NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 14 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: February 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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EiIGE
Director of Top Sec. e
Central
Intelligence
pia#ionai Intelligence Daily
7wri o
CPAS NID 844)87JX
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Copy .) Q C
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Top Secret
Contents
USSR: Chernenko's Speech
Syria-Lebanon: Support for Shia Leader
Iraq-Iran: Military Action
Syria: SS-21 Deployment
Egypt-Libya: Diplomatic Contacts
USSR-Syria: MI-17 Helicopter Shipments
Philippines: Boycott Deadline Runs Out
Panama: President Resigns
Nicaragua: Church-State Tensions Ease
Cuba: New Airfield
Norway-USSR: Alleged KGB Officer Expelled
Special Analyses
El Salvador: The Election Campaign
Iran: Economic Stagnation .
9
12
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Top Secret
USSR: Chernenko's Speech
Konstantin Chernenko's first speech as party General Secretary at
the party plenum yesterday followed the basic domestic and foreign
policy lines set forth under Andropov, but it suggests he is receptive to
resuming a dialogue with the US.
Chernenko said Moscow would insist on preserving the existing
military balance, and he added that the defense sector would be given
enough support to cool "imperialist hotheads." Chernenko also
pledged, however, to seek a peaceful settlement of disputed issues
through "serious and constructive" arms talks.
On domestic policy, Chernenko reaffirmed Andropov's policy of
increasing labor discipline while giving more attention to consumer
needs. In endorsing steps taken under Andropov to improve
economic management, he cautioned party officials against petty
interference with the work of economic managers in the government
bureaucracy. He also underscored the importance of regional party
officials for carrying out policy.
Comment: Chernenko's pledge of fidelity to the policies initiated
under Andropov may reflect the price he paid to gain support within
the Politburo for his candidacy. Nevertheless, he did not attribute
current international tensions exclusively to US policy-as had
become commonplace in Andropov's last months. This suggests a
decision in the Politburo to lower the level of vituperation.
The new General Secretary's remarks on domestic policy appear
designed to reassure members of the elite who felt threatened by
Andropov's anticorruption campaign, particularly the regional party
first secretaries, whose contributions he praised in his speech.
Chernenko's statements suggest, however, that like Andropov he is
determined to get managers to assume greater responsibility in
carrying out changes in the economic system.
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Support for Shia Leader
Syria is supporting the efforts of Shia Ama/ chief Barri to control
West and south Beirut.
The security situation was fairly calm in Beirut yesterday, as
Barri's forces continued to consolidate their control over West Beirut.
Comment: Damascus is concerned that Iranian activities in
Lebanon and growing Shia radicalism could eventually threaten
Syrian interests. Syria is now backing Bard in order to block the
growth of radical Shia and Iranian influence and to prevent factional
bickering from destroying opposition gains in West Beirut. The
Syrians receive vital economic support from Tehran, however. and
they are unlikely to crack down directly on Iranian activities.
Syria may believe that Junblatt is inflexible in demanding
President Gemayel's resignation and will not consider any proposals
from the latter, including abrogation of the accord of 17 May. Barri,
on the other hand, has contacts with all other major parties in the
current crisis, including the Lebanese Forces. His growing controj-of
West Beirut is a neaotiatin9 asset none of the parties can ignore
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Top Secret
IRAQ-IRAN: Military Action
Iraq and Iran probably will intensify their attacks on cities and
economic targets, increasing the possibility that the fighting could spill
over into the Persian Gulf region.
The Iraqis launched Scud surface-to-surface missiles against
Dezful on Saturday, according to Iranian press reports. Iraqi radio
reports state that Iran retaliated on Sunday with artillery attacks on Al
Basrah, Mandali, and Khanaqin, inflicting over 100 casualties.
In response to the Iranian shelling, the Iraqis carried out an air
attack on Sunday on the Japanese petrochemical complex at Bandar-e
Khomeyni, causing minor damage. Iraq also attacked three Iranian
border towns, according to press reports.
the Iranians are
constructing a Hawk surface-to-air missile site and three ammunition
storage areas behind Iranian lines northeast of Al Basrah.
Press reports from Tehran claim
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that Iranian troops seized two ridgelines in Iraq along the border near
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Comment: Both sides will find it difficult to back down from the
latest round of attacks and retaliation. The longer the cycle continues,
the more tempted Baghdad will be to strike at Iran's oil export
facilities.
