THE SOVIET MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY: IMPROVING QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000400530010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t
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Industry: Improving
Quality and Productivity
The Soviet Motor Vehicle
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SOV 86-10040
IA 86-10050
August 1986
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Industry: Improving
Quality and Productivity
The Soviet Motor Vehicle
of Soviet Analysis,
Soviet Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Defense Industries Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 86-10040
IA 86-10050
August 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 30 June 1986
was used in this report.
Industry: Improving
Quality and Productivity
reduce manpower and material requirements.
The Soviet leadership has challenged the motor vehicle industry to raise
vehicle quality and manufacturing productivity to world standards in
support of economywide efforts to increase industrial efficiency. The
industry has been directed to produce fuel-efficient, longer lived vehicles
that will create the basis for a better balanced transportation system and
assimilation of new production technology.
Although the industry has been a leader in the Soviet Union in developing
and introducing new manufacturing technologies and processes and has
served as a proving ground for industrial automation, efforts to modernize
antiquated and overstaffed automobile plants have been complicated by the
great diversity in plant size, level and origin of technology, and product
mix. The plants are equipped with a patchwork of machinery drawn from
various domestic and foreign sources and operate at widely varying levels
of output and efficiency. Plants do not compete with each other because
their vehicle lines for the most part are specialized to serve particular
customers and because excess consumer demand assures individual produc-
ers a ready market. These conditions hinder the efforts of planners to bring
about improved performance, particularly through the diffusion and
from just over 600,000 units in 1965 to almost 2 million in 1975.
Industry modernization in the 1980s builds on the achievements of a 1966-
80 initiative that called for increased output of cars to enhance consumer
welfare and increased production of heavy and light trucks to bring about
better balance in the truck fleet. Investment during 1965-80 continued the
traditional concentration on expanding capacity. This effort was highlight-
ed by the construction of the Volga car plant (operational in 1971) and the
Kama River truck plant (1976) and was supported by the acquisition of
Western manufacturing equipment and technology worth approximately
$4.3 billion. We estimate that completion of these two plants roughly
doubled floorspace at final-production facilities during 1965-80. According
to the Soviet Central Statistical Administration, vehicle production rose
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the Soviets chose to
spread investment more evenly throughout the industry and increasingly
opted to upgrade technology to improve productivity in established plants.
According to the official automotive industry journal, during the late 1970s
roughly 1,000 automated and 700 mechanized lines, 32 automated man-
agement systems, and 16 computer centers were installed throughout the
Secret
SOV 86-10040
IA 86-10050
August 1986
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industry, and during the early 1980s numerous numerically controlled
tools, machining centers, robots, and process controls were installed. The
Soviets chose to draw more evenly on Western, East European, and
domestic sources for this equipment. Identified orders for Western equip-
ment equaled about $1.6 billion during 1976-85, and machinery production
within the motor vehicle industry-a major source for its own equipment-
reportedly increased rapidly during 1976-80. The Soviets claim that by
1983 at least 80 percent of all manufacturing processes and 90 percent of
all foundry operations were automated or mechanized and that, during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the introduction of automated processes and
equipment eliminated about 100,000 jobs in the industry.
Although Moscow substantially raised the technological level of the
industry and its products, we believe that both remain a decade or more be-
hind the West. "Hard automation," in which machine tools are permanent-
ly arranged for most efficient production of long runs of specific parts,
remains the most common approach. Even in their most modern plants, the
Soviets have been almost 10 years behind the West in installing robots and
automated material-handling devices. Moreover, these relatively advanced
applications of Soviet automation impede production flexibility because
lines and machines are rarely linked or computer controlled and therefore
require continued operator intervention. From Western technical analysis
of the key automotive components and subsystems, we estimate that the
current generation of Soviet trucks is comparable to Western trucks of the
mid-1970s.
Taking the late 1970s as a benchmark, expansion in the motor vehicle
industry, the introduction of new vehicle models, and the installation of
advanced automated production technology have yielded small gains in
production, large gains in quality, and uneven gains in efficiency. The
modernization effort itself interfered with vehicle production. By 1980
nearly all old production programs had matured, exhausting the potential
for increases in output through more efficient use of fixed production
resources, and obsolete vehicles were being phased out. The Soviets also
were experiencing difficulties bringing new facilities-especially the Kama
River plant-up to rated capacity. Heavy investment in the Kama River
and Volga plants probably retarded productivity gains elsewhere in the
industry. Consequently, during 1976-85 output rose only slightly, from
2 million to 2.3 million vehicles-an average annual growth rate of only
1.5 percent. Truck production declined in 1982 and car production fell in
1981-82; production of both then rose.
