NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 11 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: January 11, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
11 January 1984
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Contents
Ell Salvador-Honduras: Territorial Dispute ............................ 4
Canada: Domestic Reaction to Peace Initiative ...................... 5
Tanzania: Rising Secessionist Sentiment on Zanzibar .......... 6
Suriname: Labor Unrest Continues ........................................ 7
Pakistan: Bhutto's Daughter Released .................................... 7
USSR-International: Concern About Peace Movement ........
Australia: Record Wheat Production ...................................... 11
Denmark: Election Results ...................................................... 11
Special Analysis
Argentina: Alfonsin Taking Charge ........................................ 12
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The appointment of Minister of Interior Ubaydat as prime minister
may dash hopes in the Palestinian community for more equitable
treatment.
The US Embassy reports that Ubaydat, a former chief of the
General Intelligence Department, is considered by Palestinian
Jordanians to be unsympathetic to their interests. They blame him for
supporting restrictive measures, including those imposed last spring
on travel between the West Bank and Jordan. One former West Bank
mayor told Embassy officials that Ubaydat's appointment will send all
the wrong signals to Palestinians, who hoped the reconvening of the
parliament represented the King's intention to take the lead on
Palestinian issues.
Domestic pressure for former Prime Minister Badran's ouster had
been intensifying. Badran-who had been in office almost
continuously since 1976-was extremely unpopular, particularly with
key Bedouin and Palestinian communities.
Comment: Hussein's selection of Ubaydat may have been
intended to reassure East Bank constituencies that he still regards
their interests as essential. Those groups probably are nervous about
the prospect of an expanded Palestinian role in internal matters
through parliamentary participation.
Other cabinet changes appear to be routine. Although many
observers had expected that portfolios would be evenly divided
between Palestinians and East Bankers, the cabinet consists largely
of the latter. The other cabinet members probably were named for
their ability to do a more effective job, rather than on the basis of
origin.
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EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS: Territorial Dispute
Honduran officials are angered by an article in El Salvador's new
constitution that fails to accord Honduras any sovereignty in the Gulf.
Nonetheless, the officials have assured the US Embassy that they
plans have prompted domestic opposition in the past.
El Salvador's territorial claim to the Gulf of Fonseca has strained
relations with Honduras, but leaders in both countries will try to
maintain operational cooperation.
hardliners in the Honduran
Government are advocating retaliation, including reduced trade and
closure of the Regional Military Training Center used to train the
Salvadoran military for counterinsurgency operations.
will not take drastic measures. Moderates in the government
recognize that the country's long-term interests are best served by
continued bilateral cooperation. Tegucigalpa plans to relocate
Salvadoran refugee camps-suspected of providing aid to the
Salvadoran rebels-away from the border area, even though similar
The US Embassy in El Salvador reports that President Magana
said last month he hoped to propose a solution to the maritime issue
if he met with President Suazo. Although Suazo recently indicated a
willingness to meet with Magana, he believes that Magana-a
lameduck-would have little to offer.
Comment: The basic problem between the two countries
apparently concerns their interpretation of access to the Pacific. The
Salvadoran constitutional provision cites a judgment made in 1917 by
the Central American Court that accords Honduras access through
the Gulf without any territorial sovereignty. Honduras has never
accepted that decision, however, and it claims jurisdiction over some
of the waters and islands in the Gulf.
Although the Suazo government continues to view El Salvador as
insensitive to its domestic political concerns, it is unlikely to provoke
major disruptions in military, diplomatic, or economic cooperation.
Nevertheless, Honduras will continue to urge the US to force
El Salvador to be more accommodating on territorial issues.
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Prime Minister Trudeau's peace campaign apparently has had
little effect in reducing the opposition Conservatives' substantial lead
in the polls over the Liberals.
A Gallup poll taken in December, one month after Trudeau began
his initiatives, showed the Tories supported by 53 percent of decided
voters-three points below a similar poll in October. The Liberals
were supported by 30 percent, three points above October, and the
socialist New Democrats were still supported by about 15 percent.
Twenty-seven percent of the voters were undecided.
Comment: The small change in voter preference indicates that
Trudeau's initiative has not yet captured the imagination of the
electorate or, at least, that support for his efforts has not meant many
new votes for the Liberal Party. Nevertheless, Trudeau is likely to
continue his peace campaign because he is personally committed to
reducing the dancer of a confrontation between the US and the
USSR.
The Prime Minister probably also believes that he has to continue
pushing his proposals in order to maintain his credibility. Although he
has repeatedly stressed that his goal is to improve East-West
relations and not to strengthen his party's election prospects, some
Canadian journalists question his motives. A vocal minority of
commentators, for example, are suggesting that the Liberals are
trying to exploit a "motherhood" issue to close the gap in the polls.
