NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 27 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020087-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 87
• Publication Date: February 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
27 February 1984
CPAS WD 4-047JX
25X1
27 February 19984
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Top Secret
Contents
Iran-Iraq: Battle Continues Near Al Basrah ............................
3
China-US: Leaders Discuss US Policy ....................................
6
USSR-West Germany: Acquisition of Antiaircraft Gun ..........
8
Somalia: Military Concerns ......................................................
9
Taiwan: Premier's Health Worsens ........................................ 10
Panama: Opposition Candidate's Conditions ........................ 11
Colombia: Drug Control Efforts .............................................. 11
Special Analyses
Lebanon: Palestinians Try for a Comeback ............................ 12
Persian Gulf States: Air Defense Capabilities ........................ 15
Top Secret
27 February 1984
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Iran renewed its attack in the m
Al Qurnah yesterdav, and both sid
arsh east of Al Uzayr and
es stepped up airstrikes against
each other's cities.
The Iraqis are finding it difficult to drive the Iranians out of the
marsh
Although Iraqi forces are
confident they will be successful, they want to defeat the Iranians at
Al Basrah quick) because they expect a malor a
ttack near Mandali
within two days ~
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the Iranians are
15 to 20 kilometers inside Iraq northeast of Al Basrah, but they have
not been able to take the highway between Al Basrah and Al Amarah.
Both sides continue to mount air raids on urban populations. On
Saturday alone, the Iranians claimed they conducted airstrikes on
eight cities
Meanwhile, the US destroyer Lawrence yesterday fired warning
shots at an Iranian frigate, a P-3 reconnaissance aircraft, and a dhow
in the Strait of Hormuz when they failed to respond to warnings to
veer off.
Comment: The Iraqis probably have sufficient forces at Mandali
to counter an Iranian attack, unless it is far stronger than the assaults
of recent weeks. Iraq has not yet used its reserve forces and will
continue to hold them ready for the main Iranian offensive. The
increasing attacks on urban areas heighten the threat of Iraqi attacks
on Iranian economic targets in the Persian Gulf.
The Lawrence sustained no damage. It is unlikely the approaching
craft intended to inflict any.
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CHINA-US: Leaders Discuss US Policy
Chinese officials aired their concerns over US foreign policy in
frank and sometimes heated exchanges with a former senior US
officer last week.
The US Embassy in Beijing reports that party leader Deng
Xiaoping tied China's more independent stance in foreign policy to
what China views as a shift in US policy after 1980, primarily
concerning Taiwan and the Third World. Deng accused the US of
reviving the hardline "Dulles" doctrine and of abusing its power.
Premier Zhao said, however, that China now believes good
relations with the US have an "extremely important" strategic
significance. He added that he looked forward to stable relations but
complained that the US regards China as a junior partner. Zhao
expressed frustration that US domestic legal and political
considerations took precedence in solving problems with China.
The Premier expressed support for the US effort to "correct the
balance" in military power against the USSR. Zhao nonetheless called
for the US to relax tensions with the Soviets in Europe and to
conclude a disarmament agreement. Deng indicated that China
believes the Soviets under General Secretary Chernenko will be more
rigid and less able to make important decisions.
Comment: These comments reflect the ambivalence of Chinese
leaders about US policy. Nevertheless, they want to continue the
recent trend toward better ties as they prepare for President
Reagan's visit in April.
.The Chinese regard the US as a strategic counterweight to Soviet
military power, but they believe that some US policies alienate
opponents of the Soviets, especially in Europe and the Third World.
The Chinese also are concerned that what they view as the success of
the US in redressing the balance of power with the USSR may cause
the US increasingly to discount China's strategic contribution.
In addition, the Chinese are emphasizing their extreme sensitivity
to China's status in US-Chinese relations. They continue to express
the fundamental importance of the Taiwan issue.
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West German Gepard
Specifications
Top Secret
Combat weight 47,300 kg
Max speed (road) 65 km/h
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USSR-WEST GERMANY: Acquisition of Antiaircraft Gun
A West German Gepard self-Dr o elled antiaircraft gun has been
identified the Soviet artillery test range at
Donguz. Canvas-covered equipment with the configuration and
measurements of the Gepard was there as early as April 1982. The
Gepard has twin 35-mm cannons with a range of up to 4,000 meters
and advanced search and target-tracking radars. It was fielded in
1976.
