NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 30 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010095-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 95
• Publication Date: January 30, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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F , Director of -Tuia SeeFe#-
uemrai
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
30 January 1984
CPAS 25X1
anuary 1904 ~
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Contents
Chad-Libya-France: More Fighting and Preparations .......... 1
China: Implications of New Supercomputer ............................ 2
Dominican Republic: Economic Problems ............................ 3
USSR: Criticism of Military Training ........................................ 7
USSR: Comprehensive Educational Reforms .......................... 7
USSR-Thailand: Invitation to Thai General ............................ 8
Special Analyses
Lebanon: Possible Army Offensive .......................................... 9
USSR-Cuba: Impact of Events in Grenada on Relations ........ 12
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30 - January 1984
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Lake
Chad
Gouro
Libyan +Ounianga Kebir
forces
Faya-Largeau
Al Kufrah
Ma'tan as Sarra
Government troop
movement Ouon
Government a ou a.
G
forcesyKouba Olanga
f
I5tp-pbarallel
-aa
calm'Wcon
f.tiLCT"1
L it def3m
units
Sa afZ{ ? E1 U C~1 French k$'Itine
French forces,{A
forces
r1 Moussoro Ati
Fnc -forces a4_
-combat aircra
fIJAMEWA
Za-r~an
forces
Troop Strength of Forces in Chad
French Zairian Libyan
NM_
2,900-3,000 1,800-2,000 5,200-5,600
Top Secret
Sudan
Repo mh c
Fada.
Rebel held
Monou' Governmen
it; "defensive j
pos ton
overnment
orces, Iriba
30 January
1984--
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CHAD-LIBYA-FRANCE: More Fighting and Preparations
Chadian Government troops clashed with dissident forces north of
the 16th parallel on Saturday
Libyan-backed Chadian
rebels attacked a government unit ot less 'than 50 troops at Monou on
Saturday. There is no evidence, however, that Libyan aircraft or tanks
were involved.
Some 300 government troops have set up defeqaInte-Dositions at
Ito in anticipation of a rebel push southward to Iriba
pother government unit reportedly is located between
Koro Toro and Oum Chalouba, where about 1,000 troops are now
garrisoned.
The French probably will not move their troops north of their
present positions along the 15th parallel for the time being, according
to the US Embassy and a French military official in Chad. French units
are now authorized, however, to patrol up to the 16th parallel and to
engage any rebel or Libyan forces they encounter. Although the
Embassy does not rule out further retaliation, it believes that the
extension of the area of operations may ' response
to the downing of its aircraft last week.
Comment: President Habre probably will try to gain control over
as much additional territory as possible while his troops serve as a
buffer between the French on the one hand and the Libyans and
dissidents on the other. The rebel attack on Monou may have been
designed to defend a strategic approach to the Libyan base at Fada
as well as to open the option of a further rebel advance to Ito and
Iriba.
The extension of the French forces' area of operations improves
their ability to protect themselves while Paris reassesses its policy in
light of the recent resumption of fighting. Meanwhile, high-level talks
among French officials continue in Paris.
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CHINA: Implications of New Supercomputer
China has built a fast array processing computer-apparently
using US components-that could ntial impact on its
nuclear weapons program.
A recent press release in China says scientists there have built a
high-speed computer called the "Yinhe" or "Galaxy." It reportedly
can perform 100 million "operations" per second.
Comment: Although no indication has been given of the size of
the main memory or other specifications, development of such a
computer would be a spectacular achievement. Depending on what
kind of operations the Chinese mean, a machine capable of 100
million per second might be somewhat slower than the US CRAY-1
supercomputer, which is still one of the fastest and most powerful in
the world. Nevertheless. both would be in the same general class with
respect to speed.
CRAY-1 computers are widely used in the US nuclear weapon
program for the design of nuclear weapons. They also have many
other complex applications, including weather forecasting
The press release may have exaggerated the new computer's
actual capability. In practice over long periods, it -nav onIv be le to
perform reliably at a fraction of the claimed speed.
The Chinese probably could not have built the Yinhe on their own.
The required large number of highly reliable microelectronic chips, for
example, would have to be obtained elsewhere.
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Before the press announcement, Chinese officials told 25X1
they were building an equivalent to the CRAY-1 using US 25X1
components. Even with imported hardware however, buildin
such a
computer would be a formidable task.
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Chinese computer specialists also have to develop the software to
program and run the computer. Several received valuable assistance
in software development in 1981, when they came to the US expressly
to study the software systems used with the CRAY-1.
