THE YOUTH BULGE: A LINK BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHY AND INSTABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R000500370006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
nOPY
000
N?m
00/NO
td
The Youth Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability
A Research Paper
?Secret?
GI 86-10015
March 1986
Copy 648
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability
A Research Paper
Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Geography Division, OGI,
Secret
GI 86-10015
March 1986
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Scope Note
The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demo raphy
and Instability
Intelligence to develo indicators political instability_ap0aggaLcz...IL
provides a zurmayyjpoli at _the relationshipsbetween population age
structure and political my:eq., focgsing oil,growth in the size of the young
adult population. We reoggize-that,politica_instability
aririgiirelactor, and, through a series of country profiles, we examine how
political an eccr?OroMMUMFe-ifhc-i? conszai d.arALL(a-gsrlk,
ro eo t e youth bulge" in instability.
iii
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GI 86-10015
March 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of November 1985
was used in this report.
The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demo raphy
and Instability
Social scientists have lon _postulated a relationship between the size of a
nation s youth population and its degree of social instability. Although
1_,,,,,g,_al,ilLslataLand by the difficulty- of
differentiating between the effects of pop iluatigimpsiother ir
-desiabizing
tactors iirsiTe-circ'-eTs-er political scientists, historians and jpurnalists have
-ilarghrtirliiirWilgibirage with everything from street crime to
i'arOrtitioiiTfirrar=cralinkage, if it could be proved, to the
inbat it could provide early warning o-Wh
f when and
where to expsap_obs101 stratas-Whether-or-not-such_sstrains eru t
regime-threatening instability would depend on the ability of te_govern-
lion oLiaysatt_as well as on other
ent
ac
ieve
constructive
mobiliz
societal factors.
On the basis of a preliminary examination of 49 countries and a more
ZeTairalrirdrOITTIMTW roifriffi-e-T97TniOreT'Ebli-gh-ZCrrfeTifi"On-
ergen- ce oT a -"y*Pu-th tinu re"12D?rEa=6'pe c rtriate-tifthe
4 age_grap an political instability in a number
o irs orld countries. Political instability, ranging from riots -to
insurgency, tends to break out as the youth bulge emergesarid to taper off
----7,-17-as s si es. is-r--appears to be true no on roffra'fioics'breirregions and
et ni?r-rgIO-iips wit in nationi:Althougl significant instability can occur
where no youth bulge is apparent, the youth bulfeig-afm-Ost'alWaYs
_
accompanied by some form or instability.
We have noted a number of countries that have recently developed youth
bulges or wit ? eve op em in t e next 10---3-iaitith-ertEn-Wbeing
equal, we wou e)tr7f=g711-ileant political instability in these
coirifrfa
?
Indonesia, whose previous youth bulge was associated with the overthrow
mo regji now developing a second billge-tbat will peak
? Mexico's outh bulge, which_ emerged in 1980, is projected to peak
aroun_d 1,999_at a y,endkigk.le,vel?,
? Nicaragua's small youth bulge is projected to expand slowly but steadily
-
over the next 20 years
? Bangladesh, currently without a youth bulge, will develop one by 1990;
y 199 , it wi have lir w7i-ild'-?-higlie-st 13}-6-Piiffion of:y6ung_g.,ults,
? Iraq-Eikiir, , a 'SP-Fah/ado-F. to developyouth
-
'gages by 105
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In general, however, the 1995 picture appears brighter than that of today.
Ottire-41-cmtri-eMidiFd e
'21-in 1985 to 10in 1995. The decline will be slow in countries such
liaThrazil, Peru, Venezuela, the Philippines, and por-
en ing ingering insta ii ity7-but will be rapid itiSriTanka',
- _
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Contents
Page
Scope Note iii
Summary
V
Demography and Political Instability 1
Countries Selected for Analysis 1
Sri Lanka: Two Bulges, Two Insurgencies 2
Lebanon: Where Emigration Increases the Youth Bulge 2
Mexico, Peru, and Panama: The Slowly Emerging Threat 6
The Philippines: The Changing Location of the Youth Bulge 7
Iran and Nicaragua: The Never-Ending Bulges 8
Indonesia: The Generation Gap 9
Chile, Mozambique, and Nigeria: Bulgeless Instability 10
Policy Implications 12
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The Youth Bulge
The analysis used in this research considers the
fourth and fifth age cohorts, as commonly used by
demographers, to constitute the young adult popula-
tion. Census data on population age structure are
most often reported in five-year age cohorts (ages 0 to
4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, and so on). Demographers usually
consider the fourth of these age cohorts (ages 15 to
19) to be the first that is nondependent?that is, the
younger ages are not considered to be members of the
labor force and are dependent on society for their
survival. In all modern societies, some proportion of
the young postpone their entry into the labor force to
undertake secondary and postsecondaPy schooling;
they would normally enter the labor force as mem-
bers of the fifth age cohort (ages 20 to 24). By
combining the fourth and fifth age cohorts, the
analysis captures a large proportion of all those
entering the labor force for the first time, often the
first generation of those who are seeking their places
in a modern national society instead of playing
traditional roles in village society.