Comment: The Soviets probably have exploited some of the
Gepard's features-particularly its advanced radar-for a successor
to their aging ZSU-23/4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun. An early
version of the new Soviet gun, reportedly with 30-mm cannons, was in
developmental testing in 1978. The Soviets may have obtained the
Gepard from a company involved in the manufacture of the system in
West Germany or possibly from a third country that may have bought
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SOMALIA: Military Concerns
President Siad and his senior advisers are increasingly concerned
about declining morale and discipline in the Army
The problems-highlighted by the
recent mutiny o a frontline unit-reportedly stem from inadequate
logistic support, severe equipment shortages, and the Army's failure
to rotate troops from frontline positions.
troop morale is so poor that commanders would be unable to rally
their units to engage any formidable Ethiopian force. Siad, in a recent
meeting with the US Ambassador, criticized the current level, of US
economic and military support and requested additional aid.
Comment: The current military deficiencies are largely
attributable to assigning higher priority to obtaining new weapons
rather than seeking to improve training, maintenance, and logistics.
Siad will intensify his complaints in order to try to obtain heavy
weapons from the US. He also may see his recent flirtation with the
USSR as a way of prodding the US. Moscow's commitment to
Ethiopia and Soviet antipathy toward Siad, however, leave him little
room to maneuver
Top Secret
9 21 February
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TAIWAN: Premier's Health Worsens
The ruling Kuomintang is likely to groom another successor to
President Chiang following a relapse in the health of Premier Sun
Yun-hsuan. The Premier, a leading Kuomintang moderate, underwent
surgery yesterday for cerebral hemorrhage. Sun, 70, suffered a heart
Comment: Sun's chances for a full recovery are small. Sun has
not been viewed as a strong leader, and even if he survives and
returns to work, the Kuomintang probably will seek a potential
successor with better health and greater political skills to head the
post-Chiang collective leadership. Vice-presidential nominee Li Teng-
hui, 61 and a popular Taiwanese moderate, probably will gain
increased influence, although he is unlikely to become Chiang's heir 25X1
apparent.
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PANAMA: Opposition Candidate's Conditions
Defense Forces Commander Noriega apparently has failed to
reach an accommodation with opposition presidential candidate
Arias, who used a recent meeting with Noriega to spell out his attitude
toward the military if he is elected.
the 82-year-old former President informed
Noriega that he would be allowed to remain as head of the military.
Arias indicated he would not seek to remove senior officers on his
own, but he said police investigatory functions would have to be
returned to civilian control and the law changed to underscore the
president's role as commander in chief. Arias also indicated that the
lavish lifestyles of some senior military officers would not be tolerated.
Comment: Arias's apparent dictation of terms to Noriega will only
reinforce the military's desire to prevent Arias from becoming
president again. Although Noriega ostensibly will move ahead with
plans to hold the election in May, he also probably will be looking for
ways either to postpone it or rig the results. If Arias were to win,
Noriega would be likely to take preemptive measures against him
before he took office in October.
COLOMBIA: Drug Control Efforts
The director of the Colombian National Police recently told US
Embassy officials that Bogota plans to investigate the effectiveness of
a herbicide spray campaign against marijuana and coca plants. The
Embassy believes the effort could start as early as late March. Small-
scale tests in preparation for actual spraying took place last week in
an isolated area outside Bogota. In 1983 Colombia produced an
estimated 13,500 metric tons of marijuana and enough coca to supply
20 percent of the cocaine consumed in the US.
Comment: Last fall Colombian officials visited Mexico to study a
similar eradication program that has been effective against opium
poppy, and, to a lesser extent, against marijuana. Bogota's
willingness to pursue such a course suggests a marked departure
from its earlier ambivalent attitudes toward curbing production of
marijuana and coca. Implementation of a test program, however,
would be a controversial step for the government. It probably will not
be launched until after the midterm departmental and municipal
elections next month, in order to avoid creating a major campaign
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Palestinian Presence in Lebanon
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27 February 1984
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: Palestinians Try for a Comeback
Top Secret
Palestinian forces representing most factions are moving back into
Lebanon and taking part in the fighting against the government. The
Druze, Shias, and Israelis are trying with some success to constrain
the ability of the Palestinians to set up an independent operation in
Lebanon. Nevertheless, the Palestinian presence in Beirut and in the
Shuf probably will increase, creating frictions with Druze and Shia
forces in the area.
A return to Lebanon is a primary objective of both the Syrian-
backed Palestinian rebels and those who remain loyal to PLO chief
Arafat. Both groups believe that the chaos in Lebanon eventually will
permit them to recreate an independent base of operations there.
Arafat's supporters are eager to reestablish themselves in a state
bordering Israel, while the rebels believe that having an enclave
outside Syrian-occupied territory will give them some independence
from Damascus. All PLO factions want to regain control of the refugee
camps in Beirut, in order to protect Palestinians in them from possible
attacks by Christians, Shias, or Druze.
