NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 16 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020055-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: February 16, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top b____.
Central
Thursday
16 February 1984
TOIJ 9400 t
CPAS NID 84-039JX
February
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National Intelligence Daily
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Contents
Special Analysis
Ell Salvador: Labor's Role in the Election .......
4
USSR-US: Nonproliferation Talks ....................
5
UK-Iran: Improving Relations . ... ..... ....... ... ..
6
Argentina: Labor Unrest ... ........ .....
7
Poland: Little Progress on Rescheduling
8
Iran-Iraq: Iranian Airstrikes .... .
9
USSR-Western Europe: Chernenko Holds Court
9
Sudan: Dissident Attack ...............
10
Philippines: Developments in Election Boycott
10
Japan-USSR: Foreign Ministers' Meeting .. .......
11
USSR-Czechoslovakia: SS-12/22 Equipment Identified
Taiwan: Kuomintang's Political Ticket
12
Peru: Threats to Civilian Rule 14
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EL SALVADOR: Labor's Role in the Election
The democratic labor front has agreed to su ort Chri i n
Democratic residential candidate
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In return for support for Duarte, the Christian Democrats have
agreed to allow officials of the Popular Democratic Unity-the largest
labor confederation-to nominate candidates for key labor and
economic posts if Duarte wins. 25X1
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Comment: The democratic labor front did not officially endorse
any candidate in the election in 1982, and its open support for Duarte
probably will strengthen his candidacy among urban and rural
workers. It also may undermine insurgent efforts to use labor to
oppose the election. At the same time, the rightist parties are likely
to accuse the Christian Democrats of selling out to the left.
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USSR-US: Nonproliferation Talks
Soviet-US talks on nonproliferation issues beginning today in
Vienna are likely to reinforce previous cooperation on safeguards and
export controls, but differences may emerge on preparations for the
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1985.
Moscow is taking a business-as-usual approach and has agreed
to the US request to hold the talks at the US Embassy in Vienna. The
Soviets have prepared a paper on ways to improve nuclear
safeguards, but it does not address the long-term problem of
financing the IAEA safeguards budget.
The Soviets generally agree with US positions on nuclear trade
issues. On the other hand, they have rejected a US request that they
insist on safeguards to cover India's entire nuclear program as a
precondition to a possible sale by the USSR of two nuclear power
reactors.
In preparing for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,
the Soviet representative to the IAEA has suggested that the IAEA
safeguards system be studied as a model for arms control
verification. He says the IAEA also could play some role in creating a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Europe.
Comment: Issues relating to safeguards and export controls are
not likely to be contentious because both sides want to tighten the
regulation of nuclear trade. The Soviets will support US resistance to
proposals within the IAEA to persuade the countries with nuclear
weapons to bear more of the burden in financing the safeguards
budget.
Soviet proposals to draw on the IAEA system in the arms control
area may be designed to encourage US opposition and make
Washington appear to be obstructionist. Whether or not the Soviets
raise these proposals at the current meeting, they will work to shift the
blame to the US for the lack of progress on arms control as the
Review Conference approaches.
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UK-IRAN: Improving Relations
The UK's official decision to approve military deliveries to Iran
suggests a strategy of using economic ties to increase political
leverage with Tehran.
The British had decided last month to turn over to the Iranians a
naval fleet tender embargoed since the hostage crisis. According to a
senior official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the UK also
has decided to deliver later this year two unarmed naval support ships
and to continue to sell Iran electrical and communications equipment
and spare parts for armored vehicles.
London contends that the deliveries will fulfill contracts signed as
early as 1977. The British claim that, in following through with the
agreements, they will be helping to keep open a channel of
communication with the Iranian leadership. The UK reportedly has
assured the US that it will sell only "nonlethal" military items to Iran
and that the equipment will not increase Tehran's ability to wage war.
Comment: The British decision almost certainly is in part an
attempt to improve London's chances for mediating the war with Iraq.
It probably reflects genuine concern about a possible escalation of
the conflict.
In addition, London is likely to view Iran as an important potential
market. British merchandise exports to Iran last year amounted to
nearly $1 billion, and they almost certainly will be higher this year.
Although the UK has tried to put the best light on its sales of military
and military-related equipment, Iran will be able to use the materials
in the war.
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Peronists have blocked President Alfonsin's proposals in
Congress for the reform of labor unions, and his reluctance to
compromise increases the potential for conflicts with labor in the next
several weeks.
