NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 19 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
-Monday
19 March 1984
copy ,285
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
19 March tW4
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
.Top Secret
Contents
Egypt-Libya-Sudan: Preparations for Defense ......................
Grenada: New Jewel Movement's Political Plans ..................
5
Afghanistan: Desertions and Mutinies Increasing ..................
7
Yugoslavia: Expanding Federal Police Controls ....................
8
Special. Analysis
Eastern Europe-USSR: Views on the Soviet Succession
Top Secret
19 aWarch 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Top Secret
Egypt
Syria
Saudi
Arabia
Nigeria
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Top Secret
epubiic
Ethiopia
19 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Top. Secret
EGYPT-LIBYA-SUDAN: Preparations for Defense
Cairo is taking firm steps to deter Libyan attacks on Sudan.
The forces of Egypt and Sudan remain on alert with leaves
canceled. The two countries have exchanged senior military teams
to coordinate action under their Joint Defense Agreement of 1976,
which has been invoked by Sudanese President Nimeiri.
An Egyptian official discussed with Nimeiri the possibility of
Egyptian delivery of some air defense equipment and personnel to
Sudan, according to the US Embassy in Khartoum. US military
officials in Cairo say that Egyptian F-4 fighters are being prepared for
possible deployment to Aswan.
The US Embassy reports that Nimeiri appeared alert and
composed during a meeting on Saturday. Nimeiri stated that Libya
had not succeeded in shaking his regime and that he believed the
Sudanese were rallying behind him.
Comment: Egyptian leaders want to avoid a repetition of the
criticism they received from Nimeiri last year for failing to respond
more forcefully to a Libyan-backed coup plot at the time. Moreover,
the bombing of the Sudanese broadcasting facility on Friday almost
certainly has raised Cairo's estimate of the Libyan threat that Nimeiri
faces. Nevertheless, without further Libyan provocations, Egyptian
assistance will be limited to the dispatch of a few air defense teams.
Top Secret
25X1
1 19 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
Top- Secret
IRAN-IRAQ: Baghdad Anticipates Offensive
Fighting continues in the Al Basrah area, and Iraq expects Iran to
Baghdad claims the Iranians suffered heavy casualties on the
Al Basrah front over the weekend and Iran says its
Iraae attack on the central front.
Baghdad announced on Saturday that it expected the main
Iranian push by yesterday.
Comment: Iraq probably will not be able to take the Majnoon
Islands now that the pontoon bridge,is in place. Tehran is not likely to
finish preparations for the offensive for another week. Both sides,
however, will continue limited attacks and counterattacks in advance
of Iran's main effort.
25X1
25X1
25X1
2oA]
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Top Secret
GRENADA: New Jewel Movement's Political Plans
The New Jewel Movement apparently is having little success in its
attempts to build public support and raise funds.
The celebration last Tuesday of the fifth anniversary of the
takeover of the government by the Movement attracted less than 100
people. The US Embassy reports the event had received substantial
advance publicity, including the distribution of posters depicting it as
a memorial ceremony for the late Prime Minister Bishop.
Lack of funds remains a serious problem.
Comment: New Jewel leaders are disappointed by the poor
turnout at events held in Bishop's memory during the past two
months, and they probably are reassessing their strategy. If they do
participate in the election, they will court young voters and former
members of the People's Revolutionary Army-most of whom are
unemployed.
Top Secret
5 19 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
25X1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Top Secret
AFGHANISTAN: Desertions and Mutinies Increasing
US Embassy sources say the Afghan Government's decision to
extend the length of mandatory service for soldiers serving in Kabul
from three to four years is causing widespread desertions. Half of the
government military posts near the Kabul airport were found to be
unoccupied on 9 March.
25X1
about 120 Afghan so iers from the 8th Division abandoned their
25X1
positions and destroyed two military posts b fore
forces in the Paghman Valley, west of Kabul.
Comment: The regime probably increased the term of service as
a result of the failure of its recent conscription campaigns. The
change eventually is likely to affect all Afghan troops because most
soldiers are assigned to Kabul at some point in their tours. It also will
cause an increase in the number of male civilians fleeing Afghanistan.
News of the desertions in Kabul may cause more mutinies in other
Afghan units, thereby impeding efforts by the Soviets to improve the
effectiveness of the Afghan forces.
Top Secret
March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
Top Secret
YUGOSLAVIA: Expanding Federal Police Controls
Press reports state the Federal Interior Ministry's efforts to
expand its jurisdiction are meeting some opposition in the Federal
Assembly. Last September the federal secret police asked for
permission to conduct "actions to protect the system" without the
approval of local authorities. A Yugoslav official says that the police
also wanted emergency powers to act without prior approval of the
State Presidency. According to the press, however, many Assembly
delegates objected to this arrangement.
Comment: Yugoslav leaders, who are under pressure from the
military and others to tighten order and discipline, almost certainly
will push ahead with the controversial legislation. Although regional
officials may fear concessions to the federal security apparatus as a
step toward increasing Belgrade's powers, their opposition
apparently is weakening. Political opponents of Interior Minister
Dolanc may be less inclined to block the legislation, because he will
leave this post to become a member of the State Presidency in mid- 25X1
May.
