COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES: ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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atE~"~FN~~ Directorate of
~~ ~I Intelligence
~,
~~ _~>:
Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities
GI 85-10149
June 1985
COPY 1
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~,~~.~E~ucepe I)IreCtOrate Of ~eCCet
~~ ' ~ Intelligence
Iw n ~I
Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities (u)
This paper was prepared b~
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and reviewed by the US
Embassy in Manila
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency
Center, OGI
Secret
GI 85-10149
June 1985
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Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities
Key Judgments The Communist insurgency in the Philippines now presents a formidable
I~tf'ormation available challenge to the Marcos government and US strategic and political
as of 30 May 1985 interests in Asia. Moreover, the insurgency is capable of growing more
was used in this report.
rapidly in the next two years than at anytime in the past. The Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's
Army (NPA), have seized the initiative in the countryside and are
preparing to bring their revolution to Manila. The insurgents have not,
however, been seriously contested militarily or politically by the govern-
ment. This absence of sustained counterinsurgent pressure has allowed the
Communists a free hand in many areas of the country and has left their po-
tential vulnerabilities unexploited.
Party leaders are pursuing a dual military and political strategy aimed at
achieving a stalemate on the battlefield while forming a broad political
alliance with the anti-Marcos opposition. The party is in a strong position
to gain politically from the malaise now prevalent throughout Philippine
society and the government's unwillingness to undertake political and
economic reforms. Party leaders hope to seize power by joining with the
moderate opposition in amost-Marcos coalition government they intend to
dominate. To this end, they plan to participate in the 1986 nationwide
elections and support candidates whom they can co-opt.
The Communists have assembled an extensive and sophisticated clandes-
tine political/military organization over the last 16 years that is waging
protracted guerrilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively
controlling villages inhabited by at least 5 million people, and contesting
control of villages inhabited by another 5.5 million:
? The CPP-nearly 30,000 to 45,000 strong-is a tightly knit organization
with a coherent ideology, centralized and cohesive leadership, an effec-
tive propaganda apparatus, and the discipline and patience required for a
protracted struggle.
The National Democratic Front (NDF), through its organizing and
propaganda activities, has been in the forefront of the Communists' legal
effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos
government. The government estimates that there are almost a million
members in party-controlled and NDF-initiated village associations and
that the Communists have infiltrated more than 500 legitimate
organizations.
iii Secret
GI 85-10149
June 1985
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? The NPA-with 15,000 to 16,500 regulars and 15,000 to 20,000
irregulars-has become a credible military force that is rapidly gaining
experience and confidence and is capable of fielding guerrilla battalions
in many parts of the country. NPA attacks against the government are
characterized by effective command and control, secure communications,
good intelligence, sound guerrilla tactics, and effective adaptation 'to the
Philippine environment.
The Communists are sensitive to the misgivings of many Filipinos about
uniting with Marxist revolutionaries. Consequently, their propagandaa
clever mixture of Marxism, Catholic liberation theology, and traditional
Philippine values-is careful to emphasize the nationalist aspects of their
struggle. They frequently cite Nicaragua as an example of a revolution in
which Marxist-Leninists combined with a moderate opposition to success-
fully overthrow a dictator. Popular support for the Marcos government is
at an alltime low, and party propagandists are exploiting this to their
advantage.
Despite its formidable organization and successful performance, the
CPP/NPA has weaknesses. A charismatic leader capable of galvanizing
popular support for the revolution has yet to appear, its anti-American
rhetoric rings hollow with many Filipinos, and the party's emphasis on
nationalism over Communism has drawn to its banner many individuals
lacking in ideological commitment. However, the most serious CPP/NPA
liability is the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to provide arms,
ammunition, and other war materiel to the guerrillas. Although a small
number of weapons are now being smuggled into the Philippines by the
NPA, we believe the guerrillas lack the equipment to sustain an offensive
of even a week's duration and the combined-arms capability required to
attack well-defended military targets. The Communists have so far
eschewed foreign support, and the isolated character of the Philippines
severely complicates establishing a reliable logistic network or foreign
sanctuary. he CPP has established
contacts with the Soviets probably to obtain their assistance. Although
extensive cooperation between the Communists and the Muslim Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) could help ease this problem, we
believe there is little prospect for more than token cooperation between
them.
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IJC:t ^ V 6
Key Judgments
Scope Note
Introduction
--
- - --
The Overall Strategy of the Insurgency
Communist Short-Term Intentions
The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities
-----
- _ - - -The Party
Regular Units-Armed City Partisans
Irregular Units-People's Guerrillas
Irregular Units-People's Militia
Key Insurgent Strengths
Key Insurgent Vulnerabilities
The Performance Record
--
NPA Military Performance
The Rural Control Situation
Projecting Near-Term Capabilities
Threat to US Military Facilities
Threat to US Personnel
A. Operation of a Guerrilla Front
Chronology of Key Events
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oca,~ c~
Scope Note This assessment is intended to serve as a model for analyzing the
organization and capabilities of a politically organized insurgency. In this
case, we examine awell-developed insurgent organization, the Communist
Party of the Philippines; its military arm, the New People's Army; and
united front activities that attempt to mask the radical nature of the
movement and broaden its appeal. The paper does not systematically
compare the performance of the insurgents against the Philippine military,
nor does it examine
the Muslim insurgency of the Moro National Liberation Front.
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Figure 1
CPP/NPA Communist Administrative Areas, 1985
First-order administrative
boundary
Second-order
administrative boundary
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Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organizati?n
and Capabilities
since its founding in 1968, the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military element, the
New People's Army (IPA), have consistently demon-
strated slow but steady growth. During the past two
years, they have taken advantage of increasing popu-
lar discontent with the Marcos government to swell
their ranks. The NPA now aggressively attacks the
government's Armed Forces, increasing both the
number and sophistication of tactical operations,
while the party maneuvers to seize political power in a
post-Marcos government. This paper reviews the par-
ty's political and military strategy and examines
currant insurgent organization, capabilities, and per-
formance.