The youth bulge comes from explosive population
growth rates, which in the Third World derive from
modernization, specifically from the importation of
Western medical and public health technology lead-
ing to sharp declines in death rates. Initially, deaths
prevented are most heavily concentrated among the
newly born and young children so that demographic
stress is placed first on institutions, such as primary
schools, which provide services to the young. When
this bulge reaches young adulthood, however, stress
is exerted on the entire national social, economic, and
political systems as young adults seek employment,
educational opportunities, housing, or land.
Scholars describe the activities of the young adult
cohorts as "mobilization" when they seek integration
into the national framework. Unfortunately, an ex-
cessive youth bulge thwarts mobilization by outstrip-
ping the ability of most Third World .societies to
provide the desired integration. Above all else, young
adults want to participate in active roles, and casting
a ballot does not give the same feeling of participa-
tion as marching with a rifle.
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The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability
Demography and Political Instability
We believe that there is a clear, though indirect,
re a ions ip setwen e emergence of a, !`youth bul-
,e77811%Tas when 20 percentor mor:e of the
139-raitatitrirbrairrrin the 15_19,24_age,grorid add
1515111Tal ril-riTaSiThe general linkages between the
-yotrtirlitiTestli-ave been_establis e in
easi.--fata-Temic studies .dealing with three impor-
-rstihe World: m-Obilization
7rMTY5117F16-JGa4ie-naboniryftetraWralrr?
eThriTartrrielMTOrOtfi-sifig747PC'crta ancr
explosive populatiorisw_th.,Rapid,pmulation growth
--ereaTerY. trirg7Tri the age structure of the population,
rrifein-befaif
oos an en er e a or force, they find limited
173787furiisiles n'.Msi7'icat-i3n?grrtployment and land-
ownership. Resulting frustration and_discontent
11111ififfiequently_age,Sranslatecl_
origTaliairil-OiS-, or insurgencies.
Not all causes of instability are population related,
---sirdirek-fciftilifaletiations are
able to survive theyouth bulge with minima bon ra1.
InstabiliWsi7fim external fa-ctors,siitli as -
T6e1ii--.1 intervention, or from...military, coup may be
unreraiedTo."tbulge-. Even when a_particular-
i-Yl*r;e bulge is presenLyesultintinstability may be
171.7177fire-Tag4-6?rdealing with the threat are
attl=iarirroir'eXarilpre,--adatt-Wiifii-irdx-
-CTIMMTIrirt ge o young_adults in the early
s oy encouraging emigration to Britain, Austra-
"TiZTr7tlfca- a. ome economic systems may a soi7b
MiTiaffriffeir-dire-n when new w6W-eiri contribute
lifflerfflife?r-tritc-i-141510-yrlieilt"); a -P-ractice-ginrilar-
TEM& ng. or mo
owever, neither out-rni ration nor, hidden uneinfiroy-
+CM,
men are a equate safeIwalves? arid `Oullifeati-OT-
politica ii--i''''iiraTffa';Ve-common outcomes.
Because of the relationship between population
growt ves us
a
par
ICU
ar
1
a method for the long-range forecasting of ?gpLe t
ical
touthbl is
pre ictable as to duration intensity and_location to
t e exter-h-----iat demographic_data are reliable and' the
.____..___-- - -__:_._ ,...
instability-p - potential 9Slistlasprs_,, such as ethnic4 --
faCiaT,class tensions, is most likely .tf:I be realized
Ziffii'lg silMT.iiis ordemOgra-phic stress.
