(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010047-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: January 16, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Tee -
Central
Intelligence
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16 January
Dopy #I E1 j
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National Intelligence Daily
Monday
16 January 1984
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Top Secret
Contents
China-US: Chinese Reaction to Premier's Visit ...................... 2
Belgium: Strategy on INF ........................................................ 3
Sweden-USSR: Troubled Relations ........................................ 5
International: Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone ................................ 6
Canada-US: Acid Rain Controversy ........................................ 7
Belize: Challenge From Right Wing ........................................ 9
South Africa-Angola: Military Withdrawal .............................. 10
Morocco: Unrest in Casablanca .............................................. 10
Costa Rica-US: Projects Suspended ...................................... 11
China-Hong Kong: Beijing Ignores Violence .......................... 11
West Germany: Divisions in Green Party ................................ 13
Bahrain-France: Possible Purchase of Mirage Fighters ........ 13
Special Analysis
Top Secret
16 January 1984
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The positive treatment by Chinese media of Premier Zhao's talks
in Washington underscores Beijing's continued encouragement of
improved relations.
Official accounts of the Premier's talks with the President last
week termed them "friendly, candid, and beneficial to mutual
understanding." They quoted Zhao as saying that the visit will
promote the "steady and durable" growth of China's relations with
the US after two years of "jolts and uncertainties." Zhao emphasized
that the improvement of ties is "an irresistible historical trend."
The Chinese highlighted Zhao's interest in purchasing US arms
and noted that Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping will visit the
US in the near future. Although Zhao made remarks to US
Congressmen ruling out comprehensive strategic cooperation with
the US, the media pointed to specific mutual security concerns in
Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Chinese media also replayed Zhao's
statement that China does not follow a policy of "equidistance"
between the US and the USSR.
Commentaries quoted Zhao as accepting recent US assertions of
friendship for the people of Taiwan, but they repeated calls for the US
to recognize the principle of one China. The Chinese news agency
gave prominent coverage to Zhao's pledge that China will not assist
other states to develop nuclear weapons.
Taipei gave the visit comprehensive and accurate treatment. The
ruling Kuomintang's Central Daily News had earlier warned that
Taiwan's security might be compromised by new agreements
between the US and China. Later the media concluded that US-
Chinese ties had improved, but Taiwan's position was unchanged.
Comment: Chinese leaders are clearly seeking to set the tone for
a successful visit by the President in April. They undoubtedly hope the
US in turn will avoid references to Taiwan that will force Beijing to
react and cast doubt on a US commitment to a one-China policy. At
the same time, they have begun to prepare the Chinese public-and
Communist Party members-for h r I improvement of security
ties with the US.
Top Secret
2 16 January 1984
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BELGIUM: Strategy on INF
Prime Minister Martens is following a risky strategy in avoiding a
positive decision on INF deployments until 1985.
A Belgian official has told the US Embassy that Brussels will
quietly continue INF preparations, and he expressed confidence that
Belgium would deploy ground-launched cruise missiles. The official
believes, however, that Martens will continue to deny that there is any
automatic commitment to deployment. He will avoid a final positive
decision until after the next national election, which is expected to be
held in the spring of 1985.
Comment: The strategy of making discreet basing preparations
while delaying a final decision has avoided public controversy and
splits in Martens's Flemish Social Christian Party.
As preparations proceed, however, they may become more
public, and INF equipment has to arrive well before March 1985 to
permit the missiles to become operational then. Another year of delay
on a Belgian decision also could delay the deployment schedule in the 25X1
other basing countries.
Progress in basing INF missiles depends in large measure on the
presence of Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans in the Cabinet.
Martens-who has been in office for most of the past four years-has
been troubled by health problems, and Tindemans has expressed
Interest in obtaining an EC post. If either were to leave the
government, there is a chance that a replacement less committed to
deployment would urge even more delay.
Martens apparently is confident that the current Social Christian-
Liberal coalition, which is favorably disposed to INF, will remain in
office next year. There is no immediate threat to its stability, but
government crises can arise quickly in Belgium. If the Socialists were
to reenter the Cabinet following a crisis, prospects for INF probably
would be damaged.