Yenan; they believed to do so was only to invite
government offensives that the CPP~NPA could not
hope to repel. Instead, guerrilla fronts were initiated
throughout the Philippines-especially on the larger
islands that would provide easy escape and conceal-
ment (appendix A).~
In 1981 party leaders decided that with the lifting of
martial law the time was ripe to reactivate the urban
underground that had been decimated by government
security forces. Urban guerrilla units, dormant since
1972, were reactivated in Mindanao to assassinate
government supporters and demonstrate the perva-
siveness of the CPP/NPA. Urban united front activi-
ties, whose purpose is to broaden the base of support
for the revolution, have since mushroomed in an
attempt to win over the Philippine middle class,
largely alienated from the government following the
The CPP~NPA has most closely followed the political
and guerrilla strategy of protracted revolutionary
warfare developed by Mao Zedong and articulated by
party founder Jose Maria Sison in documents still
used in teaching all party members. As in Mao's
revolution, the Communist insurgency in the Philip-
pines emphasizes the importance of building a base of
support in the countryside among the peasant popula-
tion. It also has an urban component, however, that is
increasing in size and importance. All NPA military
activity is controlled by the Communist Party's politi-
cal leadership, which has generally stressed organiza-
tion and recruitment over direct military action. The
Communists' military strategy is complemented by a
political program in which party members and front
groups work to undermine the Marcos government
and legitimize their own organization.
Party documents and actions reveal that the Commu-
nist leaders have also demonstrated an ability to adapt
Maoist strategy to the geography and politics of the
Philippines. Following setbacks in 1972 in the Caga-
yan Valley, the leadership decided not to establish
permanently liberated zones in imitation of Mao in
Aquino assassination.
The party's Central Committee recently claimed at a
meeting for cadres to be testing a "new and higher
form of struggle" by fomenting "people's strikes" in
major urban centers to cripple industries, transport,
education, commerce, and the government bureaucra-
cy. Such strikes, in theory, are intended to contribute
to the development of a revolutionary situation in the
cities to prepare them for popular uprisings that
would occur before the seizure of power during a final
Communist offensive. These uprisings would be coor-
dinated with the intensification of guerrilla warfare in
the countryside. The success of people's strikes in
Mindanao last fall-several cities were paralyzed for
several days at atime-probably presages more wide-
spread use of this tactic in the future.
Another of the Communists' strategies is to achieve
political power by presenting themselves as national-
ists and joining with the moderate opposition in a
post-Marcos coalition government. This is now evi-
dent from Embassy reporting and the public state-
ments of party-controlled front organizations that
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JCLICI
now actively promote this concept. To broaden its
popular appeal, the party frequently cites Nicaragua
as an example of a revolution in which both Marxist-
Leninists and a moderate opposition successfully
united to overthrow a dictator. The Sandinista regime
is portrayed as a state where the Christian plea for
social justice has been realized. In our judgment, this
analogy particularly appeals to many Filipino Catho-
lics who oppose the Marcos regime but have misgiv-
ings about uniting with Communist revolutionaries.
The newly formed organization, Bayan (the Nation),
is the Communists' latest attempt to portray party
willingness to join forces with moderates in a
coalition.
The party's consolidation plan is another aspect of
CPP strategy, which though not well publicized is
taught to all cadres. According to Sison's writings,
once the Communists come to power they plan a
subsequent "socialist revolution" to consolidate Com-
munism in Philippine society. Although united front
tactics and coalition government proposals are expedi-
ent now in forging a broad alliance, once the People's
Democratic Republic of the Philippines has been
established the party alone will be responsible for
transforming the society into a "proletarian dictator-
ship." Presumably, at this time the "blood debt to the
people" owed by the landlord class will be avenged,
Party strategists maintain that theirs is an "unfin-
ished revolution." The Communists insist that the
Philippine people were never really liberated-not in
February 1945 or July 1946 nor, for that matter, in
1898. They were simply transferred from Spanish, to
American, to Japanese, and then, following the grant-
ing of nominal independence, to neocolonial domina-
tion. The United States is now identified as the
principal enemy of the Philippine people, and Presi-
dent Marcos is depicted as a puppet carrying out the
mandates of Washington. We believe the anti-Ameri-
can rhetoric may ring hollow with many Filipinos, but
the appeal to nationalism and independence from
foreign dictates does not. ~~
We believe the Communists recognize that they lack
the capability to defeat the government militarily and
would settle for a stalemate on the battlefield. A
guerrilla commander recently told a Manila journalist
that the NPA expects a standoff with the military in
three years. Ahigh-ranking CPP cadre echoed this
theme when he announced at a recent party meeting
that the CPP expects to reach a strategic stalemate
with government forces in several regions in 1986.
It is in the political sphere that we believe the
Communists now see their most advantageous pros-
pects. Our analysis of Embassy reporting leads us to
believe that, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Marcos regime, the CPP is skillfully maneuvering for
a role in any government that might be formed should
the President die in office and is actively promoting
the concept of a coalition government in which it
would legally participate. In a switch from its previous
position advocating a boycott of elections, the
CPP/NPA also intends to actively participate in the
areas where the party is strong the new People's
Democratic Coalition will field candidates. Where the
party is weak but allies are present, the CPP/NPA
will campaign for the ally and harass competitors. In
other areas, the party will attempt to disrupt the
elections through military actions.
The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities
To implement their strategy, the Philippine Commu-
nists have assembled an effective, clandestine politi-
cal-military organization that wages protracted guer-
rilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively
controls villages inhabited by at least 5 million people,
and contests control of villages inhabited by another
5.5 million. For the purpose of this paper, we use the
term Communist-controlled village to mean areas
where:
? A Communist "shadow government" has been
established.
? Communist peasant, women, and youth associations
are functioning.
? Most of the population is sympathetic and gives
material support to the insurgents.
? At least 50 percent of the population can be mobi-
lized for protest actions.
