NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 24 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010055-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: March 24, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
24 March 1984
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Contents
EI Salvador: Security for Election ............................................ 2
Belgium-Netherlands: Problems With INF .......................... 5
USSR-Eastern Europe: Possible Visit by Chernenko ............ 6
Turkey: Local Elections ............................................................ 7
Israel: Next Steps for the Election Bill ....................................
Western Europe-Central America: Socialist Observers ......
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Italy: Difficulties for Economic Legislation .............................. 12
USSR-Indonesia: Foreign Minister's Visit .................... 12
Special Analysis
USSR-Syria-Lebanon: Moscow's Next Steps ........................ 13
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24 March 1984
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EL SALVADOR: Security for Election
The armed forces appear to be taking adequate security
precautions for the presidential election tomorrow,
Army and security forces have been on full alert since
Wednesday. The US defense attache reports most units in the field,
including the elite battalions, have returned to their garrisons to
provide security for the election. Some units will conduct local
patrolling, according to the attache, but the elite units will be held
ready to counter any insurgent military moves.
There are about 40 towns where the government either has no
plans to place ballot boxes or where delays have occurred,
The
insurgents claim they control over 70 towns where they will not allow
balloting.
Comment: The General Staff has issued warnings during the past
several days about possible insurgent operations and has cited a
variety of potential insurgent targets throughout the country. Several
of the recently returned battalions need rest and refitting, and they
would be hard pressed to respond rapidly to large-scale, widespread
attacks.
In 1982 the government placed no ballot boxes in about 30 towns
located in areas of insurgent concentration.
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The Dutch almost certainly will not accept full INF deployment,
and Belgium is having difficulty meeting its basing schedule.
The Dutch representative to NATO has told the US Ambassador
that a limited deployment of 16 cruise missiles now seems the most
politically palatable option. The US Embassy in The Hague reports
that parliamentary support for INF deployment in the Netherlands is
steadily eroding.
Many Christian Democratic deputies are having new qualms
about INF because the Calvinist Church-to which many of them
belong, including Defense Minister De Ruiter-has recently rejected
deployment. Although Liberals in the government coalition have
reaffirmed their staunch support for deploying all 48 missiles, they will
acquiesce if the other parties in the coalition decide on less than full
deployment.
The Belgians, who recently reassured the US that they will go
ahead with full deployment, are behind schedule in basing
preparations. Foreign Minister Tindemans recently said the main
obstacle is the government's inability to select a politically acceptable
contractor to prepare the site at Florennes.
The US Embassy in Brussels says that the Belgians also
misunderstand the timing of deployment. The schedule calls for the
first missiles to arrive at Florennes next February and for all 48
missiles to be operational by the fall of 1986. The government,
however, has stated publicly that the first missiles will not arrive until
next March and that all missiles will not be operational until the spring
of 1987.
Comment: Now that the Dutch cabinet knows the Liberals will go
along with partial deployment, it may believe that it has to move
quickly to avoid further erosion of parliamentary support.
Consequently, the cabinet may introduce a motion in the parliament
before May proposing partial INF deployment and a reduction in other
Dutch nuclear roles in NATO. Parliamentary approval, however, for
such a compromise is not certain. If the Dutch opt for less than full
deployment, the Belgian Government will come under increasing
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domestic pressure to do the same.
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USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Possible Visit by Chernenko
Soviet leader Chernenko reportedly will soon make his first visit as
General Secretary to Eastern Europe, where he is viewed by some
governments as representing a collective leadership rather than as the
dominant Soviet political figure on policy toward their countries.
Romanian and Yugoslav diplomats in Prague have quoted
Czechoslovak officials as saying that Chernenko will visit
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland this spring. The
Czechoslovaks appear satisfied with Chernenko, and the US Embassy
in Prague believes his visit there will strengthen the regime's
orthodoxy and its dependence on Soviet guidance.