Iran's preparations continue to suggest that it will launch a large
offensive in the Al Basrah and Mandali areas, probably later this
month. The Iranian attack on Saturday appears to have been only a
small border raid.
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SS-21 Deployment
Cyprus
N
Bk1RUTW
Haifa
?Him;
Syria
?Dumayr
* DAMASCUS
UZone NDOF Hirjillah
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SYRIA: SS-21 Deployment
(Syria began receiving
6.5-21 missiles last October. T e missile is accurate to a range of
about 70 kilometers, and from its new location it can hit Israeli
positions throughout the Golan Heights.
Comment: Soviet advisers probably have been training Syrian
personnel to use the missiles, and the deployment of the SS-21
battalion suggests that the unit has completed its training. Hirjillah is
likely to be the permanent garrison of a new SS-21 brigade, but
construction of the facilities there is not yet complete. Syria may have
deployed the missiles partly to demonstrate that its newest weapon
system is operational.
EGYPT-LIBYA: Diplomatic Contacts
Arab press sources report that Egypt and Libya, in talks held in
Morocco during President Mubarak's visit there last week, agreed to
reduce military deployments along their common border.
Comment: Qadhafi is soliciting the good will of the moderate
Arabs to limit pressure on Libya and to strengthen his bid for financial
assistance from the Persian Gulf states. Mubarak distrusts Qadhafi,
however, and the press reports of a military disengagement
agreement probably are premature. Moreover, the press leaks may
scuttle any further talks the two countries arranged to resolve
bilateral issues.
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The Civilian MI-17 in the Paris Air Show
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USSR-SYRIA: MI-17 Helicopter Shipments
In early
1983 Syria took delivery of 12 MI-17s, the first exported by the USSR
to a non-Communist client in the Third World.
Comment: These helicopters probably are the ones covered in a
contract signed by the Syrian Air Force last December for $47 million
worth of MI-17s. The MI-17, with its more powerful engine, is an
improved version of the widely exported MI-8 helicopter. It can carry
about 24 troops over a radius of 215 kilometers.
PHILIPPINES: Boycott Deadline Runs Out
Opposition groups that threaten to boycott the National Assembly
elections in May are planning demonstrations today in Manila's
financial district to protest President Marcos's failure to meet their
conditions for participating. In addition to election reforms, they also
have demanded that Marcos curtail his sweeping executive powers by
today. The US Embassy reports that Marcos believes his position has
been strengthened by the opposition's disarray concerning the
boycott and that he will not make major concessions.
Comment: At least a partial boycott of the elections now seems
certain. Both the radical left and moderate groups heavily influenced
by the Communist Party-such as the Justice for Aquino, Justice for
All alliance-favor a boycott. If only a few opposition parties
participate in the elections, they probably will lose credibility as
opponents of the regime.
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PANAMA: President Resigns
President de la Espriella resigned suddenly yesterday, apparently
without offering an explanation. Vice President Illueca has assumed
the presidency in accordance with the constitution. He immediately
indicated he would honor the government's commitment to hold
national elections in May.
Comment: De la Espriella has threatened several times in the
past to quit over the military's interference in political matters, but
until now Defense Forces Commander Noriega evidently has been
able to dissuade him. Illueca's strong leftist views and propensity for
taking stands at variance with official policy will make his position with
the military tenuous at best. For example, Illueca had his vice-
presidential duties curtailed late last year following his public criticism
of Panamanian involvement in regional military affairs, which had
been openly supported by Noriega.
NICARAGUA: Church-State Tensions Ease
The Sandinistas have backed away from challenging the Catholic
Church directly on the autonomy of religious education. According to
the US Embassy, the Ministry of Education is allowing a Catholic high
school to nominate a new slate of professors to replace a proregime
group approved earlier by the Ministry. The church hierarchy has
strongly supported the school on this issue, and other Catholic
schools have warned that they would go on strike in support, if
necessary. The Sandinistas had threatened to close the school, and
they organized mobs to demonstrate outside the home of the head of
the parents' association.
Comment: The Sandinistas probably want to avoid a clash at a
time when they are presenting their draft electoral law to the Council
of State and are preparing to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the
death of revolutionary leader Sandino. Church-state tensions will
continue, partly because the regime is determined to have more
influence over education. Conflict also is possible if the church
opposes the Sandinistas on the conduct of elections, as it did last
year on draft registration.
