NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 8 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 8, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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F vuucwr vi I v'r U
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
8 February 1984
Tel, See em
CPAS NID 84-032JX
1TFavraery
Copy ') R T-1
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Top Secret
Contents
Lebanon: Government at Bay
USSR-Syria-Lebanon: Visits by Soviet Officials .. .
France-Chad-Libya: Foreign Minister's Trip
Libya-Chad: Libyan Military Moves and Intentions
Nicaragua: Preparations for Elections
NATO: Views on Chemical Weapons Ban
Poland: Church Aid to Agriculture .... .
Philippines: New Election Bill Submitted
USSR-Mozambique: Aircraft Delivery 12
Romania: Crackdown on Private Farming
Top Secret
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Beirut
International
Airport
71 T C't r;1 it E'. d !i
Present areas of control
Top Secret
J6 iyah
Syrian
Druze
Druze and Shia
Christian forces
Lebanese Army forces
Lebanese Army brigade
8 February 1984
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LEBANON: Government at Bay
Antigovernment factions, with their control of West Beirut assured,
are hardening their political demands.
Press accounts from Beirut) )indicate
sporadic clashes continued yesterday along the Green Line and other
traditional flashpoints dividing Christian from Muslim Beirut. The
government, however, has lost control of West and South Beirut. The
US defense attache reports the entire 6th Brigade-which is the
major unit responsible for security duties in West Beirut-has
surrendered, defected, or returned to its barracks and refused to
fight.
The government can now count on the loyalty of most of the four
experienced, largely Christian, brigades numbering about 9,000 men.
Elements of two other brigades total perhaps 2,500 men. Fadi Fram,
the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces, yesterday called on all
Christian militiamen to join their units and be prepared to defend
Druze leader Junblatt yesterday told the US Ambassador in
Damascus that he is determined to force President Gemayel from
office-a goal that he claims is shared by the Shia Amal militia.
According to Junblatt, however, the Druze would accept a Maronite
president who would not be committed to the troop withdrawal
accord of 17 May or a member of the Christian Phalange Party.
OC)
Comment: Gemayel's opponents probably calculate that his
position is fatally weakened. They may demand political concessions
that Christian hardliners would find unacceptable. To force Gemayel's
resignation, Junblatt and Amal leader Barri may hold out the threat of
further fighting.
Christians already view current developments with alarm. They
would be likely to view additional fighting as a direct threat to their
survival. Syrian President Assad may restrain his surrogates from
further action, however, in order to prevent all-out civil war in
Lebanon.
Top Secret
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USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Visits by Soviet Officials
The planned visits of important Soviet officials to Syria and
Lebanon probably reflect Moscow's interest in obtaining a high-level
assessment of the deteriorating situation in Lebanon.
Pravda reported today that Syria has invited Politburo member
Aliyev to visit Damascus during the first half of this month. He will be
the highest ranking Soviet official to visit there since Foreign Minister
Gromyko went in 1980.
Karen Brutents, a deputy chief of
the Soviet party Central Committee's International Department who
periodically visits Lebanon, is scheduled to arrive in Beirut today. An
official of the Amal Shia militia recently told US officials in Moscow
that Amal chief Bard expects to be invited by Brutents to visit
Lebanon's Charge in Moscow told US officials that Brutents
would like to meet with President Gemayel. Recent Soviet media
commentary has reported favorably on the activities of anti-
government factions while omitting mention of their calls for
Gemayel's resignation.
Comment: The Soviets almost certainly are reviewing their role
and will be trying to determine the attitudes of the Syrians and of the
various Lebanese factions on possible diplomatic moves. Both Aliyev
and Brutents may try to determine if= respective contacts are
willing to accept a UN contingent as a replacement for the
Multinational Force in Beirut.
Moscow maintains close ties with the Lebanese Communist Party
and Druze leader Junblatt of the Progressive Socialist Party, but it
may now be prepared to invite Barri to visit Moscow. A meeting with
Gemayel would be unusual, however, because Brutents is a party, not
a government, official.
Top Secret
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FRANCE-CHAD-LIBYA: Foreign Minister's Trip
French Foreign Minister Cheysson made little progress toward a
diplomatic settlement in Chad during his recent trip through the
region.
A Chadian official has told the US Embassy in N'Djamena that
President Habre agreed to send a representative to preparatory
meetings for a new reconciliation conference, provided it not be held
in a country that is subject to Libyan pressure.
Chadian officials were pleased by Cheysson's private
and public reaffirmation of sur)po re and for the territorial
integrity of Chad.
A French official has told the US Embassy in Addis Ababa that
Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu was cool to Cheysson's proposal to
hold a new conference under OAU auspices outside Ethiopia. He says
Mengistu criticized the French for not having forced Habre to attend
the talks in Addis Ababa last month. In addition, Mengistu showed
little interest in Cheysson's proposal that France and Libya jointly
finance an OAU observer force along the 16th parallel in Chad-the
declared limit of French operations.
