their
military rulers.
We believe that, based on our assessment of past
coups, the, indicators focusing on the environmental
conditions and predisposition of the armed forces
should be monitored in countries with military gov-
ernments. Because we would anticipate a high rating
in the indicators that assess the military's predisposi-
tion in these countries, the accumulation of coup-
prone environmental conditions takes on added im-
portance. In the cases where both the society and
military already rate as highly coup prone, attention
should be focused on potential precipitating events.
According to our research, conspirators in military-
led countries frequently have mounted coups with
little motivation.
Outlining the Predisposition of the Military
The likelihood of a military coup hinges on several
key characteristics of the plotters. Based on our
evaluation of various attitudinal, political, and organi-
zational aspects of a country's armed forces, we
believe the most consistent characteristics of military
leaders in past coups are praetorianism and politiciza-
tion. Specifically, the conspirators:
? Perceived themselves?as members of the armed
forces?primarily responsible for protecting their
country's values, interests, or constitution.
? Already were actively involved in the political pro-
cess before they overthrew the government
leadership.
? Held civilian politicians and political institutions in
disdain.
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Moreover, the plotters frequently have come from a
factionalized military establishment and have been
involved in previous coup plots and attempts. We
observed that, once the military has intervened to
effect a regime change, in many cases the armed
forces has become the established vehicle for transfer-
ring power, even among civilian politicians.
To a lesser degree, we noted that government leaders
have abetted the conspirators in staging a coup by
maintaining inadequate control over the armed forces.
For example, the government has:
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? Allowed a unified military command or field offi-
cers to retain their commands for long periods of
time, thereby facilitating the organization and im-
plementation of a coup attempt.
? Failed to develop functional rivals such as a national
guard, a popular militia, or a separate security
force?at times manned by foreigners?that could
contend for power and influence with the armed
forces.
? Permitted plotters to establish close ties to opposi-
tion groups who have co-opted the plotters into
supporting a coup.
We also looked at the military's previous guerrilla
experience in a recent revolution or struggle for
independence but found it a significant factor in only
a limited number of cases. Another indicator?the
existence of a charismatic, ambitious leader in the
armed forces?appeared infrequently but proved to be
an important factor.
Assessing the Motives
We believe that a coup-prone society and military are
insufficient by themselves to initiate a coup. Specific
motives also must be present to prompt the plotters to
conspire against the government. In our opinion,
sorting out the precise motives is more complex than
evaluating the social environment and the role of the
armed forces. Our indicators examined a range of
motivations, taking into account illegal or arbitrary
actions by government leaders, their inability to rule
effectively, and policies or behavior disliked by the
public or the military in particular. The one motive
that appeared in our research as consistently signifi-
cant was the existence of major policy differences
between government and military leaders.
Motives that frequently played a role but appeared
less critical in persuading the military to mount a
coup usually were associated with the government's
inability to rule. Specifically, the armed forces often
launched coups when:
? The government proved unable to co-opt or suppress
opposition groups.
? The public blamed the government for mismanag-
ing the economy and for living standards dropping
sharply.
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? Discontent over flagrant government corruption was
widespread.
? The government appeared increasingly unable to
maintain public order.
According to our research, a government's unconstitu-
tional or illegal behavior as well as actions that
threaten the armed forces' interests generally rated
much lower as motives. Our indicators focused on
illegal behavior in terms of the government leader-
ship's extension of power into constitutionally prohib-
ited areas or arbitrary application of laws and the
retention of power beyond constitutional time limits.
We defined government threats to the military in
terms of:
? The military's perception of an incoming regime as
antithetical to its interests.
? Government policies attacking military pay, bene-
fits, promotions, and equipment procurement.
? Government decisions that military leaders viewed
as undermining their professional autonomy.
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Motives we found that only marginally influenced the 25X1
plotters to intervene included tensions between the
military and government leaders over a border con-
flict or foreign war and a government's investigation
or prosecution of human rights abuses by military
officers. We suspect, however, that the latter factor
has been gaining relevance in recent years because of
increased international attention on human rights. In
a small number of cases, government action to pro-
mote a strong functional rival?such as a popular
militia or presidential guard?has proved to be a key
factor alienating elements of the military from the
government and eventually leading them to overthrow
it.
Identifying the Precipitating Events
We believe that a coup-prone society and military, as
well as the accumulation of a substantial number of
motives, may not necessarily spur the military to
attempt a coup. In our view, a precipitating event?a
trigger mechanism?usually is required to provoke
the conspirators to act. We have found that a trigger
mechanism generally is necessary even in the case of
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Regional Patterns
In our historical assessment, we could discern no
significant regional differences in examining what
prompted military coups. Although several of the less
influential indicators applied more often to countries
in one or two regions, the key environmental and
military indicators as well as key motives rated
consistently high in every region. Moreover, all of the
indicators were evident in more than one region.
The lack of strong political institutions and eroding
regime legitimacy proved to be critical in almost
every military coup?regardless of region. Among the
other coup-prone conditions in the environment, sev-
eral appeared more significant in one or more regions:
? Ideological disputes between the government and
groups in society ranked higher in more Latin
American countries than elsewhere.