nrest. e s ress exerte
Countries Selected for Analysis
We based our anal sis_oalei bul e and instabil-
ity on a preliminary study of 43 non-Communist
"TeVeloping countries with projected populations of 10
million or more by 1995. To this lisLwereaded,
trirateni-OFC, NICaragua, Panama El Salva-
or, an t iopia e ecause of special US policy inter-
ests. Twenty-four of the 49 countries analyzed had
TOictr=''i ges 1985-figure 1). Twenty-two of ihe-se
countries showed significant symptoms of instabi -
Tfr Faller current or recent, ;He those countries with,
9141).2Lepor io,.-ria,adigts,(belowel8:5:?_p_ercerit)
were among the most stable in their regions of the
world (Ivory Coast, Saudi Ara 6111 --Turm'args we
expecte , snr-TC-e-r?iot iniaabilltrstertiefe-9ffilitriVz'
grap ic actors, t osecoun rfeewitrirroportfOris'cir'
youn-g-a-duTtelf?.-5 arff--2-0.0 'percent offdreta
ome
i ? Ardort'lair--evitent-e-OTinifal
bility, whi e others (ror
andlcu-airor) are relatively stable7Uarcci,-6ifecifth-e-
ul
although cus.L5ntl exhibiting only si3O-Fa-die-ane
-
vague signs of unrest, has been tamtedrevios
instability mortiu.c.a.A__a_iLar,canajor cpncerp
.auring the 1983-93 g&od_._Indgesia, the other excep-
tion, has Just acquired a youth hulge,andit is too
early to assess the relationship_there between the
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currenIt u ge and instability. Indonesia, however
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experienced an earlier youtc bulge related to a majg
episode of instability.
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Twelve countries, nine of which have current youth
bulges, were selected for detailed analysis according
to several criteria:
? Current or continuin interest to US policymakers,.
?esei_Thr.?.2r2eLpi...EIELai.d..eme_9_,plutie,o.1
instability.
? Re ional variation, so that the major areas of the
Third World are represented in the analysis. -
? J'AttsaL9f youth bulge develinept that are rea-
19j01)1y-rsentative of youth bulges throughout
the Thir_dWorld.
Sri Lanka: Two Bulges, Two Insurgencies
Sri Lanka's two major ethnic groups, dominant in
separate areas of the country, experienced youth
bulges at different times, and these bulges are associ-
halese and TamiriiisultUrclei.
The m Mese, concei-77--1177ein the west",
duced a youth bulge that peaked ab-oliT19707117
Varelif theafa_mil dominant in the northeast
emerged in the late 1970s and will reach its highest
have traditionally depended on the civil service and
k._12MitS.SiQLLS19?...?__'rtrn0 1 31, OUI-511*r=e1M-?arel
in the less faxoteski.
The Tamil youth bulge will fade after 1990 and will
d1saebykut 1995, although the communal
119,Eliky_tliallas-heraLaed i........22.1aieznore slowly.
Recent violence, including Tamil terrorist acts against
_
_
Sinha sacre of Tamil civilians by
createdi-sifuation where the
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ef.oli?Lgi of dempamilig_pressure may not be sufficient
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to defuse the conflict.
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Lebanon: Where Emigration
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1M:igen& Youth Bulge
Lebanone, which de_velc,:mi.Leti_Ayen
1975 and 1980, will increase until 1990, at which time
more than 22 percent of the population may befiii
1.5.122,1Azgurclup_fi tWere is
no
recent official demographic dica.-fOr'Lebanon; we.
atestimate?s?b-aged on cdiftraf-
-------
point in s0ifture 2 . insurgsccy sti_Aes?are conservative. The out-migration of
many
be
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ccidifTeTri Tfie southyvest_anglaea_kesun_191_1;_the
current Tamil insurgency is concentrated in the
y us imsiniHTb?
nese population are cdn-i's dered,
-
t1athW?1.-AliaZO-dethic study showed that Sinhalese
ccTiiiigte ei?liiiTel377373titi---1 the
greater?perhaps as muelf-aii--Third of the
c_p_opplai ion my ? '1, a igure
ore
than 50 percent gteater than thit for any other
national population.
ernment olic ticaly__p_isie_e.a_mic group over
another am lified the effect of the outll bulges. Th
initial Sinhalese bulge occurrin at a time when relict
British influences see s -t. . 88ils,cteateia_
situation whers-um..s_edsjiteLlg.gge_ j_____Rupper5
iali;oui---jr---Oults felt discriminated again,sl_Lack-
ing access to the szrE7--Iglisti-lai3R4le secondary
f _5-nu &higher
educational o_pportunities,
et-TisTie-,--a-iid?thti?T-4e-ii-deiiied access to_the_prpfessions
and middre---tange civil service positions. The insur-
-
gency le to po es?such asprejernces for Sinha
lese or university a mission and public eriLip19,ym_spl
SifiliOla as the officio)
language?that accelerated-movement towar'si a Sin;
hale-eldiiimiffated--s-o-Ciefy. By the time thesecond,
concentrated n?_mg_itlielaini.f5 in the_north,
favoring the
thamiils, who__
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Accordin to
I.. - - I . e ? 1
's total popula-
tion declined between 1975 and 1985 the
m'in-l-b7r6f3rOutlis in the population increased p-roduc-
su ? stanfiarriie- in tf___ je_pLoagr_tictojt_a_c_9ptiirile
ol-th-Frad1736PiiWii:POPUI lation decline occurred
brairse-emigli-
MOIrper year (aborif-80 perceiii7d1was
etrisITOTTis , e7Z'aFdEd=i-ddttions to the population aris-
int-fffirilifill-lifihrates_amo'_, g the s am5steL___flen?ls_,?
