NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 22 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: March 22, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
? National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
22 March 1984
e~~~i ~~h ;984
?py ? A 5
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Top Secret
South Africa-Angola: Troop Withdrawal To Resume ............ 6
Japan-China: Visit by Nakasone ............................................ 9
USSR-US: Collision at Sea ...................................................... 10
France-Lebanon: Status of French Forces ........:................... 10
Special Analysis
Contents
USSR-Nicaragua-US: Moscow Protests Tanker Incident ...... 1
EI Salvador: Election Campaign Ends .................................... 2
Iran: Logistic Difficulties .......................................................... 3
Iraq-Iran: Countering Subversion Among the Shias .............. 4
Somalia: President Siad's Problems ...................................... 13
Top Secret
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Top Secret
~..~ Boundary representation is
~ notnacessarily authoritative.
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USSR-NICARAGUA-US: Moscow Protests Tanker Incident
Foreign Minister Gromyko gave the US Charge a note accusing
the US of acts of "banditry and piracy" against Nicaragua and
violations of international law and freedom of navigation. The note
Council.
The USSR has made an official protest to the US about mine
damage to a Sovief tanker on Tuesday in Nicaraguan waters, but the
incident does not immediately threaten major Soviet involvement or
Nicaragua's fuel supplies.
indicated the USSR would demand compensation. The note also
asserted that some Soviet seamen had been injured, and earlier,
TASS had quoted Managua as saying five seamen had been hurt.
Comment: Gromyko's personal delivery of the note shows that
Moscow considers this a serious matter. Nonetheless, the note avoids
suggesting any Soviet action. Moscow is likely to intensify media
attacks on the US and reaffirm its backing for Managua, and it also
probably will support a Nicaraguan complaint to the UN Security
25X1
On the other hand, the USSR's avoidance so far of any public
commitment to Nicaragua and its desire not to provoke a US
response in the region suggest that the Soviet Navy will not become
involved in clearing Nicaraguan ports. The Soviets, however, may
provide advice and technical aid for Nicaraguan mine clearing
operations. Although Cuba has a limited minesweeping capability,
Havana also probably would be reluctant to become directly involved.
Top Secret
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Toa Secret
EL SALVADOR: Election Campaign Ends
The campaign for the presidential election Sunday has ended with
polls showing Christian Democratic candidate Duarte still in the lead,
but with ultrarightist D'Aubuisson and Conciliationist candidate
Guerrero in a close race for second.
The US Embassy reports that all three front-runners held large
rallies over the weekend. They appeared satisfied with their
respective parties' efforts. A grace period prescribed by electoral law
begins today and prohibits further campaigning.
Although Duarte is ahead, polls show that he lacks enough
strength for afirst-round majority. They also indicate that
D'Aubuisson's lead over Guerrero has narrowed considerably. A
substan i se polled, however, remained uncommitted.
Comment: The polls are of questionable accuracy, but Duarte
probably will have to face a runoff. If Guerrero came in second, he
would rovide a stron challenge to Duarte in a runoff.
Top Secret
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2 22 March 1984
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IRAN: Logistic Difficulties
Iran is experiencing problems with logistics and poor planning as
it prepares for its offensive in the south.
On Tuesday Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Khomeini's heir
apparent, publicly accused military commanders in charge of the war
of bad planning. He instructed commanders not to squander popular
support and to prepare attacks that lead to victory. He suggested that
a special corps of military planners be established.
Comment: Montazeri's comments indicate Tehran is becoming
concerned that these obstacles could reduce its chances of victory in
the coming battle. As more Iranian troops are massed in the southern
area, Tehran's logistic difficulties could increase. The main offensive,
however, probably will be launched despite these setbacks.
-CIA, DIA, NSA-
Top Secret
3 22 March 1984
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IRAQ-IRAN: Countering Subversion Among the Shias
Iraq is moving on several fronts to counter Iranian attempts to
subvert Iraqi Shias.
Iraqi intelligence announced last week it had thwarted a plot by
Iranian-sponsored Shia terrorists to bomb the Kuwaiti, Saudi, Soviet,
and French Embassies in Baghdad. According to US diplomats in
Baghdad, one of the terrorists was injured when a bomb went off
prematurely in a British school. Iraqi authorities say the plotters were
recruited by Dawa-the leading Iraqi Shia opposition group-and
trained at a guerrilla camp near Ahvaz, Iran.
Since Iran began its series of attacks along the border last month,
Radio Tehran has intensified its propaganda campaign to subvert
Iraq's Shia community. The Iranians are repeating their call to their
Iraqi coreligionists, who make up 8 million of the country's 14 million
people, to overthrow President Saddam Husayn.
US diplomats in Baghdad report the Iraqis have countered Iran's
propaganda campaign by appealing to the Shias' patriotism and Arab
pride. They also note that Saddam is personally popular with the
Shias and that so far he retains their loyalty. In recent well-publicized
tours of Shia areas, Saddam was received enthusiastically
Comment: The Iranians, who probably underrate the strength of
the Iraqi Shias' nationalist sentiment, are likely to attempt to increase
terrorist attacks in Iraq to coincide with their planned military
offensive against AI Basrah. Iran also will continue to aim propaganda
at Iraq's Shia community-and at the 75 percent of the military's
enlisted ranks composed of Shias.