The government is seeking new union elections, minority
representation in leadership councils, and tighter controls over huge
welfare funds in order to break Peronism's longtime hold on labor. A
Peronist-Conservative alliance in the Senate has stalled legislation on
the reforms. The Conservatives joined forces with the Peronists out of
fear that extreme leftists would use the reforms to gain influence with
labor.
In addition, two rival factions of the Peronist-dominated union
movement have agreed to work together and are organizing
opposition sentiment among workers. Several unions have called
strikes, and last weekend about 10,000 workers demonstrated in
Buenos Aires.
Alfonsin has countered by decreeing several wage increases and
by introducing other measures aimed at improving workers' living
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standards.
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In addition, the President is taking a tough stand against strikers,
declaring one walkout illegal and threatening to have union leaders
arrested. talks with Peronist legislators
are deadlocked because Alfonsin is unwilling to back away from
elections.
Comment: Alfonsin will continue to negotiate with the Peronists,
but new union elections are essential to his plans to curb the unions'
opposition to future reforms. His ability to prevent gradually
increasing protests also will be tied to economic performance.
Workers will be returning from summer vacations later this month,
and Peronists will increase their calls for protests if Alfonsin cannot
further reduce inflation or grant additional wage hikes.
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POLAND: Little Progress on Rescheduling
Polish negotiations with the Paris Club of Western creaitor
governments are still stalled, and talks with international banks are at
an early stage.
Since November, the Club has refused to start talks on further
debt relief unless the Poles make payments that are overdue from
1981, and Warsaw refuses to make any such payments without new
credits. The US Embassy in Paris reports that the Poles did not attend
the meeting of the Club on 6 February, at which the West Germans
proposed a rescheduling package covering obligations for 1982
through 1984 contingent on payment of arrears from 1981. Although
most Club members endorsed the proposal, US objections led to a
delay until early next month.
At two meetings with bank creditors last month, the banks could
not agree among themselves.
The deputy chairman of the Polish planning commission has
publicly argued that, because the West caused the debt crisis, Poland
is entitled to concessionary rescheduling agreements putting off
payments into the next decade. The chairman of the Polish foreign
trade bank, however, has defended earlier rescheduling agreements
and has argued that a moratorium would postpone the crisis until the
next generation and preclude negotiations with the IMF.
Comment: West European governments are increasingly willing
to offer generous rescheduling packages in hopes of resuming
negotiations and receiving payments. Warsaw, however, still does not
see any benefit in accepting even these improved terms. Agreement
with the banks, on the other hand, could come soon because their
terms are not far from Poland's earlier requests.
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Tog) Secret
Iranian Airstrikes, 15 February 1984
Turkey
Estimated Operational Iraqi and Iranian
Combat Aircraft
Aircraft
Operational
Aircraft
Operational
MIG-25
15
F-14
15
MIG-23
75
F-4
35
MIG-21
130
F-5
35
F 1
35
SU 7/20/22
90
TU 22/16
15
Ba'qubah
Iraq`
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Al 'Amaraln'
Iran
16 February 1984
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Iranian aircraft raided the Iraqi towns of Ba'qubah, Al Kut, and
Al Amarah on Wednesday in retaliation for air attacks on Iranian cities
by Iraq on Tuesday, according to military communiques from both
sides. Two Iranian fighter aircraft were involved in each of the three
attacks, and Baghdad says about 70 Iraqi civilians were killed or
injured. Baghdad's announcement that the raid on Ba'qubah would
not affect its unilateral one-week cessation of attacks on Iranian
urban areas was made before the attacks on Al Kut and Al Amarah.
Comment: Ba'qubah, Al Amarah, and Al Kut are only a few
minutes' flight time from the Iranian border, and they are easy targets.
Although such air attacks have little impact on the military situation,
they provide useful propaganda for Tehran. If Iran continues the
airstrikes, it almost certainly will provoke Iraq into revoking its cease-
fire. Iraq has a 4-to-1 advantage in operational fighter aircraft and is
able to penetrate Iran's poor air defenses.
General Secretary Chernenko and other Soviet officials are being
careful to convey an impression of cordiality and reasonableness in
their talks with West European leaders. Chancellor Kohl has told the
press that his talks with Chernenko on Tuesday were free of
recrimination and enlivened by humor. Prime Minister Thatcher says
Chernenko agrees that East-West relations have to be improved, and
TASS describes the meetings of Soviet leaders with Italy's President
and Foreign Minister as promoting better bilateral ties. French Prime
Minister Mauroy has told reporters that Chernenko's approach in
their discussion of East-West relations constitutes "a slight overture."