If Trudeau were to drop his initiative soon, the public might
consider his critics' view to be confirmed. The Liberals would be
rebuked by their parliamentary opposition, and the voters might react
negatively in the general election later this year.
The peace initiative has evolved into somewhat of a burden for
the Liberals. Continuing it apparently promises little in election
benefits for the party, but abandoning it risks appearing
opportunistic.
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TANZANIA: Rising Secessionist Sentiment on Zanzibar
The US Embassy in Dar es Salaam reports that tensions between
the mainland and Zanzibar have reached an unprecedented high,
raising the possibility of violence tomorrow as Zanzibaris celebrate
their Revolutionary Day.
Longstanding disputes over island autonomy have intensified in
anticipation of a constitutional convention scheduled for next month
that will address the legal relationship between Zanzibar and the
mainland. Senior government officials in Dar es Salaam are privately
expressing concern that events on the island will get out of hand
tomorrow. Many mainland ministers have decided not to attend the
ceremonies.
President Nyerere has created a special military unit for possible
use on Zanzibar. He also has stationed mainland police at key
facilities on the island and has sent more troops to its capital.
the military has failed to
complete the rotation o Zanzibari troops to the mainland. The
program was started in A ril at the re uest of Zanzibari President
Jum
Zanzibari troops, who are largely Muslims, have resisted the
rotation program because they do not want to leave their homes for
the culturally and ethnically different mainlan
Comment: Nyerere apparently plans to take strong action to
suppress any civil disturbances on Zanzibar. Mainland military and
police personnel on the island probably would easily defeat any
These government initiatives also may dissuade discontented
Zanzibaris from carrying through with their plans. Turmoil on the
island, however, would further damage Nyerere's position and could
encourage more plotting among military elements dissatisfied with his
faltering leadership.
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The labor crisis took a turn for the worse yesterday when striking
bauxite workers again shut down power at the recently repaired
transformer station near the Suralco bauxite plant. The US Embassy
reports that approximately 30 police and 100 soldiers were sent to the
plant after its managers requested protection for the facility. In
response to the shutdown, the government took control of all national
power facilities.
Comment: The potential for violence is at the highest level since
the strike began three weeks ago. The striking workers are likely to
gather at the plant today, and they could challenge the security forces
occupying the power station. Although Army Commander Bouterse
probably still wants to avoid a showdown with the strikers, he may
believe that their recalcitrance has left him no alternative.
PAKISTAN: Bhutto's Daughter Released
President Zia's decision to allow opposition leader Benazir
Bhutto, the daughter of the late Prime Minister, to leave Pakistan and
seek medical treatment in Europe reverses his previous position.
Zia had earlier rejected
advice that Benazir be freed from house arrest because of concern
that her release would strengthen antigovernment opposition. Zia is
now trying to persuade the moderate opposition to support his
formula for national elections that would legitimize his planned
constitutional changes.
Comment: Zia may hope that exiling Benazir will open the way for
moderate opposition politicians-who were unwilling to challenge her
leadership openly when she was under house arrest-to support his
political initiatives. He probably believes that his success in dealing
with the disturbances last fall makes it unlikely Benazir could mount a
serious challenge to the regime from abroad before the elections,
which may be held by the end of the year. The President is gambling
that in the longer term Benazir will lose her political influence.
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USSR-INTERNATIONAL: Concern About Peace Movement
Soviet officials of the Moscow-backed
World Peace Council privately expressed embarrassment that the
Council-sponsored Second Vienna Dialogue for Disarmament and
Detente last November failed to attract the number of West European
political leaders and US Congressmen that attended the first Dialogue
in February 1982. The large Soviet delegation was busy behind the
scenes but kept a low profile in the plenary session and working
groups.
Comment: The poor turnout will heighten the Soviets' concern
about the prospects for the peace movement in the West and will spur
the USSR to make discreet efforts to sustain it. Moscow is instructing
pro-Soviet Communists in Western Europe to adjust their strategy to
prevent a reduction or redirection of peace movement activism away
from the INF issue. The Soviets themselves are playing a less active
role in the movement to avoid its being further discredited by
accusations of manipulation by the USSR.
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The Australian Wheat Board projects wheat output in the current
crop year ending next month at 19 million metric tons. The record
crop is the result of a 15-percent expansion in the area sown to wheat
and the good weather that prevailed during most of the growing
season. Although harvesting will continue into early February, the
Australians already have begun marketing their crop.
