NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 7 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 7, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

FbP"-
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
7 January 1984
Central
Intelligence
Copy
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Contents
USSR: Andropov Still Active ....................................................
2
Central America: Contadora Meeting ....................................
Nigeria: New Leaders Establishing Control ............................
5
Iraq-Iran: Developments in the War ........................................
6
Cyprus-Greece-Turkey: Diplomatic Maneuvering ..................
7
Tunisia: Bread
Price Increase Rescinded ..............................
8
Nicaragua: Re
sults of Insurgent Attacks ................................
9
USSR-Canada
: Possible Invitation to Trudeau ......................
9
South Africa-Angola: Operation May Be Ending .................. 10
Special Analyses
Europe-US-USSR: Strategy for Conference on Disarmament 12
France-Italy-UK-Lebanon: Concern About the MNF ............ 15
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January
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USSR: Andropov Still Active
General Secretary Andropov was absent from the meeting
yesterday of the Russian Republic legislative body, but evidence of
his active role behind the scenes continues to accumulate.
The meeting traditionally is attended by all the top leaders based
in Moscow. There had been no indication, however, that Soviet
officials expected Andropov to be there.
Pravda is reporting honorary nominations of Politburo members
at meetings around the country in preparation for the Supreme Soviet
elections in March. The editors always carefully allocate the number
of such nominations per Politburo member. The gap between
Andropov and Premier Tikhonov is substantially wider than it was
between Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin.
A laudatory Czechoslovak review of a translation of the most
recent edition of Andropov's book of selected speeches and articles
has been steadily and frequently replayed over Soviet news media.
Late last month, Andropov was still sending personal letters to
heads of Western governments, reemphasizing points he has made
publicly regarding INF. A dissident Soviet historian told US Embassy
officers this week that Andropov is personally considering a film
director's appeal to overrule censorship officials and release his film.
Comment: Andropov seems to have been managing a variety of
activities behind the scenes, and Soviet officials act as though he is in
charge. He evidently is able to make decisions, take initiatives,
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The General Secretary's repeated failure to appear in public may
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fundamental disability. He may not be ready to receive foreign visitors 25X1
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Contadora Meeting
Guidelines submitted by the Contadora nations for the meeting
today of the nine Foreign Ministers in Panama appear to favor
Nicaragua.
The Contadora guidelines call for immediate commitments to
carry out the 21-point "Document of Objectives" that the Central
Americans agreed to last fall. The guidelines emphasize security
issues, including a moratorium on arms acquisitions and scheduling
reductions of foreign military advisers. The Contadora countries also
have proposed that working committees on military, political, and
economic matters be organized and submit reports by 29 February.
The Central American nations-other than Nicaragua-have told
US officials that an immediate arms freeze would favor Managua.
They also believe that the issues of democracy and verification as
specified in the guidelines are inadequate. These countries have
prepared a document to counter the Contadora guidelines and a draft
peace treaty advocating a regional rather than bilateral solutions.
Comment: As the negotiations approach their first anniversary
without much progress, the Contadora countries appear increasingly
determined to press for an immediate settlement. Although their
suggestions did not endorse the Nicaraguan i? .posals for bilateral
treaties, their emphasis on security issues and their vagueness
concerning democracy are compatible with Sandinista objectives.
The counterdocument reflects Central American fears that a
moratorium would upset the military balance permanently, as well as
a determination to press Nicaragua for verifiable commitments on the
democracy issue. Efforts to introduce the document, however, will
prompt charges of obstructionism by Nicaragua and possibly by
some of the Contadora mediators.
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NIGERIA: New Leaders Establishing Control
Head of State Buhari appears in control, but dissatisfaction among
some military elements, as well as his failure to name a cabinet or to
take decisive action on the economy, could erode his support.
The new leaders continue to enjoy domestic support, and the
business community, organized labor, and other major interest
groups have endorsed Buhari. Some grumbling is evident, however,
among middle-grade and junior officers who believe they have been
Hundreds of former officials have been arrpstpti
Buhari has indicated his intention to renew negotiations IMF and foreign banks.
Comment: Buhari appears to be aware of the frustration among
lower ranking officers at being underrepresented in the first round of
appointments. He is likely to be preoccupied for the foreseeable
future with the danger of a countercoup by those who believe they
have been shunted aside by the new leaders. Military support for
Buhari could begin to erode if it appears he is unable to exercise firm
The failure to announce a cabinet suggests that the coup leaders
are still groping for policies and are undecided over how much civilian
representation should be allowed. Public euphoria and relief over the
coup will wane quickly if it appears that the government is committed
to doing little more than carrying out previously imposed austerity
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IRAQ-IRAN: Developments in the War
Baghdad continues to exert diplomatic and military pressure on
T.V_..