The number of-bIithlifen and women between 40 and
49 and of children under 15 declined markedly in the
ebanese popu tion-between 197 and- r985,-
erififfiargriregirtireettilralitriktre predoififnantly
older aciuitraretatiantedietryo
Triiiiire4rthel7de-Parture from the e-ountry-rein-
fd7Ced-the-tehdtrieffo-Wafiri-kalifeidtilt-bt
alreadk present.
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Figure 1
The Youth Bulge, 1985
Youth bulge-20% or more of the
population in the 15-24 age group
18.5-20% of the population in the
15-24 age group
No youth bulge
TURKEY
North
Atlantic
Ocean
S KOREA
AFGHANISTA
ALGERIA
PAKISTAN
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABI
MEXICO
"EnnA.
South
Pacific
Ocean
ligrARAGUA
"111 PANAMA
hge4t
ECU
VENEZUELA
IVORY
COAST
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
BAN GLAD
INDIA
COLOMBIA
()SRI
LANKA
BURMA
,
.,C1A
PHILIPPINES
1-41
DA
KENYA
BRAZIL
South
At I a ticc
Ocean
(./ ANGOLA
TANZANIA
04
itZIMBABWE
SOUTH "
AFRICA Ne
ESI#
North
Pacific
Ocean
MBIOUE
GASCAR Indian
can
CHILE
/ ARGENTINA
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Figure 2
Sri Lanka: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
Sinhalese insurgency
Major anti-Tamil rioting in Colombo
Peak of Tamil insurgency, September 85
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
Critical level a
Sri Lanka total
Sinhalese
Tamil
16 1950 55 60 65 ? 70
a The critical level is the point at which youths make up 20 percent
or more of the population.
75
80
85
90
95
2000
05
31:61.68 2-86
Figure 3
Lebanon: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
?
iai aCi 111 V
Civil war begins?
orllIcJ -
- JAJJ4JJ111c11.1L/11
UI ricanicilt-cicut urcrmayei
? 241 US marines killed in their barracks
23
22
21
Critical level
20
19
18
17
16
1
1
1
I
I
I 1
1 1
15 1950
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
2000
05
169
5
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Figure 4
Lebanon: Change in Age Groups,
1975-85
Thousand persons (net change=-19,000)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
-80 -60 -40 -20
0 20 40
308170 2-86
The composition of Lebanon's youth bulge portends
contnni171317c-al stability be-
sairitiTWF________TilliTelrthelirodii.cf of a
szills_EtLitsiimspalns. The ShiL.
young adults who are at the bottom of the economic'
liader?less well es. ed and clothed than
t eir Christian Druze.._. Sunni countrymen?offer a
huge unskilled lab-Oil-supPlecoliomy that
FilirioraTai it. DE-76-557e;ce'M.Ta7,,,b-Oiliiii ,iis
moreover, will t?.!_ -ss the wales of those
fortunate enough to find employment. The alienation
of Shia yout , along with their growing numericaj
dominance o ebanon, contributes to a situation rips,
fOrniffiritientr rea s of unrest.
Scattered data from Palestinian refugee areas suggest
the possibility that P_Agginians have clexclope4?4
sei."7.317"-a ellia bulge that R!a1,ced,,A_L,_?_otw_Ctjia;?7
paLcei*----11761-61-bWdefF19-80 and 198.5. However hat
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may be, the presence of an estimated 400,000 Pales-
tinian re ugees in e anon?no inc use'1 al-
criTalu6fretzliefirrkouth-bulgectireetirprtffitites
r>o-ITTCaTb'Ts'TalillirrTlie=Vrtse-n-eeikn-g,'
equ-art-oTiearly 10 percent Ofirb'rr_e -anon s po-pu a
crelttrye O'bita-clre to natidi?fla IfiCeiration.
National policy has contributed to the frustration felt
by the Islamic youthWy-iiikitutionaliiiiiiceir-
suce
nia-TOITF37a3a jiiiiii77:67OPOTTriaate-iiiirdifirtion in
government far outweighing\ the Christian share of
the actuali&country=populimated at
about 25 percent).
Mexico, Peru, and Panama
the Slowly Emerging Threat
SiVgartatin American countries exhibit a similar
iiattern of ernergia slowly expanding
young adult population beginning in .t.11-6 early 1960s,
reaclig_t e7:207percent level during the 1980s, ails'
by thelate
There are early
indications thafinStabihtymybe growing in all these
countries.
