NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 9 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 9, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of --rucl?C
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
9 January 1984
25X1
enuary I Vag
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6 Copy 285
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top Secret
Contents
Chile: Terrorist Attacks Increase ............................................
4
Suriname: Cabinet Resigns ....................................................
6
International: Is
lamic Summit .....................................
......
.......
8
Special Analyses
USSR-Europe-US: Soviet Approach to CDE .........................
Chad: Poor Prospects for Negotiations .................................. 12
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
9 January 1984
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Iq
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Top Secret
CHILE: Terrorist Attacks Increase
Leftist attacks are prompting the government to adopt stronger
security measures.
The US Embassy reported 67 bombings, killings, and other
terrorist actions in December. some of
these attacks are being carried out both by well-known groups, such
as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and by Communist Party
elements. Others are the work of new organizations, such as the
Proletarian Insurrectional Tendency, which is preparing for prolonged
armed struggle.
In response, President Pinochet is planning to submit terrorist
cases to military courts and invoke the death penalty even for terrorist
acts that do not cause a loss of life. Counterterrorist strikes have
been stepped up and security for senior officials tightened.
Comment: The increase in terrorist attacks, occurring at a time of
reduced political opposition activities during the summer vacation
period, may be designed to deny Pinochet the breathing spell he
expected. Police reaction has been restrained thus far, but declining
morale and further attacks could lead to quicker and tougher police
responses and provide ammunition for the opposition movement
Top Secret
4 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
T? Secir92
Nahr al Yarmiik Drainage Basin
al Yarmuk
rndel construction
J
~Dar'a A-
West
Too Secret
9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Syrian storage dam
built since 1971
Drainage basin boundary
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Top Secret
SYRIA-JORDAN-ISRAEL: Water Dispute
Syria's growing use of water from its portion of the Yarmuk River
watershed has reduced available supplies for Jordan and Israel and
will aggravate the already existing water dispute between Amman and
Tel Aviv.
Syria has built 12 dams and six
smaller catchments since 1971 on tributaries of the Yarmuk, the main
waterway feeding into the Jordan River. Six of the dams have been
built since 1979, and two more are under construction. Syria's five-
year plan for national agricultural development calls for additional
dams-as well as deep wells and the expansion of associated
irrigation networks-in the southern part of the country, including the
Yarmuk basin.
Comment: Syria's annual use of Yarmuk waters may now account
for as much as half of the river's average yearly volume. About 80
percent of the river's flow originates in Syrian territory, and the
Syrians eventually could draw on most of its sources
Jordan's development plans for the East Bank will be severely
disrupted if the country is unable to rely on substantially more water
from the Yarmuk than it currently taps. These plans already are being
impeded by Amman's failure to obtain Israeli and Syrian agreement to
improve existing storage and diversion facilities and build additional
ones. There is little Jordan can do, however, to protect its interests.
Israel uses a small amount of water from the river for irrigation in
the Al Adasiyah Triangle and stores undetermined quantities of the
river's excess winter flow in Lake Tiberias. Increased Syrian water use
could lead the Israelis to harden their opposition to Jordan's plans in
order to protect their access to residual Yarmuk flows.
Top Secret
5 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top Secret
SURINAME: Cabinet Resigns
Army Commander Bouterse announced last night that Prime
Minister Alibux and his cabinet have stepped down, according to
press reports. The move follows reports that the regime now plans to
shelve some of the proposed tax increases that originally provoked
the labor crisis last month. There is no information thus far on the
composition of a new government.
Comment: The resignations reflect Bouterse's continuing effort
to deal with the labor crisis without using force. He apparently still
fears that violence could lead to US intervention. The action also will
help Bouterse avoid responsibility for the current unrest by providing
scapegoats. Alibux's departure, however, could enable pro-Cuban
elements to regain influence in the regime.
Top Secret
6 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top secrV
Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (01C)
North
Atlantic
Ocean/~
Note: The Palestine Liberation Organization is a member of the O1C.
a Egypt's membership was suspended in May 1979 and
Afghanistan's in January 1980.
Top SecM
41>
North
t Pacific
Ocean
Pdonesia
9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Top Secret
INTERNATIONAL: Islamic Summit
Morocco will host the fourth summit meeting of the Islamic
Conference in Casablanca beginning next Monday, with a preparatory
foreign ministers' meeting to take place the end of this week. The
summit will bring together representatives of Arab, African, and Asian
countries. The US Embassy in Rabat reports that most of the 44
member states are expected to participate, althou h not all will be
represented by heads of state. Iran will not .1 -1
Comment: The summit is unlikely to make substantial progress
on the various quarrels that divide Muslims. It may be useful,
however, as an opportunity for private discussions on the war in
Western Sahara, PLO talks with Jordan, improved ties between Egypt
and other Arab states, and other issues. Morocco's King Hassan, as
chairman, almost certainly will try to organize a moderate consensus
on major agenda items to be set at the foreign ministers' meeting.