Martens is counting on the Walloon Socialists-who now are in
opposition-to acquiesce in deployment. They are more likely to do
so if the decision is made before they have to accept responsibility for
it as Cabinet members.
Top Secret
3 16 January 1984
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SWEDEN-USSR: Troubled Relations
Sweden's relations with the USSR remain seriously strained,
despite Stockholm's desire to improve them.
US Embassy officials report that Prime Minister Palme will meet
with Foreign Minister Gromyko today on the eve of the opening of the
Conference on Disarmament in Europe to discuss ways of improving
relations, which have been abnormally cool since a Soviet submarine
ran aground near Karlskrona in September 1981.
Comment: Palme's meeting with Gromyko is unlikely to result in a
significant improvement in relations. The Prime Minister's handling of
the submarine violations last spring was controversial, and he will
have to avoid the impression that he is willing to compromise
Sweden's neutrality and territorial integrity.
The Soviets probably are disappointed that relations have
deteriorated since Palme's Social Democratic government took over
from the conservative-led government in 1982. They are particularly
eager to project a positive image to the Nordic countries as the
conference begins. Nonetheless, Moscow clearly is stung by the
publicity Sweden has given to recent events, and it evidently has
decided to leave any initiative on relations to Stockholm.
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INTERNATIONAL: Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone
An experts-level conference on Balkan cooperation is scheduled
to convene today in Athens to discuss various regional issues,
including a proposal to create a Balkan nuclear-weapons-free zone.
Diplomats from Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece will
meet following nearly a year of preparations by Greek Prime Minister
Papandreou. Albania has rejected Papandreou's invitation, while
Turkey reportedly says it is not prepared to attend and would prefer
postponing the meeting for two weeks. The Turks object to the
emphasis on nuclear issues in the agenda and want the focus to be on
other, less sensitive topics of multilateral cooperation.
Comment: The longstanding animosity among these Balkan
countries makes even the holding of a meeting an accomplishment.
The conference, however, probably will not produce any significant
agreements, partly because the delegates will need to devise an
agenda acceptable to Ankara. Even with Turkish participation, the
countries involved are unlikely to agree soon to hold the followup
heads-of-government summit envisioned by Papandreou.
Greece and Romania strongly support both a nuclear-free zone
and expanded political and economic cooperation in the Balkans.
Bulgaria also wants a free zone, but it will try to prevent discussion on
multilateral political or economic cooperation. Sofia probably hopes
that propaganda resulting from the meeting will persuade Moscow to
abandon possible plans to base missiles in Bul aria as a
counterweight to INF deployment.
Yugoslavia believes that proposals for regional nuclear-free zones
can be useful in restoring momentum on arms control. Nevertheless,
Belgrade shares Turkish reservations that a Balkan nuclear-free zone
would give the East a strategic advantage. In addition, the Yugoslavs
will press for an end to Bulgarian claims that Macedonians are
Bulgarians and for Greek recognition of Macedonian nationality.
Top Secret
6 16 January 1984
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CANADA-US: Acid Rain Controversy
Ottawa appears to be renewing its drive to secure a treaty with the
US on reducing acid rain, and it probably will increase its public
efforts as the Canadian general election draws closer.
Environment Minister Caccia, in a speech in New Hampshire on
8 January, emphasized Ottawa's frustration at the lack of progress in
negotiations on the acid rain problem. He said that the resolution of
the difficulty "is only a matter of political will." Caccia stated that,
without immediate ameliorative measures, acid rain will destroy the
life in 48,000 Canadian lakes and endanger about 8 percent of the
country's GNP by the year 2000.
Ottawa recently also began to issue weekly reports on acid rain,
based on readings taken at locations in eastern Canada. The sites
were chosen because they have no local source of pollution and,
Ottawa contends, are being damaged by acidic pollutants from the
US. According to Caccia, the reports are designed to make US
citizens aware of the dimensions of the problem and the US role in it. 25X1
Comment: Ottawa probably has revived its campaign because of
the failure to reach agreement in recent high-level bilateral meetings.