? Ethnic and tribal conflict showed up most frequent-
ly in African countries.
? Chronic economic difficulties were more common to
countries in Africa and Latin America than in the
Near East and Asia.
The profile of the military's predisposition before a
coup was virtually identical in all regions.
Major policy differences between military and gov-
ernment leaders and the government's inability to
suppress the opposition were the key motives for
coups in every region. Nonetheless, we believe some
other less critical motives probably bear watching in
specific regions because of their more frequent
appearance:
? Public perception of the government's mismanage-
ment as responsible for economic difficulties and
discontent over flagrant corruption was more im-
portant in Latin America.
? The government's excessive retention of power or its
arbitrary use of power was noted more often in the
Near East and Asia.
? Antimilitary attitudes and policies on the part of
the government were more discernible in Africa and
Latin America.
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Intervention by a praetorian military accustomed to
seizing power. Our research pointed up a number of
events that frequently have sparked a military coup.
Most triggers have involved actions taken by the
government leadership, such as:
? The departure of the leader from the country or the
capital.
? The sudden imposition of unpopular economic or
social measures.
? The arrest or execution of a key military or civilian
leader with a large following in the military.
? A major purge or reorganization of the armed
forces.
Other important precipitating events include the as-
sassination of a key figure in the government or
military and a sudden or acute political crisis, such as
a conflict over leadership succession or constitutional
powers.
We also noted in our research that motives sometimes
operate as trigger mechanisms. For example, while
continued government attacks against military corpo-
rate interests can motivate a coup-prone military to
initiate a conspiracy, the announcement of severe pay
cuts or political promotions actually can provoke a
military already involved in a conspiracy to intervene.
Another motive that has operated as a trigger has
been an election?recent or impending?that portend-
ed a political environment hostile to the military.
Nonetheless, we believe that motives usually can be
differentiated from triggers in that motives, which
form the bridge from coup-proneness to plotting, are
more diffuse and develop over a period of time while
triggers tend to be more sudden and discrete.
Countries Vulnerable to Military Coups
The Indicators as Warning Signs
We designed our list of indicators to serve two
functions. While a country's aggregate rating reflects
the potential for a military coup, a shift in the salience
of a particular indicator or group of indicators also
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Using the Indicators
We believe that the application of our indicators can
serve intelligence analysts and policymakers in as-
sessing the extent to which a Third World country is
prone to a military takeover and, in particular, in
identifying a country's strengths and vulnerabilities
as regards the potential threat of a military coup.
A country's comprehensive rating?a composite of
the sociopolitical environment, the predisposition of
the armed forces, and the motives?points to the
likelihood of a military coup attempt, and the proba-
bility increases as the overall rating gets higher:
? The indicators can be used in this fashion to
monitor over a period of time an increase or
decrease in a specific country's vulnerability to
military intervention.
? The indicators also can be applied to a region or
group of countries to rank them comparatively in
terms of which countries are more conducive to
coup attempts.
In addition, the indicators provide perspective on a
government's' capability?or lack thereof?to pre-
clude a military coup. Specifically, the indicators can
point out whether a society and its military are coup
prone and what actions the government or others
could take to exacerbate or mitigate those coup-
prone conditions:
? In some cases, the military plotters may only be
waiting for a provocation from the leadership, or
they may become less inclined to act if confronted
with disincentives that would reduce their
motivation.
? In other cases, conditions in either the environment
or the military may be more coup prone, in which
case efforts to change specific conditions could have
a significant impact on the probability of military
intervention, especially if a concentration of motives
already exists.
In identifying specific coup-prone conditions and mo-
tives, the indicators also can assist in drafting and
refining collection requirements for a given country.
can provide strategic warning that the likelihood of a
coup attempt is increasing. We do not intend our
indicators to predict exactly when a coup might occur,
since the dynamics of past coups suggest that the time
between conditions' becoming conducive to coup plot-
ting and an actual coup attempt can vary greatly.
Specifically, our research suggests that countries
with:
? A low rating in the environment and the armed
forces are least prone to military intervention and,
in most cases, would have to accumulate a large
number of coup-prone conditions and motives before
experiencing a coup; however, if such countries
already have a high concentration of motives,
changes in the environment or armed forces could
dramatically increase the potential for a coup
attempt.
5
? A high rating in both the environment and the
armed forces are predisposed toward military inter-
vention; in our opinion, the addition of a few
motives?along with some triggers?could easily
provoke a coup attempt.
? A high rating in the environment, the armed forces,
and the motives probably only lack provocation, and
one or two precipitating events could trigger the
military conspirators; in such cases we believe inter-
vention would quickly follow the trigger event.
As a general rule, we have found that factors relating
to the environment and the military are slow to
change while those included in the motives are more
volatile and thus more critical in determining the
overall rating.
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Figure 2
Vulnerability to Military Coups:
Ratings of Leading Candidates
Numbers a
ri Society
Military
Motives
50
100
150
200
Bangladesh
139
Central African
155
Republic
Guatemala
146
Guinea
139
Honduras
136
Liberia
139
Sudan
142
We derived the numbers for each country by applying our methodology to
the indicators as rated by regional analysts.