Government officials elsewhere in Eastern Europe, however, have
expressed skepticism about Chernenko's ability to shape Soviet
policy toward their countries. The Belgian Foreign Minister says
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mojsov told him that Chernenko's talents
are limited and that Foreign Minister Gromyko~is the leading
intellectual and political figure. The Hungarian leadership reportedly
believes a collective leadership will exist in the USSR for the next
several years, with Gromyko playing a decisive role.
Comment: Chernenko's visit probably is intended to improve his
leadership image with East European leaders, rather than to settle
any of the outstanding differences between the USSR and its allies.
His decision to visit the northern tier countries probably reflects their
strategic importance in the Warsaw Pact. Bulgarian leaders may take
offense, however, if Soviet leaders do not soon carry out the
commitment to visit Sofia made by Chernenko's predecessor.
The political importance ascribed to Gromyko by both Mojsov
and the Hungarian leadership reflects their preoccupation with Soviet
foreign policy. Although Gromyko may have a decisive role in this
area, his influence probably does not extend to Soviet domestic
policy or internal party matters. Mojsov's statements, however, do
not necessarily reflect the view of the Yugoslav leadership.
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The nationwide local elections tomorrow are the first major test of
Turkey's new democratic system since the national election last
November.
The Turks will be going to the polls for the first time since the
national election and for the first time at the local level since 1977.
Although only .the three parties approved by the military took part in
the national election, six major parties are fielding candidates in the
local contests. Campaigning has been intense for weeks, and Turkish
authorities expect at least 80 percent of eligible voters to participate. 25X1
Throughout the campaign, the centrist Motherland Party of Prime
Minister Ozal has maintained a lead in the polls. According to one
poll, however, Motherland's margin has slipped somewhat, and the
left-of-center Social Democratic Party, which was not permitter
field candidates last November, has improved its position.
Comment: Motherland, which won last fall despite being the only
party without military backing, probably will stay on top by winning a
small plurality. The Social Democrats, buoyed by a good organization,
are likely to surpass the populist party on the left and emerge with
enough local power to begin extraparliamentary opposition to
government policies. The new Correct Way Party, the most vigorous
of the three small rightwing parties, probably will become the most
effective challenger to Motherland on the right. It probably will eclipse
the fast-fading Nationalist Democrats, who are supported by the
military.
The elections will have no immediate impact on the balance of
power in the government, but they almost certainly will be the first
step in an eventual realignment of political parties. A nervous military
will watch closely to see that the politicians remain within the bounds
of the new constitution. It does not want to intervene in domestic
politics again but will do so if democratic processes begin to unravel.
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ISRAEL: Next Steps for the Election Bill
The bill to hold general elections early, which received preliminary
Knesset approval on Thursday, has gone to the constitution and law
committee controlled by the ruling Likud coalition. The committee will
set the date for elections next week and return the bill to the full
Knesset for three mandatory votes. Prime Minister Shamir has said he
will respect the decision of the Knesset and will not try to bury the bill
in committee.
Comment: Shamir still hopes to delay elections as long as
possible and will try to reach a compromise with the Labor Party on
the date. The Knesset probably will take action before it concludes its
winter session on Wednesday. If deliberations in committee are
prolonged, the Knesset probably will extend its session rather than
allow the bill to die.
The secretary general of the Socialist International told a US
Embassy official in London early this week that the organization will
not send election observers to EI Salvador. He said the leadership of
the International has decided not to criticize the electoral process
unless questioned by the media. The Embassy concluded that the
International will send observers to the Nicaraguan election in
November. The leaders of 10 West European socialist parties publicly
welcomed the announcement of that election and appealed for
support of the electoral process in Nicaragua.
Comment: Leaders of the Socialist International are attempting
to avoid conspicuous actions on EI Salvador because they feel
vulnerable to accusations that they are inconsistent in their treatment
of EI Salvador and Nicaragua. They are likely to decide to send
observers to Nicaragua, even though some West European socialist
parties are still suspicious of the Sandinistas. The International
probably will try to delay announcing a decision on Nicaragua until
publicity on the Salvadoran election has subsided.
