NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 23 APRIL 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200020077-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: April 23, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Centre'
Intellij
OCPAS/CTG
CY# 285
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
23 April 1984
Top Secret
CPAS NID 84-095JX
23 April 1984
Copy 2 8 5
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Contents
Lebanon-Syria: Tentative Agreement ........................................
Libya-UK: Response to Severed Relations ................................
China-US: Chinese Treatment of Taiwan Policy ........................
Southern Africa: Difficulties of the ANC .................................... 5
Netherlands: Posture on INF ............ :......................................... 6
Notes
Angola: UNITA Bombing ............................................................ 7
Yugoslavia: Dissident Crackdown .............................................. 7
Sri Lanka-India: Tamil Insurgents Suppressed .......................... 8
Poland: Aid to Agriculture .......................................................... 8
Vietnam-Kampuchea-China: Border Tensions ........................... 10
USSR-Mozambique: Soviets Defensive About Aid .............. :..... 11
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Top Secret
LEBANON-SYRIA: Tentative Agreement
The agreement between Presidents Gemayel and Assad to set up
a new Lebanese Government fails to resolve the most difficult
political issues and almost certainly will be opposed by Christian
hardliners.
Syrian Vice President Khaddam and an aide to Druze leader Junblatt
told US officials on Saturday that Gemayel agreed to appoint former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami to head a government of
national unity. Gemayel will expand the cabinet to 26 ministers,
including four "super ministers"-Junblatt, Shia leader, Barri, and
Christian leaders Camille Shamun and Pierre Gemayel.
Khaddam and Junblatt's aide also said that the new government will
establish ministerial committees to consider specific reforms of the
political system and to oversee and restructure the Lebanese Army.
According to the Druze official, Army commander Tannous will be
removed from office.
Christian hardliners in the Lebanese Forces militias, however, have
already announced their opposition to the agreement and their
intention neither to support nor to participate in a new government.
Christian leader Shamun publicly rejected the appointment of Karami
as prime minister.
Comment: The agreement relegates to ministerial committees the
most troublesome issues-such as secularizing the political system
and power sharing between the President and the Prime Minister.
Although Druze and Shia militia leaders may agree to participate in an
expanded government, disagreements with Christian ministers are
likely to cripple a coalition cabinet in the long term.
Opposition from Christian hardliners, moreover, will seriously weaken
the credibility of a government of national unity. Even moderate
Christians are likely to resent the agreement, which they see as a
humiliating capitulation to Syria. Christian leaders have repeatedly
stated that they will not accept Karami, who is strongly pro-Syrian, as
prime minister.
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Top Secret
LIBYA-UK: Response to Severed Relations
Tripoli's response to London's breaking of relations over the
weekend probably will be restrained, although demonstrations
could be staged to protest British "aggression."
The UK announced that Libyans leaving the Embassy in London
would be questioned and searched for arms and explosives. London
earlier rejected Libyan leader Qadhafi's attempt to gain freedom for
his diplomats by offering to permit British observers to attend a trial
of those charged by the UK. The British Foreign Office has not yet
advised British- residents in Libya to leave the country, but they have
been told to "consider their position."
Comment: The British decision to break relations was probably
influenced by public anger and by impatience with the pace of
negotiations. Qadhafi wants to keep British businessmen in Libya
despite the break because of their important role in the oil and service
industries. His direct response probably will be restrained.
Qadhafi nonetheless will wage an intense diplomatic effort to blame
London for the break in relations, and he may order the harassment
of British diplomats leaving Tripoli in retaliation for the questioning of
Libyan officials by the UK. He also could arrange demonstrations
against the UK, which could lead to violence against British citizens
and property. The British decision also could prompt Libyan agents,
perhaps acting without orders, to strike targets in the UK and
elsewhere.
Prime Minister Thatcher probably hopes the situation will go no '
farther than the expulsion of diplomats. Her main concern remains the
risk to British subjects in Libya.