Comment: The Soviets have not retaliated politically against INF
basing countries, as they warned they would before deployments
began. Their efforts to encourage West Europeans to oppose US and
NATO policies are unlikely to diminish under Chernenko.
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Sudanese rebels reportedly inflicted heavy casualties during an
attack on Tuesday on a Nile River passenger steamer pushing three
barges carrying passengers and three loaded with gasoline. The
steamer reached port at Adok and its survivors were airlifted to
Malakal, but all the barges were cast adrift. As many as 1,000
passengers were involved, but the Sudanese military is reluctant to
undertake a rescue mission. The US Embassy reports Khartoum
intends to protest what it believes were Ethiopian transport aircraft
supporting dissidents along the Jonglei Canal last weekend.
Comment: The attack probably was conducted by the groups
that recently have raided camps operated by Chevron and the French
company that is building the canal. This action, coupled with attacks
last week against road traffic, appears to be part of a rebel effort to
isolate the south by threatening main transportation arteries at the
onset of the rainy season, when air operations are difficult. Khartoum
probably is mistaken about the presence of Ethiopian transport
aircraft.
PHILIPPINES: Developments in Election Boycott
The four prominent opposition leaders who announced their
decision yesterday to boycott the National Assembly elections in May
include Benigno Aquino's brother and former President Macapagal.
The 12-party opposition coalition, UNIDO, has not yet reached a
decision on the boycott, but it is leaning toward taking part in the
election. Aquino's widow plans to issue a
statement today endorsing participation. The public reportedly
generally favors participation in the elections.
Comment: The four leaders promoting the boycott are affiliated
with groups that have been penetrated by leftists, and they have
consistently taken a firm line demanding political reform. Their
prominence will make it more difficult for UNIDO to participate
without appearing to have sold out to the regime. President Marcos
presumably is encouraged by the continued split in the opposition
over the boycott. If Mrs. Aquino issues her statement, Marcos is likely
to remain confident that there will be sufficient participation by the
opposition to make the elections credible.
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JAPAN-USSR: Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The Kyodo news service reports that Japan and the USSR have
agreed to hold high-level talks in Moscow on 12 and 13 March. The
agreement was announced at the end of a meeting yesterday between
Foreign Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Gromyko, one of a number
of such meetings held in Moscow following Andropov's funeral. Abe
says that the meeting was friendly. The two men made no progress,
however, on the question of a visit by Gromyko to Japan or on any of
the important issues dividing the two countries.
Comment: The new high-level talks presumably are the ones on
which the two sides had agreed in principle in January. If so, Abe and
Gromyko have merely set the date for the discussions, which will
involve Deputy Foreign Ministers Nakajima and Kapitsa.
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Sweden
Note: The SS 12/22 brigade at Yemil'chino
recently has expanded from 12 to 18
launchers; the others may undergo
similar augmentation.
Soviet Union
Simferopol'
Cyprus= ,
Syria The fitedStaesOo,e.nm.nthSnot..o.a.i.ed
the ineorPOretion of Estonia, Latvia, end Ldhaeni..__
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USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SS-12/22 Equipment Identified
Comment: These are the first sightings of such vehicles, which
routinely are used by the Strategic Rocket Forces outside the USSR.
They have never been associated with other Soviet "operational-
tactical" missiles, such as the Scud or the SS-23, which has not yet
been fielded. Hranice presumably is a garrison for one of the Soviet
SS-12/22 brigades that are being stationed in Eastern Europe. At
least portions of two of the three SS-12/22 brigades that are absent
from their garrisons in the western USSR probably are now in Eastern
Europe as part of the USSR's declared response to INF deployments.
TAIWAN: Kuomintang's Political Ticket
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Taiwanese press reports state that the Kuomintang yesterday
nominated President Chiang Ching-kuo for another term. It also
selected Governor Lee Teng-hui, a popular Taiwanese politician, to
replace the ailing Vice President. Their formal election next month is
certain, because the Kuomintang controls Taiwan's electoral college.
Other possible high-level changes, including the new membership of
the key Central Standing Committee, have not yet been announced. 25X1
Comment: Lee's selection is intended to underscore Chiang's
continuing commitment to giving the Taiwanese a larger role in the
ruling party. The 61-year-old Lee would assume the presidency if
Chiang died, unless the mainlander leadership revises the succession
process to maintain its dominance. Lee, who has ties to Premier Sun,
will strengthen the voice of the party's moderate wing. Nevertheless,
Chiang may have had to make concessions to mainlander
conservatives, who fear the growing influence of the Taiwanese.
