NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 26 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010059-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: March 26, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
s Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
26 March 1984
To,, Secret
CPAS NID 84071 JX
26 March-TM
Copy 2 C' r
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Contents
China: Economic Policies Relaxed .......................................... 10
Special Analysis
Ell Salvador: Election Day Difficulties ......................................
1
Iraq-Iran: Attack on Shipping ..................................................
2
Suriname: Effort To Isolate Left ..............................................
3
Chile: Protest Against Government ........................................
4
Mexico: Presidential Trip ........................................................
5
West Germany: Christian Democrats Win State Election ......
6
Southern Africa: Possible Food Transport Problems ............
7
Ghana: Dissident Attack Thwarted ..........................................
8
Jordan: Black June Bombings ................................................
8
Ethiopia: Concern About Drought ..........................................
9
USSR-Ethiopia: Planned Visit by Mengistu ............................
9
Libya: Qadhafi's New Aggressiveness .................................... 11
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EL SALVADOR: Election Day Difficulties
problems.
The secretary general of the Christian Democrats told the press
his party may present a motion to invalidate the election because of
expressed only mild concern about the irregularities.
The government's Electoral Council blamed a power blackout
caused by the insurgents for much of the trouble. The Embassy says
guerrillas also interfered with voting in at least four departments by
overrunning polling stations, destroying ballot boxes, and scattering 25X1
New voting procedures caused problems and delays in the
presidential election yesterday, but the insurgents apparently did
not make a major effort to disrupt the balloting.
The US Embassy reports that the voter turnout was heavy,
although nearly all sections of the country reported confusion and
administrative problems. The lack of polling personnel and shortages
of ballots and ballot boxes were the most common complaints.
Mistakes in the compiled national voter register also caused
trouble with the new voting system. Spokesmen of other
voters.
Comment: It probably will take several days to determine the
winners. Problems with the new voter registry appear to have caused
the most difficulties. The Christian Democrats may choose to
challenge the results unless they take a substantial lead.
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IRAQ-IRAN: Attack on Shipping
Baghdad claimed that its air and naval forces attacked a convoy
near Khark Island on Saturday, destroying four merchant ships and oil
tankers.
Iran has denied Baghdad's claims, and, according to US
diplomats in Kuwait, a National Iranian Oil Company official in Tehran
said Saturday that operations at Khark were normal.
Fighting on the ground remains at a low level.
Comment: Iraq probably attacked a convoy going to Bandar-e
Khomeyni, as it did earlier this month, but the attack could have been
aimed at ships going to Khark Island. Iran also denied the earlier
attack, but after about a week there was confirmation that some
ships had been damaged. Iran's Bushehr Airbase is responsible for
protecting Khark Island and nearby shipping.
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SURINAME: Effort To Isolate Left
Prime Minister Udenhout apparently is taking steps to remove
radical leftists from key government posts, probably with the
knowledge of Army-Commander Bouterse.
The US Embassy says that several officials affiliated with the
leftist Revolutionary People's Party were recently removed from posts
in the Ministries of Labor and Education.
efforts are also being made to remove party members from
positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including those in charge
of relations with the US. The Embassy also reports that the leftist-
dominated university steering group and the hospital board have
been replaced.
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Comment: Bouterse's motives for permitting the assault on his
radical supporters are unclear. He may only be biding his time,
allowing the labor-business coalition to show its hand before taking 25X1
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CHILE: Protest Against Government
The antigovernment protest scheduled for Tuesday will renew
the cycle of confrontations with the regime that was suspended in
December because of Chile's summer vacation period.
The opposition has asked Chileans to boycott schools,
government offices, and stores; beat pots and pans; and hold
neighborhood protest meetings. Press reports indicate the important-
truckers' union will block access to Santiago and other major cities.
The three main opposition forces-the centrist Democratic
Alliance, the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement,
and the broad-based National Labor Command-are coordinating
their plans for the protest more closely than last year. The radical
leftist opposition has decided to work with the centrists for the time
being.
Comment: The Democratic Alliance hopes that President
Pinochet's failure to speed the liberalization process begun last year
has reduced support for the government, especially in the middle
class. The Alliance knows, however, that the opposition movement
will need to remain basically peaceful and under the control of
moderates if it is to retain the backing of the middle class. Larger and
more comprehensive protests will be needed this year if they are to be
effective against Pinochet.
The Popular Democratic Movement probably wants to use the
protest to test its support among the working class. The outcome
could have an influence on which groups dominate planning for a
possible general strike in the next few months.