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Top Secret
CHINA-US: Chinese Treatment of Taiwan Policy
Senior Chinese officials appear to accept for now US policy on
Taiwan and indicate greater Interest in expanding security ties.
Official Chinese policy guidance has quoted Foreign Minister Wu to
the effect that President Reagan's "attitude" toward Taiwan has
changed for the better. Other Chinese officials note that the US has
not taken any action recently that would force China to react strongly.
In addition, Chinese media last week favorably replayed remarks by
the President and Secretary of State Shultz on US relations with
China and Taiwan.
Wu said that the basic direction of bilateral relations is now fixed,
despite disagreements with the US over Taiwan. He acknowledged
that no US President would stop arms sales to Taiwan or abandon the
notion of "one China, one Taiwan.'
Defense Minister Zhang on Friday said Secretary
oofDefense Weinberger's visit to China last September marked the
beginning of cooperation in conventional weapons, and he predicted
expanded cooperation in the future.
Comment: Chinese leaders apparently have decided they can do little
to alter US policy toward Taiwan in the near term. They almost
certainly will raise the issue during the President's visit, but they may
subordinate their harsh demands of the past to their larger interest in
improving economic and strategic relations with the US.
Recent Chinese statements on security cooperation suggest that
some influential leaders are interested in improving relations with the
US on strategic grounds.
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Too Secret
Zaire
Angola
Africa
HARARE.*
Zimbabwe
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Top Secret
SOUTHERN AFRICA: Difficulties of the ANC
Recent clashes between ANC guerrillas and Swazi police
underline the problems facing the group since South Africa and
Mozambique signed a nonaggression pact last month.
Mozambique will allow a few ANC officials to remain in Maputo but is
demanding that other members move to refugee camps or leave the
country. The US Embassy reports that senior Mozambican officials
have been surprised by the large quantities of Soviet and East
European arms and explosives uncovered in raids on ANC facilities in
the country.
More than 100 ANC members who recently have fled from
Mozambique to Swaziland are being pressed by Swazi officials to
leave. Swazi police report encountering heavily armed ANC, guerrillas,
and three clashes this month have resulted in casualties on both
sides. Swaziland claims that Pretoria threatened to take direct action
against the ANC in Swaziland after a car bomb explosion in Durban,
which South Africa alleges. was carried out by ANC insurgents based
in Swaziland.
Since the signing of the accord by Pretoria and Maputo, top ANC
officials have been traveling throughout southern Africa trying to
strengthen the group's sagging external support, but they have had
little success. Botswana, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe reportedly have
reaffirmed their political support for the group but have taken added
measures to prevent the ANC from using their territories to launch
attacks against South Africa
Comment: Although the ANC is in disarray, the group will try to find
reinfiltration routes and develop a military infrastructure in South
Africa while, continuing sporadic attacks. Politically, however, frictions
between the ANC and black states in the region may develop into
hostility. Pretoria, meanwhile, appears determined to persuade other
black states to sign security agreements that would work against the
ANC.
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Top Secret
NETHERLANDS: Posture on INF
Prime Minister Lubbers appears determined 'to push ahead soon
with a vote on INF in parliament, even though prospects for a
decision acceptable to NATO appear to be poor.
.In a press interview last week, Lubbers reiterated his determination to
make a vote on INF policy a matter of confidence. He warned his
divided Christian Democratic colleagues and Liberal coalition
partners that they must reach an agreement on this issue. Christian
Democratic leaders have publicly rejected full deployment of
48 missiles.
The Prime Minister, in the interview, also appeared to rule out other
widely discussed deployment options-such as smaller numbers of
missiles and reductions in other Dutch nuclear tasks-and claimed
that a negative decision on INF would not mean a reduced
commitment to NATO.