? NPA militia units may be present
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Figure 2. This poster publicizing the new CPP-dominated united
front. "Sayan"(The NationJ, is now plastered on walls throughout
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Figure 3. Communist propaganda attempts to equate party mem-
bers arrested or killed with opposition leaders such as Ninoy
Aquino, murdered at Manila airport in 1983. At this protest in
Manila, radical students carried a billboard picturing leading
cadres-including Central Committee members Johnny Escandor
The CPP-about 30,000 to 45,000 strong-is a tight-
ly knit organization led by professionals who are well
trained and highly disciplined. The National Demo-
cratic Front (NDF), the party's main united front
organ, is in the forefront of the Communists' legal
effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to
the Marcos government.
the party has already infiltrated almost 500
organizations. The New People's Army-with 15,000
to 16,500 regulars and 15,000 to 20,000 irregulars-
has become a credible military force capable of
fielding guerrilla battalions in many parts of the
The Communists' organizational model-with its par-
allel party, united front, and military echelons-is
very similar to other Communist insurgent organiza-
tions we have seen during the last 50 years. Neither
the party organization itself, the distinctive organiza-
tional practices it follows, the subsidiary organizations
it has set up, nor the conceptual framework it has
pursued in evolving its forces and in contending with
the government is unique. Rather, the Communist
organization in the Philippines is a synthesis of orga-
nizational principles and operational procedures
evolved in China, Vietnam, and elsewhere.
The Party
As with all Communist parties, the CPP/NPA is
under the firm control of a small number of highly
dedicated leaders, or cadres, who make all important 25X1
decisions regarding ideology, strategy, and manage-
ment of the party. These cadres form the Central
Committee, the Executive Committee, and the Polit-
buro 0 We base this judgment on the 25X1
analysis of more than a decade of party decisionmak- 25X1
ing and leadership behavior as documented in Embas-
sy reporting. This committee structure is duplicated
from the national level down to the village, called a
barangay or barrio, and is illustrated in figure 4.
Central Committee directives are interpreted and
implemented by barrio committees, the NPA at each
level is under the command of both the local party
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Estimating Party Membership
Membership in the CPP is restricted to a select group
of dedicated individuals who have been tested and
trained for six months to two years before being
admitted to the party. Under the direction of the
Central Committee, party members carry out the
party's program in the villages, the NPA, the urban
underground, and the various united front organiza-
tions. Last fall, a senior party cadre announcedC
that there were nearly 60,000
party members nationwide. We believe this estimate
is high, the actual number of CPP full members being
closer to 30,000 to 45,000.
Dur estimate is based on the number of party mem-
bers we believe serve on village committees, in the
New People's Army, and in the urban underground.
Barrio
Party Committees are functioning in at least S,S00
villages. The party mandates at leastfive but no more
thgn 10 members for these village committees. As-
suming an average of,~ZVe party members in each
yields 27,700 members scattered in CPP/NPA-con-
trolled villages nationwide. Zf'20 percent of NPA
regulars are party members-those equivalent to
officers and noncommissioned of,~cers-there are at
least 3,300 members now leading the guerrillas.
the party now has 5,800 members working in
the urban mass movement sector nationwide includ-
ing those working in labor organizing in Metro
Manila. These figures may be overstated. Neverthe-
less, they probably constitute the majority of party
members in the urban underground and legal united
front organizations.
committee and higher level NPA commands, and
united front activities are directed by a similar inter-
locking command structure. Such a system of com-
mand and control provides local flexibility in imple-
menting orders from above
The CPP is organized along both territorial and
functional lines and, since 1984, by rural and urban
responsibilities as well. Six Regional Commissions,
each headed by a Central Committee member, were
created in the 1980s to cope with the geographic
spread of the party and to ensure that all subordinate
committees operate in accordance with the party line
set by the Central Committee. Five functional com-
missions oversee party activities in the areas of propa-
ganda, military affairs, united front activities, and
"mass movement" organizations. In 1984
the Central Committee split
responsibility for rural and urban activities between
two leaders, Rodolfo Salas and Rafael Baylosis, giv-
ing Salas command of the NPA and rural operations
and Baylosis supervisory responsibility for party activ-
ities in Metro Manila and other urban centers
throughout the Philippines under the newly created
National Urban Center Commission (NUCC).
Since its founding, the CPP has stressed organization-
al efforts and recruitment in rural areas rather than
military activities. We know
that the Communists use well-estab-
is el -h d tactics. After preparing a thorough investiga-
tion of social conditions in a village or barrio, cadres
establish a Barrio Liaison Group, made up of three to
seven members who may be of any social class. This
group is then tasked to recruit new members, solicit
food supplies for the guerrillas, do intelligence work,
prepare in-depth social investigations, and conduct
limited propaganda.
New recruits form the Organizing Groups, whose
membership is strictly limited to lower-middle peas-
ants, poor peasants, and farmworkers. Basic party
doctrine and principles are studied, and potential
leaders are assessed for party membership. The most
promising recruits-but not more than 10-eventual-
ly form a Barrio Revolutionary Committee. This
committee-the highest political unit in the village-
constitutes the "shadow government" that directs and
controls party activities in the barrio.
The party has strict criteria for membership. A person
becomes a candidate member upon the recommenda-
tion of at least two party members with three years of
continuous good standing in the party. The party
member who makes the recommendation must pre-
pare an appraisal of the ideological, political, and
personal history of the candidate. Advancement to
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Figa~re ~
S~ruaeta.tre glad Channe9~ ~ff Cor~rnanal faa
aQkierd
s .~~
~r"~odaak
PoPikicaq
d 1ti9iPary
L!nitct6 Front
,Youths/Students
Religious
? gntclligence
?Traini!'ig
a;iNadical
? finance/
LogiSkiCS
aGrdnance
w Cammo
Main Rzgianti)
Guerrilla Unit
? Regional
Partisan
Gait
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ISermrdary Regional
Guerrill~~t Unit)
~Sub~Regional
Guerrilla Unit)
~ ?ArmedCityi'artisan
Unit
(Sparrow CniQ
f~ropa&R~cl
ch U'oinrnit~
?District Laval
Guerrilla Unit
? Annad Propaganda
Team
? Section Locai
Guerrilla Unit
* Awned Propaganda
Teams
elhgent~Carwin
,t,
uetttioti Comm!