Iraq's well-trained and efficient security services should be able to
contain the Iranian subversive campaign. In the past year they have
foiled all of Dawa's attempted terrorist attacks.
Top Secret
4 22 March 1984
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Joint Morfitoring c ~eia~
Commission
Headquarters {
move ? Mupa
.Cahama
Disengagementarea
/main map
Angola
Tari~ania
Top Secret
22 March 1984
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Top Secret
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Troop Withdrawal To Resume
South Africa informed Angola on Monday that it would resume the
phased withdrawal of its remaining. forces from southern Angola in the
next few days.
Pretoria also agreed that the Joint Monitoring Commission could
move its headquarters from Cuvelai to the next monitoring site at
Mupa. The pullout is now scheduled to be completed by 18 April.
The US Liaison Office in Windhoek reports that South Africa is
satisfied with Angola's efforts to remove SWAPO guerrillas from the
disengagement area. Pretoria also accepts Luanda's promise to
request South African help if it cannot control SWAPO insurgents
trying to infiltrate Namibia. Nevertheless, the South Africans have told
the Angolans that the continued presence of SWAPO guerrillas near
Cahama could again delay the withdrawal.
Cuban President Castro and Angolan President dos Santos
issued a communique on Monday following their meeting in Havana.
The document states that a gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops?will
begin after the South African forces have left Angola, the UN plan for
Namibian independence is carried out, and all outside support to
UNITA is ended. The communique characterizes the South African
Government as "repugnant."
South African Foreign Minister Botha denounced the
communique and repeated Pretoria's position linking Namibia's
independence with the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from
Angola. He demanded that Luanda restate its willingness to abide by
the troop disengagement agreement.
Comment: South Africa probably will continue the withdrawal
despite its anger at the Angolan-Cuban communique. The
communique and the South African reaction show that neither side
has changed its public position on the withdrawal of Cuban troops
from Angola.
Too Secret
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Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund Projects in China
Railway
(double-tracked
Telephone system ~ ~ v constr~tion
BEIJING ~fl~ua
Railway Railroad Qingda Port berth
(double-tracked Yanzhou ~ construction
Baoji ,~ electrified~~ ~~ port berth.
.oP
East China Sea
(double-
tracked
Telephone syst
.~. improvers
Top Secret
22 March 1984
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
ae
New OECF package
First OECF package
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JAPAN-CHINA: Visit by Nakasone
Prime Minister Nakasone arrives in Beijing tomorrow for a state
visites are using to highlight their excellent bilateral relations. 25X1
Nakasone will announce aseven-year, $2.09 billion development
credit to China for transportation, communications, and energy
projects. In addition, the Japanese are working out details for large
Export-Import Bank loans to support Chinese coal and oil
development.
Tokyo also has agreed to a one-time export of nuclear reactor
equipment, subject to on-site "visits" by Japanese officials. At the
same time, however, it is urging stricter controls before signing an ?~,,,
~?.+. .... ...y.vv...v.~a v~~ vnuac~cu i~uv~Gal VVV~./GI CIIIVII.
Press reports state Nakasone intends to make a "Beijing
Declaration," which will emphasize Tokyo's determination to pursue ?
peace and reject militarism. The statement also will reiterate Japan's
long-term commitment to supporting China's modernization and to 25X1
cementing friendship with Beijing.
Nakasone intends to transmit Seoul's desire for broader contacts
with Beijing. According to press reports, he may even call for joint
efforts to ease tension in Korea by expanding nonpolitical exchanges
between Japan and North Korea and between China and South 25X1
Comment: The aid package, which Japan is billing as the largest
it has ever offered, is.intended in part to draw China closer to the
West and to forestall any improvement in relations with the USSR.
The aid will be in yen, and Japanese firms will be strong competitors
for the business the credits create. China would welcome a "Beijing
Declaration "but it will respond cautiously to Japanese proposals on
Ton Secret
9 22 March 1984
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Top S?cr?t
North
Korea
`~lladivostok
L
Top S?cr?t
Sea of
Okhotsk
La Perouse Strait
(Soya Strati)
Tsugaru-kaiky8,
(Tsugaru Shait)
Sea of Japan
USS Kitty Hawk
and Soviet submarine collide
~T
'Northern Territories
(edmidlsfered by Soviet
Union, claimed by JapenJ
North
Pacilic
Ocean
Boundary representation ie
not necessarily authoritative.
22 March 1984
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The US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk reported a collision yesterday
in the Sea of Japan with a submarine, apparently a Soviet V-I nuclear-
powered attack unit. The Kitty Hawk suffered no damage. The
submarine surfaced and is in the company of a Soviet cruiser. The
Kitty Hawk is participating in an exercise in the Sea of Japan, where it
has been closely followed by Soviet naval forces.
Comment: If damage to the submarine is more extensive than
now appears to be the case, a support ship may escort or tow it to a
repair facility. The Soviets are particularly sensitive to the presence of
US aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan. Their ballistic missile
submarines frequently operate there, and the headquarters of their
Pacific Fleet is located at Vladivostok. They usually monitor aircraft
carrier operations with surface ships, submarines, and aircraft.
