NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 29 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020095-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 95
• Publication Date: February 29, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
'rop-sVcrer
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
29 February 1984
TOP 39OFet
CPAS NID 84-049JX
29 February 1984
Copy 9 R 1;
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Contents
Lebanon-Syria: Impending Political Talks .............................. 2
Syria: Tensions in the Regime ................................................ 3
Oman-US: Anxiety About Relations ........................................ 4
East Germany-West Germany: Status of Relations .............. 5
USSR-Vietnam: TU-16 Badgers Equipped With Missiles ...... 6
USSR: Status of Jewish Emigration ........................................ 8
Sri Lanka: Terrorism and Communal Violence ...................... 9
USSR-Iran-Iraq: Soviet Concern ............................................ 10
Guatemala: Army Operations in the North ............................ 12
Costa Rica-Nicaragua: Strained Relations ............................ 12
West Germany: Extension of Territorial Waters .................... 13
Egypt-USSR: Possible Exchange of Ambassadors ................ 13
Special Analysis
Sudan: The Southern Insurgency ............................................ 14
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Impending Political Talks
Press reports state that Lebanese President Gemayel is expected
in Damascus today for talks aimed at ending the political deadlock,
but infighting among his domestic opponents could encourage
Gemayel to resist Syrian demands.
The US Embassy in Damascus reports that Foreign Minister
Khaddam told US officials that Syria will do everything it can to
advance the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon, provided
Gemayel "buries" the Lebanese-Israeli accord of 17 May. Khaddam
added that Syria prefers Gemayel to other candidates for the
presidency.
Comment: Gemayel thus far has balked at coming to terms with
Damascus, because he fears Syrian demands will go beyond
abrogation of the accord. He probably will delay officially announcing
its repudiation until Damascus agrees to rein in the Shias and Druze 25X1
who have been demanding his resignation.
Reports of squabbling among Gemayel's opponents may
strengthen his resolve to resist making major concessions to them.
Moreover, additional deterioration of relations between the Shias and
the Druze could threaten Syria's control over its Lebanese allies and
5
2
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jeopar daze
ability LV
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ver on KKh ha
am s promise.
A visit to Damascus by Gemayel probably would be a sign of his
intention to form a government of national unity and call for a return
to national reconciliation efforts in Geneva. Nevertheless, the
President is likely to tie progress on political reform to Syria's
willingness to offer guarantees for the Christian community. Gemayel 25X1
is anxious to soften the reaction of Christian hardliners who otherwise
might move against him or possibly assassinate him.25X1
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SYRIA: Tensions in the Regime
An open power struggle among President Assad's key lieutenants
poses no immediate threat to the Syrian leader, but it raises the
possibility of armed, clashes between opposing factions of the military
and security forces.
Security forces in Damascus now are on a high state of alert. US
Embassy officers reported that soldiers in full combat gear took up
positions on Monday in the capital where government offices and
residences of the regime's leaders are located. There was no
apparent trouble among rival security forces, however, and by
yesterday the troop presence was slightly reduced
Comment: There is no indication that any move has been
planned or taken against Assad. The heightened security in
Damascus may be related to concerns in the government that pro-
Arafat Palestinians or Syrian dissidents are planning terrorist
operations there in conjunction with Arafat's talks in Jordan
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OMAN-US: Anxiety About Relations
Senior Omani officials appear increasingly nervous about the
country's close military and political relationship with the US and
would be reluctant to agree to a greater US military presence.
the US Embassy says Oman
has recently toughened its position on maintenance arrangements for
Oman's chief foreign policy architect, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Alawi, repeatedly has expressed disappointment with aspects
of Oman's security relationship with the US. He also has stressed to
US officials that the US handling of the crisis in Lebanon and the
withdrawal of the Marines have raised strong doubts among Omanis
about the reliability of the US. Although pro-US and staunchly anti-
Communist, Alawi believes Oman should have more balanced
relations with the US and the USSR.
Comment: Muscat's actions and statements suggest that it would
deny a US request to move forces and additional supplies to Oman,
unless Iranian action against the Strait of Hormuz seemed imminent.
Over the longer run, Omani nationalists-who have an increasing
voice in foreign and military policy-are moving toward the position
of other moderates in the Persian Gulf, who prefer that US forces
remain over the horizon until needed.
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EAST GERMANY-WEST GERMANY: Status of Relations
East Berlin is making plain its interest in good relations with Bonn,
but with a caution that suggests uncertainty about Moscow's policy.