At those meetings, Caccia rejected US claims that further scientific 25X1
investigation was needed.
The government believes that the political influence wielded by
US coal and utility industries is blocking a treaty. By speaking out on
acid rain in US forums during the presidential election year, the
Canadians probably hope to focus US public opinion on the need for
immediate cleanup efforts.
Canadian rhetoric is also designed to improve the Liberals'
election prospects. In Canada, acid rain is an issue of unquestioned
national importance, and the opposition parties are certain to attack
the government for not securing US cooperation and for failing to
eliminate Canadian sources of acid-rain-causing pollutants. Caccia's
speech probably portends the start of an effort by the Liberals to
head off opposition criticism.
Top Secret
7 16 January 1984
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BELIZE: Challenge From Right Wing
Three conservative leaders of Prime Minister Price's party have
said they will resign from the Cabinet today in response to recent
Cabinet changes favoring the party's left wing,
the threatened
resignations are a ploy to force the Prime Minister to rescind his
appointment of a leftist to head the Foreign and Home Affairs
Ministries. Price told US Embassy officials that one of the Cabinet
members-the leader of the party's right wing-is demanding
privately that he be named deputy prime minister and minister of
home affairs. The Prime Minister is unwilling to give the rightwing
leaders more authority, but he reportedly is asking the other
disaffected conservatives not to resign.
Price has added the Defense Ministry post to his own portfolio,
which already includes the Finance Ministry. He also reportedly
instructed a group of foreign diplomats to continue to approach him
directly on foreign affairs issues.
Comment: The Prime Minister's major concern is to stem
factionalization in his party before the national election campaign gets
under way. He is unlikely to undermine his authority or invite leftwing
protests by meeting the conservatives' demands. Price also probably
believes that curtailing the right wing-which frequently challenges
his policy decisions-will serve party unity over the long term.
Price would further strengthen the left-already helped by his
Cabinet shuffle-if he accepts the conservatives' resignations. He
could alienate some support by doing so, but the loss in local
elections last month may have persuaded him that the party needs
new faces to attract voters. The disaffected conservatives and the
opposition party could loin forces, however, to pose a strong
challenge.
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Military Withdrawal
The commander of South African military forces in Namibia and
Angola told journalists on Friday that his troops would be withdrawn
from Angola by yesterday.
Comment: Pretoria probably will withdraw its conventional units
from Angola within the next few days. It will, however, continue
aggressive patrolling in southern Angola to monitor SWAPO and
Angolan forces. South Africa has enough troops in northern Namibia
to reoccupy its area of recent activity with little preparation.
Moroccans may attempt demonstrations against deteriorating
economic conditions during the Islamic Conference in Casablanca
this week. According to the US Consulate and the defense attache, a
general strike and another, round of student demonstrations are to
be in today in Casablanca
Islamic fundamentalists are distributing tracts attacking the
rnment. The leader of Morocco's major trade union has told US
Embassy officials, however, that the union will not participate in any
strikes during the conference. About 20,000 security personnel are in
Casablanca for the summit, according to the Consulate.
Comment: January is traditionally a month for labor strikes in
Morocco because contract negotiations are often under way.
Demonstrations over economic grievances, particularly during the
conference, would encourage Islamic fundamentalists and other
disaffected groups to take advantage of the situation. King Hassan
will want to avoid embarrassment during the summit, and security
d to deal quickly with disturbances.
I forces can be expect
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ToD Secret
US Development Projects in Costa Rica
MANAWA
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Ocean
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16 January 1984
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COSTA RICA-US: Projects Suspended
President Monge apparently has decided to postpone some
development projects at Upala involving US military engineers
because of growing domestic opposition. Costa Rican officials have
told the US Embassy that the presence of armed US personnel would
require Monge to obtain approval from the legislature, which strongly
opposes military activities near the Nicaraguan border. The Costa
Ricans cite the need to avoid protracted debates that might delay
passage of the budget and other economic measures required to
achieve a new agreement with the IMF. San Jose reportedly will
welcome scaled-down US aid, however, such as the construction of
water wells in western Guanacaste Province and improvement of San
. Isidro Airfield, south of San Jose.