Too Secret
25X1
25X1
8 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Top Secret
Special Analysis
USSR-EUROPE-US: Soviet Approach to CDE
The Soviets will go to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe
intent on emphasizing to West Europeans that they remain interested
in arms control, but with no expectation of immediate substantive
progress. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies will, in the course of
the conference, try to evade commitments to provide NATO with
significant additional information on Eastern military activities. The
Soviets hope that Foreign Minister Gromyko's attendance at the
opening session on 17 January and his meetings with Secretary of
State Shultz and some of his West European counterparts will convey
an impression of commitment to European security and East-West
cooperation.
The USSR realizes that the Stockholm meeting has acquired
additional importance since the Soviets suspended other European
security negotiations. Until the USSR returns to those talks, the CDE
is the only propaganda platform from which ke the Soviets'
arms control case to Western publics.
Soviet media are stressing, for example, that NATO INF
deployments contravene the spirit of Helsinki. Despite their avoidance
of the INF issue at the CDE preparatory conference last fall, Eastern
representatives probably will now try to use the CDE to undermine
European support for INF and other Western security policies.
Likely Eastern Initiatives
The USSR has outlined publicly its likely proposals at the
Stockholm meeting. These include:
- A nonaggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO.
- No further expansion of the two alliances.
- An agreement by the Pact and NATO that neither will be
the first to use nuclear weapons.
A Soviet diplomat in Washington told US officials on Wednesday
that the USSR does not itself intend to submit proposals for nuclear-
weapons-free zones, as have been suggested in the past for the
Nordic and Balkan regions and Central Europe. It would, however,
consider formal proposals at Stockholm offered by other countries.
Top Secret
9 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top Secret
In addition to such declaratory measures, the Soviets probably
will propose the following confidence and security building measures:
- Prohibition of military exercises involving more than
50,000 troops.
- Lowering the current threshold for advance notification of
exercises from 25,000 to 20,000 troops and extending the
lead time for notification from three weeks to one month.
- Confidence and security building measures to include the
Mediterranean Sea, which would require, among other
things, withdrawal of nuclear-armed ships and prohibition
of nuclear weapons in those Mediterranean countries in
which they are not already deployed.
The Soviets have also confirmed that they do not consider the
question of the geographical scope of confidence and security
building measures to be closed by the language of the CDE mandate.
The USSR and its allies almost certainly will reopen the issue by
advocating notification of air and naval maneuvers adjacent
European continent but independent of activities there.
As has been the case in the MBFR talks and other East-West
arms control negotiations, the USSR and its East European allies will
try to turn aside Western efforts at Stockholm to ensure greater
access to information on Eastern military activities, capabilities, and
intentions. Soviet officials have told Western contacts that
"transparency" of military movements and intentions cannot be the
objective of confidence and security building measures negotiated at
Stockholm. The Soviets told Austrian CDE representatives in late
November that, because of NATO's INF deployments, the USSR
would not feel "inclined to divulge any military activities."
The Soviets have told the Austrians and other contacts that some
officials in Moscow view the CDE as an "absurdity" out of tune with
the current East-West situation and that they expect to achieve little
of substance at Stockholm. The USSR and its East European allies
nevertheless will work to convince the West Europeans of their
interest in achieving CDE objectives. If the negotiations become
bogged down in East-West polemics, the East will portray the
impasse as the result of continued US intransigence and lack of
sincere desire to promote European security
Top Secret
10 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Top Secret
The Meeting With the Secretary of State
The Soviets probably agreed to the bilateral meeting between
Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko primarily to
avoid giving the appearance to the people of the West European
countries that the USSR was rejecting an opportunity to improve
US-Soviet relations. Interest in maintaining high-level communication
with the US while the arms talks are in abeyance also may have been
a factor.
The Soviet leaders may hope that the bilateral meeting will
dampen public concern in the USSR and some East European
countries about Soviet suspension of the major arms talks. Gromyko
currently plans to meet also with West German Foreign Minister
Genscher, French Foreign Minister Cheysson, Italian Foreign Minister
Andreotti, and British Foreign Minister Howe
The Soviets are likely to continue to profess, for the benefit of US
as well as West European audiences, their pessimism about the
prospects for improving relations with the current US Administration
and particularly about the prospects for resuming arms control talks.
This was reflected in a TASS statement on 31 December that
disparaged the US announcement of the meeting between the two
Foreign Ministers as an attempt to spread false optimism. TASS
asserted that neither the CDE nor bilateral contacts can substitute for
the Geneva negotiations.
The Soviets presumably do not want the meeting with Secretary
of State Shultz to degenerate into polemics and thereby provoke
further deterioration in bilateral relations. They will nonetheless seek
to counter any impression that the talks represent a significant
reduction in the bilateral tensions brought on by NATO INF
deployments.
