NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 29 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010071-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: March 29, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010071-2
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Director of
Central
(X.:PAS/C:1G
LY1 285
-Tep-Seeret-
National Intelligence Daily.
Thursday
29 March 1984
0
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-Top-Geeret-
CPAS NID 84-074JX
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Com, 9 A
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?
Contents
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Chile: Implications of Day of Protest
Guinea: Making the Transition
Africa: Reaction to Negotiations in the South
3
4
5
Vietnam-Kampuchea: Increased Vietnamese Attacks
7
Sweden: New Approach to Export Controls
9
Iran: Khomeini Under Pressure
10
Sri Lanka: Increase in Tamil Terrorism 13
Special Analysis
USSR-Southern Africa: Views on Diplomatic Developments 14
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Top Secret
29 March 1984
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CHILE: Implications of Day of Protest
The national day of protest on Tuesday gives the opposition
movement new momentum and could place the government on the
defensive.
The middle and working classes participated extensively,
according to press reports. There were few violent clashes with the
police?most of which involved slumdwellers and university students.
The Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement w
unable to mobilize workers to challenge the police.
Comment: The Communists' failure will indirectly benefit the
moderate Democratic Alliance and the broad-based National Labor
Command. Extensive violence could have persuaded many in the
middle class that moderates are unable to control the protest
movement. There were enough disturbances, however, to underscore
the widespread dissatisfaction over the slow pace of political
liberalization and continued high unemployment.
The protest probably will encourage the Alliance and its centrist
labor allies to call for a general strike within a few months. 0 osition
labor forces are expected to meet on 14 April to set a date.
The failure of the state of emergency, the curfew, and press
censorship to contain the demonstration may cause some rightist
politicians and military officers to question this hardline approach.
These elements have already complained that President Pinochet is
seeking to expand his authority and that his refusal to make even
minor concessions is raisina social tensions and deepening political
polarization.
Top Secret
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GUINEA: Making the Transition
Prime Minister Beavogui has been sworn in as interim head of
government, as pre arations continue for the funeral tomorrow of
President Tou re.
Numerous African leaders and representatives from Western,
Middle Eastern, and Communist countries will attend the funeral. The
USSR and Libya have not reacted publicly to Toure's death.
Comment: After the funeral senior officials will begin to discuss
the selection of a successor. Some French officials suggest that
Beavogui may be the next elected president and that key members of
the government will cooperate to keep the country functioning
smoothly in order to forestall factionalism and tribal bickering.
Beavogui's health reportedly is fragile, however, and he might not
withstand the pressures of a declining economy, any political
infighting, and possible foreign meddling.
Libyan activism, the future of the OAU, and regional economic
deterioration will be topics of primary concern to African moderates
gathering in Conakry. The US delegation is likely to receive requests
for help in these matters. Togo is being proposed by some West
Africans as a ossible alternative to Conakry as the site for the next
OAU summit.
Beavogui may request direct US financial help and further private
investment to reverse the effects of the drought, a recent earthquake,
and the deteriorating economy. He also may ask about the status of a
$1.5 million US program to provide Guinea with coastal patrol boats
and naval training.
Top Secret
4 29 March 1984
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701963 3-84
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AFRICA: Reaction to Negotiations in the South
South Africa's negotiations with Angola and Mozambique have
been favorably received by African countries outside the region,
although most doubt that the talks will lead to a lasting settlement.
Some of the strongest support has come from the other
Portuguese-speaking countries?Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and
Sao Tome. Their leaders will join Angola and Mozambique at a
summit in Maputo on Sunday to take a joint stand in favor of the
negotiations, according to the US Embassy in Cape Verde.
Some seniorofficials, including a Nigerian and a Malawian, have
expressed appreciation for the US role in facilitating the negotiations.
Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador last week
that his government commends the US for its persistence.
On the other hand, Zairian President Mobutu and others have
expressed concern that the interests of SWAPO and the ANC will be
sacrificed. Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs told the US ?