President Saddam Husayn, in an Army Day speech yesterday,
threatened Iraqi retaliation for any new Iranian aggression. He said
Iraq had not expanded the war in the Persian Gulf out of concern for
neighboring states and for legitimate Western commercial interests
Comment: The Iraqis clearly still see gains to be made through
diplomatic efforts, backed by the threat of intensified military action.
Even so, Baghdad continues to weigh its military alternatives. It
probably would use chemical agents again to combat renewed Iranian 25X1
Iraq's more frequent attacks on Iranian merchant ships in recent
months and Iran's renewed determination to challenge the Iraqi Air
Force have prompted Tehran to increase its efforts to obtain
additional combat aircraft, thus far with little success_
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Turkish-controlled area
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CYPRUS-GREECE-TURKEY: Diplomatic Maneuvering
Cypriot President Kyprianou visits Washington on Monday, as
both sides in the Cyprus dispute continue to maneuver for diplomatic
advantage.
Greek officials in Nicosia and Athens indicate that their diplomatic
efforts will continue to focus on discouraging international recognition
of the new Turkish Cypriot state. They continue to seek a
comprehensive solution.
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash recently proposed several
"goodwill" measures, including interim UN control of the once-
prosperous Greek resort town, Varosha, and the reopening of Nicosia
airport. Both offers are contingent on the resumption of negotiations
The Turkish Government simultaneously announced that it will
withdraw 1,500 troops from northern Cyprus. The Cypriot
Government has publicly rejected Denktash's proposals.
Comment: Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and Kyprianou
appear to be uncertain as to how to proceed on the diplomatic front.
They do, however, seem to be relying on US or British efforts to
create movement toward a settlement.
The Turkish gestures almost certainly were designed primarily to
blunt Western criticism, and Turkey's withdrawal of 1,500 troops will
not alter its preponderant military advantage on the island. The terms
of Denktash's proposals, however, are slightly more flexible than
similar proposals he made in August of 1981.
The Cypriot Government has not acknowledged this publicly, and
it remains opposed to direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots.
Recent comments by government officials strongly suggest that
Kyprianou, nevertheless, may view the Turkish Cypriot offer as an
opening for progress.
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President Bourguiba's sudden decision to restore bread subsidies
may strengthen his popularity, but it could strain the economy and
weaken Prime Minister Mzali.
Bourguiba's announcement caused spontaneous demonstrations
of support in the capital and calls for the removal of Prime Minister
Mzali, whom Tunisians blame for the increases. Press reports indicate
that the government has relaxed the security measures that had been
put into effect to quell protests.
The President has ordered the government to prepare a new
budget within three months and has hinted that prices for petroleum
and alcoholic beverages may rise. The regime estimates that its
subsidy compensation fund will run a deficit of well over $200 million
this year if' existing subsidies on a number of commodities are
retained.
Tunisian security officials, meanwhile, are accusing Islamic
fundamentalists of inciting some of the riots. Press reports say as
many as 3,000 people may have been arrested during the protests.
Comment: The extent of the political damage to Mzali is not yet
clear. Guiga has won a political victory, but Bourguiba may be
reluctant to replace Mzali, whom he has touted as his successor.
The bread price rollback will require the government to postpone
several development projects planned for this year and increase
prices of at least some other subsidized goods. Tunis is likely to try to
obtain more assistance from Western countries to offset its budget
Tunisian authorities clearly are worried about the possible
involvement of Islamic fundamentalists in the rioting. Hints by
Bourguiba that the government might raise prices on liquor may be
partly intended to placate them.
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NICARAGUA: Results of Insurgent Attacks
Anti-Sandinista insurgents in the north staged another combined
air and sea attack on government installations last Thursday.
According to press reports, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force has
claimed responsibility for destroying some buildings and a patrol boat
in the second attack on the northwestern port of Potosi, following an
unsuccessful raid earlier this week. The group also says it conducted
a similar raid on Puerto Sandino on Monday.
Comment: The insurgents probably hope that these highly
publicized operations-similar to guerrilla actions early last fall-will
further their cause and embarrass Managua. Fighting in the north
apparently continues to be intense, with casualties mounting on both
USSR-CANADA: Possible Invitation to Trudeau
A member of Trudeau's peace initiative task force says the
Soviets are hinting that they will invite the Prime Minister to visit
Moscow, if he agrees to be received by officials other than General
Secretary Andropov. The staffer says the trip could be announced
next week and might take place within the next six weeks. He said,
however, that the Soviets have remained noncommittal toward
Trudeau's peace initiative.