The languid pace with which the youth bulge has
emerge m e)------E?M-E?notes less destabili-
zation than would a smaller bulge that emeried more
itical system?essen-
rapi
exico s po
a sing e par y encompassing a broad political
spectrum?is mar a y resilient and7;eiii, HEIM-
p e response ime prows es sy t e gradua expan!L.
orfreTOutlirirrfa-VOTr'S5relaiii(in
respoilie most sa ierit-featuLuMgzesponse is
ine continuing migration of a portion of the youth
byg_e to the United STaie-sc, _ro_v_faes,Mexico
with a demographic safety valve." In this case,
miotEe
o
irigidgiliThas been scco-Mliiiiged'not so much ry''
po icy as y t ea sence o po icy; t e se la Madrid
government, an s pre ? ecessors,
emigration with benign neglect.
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Figure 5
Mexico: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
Period of high potential
for instability a
Critical level
17 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
a See National Intelligence Estimate 81-84 (Secret NF NC OC),
25 April 1984, Outlook for Mexico.
Figure 6
Peru: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
?u.iiiciguin..,c UI acIllIclo
Luminoso
20.5
Critical level
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
IIIIII
III
i 1
17.5 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
3C6171 2-86
Peru's small youth bul e emerged in 1980, at the
iame time as the emergence of the Sen ero uminoso
princi al nsurgentgroun, and will disap-
ffflo fi u .)_SLictiyity shows a steady
increase rom 1980 through 1984,corresRoWng to
t e.PM--"Z'Epe-?toii'bT-tljeT_y_ot_L.tk,12ulg_enhassy reporting
-
indicates that the SL is an almost ideal example of an
insurgent group spawned by the youth bulge. ts
members are 15 to 25 often with above-average
education. Captured members cite frustration with
J4....Leir inability to obtain employment commensute
with theireducational levels asa_princi1 reason- ror
?
joining.
Panama's outh bulge, which peaked at about 2
-
percent in 198 ?appears_o coinci e wit a degree of
political instability (figiiie "
l-Frie-s'sriallg
reportin- 24.L9-8-0, corresponding to the emergence
-
Ort.he youth bnlke?shows a gradual escalation-in
demonstrations political killings, and other indica-
tions of instability. The SeilleiriberTanlister of
arletta, though coinciding, with ?opth
7
3C6172 2-86
bulge peak, appears to have been largely unrelated to
demograpffinonstrations in
bear the mark of-Tht?=
bulge in action.
-
- -
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Th_e_youth bulge in Panama will begin to diminish by
1990, and by 2005 the young adult populationwi I
reach the norm for developed countries. Such a steep 25X1
dec me, s ared only by n onesia among e countries
analyzed for this study, will sharply reduce demo-
graphic pressure generating instability.
The Philippines: The Chogiug
Location of the Youth Bulge
The increase in the proportion of the Filipino young,
adult popu ation has been dramatically sudden and
niRreits appearance has left
the governmet e ecompay_unapc_
effectively with it (figure 8). As recently as _..1
PiZcOrfOrori?outhilinTinshilippine population wa
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Figure 7
Panama: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
?Barletta ousted
21.5
21.0
20.5
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
Critical level
Figure 8
Philippines: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
'
1V161 um flaw uv..,,icu,...,?
NPA formed?
? .....,/l1/1,411,
MI IV.I.,?... 111.3.415%.11%, j
?Student unrest peaks;
visit of Pinochet
22
21
Critical level
20
19
18
i
1 1 1
i
t
1 i
1 i I
17.5 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05 17 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
303173 2436
only slightly larger than the norm for a developed
country. By 1970 however, more thTintrperalliT of
t e population was made up o young ?0 s,ans -their
impact had become a roa7Fr1-
ers
id-
ers are predomiformer_stu_en -ffitariffireilty
1970s recrui ed to membership in the Communist
arty of the Philippates or inTgeNe--i; PeOaes'
ArmySI,s1122N..),from a societal context in which unem-
Pro7rnent rates grew increasingly-edir driTtfie OPPOi-
wrinTs' or_socianore ernlive. The
emergence of the youth bulgevitlithe-,_-_
ae-cIaration of law by the Marcos and
the bulge its maximum around 1980,- corre-
ionOf the
-
ingjo increasing
countryside and stu7d-ehrunrest:
ommunist domi a
The youth bulge will start to dissipate by 1990, but
Thrtlreat to sability will probZiebntinue Fe-7a
structure
a ttesnsil
mencan countries, wher_e_1,.Mmy.l_kijze quicla
'AZZfrel7FrOgririt-Fle Philippines has been more
protracteyeali-in inost of
menca icus. reinographic pressn,re
governmerii-;Olicy,
a--C" -t fY 0 arcos regime,_?