308341 3-86
The Leading Candidates
Our analysis of 81 Third World countries, based on a
composite rating of the indicators in their environ-
ment, military, and motives, suggests that seven coun-
tries?as of December 1985?are highly vulnerable to
a military coup attempt over the next year (figure 2).
Our coup-prone list includes: Bangladesh, Central
African Republic, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras,
Liberia, and Sudan. We believe these countries should
be monitored in terms of potential precipitating
events.
Bangladesh. Cyclical periods of military rule since
independence have retarded the growth of workable
political institutions, although Martial Law Adminis-
trator Ershad has promised to hold national elections
before the end of the year. Ershad has formed a
Secret
progovernment party to back his presidential candida-
cy, but the US Embassy reports his efforts to co-opt
various opposition parties into participating in the
elections and to suppress others so far have failed. In
addition, chronic economic problems?rapid popula-
tion growth, high unemployment, and heavy depen-
dence on foreign aid?continue unabated, frequently
exacerbated by disastrous floods. The Army remains
the nation's power broker, and its political support is
essential to the survival of any government.
Senior generals have not moved against Ershad, in
large part because he lacks a serious challenger in the
military, but the Embassy reports the generals are
becoming increasingly concerned over his indecision,
corruption, and vacillation in confronting opposition
leaders. We believe the generals probably would
intervene if Ershad agreed to opposition demands to
hold parliamentary elections before the presidential
poll, or especially if he secretly negotiated a deal with
the despised leftist Awami League. In our view, the
Army would not tolerate a move that would strength-
en the leftist parties' power at the expense of the
military. Another potential provocation would be
widespread evidence of corruption by Ershad and his
cronies. In the past, the corruption issue has kindled
dissatisfaction among the lower military ranks and led
to attempted coups.
Central African Republic. President Kolingba several
months ago installed a civilian government to replace
the military regime he led since 1981 but, according
to US Embassy reporting, he remains the final arbiter
on all governmental matters. The economy has suf-
fered through 15 years of inadequately designed and
implemented policies, occasional drought, inept man-
agement, and corruption. In addition, the government
has faced sporadic challenges from tribal dissidents in
the north along the Chadian border. High ratings in
all the military predisposition indicators point to an
extremely coup-prone armed forces. We believe,
moreover, Kolingba has exacerbated tribal rivalries
among senior officers by favoring members of his own
clan.
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A number of motives are evident?some public dis-
content over continued economic austerity, corrup-
tion, and Kolingba's arbitrary exercise of power.
Nonetheless, this is a case where the support of a
foreign country?France, in this instance?plays a
critical role in determining the likelihood of a military
coup. France has maintained close ties to the Central
African Republic since independence and, indeed, was
instrumental in Kolingba's assumption of power in
1981. Thus, we believe that continued French support
for Kolingba could deter a military coup.
Guatemala. Despite an orderly transfer of power from
military rule to civilian President Cerezo in January,
the environmental conditions are highly coup prone.
Against the backdrop of a long history of rigged
elections and weak political institutions, the govern-
ment faces a dire need for foreign exchange to pay for
fuel and other imports, rising inflation, and mounting
pressure to renegotiate Guatemala's foreign debt.
Moreover, the government has to contend with tradi-
tional class, religious, and ethnic tensions as well as a
leftist insurgency. The armed forces, driven by their
self-image as protector of Guatemalan values and
interests, has a long history of coup plotting and
involvement in the political system. While it never has
had much respect for civilian politicians and the
democratic process, all levels of the military, in our
view, continue to endorse the transition to civilian
rule.
Cerezo's public statements so far have been cautious
and have not provoked significant negative reaction
from the armed forces, but we believe their apprehen-
sion will increase as the government settles in. Senior
officers will pay close attention to the new civilian
government's willingness to protect their professional
autonomy and corporate interests. In our opinion, the
officers would be provoked to act if Cerezo imposed
economic austerity measures that slashed defense
spending, interfered in the military's counterinsur-
gency campaign, or prosecuted military personnel for
past human rights abuses.
Guinea. President Conte, who seized power in April
1984, and his ruling Military Committee for National
Redress lack strong political institutions, popular re-
spect, and civilian elite support. Since November,
7
however, Conte has reshuffled his Cabinet, demoting
military members who posed the greatest challenge
and improving its tribal balance. He also has moved to
liberalize the socialist, state-controlled economy. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting, Conte's initiatives
have increased his public and military support, but
keeping such support will depend on his ability to
continue his economic reform program and balance
competing interests among the military and tribal
groups. In particular, Conte will face continued pres-
sure from the Malinke, who dominated under former
President Sekou Toure and strongly resent their re-
placement by Conte's minority tribesmen. The predis-
position of the military, even though it comprises the
government, also rates high in previous coup plotting,
involvement in politics, disdain for civilian politicians,
and no functional rival. The armed forces is becoming
increasingly factionalized as discontent with Conte
spreads through the lower ranks.