w Trade Unions
Youth arrd !v9idtllc Farce
L,alxrc
> 6ougeoisie RaPormists
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Figure 5
CPP/NPA Organizational Stucture
Central Committee
RodolfoSalas
RodclfoSalas Ignacio Capegsan
Rafael Baylosis Jose Lamangan
Juanita Rivera Loretta Rosales
Benito Tiamzon
International Liaison National Commission
Commission (Europe) For Mass Movement
Luis Jalandoni Gerry ACUna
Rodolto Salas Benito Tiamzon
Juanito Rivera Benjamin De Vera
Rafael Baylosis Ignacio Capegsan
General
Secretariat
Rafael Baylosis
Central Committeeout
(Chios)
Ericson Baculinao
Security
Defence Corps
(Counterintelligence)
National Military Northern Luzon Central Luzon Southern Luzon Visayas Mindanao National Urban
Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Center Commission
Rodolfo Salas Ignacio Capegsan Francisco Pascual Roberto Tacbad Manuel Calizo Romulo Kintanar Rafael Baylosis
National Commission National United
For Propaganda Front Commission
Antonio Zumel Domingo Anonuevo
Politico-miGmry
Training Department
National
Democratic Front
National Alliance Regional Alliance Special Sectors
Abet Bahena Sonny Pagador Markel Sarmiento
Zambales PPC L Bohol PB
Oscar Estrada EDIIaC10 Ramirez
NW PAMP DC
Pablo Santos
L_ E PAMP DC
Felixberlo Macalino
Legend:
Central PH Central Publishing House
NEL RPC Northeast Luzon Regional Party Committee
NWL RPC Northwest Luzon Regional Party Committee
PPC Provincial Party Committee
NW PAMP DC Northwest Pampanga District Committee
E PAMP DC Eastern Pampanga District Committee
STRPC Southern Tagalog Regional Party Committee
BRPC Bicol Regional Party Committee
QBBPC Quezon Bicol Border Provincial Committee
IPC Island Party Committee
PC Provincial Committee
PB Party Branch
WMRPC Western Mindanao Regional Party Committee
SMRPC Southern Mindanao Regional Party Committee
NCMRPC North Central Mindanao Regional Party Committee
NEMRPC Northeast Mindanao Regional Party Committee
SEMRPC Southeast Mindanao Regional Party Committee
9 I I 25X1
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full membership varies, depending on the candidate's
class background: six months for those from peasant/
labor and urban sectors; one year for those from the
middle class; and two years for everyone else. Those
who make it through the selection process undergo
rigorous training, as revealed by captured training
materials. We believe nearly all party members are
highly motivated and dedicated to the revolution; few
cadres have defected.
Parallel to the party structure for full members, but
separate and distinct from it, is the party youth
organization, the Kabataang Makabayan (KM).` In a
developing nation like the Philippines, where a major-
ity of the population is under 18, captured documents
reveal that party leaders believe it is essential to allow
for the participation of youth in the revolution even
though they may not yet be mature enough for full
party membership. The KM serves as a training
school for future party members and allows the party
access to the enthusiasm and dedication of young
radicals. Some as young as 13 are admitted to the
KM after a careful assessment acrd become eligible
for party membership at age 18
The United Front
In our view, united front organizing has heretofore
been the weak link in this Communist insurgency.
The party's efforts to form a broad alliance of Filipi-
nos opposed to the Marcos government have suffered
setbacks repeatedly. In addition to an ideological bias
favoring rural organization and a reluctance of many
Filipinos to join a Communist movement, the long
period of martial law (1972-81) made all overt opposi-
tion activities very difficult. Since 1979, government
security forces have captured or killed many key
cadres connected with these efforts: Sixto Carlos,
Horacio Morales, Isagani Serrano, Edgar Jopson, and
Mila Aguilar Roque.~~
' The KM is distinct from the League of Filipino Students, the
CPP's legal mass organization for youth, which appeals, with little
Marketing Nationalism, Not Commuuism
The unofficial national anthem of the CPP/NPA is
Sayan Ko (My CountryJ, which conveys a strong
sense of nationalism and antieolonialism with a
subtle blend of anti-Americanism while omitting any
mention of Communist ideology. The song originated
during the Philippine-American war, but the party
has changed the words and popularized this version.
Today it can be heard at most moderate and radical
opposition gatherings, always sung in Pilipino:
Sayan Ko (My Country)
In my golden land of Philippines
Fragrant.flowers filled the morning breeze.
Loving fingers built a paradise,.
A resting place for humankind.
One day foreign ships and strangers came,
Seeking out our wealth and beauty.
Left our people bound in chains,
Our hearts in misery.
Birds go winging freely through the sky.
Try to cage them and they surely cry.
Take away a people's liberty,
Sons and daughters live to set them free.
Soon one day our trials will be done.
Night will fade and golden morning come.
Now, my life and love
I give to set my country free.
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Figure 6
CPP/NPA Flagsa
C:
Flag of [he hoped-for People's Democratic Republic of
the Philippines.
The same flag is used by the Maoist Sendero Luminoso
insurgents in Peru.
'CPP=Communist Party of the Philippines.
NI'A=New People3 Army.
party leaders realize this weakness and are now
concentrating their attention on united front activities
to ensure a role for the party in any successor
government. The CPP/NPA has begun to scatter
party cells, infiltrating the leadership of some organi-
zations, forming new ones seemingly independent of
the party when necessary, and establishing alliances
throughout Philippine society in support of the party's
revolutionar ob~ectives.
n t e stu ent sector, t ere are 25 i enti e CPP
front groups and 114 infiltrated organizations: in the
labor field, there are 10 front organizations and 251
infiltrated. Embassy reporting from awell-informed
source, indi-
cates that the party now has about 5,800 members
working in urban united front activities nationwide,
with 2,800 active in Manila. The same source asserted
that there are now 38,600 urban activists in the
National Democratic Front-a claim that the Embas-
sy believes may be exaggerated.