The government wants to avoid heavyhanded repression, which
could produce sympathy for the opposition. Pinochet has made
economic concessions to try to reduce participation by labor in the
protest movement. The government hopes that an improving
economy will strengthen its position and induce the moderate
opposition to accept Pinochet's plan for a slow transition to
democracy under the current constitution.
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MEXICO: Presidential Trip
President de la Madrid's trip to South America, which begins
today, is designed to enhance his prestige at home and to strengthen
bilateral relations with key Latin countries.
The President will visit Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and
Caracas. Recent public statements and the itinerary indicate that
talks will focus on the Contadora initiative, hemispheric solidarity, 25X1
trade, and financial issues.
According to the press, the Secretary of Energy may join the
presidential party in Caracas, so that joint petroleum aid programs for
Central America can be discussed. De la Madrid has sharply limited
his entourage, in contrast to the large party that accompanied his
predecessor on state visits.
Comment: De la Madrid is seeking new support for his Central
American policies and muting the shrill tone of foreign policy under
the previous administration. He rejected or deferred invitations to visit
Cuba and Nicaragua, probably to avoid irritating relations with the
US. Even though foreign debt is a major issue in Mexico and most of
the host countries, Mexico City remains opposed to joint regional
action on the problem.
The inclusion of Argentina reflects Mexico's improving relations
with the new civilian government in Buenos Aires. De la Madrid
probably will urge the Argentines to ratify the Mexican-sponsored
Western Hemisphere nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
The absence of pomp in preparation for the trip reflects the
Mexican President's personal style and his desire to avoid criticism
for squandering public funds. The trip will help enhance his image at
home and in Latin America even thou h dramatic developments are
unlikely.
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WEST GERMANY: Christian Democrats Win State Election
The Christian Democratic victory in Baden-Wuerttemberg
yesterday will be seen by Chancellor Kohl as a vote of confidence in
his government.
The Christian Democrats dropped about 2 percentage points
from the election in 1980. Projections indicate, however, that they will
retain their parliamentary majority with nearly 52 percent of the vote.
The Social Democrats, weakened by divisions and ineffective
leadership, remain a distant second with 32.4 percent. In 1980 they
won approximately 32 percent.
The Greens increased their proportion of the vote from 5 percent
to 8 percent. The Free Democrats lost some voters but won over 7
percent, reversing a series of losses at the state level.
Comment: The vote probably reflects primarily the popularity of
state Minister-President Lothar Spaeth and the state's strong
economic performance. Kohl and his party, however, almost certainly
will claim the election represents popular endorsement for his
government
Some observers may hold to their earlier speculation that any loss
of votes would reflect poorly on the Christian Democratic government
in Bonn. Others will interpret the retention of the parliamentary
majority as a positive sign.
The Social Democrats and Free Democrats had hoped just to
retain the voting totals they received in 1980. Both parties probably
view the results as an indication that the decline in their fortunes has
leveled off and may even begin to improve.
The Greens almost certainly will claim a clear victory. The party
had suffered from philosophical disputes in public, poor organization,
and the resignation of its delegation from the state parliament. Its
improved showing reflects the solid core of support the party has
won.
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Congo
BRAZZAVILLE
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KINSHASA
Zaire
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26 March 1984
Swaziland]
Tanzania
DARES AN
Lake
Nyasa
Indian
Ocean
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SOUTHERN AFRICA: Possible Food Transport Problems
Growing food imports will create transport bottlenecks in southern
Africa and, together with political tensions between South Africa and
Zimbabwe, could delay deliveries of emergency food aid and
commercial grain imports to the drought-stricken region during the
next year.
South African officials say that the country's transportation
system may be unable to handle the volume of food imports needed
by its landlocked neighbors because of its own massive import
requirements. Although South Africa normally exports corn,
government officials say that the country may have to import more
than 4 million tons of corn this year because of drought.
Moreover, Mozambique, which is struggling to overcome drought
and typhoon damage, is anticipating a large volume of food and other
aid deliveries that could overwhelm the capacities of its ports unless 25X1
deliveries are scheduled carefully.
South African officials reportedly have told Zimbabwe that
deliveries of 40,000 tons of corn per month-less than may be
required-can be virtually assured if Zimbabwe combines its
purchases and deliveries with those of South Africa for more efficient
handling. Harare reportedly has rejected this arrangement on political
grounds, and it will seek supplies independently.
Zimbabwe may be able to obtain as much as 150,000 tons from
Malawi, according to the US Embassy in Harare, but the main truck
routes through Mozambique are vulnerable to attack by insurgents.
The Embassy believes these shipments may have to travel the longer, 25X1
more costly route through Zambia.