The most significant motives stem from Conte's prob-
lems in dealing with personal rivals and with the
Malinke, as well as his perceived mismanagement of
economic policy. In particular, as reported by the US
Embassy, some elements of the military?junior offi-
cers and enlisted ranks?blame Conte for failing to
improve their living conditions and for procrastinating
on pay increases while tolerating corruption among
their superiors. We believe a move by Conte to put
arrested influential Malinke leaders on trial or to
impose stronger austerity measures on the armed
forces could trigger another coup attempt.
Honduras. The military, the key social institution, has
launched numerous coups in this century and has
governed in all but two of the 18 years before
President Suazo's election in 1982. The current con-
stitutional mechanisms for succession were tested for
the first time in January with the election and
inauguration of President Azcona. We believe
Azcona's chances of completing a four-year term,
however, are even at best. Civilian governments rarely
have been efficient or honest enough to earn public
respect; most leaders, including Suazo, have pursued
patronage, power, and privilege rather than genuine
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reform. Civilians also lack the ability to restrict the
Armed Forces, who operate without a functional rival
or any constitutional checks?the 1982 Constitution
gives them broad powers to maintain domestic order
and oversee elections.
Although the US defense attache reported that
Azcona was not the military's preferred candidate, we
believe senior officers probably will allow the new
President a grace period, after which their decision to
intervene would depend on the Azcona government's
performance and?more important?the military's
ability to shape policy behind the scenes. We further
believe serious infighting among the officers or
Azcona's failure to resolve an economic or political
crisis?over Honduran support for the Nicaraguan
insurgents for example?could provoke them into
action.
Liberia. The initial positive response?both military
and civilian?that greeted the recent coup attempt
reflects the unpopularity of Head of State Doe's
government. Doe's political standing already had
plummeted over his failure to halt the steady deterio-
ration of the economy and his announced victory in
the October elections, which Liberians generally be-
lieve were rigged. As for the military, US Embassy
officials report that consistently late salary payments
have reduced morale and discipline in the enlisted
ranks. Nonetheless, since 1980 the armed forces has
become accustomed to its position of power and
privilege and grudgingly continues to support Doe.
While the growing discontent over Doe's behavior?
characterized by the Embassy as arbitrary and cor-
rupt?provides several motives for a coup, the most
critical motivation is his dwindling ability to protect
the military's interests from continuing economic
decay. Triggers that could set off a coup attempt, in
our opinion, would be Doe's use of the Armed Forces
to crack down on the general public or blatant efforts
to promote his own Krahn ethnic group in the mili-
tary.
Sudan. Despite scheduled elections in April to return
the government to civilian rule, all sides are notably
unprepared. The Transitional Military Council has
proved ineffectual in gaining popular support and has
Secret
not resolved key problems?the southern insurgency
and severe economic deterioration, abetted by wide-
spread drought?that led to its intervention in April
1985. Civilian groups, including the major political
parties, also remain weak and fragmented, according
to extensive US Embassy reporting. Indeed, uncer-
tainty continues as to whether the elections actually
will be held. In addition, although senior military
officers on the council have stated they eventually will
retire from government, the Sudanese armed forces
still ranks high in terms of coup potential. The
military has a strong praetorian self-image as well as
a long history of coup plotting and political involve-
ment. Several conspiracies were uncovered among
discontented elements last year.
The most evident motives stem from the government's
continued inability to co-opt or suppress the burgeon-
ing array of opposition groups?among radicals in
particular?and its failure to contain the southern
insurgency. In our opinion, a significant insurgent
victory or prolonged civil unrest in the capital could
spark a coup. The assassination of a military or
civilian leader also could prompt the council to cancel
or postpone the elections in favor of continued mili-
tary intervention.
The "Sleepers"
On the basis of our indicators, this group of countries
currently rates high in the social environment and
military predisposition, especially the critical condi-
tions, but low in motivation (figure 3). Our "sleeper"
candidates include Bolivia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and
Panama. We believe these countries already have a
propensity for coup plotting?the overall rating of
each candidate is only slightly lower than that of
countries in the leading group. Stronger motivation or
the addition of triggers, in our view, could impel the
military toward a coup.
High Environmental and Military Ratings. The four
"sleepers" display significant similarities in both
social environment and military predisposition.
Among the key regime indicators, they share a history
of nonconstitutional or nondemocratic transfer of
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The Case of Uganda
According to our indicators, Uganda at the end of
1985 was the most vulnerable Third World target for
military intervention. Although the ruling military
council had just signed a peace accord with the
insurgent National Resistance Army, conditions had
not improved since the council seized power the
previous July. The highly coup-prone environment
still was highlighted by a prolonged power struggle,
tribal strife, personal rivalries, and political violence.
Support for the council, led by 71-year-old General
Okello, was especially low in the capital because of
the brutal and undisciplined behavior of government
forces.
Moreover, every indicator in the military's predispo-
sition at that time rated high. Echoing the country's
tribal animosities, all segments of the Ugandan
armed forces had long been accustomed to operating
outside the law. In our view, motivation for a conspir-
acy against the council abounded, given the govern-
ment's inability to establish a semblance of order, to
defeat the insurgency, to curtail human rights ex-
cesses by government troops, and to halt the severe
deterioration in economic conditions. By January,
support for Head of State Okello among his own
forces had deteriorated to the point that insurgent
leader Yuweri Museveni and his National Resistance
Army moved into the capital and easily seized power.
