NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 2 MAY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200030007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 2, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
2 May 1984
Copy 285
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Contents
China-Vietnam: More Border Clashes Loom ............................ 1
Afghanistan-USSR: Insurgent Activity Increasing ...................... 2
Iran: Chemical Weapon Prospects .............................................. 3
Canada: Liberals' Election Prospects Brighten .......................... 4
Ecuador: Troubles Surround Presidential Runoff ...................... 5
Botswana-US: Masire's Visit ...................................................... 6
Libya-Chad-France: Possible New Libyan Policy ...................... 7
Colombia: Implications of Assassination .................................... 8
Poland: May Day Demonstrations .............................................. 9
India: Split in Sikh Movement .................................................... 9
Special Analyses
Lebanon: Bleak Prospects for New Government 12
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The Chinese apparently are planning to increase the fighting
along their border with Vietnam. but probably intend to limit
attacks to shallow incursions.
Beijing has set the stage by accusing Vietnam yesterday in the
People's Daily of preparing an invasion and warning Hanoi to halt its
provocations immediately.
Comment: Beijing's decision to expand hostilities along the Sino-
Vietnamese border as Hanoi winds down its offensive in Kampuchea
suggests the Chinese are not merely reacting to Vietnamese actions
there, but are intent on signaling that they cannot be intimidated by
growing Vietnamese-Soviet military cooperation. Beijing's offensive
operations follow the unprecedented joint Soviet-Vietnamese
amphibious assault exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin last month.
Coming so soon after the President's visit, the Chinese may also want
Moscow to think their actions have US approval.
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AFGHANISTAN- Insurgent Activity Increasing
USSR:
The insurgents are offering only token resistance in the Panjsher
Valley, but other guerrillas are increasing their attacks
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Insurgents attacked Kabul 25X1
airfield last week, an U massy sources report that the insurgents
have increased their cooperation in conducting attacks in and near
Kabul. Guerrilla activity was also intense in Ghazni, Qandahar, and
Herat.
Comment: The Soviets' failure to find Masood or to inflict decisive
losses on the Panjsher insurgents makes a hollow success of their
easy move into the valley. Masood's death would be a psychological
blow to the resistance, but the effect would probably be short lived.
The Soviets soon will have to decide whether to risk leaving a large
garrison in the rugged Panjsher Valley or to withdraw and then stage
new assaults there.
The Soviets will be hard pressed to continue major operations in the
weeks ahead, even though recent increases in insurgent cooperation
may be limited to the area around the Panjsher Valley. Although some
of the insurgent activity may be intended to reduce pressure on the
Panjsher guerrillas, much of it is simply the renewal of resistance
activity that occurs each spring.
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IRAN: - Chemical Weapon Prospects
Iran's UN delegate last month said Iran is capable of manufacturing
chemical weapons and, if the Iraqis continue to use them,.Iran may
consider doing so. The Speaker of the Iranian National Assembly
made a similar statement in a speech on Radio Tehran on 23 March.
Comment: Although Iran has the general scientific expertise for a
chemical weapons program, it lacks experience in weapons
development and production. Nonetheless, Iran probably could
develop a production capability for lethal chemical agents within one
to two years.
Iran, however, could rapidly assemble a small stockpile of chemical
weapons using riot control munitions, refurbished Iraqi dud
munitions, or munitions employing dual-purpose industrial chemicals.
Iran may also try to purchase nerve or mustard agent munitions from
a friendly country, but such a sale is unlikely because of the political
repercussions if it became known publicly.
Once Iran has chemical weapons, Tehran is likely to use them if its
diplomatic efforts to stop Iraqi use are futile. Urgent battlefield
requirements, however, such as stopping a major Iraqi offensive or
supporting a major Iranian thrust, might force Tehran into an earlier
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CANADA: Liberals' Election Prospects Brighten
The ruling Liberal Party moved ahead of the opposition Tories for
the first time since 1981 in the Gallup Poll announced yesterday,
and a continuing lead may prove an irresistible inducement for
the new Liberal leader to call a snap election this summer.
The new poll-taken in late March-showed the Liberals with
46 percent and the Tories with 40 percent. As recently as last
September, the Tories held an advantage of 62 to 23 percent.
Comment: The Tories appear to be largely responsible for their
sudden slide in the polls. Since becoming party leader last June, Brian
Mulroney has refused to take positions on major issues such as
national energy policy and social welfare programs. He insists that if
Canadians want to know about Tory policies "they will have to elect
us."
In addition, the Tories recently indulged in a highly publicized spate.of
party infighting over minority language rights. Intraparty bickering,
more than any other factor, probably keeps the Tories from
establishing themselves in the public mind as a credible alternative
government.
Prime Minister Trudeau's decision to retire in June almost certainly
has helped to spur the Liberal resurgence. Polls consistently have
shown that Trudeau, rather than the Liberal Party, is the main source
of voter dissatisfaction, and his impending departure probably has
encouraced the return of many disaffected Liberals to the party's
ranks.