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Development of such a computer would help China's nuclear 25X1
weapons program by allowing study of more complicated weapon
The ability to study more complex nuclear weapon models also
probably will decrease the time required for the Chinese to develop
an enhanced-radiation warhead. They have shown a strong interest in
such a weapon
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The country's weakening economy and lack of progress in
negotiations with the IMF are likely to have political and social
repercussions.
The US Embassy reports that talks with the IMF on requirements
for the second year of a three-year loan could take up to two months
to complete. Discussions stalled last month when Santo Domingo
rejected IMF proposals for substantial cuts in government spending,
movement toward unifying the dual exchange rate, and elimination of
overdue foreign payments. The government says the measures would
triple the inflation rate and further reduce real income levels.
Santo Domingo, meanwhile, has announced a series of foreign
exchange reforms to stabilize the economic situation until an
accommodation with the IMF can be reached. The measures include
floating the unofficial exchange rate, shifting additional imports to the
costlier unofficial market for foreign exchange, extending new
exchange incentives to exporters, and suspending Central Bank
credit to the public sector.
Comment: The new reforms appear to be directed primarily at
slowing the demand for US dollars caused by uncertainty in the
private sector about the government's financial problems. The
government nonetheless will have little bargaining power with the
IMF, especially after missing its program targets last month by a wide
margin.
Business confidence is likely to remain weak, at least until the
IMF's program targets for 1984 are completed. Moreover, President
Jorge Blanco probably will face growing opposition to any new
economic cuts from labor, which already is angered about high
unemployment and shrinking real wages. Although the burden of new
austerity measures would fall on the middle class, the poor would be
likely to support its protests.
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USSR: Criticism of Military Training
Several recent articles in Soviet military journals have criticized
traditional officer training that encourages rigid adherence to
"scientifically objective" solutions to combat situations. For example,
an article by the deputy commander of Soviet Airborne Troops notes
that modern combat demands high levels of initiative and that officers
have to have the authority to alter approved plans under battle
conditions.
Comment: This issue is not new, but the latest call for more
initiative may have been prompted in part by the failure of the
textbook approach in Afghanistan. Soviet officer training will continue
to face the problem of how to encourage battalion and regimental
leaders to be more innovative in rapidly changing combat situations
while preserving the rigid approach to proficiency testing. If more
flexible training of field units ensues-perhaps by providing more
than one school solution-Soviet tactics may become somewhat less
predictable.
USSR: Comprehensive Educational Reforms
A Politburo commission recently drafted a plan calling for
comprehensive changes in general education practices in an effort to
relieve labor shortages. Few concrete measures are offered, but the
plan strongly encourages increased vocational training, particularly in 25X1
secondary schools.
Comment: The emphasis on vocational training is intended
primarily to help compensate for the reduced number of young people
who will enter the labor force during the remainder of this decade.
The Soviets are trying to lower the average age at which youths enter
the work force, increase the supply of skilled workers, and improve
the matching of job requirements and available skills. Although
deemphasizing academic curricula could ease the manpower
squeeze, it will reduce the USSR's ability to deal with the demands of
an increasingly complex .economy.
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Press reports from Bangkok say the Soviet military has invited
General Athit, Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces,
to visit the USSR some time between March and September.
According to the Thai Foreign Ministry, however, the
Ministry has advised Athit to avoid making a visit this year. Athit has
already said publicly he might be too busy for such a trip because of
Vietnam's dry=season operations in Kampuchea this year.
Comment: Bilateral relations recently have improved somewhat,
following a period of increased friction resulting from an espionage
incident last May and the shootdown of the South Korean airliner. The
invitation is an obvious attempt to cultivate Athit, whom the Soviets
believe will become prime minister next year. According to the US
Embassy in Bangkok, the Soviet mission there has had little success
thus far in establishing a relationship with Athit. In the unlikely event
that Athit accepts the invitation, he would be the highest ranking Thai
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Possible Lebanese Army Offensive
Beirut
International
Airport
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30 January
1984
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: Possible Army Offensive
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If Lebanese factions do not reach agreement with the central
government soon on the proposed security plan, the Army almost
certainly will attempt-perhaps early this week-to expand Beirut's
authority by force. The Syrians and Druze are generally aware of
government intentions and are preparing to resist an offensive. The
political repercussions of the move could be substantial in the current
highly charged atmosphere.
In talks with US officials, Army Commander Tannous has
expressed his desire to undertake a limited offensive to seize control
of the entire Alayh ridgeline. The goal would be to push Druze gunners
off the heights overlooking Beirut, thereby reducing the shelling of
Army and MNF positions around Beirut and the airport.