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The marked increase in the quality of Soviet vehicles produced since 1975,
however, has improved the efficiency of the military and civilian transpor-
tation systems. Soviet consumers, institutions, and industries purchased
about 75 percent of all cars-about 1 million cars per year over this period.
We estimate that agriculture and the military each received about 25
percent of truck production, other civilian fleets received 45 percent, and
exports accounted for about 5 percent. We estimate that, on average,
trucks produced in 1985, versus those produced in 1975, can carry about 25
percent more cargo by weight, have about a 45-percent longer service life,
are slightly more fuel efficient, and that the aggregate life-cycle carrying
capacity of trucks produced in 1985 was almost 70 percent greater than
that of those produced in 1975.
Motor vehicle industry productivity remains substantially below Western
levels. Despite the introduction of laborsaving measures over the last
decade, Soviet statements indicate that many
plant operations remain labor intensive by Western standards. The capital
productivity measures we use suggest that the strides the industry has
made over the past decade have been due largely to vehicle design
innovations that have increased average service lives and payloads rather
than to gains in manufacturing efficiency. Using final-assembly floorspace
as a surrogate for capital endowment, we compare the value of output per
unit of floorspace among plants according to four measures:
? The number of units produced reflects a plant's ability to organize
production throughput. By this measure, productivity declined in the
industry as a whole and at three truck plants and all car plants.
? The value derived from summing the current ruble wholesale prices for
all vehicles produced provides an approximate measure of the resource
cost of production. By this measure, productivity rose in truck production
but fell in car production.
? The total weight of vehicles produced demonstrates a plant's ability to
process material inputs. By this measure, productivity declined in the
industry as a whole and at three truck and all car plants. Some of this de-
cline, however, reflects Soviet design advances that have reduced the
weight of individual vehicles, mostly to increase fuel economy.
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? Life-cycle carrying capacity reflects the potential usefulness of trucks to
the economy. By this measure, productivity rose in truck production as a
whole and at all but two truck plants.
To remedy this situation, the Soviets have set ambitious goals for the motor
vehicle industry in the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90) and beyond. Labor
productivity, which is expected to more than double, is slated to grow about
20 percent more rapidly than in the economy as a whole; and the value of
output is to double. Plans also call for a new wave of basic vehicle designs,
including new heavy diesel truck models-some especially for agricul-
ture-and front-wheel-drive cars. By 1990, diesel trucks are to account for
85 percent of total production, up from about 25 percent in 1985.
To achieve these goals, Moscow plans to continue to reequip plants
throughout the industry with more modern and productive machinery
while building substantial new capacity. According to a deputy minister of
the Automotive Ministry, 2,000 automatic lines, more than 300 flexible
manufacturing systems, 5,500 robots, and numerous pieces of equipment
for metal cutting and forming are to be installed by 1990. The Gor'kiy
plant reportedly will be completely reconstructed and retooled at a cost of
1.2-1.4 billion rubles-probably the largest single revitalization project
ever in the industry. In addition, as part of Moscow's increasing emphasis
on using domestic sources of high-technology equipment, the Minsk,
Volga, ZIL, and Gor'kiy motor vehicle plants are to greatly increase their
production of machine tools for the automotive industry and for the
economy as a whole.
Industry final-production floorspace in total probably will expand by at
least an additional 15 percent over the coming decade. We estimate that
completing the expansion of existing plants will account for two-thirds of
the growth. The Soviets reportedly also plan to complete construction of
two new major truck plants and make another addition to ZIL. One new
plant, in Ivanovo (northeast of Moscow), will reportedly assemble 150,000
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medium or heavy trucks per year. The other, in Kirovobad in the
Azerbaijan Republic, will reportedly assemble 40,000 to 50,000 light
trucks and vans per year. These new facilities will probably be completed
and operational sometime in the mid-1990s.