The party's control over the activities of the NDF is
accomplished by clandestine cells of three to five
persons who work together to broaden the base of
support for the CPP/NPA revolution. Cadres use as a
guide the 12-point program contained in the NDF
manifesto of 1 January 1973. In urban areas, the
cadres are to forge links with labor federations and
unions, teachers associations, student organizations,
and professional and civic organizations. In rural
areas, the cell is to conduct social investigations
among peasants and farmworkers and eventually help
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Secret
Figure 7
Philippines: Mass Protest Activities
by Sector, 1982-84
Percent
1982
Multi-sectoral 16.1
Students /youth 32.3-
55% CPP-initiated
1'ota1=467 protests
38% CPP-initiated
Total=719 protests
Professional-
40-60% CPP-initiated
Total=1,451 protests
recruit NPA guerrillas. A captured internal party
guide to building NDF cells also directs them to:
? Disseminate propaganda among friends, relatives,
and sympathizers by distributing underground pub-
lications, writing chain letters, and holding
discussions.
? Give direct support to the NPA and the under-
ground by providing material support and services.
? Form additional cells from among trusted asso-
ciates, friends, and relatives.
? Actively participate in legal institutions with the
aim of making them support the CPP~NPA directly
or indirectly.
? Foster close relations with sympathetic groups and
individuals.
In villages controlled by the party, united front activi-
ties take the form of mass organizations run by village
cadres with members drawn from the village popula-
tion-farmers, women, youth. Membership in these
associations is voluntary, but the Village Party Com-
mittee makes every effort to involve every family; fear
undoubtedly contributes to association ranks. How-
ever constituted, this is the "mass base" that grows
food for the NPA and, at times, can be mobilized to
support protests.
this base now exceeds 1 million persons. We believe
their numbers are seriously underestimated because,
most of the estimated 5 million persons in CPP NPA-
controlled areas actively support the guerrillas
the
CPP/NPA directly initiated 40 to 60 percent of all
major protests in 1984, and, when party-controlled
front organizations are included, the party was proba-
bly responsible for the majority of all major protests
throughout the Philippines. As illustrated in figures 7
and 8, the party has steadily increased the number of
Communist-initiated marches, strikes, and boycotts.
However, the party's efforts have failed to keep pace
with the general rise in activities protesting against
the Marcos government.
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~c~.i ca
The New People's Army
The NPA is a military organization characterized by
effective leadership and operational security, sound
command and control, and strict discipline. The NPA
is made up of both full-time regulars and part-time
irregulars. We estimate that there are now probably
about 15,000 to 16,500 regulars organized in infantry
battalions and urban guerrilla units. Local guerrilla
units and village militia make up the irregulars, which
between 15,000 and
Regular Units-Regular Mobile Forces. The Regular
Mobile Forces are the best trained, equipped, and
organized guerrillas. These uniformed forces are re-
sponsible for most of the newsworthy raids and am-
bushes. NPA regulars operate at three levels-dis-
trict, guerrilla front, and regional-under the full-time
direction of the respective party committees.
District Local 15 combatants (9
Guerrilla Unit militia + 6 NPA
(DLGU) regulars)
Section Local 15 combatants (9
Main Re Tonal Guerrilla Units MRGUs and Sec- Guerrilla Unit militia + 6 NPA
g ( ) (SLGU) regulars)
ondary Regional Guerrilla Units (SRGUs) are each Irregular Village Militia squad- to platoon-
equivalent to a regular company of the Armed Forces part-time size units; 15 to 20
of the Philippines and normally confine operations to combatants
the 56 to 60 guerrilla fronts now active throughout the
country. According to Embassy reporting, the MRGU
is a mobile force that can link up anytime with an
SRGU, forming a combined force to conduct guerrilla
operations in the latter's area. Within the past two
years, the NPA has frequently combined such forces
to successfully attack poorly defended government
targets. MRGUs in Mindanao can now field 200 to
300 men (and in Northeast Mindanao, an additional
squad armed with four M60 machineguns), but units
of this size are still in their formative stages in most
regions. Operations involving 100 to 200 guerrillas are
the norm throughout the rest of the country.
Regular Units Armed City Partisans. The NPA
uses classic urban guerrilla tactics to bring the war to
four-to-seven-member guerrilla teams specialize in
the cities.
Table 2
Organization of the New People's Army
Regular Region Main Regional 5 per Regional Com-
Guerrilla Unit mittee; undersize to
(MRGU) regular size company
(100 to 300)
Regular Front Secondary 21 per Front; regular
Regional size platoon to un-
Guerrilla Unit dersize company
(SRGU) (50 to 150)
Regular Urban Armed City 10 to 15 teams in
Partisan Unit various cities, with 4
(ACPU) to 7 persons in each
killing police, other government employees, and in-
formers whom the party identifies in its propaganda
as responsible for abuses of the. people. Commonly
called sparrow units, these assassins attack like spar-
rows, diving in pairs for food one after the other, so
that if one misses, the second does not.
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Figure 12
The Communist Urban Underground: Example of the Butuan
City White Area Committee
Political
Military
~~~32^cT
rtt~s ~_~
~iHi~tt-_= -_'
Armed City
Partisans
Operational Organizing
Cell Cell
~outt~ttt~ ~Jg~[~ - - _ - = 1R~tmis
? Education ? Peasants
Committee ~ ?Semiproletariat
? Jeepney drivers
?Out-of-school
youth
? Paramilitary ? Patriotic
? Professionals Peasants'
? Private Association
employees
? Government
employees
?Out-of-school
youth
? Semiproletariat
? Sectoral mass
movement
? Destination
force
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~ecrer
The party is now making a concerted effort to
establish a covert urban infrastructure in cities
throughout the Philippines, including illanila.a
during 1984 urban-
Urban guerrillas were active in Manila setting time
bombs and killing opponents before the declaration of
martial law in 1972. They resumed these acts of
terrorism in 1981 in small cities and in Mindanao but
were hardly noticed.
the recent effectiveness of urban guerrillas in
based CPP Central Comn~tittee members focused
their efforts on building a clandestine network in the
cities to garner ,support for the party among various
.rectors of society, to provide logistic support to NPA
activities in the countryside, and to initiate urban
Cadres assigned to work in urban "White Areas"
controlled by the government are tasked to form
covert political and military cells.