The Palestinian Presence
There may be up to several thousand Palestinian fighters in the
Shuf, the Matn region, and in Beirut. Most of them belong to the pro-
Syrian rebel factions, but some are still loyal to Arafat.
An additional 3,000 to 4,000 Palestinian fighters are still around
Tripoli and in the Bekaa Valley. They will continue to try to infiltrate
into Beirut and the Shuf.
Those loyal to Arafat will have the most difficulty because they
cannot move freely through Syrian-controlled territory. The loyalists
may be able to augment their numbers, however, by recruiting from
the largely pro-Arafat Palestinian refugee population in the region. At
least 50,000 civilian Palestinians evidently reside in Beirut itself.
Palestinian fighters began returning to the Beirut area and to the
Shuf during the fighting last September, joining several hundred who
remained in Beirut after the evacuation of 1982. Other Palestinian
positions extend from Ad Damur to Al Muruj in the northern Main.
Organized PLO forces so far have not been detected south of the
Ad Damur area.
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A large number of the Palestinian forces belong to the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-the two PLO organizations that 25X1
remained essentially neutral during the conflict last year
The pro-Syrian groups apparently lack a unified leadership and
are prone to squabbling. They have fought alongside both the Shias
and the Druze in the Shuf. On the other hand, Arafat's backers who
have returned to the Beirut area have stayed out of the fighting and
are trying to rebuild their organizational structure in West Beirut.
Restraints on the Palestinians
There is little chance the Palestinians will regain the degree of
independence they enjoyed during the 1970s. The Druze, the Shias,
and the Israelis all have an interest in preventing a Palestinian
resurgence in Lebanon, and they will constrain the Palestinians'
numbers and activities.
The Druze and the Shias accept Palestinian assistance in the
fighting, but they insist on keeping the upper hand in their area of
control. Druze leader Junblatt and Shia leader Bard have issued
orders prohibiting further Palestinian infiltration into West Beirut.
Their efforts have prevented large units from moving in, although
small groups continue to make their way into the city.
Israel is determined to block the return of PLO forces south of the
Damur River. Tel Aviv has made it clear to the Druze that its
willingness to allow them freedom of action depends on their ability to
Recent airstrikes in the areas of Hammana, Bhamdun, and
Ad Damur, where Palestinian forces are located, were intended to
drive home the message. The Israelis probably would not move into
Beirut to combat the Palestinians, but they will continue the airstrikes
and patrols they have been conducting in the Shuf.
Syria has an interest in allowing some pro-Syrian Palestinians to
move into the Beirut area. It wants to prevent pro-Arafat Palestinians
from reestablishing a presence there, as well as to keep the Shia and
Druze forces from becoming too independent of Syrian control.
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At the same time, Damascus does not want to see the PLO
groups establish their own area of control outside Syrian-occupied
territory. It will follow its customary practice of playing off the various
groups against one another.
Prospects for Conflict
If the contradictory goals of the Shia and the Druze eventually
bring them into conflict, the presence of the PLO groups will make the
situation even more volatile. The Palestinians may seek to ally
themselves with West Beirut's Sunni population, which resents Shia
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Iraq
Persian Gulf Desalination Plants and Oil Installations
Top Secret
b
uwait dRdab UWAIT
sn
taybah
Iran
D
Jazireh-ye
ter. Khark
(Khark Island)
PERSIAN
Jubayl
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Ras Tanura
Bahrain
MAMA
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Saudi Arabia
U nli-t e
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Ila
Number of desalination plants with a
capacity over one million gallons/day
Tanker terminal
Refinery
Crude oil pipeline
Pump station
Oilfield
0 80
Nautical Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Ra's aI Khaymah
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Strait of
Hormuz
Ash Shariga 04 Admin.
nuhavv Line
0 ABU DHABI,:!:~
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Special Analysis
PERSIAN GULF STATES: Air Defense Capabilities
Iran has announced that, if its oil exports are disrupted, it will
retaliate against countries on the Arabian Peninsula that are
supporting Iraq. Now that a major Iranian offensive seems imminent,
Iraq is more likely to send its aircraft against Iranian oil facilities and
shipping at Khark Island. If Iran retaliates with airstrikes against its
neighbors on the Persian Gulf, their air defenses would be unable to
prevent some strike aircraft from reaching important targets.
Iran demonstrated an ability to hit targets in the Gulf by attacking
Iraqi offshore oil-loading terminals in November 1980 and Kuwaiti oil
facilities in October 1981. Although Tehran's air capabilities have
diminished since then, Iran still has 85 operational fighter aircraft
available for limited strikes across the Gulf.