Comment: The Soviets probably would welcome a Trudeau visit
to demonstrate their commitment to arms control and to show that
Andropov's absence has not adversely affected his policies or the
daily workings of the government. Trudeau reportedly is eager to go
to Moscow to rejuvenate both his peace initiative and his party's
domestic standing, and he may not insist on a meeting with Andropov
as a precondition. The Soviets are no more likely, however, to
endorse his proposal to revive the arms control dialogue with a
conference of the five nuclear powers than they were in late
November, when Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Moscow
Trudeau's special envoy. 7- W7
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Operation May Be Ending
A senior military officer has told the US Embassy in Pretoria that
South Africa expects to end anti-SWAPO operations in southern
Angola in the next few days, following a major battle against a force of
Cuban, Angolan, and SWAPO units near Cuvelai on Tuesday. The
South Africans claim that they killed 350 soldiers-most of them
SWAPO-destroyed approximately 10 Soviet-manufactured tanks,
and captured a large amount of SWAPO military equipment.
has admitted that 17 of its personnel were killed.
Comment: The battle at Cuvelai is the first major conflict between
South African and Angolan forces since 1981, and South Africa's first
battle involving Cubans since the spring of 1976. Pretoria probably
will terminate the mechanized infantry operation but will continue
aggressive patrolling in southern Angola.
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Participants in the Conference on Disarmament in Europea
Western
Eastern
Neutral and/or nonaligned
aParticipants include Canada and
the United States.
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9jc>rjia
Libya
The United States Goverrirherit has not recognized
the in orporation'6f Estonia_ Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Uniap. Boundary'representation rt
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Special Analysis
EUROPE-US-USSR: Strategy for Conference on Disarmament
Public attention will focus on the meeting between Secretary of
State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko when the Conference on
Disarmament in Europe convenes in Stockholm on 17 January. Most
of the 35 participants, however, will be intent on using the conference
to further their interests. NATO members probably will arrive in
Stockholm publicly united but without a completed package of
confidence- and security-building measures, which the US intends to
be the basis of the Western position. The diverse members of the
neutral and nonaligned group at most may be prepared to state their
collective goals for the conference.
Foreign Ministers of the countries participating in the Conference
on Disarmament in Europe will open negotiations to last at least two
years on confidence- and security-building measures designed to
lessen East-West tensions. According to agreement reached at the
CSCE review meeting in Madrid last year, the measures adopted at
the Stockholm conference have to be "militarily significant, politically
binding, and verifiable." At least in the West's view, they also have to
be applicable to all of Europe, including the USSR west of the Urals.
The Madrid agreement limits the first phase of the conference to
talks only on these measures and not on actual arms reductions.
Participants, nevertheless, differ on the scope of the measures to be
discussed at Stockholm.
Negotiations in Brussels since last September have been intense.
NATO members, nevertheless, still have to settle remaining technical
and substantive differences on the highly complex set of proposals
that outline procedures for notification and observation of military
activities. NATO ambassadors and the heads of Allied delegations to
the conference will make a final effort to resolve these differences
when they meet in Brussels next week
The chief stumblingblock remains the insistence of some Allies on
including language on notification. concerning non-European forces
that enter and leave Europe for another destination. The UK, France,
West Germany, and Canada are the main proponents, probably
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because they want to ensure advance warning of US out-of-area
activities, or to limit them. They may believe that the US desire to get
Allied agreement on the package of measures could weaken US
resolve to exclude references to transits.
Neutral and Nonaligned Nations
The neutral and nonaligned countries are divided into those that
see themselves primarily as mediators between East and West-
Austria, Switzerland, and Finland-and those that are preparing
specific proposals-Sweden and Yugoslavia. Sweden, for example, is
eager to get agreement on constraints on military activities and
training and on a requirement for prior notification of independent air
and naval activities. It also supports the creation of a Nordic nuclear-
free zone, although it maintains that it will not push this at the
conference soon, despite Soviet endorsement of the concept.
Coordination of a neutral and nonaligned policy has not made
much progress thus far because of differing interests. Although most
countries in the group are concerned that the conference will
degenerate into a confrontation between East and West, it is unlikely
they jointly will take a more active role, at least in the near term. Most
believe it would be useful, however, to produce a formal statement on
their views when they caucus just before the meeting.
Allied reluctance to close ranks may presage basic problems for
the West in Stockholm. Certain Allies may find some proposals of the
East and neutral and nonaligned countries to be attractive. The goals
of the Allies, moreover, are not identical.
West German officials have been emphasizing the need to use the
conference constructively to rebut Soviet rhetoric. They are likely to
urge the West to consider measures about constraints on
conventional military activities and on independent air exercises,
contrary to US wishes. Foreign Minister Genscher also may revive an
earlier suggestion that the West support a proposal on non-use of
force or similar such declarations.
France holds the presidency of the EC for the next six months. It
presumably will raise its already high profile within Allied policy
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EC members will caucus informally at Stockholm, but EC policy
coordination is likely to be hampered by personality clashes among
delegation members and competing national interests. Both NATO
and EC policy coordination will be complicated by Greece, which
recently joined Romania in advocating a Balkan nuclear-free zone and
a moratorium on INF deployments.