We expect that vehicle production will grow moderately during 1986-90 as
the industry continues to cope with the challenges of assimilating new
programs, plants, and technology. Although we estimate that during this
period production will rise only by roughly 10 percent, from 2.3 million to
2.5 million vehicles, recent trends in qualitative improvements will contin-
ue. By the mid-1990s, the Soviets will have created the conditions for more
rapid increases in production. If they maintain momentum in current
programs, output should rise as new production programs and technologies
are assimilated. We estimate that by the mid-1990s-under optimal
conditions-annual production could reach 1.2 million trucks, nearly
2 million cars, and 125,000 buses-a total of 3.3 million vehicles.
By the early 1990s, as production rises and more durable and efficient
trucks remain longer in the inventory, the military may actually require
delivery of fewer trucks each year. If more trucks are thus made available
to agriculture and construction, motor transportation bottlenecks in these
sectors could be relieved. We also believe that car exports to the West will
receive greater priority over the next several years as Moscow uses sales of
more attractive and efficient vehicles to balance hard currency losses
attributable to poor performance in other sectors and to partially finance
the industry's modernization program.
On balance, we believe that the modernization program of the last
decade-albeit heavily oriented toward hard automation-will yield sub-
stantial gains in product quality and productivity well into the 1990s.
Moreover, the improvements are well timed to support Gorbachev's
objectives of economywide industrial modernization. But, to achieve the
more ambitious objective of raising the motor vehicle industry to world
standards, the Soviets must move to more flexible forms of automation that
can more easily accommodate rapid product change. To do this, they must
overcome or circumvent serious deficiences in key technologies that support
factory automation, including arrays of linked minicomputers, sophisticat-
ed software engineering, microprocessor-operated controls, and high-speed
telecommunications networks. In addition, the leadership will have to
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accommodate associated changes in organizational, managerial, and em-
ployment practices that have been confronting Western automotive manu-
facturers for at least the past decade. Progress in the West, combined with
Soviet deficiencies, suggests that the Soviet motor vehicle industry proba-
bly will not attain the standards of its Western counterparts in this century.
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Development of the Motor Vehicle Industry, 1975-85
2
Expanding Capacity
Advancing Production Technology
8
Impact of Expansion and Modernization
12
Vehicle Quality
14
Manufacturing Productivity
21
Plans and Prospects
26
A. Primary Motor Vehicles Currently Produced by Plant
and Model and Soviet Vehicle Designations
B. Methodology for Estimating Deliveries of Trucks
to the Soviet Military
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The Soviet Motor Vehicle
Industry: Improving
Quality and ProductivityF
The Soviet motor vehicle industry is a prime target of
Gorbachev's industrial modernization program. The
trucks, cars, and buses it produces provide essential
transport services to the military, industry, and the
public, yet many vehicles are inefficient and tie down
a large force of drivers and maintenance personnel
and consume large quantities of scarce petroleum
products.' Its plants are a major source of and
customer for laborsaving machine tools and robotic
systems but, by Western standards, are also over-
staffed. Finally, its consumer goods production-
especially the passenger automobile-provides major
incentives to fuel the greater worker effort that
Gorbachev is seeking.
The industry Gorbachev has to work with reflects the
main tenets of 60 years of Soviet development strate-
gy. Stalinist pressure for rapid industrialization and
appreciation for economies of scale brought about the
construction in the late 1920s and early 1930s of
massive factories manufacturing highly standard ve-
hicle and slowly changing product lines. Construction
of the Moscow (ZIL), Gor'kiy, and Yaroslavl' plants
increased production from a few thousand vehicles in
1928 to 200,000 vehicles in 1937, nearly all of them
trucks. Additional plant construction after World
War II supported an average annual increase in
vehicle production-mostly general purpose medium
trucks-of almost 15 percent between 1946 and 1958.
Much of this extensive growth was sustained by the
sometimes opportunistic import of Western technol-
ogy, creating a patchwork of manufacturing plant and
equipment. The ZIL, Gor'kiy, and Yaroslavl' plants
were partly or totally built by Western firms. During
' According to a Soviet press account, in 1985 the motor transport
sector consumed 70 million tons of fuel and employed 10.5 million
people.
the war, US Lend-Lease aid established several as-
sembly plants and also included the delivery of about
417,000 complete vehicles, most of them all-wheel-
drive trucks. German war reparations provided a
considerable infusion of capital, and US truck and
engine designs acquired through the Lend-Lease pro-
gram were used to establish the postwar generation of
vehicles.
