NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 25 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010079-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: January 25, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
25 January 1984
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anuary
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Contents
USSR-US: Andropov's Response to President's Speech ...... 1
Egypt-Jordan-PLO: Diplomatic Activity .................................. 2
Warsaw Pact: Military Exercise Announced ............................ 3
Ecuador: Presidential Election ................................................ 4
Portugal: Abortion Issue .......................................................... 5
USSR: Gromyko on Andropov's Health .................................. 6
NATO: Compromise on CDE Policy ........................................ 6
Lebanon: Druze Position on Security Plan .............................. 7
Special Analysis
Cyprus: Prospects for Negotiations ........................................ 12
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USSR-US: Andropov's Response to President's Speech
General Secretary Andropov-again using the format of
answering questions from Pravda-responded yesterday to President
Reagan's speech of 16 January by affirming that the USSR also is
ready to engage in a dialogue, but he indicated no Soviet movement
on the stalled INF and START talks.
Andropov prefaced his remarks by asserting that the nuclear
danger in Europe has increased and that the world situation has
become "acute and dangerous" as a result of US actions. He then
stated that the USSR believes in the utility of a dialogue but that it
should be conducted on an equal footing and directed at achieving
specific accords. The Soviet leader accused the US of seeking to
negotiate from strength and of offering no new ideas or proposals.
As possible bases for improving East-West relations, Andropov
repeated Soviet proposals that the US duplicate the USSR's pledge
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that NATO accept the
Warsaw Pact proposal for a nonaggression pact, that efforts be made
to prevent an arms race in outer space, that NATO accede to Soviet
proposals at the MBFR talks, and that the US agree to a freeze on
nuclear arms. In addition, as a condition for resuming talks on nuclear
weapons in Europe, Andropov repeated the standard demand that
the West display readiness to return to the situation existing before
the start of US missile deployments.
Comment: Andropov's statement appears designed to avoid
polemics and affirm a willingness to ennane inn dininnl,a It rime not
I IV?Vp VpI I J1 ICI CAI Ir .1 Ja1 LUI V II V111 F.JI VVIVU.7 OUVItlt pUJILIUIIJ.
The statement also is designed to present a constructive image
regarding those negotiations in which the Soviets are willing to
participate, while holding firm on their INF and START positions. The
Soviets probably hope that West Europeans will now view the US as
responsible for making the next move to improve East-West relations. 25X1
The use of the question-and-answer format has again enabled
Andropov to act as the USSR's ultimate spokesman on policy without
having to make a personal appearance.
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EGYPT-JORDAN-PLO: Diplomatic Activity
Egypt is trying to arrange an agreement between Jordan and the
PLO, even though it is uncertain about its readmission to the Islamic
Conference.
A senior adviser to President Mubarak told a US Embassy official
that Cairo's effort is intended to facilitate early negotiations with
Israel, in spite of the US election campaign and the PLO's
preoccupation with its internal problems. The adviser said that King
Hussein and PLO Chairman Arafat had agreed to Egyptian mediation
and that an Egyptian-Jordanian-PLO meeting might take place this
spring.
The Egyptian adviser said Arafat would return to Cairo in March.
According to the Embassy, Hussein concluded after a recent
telephone conversation with Mubarak that the Egyptian President
probably would visit Amman and Baghdad.
The adviser indicated Egypt would not accept any
invitation from the Islamic Conference that would cast doubt on its
commitment to the Camp David accords.
Comment: Cairo will continue to promote a comprehensive Arab-
Israeli settlement and assert its regional leadership, regardless of
whether it rejoins the Islamic Conference. Arafat's meeting last month
with Mubarak strengthened the confidence of E tian leaders in the
peace process and their own role in it.
Egypt is refusing to endorse past resolutions by the Islamic
Conference-as required by the Casablanca summit-partly to avoid
complicating its relations with the US and Israel.
some
ace-saving formula for Cairo to rejoin the organization may yet be
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WARSAW PACT: Military Exercise Announced
The Czechoslovak news agency on Friday announced that a major
Warsaw Pact exercise involving Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian
units will be held early next month.
The press release
states that the military exercise -Druzhba-84-will take
place in northwestern Czechoslovakia on 6-11 February. The
announced objective of the maneuvers is "to test cooperation
between commanders and units of allied armies in winter conditions."
The Druzhba series has been held every winter since 1972, initially
involving Soviet and Czechoslovak units. Hungarian units began to
participate in 1982.
The announcement did not specify troop figures.