Most neutral and nonaligned countries probably will act as
middlemen between East and West, despite Sweden's and
Yugoslavia's exhortations to be more activist. Most will prefer that the
conference remain focused on negotiating confidence- and security-
building measures. Even the most cautious among them, however,
may be drawn to support Eastern measures on non-use of force and
no-first-use of nuclear and conventional weapons.
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Special Analysis
FRANCE-ITALY-UK-LEBANON: Concern About the MNF
Paris, Rome, and London are increasingly uncomfortable about
their role in the Multinational Force in Beirut. Their primary concerns
appear to be their troops' physical security, their partners' staying
power, the prospects for the peace talks, and the possibility of placing
operations in Beirut under a UN mandate. All three governments fear
the political cost of unilateral withdrawal, and they probably will
continue their participation in the short term. They will, however, be
interested in political initiatives that would permit an honorable
withdrawal and are likely to take further steps to reduce their troops'
exposure to danger.
All three nations have important interests in the Multinational
Force that would make a complete and abrupt departure difficult.
Paris has historical ties to the area, and Defense and Foreign Ministry
officials have acknowledged a continuing special French role in
Lebanon.
The US Embassy in Rome says leading political figures recognize
that Italy must undertake and support important Western initiatives in
order to have a voice within Alliance councils. London dispatched
troops to Lebanon largely to demonstrate support for the US position,
and the government of Prime Minister Thatcher will not abandon that 25X1
commitment lightly.
European Concerns
The willingness of the three countries to run risks in support of
their foreign policy interests has been undermined by the continuing
violence in Lebanon and the halting progress toward national
reconciliation there. In the short term, Paris, Rome, and London seek
a way to honor their commitment to support the Lebanese
Government and the MNF mandate while providing for the safety of
their troops. They almost certainly are interested in finding a way to
withdraw honorably within the next few months
Prime Minister Craxi has to deal with public opposition to the
presence of Italian forces in Beirut and with growing dissent within his
coalition government as well. Continuing Italian participation in the
MNF is less assured than that of either France or the UK. A
breakdown of the peace talks or a major attack on the Italian
contingent would substantially increase pressure on the Italian
Government to withdraw.
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Prime Minister Thatcher has publicly reiterated London's
commitment to the MNF and thus far has resisted pressures from her
own party and from the opposition to withdraw the British contingent.
Foreign Secretary Howe has said London is reviewing its role in the
MNF. Serious casualties or the withdrawal of another national
contingent would probably result in irresistable domestic pressure to
pull out the British troops.
Public opposition to the Multinational Force has been slow to
develop and is more subdued in France. Paris's shift of some troops
and its reexamination of the French role in the MNF was probably
prompted by the worry-shared by London-that political pressures
may force a US pullout. This would leave the French contingent
isolated in poor defensive positions amid uncontrolled violence.
Prospects
A political breakthrough in Lebanon might increase the
willingness of the three nations to continue participation in the MNF.
None of the MNF partners, however, is willing to remain in Beirut
indefinitely under current circumstances, and even Rome's and
London's short-term participation could be jeopardized, if the peace
process were to break down entirely.
The three governments regard UN assumption of peacekeeping
responsibility as their best.hope for disengaging in Beirut. They
recognize the current opposition of Syria and of the USSR to deeper
The Soviets have traditionally opposed a UN peacekeeping role in
Lebanon. Although they eventually might see an expanded UN
presence as the most effective way of getting US forces removed,
they will not support it as long as Syria remains opposed.
The Italian Government approached the UN Secretary General
last month to discuss UN action in Beirut. Both London and Paris are
now seeking ways to overcome Syrian and Soviet opposition.
Despite their public statements, all three appear to be moving
toward acceptance of Lebanon's de facto partition. Their political
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The reconciliation talks have not yet been scheduled and are not
likely to occur until President Gemayel offers substantial political
concessions to his opponents. In the interim, renewed fighting or the
conclusion by any of the three governments that their troops were in
great danger might prompt them to alter the disposition or
responsibilities of their forces. They might move men offshore or limit
their tasks in Beirut to reduce their vulnerability.
In the absence of visible progress toward peace, the Europeans
may become even more reluctant to continue their commitment to the
Multinational Force. They might then urge the US to help arrange a
joint timetable for winding down the MNF. The Italian troops'
presence has already been publicly tied to the talks, and Rome might
simply declare the MNF lacked a convincing political rationale and
If Rome announces a phased pullout of its troops, London will
probably do the same. A US or Italian withdrawal would probably
force Paris to reconsider its position.
The Europeans will be reluctant to consider any peace plan that
would place their forces at great3r risk or that would entail an
enlargement of MNF forces.
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