In the 1960s the Soviets sought to diversify and
broaden the motor vehicle industry but continued to
rely on massive vertically integrated facilities. Their
15-year transportation modernization plan announced
in 1965 called for increasing production of automo-
biles and heavy trucks to boost consumer welfare and
create a larger and more balanced truck fleet.' The
Soviets reportedly allocated one-half of the estimated
7 billion rubles invested in the automotive industry
during 1971-75 to the construction of the Volga car
and Kama truck plants. Both plants are based almost
entirely on Western technology and are the largest
plants of their kind in the world.
In the late 1970s-as the 15-year plan was drawing to
a close-the Soviets modified their traditional ap-
proach of simply building additional plants to raise
output. Soviet officials publicly acknowledged the
need for continued growth in vehicle production, but
they stressed the need for greater productivity and
new vehicle designs to improve performance, utility,
and operating efficiency. They allocated investment
more evenly throughout the industry, expanding and
refurbishing existing production facilities with West-
ern, East European, and domestic production technol-
ogies. These themes have been generally reempha-
sized in Gorbachev's industrial modernization
program.
2 In this paper the three truck classes are: light (less than 2 metric
tons carrying capacity), medium (2 to 5 tons), and heavy (over 5
tons). These are the definitions used in the USSR and differ from
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This paper assesses the Soviets' progress toward and
prospects for modernizing and expanding their auto-
motive industry. We consider developments since the
mid-1960s in Soviet facility construction and modern-
ization, and the roles played by Western, domestic,
and East European technology; the quality and quan-
tity of vehicles, particularly trucks; and trends in
manufacturing efficiency. We also consider the im-
pact of ongoing improvement on the Soviet economy
and military.
Development of the Motor Vehicle Industry, 1975-85
The Ministry of the Automotive Industry (Minavto-
prom) operates about 300 plants and numerous re-
search and development (R&D) organizations.' Most
key facilities belong to a production association, and
most associations consist of a lead final-assembly
plant and numerous satellite plants' (see figure 1 and
table 1). Eight production associations produce nearly
all trucks and about one-half of all buses; four
produce almost all Soviet passenger cars. In the mid-
1980s the ministry produced about 250 truck, 60
automobile, and 35 bus models and modifications and
50 types of trailers and attachments. The ministry
also maintains its own internal R&D base for vehicle
design and production technology development (see
inset).
The pattern of expansion and modernization over the
past six decades has created considerable diversity
' Before 1965 the automotive industry was subordinate to several
different administrative organizations including: the Central Ad-
ministration of State Automotive Plants (1922-41); the People's
Commissariat for Medium Machine Building (1941-45); the Minis-
try of the Automobile Industry (1945-47); the Ministry of the
Automobile and Tractor Industry (1947-53); the Ministry of Ma-
chine Building (1953-54); and the Ministry of the Automobile
Industry (1955-57). In 1957 most industrial ministries were abol-
ished and replaced with regional economic councils. In 1965 the
present ministerial structure was introduced.
' Production associations were introduced in the mid-1960s to
increase manufacturing efficiency through a unified administrative
structure that usually brings together in a single enterprise a major
manufacturer and its principal suppliers. This structure is supposed
to provide coordinated production programs among cooperating
plants, more efficient use of resources, and more rapid assimilation
across the industry in production technology, the
degree of vertical integration, and product mix:
? Most of the truck assembly plants and one car
plant-the Volga plant-are highly vertically inte-
grated, producing many of the truck and car compo-
nents in on-site foundries, forges, machine shops,
engine plants, and other facilities. These plants have
varying access to satellite plants that produce other
components (such as transmissions and electrical
equipment) or assemble specialized vehicles, and
rely on production technology that varies greatly in
vintage and origin.
? The remaining automobile and bus plants rely ex-
tensively on other facilities for the supply of compo-
nents and subassemblies. In production technology,
the Volga and Moskvich plants, which were built by
Italy's Fiat and modernized by France's Renault,
have little in common with their counterparts.