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The account by the Japanese of their recent talks in Moscow with
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa has made Bangkok uneasy
about the USSR's attitudes toward Thailand, according to the Thai
Foreign Minister. The US Embassy reports that Kapitsa accused
Bangkok of waging an undeclared war in Kampuchea and warned that
Thailand would eventually "fall like a ripe fruit into another's basket."
Comment: Kapitsa's threat appears intended to strengthen those
elements in Thailand who are growing weary of Thai involvement in
Kampuchea and who are more anti-Chinese than anti-Vietnamese. In
the past, however, such threats have only strengthened Bangkok's
view that its policy of trying to obstruct Vietnam's takeover of
Kampuchea is correct.
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Soviet Trainborne Defense Units
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USSR: Trainborne Defense Units
units usually consist of a tank company with T-55 tanks, a motorized
rifle company with armored personnel carriers, and a reconnaissance
platoon. The units have flatcars with loading ramps and armored
railcars for transport. The units appear to have an authorized strength
of about 300 men but currently are understrength.
Comment: These units, along with air assault units, would provide
mobile forces to react more quickly to small-scale raids than would
units at fixed garrisons and fortified posts that guard the strategic
railroad. Their quick-reaction mission suggests the units would be
brought up to strength before or at the outset of a conflict. A marked
increase in their strength thus could provide early warning of potential
hostilities with China.
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ITALY: Difficulties for Economic Legislation
The government's decree last month that limits cost-of-living
wage adjustments has met stiff o osition in arliament es eciall
from the Communist Part .
The nation's largest labor union, which
the Communists dominate, has sponsored'a series of strikes and
protests that will culminate in a demonstration in Rome today.
According to the US Embassy, labor leaders expect 450,000 to
650,000 participants.
Comment: The Craxi government is entering a crucial phase in its
effort to enact legislation to lower inflation and to trim the growing
budget deficit. The wage issue has offered the Communists an
opportunity to shore up their support and to convince the governing
coalition that Italy cannot be governed without Communist
acquiescence. They probably recognize, however, that widespread
social unrest would not benefit anyone. Although the Communists are
likely to continue their militant stand, in parliament, they probably will
seek a compromise on wage issues.
USSR-INDONESIA: Foreign Minister's Visit
Pravda announced yesterday that Indonesian Foreign Minister
Mochtar would be making his long-planned trip to the USSR early
next month. According to the Singapore Embassy in Moscow, the trip
was temporarily in jeopardy this week when the Soviets told the
Indonesians that Foreign Minister Gromyko could not be expected to
see every visiting foreign minister. Mochtar canceled a trip to the
USSR last year when he was told that Gromyko would be on vacation.
Comment: Moscow's reluctance to guarantee Mochtar a meeting
with Gromyko was surprising. The Soviets believe Indonesia's
commitment to ASEAN's policy on Kampuchea is weak, and in recent
months they appeared to be trying to exploit Jakarta's reservations to
improve bilateral relations. The Indonesians see the visit primarily as
an opportunity to refurbish their reputation as a nonaligned state.
Their unwillingness to break with ASEAN on the Kampuchea issue
and their displeasure with Moscow's handling of the tri robabl rule
out any major advance in Soviet-Indonesian relations.
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Special Analysis
USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Moscow's Next Steps
The Soviets almost certainly regard the recent US setbacks in
Lebanon as vindication of their policy of firm support for Syrian
President Assad's strategy. Nonetheless, the "victory" of Syria-and,
by association, the USSR-is clouded by the continuing presence of
Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. In deference to Damascus, the
Soviets are likely to remain on the sidelines in Lebanon, buf they will
try to parlay Syria's success there into expanded influence in the
Middle East. Syria's isolation and apparent unwillingness to reconcile
differences with the other Arabs, however, remain major obstacles to
the USSR's effort to rebuild a credible Arab "rejectionist front"
opposed to US peace efforts.