Secret
3174 2.86
in creating a favorable environment for insurgent
groTh?TaT6ThilaTitze,rei. lit'71-rregftioa
SlibTarrtiarardrillreorlictrr
The yOutlfbulge,zlich,was predominantly urban
gallefore 1984, is now becoming increasingly
rural a transformationa reduce the quality of
thAlpadership2,vithin insurget_gifonpsOz.nre 9).
Although insurgent operationg bases are located in
rural areasa_substantilj portion of leaders, and
perl.......La_miSignificant number of trained ersonnel
general! - ? -d urb-anites who have "ta en to
t e hills" in o position to the government. e poten-
,.
ial
pool
of
support
among
young
qr.
an
tes_in the
P n_22.:Le==_Iow rying up and will be_substantiAy
reduced in 20 years.
orzsoZeir.,-^,- .
Iran and Nicaragua: The Never-Endinge
Iran and Nicaragua are unusual case's because their
Loatlakulge- em-e70717---cice 197 aThcl-Vir-
continue tulow -slaTYITairilirerti;e7e-riod
projected by -curientiiiiiiiralTOTFinre7rirgiiie;76
an 10. 01-1ThtastraptirdireritrrticraTtrereCinca-
t= young maTleMaifirif,--co-uld reduce .the..y040
_
bulge 'Mow t -p-e-reentlevel before 2010.
8
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Figure 9
Philippines: Rural and Urban
Youth Bulges
Youths age 10-25 as a percentage of total population
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
Rural
Urban
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
28 1975 80 85 90 95 2000 05 10
Figure 10
Iran: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
?hl au- u aki w ai ...,glin
20.5
Critical level
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
17.5
17.0
1 1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
16.5 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
366175 2-86
It appears that both countries have turned the youth
bu ge to the tasi?i--727;17;71;i3weiza=-Ienvirof
the state m c(------"--o'iMartEirre-eTrTTnterminable. While
it is c ear a nei er e ran- r'a7N177uirtire?
ToflictTWWT'fie idea
7FISZiSinlIETOTiirb-u-lie;-both accomplish that
end. The wholesale conscriaion of "youngra
Iran alidNicarani5lishes the abiOiTtroirof
youth into the national f!bi----IrWrri e new regimes
altaatarget the young for indoctrination, in boti
a??149=-.rellflaCeWati-ciii-o
symbolic involvenient is MobiliiaTibiThrf the
yiz_ 3111,11.gmA?A.qutiALtELthe uprisings fhatbrought
?Thboth Khpmea.mi_arp:Irt4s, Sandliiair
bothregimes probably 'fear 1.-e-at-IU---"1)17.117.1 of
TheinZilifile_Kouth coda turii.against them.
Indonesia: The Generation
n onesia s yout bulge first developed in 1950,
reac es i s maximu ro) no ' .."--'?'7,1,,hiler?eared, re-
emerged in?,19,.8.5.,..ari0 IA,1117C7Eraliew?anTcOr-alsi
ably higher?peak around 19907fiiiiireT2717?'le
nal apueuan.ce_of,t_solt 1.7771Zeri7h?leear y
independe leiTn OirtIrSuk r-
no re ii...._Amica,matuadie,tsLigui cimployment
9
3/1:6176 2-86
Figure 11
Nicaragua: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
- ,../VG1 VII V W
VI
JVIIILIZA
21.0
20.,,
Critical level
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
'
18.0
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
17.5
1950 55
60 65 70 75 80
85 90 95 2000 05
Note: The 1975 bulge is associated with the ouster of Somoza in 1979,
but was immediately followed by the outmigration of youth as reflected
in the troueh of 1980.
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Figure 12
Indonesia: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
-rsuui LIVG WIlp, I VIIVWCUL Uy
antileftist, anti-Chinese rioting
?Soeharto assumes power
22
21
Critical level
20
19
18
1
1 1
11111111
17 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
303178 2.86
and e
for-Alundrests_d_thousands of youths.