Ambassador that he opposes an a reements that tend to sanction
South African aggression.
The Foreign Ministers of OAU countries, who met in Addis Ababa
earlier this month, expressed their, belief that severe security and
economic problems led Angola and Mozambique to enter the
negotiations. According to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, however,
they agreed to change their original draft from a statement of "full
support" to an expression of "sympathy and understanding." They
apparently acted at the behest of SWAPO, the ANC, and the more
radical states.
Comment: Most African countries would like to see the
negotiations in southern Africa succeed, but they want to avoid the
appearance of giving too much support to a process that they fear
could easily collapse. They are also reluctant to say anything that
might be interpreted as approving South African behavior, lest they
indirectly relieve international pressure on Pretoria to reform its
domestic policies.
Top Secret
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VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Increased Vietnamese Attacks
Vietnamese forces have substantially increased their attacks
against Communist guerrillas over the past week.
Two Vietnamese regiments supported by tanks and artillery
attacked a major Democratic Kampuchean base in northern
Kampuchea over the weekend, and some of the fighting spilled over
into Thailand. The Thai have sent several companies of irregular
troops and a rifle company to the area, and they have shelled the
Vietnamese. Press reports of clashes between Thai and Vietnamese
troops are unconfirmed.
some
Vietnamese troops were still holding positions in Thai territory on
Tuesday. Thai Army Commander General Athit claims, however, that
the Vietnamese have been pushed back across the border.
Fragmentary information suggests both Vietnamese and guerrilla
losses are heavy. Between 5,000 and 10,000 civilians have fled into
Sisaket Province in Thailand.
Comment: The Vietnamese apparently delayed any major border
operations until Foreign Minister Thach had completed his recent
'visits to Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Hanoi will now try to set
back resistance gains in the interior before the rainy season begins in
May
Vietnamese assaults on the large non-Communist bases alonp
the western border do not appear imminent
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Top Secret
SWEDEN: New Approach to Export Controls
The government is reviewing its export control procedures with
the aim of iving greater protection to COCOM-controlled technology.
A special group has been established in the Foreign Trade
Department to decide what measures Sweden should take to tighten
export controls. There appears to be a consensus in the government
that the country's export control list, which now is confined largely to
war materiel, will have to be expanded to include a large number of
dual-use technologies that are imported from the COCOM countries.
The group is expected to make a report in June or July
Comment: Swedish sources have described the new approach as
conforming to the COCOM list without joining COCOM. The new
procedures probably will include a certification system for importing
and reexporting COCOM-controlled items. The government, however,
apparently is still debating whether the new procedures will be legally
enforceable and what provisions for verification?including end-user
checks?should be made.
The review of export control policy is an effort to erase the
perception in the US that Sweden is an easy route for the diversion of
high technology to the USSR and East European countries. Sweden is
increasingly concerned that this view could jeopardize access to US
technology that is crucial to modernizing its armed forces and key
industries.
Too Secret
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IRAN: Khomeini Under Pressure
Ayatollah
Khomeini's health has deteriorated considerably, possibly in reaction
to recent setbacks in the war. In recent broadcast speeches,
Khomeini has begun to sound short of breath. Khomeini's heir
apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, and
other prominent clerics have differed publicly with Khomeini's
guidelines on war policy in recent weeks.
Comment: Khomeini may be suffering from stress as a result of
his growing isolation over his insistence on continuing the war. He
apparently fears that ending the conflict without toppling the Iraqi
regime would undermine the Islamic Republic and its appeal abroad.
He may now recognize, however, that his decision to continue the
fighting in Iraq has produced only minor military gains at the cost of
increasing domestic dissatisfaction.
Top Secret
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I op Doom
SRI LANKA: Increase in Tamil Terrorism
Tamil terrorists have claimed responsibility for killing seven
Sinhalese police officers in Jaffna, on the northern end of the island,
during the past week.