I~olitical cadres working in
urban areas do not, however, normally interact with
the NPA urban guerrillas, except on political and
financial matters. The NPA maintains its own safe-
houses and acquires its ownfirearms and other
support services. White Area Committees modeled on
the success of Davao-where whole areas of the city
are now governed by the CPP/NPA and where hun-
dreds were assassinated in 1984-are now known to
fie functioning in n~tost cities throughout Mindanao
and in Manila,
The recent capture of an important guerrilla organiz-
er in Manila, however, demonstrated what could
prove to be a key organizational weakness, the failure
to maintain strict compartmentation. To carry out
their mission in cities where the government's intelli-
gence and security assets are strongest, urban guerril-
las must operate in small independent cells. U a
guerrilla unit is compromised, this compartmentation
impedes government efforts to neutralize the entire
organization.
For example, we believe the creation of the National Urban
Center Commission (NUCCJ in 1984 presages an attempt to bring
the revolution to Mnnila as the Marcos era draws to a close.
Davao-where in 1984 nearly 700 people were assas-
sinated-has convinced most party leaders that the
time is ripe to intensify urban guerrilla operations and
to initiate them in Manila, Cebu, and other cities.
the NPA has
been organizing for combat in Manila since 1980 and
activities in the capital To date, however, these urban
guerrillas have been largely inactive, In addition,
now has about 300 to 600 people involved in these 25X1
operating in cities throughout Mindanao, and cap-
tured documents reveal that in Manila the NPA has
organized an extensive logistic network involving
several hundred people to support urban guerrilla
operations.
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Irregular Units-People's Guerrillas. In municipal-
ities and barangays where the party is contesting
control or is already firmly entrenched, local guerrilla
squads of 10 to 20 irregulars are formed by the NPA,
both to support regular insurgent military forces and
to operate independently.
these local guerrilla squads operate in or
close to their home villages, sometimes in conjunction
with much larger guerrilla units. They are usually
poorly armed and may play only a supporting, rather
than a combat, role in large NPA operations. By day,
a guerrilla in such a unit works at his normal job; at
night, or in emergencies, he is available for assign-
ment by his party superiors.
the formation of a militia unit
is the final stage of party organization at the village
level. These units of about 20 persons operate directly
under the village committee rather than the NPA.
The militia members are villagers, male and female,
who are covertly recruited and given the critical
responsibility for defense of villagers in CPP-
controlled areas against government reprisals and
protection of resident or visiting cadres. A secret unit
within each village militia is responsible for enforce-
ment of party discipline, including assassinations.
Although they have few firearms and receive only
limited military training, members of the village
militia are the eyes and ears of the insurgent move-
ment within the village, providing tactical intelligence
on all aspects of the local scene, according to Embassy
reports. Training for the militia emphasizes political
indoctrination. The village militia also supports NPA
operations by playing a part in the flexible insurgent
logistic system. The militia members provide a labor
force for the transport and storage of food and
equipment, serve as guides for guerrillas traveling
through the area, and are a source of recruits for
regular NPA units.
Arms and Ammunition. Embassy reporting indicates
that nearly all firearms used by the NPA have been
purchased, stolen, or captured from the Philippine
Armed Forces. We believe that the insurgents now
have about 10,000 high-power rifles and an unknown
but limited quantity of grenade launchers and ma-
chineguns.
Although we know very little about their logistic
system, the insurgents seem to be able to transfer
their weapons between units scattered throu hout the
Philippines. In Mindanao for exam le
(nearly all
guerrillas in large units now use M 16 rifles. In regions
where guerrilla warfare is less advanced, guerrilla
units may have as many as 10 or 15 different firearms
that use different caliber ammunition. It is assumed
that the NPA uses every means possible to supply its
guerrillas, including reloading spent shell casings. A
safehouse containing a weapons repair facility and
several ammunition reloaders was discovered recently
in Cagayan de Oro, a city in Northern Mindanao
Apparently, ammunition shortages are not a major
problem for the NPA at this time. In an increasing
number of encounters, Philippine military officers
report that NPA firepower outweighed that of the
military. However, should military action increase,
maintaining weapons and supplying adequate ammu-
nition would become an important problem for the
NPA.
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Figure 13
NPA Military Organization in Manila ~? 300 persons)
Netiooal
Military Commission
I
National
Operatiortel
Command
Special Operations
Staft
?Detention-Interrogation Group
? Liaison Group
? Intelligence Records and Research Group
? Radio Scanning Group
? Mapping/Illustration/Mock-Up Group
? Photo LaboratoryForgery Legal Papers Group
Com(~t
Focea"
C',utajrat
7"eani:-
Coadtaj
Team
(3?S Persons)
? Team Leader
(C.O. and Political Officer)
? ViceTeam Leader
? Finance Officer
? Intelligence Officer
Nafiomtl
DenneareE
liti9m
Group'
Iiaisoa
Graep '
'i%T~it~!
~+
Military Research/ Politico-
Logistics Training
Department Department
Special Project
Group
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Anti-American rhetoric. Party propaganda portrays
the United States as an imperialist nation and the
sole prop supporting the Marcos government. But
we believe America and Americans are favorably
regarded by most Filipinos, and this propaganda
rings hollow the
CPP now downplays the anti-US rhetoric in rural
areas to avoid alienating people and uses it only with
students and intellectuals.
? Non-Communist elements in the NPA. In the at-
tempt to stress nationalism over Communism, the
party appears to havc accepted under its banner
many individuals who havc a grudge against the
government but lack ideological commitment to
Communism. In Kalinga Apayao, several hundred
guerrillas belonging to an ethnic minority recently
defected from the lv PA but continue to war against
the government. Similarly, in Palawan the
CPP~NPA has not been able to establish a front
because of the activities of a renegade NPA band,
according to Embassy reports.