Since the deployment of the Multinational Force to Beirut in 1982,
the USSR's primary objectives have been the removal of US forces
and the prevention of a US-sponsored settlement in Lebanon. From
the Soviet viewpoint, the US decision to redeploy the Marines has
reduced the prospect of a permanent US military presence in
Lebanon and the risk of a military confrontation with the US in the
region.
Moscow's Syrian and Lebanese friends forced President Gemayel
to abrogate the troop withdrawal agreement with Israel and erased
his government's control of all but the Christian heartland. Although
the Soviets played no direct role in these events, the arms they
supplied to Syria and to the Druze, Shia, and leftist militias via the
Syrians helped make those achievements possible.
Nonetheless, the Soviets' satisfaction with recent events in
Lebanon is likely to be guarded. The unity the Syrians, Druze, and
Shias have shown in opposing the government almost certainly will
fragment in the course of reestablishing central authority in Lebanon.
Continuing Problems
The Soviets had always been uneasy with Syria's intervention in
Lebanon. It was only after Israel's invasion in 1982 that they accepted
Syria's argument that it had legitimate security interests in Lebanon.
In part, this policy change was taken to ease strains in bilateral
relations stemming from Syria's belief that Soviet assistance during
the invasion was inadequate.
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With the redeployment of US forces and Syrian predominance
growing, Soviet-Syrian differences over Lebanon are likely to
Israel's continuing occupation of the southern third of Lebanon is
a sobering factor for the Soviets, as well as for their Syrian and
Lebanese friends. Syrian troops are unlikely to be withdrawn as long
as the Israelis remain, thereby posing a continuing risk of a clash.
Although the Israelis have stated publicly they will not intervene to
save Gemayel's government, they have demonstrated they will try to
prevent PLO forces from reestablishing themselves south of Beirut.
Building Influence in Lebanon
The USSR's lack of influence in Lebanon is likely to leave it little
choice but to continue deferring to Syria. The Soviets, however,
probably are discreetly advising the Syrians, who need no reminding,
that thev should avoid provoking an Israeli countermove in Lebanon.
An Israeli action could wipe out the gains Moscow's friends have
made and lead to a new Syrian-Israeli confrontation. This would again
put the USSR in the position of either coming to Syria's aid militarily.
or opening itself to charges of being an unreliable ally. The Soviets
also probably would be worried that too bold a grab for power by
Syria and its allies could prompt the US to reintroduce military
personnel.
Moscow is likely to increase its contacts with the Lebanese
factions, hoping to influence domestic developments. In the last two
months Soviet Central Committee International Department Chief
Ponomarev has consulted with Druze leader Junblatt and Lebanese
Communist Party General Secretary Hawi in Moscow. Hawi also had
discussions with Soviet Politburo member Aliyev in Damascus.
In addition, Soviet Ambassador Soldatov has met with Shia
leaders Burin the ast three months.
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Beyond Lebanon
Syria's success in Lebanon strengthens the USSR's credibility
among the Arabs. Even those who oppose Syrian hegemony there are
likely to be impressed with the extent of Moscow's military support for
Damascus over the last 18 months, in particular its deployment of
SA-5 surface-to-air missile units to Syria.
Nevertheless, Syria is still the USSR's only significant ally in the
Middle East. Despite its success in Lebanon, Syria remains isolated
among the Arabs.
The rift in the PLO and the feud between PLO chief Arafat and
President Assad make greater Arab unity-which the Soviets have
long called for-as elusive as ever. Moreover, Moscow probably
views such unity as may be developing in the nascent alignment of
Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Arafat's faction of the PLO as
counterproductive, because it would further isolate Syria and possibly
lead to increased cooperation with the US.
Over the next few months, Soviet policy probably will focus on
preventing the creation of an anti-Damascus axis among the Arabs
and reviving the "rejectionist front," which once included Syria, Libya,
South Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, and the PLO. Moscow also is likely to
continue trying to lure moderate Arab governments into this front.
The USSR's efforts to reconcile Syria with other Arabs, however,
will continue to depend on Assad. At this point, the Syrian leader
appears as determined as ever to chart his own course.
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