Museveni's new government, in our judgment, has
precipitated such a major change in Ugandan politics
that the likelihood of a military coup has drastically
declined. For the first time since independence in
1962, the Bantus, a southern ethnic group who com-
prise two-thirds of the population, are in power.
Moreover, the economy already has begun to recover
as stability takes hold in the south. Okello's barbaric
army has been decimated by battlefield losses, and
many of his remaining soldiers are in government
custody. Others fled north with Okello but are scat-
tered and disorganized. Museveni's troops?the new
national Army?comported themselves with disci-
pline throughout their jive-year insurgency. Although
the new government is likely to continue to be beset
with serious human rights problems, we believe the
consistently restrained conduct of the insurgents sug-
gests that Okello will try to make good on his
government's commitment to curb human rights
abuses.
power and weak political institutions. For the most
part, all four also face chronic economic difficulties
and serious exogenous pressures?balance-of-pay-
ments problems and, in Pakistan's case, the loss of its
overseas labor market. The four militaries rate high in
previous involvement in coups, praetorian self-image,
unchecked power, and?to a lesser extent in Bolivia?
factionalism and the absence of a functional rival. As
with virtually all the highly coup-prone countries,
moreover, the military plays a critical role in the
survival of the four governments.
Low Rating in Motivation. The profiles of the four
countries' motivation are more varied, although each
"sleeper" rates high in at least one motive concerning
economic mismanagement and low in disagreement
between government and military leaders over policies
or military prerogatives. Given the powerful role of
9
the armed forces in these countries, we believe that a
change in the military's attitude toward the govern-
ment leadership?concerning its ability to maintain
order or resolve economic problems without threaten-
ing the armed forces' interests, for example?could
spur coup plotting. We also believe that, if senior
military officers in these countries lose confidence in
the government, any one of the precipitating events
could trigger their action:
? In Bolivia the election last summer of moderate
President Paz Estenssoro somewhat diminished the
prospects for military intervention. Nonetheless, the
US Embassy reports that the armed forces' willing-
ness to remain within the confines of the constitu-
tion will depend on its perception of how well the
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Figure 3
Vulnerability to Military Coups:
Ratings of Sleepers
Numbers?
Society
Ei Military
Motives
0 50
100
150
200
Bolivia
133
Nigeria
132
Pakistan
132
Panama
132
a We derived the numbers for each country by applying our methodology to
the indicators as rated by regional analysts.
308342 3-86
democratic government is able to address fundamen-
tal social and economic concerns, while retaining
broad popular support. The most significant factor
will be the government's ability to enforce far-reach-
ing austerity measures that Paz Estenssoro has begun
implementing to deal with the severe economic crisis.
? President Babangida, who seized power this past
summer in Nigeria, has appointed more junior and
middle-grade officers to policy positions than any
previous head of state; he recently survived a coun-
tercoup attempt because key officers supported him
rather than the conspirators. In our view, Babangida
will need continued military backing to deal with
the economic collapse?which will be further aggra-
vated by the recent sharp drop in oil prices?and the
resentment of northerners over the increased power
of southern minority tribes. If he fails to halt the
decline in living standards or to ease regional antag-
onisms, we believe the stage could be set for another
coup?possibly by more radical junior officers.
Secret
? The Armed Forces in Pakistan, which was anxious
to be relieved of police functions, vigorously sup-
ported President Zia's decision to end martial law in
December. According to press accounts, Zia has
sought to ensure continued support of the Armed
Forces by molding a civilian bureaucracy with
handpicked retired officers in key positions. None-
theless, many officers oppose his retaining the posts
of Army chief of staff as well as president. We
believe a move by Zia to impose martial law again
in the face of widespread political agitation could
prompt the military to conspire against him. Should
Zia's new government prove ineffective?as have all
previous civilian governments?the military also
would be tempted to intervene.
? In Panama, President Delvalle serves at the plea-
sure of Defense Chief Noriega, who pressured for-
mer President Barletta into resigning last Septem-
ber. The new President, however, faces a worsening
economic situation, public disgust with the
military's arrogance, and divisions within the De-
fense Forces. We believe Noriega is likely to view
lacking a political base?
as a liability in any political crisis and remove him.
At the same time, some elements in the Defense
Forces could use such a crisis to conspire against
Noriega.
The "Surprises"
These countries rate high in motivation, but their
lower ratings in the social environment and military
predisposition make the prospects of military inter-
vention appear less likely (figure 4). Our "surprise"
candidates include Libya, Mozambique, Peru, and
Suriname. Overall, these four countries rank close
behind our leading candidates, and we surmise that
minimal changes in their sociopolitical or military
conditions?especially in Libya and Suriname?
would significantly raise the probability of a coup.
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Vulnerability to Military Coups:
Ratings of Surprises
Numbersa
n Society
I=1 Military
Motives
Libya
Mozambique
Peru
Suriname
0 50 100
150
133
130
130
133
200
a We derived the numbers for each country by applying our methodology to
the indicators as rated by regional analysts.