Top Secret
8 19 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
Special Analysis
EASTERN EUROPE-USSR: Views on the Soviet Succession
East European leaders presumably are looking forward to their
first substantive meetings with the new leadership in Moscow-
perhaps as early as next month-to assess any changes in policy and
the power relationships among top Soviet officials. Some reportedly
believe the elevation of General Secretary Chernenko will bring a
return to the less disruptive policies of the Brezhnev era. Nonetheless,
relations with the USSR over the next several years are likely to be
troubled by uncertainty about the political lineup in Moscow and by
Soviet economic strategies that conflict with East European policies.
The East Europeans probably will try to establish ties with members of
the current collective leadership while putting themselves in position
to cope with the next transition in the USSR.
The East Germans, Czechoslovaks, and Bulgarians demonstrated
their satisfaction with the succession by publishing warmer
commentaries on Chernenko than they had for Andropov when he
became General Secretary. According to the US Embassy in Berlin,
East German party chief Honecker has good personal rapport with
Chernenko. The conservative Czechoslovak leadership reportedly
sees Chernenko as less of a threat to the status quo.
These leaders probably are more comfortable dealing with
Chernenko, because he is a known quantity with whom they have
dealt over a number of years. They presumably hope he will not be as
vigorous in carrying out of the anticorruption campaign and other
policies advocated by Andropov that troubled them. They also will be
somewhat relieved that there once again is a General Secretary who
can carry out his duties.
The Romanians, somewhat belatedly, also published warmer
congratulations to Chernenko than they had sent to Andropov. This
reflects their hope that a weak leadership under Chernenko would
give them more room to follow an independent policy.
Foreign Minister Andrei reportedly told a West European
ambassador that the Romanians understand Chernenko and had
worked well with him in the past. Under Andropov, the USSR's
relations with Romania had deteriorated.
The most serious concern, however, has come from Poles and
Hungarians, whose respective domestic policies diverge the furthest
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
from Moscow's.) I Polish
leaders expect Chernenko to take a harder line toward Poland, partly
because-as a strong believer in the party organization-he would
not condone the role of the Polish military.
The Hungarians appear concerned that the new Soviet leadership
might not be as sympathetic as Andropov was toward their innovative
policies, and they will try to build new support for them in Moscow.
The US Embassy in Budapest notes that party chief Kadar appeared
to go out of his way publicly to emphasize his loyalty to Chernenko.
The Hungarians, however, apparently have decided to go ahead with
.the scheduled approval later this month of a long-term reform
package rather than wait to gauge Moscow's reaction.
The Yugoslav and Japanese Ambassadors in Sofia have told the
US Embassy there that the long-awaited CEMA summit is to be held
in Moscow in April. The early scheduling of the summit implies there
will be no major changes in the agenda and in the policy statements
that were agreed on last fall.
The East Europeans will be particularly sensitive to any
indications that the Soviet leadership will try again to integrate
economic planning. They also will be attentive to Soviet attitudes,
following INF, on trade and political ties with the West and on military
modernization and defense spending.
The Japanese Ambassador. also says that a Warsaw Pact summit
is to occur in Moscow in April or May.
Implications
The transition period in the USSR will create a number of
uncertainties for the East Europeans that could lead to drift and
indecision in the coming months. Much will depend on the degree of
unity among Soviet leaders on issues concerning Eastern Europe and
on the priority they assign to relations with the region.
Top Secret
10 19 March 1984
25X125X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Top Secret
The East Europeans who feel most secure at home will continue
policies they believe have already received Moscow's approval. At the
same time, however, they are sensitive to, the possibility that policy
initiatives could provoke Soviet criticism.
Except for Romanian President Ceausescu, none of the East
European leaders are politically daring. Honecker, however, has
indicated a willingness to go ahead with the resolution of some
problems with West German Chancellor Kohl. The Hungarians also
will proceed with economic reform proposals.
The tendency to drift will be more pronounced in some countries
if the Soviet leadership does not follow through on promises to
continue limited efforts at reform in the USSR. Those in Eastern
Europe who support reform-and indeed would take it much further
than Moscow would contemplate for itself-need the example of
Soviet reform efforts to help overcome the opposition of hardliners at
home.
East European uncertainties will be made worse by the difficulties
in working with a Soviet leadership that is still sorting out its own
internal power relationships. The Hungarians, for example; reportedly
believe that Politburo member Gorbachev is sympathetic to their
economic policies.
If Jaruzelski comes under pressure from Soviet civilian leaders, he
may seek the help of Defense Minister Ustinov.
The East Europeans also will be looking ahead to the next
transition. They will be concerned that cultivating close relations with
the wrong candidate for leadership could have serious consequences. 25X1
In the longer term, the East European and Soviet economies face
difficult problems that could cause increasing friction. If the new
Soviet leadership increases economic demands on the East
Europeans, the East Europeans will have.to defend their own
economic interests more strongly or face heightened domestic unrest.
No matter how such issues are resolved, the forces pulling the
countries of Eastern Europe in different directions are likely to
become stronger.
Top Secret
11 19 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000200010035-2