In Paris, an official in the Foreign Ministry has told the
US Embassy that Cheysson's talks with Libyan leader Qadhafi got
nowhere, in part because Qadhafi insisted that France first drop its
support for Habre. The official says that Chadian rebel leaders
echoed Qadhafi's demand in recent meetings with a French
presidential adviser.
Comment: Although the French will continue to probe for a
diplomatic opening, Cheysson's statements in N'Djamena apparently
reflect a consensus among French officials that for now Paris has no
alternative to maintaining its military presence and support for Habre.
If Cheysson's talks with Qadhafi were as unproductive as the official
indicates, there probably will be increased support in Paris for a firm
military response to any threat of direct Libyan involvement in fighting
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Recent Military Developments in Eastern Chad
*Ounianga Kebir
151h parallel
Zi
. gey SaIaI, C h a
,Mao
French
Zairian forces
forces * Moussoro {
1l~Ati
,French forces and
a combat aircraft
}N'DJAM ENA
Zairian
forces
Troop Strength of Forces in Chad
French Zairian Libyan
2,900-3,000 1,800-2,000 5,200-5,600
Top Secret
Monou Ito
* Ailtine
French
forces
8 February 1984
Koro Toro,
Go,ernrne,, Oum Chalouba.
forces OKouba
Olanga
*.Abbch6
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LIBYA-CHAD: Libyan Military Moves and Intentions
Libya continues to improve its military position in Chad while
assessing its next moves.
Fada has been reinforced by three light strike aircraft.
Meanwhile, government forces appear to have routed the rebels
in the battle for Monou. There is no evidence of significant Libyan
participation in the fighting.
Comment: One or both of the SA-6 batteries at Al Kufrah
probably will be moved to Ma'tan as Sarra, which is becoming a key
support facility for Libya's operations in Chad. The buildup in Fada
strengthens its defenses and also increases Libya's alternatives for
limited offensive action.
Libyan leader Qadhafi is likely to be interested in keeping
substantial military pressure on President Habre. At the same time,
however, he probably does not want to provoke French intervention.
To prevent further defeats similar to the one at Monou, Qadhafi
may support future rebel attacks north of the 16th parallel with Libyan
aircraft, artillery, and armor. He also probably will encourage
continued rebel probes south of the 16th parallel, but without major
involvement by Libyan forces.
Top Secret
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NICARAGUA: Preparations for Elections
The Council of State begins discussion of the electoral law today,
reversing an earlier decision postponing such consideration in order
to protest recent insurgent air attacks.
A junta communique does not explain the reversal, but notes that
the election cannot be isolated from the climate created by "US
aggression."
The junta has reaffirmed that on 21 February it will announce the
date for elections. Last month the Sandinistas proposed to elect a
president, vice president, and 90-member assembly for six-year
terms. The assembly is to adopt a constitution within two years.
The regime intends to present a draft media law within the next
several weeks, and it has given assurances that all parties will have
access to an uncensored media. Other recent preparations for
elections include a decree giving seats on the Council of State to two
parties that were not represented and approving regulations to carry
out the political parties law that was passed last September.
Opposition leaders took advantage of relaxed censorship last
month to insist that they need more freedom to campaign. In calling
for international supervision of the elections, they pointed out that the
regime's control of the Army, public employees, and neighborhood
defense committees gives it an unfair advantage. The Social Christian
Party has named a tentative presidential candidate, but the rest of the
opposition has not yet decided how to proceed.
Comment: The opposition may wait to see the final electoral law
before deciding whether to participate. Although the opposition can
agree on a series of demands for increased freedom, it has lacked the
unity to devise a specific plan of action. Moreover, the largest
opposition party, the Democratic Conservative Party, recently was
split by a leadership dispute and remains outside the opposition's
umbrella organization.
Top Secret
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NATO: Views on Chemical Weapons Ban
Certain Allies are expressing qualified support for the USSR's
recent proposal for a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe as a first 25X1
step toward a global ban.
The West German press on Monday reported that the
disarmament spokesman of the governing Christian Democrats has
stated that the party would support a verifiable prohibition on
chemical weapons "limited at first to Europe." Canadian officials have
confirmed that Prime Minister Trudeau recently told East German
leader Honecker that the West and the East could reach an
agreement on chemical weapons if they first banned them in Europe.
West Germany, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, and
the UK preferred a NATO response to the Soviet proposal to put
Moscow on the defensive. The Allies failed, however, to agree on a
compromise text.
West German officials, with support from Norway,
Denmark, Belgium, and Canada ar r the US to begin Allied
consultations on the draft.
Comment: The West German and Canadian expressions of
conditional support probably are motivated in part by the public
appeal of a European ban. Bonn and Ottawa also may be hoping to
prod the US into moving ahead quickly with the promised draft treaty.
