NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 13 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 13, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secrel
Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CTG:
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
13 March 1984
Tmrsee e
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Contents
Arab States: Token Support for Baghdad ..............................
Egypt: Regional Diplomacy and Politics ..................................
2
3
Nicaragua: Opposition Protest ................................................
Poland: Pressure on Cardinal Glemp ......................................
5
6
Syria: New Government Named ..............................................
8
Ell Salvador: Strikes End Temporarily ....................................
USSR-India: Results of Ustinov's Visit ....................................
9
9
Iran: Legislative Elections Scheduled ...................................... 10
Special Analyses:
Israel-Lebanon: Security Options in Southern Lebanon ........ 11
UK: Thatcher and the Unions .................................................. 13
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IRAN-IRAQ: Airstrikes on Majnoon Islands
Iraq probably will try to destroy the Iranian pontoon bridge to the
islands before it can be completed late this week.
Iraqi press reports claim that yesterday fighter aircraft and
helicopters attacked Iranian positions on the islands.
shelled the eastern end of the bridge.
the Iraqis-have
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Al Basrah remains Iran's objective, although other attacks
will be launched along the border.
mobilized 300,000 to 500,000 men
they have suffered 20,000 casualti
for the offensive, and
es in recent fighting
Comment: Destruction of the pontoon bridge would keep Iranian
forces on the islands partially isolated and increase the chances of
recapturing them. The Iraqis apparently have been reluctant to send
aircraft against the bridge so far because of Iranian air defenses
around the islands and the difficulty of destroying a pontoon bridge.
They may now be more willing to launch air attacks, however, since
their ground attack on the island has stalled.
To prevent repair operations, they would have to make repeated
attacks on the bridge and on the construction support areas at its
eastern end.
If the bridge is completed, the Iranians could use it to move large
numbers of troops to strengthen their defenses on the islands. This
would leave them in a better position to launch new attacks across
the marshes against the Iraqis that would threaten the strategic road
between and Al Basrah as well as Iraqi troops east of Al
Basrah
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ARAB STATES: Token Support for Baghdad
The session over the weekend of the Gulf Cooperation Council
and the emergency meeting in Baghdad today of Foreign Ministers of
the Arab League are likely to provide only rhetorical support to Iraq's
war efforts.
The Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, and Oman gathered in Riyadh over the
weekend for the Council's quarterly meeting. The latest fighting and
Iran's threat to the Persian Gulf states were high on the agenda, but
results of the meeting are not yet known.
Oman's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs told the US
Ambassador in Muscat on Saturday that the members of the Council
are reluctant to engage in collective military contingency planning
with the US because they are afraid of Iran and of domestic criticism.
They prefer instead discreet bilateral talks.
Seventeen of the 22 Arab League members have agreed to
Iraq's request for the emergency meeting of Foreign Ministers. A
government-controlled Iraqi newspaper yesterday called for the
Foreign Ministers to support Iraq and condemn Iran in accordance
with the Arab League's charter and collective defense pact. Syria
and Libya are among the states that have not announced if their
representatives will attend.
Comment: Any resolutions resulting from these meetings
probably will be of little practical use to Baghdad. The six members of
the Gulf Council thus far have had little success in interesting Tehran
in mediation efforts. They are unlikely to increase substantially their
financial assistance to Baghdad, because each faces financial
constraints of its own.
Syria, which supports Iran's war effort, probably will boycott the
meeting. Its absence would increase the likelihood that the Arab
League will issue a denunciation of Iran.
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EGYPT: Regional Diplomacy and Politics
Cairo is unlikely to react to its formal reentry into the Islamic
Conference by campaigning hard for readmission to the Arab League
or by backing away from its peace treaty with Israel.
The chairman of the Islamic Conference, Morocco's King Hassan,
declared in a letter sent to the organization's secretariat on Saturday
that Egypt's readmission was "final and effective as of now."
the secretariat told US officials that Cairo will routinely be
invited to all meetings of the Conference and its committees. The next
meetings will be held in late March or in April.
President Mubarak said in an interview on Sunday that Egypt,
despite pressure from Syria, will continue to adhere to the Camp
David Accords. He said that Egypt would not reenter the Arab League
at the price of abrogating its treaty with Israel, even though Tel Aviv
violates the treaty every day.
Comment: Egyptian officials repeatedly have said that the Arab
states have to come to Egypt rather than the reverse. They believe
that the Arabs already recognize Egypt's importance in regional
politics.