Moreover, Trudeau's announcement brought on a leadership contest
to choose his successor, and the resulting campaign has put the
Liberals at the center of media reporting throughout Canada. Seven
candidates are in the contest, led by former Finance Minister John
Turner. If the Liberals remain ahead in coming polls, the party's
hierarchy probably will not permit a fractious leadership convention.
but will urge the delegates simply to choose Turner.
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ECUADOR: . Troubles Surround Presidential Runoff
A victory by center-leftist Rodrigo Borja, a slight favorite in the
presidential runoff on Sunday, would incr ase the risk of
intervention by the conservative military.
The US Embassy notes that senior officers have reaffirmed the
military's commitment to the election.
Most center-left and some leftist parties, according to the Embassy,
endorse Borja.
The Embassy believes that conservative candidate Febres Cordero's
support from business interests, improved campaign, and strength in
the populous coastal area make him a strong contender.
Comment: A win by Borja-particularly a close one-almost certainly
will prompt fraud charges from the military and tend to divide the
officer corps. The conservative high command may not reach a
consensus that Borja presents a serious enough threat to warrant
intervention. The vehemence of some antileftist officers, however,
leaves considerable leeway for intervention even without consensus.
Both candidates have distinct advantages in a close race. Borja is
aided by the leftward shift of the electorate and by the assistance of
the government. Febres Cordero has more personal appeal as well as
strong support along the coast.
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BOTSWANA-US: Masire's Visit
Botswana's President Quett Masire will try to use a working visit
to Washington beginning next Monday to improve his stature at
home before the parliamentary election slated for later this year.
Comment: Masire and his ruling Botswana Democratic Party are
unlikely to face.a serious challenge in his country's multiparty
elections. Although there are no outstanding bilateral issues between
Botswana and the US, he hopes to return home with specific promises
of closer cooperation.
Masire appreciates the substantial economic development and food
assistance that Botswana has received from the US. He recently
asked for more emergency food relief to cope with the prolonged
drought. Masire also hopes to use the visit to attract private US
investment.
In addition, Masire will want to discuss Namibia. Botswana is
encouraged by the disengagement agreement between South Africa
and Angola and hopes the accord can serve as the basis for a
broader settlement, according to Embassy reporting. Masire is still
skeptical about South Africa's sincerity, however, and may urge the
US to keep pressure on Pretoria to implement the UN plan for
Namibia.
The Botswanan leader also may raise his country's recurrent border
problems with Zimbabwe, a result of anti-Mugabe dissidents using
eastern Botswana as a sanctuary. Some Botswanan officials are
concerned that, if Botswana were to sign a security agreement with
South Africa, Zimbabwe would demand a similar pact.
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LIBYA-CHAD-FRANCE: Possible New Libyan Policy
Libyan leader Qadhafi stated in an interview on Monday that he is
prepared to withdraw his forces from Chad, in order to remove the
"pretext" for the French military presence. He repeats, however, that
an alternative to rebel leader Goukouni or President Habre has to be
Comment: Growing public discontent-in part directed at Libyan
involvement in Chad-may be prompting Qadhafi to consider a
unilateral withdrawal from Chad.
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COLOMBIA: Implications of Assassination
President Betancur has declared a nationwide state of siege and
probably will adopt a more vigorous antinarcotics policy following the
assassination on Monday of Justice Minister .Lara. No group has
-claimed responsibility, but it is widely believed that drug traffickers
killed Lara in retaliation for his strong campaigns against them. The
US Embassy reports Lara had received numerous threats from drug
kingpins and was planning to resign later this month.
Comment: The murder doubtless is intended to deter the
government's current drive against drug dealers and to intimidate
Lara's successor. It is likely, however, to produce a popular outcry
that will prompt Betancur to launch an even more vigorous campaign
against the narcotics industry. He may reverse his opposition to
widespread herbicidal spraying of marijuana and coca plants and to
extradition to the US of Colombian nationals accused of trafficking.
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POLAND: May Day Demonstrations
The authorities had little difficulty controlling demonstrators-about
10,000 altogether by the latest estimate-who turned out in five cities
in response to calls from underground chapters of Solidarity. The US
Embassy reports that in Gdansk Lech Walesa infiltrated the official
parade with some Solidarity supporters and shouted slogans while
passing near the reviewing stand. In Warsaw, special riot troops were
not even deployed, as regular police dispersed a crowd of about
1,000 outside the city's cathedral.
Comment: Walesa's presence'probably took the authorities by
surprise, and he may experience increased harassment as a result of
his uncharacteristic involvement in street demonstrations. The regime
will hesitate to arrest him, however, particularly with church-state
negotiations over the release of the 11 Solidarity leaders and their
advisers at a critical juncture. Demonstrations tomorrow, Poland's
prewar constitution day, are also likely to be smaller than in the past.
INDIA: Split in Sikh Movement
Growing factional disputes in the Sikh movement have resulted in a
formal split within the Sikh Akali Dal Party, according to the US
Embassy. Nearly one-third of the party's members left the moderate
faction this past weekend to join the more militant extremists. The
breakaway group complained that the party leadership is weak and
prone to compromise with New Delhi
Comment: The split not only strengthens the extremists but reduces
prospects for a negotiated settlement between New Delhi and the
Sikhs. Longstanding personal and political animosities between rival
Sikh leaders have led to the recent rise in vendetta killings, which
preceded the break.