308343 3-86
High Rating in Motivation. A broad range of motives
is evident in each of the countries in this group. Key
motives include a public perception of economic mis-
management by the government and policy differ-
ences between government and military leaders, close-
ly followed by government threats to the armed
forces?through interference in their professional
autonomy and attacks on their corporate interests. In
several cases, government difficulty in containing
insurgency or terrorism also rates high.
Low Environmental or Military Ratings. Among the
"surprise" countries, Peru and Suriname have armed
forces that are disposed to coup plotting posed against
political and socioeconomic conditions that are less
conducive to military intervention. Libya and
Mozambique, on the other hand, display the opposite
profile. The environmental conditions in these coun-
tries rate high?indeed, as high as some of our leading
candidates for coups?but the predisposition of their
militaries to intervene rates rather low, although in
11
Secret
the case of Mozambique the rating is low because it
has been independent for only 10 years and lacks a
history of military intervention:
? In Libya, domestic tensions are rising, fueled by a
deteriorating standard of living?once relatively
high?and Qadhafi's constant efforts to implement
revolutionary policies. The military is led by an
officer corps drawn from the middle class that has
suffered most from these policies, but we believe
Qadhafi's pervasive security precautions, including
his elite Jamahariyya Guard, have effectively
checked its power. The regime quashed a military
conspiracy in the spring of 1985.
? President Machel in Mozambique faces a deterio-
rating security situation, as the insurgent Mozam-
bique National Resistance continues to spread de-
spite the reduction in South African funding. He
also has to contend with an economy?once relative-
ly prosperous?in virtual collapse, the impact of
several years of disasterous drought, traditional
tribal leaders alienated by harsh government treat-
ment, and potential factionalism in the ruling party.
In our view, the pragmatic Machel still enjoys a
strong power base among the Armed Forces, but
military leaders probably would move to install a
leader more willing to negotiate with the rebels if
the war against them appeared hopeless.
? Since his inauguration last July, President Garcia in
Peru has taken bold steps to deal with corruption,
drug trafficking, inflation, and foreign debt. These
moves have gained the charismatic leader broad
popular acceptance and also some criticism?nota-
bly from elements in the security forces. Character-
ized by a past involvement in coups and a strong
praetorian self-image, some military leaders?ac-
cording to press reports?view Garcia's removal of
three ranking generals and cuts in arms spending as
major threats to the military's institutional interests.
In our opinion, the President's ability to retain
popular support?in part by grappling with massive
economic and financial problems?will play a criti-
cal role in determining the likelihood of military
intervention.
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The "Surprise" in the Philippines
At the end of 1985 the Philippines was our leading
candidate in the "surprise" group. The country dis-
played a large number of coup-prone sociopolitical
conditions and motives, but its military showed little
proclivity to intervene. In addition to a highly person-
alized and unresponsive political system, an economy
in shambles, and a steadily growing Communist
insurgency, President Marcos appeared determined to
stay in office until he died. The Philippine armed
forces, on the other hand, then viewed itself as the
country's protector against a Communist takeover
but had no history of coup plotting. More important,
officers disgruntled over pay, promotion opportuni-
ties, and insufficient logistic support to fight the
insurgents were poorly organized, and senior officers
loyal to President Marcos controlled virtually all
military resources.
Statements and actions by reformist military officers
during the election campaign in February, however,
pointed to a significant shift in the predisposition of
the armed forces. We observed that factionalism was
increasing, ties between some officers and the politi-
cal opposition were becoming stronger, and a growing
number of reform-minded officers were adopting the
belief that it was now up to the military to safeguard
the country's security, economic well-being, and in-
tegrity. Anticipation of a government crackdown
against reformist officers in the wake of the blatantly
fraudulent election, in our view, did in fact provoke
leaders of the anti-Marcos elements of the armed
forces into action.
? In Suriname, leader Commander Bouterse recently
agreed to consider a proposal from two traditional
political parties to liberalize the political system.
We believe he probably hopes such a decision will
broaden his support and, more important, persuade
the Netherlands to resume economic aid, halted in
1982 in retaliation for the Army's killing of 15 party
leaders. This dialogue, however, has heightened
dissatisfaction among the armed forces. In our
opinion, military leaders worry Bouterse may jeop-
ardize their interests?particularly by backing off ?
Secret
Figure 5
Vulnerability to Military Coups:
Ratings of Long Shots
Numbers'
pi Society
Military
I I Motives
I I
0 50 100 150 200
Burkina
110
Chile
102
Nicaragua
100
South Africa
99
Syria
101
Thailand
100
Zambia
104
We derived the numbers for each country by applying our methodology to
the indicators as rated by regional analysts.
308344 3-86
from a demand that those involved in the 1982
killings be granted amnesty?to institutionalize his
own control.
Possible "Long Shots"
These countries have significantly lower composite
ratings but, in our opinion, are worth tracking if
conditions in their environment, the predisposition of
their armed forces, or their level of motivation begin
to shift dramatically (figure 5). Three candidates?