Comment: Lubbers evidently takes seriously his frequent claim that a
deployment decision should be made this spring, even though he
recognizes the serious risk of a government crisis. He probably is still
trying to come up with a package of proposals that will hold the
Christian Democrats together and be acceptable to the Liberals and
By repeatedly asserting that the center-right coalition will fall unless it
can reach a consensus on INF, the Prime Minister is trying to force
agreement within the Cabinet on a single proposal. Press speculation
continues to center on a plan whereby the Dutch would begin base
construction but agree to install the missiles only in time of crisis.
Lubbers, however, could consider asking parliament to support base
construction without a deployment decision, but only if he received
Allied assurances that NATO would soon undertake a new arms
limitation initiative.
Lubbers may be laying the groundwork for a justification of his policy
in the event parliament rejects the coalition's proposal and prompts
the government to resign. The Prime Minister seems to resent
charges that the Netherlands is not loyal to NATO. By making INF
deployment a matter of confidence and publicly risking his office on
the decision, Lubbers will be able to make the case to the NATO Allies
that he did everything possible to gain the approval of parliament.
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..Top '.Secret
Namibia
0 200
Kilometers
Boundary
representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Top.Secret
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Congo
BRAZZAVILLE
South
Atlantic
Ocean
5 "'" Huam o
Sowet-- - 'uban4
occdi ied building
struck by UNITA,bomb
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,Top Secret
ANGOLA: UNITA Bombing
UNITA claims to have exploded a bomb at a building occupied by
Soviet and Cuban nationals in Huambo, Angola's second-largest city,
killing more than 200 people, including two Soviet and 37 Cuban
officers. TASS has confirmed the incident on Thursday but reported
that the bomb exploded near an apartment house occupied by Cuban
civilian aid workers and their families, causing about 100 casualties.
Comment: Last month UNITA promised to intensify its military efforts
in a campaign that would increasingly be directed against Angolan
cities. Late last month, a UNITA force temporarily seized the poorly
defended provincial capital of Sumbe, but the presence of a large
Angolan and Cuban garrison in Huambo rules out a direct assault
there. Stepped up urban guerrilla activity in Angola's major cities,
combined with operations in the countryside where the insurgents
already hold the initiative, will hinder Luanda's consideration of a
Cuban troop withdrawal. The insurgent campaign will also reinforce
the position of the hardliners in the government who have vetoed
discussions with UNITA and have argued against reductions in Cuban
troop strength.
The arrest on Friday of former Vice President and prominent dissident
Milovan Djilas probably was meant to strengthen the credibility of
repeated calls for social discipline. Djilas, the last survivor of Tito's
inner circle, was arrested along with 27 other intellectuals who had
met to discuss Yugoslavia's nationality problems. Although Djilas was
among those released on Saturday, 21 reportedly remain in
detention. Party leaders are publicly attacking the increasing criticism
from dissidents and warning that Central Committee members and
regional politicians must stop obstructing political reform.
Comment: The US Embassy suggests that Serb President Ljubicic
and other Serb conservatives may be responsible for the arrests.
Ljubicic, who becomes Serbia's representative on the state
Presidency next month, cultivates Serb nationalist sentiment and
supports increased central authority. Nevertheless, as the Embassy
notes, top party and state officials almost certainly approved of the
crackdown. They are preparing for the latest in a series of Central
Committee plenums that have so far failed to break the political
logjam created by the decentralized political system bequeathed by
Tito.
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,'Top Secret
Predominantly Tamil region
First-orderadfninistrative
boundary_
o . 100
Kilometers
? Top: S?cret
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SRI LANKA-INDIA: Tamil Insurgents Suppressed
Ethnic violence between Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority and the
country's Tamil insurgents has abated since Sri Lanka's new Minister
for National Security returned from New Delhi last week. The minister
reported in parliament he had been assured by senior Indian political
advisers that New Delhi was committed to maintaining a unified Sri
Lanka. Indian Tamil leaders in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu,
however, are continuing to call on New Delhi to prepare for armed
intervention in Sri Lanka to protect Tamil civilians in the event of
another round of violence, according to press and US Embassy
reporting.