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Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
N.S.)
The South Pacific island ministates of Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, Tonga and Western Samoa.presently
have diplomatic relations with nonresident
ambassadors with the Soviet Union.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
South Pacific
Ocean
1000 Kilometers
1600. Nautical Miles
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In Brief
with him.
- Soviets continue trying to establish a foothold in South Pacific . -. .
Soviet Ambassador to Australia paid private. visit to Vanuatu last
month ... Prime Minister, however, reportedly avoided meeting
creditors, who expect sharp budget cuts.
with election politics... move likely to upset IMF and foreign
- Philippine President Marcos ordered 10-percent pay raise for
government workers yesterday ... underscores his preoccupation
Middle East - Despite Armenian terrorist attack on Turkish diplomat in Tehran,
Prime Minister Ozal's visit there successful ... two sides agreed to
seek $700 million increase in bilateral trade ... Iran now Turkey's
largest trading partner and primary source of crude oil.
movement ... Shamir will stress it is a small group of extremists.
Israeli press says suspects in last Friday's attempted bombing of
Arab buses are from radical wing of West Bank settlement
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- Former Prime Minister Begin of Israel to end his political career ...
will not run for seat in Knesset this July. 25X1
mobs will further tarnish government's image.
- Unrest growing over Nigerian Government's inefficient handling of
currency conversion ... likely to become more chaotic before
changeover ends on Sunday ... possible resort to force to control
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: Bleak Prospects for New Government
The coalition government announced by Prime Minister Karami
on Monday will at best produce a temporary respite in the
Lebanese civil war. It relegates to ministerial committees the
most troublesome issues, including basic reforms in the
distribution of political power among the religious groups, the
revision of, the constitution, and the command structure of the
Lebanese Army. Factional leaders already are squabbling over
the makeup of the cabinet, and they are likely to revert to armed
combat as their longstanding political disagreements and
personal hatreds come to the surface.
Karami named Druze leader Walid Junblatt, Shia leader Nabih Bard,
and Christian leaders Camille Shamun and Pierre Gemayel to the new
cabinet, but it remains unclear whether they will participate. They are
angry that Karami did not consult them before the appointments, and
Barri has said that his portfolio carries no real power. They probably
also resent Karami's efforts to take a dominant position by naming
himself Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister.
The US Embassy says the Karami government will try to.set up a
32-man constituent committee and a military council to consider the
problems of the political system and the Army. The cabinet
presumably will not address these problems until the committees
have made recommendations.
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earnest until the government establishes a firm cease-fire, but the
cycle of fighting has developed a momentum of its own. Street militias
have grown accustomed to daily battles with rival groups, and
factional leaders do not have enough control to stop the fighting.
Extremists on both sides probably will try to sabotage the new
government by instigating clashes. The Christian Lebanese Forces
militia and radical Shia groups, among others, refuse to recognize
Karami's authority and could use violence to play a spoiler role.
Continuing Political Discord
Even if a cease-fire can be maintained, the fundamental problem of
Christian intransigence in the face of Druze and Muslim demands for
political and economic power will disrupt the new government.
Despite the setbacks to Christian militia forces and the Lebanese
Army, President Gemayel and the Christians in the new cabinet still
appear unwilling to accept reforms that would seriously diminish
Christian political predominance.
continued
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The Druze and Muslims remain determined to exploit their military
victories to achieve political gains. They want to strengthen the
Muslim Prime Minister at the expense of the Christian President,
balance the ratio of Muslims and Christians in the parliament and civil
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The Shia Muslims, in particular, will no longer settle for paper
guarantees. Even moderate Shias, frustrated by the gap between
their large numbers and their limited political and economic power,
expect far-reaching changes in the government. Christian and nni
Muslims, however, share a desire to deny power to the Shias.
Personality Problems
The fundamental political disagreements are complicated by deep
personal antagonisms between leaders in the coalition cabinet. Many
of them are barely on speaking terms after years of blood feuds. The
hatreds that plagued the reconciliation conferences in Switzerland will
impede cooperation within the new cabinet.
Most Druze and Muslims doubt that any progress can occur as long
as Gemayel remains in office. They are convinced that he is a
Phalangist at heart and will never yield on key issues affecting
Christian power. In a situation where strong leadership would be
necessary to bring the factions together, Gemayel co -nmands neither
the respect nor the authority to arbitrate among them.
Implications
Despite the inclusion of factional leaders in the cabinet, the new
government is unlikely to be able to arrange a settlement. Fighting
may subside in the short term as the warring groups adopt a wait-
and-see attitude toward the Karami government, but a political
deadlock eventually will prompt militia leaders to return to the
battlefield.
Continued instability guarantees that Lebanon will remain vulnerable
to Syrian manipulation. Damascus, however, has become wary of
deeper involvement in Lebanon and appears unwilling to impose a
settlement at this time. President Assad, moreover, is preoccupied
with the internal power struggle in Syria.
Karami, hoping to draw attention away from internal political
problems, probably will focus his government's efforts on ending the
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.
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