Oil facilities and water desalination plants in all the Gulf countries
are highly vulnerable and could be crippled by an airstrike if it were
well executed. Kuwait's oil export facilities are concentrated and are
particularly susceptible to disruption. Saudi officials have indicated
they are most concerned about attacks on desalination plants,
probably because of the lack of alternative sources of water for
domestic use.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
Saudi Arabia has the largest and best-equipped air force of any
Gulf state, but it could not react to an Iranian attack quickly enough to
fend it off. Even with warning from US AWACS monitoring the Persian
Gulf, the Saudis would have no more than 15 minutes to respond to 25X1
aircraft approaching from Iran.
The Saudis raised the alert status of some F-15 fighter aircraft at
Dhahran on 18 February, according to the US defense attache in
Jidda. Nevertheless, few air defense units are available for immediate
use. During the day, two F-15 fighter aircraft are on five-minute
ground alert, two F-5 fighters are on 15-minute alert, and one I-HAWK
surface-to-air missile battery is on 10-minute alert.
Iranian aircraft probably could stage a surprise attack with
minimal losses. Subsequent Iranian airstrikes, however, would be
likely to suffer much higher losses.
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Persian Gulf Air Defense
wait
* KUWAIT
Jazireh-ye
Kherk
(Khark Island)
ushehc
Has Tanura Persian
Dhahran
"MANAMA Gulf
Hawker Hunter
DOHA
Sabkhataa
r3 Selamryah
" 41
5 Mh ge-III/5
HAWK battery
100 Kilometers Boundary representation is
y represen
00Mile s not necessarily authoritative.
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The Saudis could sustain a high state of readiness for their SAM
batteries and fighter aircraft for about a week. After that, fatigue of
personnel and attrition of equipment would begin to decrease their
effectiveness.
Kuwait has less capability than Saudi Arabia to defend against an
Iranian airstrike. Moreover, it is an even more likely target than Saudi
Arabia. Iran has attacked Kuwait before without provoking much
international reaction.
In addition, Kuwait would have less warning of an attack than
Saudi Arabia. It probably would not be able to scramble its fighters in
time to intercept, even if they were on alert.
Even if the Kuwaitis were to have time to engage Iranian aircraft
with their I-HAWKS, inadequate equipment maintenance as well as
poorly trained and motivated personnel would seriously hamper the
effort. The Iranians' airstrike on Kuwait in 1981 demonstrated that
they can inflict major damage on Kuwaiti oil facilities with little
interference from air defense forces.
Other States
Oman is more distant from Iranian airbases, and its air defenses
would have more time to react to an approaching attack than would
those of the other Persian Gulf states. The Omani Air Force, which is
made up largely of British pilots, probably is the most capable in the
region.
The United Arab Emirates does not have the command and
control capability to respond effectively to a surprise attack. Qatar
and Bahrain have virtually no air defenses, and they would have to
rely on the Saudis or US warships in the area.
Lack of cooperation among the Gulf states hampers coordinated
air'defense efforts, although the Gulf Cooperation Council is trying to
encourage such coordination. This winter Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
held their first combined air exercises, as did Oman and the UAE.
Nonetheless, the Gulf states have not yet established a combined
command structure or channels for sharing targeting information that
could shorten their reaction time in an emergency.
Implications for the US
Iranian air attacks probably would cause only a minor disruption
in oil supplies, such as the loss of 2 million to 3 million barrels per day
of Saudi and Kuwaiti exports for a few days or weeks. Losses such as
these easily could be offset by commercial inventories, floating
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storage, and surplus productive capacity. Price increases on the spot
market caused by a limited disruption probably would be temporary.
A more substantial disruption, such as a drop in exports from
Persian Gulf states of 5 million barrels per day over several months,
would have a more serious impact on prices. Such a disruption could
occur in the unlikely event that Iranian attacks caused severe damage
to export facilities in both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
An Iranian airstrike against one of the Gulf states would produce
varying reactions, ranging from appeasement of Iran to requests for
US military intervention, depending on the country and installations
attacked and the number and intensity of the attacks. Each of the Gulf
states-with the possible exception of Kuwait-probably would grant
US forces access to their military installations following a major
Iranian attack.
The Saudis might first launch retaliatory airstrikes against Iranian
installations along the Persian Gulf. During the last few months, the
Saudi Air Force has been training for such a contingency.
US civilian contract personnel provide essential equipment
maintenance for HAWK missile sites in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In
the event of hostilities, they would be likely to leave the sites.
US forces in the area include five warships stationed in the
Persian Gulf, US AWACS and advisers in Saudi Arabia, and a carrier
battle group in the Arabian Sea. The warships can provide limited
point air defense and can supplement the radar coverage provided by
the AWACS.
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Tog) Secret
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