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~-" ` Apurimac)
Ayacucho\
'
8-ochry repre nnt.t,.n s
not o-e-dy aulhodte - Chile
Bolivia
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Special Analysis
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A deteriorating economy, persistent insurgency, and major
election setbacks have badly eroded President Belaunde's base of
support. The military believes the President has not acted decisively in
addressing these problems, and it is displeased over restrictions it
asserts he has placed on the counterinsurgency effort. Unless
Belaunde deals with these challenges more effectively in the months
ahead, there is about an even chance the military will intervene.
The economic decline is at the root of many of Belaunde's
difficulties. Weather disasters last year aggravated the stagnation by
destroying infrastructure facilities, causing food shortages,
contributing to inflation, and reducing export earnings.
Economic problems this year have prompted more frequent
strikes, consumer protests, and civil disorder. Late last month the
level of violence caused the government to raise publicly the
possibility of declaring a state of emergency.
A new tentative agreement with the IMF probably will provide
some temporary help. The submission on 3 February of a mutually
acceptable letter of intent for a $267 million standby loan program is
likely to facilitate negotiations with foreign bankers on debt
rescheduling and on new loans totaling some $1.6 billion this year.
The US Embassy notes, however, that the IMF program could easily
come apart because of unusually tough performance targets, labor's
rejection of austerity, the tendency to spend during an election year,
and the military's insistence on continued equipment purchases.
The Insurgency
The Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist insurgent group numbering
about 2,000, is not currently a direct threat to the government's hold
on power. Nevertheless, its resilience in the face of a yearlong push by
the armed forces has badly damaged Belaunde's popular image and 25X1
his relations with the military.
The security forces, however, have managed to reduce the
insurgents' ability to carry out acts of terrorism in Lima. They also
prevented the guerrillas from disrupting national municipal elections
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last November in all areas except some provinces in and around
Ayacucho Department, the groups' stronghold that the government
has designated the Emergency Zone.
The government's efforts probably have not seriously damaged
the insurgents' leadership structure, terrorist capabilities, or
popularity in the Emergency Zone. In addition, a recent military
assessment suggests guerrilla recruitment is outpacing losses.
Loss of Popularity
These difficulties have contributed to Belaunde's decline in
opinion polls from an approval rating of 60 percent in 1980 to
18 percent last August. This has resulted in factionalism in his party
and caused another party in his governing coalition to put some
distance between itself and the administration. Consequently, the
President's ability to work with the Congress has been undermined. 25X1
Opposition political forces capitalized on public discontent to turn
the municipal elections into a referendum on Belaunde. His party
suffered record losses and captured only 15 percent of the vote, while
the major opposition party, the center-left American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance, won 38 percent. To the military's alarm, the
Marxist United Left coalition won more than 30 percent of the vote
and gained control of the mayor's office in Lima.
Military Attitudes
The Embassy reported three months ago that the military was not
inclined to seize power, because it was still discredited by its last
period in office-1968-80-and because it did not want to assume
responsibility for the economy. Nevertheless, the military's
dissatisfaction with the Belaunde administration is growing.
Senior commanders charge that the President has not delivered
on promises of economic aid to address the socioeconomic roots of
insurgency in the Emergency Zone. They also complain that he has
not granted the armed forces enough autonomy in combating the
guerrillas. They want the terrorists to be prosecuted in military courts
and to have the police withdrawn from counterguerrilla operations.
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The President's Prospects
Belaunde still has some advantages. For example, opinion polls
confirm that the public continues to prefer civilian over military rule.
Moreover, opposition parties do not want to jeopardize expected
election victories next year by completely discrediting Belaunde and
thereby increasing the chances of a military coup. Although the
military blames the President for lack of success against the
guerrillas, it is generally pleased with his, support on arms
procurement and other military matters.
These factors are overshadowed, however, by Belaunde's limited
room for maneuver on the economic, military, and political fronts. The
IMF agreement will tie his hands in several ways and may force him to
cut back planned military purchases.
In addition, granting the armed forces greater latitude in
combating the Sendero Luminoso is not likely to produce quick
results and could cause increased abuses of human rights. As a
result, Belaunde's chances of reversing his declining fortunes are
likely to be only about even.
The President's best hope may lie in a strategy of short-term
maneuvers-cabinet changes, removing some police from the
Emergency Zone, and pledging developmental aid for Ayacucho
Department-aimed at fending off the armed forces until next fall. If
at that time non-Marxist candidates gain a strong lead in the
presidential election campaign as expected, the military's attention
probably would shift away from Belaunde and toward the election in
March.
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