Comment: Zambia and Zaire may receive preferential treatment
on transportation by South Africa because they have been traditional
purchasers of its corn. Port congestion in Mozambique probably will 25X1
force Zimbabwe to rely entirely on South African ports.
Harare's refusal to accept combined purchases, however, may
reduce South Africa's willingness to guarantee timely deliveries.
South Africa is likely to use its leverage to force Zimbabwe to comply
with Pretoria's longstanding demand for negotiations at the
ministerial level on food and other issues.
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Forces loyal to Head of State Rawlings are continuing to hunt an
unknown number of Ghanaian dissidents who infiltrated the country
from Ivory Coast and Togo over the weekend. At least 10 dissidents
have been killed. Radio Accra claims the infiltrators are remnants of a
faction of ultraleftist northerners who attempted coups last year and
in 1982. Most of the Ghanaian Army has been confined to barracks.
Comment: The failure of the sixth attempt to oust Rawlings's
weak and unpopular three-year-old regime reflects the inability of
opposition groups to organize and coordinate their efforts effectively.
The fact that the plotters are from the north may encourage warmer
relations at least temporarily between Rawlings. and his ultraleftist
security adviser, Kojo Tsikata, since both are southern Ewe
tribesmen. Tsikata could emerge in a stronger position to oppose
Rawlings's pursuit of IMF-imposed economic reforms. Shortages of
food and fuel, drought, and rising prices of basic commodities that
have resulted from the reforms nevertheless are likely to lead to
further discontent and challenges to the regime.
JORDAN: Black June Bombings
Jordanian authorities discovered and defused three bombs,
two of which were directed against British interests, following the
explosion at a hotel in Amman on Saturday. The Black June
Organization, based in Damascus and headed by Abu Nidal, claimed
responsibility for the hotel bombing and has previously threatened to
attack British as well as Jordanian targets. Jordanian officials believe
that the bombings may be intended to force the cancellation of Queen
Elizabeth's visit to Jordan, which is scheduled to begin today. Press
reports indicate the Queen is proceeding with her trip.
Comment: Abu Nidal has been attacking Jordanian interests
since last fall because of Jordan's refusal to release imprisoned
members of his group and because of Jordan's growing
rapprochement with PLO chief Arafat. The UK has been threatened
because of its imprisonment of Black June members responsible for
the attempted murder of the Israeli Ambassador in London in 1982.
Further attacks are likely during the Queen's visit in an attempt to
embarrass the Jordanians.
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Ethiopian Drought
Lake
Rudolf
Tana
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Uganda
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26 March 1984
Boundary representation is
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ETHIOPIA: Concern About Drought
The increasing prospect that this year's food crop will fail is
causing grave concern among Ethiopian officials, according to US
Embassy reporting. Little rain has fallen since October in the central
highlands, which is the major agricultural region, and wells in the
countryside have dropped to low levels or dried up. Disaster relief
workers report forest fires throughout the country, livestock deaths,
and alarm over the absence of seasonal rains.
Comment: A major crop failure could lead to famine conditions
on a scale equal to those caused by the disastrous drought in 1974.
Fears of a poor harvest probably are being compounded by false
rumors that Ethiopia has been declared ineligible for more US
humanitarian assistance. Last year's harvest and international food
aid will enable Ethiopia to feed most of its population until November.
Nonetheless, food shortages in the remote areas of the north are
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USSR-ETHIOPIA: Planned Visit by Mengistu
TASS announced yesterday that Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu
will visit Moscow late this month. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa
said today that he would leave on Thursday for 10 days in the USSR.
According to earlier reporting from the Embassy, Mengistu reportedly
was to meet with General Secretary Chernenko and sign economic,
military, and cultural agreements. Mengistu is the first leader outside
the USSR's allies to visit Moscow since Andropov's funeral.
Comment: The USSR has turned down Ethiopian requests to
cancel or delay payments on a $2 billion arms debt, but Mengistu
presumably will raise the issue again. Ethiopia apparently is unable to
pay a $200-million installment due shortly, so the Soviets will have
little choice but to delay payments, but they are unlikely to cancel the
debt. Mengistu probably will not raise the recent abrupt departure of
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Beijing has issued a series of regulations that further liberalize
current policies allotting farmland to individual peasant families.
Farmland leases have been lengthened from three years to 15 years
in an effort to encourage investment by farmers. Peasant families will
be encouraged to specialize in growing one or two marketable
commodities. They also will be allowed to sublease their land and
move to towns age in privately owned service and transport
activities.
Comment: It is clear that Beijing wants less government control
and more personal responsibility in all sectors of the rural economy.