Differences among plants are accentuated by the
extreme specialization of each product line. There is
relatively little overlap among the customer require-
ments that each production association is designed to
serve.
Soviet literature indicates that the plants also operate
at widely varying levels of efficiency, which compli-
cates industrial management. For example, in the
early 1970s Soviet authors claimed that labor produc-
tivity in the Kama plant would be two to three times
greater than productivity in older Soviet passenger car
plants. These wide differences make it difficult for
planners to distinguish between bad management and
factors beyond the plant manager's control. The
differences particularly frustrate efforts to induce
technical innovation. Plant managers cannot be readi-
ly evaluated against the same performance norms,
and the patchwork of equipment means that technol-
ogy needs vary by facility. Soviet literature reveals
frustration over the limited successes of campaign-
style efforts to introduce new production machinery-
much of it Western-at older plants to increase
production efficiency.
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Figure 1
Major Soviet Motor Vehicle Plants
E5
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
Q?
Baltic Sea
Minsk_ Zhodino
Lvov 17 . Lutsk
10
Black "-
Sea
Ustinovl3
1 3
15 Kurgan
Soviet Union
Kutaisi
Turkey 5
.Yerevan
20
IragSaadr Arabia
Neutral Zone
jK w
P
altL
ersian
Gull
Saudi
Arabia
Caspian
Sea i
Aral
Sea
Kremenchug
4
14 aporozh'ye
12 Mosco
9* Likii
16 18
Pavlovoe`
Gor'kiy
Motor vehicle plant - vehicle produced
1. Belorussian - heavy trucks
2. Gor'kiy - medium trucks, automobiles, and armored vehicles
3. Kama River - heavy trucks
4. Kremenchug - heavy trucks
5. Kutaisi - heavy trucks
6. Minsk - heavy trucks and missile transports
7. Ul'yanovsk -jeeps, light trucks, and vans
8. Ural - medium and heavy trucks
9. Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Likachev (ZIL) - medium
and heavy trucks and automobiles
10. Lutsk - automobiles
11. Volga - automobiles
12. Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Lenin Komsomol (Moskvich) -
automobiles
13. Ustinov - automobiles
14. Zaporozh'ye - automobiles
15. Kurgan - buses
16. Likino - buses
17. L'vov - buses
18. Pavlovo - buses
19. Riga - buses and minivans
20. Yerevan - buses and minivans
7
UI'yanovsk
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Table I
Major Production Facilities in the Soviet Motor Vehicle Industry
Production
Association
Plant Name
and Acronym
Final Machining
Assembly
Fabrication
Forging
Foundry
Number of
Identified
Satellite Plants
BelavtoMAZ
Belorussian Motor Vehicle Plant
(BeIAZ)
2
1
1
1
AvtoGAZ
Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant
(GAZ)
5
2
2
2
4
AvtoKamAZ
Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant
(KamAZ)
2
3
1
6
5
14
AvtoKrAZ
Kremenchug Motor Vehicle Plant
(KrAZ)
3
3
3
1
1
1
AvtoKAZ
Kutaisi Motor Vehicle Plant (KAZ)
5
3
1
3
1
BelavtoMAZ
Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant (MAZ)
3
2
1
3
AvtoUAZ
Ul'yanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant
(UAZ)
2
2
1
4
4
AvtoUralAZ
Ural Motor Vehicle Plant
(UralAZ)
4
4
2
4
4
1
AvtoZIL
Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant imeni
Likachev (ZIL)
4
7
1
3
2
17
AvtoZAZ
Lutsk Motor Vehicle Plant (LuAZ)
2
2
AvtoVAZ
Volga Motor Vehicle Plant (VAZ)
2
2
2
1
4
5
AvtoMosk-
vich
Motor Vehicle Plant Lenin
Komsomol (AZLK)
2
1
3
AvtoZAZ
Zaporozh'ye Motor Vehicle Plant
(ZAZ)
3
1
2
1
4
3
AvtoGAZ
Kurgan Motor Vehicle Plant
(KuAZ)
2
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Automotive R&D is conducted by two specialized
independent scientific research institutes and by the
R&D departments of the principal plants:
? The Central Scientific Research Institute for Auto-
mobiles (NAMI) researches vehicle design, materi-
als, and components. NAMI s scientists consult and
cooperate with plant designers-especially regard-
ing vehicle quality and service life-but do not have
primary responsibility for developing vehicles.