Chile, South Africa, and Zambia--display conditions
in their environment and military that at present do
not appear conducive to coup plotting. In view of their
high ratings in the motives, however, we believe a
coup could occur unexpectedly
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Specifically, the armed forces in Chile, while still
loyal to President Pinochet, is growing restless over
Pinochet's intransigence and the possibility that he
may intend to seek reelection in 1989 in the face of
persistent political turmoil and growing terrorism. In
South Africa, President Botha's control of the white
political structures and his overall support among the
white electorate are likely to remain strong. Military
leaders, however, are playing a growing role in main-
taining order, and we believe their concern would
increase if they believed that civilian leaders were
losing control. President Kaunda's charisma has sus-
tained his widespread popularity in Zambia, but
miscalculations in implementing a painful IMF-im-
posed austerity program could spark a consumer and
labor backlash or provoke serious unrest among the
lower ranks of the military.
Our four other candidates in this group?Burkina,
Nicaragua, Syria, and Thailand?rate extremely low
in motivation, but in each country several or more key
conditions in the sociopolitical environment and pre-
disposition of the military rate high. We generally
would expect such countries to accumulate additional
coup-prone conditions and especially more motives
before experiencing a coup. Nonetheless?as with the
other "long shots"?we believe a coup could occur
unexpectedly. In fact, this past September military
conspirators in Thailand attempted to seize power.
In Burkina the traditional power groups remain alien-
ated from President Sankara's populist regime. Al-
though Sankara has initiated some economic reforms,
we believe the country will remain heavily dependent
on foreign aid, and food production will not keep pace
with population growth. In Nicaragua, there are no
current indications of discontent or factionalism in the
Sandinista military, and the population?while gener-
ally opposed to government policies?is quiescent. We
believe that an abrupt change of leadership is most
likely under extreme circumstances, such as a severe
deterioration in the government's war against the
anti-Sandinista insurgents.
Although President Assad's position in Syria is still
strong, we believe several critical sources of popular
discontent?fundamentalism, sectarianism, and eco-
nomic malaise?could erode his support,
13
In Thai- 25X1
land, the annual military promotions in October 1985
strengthened officers who had supported Prime Min-
ister Prem in the earlier revolt, but we believe the
officer corps as a whole is dissatisfied with Prem's
lack of leadership during a sharp slowdown in the
economy. Moreover, in our view, Prem's political
difficulties are likely to mount this year, and as a
result the Army Commander probably will increase
his pressure on the government.
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Appendix
Military Coup
Indicators Methodology
After we refined the
initial indicators through further discussions with
appropriate experts, we applied them to more than
100 successful military coups that have occurred in
the Third World since 1952.
we rated the degree of applicability
of the indicators to each coup.
As a result of this research, we observed that certain
coup-prone conditions and motives consistently have
played a more significant role than others in past
military coups. Indeed, we found that the indicators in
each group?the sociopolitical environment, the pre-
disposition of the military, and the motives?histori-
cally fell into parallel groups of frequency and rating.
For example, each of 11 indicators?five in the
environment, five in the predisposition of the military,
and one in the motives?rated high in applicability in
more than 60 percent of the coups studied and low or
not applicable in less than 20 percent. On the other
hand, each of 12 indicators rated low or not applicable
in more than 85 percent of the coups and high in
applicability in less than 30 percent of the cases
studied (figure 6).
To determine the likelihood of future military coups
in the Third World, we devised a weighted scheme
that reflects our findings. The scheme assigns indica-
tors that consistently rated high in past coups a value
of 3, followed by a value of 2 for predominately
medium ratings, and 1 for low. Because every indica-
tor was evident in at least 10 percent of the historical
cases, we also gave a weight of 1 to indicators that
generally were not applicable. In addition, we formu-
lated a "country specific" indicator?likewise weight-
ed at 1?to allow for the inclusion of peculiar factors
that could be significant for an individual country.
Although we recognize that some of the conditions
and motives that frequently rated lower or not appli-
cable in past coups?such as an insurgent threat-
15
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now may play more important roles as coup indica-
tors, we nonetheless believe that the key historical
indicators continue to be the most critical determi-
nants for assessing the degree to which a country is
coup prone.
We applied our weighting scheme to the coup indica-
tors as rated for 81 countries by regional intelligence
analysts. We created a data base by converting the
analysts' ratings for the indicators in each of these
countries into numerical equivalents-3 for high ap-
plicability, 2 for medium, 1 for low, and 0 for no
applicability. By multiplying each numerical rating by
the appropriate weight from our methodology and
totaling the results, we compiled an overall score for
each country. For example, an analyst's rating of high
for personalistic politics in country X would be con-
verted to a 3. If we also weighted this particular
indicator high?based on our historical research?we
would assign personalistic politics in country X an
overall value of 9. The composite score for country X
would comprise the sum of this and the other indica-
tors weighted accordingly.
We also determined partial scores in each country for
the three groups of indicators?the environment, the
military, and the motives. We used the composite
scores to rank the 81 countries in terms of their
potential for coup plotting and to select the seven
countries we deemed most vulnerable to a coup
attempt (figure 7). We based our choice of "sleeper"
and "surprise" candidates on the appropriate groups
indicators.