Comment: The current lull in communal violence is in response to
Colombo's tough new antiterrorism program instituted by the
Minister for National Security. The brutality of the Army's tactics has
alienated even moderate Tamils and increased the likelihood of a
more extreme round of ethnic violence. New Delhi has informed
Colombo-as well as the US and the UK-that Indian military
intervention to stop further communal bloodshed is still a distinct
possibility if President Jayewardene cannot maintain law and order.
POLAND: Aid to Agriculture
Polish Catholic Church spokesman Father Orszulik late last week told
the US Embassy that a law that will govern the Church's newly
established foundation for aid to private agriculture should be ready
for implementation in June. Regime and Church officials, who have
been negotiating since January, are attempting to work out provisions
of the statute spelling out the extent of government oversight. The
priest said the sides must also reach agreement on another document
that will regulate the foundation's financial dealings, but he does not
expect any significant delays.
Comment: Although the negotiations appear to be moving forward,
Orszulik may be overly optimistic about the timing. Compromises
probably will have to be made on both sides, but the regime will insist
on retaining sufficient oversight powers to show that it is in control.
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Top secret
VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA-CHINA: Border Tensions
The US Embassy in Bangkok reports that late last week Vietnamese
troops in Kampuchea withdrew from some positions near the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front base at Ban Sa Ngae. Heavy
shelling continued over the weekend, however, and KPNLF officials
believe the Vietnamese may be preparing for additional ground
attacks there and on non-Communist bases at Nong Samet, Nong
Chan, and Ta Turn. Press reports indicate that 34 Thai troops have
been wounded since Thursday in attempting to drive Vietnamese
troops from a hill in Thai territory near Ban Charat. Vietnamese and
Chinese media are charging that border clashes increased last week,
and an increased Chinese military presence has
caused food shortages in the Nanning area.
Comment: Vietnamese attacks have placed most guerrilla forces on
the defensive and may have hampered their plans for vigorous rainy
season attacks.
(Beijing does
not appear likely to enlarge the scale of its attacks soon.
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Top Secret
USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: Soviets Defensive About Aid
The Soviet Ambassador in Maputo recently told the press that
"Mozambique can count on us," despite its nonaggression
agreement with South Africa. The US Embassy reports that the
Ambassador was defensive about criticism that the USSR was
partially responsible for Mozambique's serious economic problems.
He said, however, that Moscow has promised more aid on
concessional terms.
Comment: Soviet economic aid to Mozambique has been meager,
and Moscow seems reconciled to merely maintaining the foothold it
acquired largely as a result of the weapons it continues to supply. The
Soviet unwillingness to provide large amounts of economic aid to
Mozambique is typical of Moscow's policy toward Third World
countries that it does not consider of vital strategic importance.
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Top Secret
In Brief
Middle East-Africa 25X1
- The Jerusalem Committee of the Islamic Conference has called
on its 45 members to break relations with Ell Salvador and Costa
Rica ... issue is move of Embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem ...
invited Moroccan King Hassan to visit US to discuss issue ...
Hassan has no plans for trip at this time.
Asia-Pacific - Chinese press says Vice-Premier Li Peng to sign nuclear
cooperation agreement in Bonn next month ... will include
nonproliferation commitments but no inspection rights ... West
Germans to sell coolant pumps for nuclear plant in Shanghai.
- Rumors that North Korean President Kim II-song is ill remain
unsubstantiated ... Kim, 72, is overweight and hypertensive but
keeping to active schedule ... no unusual security precautions
apparent in P'yongyang.
- Australian Prime Minister Hawke for first time is publicly
confirming speculation about early elections ... not required until
early 1986, but he expects to call for voting between December
and next March ... probably anxious to capitalize on high public
approval ratings.
Europe - Western press reports state Czechoslovak Cardinal Tomasek has
invited the Pope to visit next year ... Prague unlikely to approve,
fearing domestic impact of such a visit ... regime reportedly
arresting Catholics circulating petitions asking the Pope to come.
Top Secret
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Top k-MUML
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