Comment: Because the announcement comes less than the 21
days before the event required by the Helsinki Accords and provides
no troop figures, the exercise presumably will not meet the 25,000-
troop notification level. The Czechoslovaks announced Druzhba
exercises in 1979 and 1982 as involving 25,000 troops or more, but
announcements of exercises not meeting that threshold are optional.
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The presidential election on Sunday, which is likely to require a
runoff, probably will be respected by the military-particularly if the 25X1
conservative candidate remains in contention.
Frontrunner Leon Febres Cordero heads a coalition of five
conservative parties, and he is followed in a field of nine candidates
by center-leftist Rodrigo Borja. Recent polls indicate that both men
are losing ground. If no candidate wins a majority, a runoff will be held 25X1
in May between the two top contenders.
Febres Cordero has advocated a free market approach and
austerity measures in a campaign otherwise characterized by populist
rhetoric and antigovernment diatribes. No candidate has presented a
comprehensive economic program, and most support more
government intervention and social spending.
Comment: President Hurtado, who is ineligible for reelection,
may have encouraged caution by interventionist-minded officers
through his adept handling of coup plotting last year. Real or
perceived fraud could prompt the military to consider stepping in,
however, particularly if Febres Cordero is eliminated.
A runoff between a conservative and a center-leftist would
provide a clear-cut ideological choice but would help polarize the
voters. This would make it more difficult to fashion a nonpartisan
approach to the country's economic problems.
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The current debate in the National Assembly on liberalizing
abortion is likely to weaken the Socialist-Social Democratic coalition.
The Assembly will vote on two bills, one introduced by the
opposition Communists, the other by the Socialists. Although the
Socialist proposal removes legal sanctions against abortion only in
three special cases, the Social Democrats oppose it. The Communists
say that, if their measure fails, they will support the Socialist bill.
The conservative opposition Center Democrats reject both
bills and have hinted at presenting a censure motion against the
government. The Catholic Church also has condemned both bills and
is holding protest rallies.
Comment: Last November the coalition partners had agreed to
put off dealing with this issue. Socialist Prime Minister Soares is
caught between the strongly proabortion faction of his own party and
his antiabortion coalition partner. He apparently is gambling that
addressing the issue now is less likely to split the coalition than later,
when public discontent over tight economic policies will have grown
and the presidential election will be closer
Soares may have underestimated the depth of antiabortion
emotion among the Social Democrats. The government's handling of
the issue could provoke a challenge to Deputy Prime Minister Mota
Pinto's leadership of the Social Democrats at the party's congress in 25X1
To survive, Mota Pinto might be forced to pull his party out of
the government. Even if the coalition remains intact, however, the
divisions created over the issue will impair the government's overall
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USSR: Gromyko on Andropov's Health
A senior Western foreign policy official reports that Foreign
Minister Gromyko told the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary in Stockholm
last week that General Secretary Andropov is recovering from a long-
term kidney problem. Gromyko said that Andropov is in better shape
than he was a few months ago but that he still is not in physical
condition to move around. Although Gromyko emphasized that
Andropov is back at work and active in decisionmaking, the Soviet
leader is spending only a few hours a day at his desk and avoiding all
Comment: This is the first known discussion of Andropov's
kidney problem by a top member of the leadership. Gromyko made
his remarks on the same day that the chief editor of Pravda
mentioned the kidney problem to a US television interviewer, and this
timing suggests a high-level decision to be more forthcoming. The
editor predicted that Andropov would show up in about two weeks,
during preparations for elections to the Supreme Soviet, but
Gromyko's remarks indicate that Andropov might not be able to
appear by then. The elections are not until 4 March, however, and the
General Secretary customarily makes a speech to his designated
election district only a day or two before the voting.
NATO: Compromise on CDE Policy
NATO members have put aside remaining differences on
proposed confidence and security building measures, clearing the
way for the West to present its package this week in Stockholm.
The UK and West Germany last Friday bowed to US pressure and
dropped their demands that the measures include prior notification of
non-European forces that transit through Europe. On Monday Turkey
agreed to compromise language proposed by the US on the level of
information to be exchanged on military forces.
Comment: The willingness of the Allies to defer to Washington on
the transit issue almost certainly will end if the East demands that
transiting forces be included in notification provisions. Moreover,
Western delegates have not yet begun to formulate a response to the
proposals advanced by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and his East
European counterparts last week, and deliberations will be difficult.
Many NATO members and most neutral and nonaligned countries
favor an agreement on nonuse of force and constraints on military
activities-ideas advanced by the East that the US opposes.