Comment: Monge has been under intense pressure from leaders
of his party to cancel the projects, which they believe could jeopardize
Costa Rica's claim to neutrality and worsen relations with Managua.
The President probably remains committed to the development of the
Upala region and may attempt to reintroduce the suspended projects
when tension in the border area subsides. Meanwhile, he probably
wants to demonstrate his continuing interest in US aid by consenting
to projects located away from the Nicaraguan border.
CHINA-HONG KONG: Beijing Ignores Violence
Beijing has so far not reported the riots that broke out in Hong
Kong on Friday. The violence, which has not resumed, was caused by
gangs of young criminals who took advantage of disruptions caused
by a strike of taxi drivers who were protesting huge increases in
licensing fees. Before the violence, Beijing's representatives in the
colony had given only lukewarm support to the drivers and had urged
them to negotiate with the Hong Kong Government and to avoid
creating instability.
Comment: Beijing is probably anxious to preserve the improved
atmosphere in its talks with the British concerning Hong Kong. China
also is interested in limiting any damage to Hong Kong's troubled
economy. Both Beijing and London will be careful to avoid actions
that could increase tensions in the colony.
Top Secret
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WEST GERMANY: Divisions in Green Party
Retired Army General Bastian, a leading member of the Green
Party in the Bundestag, has underscored the persisting divisions in
the party by charging that it is being infiltrated by Communists and is
showing an anti-American bias. Bastian also criticized his fellow
deputies from the Green Party for inefficiency and for adopting a one-
sided approach to the disarmament debate by claiming that the US is
the power most likely to start a nuclear war. He has threatened to quit
the party if it continues on this course.
Comment: Bastian, who acts as the Greens' expert on defense
issues, is one of the party's most respected spokesmen. His
departure would reduce the credibility of the party's arguments in the
nuclear arms debate and could cause a decline in its support.
Bastian's call for moderation and pragmatism is likely to add to the
intensity of debates now coming to a head in the party. Cooperation
with the Social Democrats and the participation of Communists and
other radical leftists in the Green Party are among the issues in
dispute.
BAHRAIN-FRANCE: Possible Purchase of Mirage Fighters
Crown Prince Hamad of Bahrain has told US Embassy officials
that his country now leans strongly toward purchasing French Mirage
fighters. He says that Qatari and Kuwaiti purchases of the Mirage F1
and that US delays in responding to requests for the F-16A have
given France an advantage. The F-16 is now a second choice, and the
F-5E is a distant third.
Comment: Hamad's statements may be designed to help
persuade the US to release the F-16A for export. The Saudis will have
some influence on Manama's final choice, because Bahrain is
counting on financial aid from Saudi Arabia and from the Gulf
Cooperation Council for 12 to 15 fighters as well as trainer aircraft
that it plans to buy. In November 1982 Bahrain refused to buy F-20 or
F-16/79 fighters, asking instead for the more advanced F-15s. The
F-16A has the same engine as Saudi F-15s, and Bahraini acquisition
of the F-16A would assist in increasing the degree of equipment
standardization between the two air forces.
Top Secret
13 January
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Top Sec
Religious Groups in Southern Lebanon
Christian
Druze
Mixed Christian
and D"ruze
Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Mediterranean
BEIRUT
INTERNATI ONA
AIRPORT
j u"
t- -1 a r'--I -
9sr el
UND F
-zone
Golan
Heights]
(Israeli occupied)
.16-January 1984
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Special Analysis
LEBANON-ISRAEL: Tension in the South
Attacks by Lebanese Shias against Israeli soldiers in southern
Lebanon have intensified since mid-December, prompting repressive
countermeasures by the Israeli Defense Forces south of the Awwali
River. As a result, what had been primarily an indigenous guerrilla
campaign against the 18-month Israeli occupation is becoming
transformed into a resistance movement that includes Sunni and
Christian elements. There is a danger that the Shia population, which
normally is divided, could be driven into the arms of the Islamic Amal
or other radical Shias who look to Iran for help.