By cutting one of the main infiltration routes from the Shuf and
isolating the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Army advance should
diminish the ability of the militant Shia in the city to sustain fighting
against the Army. Such a move, the government calculates, would
further consolidate its control of the Beirut area, enhance Army
morale, and render unnecessary a direct assault on the suburbs-a
far riskier operation.
Lebanese officials may believe a successful offensive would give
the government the upper hand in dealing with its opponents.
Moreover, President Gemayel, who is concerned about the prospect
of a sudden MNF. withdrawal, may believe that a move by the Army
would increase the possibility that the MNF or at least US forces
would remain.
The government, especially Tannous, expects that additional US
military support will be forthcoming if the Army needs it. If the
offensive were to bog down or the Army were forced to give up earlier
gains, the opposition would grow more confident of its ability to
challenge the central government's authority.
Army Capabilities
The government's military capability to enlarge the area it
controls-even in the absence of a political agreement-has steadily
improved in recent months. The Army is larger, better equipped, and
better trained. It has emerged from fighting in the Shuf and the sweep
operations in Sabra and Shatila with an improved reputation and its 25X1
confessional balance largely intact.
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The Army now can conduct a limited operation, such as one to
consolidate its control of the ridgeline, without encountering serious
confessional strains. The move on the ridgeline, however, could cause
violence in the predominantly Shia southern suburbs. The Army is 25
percent Shia, and its confessional cohesion would be sorely tested if it
were forced to quell Shia unrest there.
Syrian Tactics
An Army offensive would convince Syria that Gemayel had
abandoned earlier tentative steps to reach an accommodation with
Damascus. At a minimum, Syria's aid to its Lebanese surrogates
probably would parallel the support it gave during the fighting last
September and could extend to providing targeting information or the
use of some Syrian commandos as advisers.
The Syrians could keep the defenders supplied with ammunition
and equipment indefinitely. Syria probably would limit and attempt to
conceal any direct participation, however, for fear of provoking wider
US military involvement.
A greater risk would be the exercise by Syria of several
nonmilitary options. It could put pressure on Lebanese Shia leaders
to call for mass desertions of Shias from the Army or, in cooperation
with Iran, encourage a general Shia uprising in Beirut's southern
suburbs. Moving against the suburbs would stretch the Army's
manpower and risk defections by Shia soldiers.
Syria also could try to undermine the Lebanese Government by
directing increased terrorism against the MNF and the diplomatic
community or by killing Lebanese political figures. Gemayel would be
a prime target.
The Political Fallout
An Army offensive almost certainly would jeopardize any further
attempts to expand the government's authority through political
agreement. In addition, it would undermine the national reconciliation
effort itself.
A military success on the ridgeline would strengthen Christian
resolve to resist fundamental political reforms. Left to his own
devices, Gemayel probably would continue to temporize on reform
and refuse to go beyond cosmetic changes, such as expanding the
cabinet or increasing non-Christian representation in the parliament. 25X1
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Even if the government were to offer greater concessions to
Druze and Muslims from a position of military strength, opposition
groups probably would be unwilling to consider what they would
regard as dictates from the Christian Phalange. The ability of the
opposition to resist compromise with the central government,
however, depends-as in the past-on the level of Syrian
determination to block the reconciliation process.
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Special Analysis
USSR-CUBA: Impact of Events In Grenada on Relations
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Differences over events in Grenada last October appear to have
strained ties between the USSR and Cuba. These frictions-plus
recurring tensions caused by the aid burden that Havana poses for
Moscow-mark the latest bout of bad feelings in the chronically
troubled relationship. Both sides, however, continue to share an
overriding concern about what they see as growing US assertiveness
in the Third World. As a result, the prevailing trend continues to be 25X1
toward closer political and military cooperation.
The USSR and Cuba reacted differently to the death of Grenadian
Prime Minister Bishop, and there are indications that relations have
cooled since then. The Cubans have shown the most irritation, while
the Soviets have presented an appearance of business as usual.
President Castro publicly blamed Grenada's former Deputy Prime
Minister Coard for destroying the government, causing Bishop's
death, and opening the way for Washington to intervene. In reporting
Castro's statement, Pravda omitted his mention of Coard and instead
distorted his reference to alleged CIA involvement to strengthen the
implication that Castro had blamed the US. Caribbean Marxists say
Moscow was angry at Havana for blaming Coard,
and Soviet media late last year alleged that US
responsibility had been "irrefutably proved"-a charge Cuba still has
not repeated.