The formation of individual transport enterprises will help augment
the inefficient system and, if developed properly, eventually could
lessen the demand for imported grain. Many provincial- and local-
level officials oppose a further relaxation of government control,
however, and implementing the new policies will be slow and may
even be ignored in some areas. Beijing has tried to prepare for such
opposition by including regulations making officials more accountable
for promoting local economic growth.
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Special Analysis
LIBYA: Qadhafi's New Aggressiveness
Libyan leader Qadhafi recently has adopted more aggressive
tactics in hopes of dealing Washington a major foreign policy setback
similar to the one he believes the US suffered in Lebanon. He also is
motivated by frustration over recent attacks against Libyan officials,
increasing economic difficulties, and lack of enthusiasm for his
revolutionary programs at home. Qadhafi may now be willing to risk
increased terrorist operations or, less likely, a limited military
confrontation with the US or France.
Qadhafi's recent moves have been directed principally against
Egypt, Sudan, Chad, and opponents to his regime abroad. In the past
two weeks, Qadhafi launched an airstrike against Sudanese
broadcasting facilities in Khartoum, was implicated in the terrorist
bombing of a French airliner in N'Diamena and
He also
caked on Libyans to stage a mass marc in g~ ypt to "impose unity,"
although he later denied doing so.
Last month,) Qadhafi encouraged
demonstrators to burn the Jordanian Embassy in Libya as a warning
to King Hussein against negotiating a Middle East peace settlement.
He also began propaganda broadcasts to support Sudanese
dissidents.
Foreign Policy Motivations
Qadhafi may want to emulate Syria's ascendency in the Levant. In
recent speeches Qadhafi has pointed to the withdrawal of US Marines
from Beirut and the abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli accord as
major "victories" for the Arab cause.
The Libyan leader is attempting to exploit the reverses of
Sudanese President Nimeiri, whose ill-conceived domestic policies
have seriously weakened his authority and generated insurgency in
the south. Libya's airstrike on the radio station in Khartoum probably
was intended to increase Libyan influence among Sudanese
dissidents and to highlight Nimeiri's vulnerability.
Qadhafi probably believes moderate Arab regimes are vulnerable
to arguments against the US role in the Middle East and to demands
for a more united, militant stand against Israel. His call for a mass
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march into Egypt probably was designed to push President Mubarak
toward a tougher approach toward Tel Aviv.
In Chad, Qadhafi probably hopes the attack on the French airliner
will increase pressure on Paris to negotiate the withdrawal of French
forces there.
Domestic Pressures on Qadhafi
Qadhafi also may see more aggressive policies as necessary to
strengthen his position within Libya. His domestic opponents are
undertaking increasingly bold actions.
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(Antigovernment leaflets are becoming
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and Libya's ranking diplomat in Rome was shot by
more widespread
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unidentified assailants two months ag
o.
Even more unnerving for Qadhafi was the attempted murder of
his confidant and cousin, Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam, in Tripoli last month.
Several days after the incident, Qadhafi lashed out at his domestic
opponents and hinted at a purge of the revolutionary committees,
previously considered his staunchest supporters.
. Some of Qadhafi's actions have proved counterproductive.
Many moderate Arab states, however, have avoided condemning
Qadhafi's actions directly. The Saudis-who have been trying to turn
Libya toward moderation-have argued that isolating Qadhafi would
make him even more dangerous.
Moreover, the Libyan airstrike on Khartoum may yet sharpen
opposition to Nimeiri within Sudanese military circles. The US
Embassy in Khartoum says the attack already has eroded public
confidence in the military.
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Prospects
Qadhafi relishes posturing and brinkmanship, but he has
generally responded to strong challenges by backing down, at least
temporarily. His decision to play down the possibility of a march into
Egypt after Cairo alerted its forces fits this pattern.
In the case of Sudan, however, Qadhafi may believe he is too
close to victory to retreat despite greater US and Egyptian military
support for Nimeiri. He is likely to increase help and encouragement
for Sudanese dissidents. He will try to identify the US with Nimeiri's
ineffectual domestic policies in order to discredit the US if Nimeiri 25X1
falls.
Successes by radicals in Lebanon and the need to rally the
Libyans may tempt Qadhafi to risk operations that would invite strong
retaliation. His actions could include sponsoring terrorism against US
and French interests in Sudan and Chad.
Qadhafi's objectives in the Middle East and Africa dovetail with
some Soviet interests. Moscow probably will continue supporting
Libyan policies designed to undermine US influence as long as it can
avoid openly identifying itself with Qadhafi's behavior. The USSR, for
example, accused the US of using the airstrike against Khartoum as a
pretext for strengthening its military forces in the region but avoided
mentioning the Libyan role in the attack.
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