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A new airfield that could have both military and civilian
applications is being built at Pina West near Cieoo de Avila_ in cen
Comment: The isolation of the new field and the existence of a
larger airbase near Camaguey, some 100 kilometers to the east,
suggest that it will not be a major military airfield. It could be used to
accommodate fighters and other aircraft dispersed from home bases
during a war or a major crisis. In the past few years, Cuba has
improved or extended the runways of a number of secondary or
reserve airfields that could be used as dispersal sites. When
completed, the new airfield will be able to support all models of jet
fighters in the Cuban inventory and most of its transport aircraft.
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NORWAY-USSR: Alleged KGB Officer Expelled
The Norwegian Government on Friday expelled the director of a
division of a Soviet-owned import firm, on suspicion of being a KGB
officer. Norwegian officials charge that the firm was used for
intelligence collection. The Soviet Embassy has asked the
government to reconsider the decision.
Comment: Oslo's relations with Moscow are already cool as a
result of the expulsion earlier this month of five Soviet diplomats.
Norwegian security officials have heightened public awareness of the
USSR's activities in Norway by giving interviews stressing the extent
of Soviet espionage, including the monitoring of telephone
communications.
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Top Secret
Salvadoran Political Parties
Parties in the Assembly
Political
Presidential
Popular Vote
Assembly
Philosophy
Candidate
in Election of
Seats
1982
(percent)
Christian Democratic
Left-center
Napoleon Duarte
40
24
Party (PDC)
Nationalist Republican
Extreme
Roberto
29
19
Alliance (ARENA)
right
D'Aubuisson
National Conciliation
Center-
Francisco
19
Party (PCN)
right
"Chachi" Guerrero
Authentic Institutional
Rightist
Roberto Escobar
Party of El Salvador
Garcia
(PAISA)
Democratic Action Party
Center
Rene Fortin
(AD)
Magana
Salvadoran Popular Party
Rightist
Francisco
(PPS)
Quinonez
a New party formed from a split in the PCN after the election of 1982.
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Special Analysis
EL SALVADOR: The Election Campaign
Top Secret
All six parties represented in the Legislative Assembly have
fielded candidates for the presidential election scheduled for
25 March. The campaign has been running smoothly, despite a delay
in completing a national voter register. Popular interest apparently is
high, and campaigning so far has been marked by greater cooperation
No candidate is likely to win a majority in the initial balloting. In
that event the two top finishers will face each other in a runoff within
30 days.
The finalists will need the support of more than one party to
become president, but it has not yet been determined whether parties
will be allowed to merge their tickets or to form coalitions for the
runoff. In any case, only the three largest parties appear to have a
chance of getting their candidate elected.
Major Contenders
The Christian Democratic Party won 40 percent of the vote in the
Assembly election two years ago. Its candidate, Napoleon Duarte, is
expected to win another plurality. Duarte has done much to promote
the new progressive constitution and liberal reform laws, and he is
supported by the influential centrist labor front.
Nonetheless, much of the private sector and conservative political
interests oppose Duarte. They fear that he is too liberal and would be
tempted to compromise with the far left.
The ultraright Republican Nationalist Alliance-ARENA-came in
second in 1982 and may do as well this time. Its controversial
candidate, Roberto D'Aubuisson, has been accused of links to
rightwing death squads.
D'Aubuisson, however, gained enough support from the smaller
rightist parties to head the Assembly until he resigned to become his
party's presidential nominee. If he finishes second, the party believes
he has a good chance of winning a runoff with support from rightist
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The National Conciliation Party is a conservative grouping long
associated with the government. Its candidate, Francisco "Chachi"
Guerrero, portrays himself as the choice between Duarte and
D'Aubuisson.
Guerrero probably would become the kingmaker in a runoff. If he
should upset D'Aubuisson in the first round, however, he would have
a good chance of being elected president.
The three smaller parties are likely to play only supporting roles
in the election and in the subsequent government. The Authentic
Institutional Party broke off from the Conciliationists in 1982.
Although it formed a temporary legislative alliance with the Christian
Democrats last December, it may not support Duarte in a second
round.
The Salvadoran Popular Party generally has aligned with ARENA,
and it probably would support D'Aubuisson in a runoff. The
Democratic Action Party would be likely to throw its support to Duarte
on a second ballot.