Chancellor Kohl's government is particularly concerned that the
US chemical weapons stockpile in West Germany and public fear of
modernization of chemical weapons will become a major political
issue. For Trudeau, a ban on chemical weapons is an integral part of
his peace initiative.
If the Allies become more impatient for a draft global treaty,
Norway, Denmark, and possibly Belgium also could offer qualified
backing for the Soviet initiative.
Top Secret
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POLAND: Church Aid to Agriculture
Church officials in Poland are optimistic that the church's plan to
aid private farmers can begin operation by midsummer, and they are
making new efforts to secure Western financial support.
The church and government have finally agreed on a law on
charitable foundations that is a prerequisite for the plan, according to
the church official who originated the scheme. The official conceded
that the wording of the law gives the regime broad control over the
plan, but he is confident that the church can prevent this.
The official also says the two sides have not yet worked out the
specific regulations governing the work of the foundation. The church
hopes to ensure the foundation's independence by insisting on the
right to appoint its administrators-who will be church laymen-and
by keeping its funds abroad. The church has conceded, however, that
state farms will be entitled to use some of the programs established
under the plan.
A church spokesman, Father Orszulik, will spend most of this
month in the US and Canada trying to secure financial commitments,
particularly for seven pilot projects.
The West German Government and episcopate have taken the
lead in pledging financial backing. According to US Embassy officials
in Brussels and Paris, however, some West European governments
are waiting to judge the success of the pilot projects before pledging
financial support.
Comment: The optimism of church leaders is likely to reflect a
belief that the regime's desire to increase agricultural output is
stronger than its objections to the church's control of the scheme.
The government probably softened its earlier opposition to church
control because state-controlled farms will benefit indirectly from the
plan, and imported agricultural goods for the private sector will help
ease the government's economic burden. Moreover, the draft
legislation contains enough loopholes to enable the regime to show
hardline critics and the Soviets that it can tighten its grip if necessary.
Top Secret
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President Marcos's move to ensure his control of the National
Assembly may backfire by forcing moderate opposition groups to
boycott the National Assembly elections this May. A new election bill,
which would add 20 appointed seats to the legislature, is expected to
pass the 200-member Assembly this week. The US Embassy says the
move has caught Marcos's opponents by surprise, and opposition
groups packed the Assembly early this week to protest the bill. The
leader of a nonpartisan citizens organization overseeing the conduct
of the elections said last week that the change disregards the will of
the people.
Comment: The bill is intended to provide insurance against a
strong showing by the opposition in the elections by allowing Marcos
to add enough new members to maintain the ruling party's majority in
the Assembly. Its timing is an affront to opposition groups, which are
threatening to boycott the election unless Marcos agrees to limit his
sweeping executive powers by next Tuesday.
Top Secret
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Rabat
Morocco
7
1 E.anre
Po)t Spain
A lanIc j
Alyia~,r
Bu Craa
BUi Uer
violation
Western
Sahara
Mauritania
Top Secret
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Top Secret
a recent extension of the
border with Mauritania. The southernmost part of the wall now
extends about 5 kilometers into Mauritanian territory.
Comment: Neither the Moroccans nor the Mauritanians evidently
are aware of the territorial violation. Morocco had planned to extend
the berm to the unmarked border, and construction probably strayed
off course accidentally. Relations between the two countries are
already strained, and they probably will deteriorate further when the
violation is discovered.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: Aircraft Delivery
the Soviets
have delivered 12 more MIG-21 fighters over the past six weeks to the
northern Mozambican port of Nacala. This brings the total number of
MIG-21s in the Mozambican inventory to 27, all of which have arrived
since mid-1983.
Comment: The delivery of the additional MIG-21s is part of the
USSR's program to strengthen Mozambique's forces against South
African-backed insurgents. In Mozambican service the aircraft may
be piloted by Cubans. Agreements covering the aircraft presumably
were concluded well before the latest round of talks between
Mozambique and South Africa. During the talks, the Mozambicans
have tried to persuade Pretoria to sever its links with the insurgents
in return for new Mozambican restrictions on the ANC.
Top Secret
12 8 February 1984
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ROMANIA: Crackdown on Private Farming
Bucharest recently announced new measures, including
provisions to expropriate land, if necessary to force private farmers to
increase sales to the state. Private farmers and members of
cooperatives who engage in private farming are obligated for the first
time to sell specified amounts of goods to the state at fixed prices.
Quotas are to be based on the size of the family, the amount of land
worked, and the number of animals owned.
Comment: The new measures reflect the failure of earlier efforts
to gain tighter control over the supply and distribution of food.
Farmers now will have little choice but to sell to the state or risk the
loss of their land. Although the new measures are unlikely to increase
production, they will put a larger proportion of available supplies at
the state's disposal. With exports taking precedence over domestic
needs, consumer shortages and social tensions probably will
Top Secret
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