Cairo believes that the current state of relations with Israel serves
Egyptian interests by improving the Israeli Labor Party's chances of
success in an early election. As a result, Egypt is unlikely to send its
Ambassador back to Israel in the near future or to make other moves
that might strengthen Prime Minister Shamir's coalition.
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NICARAGUA: Opposition Protests
The Sandinistas probably are embarrassed by the opposition's
boycott of discussions of the draft election law.
The Social Christian Party withdrew from the Council of State's
debate on the electoral law last week in order to protest approval of
an article providing for presidential elections. A party official says
many members believed that the party, by continuing to participate in
the debate, was allowing itself to be used. Press reports state the
remaining opposition parties and a labor confederation subsequently
followed the lead of the Social Christians.
Earlier last week the regime had shown some sensitivity to non-
Sandinista concerns, agreeing to drop a proposed requirement that a
political party obtain 5,000 signatures on a petition to qualify for the
election. The Sandinistas also appointed a special committee to
rewrite an article on the parties' access to the media, after the
opposition attacked a proposal that all parties divide one hour of
television time each week.
Opposition sources say that prominent exiled politicians Arturo
Cruz and Alfredo Cesar plan to return to Nicaragua next week to test
the political climate. The Sandinistas have said they will be allowed to
return but they also have published items linking Cruz to the
insurgents.
Comment: The opposition's decision to walk out over a fairly
unimportant issue underscores its threat to boycott the election. The
Sandinistas may make some overture to entice the opposition to
return to the debate, but they will not relax their overall control of
election planning.
The Sandinistas probably calculate that the return of Cruz and
Cesar will help legitimize the election process. Although neither has
a popular following, the government apparently is putting itself in
position to counteract whatever support they might gain.
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POLAND: Pressure on Cardinal Glemp
Cardinal Glemp, who is under increasing pressure to be less
accommodating to the regime, will have a chance to defend his
policies during a special mass tomorrow in Warsaw's cathedral.
Glemp returned yesterday from a monthlong visit to South
America. He faces a renewed hunger strike in a suburban Warsaw
parish protesting his transfer of a pro-Solidarity priest. He also has to
deal with a controversy over the removal of crucifixes from a state
agricultural academy and with the student demonstration that
followed that action.
Meanwhile, US Embassy officers at the Vatican report a
resurgence of speculation that Glemp will be reassigned to a position
in the Vatican bureaucracy as a means of "gracefully" removing him
as head of the Polish church.
Comment: Glemp is likely to face more challenges to his authority
as the faithful and local priests increasingly come to view his
willingness to accommodate the regime as a sellout. He may be able
to restore some of his credibility, however, if he defends displaying
crucifixes in schools and public buildings. In the past, the Church's
hierarchy has supported this policy.
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President Assad's appointment of his brother, Rifaat, and two
other officials as vice presidents may ease tensions in Damascus
temporarily. Three decrees issued on Sunday named former Foreign
Minister Khaddam, Rifaat, and Baath Party leader Masharigah to be
vice presidents in that apparent order of precedence. Assad also
approved a new government under Prime Minister Kasm. The cabinet
includes Khaddam's deputy, Faruq al-Shar', as the new Foreign
Minister, and indicates that Defense Minister Talas has gained an
additional post as deputy prime minister.
Comment: Rifaat may order the troops of his defense companies
to return to their barracks, but tensions are likely to reemerge when
he tries to assert his authority over the military and security forces.
Although the President apparently has acceded to Rifaat's ambitions
for a more prominant role, he has kept his own team of advisers
intact. Only six of the 36 positions in the cabinet are filled by new
appointees, and there is no indication that Rifaat's opponents have
been moved to less powerful positions
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EL SALVADOR: Strikes End Temporarily
Employees in the public sector have returned to work, but they
are threatening to strike again later this week if their demands are not
met. The US Embassy reports that labor-management negotiations
continue and that one union is asking for a 25-percent increase in
wages, well above the 10 percent specified by the government's new
wage decree. Although most of the unions currently involved are
affiliated with the leftist labor front, labor leaders claim that
democratic unions also may strike.
Comment: Democratic labor has endorsed Christian Democratic
presidential candidate Duarte, and continuing labor strife at this stage
of the presidential campaign probably would benefit rightist
candidates. If the situation gets worse, the Army may intervene. This
would give the insurgents a propaganda windfall just before the
elections on 25 March.
Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov has ended his six-day visit to
India with broad agreement on regional security problems but no new
arms deals. According to the US Embassy, Ustinov and Prime
Minister Gandhi expressed concern about US military sales to
Pakistan and the US Navy's buildup in the Indian Ocean. A high-level
Indian military delegation is scheduled to go to Moscow soon to follow
up on Soviet offers of a wide range of weapons on favorable credit
terms.
Comment: The visit reaffirmed Moscow's desire to strengthen
and diversify bilateral relations. Most of the arms the USSR is
offering, including a new MIG fighter, have been under discussion for
some time. The Indians have been slow deciding on a major new
agreement with the Soviets. They want to have the flexibility of
acquiring some arms from Western sources and to try to obtain better
terms from the Soviets.
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IRAN: Legislative Elections Scheduled
Tehran has announced that elections to the Consultative
Assembly will be held on 15 April and has decreed that members
of the government who want to run have to resign their posts by
Thursday. Iranian merchants
are funding a drive to elect as many representatives as possible in
order to counter radical unsympathetic toward
the private sector.
Comment: Cabinet ministers in Iran are not required to have
seats in the legislature, but some ministers who do not expect to
retain their portfolios may resign to run. The elections have been
delayed for several weeks, probably because of disagreements
over procedure and the government's preoccupation with military
operations. Efforts by the commercial sector to gain seats could
result in a contentious campaign in some districts and perhaps
make the conduct of the war an issue.
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Present Areas of Control
Syrian
Druze
Israeli Army
Christian militia
Druze and Shia
Lebanese Army forces
Mediterranean
Boundary-repreaentation4~i
not necessariltr authonttativ
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BEIRUT
INTERNATIONA
AIRPORT
sraer
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Special Analysis
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Security Options in Southern Lebanon
The Israeli Government is under increasing domestic pressure to
redeploy its forces at least out of the heavily populated areas of
southern Lebanon. Tel Aviv still hopes to work out effective security
arrangements that will eventually allow it to withdraw its troops
completely, but Israeli officials are pessimistic that they can rely on
Lebanese surrogates alone to maintain security along the border. As a
result, Israel probably will have to maintain a military presence in the
area for an extended time.
most Israeli military and government
officials favor a substantial redeployment of their forces from the
western, more heavily populated area of the south. They see Lebanon
as a drain on valuable financial and material resources and a highly
disruptive factor in the training cycle of Army reserves. The officials
believe that Israel's occupation of the predominantly Shia areas of the
south actually fosters the goals of Shiite radicals.
Only a minority of officials, including former Defense Minister
Sharon, favor remaining along the Awwali River. They argue that
partial or complete withdrawal now would be interpreted by Syria as
another sign of Israeli weakness.
The officials contend that standing fast helps to put direct
pressure on the Druze to prevent the Palestinians from reentering the
southern Shuf. They also argue that the Army is now best situated to
strike at Palestinians who come near the Israeli-imposed "red line" at
the Damur River.
Where To Draw the Line
Political considerations prevent Prime Minister Shamir's
government from ordering a complete withdrawal. The Labor Party
is using Israel's continued presence in Lebanon to attack the
government. Labor argues that the security of northern Israel would
be protected best by a complete withdrawal and that Israel should
go ahead and unilaterally implement the security provisions of the
scuttled withdrawal accord.
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The government says that, without substantial security
arrangements in the south, a sudden withdrawal to the border would
subject northern Israel to renewed shelling and infiltration by the
Palestinians. Its view is that Israel requires a buffer zone along the
border to prevent a return to the situation that existed before the
invasion.
Israeli officials are examining several alternatives for a partial
withdrawal. Shamir and Defense Minister Arens favor a limited
pullback from the Sidon area, which the Army describes as a
"hornets' nest."
A withdrawal from only Sidon, however, probably would not result
in substantially fewer Israeli casualties over the long run. A large
number of attacks against Israeli soldiers occur on the coast road
south of the city, or in Tyre, Nabatiyah, and other heavily populated
areas. By opening Sidon to traffic from the north, Israel also would
make it easier for its opponents to smuggle arms and explosives into
the south.
Most members of the cabinet prefer a larger pullback to either the
Zahrani or the Litani Rivers. The Litani is the easier to defend, and a
withdrawal to it would remove Israeli soldiers from most of Lebanon's
heavily populated coastal region.
Other Security Arrangements
Tel Aviv will continue its efforts to build up the Army of Free
Lebanon as the primary security force in the south. Israel is trying to
integrate members of the Lebanese Forces stationed in the south into
the Army of Free Lebanon. Although most of its efforts to establish
local Shiite militias have failed, Israeli officials still hope to reach
agreements with local Druze, Shias, and Sunnis to help maintain
security in the south.