No combined-awns capability. The NPA has dem-
onstrated an ability to use small-unit guerrilla tac-
tics e13~ectively but to date has not used combined
arms---the coordination of different types of mili-
tary units-in its operations. Should the Commu-
nists decide to attack well-defended military instal-
lations, they will find it necessary to use direct and
indirect fire from machineguns and mortars to
support their assault force.
NPA Military Performance
Analysis of CPP~NPA-initiated actions from 1973
through January 1985 reveals that the level of insur-
gent activity has increased steadily over the last
decade with a significant upsurge in 1984-80 per-
cent of the more than 5,000 violent incidents were
initiated by the NPEi in 1984. Last year there were 12
times more violent incidents than l0 years earlier and
107 percent more than in 1983. Much of this sudden
increase last year occurred during two months-in
January, when there was a national plebiscite, and in
May, when parliamentary elections were held.
NPA units nationwide now regularly attack military
targets, and, in our judgment, the guerrillas have
gradually gained the combat experience and confi-
dence necessary to sustain the revolution's momen-
tum. In 1984 NPA raids and ambushes involving 100
to 200 guerrillas became more common in most
regions of the Philippines, especially in Mindanao and
other areas where the NPA is strong. Raids, which
net the guerrillas favorable publicity and firearms,
increased by 53 percent in the past year-216 were
carried out in 1984. For such operations, NPA com-
manders now combine part-time local guerrilla units
with district, front, or main regional guerrilla units,
13y attacking
weakly defended targets in such numbers, the NPA is
virtually assured a tactical and propaganda victory.
Mapping the distribution of these raids and ambushes
reveals that most CPP/NPA front commands sched-
ule at least one per month; in Mindanao, two per
month (figure 22).
Most guerrilla initiated military activity is focused on
assassinations and assaults upon individuals to acquire
weapons. Such incidents now occur nationwide. In
1984, govern-
ment and civilian casualties as a result of these
incidents totaled 2,600 killed and 1,400 wounded. The
insurgents' casualties totaled 1,321 killed and 266
captured. Insurgent losses are increasing but at a
much smaller rate than might be expected given their
more aggressive posture.
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oc~i c~
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as a mid-
dleman.' NDF cadres were reportedly dispatched to
Europe for this purpose.
with the
help of MNLF leader Nur Misuari these cadres may
have succeeded in purchasing arms, ammunition, and
communications equipment from Libya or Syria and
in arranging for covert shipments to MNLF bases in
Sabah, Malaysia, for transshipment via coastal
freighters to various parts of the Philippines
he formation of
NPA units trained in clandestine arms infiltration
techniques using stnall boats. These units were report-
edly being used in 1983 to transfer war materiel from
freighters off the coast of Mindanao. At this point,
however, we have no corroborating evidence.
the CPP/NPA is looking
for new sources of foreign assistance and has estab-
lished contacts-through NDF offices and European
Communist Parties-with Soviet officials in Stock-
holm, Rome, and the Netherlands.
claimed further that a "reconciliation" between the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
CPP/NPA is now being tested in joint efforts in the
labor sector between World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU)-affiliated unions and the
CPP/NPA's labor front, the Kilusang Mayo Uno
Beyond the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to
support a guerrilla war, other CPP/NPA weaknesses
include:
? No foreign sanctuary. The Philippines is geographi-
cally isolated-a situation almost unique in the
world-and neither Malaysia nor Indonesia, the
nearest countries, will permit Communist insurgent
bases on their soil. The CPP has so far used the
island's environment to their advantage by forcing
the government to confront them on several fronts
and by establishing bases in remote mountainous
terrain found throughout the Philippines. However,
should the government's counterinsurgent effort in-
tensify, the Communists-like the Huks of 30 years
ago-could find their lack of sanctuary a serious
liability.
? Penchant for paperwork. The Communists keep
detailed records and files that are regularly discov-
ered when cadres are captured at their homes or
safehouses. When compromised, such information
provides government security forces with a better
understanding of the insurgent organization, mem-
bership, and plans.
? No charismatic leader. The CPP/NPA has no one
of the stature of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, or
Fidel Castro. The Central Committee and senior
cadres in prison are virtually unknown to the public.
Were a popular non-Communist leader-with the
charisma of Magsaysay-to emerge in the post-
Marcos era, he might attract considerable popular
support away from the Communists.
2 MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who is supported by Libya and Syria,
has been advocating a tactical alliance between his guerrillas and
the CPP/NPA for some time,
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Despite their extensive organization and the strengths
their performance has shown, the CPP~NPA has a
number of current and potential vulnerabilities. In
combination, these shortcomings have hindered insur-
gent expansion and provided the government with
several key targets for exploitation
The lack of foreign support is the key weakness of the
CPP~NPA. On the basis of all available evidence, we
do not believe the Communists now receive any
sizable foreign assistance. In the past, Beijing provid-
ed arms, training, and money, but we believe Chinese
assistance was terminated in 1975. Captured mem-
bers of the Central Committee have admitted under
interrogation that the party's most significant foreign
financial support has come from unnamed US organi-
zations. Additionally, Libya-through the Palestine
Liberation Organization-is known to have provided
150 AK-47 rifles, which were smuggled into Manila
harbor in 1981
In November 19841 the
CPP leadership was reassessing~i itar~gle
and had concluded that foreign arms purchases were
necessary if the Communists were to take advantage
of the deteriorating domestic situation and rapidly
escalate guerrilla warfare how-
ever, that the CPP wanted to maintain an indepen-
dent foreign policy-following Mao's concept of self-
reliance-and would, therefore, probably not turn to
the Soviet Union. Instead, it would attempt to pur-
chase arms from Middle Eastern countries using the
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? Good intelligence.
the NPA usually is better informed on
government operations than the government is on
the insurgents.
the NPA in Bataan is now forewarned
of all military operations by informants within every
military unit in the province.
? Sound guerrilla tactics. The NPA effectively uses
classic guerrilla tactics and demonstrates a good
military combat capability. Over the last several
years, the NPA has cautiously escalated the number
of operations to provide combat experience for
guerrillas with minimal risks.