The Soviets do not appear to expect any major US initiative on
the deadlocked arms control issues at the bilateral meeting. At the
same time, there is no indication thus far that Gromyko will bring any
significant new initiative of his own.
Top Secret
11 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Special Analysis
CHAD: Poor Prospects for Negotiations
Top Secret
OAU-sponsored talks on Chad scheduled to begin today in Addis
Ababa will try to negotiate an end to the country's four-month-old
military stalemate and encourage factional leaders to reconcile. The
major participants' conflicting goals probably will undermine the
conference, however, or even scuttle the talks before they begin. Each
side will blame the other if the meeting collapses, increasing the
potential for renewed fighting and more Libyan meddling.
The conference-to be headed by OAU Chairman Mengistu,
Ethiopia's pro-Libyan head of state-is the first direct meeting of the
11 principal Chadian factions since 1979. The participants will discuss
OAU proposals for forming a peacekeeping force, establishing a
transitional government, organizing elections, and arranging for
military withdrawals from Chad by France and Libya, neither of which
will take part in the discussions. Even if a dialogue proves possible,
reaching agreement on a compromise candidate to head a new
government in N'Djamena will be a major stumblingblock.
President Habre-who has sent to the talks a stand-in delegation
led by the government's second in command, Interior and Security
Minister Guinassou-probably decided not to attend for fear that
Mengistu would not make good on his promise to receive the
President as chief of state instead of simply as a factional leader.
Habre probably hopes to demonstrate his intention to bargain in good
faith while avoiding Libyan and dissident efforts to undermine his
legitimacy and shift the blame to him if the talks fail.
the government will call
for the return to Chad of all factions and the formation of a broad-
based national leadership. Habre probably believes that, if the talks
were shifted to N'Djamena, he would be able to exert greater
influence over the outcome.
Libyan Intentions and French Goals
Tripoli's motives for intervening militarily last June have not
changed. Libyan leader Qadhafi remains determined to consolidate
control over northern Chad and install a friendly regime in N'Djamena.
The economic and political costs of continuing the current Libyan
military presence in Chad appear manageable for Qadhafi. Foreign
exchange reserves-helped by a more stable world oil market-
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
Top Secret
would be more than adequate to defray the cost of such operations
there if Libya's generally sound economy were to falter
.
25X1
In addition, military promotions and furloughs probably have
eased discontent among the military personnel taking part. Qadhafi's
efforts to repair relations with moderate Arab states also have largely 25X1
forestalled regional criticism.
Libya has acquiesced in OAU mediation efforts in hopes of
undermining Habre's legitimacy and making him the scapegoat for a
breakdown of the talks. Tripoli may calculate that his failure at the
bargaining table will weaken French support and persuade Paris to 25X1
search for an alternative leader. Libya is
prepared to shift its support from dissident leader Goukouni to a
compromise candidate to obtain Habre's removal. 25X1
The Libyans also may be trying to make a separate deal with
France that at a minimum would lay the groundwork for the
withdrawal of French troops and provide for a new Chadian head of
state. Private talks between French and Libyan representatives are
continuing, and press reports indicate that a French Foreign Ministry
official visited Tripoli last week.
France seeks a diplomatic solution that will permit the withdrawal
of its troops without leaving the Libyans in control of northern Chad.
Paris has tried to strike a balance between supporting Habre and
keeping channels open to Tripoli. According to the US Embassies in
N'Djamena and Lagos, French diplomats are pessimistic about the
chances for successful talks.
So long as French public support for the deployment in Chad
remains strong, Paris probably will not make reductions in its forces
there. France currently has 2,800 troops in Chad.
Bleak Outlook
Negotiations are likely to be long and frustrating at best. During
the process, Libya will seek to isolate Habre internationally and
intensify Chadian dissident activity in the south and north.
Libya may encourage the dissidents to make some limited moves
into the area south of the 15th parallel-which Paris is pledged to
defend-to test French resolve.
Top Secret
13 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010023-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top Secret
Although Paris hopes to avoid renewed fighting, it might decide to
encourage Habre to take limited offensive actions to keep the
pressure on Tripoli. French officials question the effectiveness of
economic boycotts against Libya and worry that such actions could
hurt them more than the Libyans, or could even push Qadhafi closer
to the Soviets
France might seek concessions from the Libyan leader by offering
to lift a de facto arms embargo that recently was imposed. The recent
decision to release the last of 10 patrol boats purchased by Tripoli
may be a gesture by the French to encourage Libyan cooperation.
If the French conclude that Habre is an obstacle to progress, they
could threaten to reduce economic and military aid to N'Djamena.
Paris might even o be and this by threatenin to support some other 25X1
Chadian leader.
14 9 January 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top Secret
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6
Top SecW
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100010023-6