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LEBANON: Druze Position on Security Plan
Druze leader Walid Junblatt may have dropped his opposition to
the proposed Lebanese security plan. In a meeting with US officials in
Damascus on Monday, an aide to Junblatt said the Lebanese National
Salvation Front was willing to resume talks on the plan with Lebanese
Government representatives and officials of the Christian Lebanese
Forces militia. The aide noted that Junblatt, as a goodwill gesture,
had ordered an end to shelling by Druze forces so long as actions by
the Lebanese Army do not reach the "intolerable" levels of last week.
Comment: Junblatt's new position contrasts with his recent
statements criticizing Gemayel and threatening a return to full-scale
civil war. It probably reflects his desire to forestall a possible assault
by the Army against Druze forces along the Alayh ridgeline. The Druze
have been hurt by US naval gunfire in the past, and they probably fear
that the US would become involved in any move by the Army. The
more conciliatory attitude also may be the result of Syria's efforts to
avert greater US military involvement.
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Turkish-controlled area
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UN Buffer
Zone
-Cyprus
Varosha
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Special Analysis
CYPRUS: Prospects for Negotiations
Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have proposed plans in the
past two weeks aimed toward a solution of the Cyprus problem. Each
is offering a complex blend of previously held positions, many of
which each knows will be unacceptable to the other, and currently
there are no indications that compromise is possible on fundamental
issues. Even so, there are hints of accommodations that might get
the protagonists talking. Negotiations are likely to begin in earnest,
however, only if a third party assumes the reponsibility for organizing
and directing them and if the two sides demonstrate the requisite
political will.
The "goodwill" proposals announced by Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash on 2 January, and the somewhat more ambitious plan for a
settlement proposed by Cypriot President Kyprianou during his trip to
the US earlier this month, represent little change in mutually exclusive
positions that have surfaced in one form or another since Cyprus
gained independence in 1960. The two proposals reflect longstanding
disagreements about the structure of a unified government, the
amount of land to be controlled by each side, basic freedoms and
human rights, economic issues, internal security, the presence of
foreign troops, and even the nature of a federal state. Some 15 years
of intercommunal talks, and a major initiative pushed by the US,
Canada, and the UK in 1978, have failed to break the deadlock
The gulf between the two sides has widened since last November,
when the Turkish Cypriots declared independence. The Greek
Cypriots claim they will not negotiate or agree to a summit until UN
Resolution 541, which, in part, demands a rollback of Turkish Cypriot
independence, is fully implemented. The Turkish Cypriots insist they
will not rescind the declaration of independence as a condition for
talks.
Signs of Flexibility
The outlook is not completely bleak.
The Turkish Cypriots continue to insist that, now that they have
asserted their independence, they are more willing to bargain.
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Both sides, moreover, recently have hinted at flexibility on the
status of Varosha and the Nicosia airport. These two particularly
difficult issues ma hold the key to serious talks about more far-
reaching matters:
Agreement on Greek resettlement of Varosha-an area vacated
by the Greeks and controlled by the Turks, but for the most part
closed to settlement by Turkish Cypriots since 1974-is likely to hold
the greatest potential for breakthrough. Accord probably could be
reached without the Greek Cypriots having to recognize the Denktash
state and without the Turkish Cypriots having to renounce
independence. In addition, it now appears that the Turks would be
willing to allow UN control of a section of Varosha to commence
followed by the start of negotiations on the question of Greek Cypriot
Agreement is also possible, although perhaps less likely, on
reopening Nicosia airport, which has been closed and occupied by the
UN since 1974. As in the case of Varosha, a compromise on the
airport would not have to impinge on the questions of sovereignty and
independence.
If some progress could be made on these matters, it might then
be possible to begin negotiations on the more fundamental questions.
At that stage, the major sticking point would be whether the two sides
could agree on the modalities of negotiating.
The Turkish side believes that the long-dormant intercommunal
talks can and should be revived. According to the Greek side,
however, the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence required a
change in approach that draws in the international community. There
is no evidence that the two sides are ready to stop talking past each
other on procedural questions.
Need for a Third Party
If the impasse is to be broken at all, it will not be done without the
direct intervention of a strong third party acceptable to both sides.
The UN, the US, and the UK would be the most likely to win the
necessary support. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar is working
to get talks started, but he is unlikely to succeed.
The UK would appear capable of playing an effective third party
role. It has the most experience in the area and a permanent presence
on the island.
As a first step toward a settlement, the UK has offered to convene
talks with Greece and Turkey, the other two guarantors of Cypriot
independence. Athens, however, thus far has blocked a guarantors'
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meeting. The Government of Cyprus has not rejected a direct British
role, but it has shown little interest in London's proposal.
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