? FJ.fective use of environment. The CPP/NPA has
focused guerrilla activity in areas where the terrain
provides cover and escape. As early as 1974, Sison
saw the insular nature of the Philippines as a
potential asset for the insurgents. He realized that
the growth of guerrilla fronts on all the larger
islands would stretch thin the capabilities of the
Armed Forces while making it almost impossible to
defeat the CPP/NPA in any one campaign.
? Popular support. Both the party and the NPA have
demonstrated an ability to recruit and to mobilize
the population in support of their cause. While
coercion is sometimes used,
many people voluntarily cooperate with
the insurgents at considerable risk of government
retribution.
? Ffjective propaganda. The CPP has infiltrated
many opposition organizations-including Catholic
human rights groups and the media-to secure
favorable coverage for its cause and discredit the
Marcos government and the Armed Forces. This
covert propaganda campaign has been effective both
in the Philippines and abroad.
Analysts are divided over the degree of commitment
to Communism of NPA guerrillas, party sympathiz-
ers, the rural population living in areas now con-
trolled by the CPP/NPA, and the population at large.
Some analysts believe that many, ij~not most, of these
people may be cooperating with the insurgents be-
cause of human rights abuses by the military, griev-
ances against the Marcos government, or the lack of
improvement in rural standards of living. The issue is
central to US concerns because, like the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua, the commitment to Marxist-Leninist-
Mao Zedong ideology will largely determine whether
the Philippines would become a Communist state
should the revolution succeed. It also ctfjects the
effort required to dissipate support for revolution and
defeat the insurgency.
All available evidence indicates that hardcore
CPP/NPA members are ideologically committed
Communists who are determined to bring a Marxist
government to power-even l1'they have to impose it
,from the top. Moreover, in areas controlled by the
party, there are indications that some people cooper-
ate voluntarily, not just out of,fear. Although we
cannot gauge the attitudes of most rural dwellers, we
believe that the longer an area is under Communist
control-and we estimate that at least 5 million
people now live in CPP/NPA-controlled areas-the
stronger the popular commitment to the party and the
revolution is likely to become. However, the party is
sensitive to the lack of strong commitments to any
ideology on the part of most Filipinos and the
peasants' almost exclusive concerns with local issues.
Thus, the party stresses anti-Marcos themes, nation-
alism, land reform, and abuses by the military while
downplaying Communist rhetoric (appendix CJ.
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? Momentum. The CPP/NPA has gradually built a
momentum-a combination of its own initiative and
government inaction-that could take years to re-
verse
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Figure 16
NPA Camps Established During 1980
--~.~
the locations
of 16 new base camps and 44 new training camps
established by the NPA during the year. As shown in
figure 16, these new insurgent camps were spread
throughout the country, which indicates the signifi-
cant training and logistic capability five years ago
when the guerrilla forces were estimated at less than
one-third their present strength.
Embassy reporting of CPP/NPA activities and our
analysis reveal
strengths in a number of key areas that combine to
make these insurgents a formidable opponent:
? Coherent ideology. The party has a coherent, well-
articulated ideology that emphasizes nationalism
and anti-imperialism. First articulated by Jose Ma-
ria Sison, the CPP through its publications and
courses presents a program that combines Marxism-
Leninism and Catholic liberation theology, all in the
guise of traditional Philippine nationalism.
? Effective political leadership. Through the Politbu-
ro, the Executive Committee, and the Central Com-
mittee, the CPP provides strong direction to subor-
dinate cadres nationwide. Effectiveness can be
judged by the absence of factionalism and-with
one exception-high-level defections, and the mini-
mal effects on operations caused by the capture of
senior cadres.
? Patience. Aware of the Huk's premature switch to
conventional warfare, party literature repeatedly
stresses the protracted nature of this revolution to
prepare followers for an indeterminate period of
guerrilla warfare. We believe the party is quick to
learn from mistakes and has been content to work
slowly but steadily at establishing a popular base of
support in the countryside.
? Strong command and control. The CPP/NPA fol-
lows the standard Marxist-Leninist policy of "Dem-
ocratic Centralism." This policy provides consider-
able autonomy to local leadership as long as they
adhere to Central Committee directives. Senior
cadres are frequently reassigned, and there has not
been even a hint that either they or their subordi-
nates question command decisions. Party discipline
is strict and very effective.
? Secure and effective communications. The party
and the NPA rely on a courier system for most
communications
The CPP~NPA organizational infrastructure is now
firmly in place and growing. Moreover, its perfor-
mance over the past several years has been impressive.
25X1
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Secret
Training. Two recently acquired NPA training man-
uals-one published in 1978 in Mindanao and the
other in 1982 in the Visayas-show that the guerrillas
are taught tactical operations from the US Army's
Ranger Handbook, the Malaysian Jungle Operations
Manual, and the writings of Mao Zedong. The docu-
ments describe tactics applicable to team, squad, and
platoon operations and emphasize the political aspects
of guerrilla warfare. They do not, however, mention
fire and movement, rally points, and security for night
field positions-all tactical essentials in combat.
Some former Armed Forces noncommissioned officers
have joined the NPA and serve as training instructors,
according to press reports. Training generally takes
place at base camps located in remote areas and, in
several cases, includes an obstacle course that meets
US Army specifications. If the NPA follows classic
guerrilla procedures, new recruits will be quickly
included in combat operations-albeit in minor, less
dangerous capacities-to acquire on-the-job training
and boost their confidence.
Figure I5. A captured NPA training/propaganda manual explains
in detail proper ambush tactics. Note the variety of weapons being
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Figure 19
Philippines: Violent Incidents Involving
the New People's Army, 1973-84
Number of incidents
5,500
Assassinations/
kidnapings
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Figure 20
Philippines: Monthly Trends in
Military Casualties Involving the New
People's Army, 1981-84
Number
Government Casualties
Ilvll~ll 111 ll'I ll lllil~lll ltll IIII lilllllli
IIIII IIII1111111111~1~11 1111111 1111111 111111
0 1981 82 83 84