The government is tightening security, and it
recently captured over 1,000 pounds of illegal explosives in Jaffna.
President Jayewardene has created a new Ministry of National
Security to monitor terrorist activities.
Comment: The recent killings and new rumors of Indian support
for the Tamil terrorists suggest that the country may experience
communal violence over the next several weeks even worse than that
of last summer. Jayewardene's inept negotiations with Sinhalese and
Tamil leaders to resolve the ethnic conflict have failed. Security forces
are inadequate to contain more intense and widespread violence.
Top Secret
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%PP OCUMIL
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Indian
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701955 3-84
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29 March 1984
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Special Analysis
USSR-SOUTHERN AFRICA: Views on Diplomatic Developments
Moscow is apprehensive that South Africa's recent agreements
with Angola and Mozambique could jeopardize the USSR's position in
southern Africa and its support for insurgents in Namibia and South
Africa. On the other hand, the Soviets' recognition of the Angolan-
South African cease-fire will help to shore up Luanda's deteriorating
military position. They still expect that the Angolans will continue to
require the Cuban military presence. They probably believe that it
would be premature to try to sabotage the talks, in view of their
conviction that South Africa is not willing in any case to relinquish its
hold on Namibia. Moscow evidently was more dismayed about the
extent of President Machel's turn toward Pretoria. Despite this setback
for their interests, the Soviets will use Ma uto's need for arms to
maintain a role in Mozambique.
Soviet media have not denounced the cease-fire, but they have
criticized the US and South Africa. Moscow is using the media to raise
doubts about Washington's motives as the broker and about
Pretoria's reasons for agreeing to the cease-fire.
Moscow, however, may see little reason to try to disrupt the
bilateral talks. The cease-fire and the South African withdrawal from
southern Angola have reduced the security threat that prompted
record Soviet arms deliveries to Angola last year.
If the cease-fire holds, moreover, Angolan and Cuban forces
could focus on combating UNITA. Although the Soviets may have
misgivings about temporarily abandoning SWAPO, preservin the
regime in Luanda is the more important immediate task.
Cuban Troop Withdrawal Issue
, The Soviets, presumably pleased with the statement issued
earlier this month by Angola and Cuba, reaffirmed that a withdrawal
continued
Top Secret
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of Cuban troops would occur after South Africa ends its support of
UNITA, withdraws from An ola and Namibia, and implements the UN
plan on Namibia.
Moscow's major concern is that a Cuban withdrawal from Angola
would substantially undermine Soviet influence in Luanda. In view of
the deep-seated regional tensions, the threat from UNITA, and
Moscow's conviction that South Africa will not relinquish Namibia, the
Soviets probably believe the current talks are unlikely to lead to a
Cuban withdrawal.
Relations With Mozambique
The USSR has only belatedly acknowledged the nonaggression
pact between Mozambique and South Africa. The delay probably
reflects Moscow's displeasure with President Machel's
rapprochement with Pretoria, which undercuts Soviet interests and
prestige, tarnishes Maputo's revolutionary credentials, and opens up
new opportunities for Western inroads in Mozambique.
The improvement in relations also reduces the already limited
capabilities of the ANC insurgency. This obstructs the USSR's long-
term objective of toppling the regime in Pretoria.
The Soviets do not have the degree of access and influence in
Maputo that they enjoy in Luanda, and Machel's about-face almost
certainly has caused them some anxiety.
Prospects
The USSR will continue to use its influence with hardliners in
Angola to keep the regime there suspicious of the US and South
Africa. If the Soviets conclude that President dos Santos's diplomacy
might seriously threaten their position in Angola, they are likely?as
they have done in the past?to put direct pressure on him.
Moscow has not written off Mozambique. The account in Pravda
of Machel's meetings with Premier Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign
Minister ll'ichev at Andropov's funeral noted that prospects for the
further development of bilateral relations are favorable. To maintain
their presence in Maputo, the Soviets will exploit Machel's continued
need for military assistance.
Top Secret
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