East Germany had slowed or suspended most bilateral
negotiations-including some that could have brought it economic
benefit-after Bonn confirmed its support for INF deployments last
In recent weeks, East Germany has allowed at least 50 people
who took refuge in Western diplomatic missions to emigrate,
accelerated release of emigration applicants, and resumed
dismantling automatic shooting devices on the border
At the same time, however, Western press reports state that East
Berlin has moved to restrict contacts between its citizens and
Westerners. The two sides also have not agreed on the release of
relatives of East German Premier Stoph who are in the West German
Embassy in Czechoslovakia. Bonn has declared an official news
blackout on the case.
The East Germans presumably are getting rid of malcontents by
encouraging emigration. The Kohl government will try to interpret it as
another conciliatory move, in order to show the voters that intra-
German relations have not suffered because of INF deployments.
Failure to resolve the case of Stoph's relatives, however, could hinder
the slow improvement in relations.
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USSR-VIETNAM: TU-16 Badgers Equipped With Missiles
USSR has equipped its naval
TU-16 Badger strike aircraft deployed in Vietnam with air-to-surface
The Badgers were sent to Cam Ranh last November, and five
strike, two tanker, one photoreconnaissance, and one ECM Badger
aircraft currently are there. These aircraft joined the pair of Bear D
naval reconnaissance and the two Bear F ASW aircraft that have been
stationed continuously in Vietnam since 1979-80.
Comment: Missile-equipped Badgers would give the Soviets their
first airborne antishipping capability from Vietnam. The maximum
range of Badger C's with two AS-5 antiship cruise missiles is about
1,200 nautical miles without refueling, enabling them to cover all of
the South China Sea and to reach US naval and air bases in the
Philippines.
The Badgers also provide a greater capability to support a Soviet
naval presence in the South China Sea and to conduct more intensive
reconnaissance of Chinese and Western naval forces there.
Last summer the Soviets began construction of what could be
missile storage buildings at Cam Ranh. There are six separately
secured quonset buildings and a large storage building at the airfield
that could serve for missile storage.
e field and ground support facilities and equipment
probably could support "f ll regiment of about 35 Badgers.
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Jewish Emigration from the USSR, 1970-83
Visas issued (thousands)
50
f t
0 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
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USSR: Status of Jewish Emigration
The plight of Soviet Jews has deteriorated in the past Year, with
little, prospect for improvement in the near term.
Only 1,300 Jews received emigration permission in 1983. This is
half the total for 1982 and the lowest number of departures in over a
decade. The Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, a "private"
group established in the USSR last April, has announced that
emigration has come to a "natural end" because all family
reunifications-the only justification allowed for emigration-have
been completed.
Oppression of activist refuseniks-those Jews whose requests to
emigrate have been denied-also continues. A prominent Ukrainian
refusenik was imprisoned last June for his involvement in an illegal
"university" that tutored Jewish students who had been expelled from
universities when their parents had applied for emigration. In addition,
refuseniks remain under pressure to avoid Western contacts.
Official propaganda also has been taking an increasingly anti-
Semitic tone. The Anti-Zionist Committee has led a crude campaign
that compares Zionists to Nazis and stresses the threat of subversion
by "foreign Zionist agents."
Comment: The committee's announcement provides semiofficial
confirmation that large-scale emigration has ended. The harsh anti-
Semitic content of its propaganda is a transparent effort to
discourage Jews from applying for permission to emigrate.
The new leadership might reverse this policy in a bid to improve
relations with the US, but there are less disruptive ways to achieve
such an objective. The Soviets, for example, could allow several well-
known dissidents to leave the country.
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of
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
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India
China
Bay
of
Bengal
Bay
of
Bengal
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SRI LANKA: Terrorism and Communal Violence
A resurgence of Tamil terrorist attacks threatens President
Jayewardene's attempts to resolve communal problems through
negotiation.
Terrorist incidents in the Tamil-dominated north within the past
week have caused the death of one Sinhalese soldier and one
terrorist, according to the US Embassy. Tamil separatists also have
robbed several banks since January, making off with more than
To avoid public outcry over the death of the soldier and to
forestall a repeat of the violence of last summer, the government-
censored press reported only that the soldier had been accidentally
shot during a search operation. Nonetheless, the Embassy reports
tensions in the capital are increasing as roving bands of Sinhalese
youths are threatening Tamils.
Comment: Jayewardene's all-party conference to resolve the
country's ethnic divisions has been disrupted by the walkout of a
dominant Sinhalese party and footdragging by minority
representatives After more than two months, the President's efforts
to continue the talks are seen by minority and opposition party
members as an attempt to create a forum for grievances rather than
to resolve communal problems.
Jayewardene is anxious to prevent a new outbreak of widespread
violence, which would damage the fragile economy and cast a shadow
over his projected visit to Washington in June. The all-party
conference, however, is unlikely to produce a reconciliation formula
acceptable both to the President's chauvinistic Sinhalese
constituency and to the Tamils.