? The Scientific Research Institutefor the Technol-
ogy of the Automotive Industry (NIITavtoprom)
researches new production processes, equipment,
and management techniques and helps to facilitate
their introduction into production at the plants.
NIITavtoprom conducts research on technologies-
such as machine tools, robotics, and factory auto-
mation-that are applicable to many industries and
formulates technical standards for automotive pro-
duction technology. F__]
Vehicle design bureaus at selected production plants
generally integrate technology and make the final
decisions on overall product and process design,
although they do interact extensively with NAMI and
NIITavtoprom. Several plant design bureaus also
influence development and thus affect likely paths for
diffusion of technology throughout the industry:
? Gor'kiy is a leading developer of light and medium
trucks, passenger cars, gasoline engines, and ar-
mored personnel carriers. It designs the jeeps made
at the Ulyanovsk plant and the trucks assembled
at its subordinate Saransk and Frunze truck as-
sembly plants.
? The Minsk truck plant develops very heavy trucks,
several of which have no Western counterparts.
? The Volga car plant is a leading developer of
manufacturing technologies, particularly industrial
robots.
? The Yaroslavl' engine plant is the leading developer
of Soviet diesel engines.
Foreign R&D organizations still support car and bus
design, but the Soviets no longer slavishly copy
Western truck designs. For example, Italy's Fiat
built the Volga car plant and designed all its cars
except the new VAZ 2108, which was designed by
West Germany's Porsche. France's Renault recon-
structed and equipped the Moskvich car plant in the
late 1970s and designed new Moskvich cars. Hun-
gary's bus manufacturer Ikarus has influenced Soviet
bus design. Conversely, Soviet trucks, although still
showing signs of their Ford and Studebaker heritage,
are largely Soviet in design.
? ZIL is generally acknowledged as the leader of the
industry and as one of the technical leaders of all
Soviet machine building. The Kriger Design Bureau
at ZIL has designed since at least the early 1950s
all military and civilian medium and heavy ZIL
trucks (except the 8x8 missile transporter-erector-
launchers), as well as trucks being built at the
Kama, Kutaisi, and Ural truck plants. ZIL also is a
leader in automated machining technology.
Articles in the Soviet press suggest that the industry's
R&D base is uneven in quality. ZIL is almost
universally praised. Others-like Gor'kiy-are ac-
cused of having a weak scientific and technological
experimental base, inadequate to bring it up to par
with leading world automotive manufacturing tech-
nologies. NAMI and, even more, NIITavtoprom are
accused of not meeting the needs of the industry, and
individual plants are urged to develop stronger in-
house R&D facilities.__________
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Expanding Capacity
We estimate that floorspace available at motor vehi-
cle industry final-production facilities increased by
about 50 percent between 1975 and 1985 and roughly
doubled between 1965 and 1980-the period of the
transportation Ian 5 (see figure 2). We base this
estimate on the 20 major
motor vehicle assembly plants, which account for
nearly thr - vehicle industry
floorspace Soviet press state-
ments indicate that several of the remaining motor
vehicle facilities have grown at about the same rate
over the past several years. One-third of the expansion
at the 20 major facilities took place in final-assembly
buildings and the remainder in chemical and thermal
processing, machining, foundry, stamping, and subas-
sembly operations.
A near doubling of truck production facilities ac-
counts for about three-fourths of industry expansion.
Most of the growth occurred at the five heavy truck
plants in preparation for new models of heavy, diesel-
powered general purpose trucks or special-purpose
offroad trucks for lumbering, mining, and agriculture,
where, according to numerous Soviet press accounts,
there is an acute shortage of adequate transport
capabilities. The key projects included and the vehi-
cles they support are:
? Kama River truck plant. The facility-operational
in 1976-accounted for 75 percent of the growth in
the truck industry and about 60 percent of the
growth in motor vehicle industry facilities during
1976-85. KamAZ-5320 and -4310 general purpose
cargo and tractor trucks account for much of the
increase in Soviet heavy truck production (see
figure 3).
? Kremenchug truck plant. Two new assembly build-
ings were added to support production of the general
purpose KrAZ-250 and -260 heavy trucks.