Tel Aviv is not now, contemplating any pullback of its forces
from the Bekaa Valley. Israeli officials probably would be willing to
consider an agreement with Damascus on a mutual reduction and
disengagement of forces in return for Syrian pledges to prevent
terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and
across the border.
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Special Analysis
Trade unions and the government are trying to achieve some
degree of cooperation, or at least reduce the hostility that has marked
their relationship since Prime Minister Thatcher was elected in 1979.
Although Thatcher has taken a number of actions to deprive the
unions of their economic and political influence, she has been under
pressure recently to modify this stand. The Trades Union Congress is
reexamining its ties to the Labor Party because of the changing
political and economic climate.
Thatcher burnished her reputation for toughness recently by
refusing to back down from the government ban on union
membership at the Cheltenham signals communications facility. The
employees were given until 1 March to renounce their memberships
or cease working at the installation.
Thatcher reportedly took this action in order to eliminate the
possibility of further strikes at the facility, which she claims damage
national security. Civil service unions have appeared reasonable in
the dispute and evidently have offered a "no strike" guarantee in
exchange for lifting the ban.
Thatcher has claimed that up to 90 percent of the employees at
the facility have agreed to give up their union ties. Nonetheless, she
apparently was surprised by the strength of opposition to her action,
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The Trades Union Congress says the government's position
demonstrates its unwillingness to accommodate the unions. It is
threatening to withdraw from talks under, way on a broad range of
government-labor issues.
Thatcher's Position
Until recently, the Prime Minister had refused all contact with
union leaders, and in 1980 and 1982 she led a drive to enact
restrictive labor laws without consulting leaders of the Trades Union
Congress. Some of her colleagues are urging her to keep pressure on
for labor reform while the unions lack the power to impede it.
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The Prime Minister, however, recently authorized limited talks
with Trades Union Congress leader Murray. She presumably sees no
current political benefit in union "bashing." She also may believe that
further labor legislation, particularly without prior consultation with
union leaders, might prompt public sympathy for the unions, as
occurred in the Cheltenham affair.
Thatcher's approach seems to be producing results. Press
reports state that the Trades Union Congress has agreed to ask
member unions to recommend voluntary pay deductions for union
political funds-the lifeline of the Labor Party. If this change were
implemented, it probably would satisfy some of Thatcher's concerns
about democracy in union procedures.
The Changing Atmosphere
There are several reasons for the decision by the Trades Union
Congress to engage in a dialogue with the government. The work
force recently has gained many more white collar members, and many
of the older and more militant unions have been put on the defensive
by the poor economic situation. The current unemployment rate of
13 percent has caused substantial job losses in highly unionized
industries and the public sector.
Union membership had fallen to below 10 million at the end of
1983, the lowest figure since 1971. Unemployment is likely to grow,
however, and the unions are seriously considering a government
proposal to trade lower pay for more jobs.
Declining union membership, however, has altered the balance of
power in the Trades Union Congress in favor of more moderate
unions. Moreover, the rank and file in a number of militant unions
have repeatedly refused to endorse strike decisions over the past few
years.
The Labor Party's disastrous showing in the general election last
June, when an estimated 60 percent of union members voted against
the party, has prompted the Trades Union Congress to take another
look at its traditional links to Labor. Trade unionists reportedly want
to distance themselves from the Labor Party because it has become
increasingly a captive of its left wing.
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Looking Ahead
Thatcher is likely to continue her antiunion position, but she also
will try to maintain a dialogue with the Trades Union Congress.
Whether the unions will continue to be conciliatory depends in part on
their assessment of the economy. Economists are predicting an
improvement over the next few months, which, according to the US
Embassy, should encourage unions to be more demanding as they try
to make up for ground lost since 1979.
The future of the Trades Union Congress's links to the Labor
Party may also have a considerable impact on the political scene. The
Trades Union Congress almost certainly will not bolt the party any
time soon, but union leaders probably will take a more independent'
and pragmatic stand, especially if the party fails to regain its position
as the only serious alternative to the Conservatives.
Neil Kinnock, the new chief of the Labor Party, is trying to project
a more moderate image on domestic issues, in part to avert a break
with the unions. His efforts have improved Labor's standing in the
polls, and this probably ensures that the relationship will continue for
the time being.
The chances of a split are remote, but in the unlikely event that it
occurs, the Labor Party would be seriously weakened. This would
ensure continuing rule by the Conservatives, or usher in a long period
of political uncertainty.
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