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USSR-IRAN-IRAQ: Soviet Concern
The deputy chief of the Soviet party Central Committee's
International Department said in a television broadcast on Saturday
that the US is using the Iran-Iraq conflict as a pretext for increasing its
military presence in the region. Pravda repeated the charge on
Sunday, and the TASS report of the announced Iraqi bombing of
Khark Island on Monday said the US naval presence in the Persian
Gulf is growing.
Comment: Moscow is likely to be concerned that US actions to
keep open the Strait of Hormuz will increase US military power in the
region and could result in US operations on Iranian territory. The
Soviets may believe that any successful US military effort against Iran
could persuade Arab states to rely more heavily on the US to counter
the Iranian threat. They also may believe that such an effort would
help remove current Arab doubts about the reliability of the US as an
ally. Despite these expressions of concern, the Soviets have not
increased their naval forces in the area.
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Top Secret
Boundary orOn iv
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GUATEMALA: Army Operations in the North
The military is increasing its troop strength in the north and
accelerating operations there against a guerrilla stronghold 25X1
government forces, including an Army 25X1
task force established last month, have destroyed seven insurgent
camps in recent operations in the Peten region. The Army is
organizing a small, quick-reaction battalion and a river Datrol base for
ossible operations along the Mexican border.
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Comment: The 500 or so insurgents in the remote Peten region
have avoided substantial losses during the past two years because
the government has centered its counterinsurgency efforts in other
more hotly contested areas. The guerrillas recently have carried out
several attacks on economic targets and Army patrols, however, and
now apparently will face a determined government effort to pacify the
area. This military pressure is likely to prevent the insurgents from
launching an offensive any time soon.
COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA: Strained Relations
Costa Rica's recall of its Ambassador to Nicaragua after
Sandinista troops crossed the border and fired on poorly armed
Costa Rican security forces probably reflects strong public demands
for a vigorous response. The US Embassy in San Jose reports the
Costa Rican Security Council has decided to issue a protest note to
Managua and to reinforce the border with civil guard units instructed
to repel any attacks launched by the Sandinistas. In addition, a San
Jose official told the Embassy that several ministers have discussed
declaring the Nicaraguan Ambassador persona non grata. According
to press reports, Managua claims its soldiers were pursuing anti-
Sandinista insurgents taking refuge in Costa Rica.
Comment: The Sandinista incursion appears to have been
prompted by anti-Sandinista activity in the border area. To
underscore its neutrality, San Jose probably will institute a new
security crackdown against anti-Sandinista operations in the region.
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North
Se
e ririarK
COPENHAAGEN*
United
Kingdom
France
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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WEST GERMANY: Extension of Territorial Waters
A senior West German official believes Bonn has postponed a
decision on the territorial waters of Helgolander Bay to avoid a
serious dispute with the US during Chancellor Kohl's coming visit to
Washington. Last October Bonn extended its territorial limit in the
bay from 3 nautical miles to 16 nautical miles in an effort to prevent
oilspills from tanker accidents. Following US objections, however, the
West Germans decided to review the decision. The US argued that
the decision would create a precedent for other extensions that might
hamper the freedom of movement of Western naval forces and
merchant marines.
Comment: The postponement indicates the West Germans may
be leaning toward rejecting the US request. A decision paper
prepared in January for Kohl stated that a simple retraction of the
decision is out of the question because it would create a poor public
image. Nonetheless, the paper made clear that reaffirming the
decision probably would lead to a formal US legal protest and an
order that US ships not observe the extension.
EGYPT-USSR: Possible Exchange of Ambassadors
Recent comments by President Mubarak suggest he may agree
this spring to exchange ambassadors with the USSR. Relations were
downgraded to the Charge level in September 1981. Mubarak told a
visitor that he has the matter under consideration but that he
probably will not act for several months. Last week he noted to the US
Charge that it would be normal for Egypt to have full relations with
both superpowers and that an exchange of ambassadors would not
affect the content of its relationship with the USSR.
Comment: Mubarak has been close to resuming full relations
several times, but he has been dissuaded by such events as the
shootdown of the South Korean airliner. He may be considering the
move again, because he sees a reduction in US influence In the
Middle East and because he wants to strengthen Egypt's nonaligned
credentials before he assumes a more active role in any Arab-Israeli
peace process. With parliamentary elections scheduled for May,
Mubarak also probably hopes to reduce domestic criticism that he is
too subservient to the US.
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Recent Dissident Attacks
Boundary representation is
not neceaaerily, authoritative.