Sukarno attempted to mobilize this group with the
Tae-airan,
foreign and domestic enemies. It is doubly ironic tiiat
it was m'fiibers or tne youth bulge, Dotn stuaents and
milirtarYTWIOThvertlifew Sukarno and were them-id-Nig
cimated by the purges that followed. By 1970
jr,oung adults were sparse in the Indonesian popula-
tion, in part becarse o 1-1-reTrT9Tor,or )0 deaths in the
vti-Chinese, antiTeTtist riots occutiffeliTth-e-Valc_761
Sukarno's ouster.
potential impact of Indonesia's second youth
ulge, now erin t e scene is soth aggravated and
-TESZ---ted-by certain governmept_policies_and _cultural_
-iTailitions. Since independence Indonesias made
e s ucation the inchpin of its policy for economic.
nt AnArmoslat_it a_spect of educational
policy has been_the_introduction of Bahasajtjslofiesia
Ilir?fgi..?1.9.1,elsalka_I little siinilarity_to the_many_
regional tongues of the countrytis the medium of
Secret
instruction. The traditional languages of Indonesia
are spo en wit ii erent in ec ions, accordiniTithe
social status or authTigf16fi1id-PerS?nilielirad--
?lima-1-6101'a these digtitTetions
ereby helping to create an especially broad genera-
tiot".ia1776mem th;yoiiIh bale; WHO
use the new language, and older In otrielterrwirrtire
the
tendencies is theeigreirerof a centralist government
in Indonesia that has developed as a resu?lt-oTI7eVilig
popteeTOrrurthirS rom oth the left an
The right. Government political ideology, probably the
most common target of youth protes1 vvorldwide,j1,
not a major issue.
The reemergence of the Indonesian youth bulge in
1985 bodes ill for the country over the next decade.
Since the Sukarno years, Fercliira
as ill'aore ou e an-d-ige-Fouliitrade
major aevances in creating a coherent state from
isparate islands and cultures. Despite the gains,
hAtcysLjgclojn_ia remainsamor c.o.yncry and its
n_ uth bulge, without the
outbreak of..u.nrest. is doubtful.
-
Chile zan____,A19,..u.L_____1(1 Nigeria: BulgelessbagMtx
The youth bulge appears always to result in at_least_
some instability, but not all instability results from
the youth bulge as demonstrated by the cases of Chile,
gOzaiThigiciue, and-Mieria:6hile maintairg
tradition of political stability?until the cop 110373
that overthrew the Marxisliegime of-Salvador
Allende?with-OVA a Yolith bulge present (figure 13).
Oiftih follie-lifende -regime carne f1
t e
upper and middle c ass, as well as from tfrniTlitary,
_ _
afhTrif?ouss.
,eraiiic military coups, sup_h_g_.s__Cliile's, can occur
without the support of youth; organized youth_groups
irerrerittnrfrrliiIrdiffingthe 1960s and early_ _,
1970s, but in support of Allende or of causes
embraced by the Allende regime. Chile-e-rp-Efienced a
, _ _
th that--see-ms to
correspond with increasing pressure on the Pinochet
regime.
10
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Figure 13 Figure 14
Chile: Youth Bulge Mozambique: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24 Percentage of total population, age 15-24
-i-ulcinac a c&mv... I cu. IA" WIll,
21.0
20.5
Critical level
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
17.5
milli]]
1
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
17.5
17.0 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05 17.0 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
308179 2-86
Mozambique and Nigeria both currently experienc-
ing-higlireical instability have
oThtiIges, nor are bulges PrOjeCied e
(fiviers1-47.1=Y_Ite,percent-age Moiiig
a u ts1 popu ations of both countries
" .. hi
Thimadatdiii consistently hi0since1950,butbeliw dei:;?
rcflvtOivenn the heayyjny.dlycs?.nent
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in traditional agri-
ce and me corresponding liarorniOderilialiiin,
economic infrastructure through-
out the region is so ragi e a eirideare
arising fr-om- the- yoU?tli_bulieZa3-,be-Tap-plieGill?
Te 20-percent level. Age structure data derived
fronThi-olrATfiFaiTeeiigig6?andreove5are lghly
unreliable because traditional groupsterici to measure
the passage o time in ways unrelated to tliMaiiri
calendar. Respondents to census forrifs-ofteiot
1-ria-vlifeiriaiid-Tgir answers may refliCi- -_,
variety,of,infttlencing factors.
While this analysis does not reveal the presence of a
thelNerinent in1?8-3 took
c ion a su is an iar.