Comment: Wheat sales this year will reach about 12 million tons,
a 50-percent increase over drought-reduced exports in 1983. Record
sales to Egypt and Iraq, as well as large sales to the USSR and China,
already have been made. Wheat exports by Australia, Canada, and
Argentina are expected to show a 25-percent increase in 1984, while
US exports are expected to drop for the second straight year.
Late voting returns indicate that Prime Minister Schlueter's
center-right minority government will increase its standing in the
parliament from 65 to about 76 seats. It has fallen short, however, of
the 88 seats it would have needed to become Denmark's first majority
government since 1971.
Comment: The current ruling four-party coalition-whose
portfolios Schlueter says he will not change-is likely to be forced to
rely on support from both the pacifist, anti-NATO Radical Liberal
Party and the anti-taxation Progress Party to pass future legislation.
The Prime Minister has said he will not bring either party into his
coalition, but he almost certainly will try to use negotiations next week
to gain their support on security policy and other key issues.
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Special Analysis
ARGENTINA: Alfonsin Taking Charge
President Alfonsin has taken full advantage of the postelection
euphoria during his first month in office to address important domestic
and foreign policy issues. The left-of-center leader's tough rhetoric
and swift action have been matched by deft political efforts to regulate
the pace and temper the impact of promised reforms. These moves
thus far have helped prevent a backlash from Argentina's usual power
brokers-the military, the Peronists, and the unions. Beyond midyear,
however, economic problems coupled with unmet expectations and
possibly a strengthened opposition could result in more serious
challenges to Alfonsin.
Alfonsin's most visible initiatives-and the most popular ones
among Argentines-have been aimed at curbing the military and
redressing violations of human rights committed during the
antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s.
Labor and the Economy
Alfonsin also is moving quickly with plans to democratize labor
unions by holding new union elections. Several local labor bosses,
who have been courted by the new government, reportedly have
pledged to support Alfonsin's union program. Labor militants were
unable to get support for a strike last month.
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Peronist-dominated unions will be
unable to challenge the President for at least the next six months.
Alfonsin is attempting to mollify the opposition parties further by
giving Peronists middle-level government posts and b
party leader a presidential adviser on military matters.
The administration's political initiatives are receiving greater
media coverage, but it has been equally active on the economic front.
The government has imposed price controls, submitted a major tax
reform package, and begun a program of increased public spending
to spur a recovery. According to the US Embassy, Economy Minister
Grinspun has also begun talks with bankers in the US and has
reiterated his willingness to facilitate refinancing some $18 billion in
foreign debt in 1984 and to negotiate a new IMF agreement.
Foreign Policy
Alfonsin's fast pace extends to foreign policy. His government has
offered concessions to Chile, for example, that could soon lead to a
settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute.
On the Falklands, Alfonsin has tried to appear flexible, but he still
supports the military's basic position that normalization of relations
with the UK has to be linked with renewed negotiations on sovereignty
over the islands. These moves improve his standing, and they may be
used to help justify cuts in defense spending and a more limited role
for the military.
The announcement in November, before the President took
office, that Argentina had mastered uranium-enrichment technology
led Alfonsin immediately to reaffirm his intention to assure that the
nuclear program is to be for peaceful purposes only. He transferred
the program to civilian authority and created a commission to
evaluate it.
Alfonsin has been cautious, however, in making any major
changes in the nuclear program. He recognizes that it is a source of
national pride and that the military has a strong interest in protecting
it. The President probably will wait for the commission's report before
blocking out the direction of future policy.
Alfonsin's bold style, the conditions conducive to change in
Argentina, and the disarray among opponents suggest that the new
President probably will continue to have his way over the next six
months. The successful transition to democratic rule and Alfonsin's
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decisive actions thus far, however, have produced extremely high
popular expectations that will be difficult to satisfy even under ideal
conditions. They are even less likely to be met after midyear, when
revenue raising measures probably will be inadequate to finance
public spending, putting renewed pressure on prices and making
accommodations with labor difficult
Labor leaders will then be better able to rally the opposition to
challenge economic and union reforms. Even members of Alfonsin's
own coalition, especially the human rights groups, may demand more
vigorous prosecution of security officials and embarrass the
government if their demands are unmet.
Anti-Alfonsin sentiments in the military are unlikely to coalesce in
the near future. Officers subject to human rights investigations will be
preoccupied with their own difficulties and probably will avoid
conspiracies that could make them appear guilty. Unrest in the
military will be likely to grow, although slowly, if Alfonsin appears to
be losing control of the investigations.
Most officers will grudgingly accept a settlement of the Beagle
Channel dispute, even with major concessions. On the other hand,
similar compromises on the Falklands would not be tolerated and
would almost certainly become a rallying point for opponents in the
military. At this point, however, the services are deeply divided on
many issues and lack a commonly acceptable leader.
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