Tensions between Soviets and Cubans in Grenada had been
building before the coup. A diplomat stationed there says Moscow
tried to gain influence at Havana's expense.
he USSR opposed Cuba's efforts to
encourage the Grenadians to hold elections.
Castro was personally close to Bishop, while the pro-Soviet Coard
had made several visits to Moscow, includin one shortl before the
coup. There are indications that Castro
holds Moscow directly responsible for Bishop's ouster
the differences between Moscow and
Havana over the coup were made worse by the US intervention.
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Signs of Friction
The Grenada issue may have been one cause of the lackluster
celebrations in Havana on 1 January of the 25th anniversary of the
Cuban revolution. Castro made no mention in his anniversary speech
of the USSR's role in sustaining Cuba, as he usually has done.
Moscow's commemoration also was uncharacteristically low key.
In addition, Cuban media did not report a meeting in Havana on
9 January between Castro and Soviet Cultural Minister Demichev, the
highest ranking Soviet to visit Cuba since the US intervention in
Grenada. Demichev, in a speech in Havana, said that socialist
countries have to improve political cooperation while taking into
account specific national interests, and he called for better economic
integration. Both points apparently were aimed at Cuba.
On the same day, Foreign Minister Gromyko assured the new
Cuban Ambassador-who as economic secretary of the Cuban
Communist Party is the hightest ranking Cuban ever chosen to head
the Embassy in Moscow-that the USSR would continue to provide
development aid and assist Havana's "struggle to protect its
sovereignty."
Differences over Grenada would be only the latest dispute
between the USSR and Cuba. The Soviets, for example, were upset
by Castro's efforts in the 1960s to encourage Latin American leftists
to emphasize armed struggle, and they used their control over oil
shipments to rein him in.
Moreover, Castro in recent years sometimes has taken a different
approach than Moscow on third-party proposals for improving
relations in Central America. The USSR's hue aid bill also has
increasingly been a source of tension
In addition, relations are likely to be troubled by Moscow's
continued resistance to Castro's efforts to obtain a formal defense
commitment. Events in Grenada have caused nervousness in Havana
about the vulnerability of Marxist states beyond the easy reach of the
USSR's military power.
Growing Cooperation
Despite such periodic strains, close political and military ties have
continued. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979 reduced
earlier discord between Moscow and Havana over strategy in Latin
America, and both sides have been cooperating more closely in
supporting Marxist clients elsewhere in the Third World.
Cuba's perception of an increased threat from the US also has
helped to ensure closer relations with the USSR, which continues to
underwrite the modernization of the Cuban armed forces. Soviet
military equipment deliveries have risen substantially from an
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estimated average annual value of $90 million in the mid-1970s to
$290 million in the late 1970s and to almost $900 million in 1981 and
1982.
Such shipments continued at a high-although somewhat
reduced-level in 1983. Early this year the Soviets were delivering
additional MIG-23 fighters, a fri ate, and a third diesel-powered
attack submarine.
At the same time, Soviet economic aid increased from an annual
average of $327 million in the 1960s to an estimated $4.6 billion in
1982, declining only slightly in 1983. The USSR's total economic aid in
1982 to Vietnam An Ia. Ethiopia, and Mozambique is estimated at
only $1.2 billion.
Outlook
Frictions over Grenada are unlikely to cause serious disruptions in
the mutually beneficial relationship between the USSR and Cuba.
Deteriorating economic conditions and tensions with the US probably
have strengthened the belief in Havana that Cuba cannot survive
without massive Soviet military and economic aid.
In turn, the fall of Grenada's New Jewel Movement and increasing
insurgent pressures on the Nicaraguan Government presumably have
increased the value the USSR places on Cuba as a Marxist outpost in
the Western Hemisphere and as a conduit for support to clients in
Central America. The deteriorating security situation in Angola and
Mozambique also ensures that Moscow will continue to see the need
for Cuban military assistance elsewhere in the Third World.
The economic relationship, however, is a more likely source of
future tension. The USSR's own economic difficulties may lead to
increased pressure on Cuba to reduce its heavy dependence on
Soviet aid.
The Soviets could try to assume greater control over Cuban
economic planning-as they have in Vietnam-and to urge reforms
to stimulate production. They also might increase pressure on the
Cubans to conserve Soviet-supplied fuel. Neither side, however, is
likely to allow economic frictions to reduce the scope of their political
and military cooperation.
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