Tre-dirde
resid6nryoung adult population. The Shagari admin-
-
308180 2.86
Figure 15
Nigeria: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
19.6
19.4
19.2
19.0
18.8
18.6
18.4
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308181 2436
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istration ordered the expulsion of all illegal immi-
grants, i'"---rigt-oTh'h"o"Frg-iriltsmriiri-other
est African Vairer-fir is
rctKiiireiricWeC-ISOirie-finilW6irp-eilfdFfran--Nirc-rta,
ne o t e arges s or erm migrations in moo ern
TrilirNireerral6:ar roTTWEITirilgirraer".'n
ilanwiry-16-6-averoarmreciikVerisWilielltaiira of
1-56-rtiToTrrig Nigerians in Ilio-sothel'iirb-an'"
areas, a common manifestation of a youth bulge. i he
ititretie ithrilireit by the Nigerian GoVertmierit-
ate demographic ressure from
a yout u ge, i one existed r to prevent its
-
emergence.
tra
Policy Inudlications
There are no easy or universal solutions but if the
explosive potential of the youth bulge is to be con-
tained, new policies must ad iC tfie successful mobi-
ization o you so a eir mtegratioLm:_to_44.,
iiatTb?l figic can Fra'aiied. Since World War II,
attention o
po icyma ers in
the United States and
more recently in is has _fccu-s-eil-makulloirm: apid.
13;MaTiOri--1 growth7, and the olic outcome has been
creation of national andinternational programs
aimed at plan-
ning
progranTrOiTi=g7pi'76117?ns, tlky
--iWiftrfaton---eZstiTrirThild'Ward bulies;
76-irtfrafilfs ti?thi-liulges have-already been
orn. In Iran, Bangladesh, and Nicaragua_w, ae.--tfife
y'Trtr'5tilg-Ts---a-re-prbjectedT6-Continue indefinitely,
tge'Crealtah'io
? _ ?
could have an effect on political stability a-rising-from
demograp s e ect would not be felt
.$-erirelergar_t
IC
The existence of the youth bulge carries with it, at
least in part, the seeds of its own correction. Nations
'are unlike-1y to fespond to problems until they have an
iiThihe national 16/el. An increase in the
number of infants and youngc rei==6117cipally
anvelawarslive , airirihTiiicrease may provok'roliry
fliT5iicVes onse, or no response aiill. When
e 11...-.211mizesraU1nfa-nis a-ELI childj grow
older, prodlicii_mille_youth bulge, the burden of rapid
popTion growth threatensThe Ability of national
? -
Secret
institutions and demands policy response. Effective
national fa ? tla.i t ? ? ? u to be a
response to the youth ar_cMgra_zijksylave robabl
been a ma?or factor in the reduction of the number of
countries ttLy_a____41 bul
10 in 1995ifigure 10). ,Thelgao_wJtowever cornes
too late to a;foid-i-M7C-h-Of the demographic pressure
associa esith poI i?unrest.
Since 1980 Third World nations have increasingly
developed population policies that deal with the relo-
cation of people, rather than with birthrates, to the
point where there are now more countries with explic-
it relocation policies than with family planning pro-
grams. This policy has potential for dealing with the
youth bulge, but it also has limitations. In Indonesia,
for example, policy favors the settlement of islands
other than Java, and the policy can be seen as a means
of mobilizing the youth bulge to the frontier, much
like the notion of "Go West, young man, and grow up
with the country." The Indonesian scheme, and simi-
lar ideas in other countries, has achieved mixed
success at best. Young people seek a role in the future
of the country, and the sparsely occupied regions seem
to offer little future.
Emigration by young adults can help to reduce the
pressur , tit-ts-dirmibtful
qfiartelat--Riti--attona-'
sign' ical'-'"1"- .--seiving countries
Ta-vor the immigration orthe ofd-ei acrults,-partiCtilarly
thFniEFaTfliient alid-fro-b-e-tter edircIteiMettiff'
young s epen en s, ra er an ose in e youu.
Tfls.Immigratioirderallrii-s-ort actually
accen ua thliilge, as was the
-Ictirreb-a-MICa'billtieWfiWIliiii. illegal
immigra-
tion such as the movement of Mexicans and_Centrar
_
Americans to the United States, direct1?
17rers'iiiTof yout u ge in t e source countries,
but resentsma to the receiving countriesL,
oes the bensLiLdErreglistisA
ojja?Ability within the sending country_outweigh thc,
cost of absorbing these Migrants within the receivink
country.
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Figure 16
The Youth Bulge, 1995
Youth bulge-20% or more of the
population in the 15-24 age group
18.5-20% of the population in the
15-24 age group
No youth bulge
North
Atlantic
Ocean
LEBANON
AFGHANISTA
PAKI T N
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABI
BA NO LAD
MEXICO
GufrA'r,,A.
RAGUA
SUDAN
PHILIPPINES
North
Pacific
Ocean
PANAMA
IVORY
COAST
NIGERIA
ETHIOPIA
C) SRI
LANKA
ECU
DA
KENYA
MALA?SlA
PER BRAZIL
TANZANIA
rz, tcz.
SouthSouth
Pacific Atlantic
Ocean Ocean
ANGOLA
CHI
OZAMBIOUE
MADAGASCAR 0
Indian
?teen
ARGENTINA
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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