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Figure 6
Frequency and Applicability of Indicators to Past Coups
n High
n Medium
Low
Frequency
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
The Political and Socioeconomic Environment
Personalistic politics rather than strong political institutions.
I
Lack of popular respect for government leadership.
Weak civilian elite support for the government.
History of nonconstitutional or nondemocratic transfer of power.
1
Uncertain succession procedures.
i
I
Chronic economic difficulties.
1
Ideological divisions between government and one or more elements
in society.
Widespread chronic civil disorder, other than insurgency.
1
Ethnic or tribal conflict.
Exogenous complications.
I
Loss of superpower patron-client support.
The Predisposition of the Military
Self-image among the military of its role as protector of the country's
values, interests, or constitution.
Active involvement in the political process.
Disdain for civilian politicians and political institutions.
Military factionalism and coalition building.
History of participation in coup plots and attempts.
Power unchecked by regime.
Absence or weakness of functional rivals.
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Figure 6 (continued)
Frequency
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Close ties between some military leaders and opposition groups.
Guerrilla experience in a recent revolution or struggle for independence.
The Motives
Major policy differences between government and military leaders.
Inability of government leadership to co-opt or suppress opposition
groups.
Public perception of gross government mismanagement as
responsible for economic problems.
Public discontent over flagrant corruption.
Difficulty in maintaining public order.
Extension of government's power into constitutionally prohibited
areas; arbitrary application of law.
Perception among military of incoming government leadership as
antithetical to military's interests.
Government interference in military's professional autonomy.
Government attacks against military's corporate interests.
Retention of power by government beyond constitutional time limits
or attempts to do so.
Difficulty in containing terrorism or insurgency.
Tension between military and government leaders over border conflict
or foreign war.
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Figure 7
Composite Ratings of Countriesa
Numbersa
Society
Military
Motives
0
50 100 150 200
Uganda
Central African Republic
155
146
142
139
139
139
Guatemala
Sudan
Bangladesh
Guinea
Liberia
Honduras
I
36
Philippines
133
Libya
I
133
Bolivia
133
Suriname
133
Nigeria
132
Panama
132
Pakistan
j
132
Mozambique
130
Peru
130
Benin
129
Congo
I
126
El Salvador
I
122
Argentina.
I
121
Iran
I
118
Somalia
117
South Yemen
I
I
117
South Korea
1
115
?1110
Burkina
1
Mali
110
We derived the numbers for each country by applying our methodology to
the indicators as rated by regional analysts.
170
0
50
100
Togo
Brazil
Niger
1
Burma
I
Sierra Leone
I
Zambia
1
Ghana
11
Ecuador
f
Chile
11
Algeria
li
Syria
II
Nicaragua
1(
Tunisia
1(
North Yemen
1(
Thailand
1(
Indonesia
9(
South Africa
9(
Mauritania
9?
Ethiopia
9E
Zaire
95
Ivory Coast
94
Guyana
93
Burundi
91
Iraq
91
Mexico
91
Uruguay
91
Colombia
9(
108
108
05
05
05
04
2
2
2
2
1
150 200
0
50 100 150 200
88
7
Zimbabwe
Tanzania
Morocco
Nepal
Angola
?
Egypt
8
Jordan
8
Paraguay
8(
Sri Lanka
7(
Kenya
7(
Haiti
77
Seychelles
76
Dominican Republic
76
Taiwan
72
Malawi
70
Saudi Arabia
70
Venezuela
69
Kuwait
68
Senegal
167
Belize
65
Cameroon
65
Madagascar
63
Botswana
63
Rwanda
61
Malaysia
61
Jamaica
57
India
55
1
6
6
4
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Figure 8
Vulnerability of Third World Countries to a Military Coup Attempt'
High
Medium
Low
North
Atlantic
Ocean
ROCCO
ALGERIA
PAKISTAN
MEXICO
GUATEMAL
EL SALVADOR
BELIZE JAMAICA
RAS
South
Pacific
Ocean
RAGUA
04% PANAMA
ECU
y
Oyi,NICAN
LIBYA
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
BANG LADE
INDIA
Taiwan
MAURITANIA
SEN
SUDAN
vEM II P.O
' PHILIPPINES
North
Pacific
Ocean
GUYANA
SURINAME
GUINEA
SIERRA LEO
LIBER
IVORY
COAST
IN
NIGERIA
TOGO
ALIA
()SRI
LANKA
BRAZIL
DA
KENYA
wAND
URUNDI
TANZANIA
MALAVSIA
HE
ANGOLA
Q0111/ D 0 ,E I A
s.
ZAMBIA
ZIMISAB
BIQUE
South
Atlantic
Ocean
OTSWANA
GASCAR
Indian
Ocean
CHI
AS
ARGENTINA
a The categories are based on the countries' composite
ratings as determined by our methodology, using data
available as of December 1985. The "High" countries rank
in the top 28 percentile and the "Low" countries in the
bottom 30 percentile.
C.A.R. ? CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
P.D.R.Y. ? PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Y.A.R. ? YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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