Insurgent leaders repeatedly have rejected invitations by the
government to enter the contest. They claim the election is a fraud
and that their, candidates would be the targets of death squads.
The guerrillas, in an attempt to discredit the elections, recently
announced a new peace proposal calling for a delay in the ballotin
and an interim provisional government.
Problems and Prospects
A new voter registration system, a key electoral measure, remains
to be completed. The register-which all parties agree is necessary-
may not be ready before the election. If it is not, several modified
procedures will be adopted that are intended to permit a maximum
turnout while ensuring an honest election.
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The campaign itself appears to be proceeding with greater vigor
and cooperation than in 1982. All six candidates participated last
month in a roundtable discussion that allowed the public to compare
their platforms. At a luncheon for Secretary of State Shultz this
month, the candidates tended to play down party differences and
stress the need to put the country first.
Polls taken over the last three months indicate that about
85 percent of the electorate intends to vote. The actual turnout,
however, will depend on developing re istration procedures in time-
and on providing adequate security.
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Iran: Imports, 1982-83
t SSR-F,i tcrn
Iiir c 22
wc,,t Gcrmanc 1 I SSR-Ia~tcrn
I(urol1c I?
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Special Analysis
IRAN: Economic Stagnation
Top Secret
Strong oil exports over the past two years are doing little to
help Iran's economy, which has been stifled by bureaucratic
mismanagement, ideological constraints, and corruption. The country
is spending most of its new oil revenues on imports to increase living
standards for a populace that has grown war weary and increasingly
cynical. Tehran apparently has no coherent vision of how to organize
the economy, and it seems willing for the time being to live off the
capital accumulated by the former regime.
A decline in oil revenues and the need to fi
prompted Tehran to reduce oil prices in early 1
them into line with the rest of OPEC. As a resul
1.9 million barrels per day durin 1983, as com
900,000 barrels per day in 1981.
nance the war
982, in order to bring
t, oil exports averaged
pared with only
At current oil prices, the increase represents about $9 billion a
year. Tehran raised imports by 75 percent in 1983 but now faces 25X1
renewed austerity
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The Troubled Economy
urban consumers
line up daily to purchase subsidized food of poor quality. Much of the
former middle class is subsisting only by selling off personal property,
such as real estate, automobiles, or rugs.
At the same time, customers able to pay four times or more the
government-controlled price can purchase a wide range of goods.
The regime ignores such trade, which it sees as a useful device for
shifting consumer resentment onto the bazaars.
Basic services are being strained by migration to the cities.
Tehran still experiences scheduled daily outages of power and
interruptions to the water supply. Purification facilities in at least two
major cities have been out of service for some time.
Public health also has deteriorated as a result of the widespread
shortage of doctors, the breakdown of garbage removal, and the
unavailability of pesticides. Epidemics of diseases previously under
control have been reported.
continued
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Economic activity is being hindered by the shortage of skilled
personnel-particularly managers-and a patronage system that
places unqualified adherents of the regime in key positions.
Corruption is worse than ever. In addition, the economy is being
disrupted by Islamization, arbitrary government decisions, and
confiscatory social welfare and other taxes.
Agriculture and Industry
Under the Khomeini regime, the country is importing three times
as much as it did under the Shah
controlled prices and shortages of fertilizer, pesticides, and
machinery have destroyed incentives. Feed shortages have required
the slaughter of most breeding stock.
Since the revolution, many of the larger farms have been
occupied by squatters. Power shortages in some areas have burned
out electrical irrigation pumps, and diesel fuel for mechanical pumps
generally is unavailable. New pumps and spare parts are difficult to
obtain because the distribution system is unreliable and does not
extend much beyond the major cities.
Industrial output is running at 40 to 60 percent of the
prerevolution level, Many major
industrial facilities have been all but abandoned. An Iranian official
recently noted that, as a result of the shortage of foreign exchange,
the government is unable to supply industry with some $2 billion
worth of crucial imports.
Prospects are poor for any quick improvement in Iran's economic
performance, even if the war with Iraq ends. Competition from other
suppliers strapped for cash will hamper Tehran's attempts to increase
oil exports by shaving prices. The regime is divided over economic
policies.
Claims by the leadership that the Islamic Republic and its policies
are divinely inspired will continue to make the leadership slow to
come to grips with the economic problems it has created. Instead, it
will tend to look for new scapegoats.
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