The Israelis have reacted to bolder and more frequent attacks on
their troops by making mass arrests, conducting predawn house
searches, imposing daytime curfews, and putting restrictions on
movement across the Awwali. These actions have persuaded local
residents that Israel intends to annex the area.
The US Embassy in Beirut fears that southern Lebanese are
becoming radicalized by the occupation. Moreover, the situation is
alienating the Lebanese in the south from the central government
In recent weeks the predominantly Sunni city of Sidon has
become the focal point of resistance. Local Sunni and Christian
leaders have endorsed antioccupation activities, and the Israeli
presence has at least temporarily united the divided Shia leadership.
This unprecedented display of cross-sectarian solidarity will
increase Israel's headaches in the area. It eventually could become an
insurmountable problem for the Lebanese Government. Unless the
government can extend its authority into the area and alleviate some
of the harsher aspects of the Israeli presence, it may permanently
forfeit sovereignty over southern Lebanon.
Israel is conducting a major policy review of its presence in
Lebanon, as a result of the local resistance and mounting casualties in
the south. Israeli officials may be considering withdrawing troops from
the Sidon area and redeploying farther south along the Zahrani River.
If the Israelis proceed with a pullout before security arrangements
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with the Lebanese Government can be worked out, fighting is likely to
erupt along the coastal highway, bringing the violence closer to
Israel's northern border.
Tel Aviv has sought to deal with its security dilemma by trying to
create a Shia militia that would act as an Israeli surrogate. Most Shias
dislike this plan, and Sunni and Christian leaders are disturbed at the
prospect of another Israeli-backed militia.
The Embassy notes that the effort to recruit Shias has been
unsuccessful, partly because Israelis do not take into account Shia
sensitivities. Moreover, several pro-Israeli Shias have been murdered.
The Lebanese Government also faces problems in the south.
Beirut has traditionally ignored residents of the predominantly Shia
and agricultural region. During the civil war, portions of the south
were routinely referred to as "Fatah Land," in recognition of the
area's virtual abandonment to the PLO.
Southerners are becoming alienated from the rest of the country
as a result of Beirut's inaction in the face of the occupation. Local
leaders repeatedly have called for the Army to move into the south to
relieve the fear of annexation and to forestall violence if the Israelis
leave. The increasingly impatient southerners have little respect for a
government that sends them no material aid, provides no armed
presence, and apparently gives liberation of the region a low priority.
Many southerners initially welcomed Israel's invasion in June
1982, because it freed them from the Palestinian presence. Now,
however, most view Israeli military rule as oppressive.
The Embassy reports that Foreign Minister Salem has complained
of capricious Israeli behavior. As an example, he notes that Israeli
troops have forced Lebanese to perform folk dances before allowing
them to cross Awwali bridges.
Lebanese frustration with the occupation has been aggravated by
the deteriorating economic situation and the belief of local residents
that Israeli actions are designed to disrupt the south's ties to the rest
of the country. Israel routinely violates its pledge of 1982 not to export
to Lebanon any goods that compete with Lebanese commodities.
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Local businessmen claim it is difficult to move produce to regional
markets. because the Israeli Defense Forces allow only favored
shippers access to the port at Sidon. The Israelis also frequently close
traffic across the Awwali River, hindering transport of products to and
from Beirut. The highway from Sidon to Israel generally remains open,
however, and Israel continues to allow Lebanese to import goods duty
free via the Israeli port of Haifa.
The most dangerous aspect of events in the south probably is the
radicalization of the Shia population. Although Shia loyalties are still
uncertain, there is a growing risk that the occupation and the
government's neglect will foster a potent Iranian-style Shia radicalism
south of the Awwali.
Top Secret
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