President Mitterrand evidently has concluded that the failure of
the talks in Lausanne has undermined the current role of French
forces in Beirut. Shia leader Barri, following his meeting yesterday
with Mitterrand, announced that France has decided to withdraw its
troops from Beirut. French military sources previously told US
Embassy officials in Paris that France has chartered acar-ferry
capable of evacuating its forces as early as next Monday. Another
French military source has claimed, however, that French troops will
be withdrawn by 7 April. (S NF)
Comment: Paris may leave a significant. residual force in Beirut to
protect French installations there and to help preserve France's
influence.
Top Secret
10 22 March 1984
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Special Analysis
President Siad's domestic position continues to weaken because
he will not make the political and economic decisions needed to
reverse the country's decline. Iri the months ahead he will increasingly
look to the US and other Western countries to solve Somalia's military
and economic problems. Siad's opponents remain divided and pose
no immediate threat. Over the longer term, however, his failure to find
solutions will increase the likelihood of a coup.
Siad's base of support is limited to his fellow Marehan tribesmen
and their allies and to senior government and military officials. They
benefit most from the pervasive corruption, Siad's patronage, and
Marehan domination of the economy. Many of Siad's supporters see
their positions closely tied to the President's retention. of power.
Since 1980, tribal dissidence has risen markedly. The regime's
heavyhanded suppression of dissent has reinforced antigovernment
sentiment, especially in the north.
Tribal frictions, however, have prevented Siad's opponents from
uniting against him. The two dissident groups backed by Libya and by
Ethiopia have resisted pressures from their benefactors to merge and
to coordinate their military operations. The appeal of both groups in
Somalia also is limited by their ties to Ethiopia and, by the general
belief that they represent parochial tribal interests.
Status of the Military
The capabilities of the armed forces continue to decline. Morale
has been lowered by long tours along the Ethiopian border, a
constant state of alert, obsolete equipment, poor logistic support, and
generally poor leadership. During the past two years, these problems
have led to several mutinies, increasing rates of desertion, and
defections to the insurgents.
Siad and his senior commanders have spurned Western efforts to
correct the military's basic weaknesses in training and maintenance.
They believe that acquiring large amounts of armor and other
advanced weapons will solve Somalia's problems. Siad has gained
some time with the military, however, by acquiring old military
equipment from Egypt, Italy, and several other countries.
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Top Secret
Tribal tensions also have had an adverse effect on the military.
Competent officers often are transferred for tribal reasons, and Army
units have been used to defend Marehan interests in tribal clashes,
thereby alienating other tribes.
Some in the military-especially junior officers-are increasingly
unhappy about the weak state of the armed forces and what they see
as the unwillingness of the US either to provide needed weapons or to
encourage other allies to be more generous with assistance. Some
officers believe that Washington:s mistrust of Siad is responsible for
the military's problems and that the West will not rebuild the armed
forces until Siad is removed. At the same time, the US defense
attache has reported that some officers have been impressed by the
contrast between the limited support Somalia receives from the West
.and the large amounts of military assistance Ethiopia receives from
Economic Pressure
Economic difficulties are adding to Siad's troubles. Crop failures
caused by drought, military seizures of food, and hoarding by local
merchants have led to food shortages. The US Embassy estimates
that scarcities will remain a problem for about another two months,
when shipments of food aid will arrive.
Export earnings are being hurt by Saudi Arabia's continued ban
on importing Somali cattle. In addition, Somalia has received its final
oil shipment under a Saudi grant in 1982, leaving only enough stocks
to last until mid-April. Nonetheless, the government recently rejected
IMF-mandated reforms that were needed to qualify for a new three-
year, $83 million credit, thereb also 'eo ardizing another $20 million
in financing from the Fund.
If the government fails to come to terms with the IMF, official aid
donors will be extremely reluctant to cover the lost funds, and local
businessmen are likely to move more capital abroad. Somalia soon
will be forced to cut back further on imports and delay servicing its
foreign debt of about $1.3 billion.
Siad is likely to respond by making more pleas to Western
countries for economic assistance and eventually approaching the
IMF for new credits. He almost certainly will continue to ask the US to
urge the Fund to agree to more politically acceptable terms.
Ethiopia probably will keep trying to increase pressure along the
border and to encourage more activity by Somali insurgents. Such
moves would increase unrest in the Somali Army by focusing
Top Secret
22 March 1984
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attention on its weakened condition. This would raise more questions
abou~'s leadership, thereby heightening chances for a coup.
If Siad were removed, his successors would be likely at the outset
to follow his pro-Western policies. A refusal by the West to meet the
military's expectations after a coup, however, could lead to a power
grab by pro-Soviet junior officers and closer relations between
Somalia and the USSR.
Leftist Somali officers might overestimate the Soviets' willingness
to respond favorably to Somali overtures because Moscow could risk
jeopardizing its position in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the officers
probably would see nothing to lose by terminating what they regard
as an unproductive relationship with the West.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
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