Central
African
Republic
0 150 Kilometers
0
Zaire
ADDIS
ABABA
Top Secret
Mortar at c Malakal
-r 5 ~{~ 23 FeYbruery _0 Regional Army H
Chevron base camp attacked ""Rub Kona f
2 February
4~'Adal Upper
Bat r al GhAzal
Passenger steamer attacked
13 February
Jonglei Canal
Canal workers
(under construction)
killed by land mine
French contractors
6 February
10 kidnaped
10 February
Bar
r'ana
Hayk
Ethtopla
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Special Analysis
SUDAN: The Southern Insurgency
Recent terrorist attacks have underscored the threat to President
Nimeiri's regime posed by the insurgency in the south. The dissidents
already have forced the suspension of key projects intended to
develop southern petroleum and water resources. The situation in the
region has stirred serious unrest in the military and could jeopardize
Nimeiri's hold on power. Only a political settlement between Khartoum
and the south is likely to end the unrest, but Nimeiri will have to show
more flexibility if one is to be achieved.
Southern troops who have deserted in opposition to the regime's
new policies toward the south are primarily responsible for the recent
surge in dissident attacks. Most of the largely Christian and animist
southerners have been incensed by Nimeiri's decisions last year to
divide the regional government, to reassign southern troops to the
north, and to impose Islamic law.
Nimeiri characterizes the unrest as a local problem that is being
exploited by hostile neighbors and that can be solved only with
foreign military assistance. The official media highlight Libyan and
Ethiopian plotting and play down developments in the south. Nimeiri's
recent agreement to hold talks with Ethiopia probably is an effort to
curtail a major source of assistance to dissidents.
The US Embassy reports that Nimeiri recently has appeared
withdrawn, a result both of illness and of depression over the
problems in the south and the other political and economic challenges
he faces. First Vice President Tayyib is handling much of the daily job
of running the government as well as dealing with southern politicians
Insurgent Capabilities
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Insurgent mortar attacks n Arm units have demonstrated
good grasp of military tactics.
The dissidents have not captured any major garrisons, but their
recent raids and kidnapings have demoralized the armed forces and
drawn attention to north-south problems. In late April, when the rainy
season begins to hamper the government's resupply efforts, the
insurgents are likely to increase their attacks on larger towns.
Pamphlets issued by southern rebel leaders have begun
appearing in Khartoum. In one of them, John Garang, a military
deserter who has become the most prominent dissident, demanded
that Nimeiri restore a unitary regional government, end "integration"
with Egypt, and terminate Islamic law.
Garang's groups recently sent an open letter to foreign firms
operating in the south. The letter declared the region a war zone and
warned against any development of resources for the benefit of the
north.
Nimeiri's Reconciliation Efforts
Nimeiri has shown little enthusiasm in pursuing a political
settlement. His strategy has been to undercut the rebels by co-opting
traditional southern politicians. In the past three months, he has
created a commission to reexamine the division of the south, released
several imprisoned southern leaders, and delivered a major speech
reassuring non-Muslims of their rights under Islamic law.
The President's efforts have shown few results. Southern
politicians complain that they have little direct access to Nimeiri and
are forced to negotiate with government officials who are even less
sensitive to their problems. Nimeiri recently told a US businessman
that he has received no reply to letters he had sent to insurgent
leaders through southern emissaries.
The government has responded to the seriousness of the current
situation by making new conciliatory gestures. Last week Tayyib met
with southern politicians, promising to pass their views to Nimeiri.
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The southerners presented a carefully coordinated list of
demands, including a general amnesty for dissidents and meetings
between Nimeiri and key rebel leaders. Nimeiri has pledged to
announce a new strate y for the south in a major Unity Day speech on
Saturday.
Outlook
The insurgency almost certainly will spread unless the
government makes greater efforts to negotiate a political settlement.
Sudan's close ally, Egypt, is reluctant to support a military campaign
in the south, and even rapprochement with Ethiopia would not
guarantee that all aid to the dissidents would be cut off. Any attempt
at a settlement would have to address such key southern concerns as
a unified regional government, removal of corrupt southern
governors, increased social services, cancellation of Islamic law, and
sharing of profits from development projects.
Some southern politicians in Khartoum recently expressed
optimism that an agreement can be reached as long as the dissidents
are making limited demands aimed at improving conditions in the
south. Nimeiri still is widely regarded as the only northern leader with
the stature to resolve problems between the two regions.
If the insurgents' military position becomes stronger, however,
their demands probably will become more radical. They might call for
Unless security in the south improves, the regime will continue to
suffer broad economic and political consequences. The success of
the dissidents in disrupting the operations of foreign firms in the south
is setting back economic development and could jeopardize foreign
aid. These economic factors, combined with the Army's frustration
about containing the insurgency, has increased the chance of a
military coup.
Nimeiri is a skilled political tactician, and he may manage to stay
in power. In any event, he and the military probably will blame the US
and Egypt for unwillingness to supply greater military support against
the dissidents. Tayyib, who is visiting the US this week, almost
certainly will ask for increased deliveries of US military equipment.
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