' We estimate expansion by measuring the floorspace of new
production buildings completed. Production floorspace includes
foundries, forges, machine shops, and component, subassembly, and
final-assembly buildings. It excludes administrative, engineering,
Figure 2
Estimated Soviet Motor
Vehicle Plant Floorspace, 1975 and 1985$
I I I I
0 4 8 12
a These data are only for the 20 motor
plants listed in figure 1.
? Kutaisi truck plant. Assembly floorspace grew by
55 percent to support production of the KAZ-4540,
a 5.5-ton-capacity vehicle used primarily for
agriculture.
? Minsk truck plant. Production floorspace grew by
40 percent to support the introduction in the early
1980s of new MAZ-6422, -7310, -7510, and -7910
cargo, tractor, and special-purpose heavy trucks.
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? Belorussian truck plant. Production floorspace
nearly doubled between 1975 and 1985 to support
the introduction in the early 1980s of new 75-, 110-,
and 180-ton-capacity dump trucks used in mining
and construction (see appendix A).
Overall, automobile plant production floorspace grew
by nearly 25 percent during 1976-85, modest growth
compared with the previous decade when completion
of the Volga car plant roughly doubled its production
floorspace. About one-half of the capacity added
during 1976-85 represented further expansion of the
Volga plant, while the considerably smaller Moskvich,
Ustinov, Lutsk, and Zaporozh'ye car plants expanded
by between 20 and 50 percent.
Bus final-production facilities grew by about 25 per-
cent, but only two of the six bus assembly plants were
affected. The L'vov plant more than doubled in size in
1976-80, and the Kurgan plant has expanded by
almost three-quarters since 1980. The growth was
concentrated in final-assembly areas and is to support
production of new bus models in the late 1980s.
Overall, between 1975 and 1985 we estimate that
truck and automotive plant production floorspace
increased at an average annual rate of a little more
than 4 percent, faster than the 3-percent expansion
rate of the previous decade. If Kama is excluded,
however, average annual growth would fall to less
than 2 percent.
Advancing Production Technology
Soviet investment in the motor vehicle industry be-
tween 1965 and 1980 supported facility moderniza-
tion as well as expansion of production capacity.
Many new vehicles had been introduced in the 1960s,
but Soviet literature
indicate they were produced in
labor-intensive operations using equipment that fre-
quently dated from the 1950s and even earlier.
Foundry, stamping, pressing, and machining opera-
tions were only partially mechanized and almost never
truly automated. The first Soviet numerically con-
trolled (NC) machine tools were not available for
installation until the late 1960s (see inset).
During 1966-80 the Soviets turned to the West for a
quick infusion of modern production technology. We
estimate that, during the late 1960s to middle 1970s,
outlays for foreign technology for the Volga and
Kama plants totaled about $4.3 billion. Automated
machining, forging, pressing, processing, and welding
constituted more than 60 percent of the total value of
Western technology acquired for these plants. The
Soviets procured hundreds of automated lines for
machining, foundry, stamping, and material handling,
as well as hundreds of NC and computer numerically
controlled (CNC) machine tools. Soviet literature
indicates that between 1965 and 1975 the share of the
vehicle industry work force engaged in mechanized or
automated manufacturing operations increased from
less than two-thirds to more than three-quarters.
Modernization of the motor vehicle industry contin-
ued in the 1975-80 period. According to Soviet indus-
try journals, about 1,000 automated and continuous
production lines for assembly, foundry, stamping, and
machining operations were added, an increase of 40
percent. By 1980 the 3,600 automated lines in the
automotive industry represented almost 15 percent of
the roughly 25,000 automated and semiautomated
lines reportedly in use in the USSR in mid-1980.
Nearly 700 new mechanized lines also were installed,
a 15-percent increase that brought the total in opera-
tion to 5,300. Computer systems were introduced to
manage production resources. Between 1976 and
1980, automated management systems were installed
at 32 locations, 16 computer centers were built for
centralized automated data-processing services, and
12,000 people were employed in computer-related
jobs. Automated processes and equipment installed
during 1976-80 eliminated some 80,000 jobs in the
industry-almost 10 percent of the estimated total
industry work force during this time.
We believe modernization became more selective and
broad based in the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1981-
85). The focus shifted to installation of individual NC
tools, machining centers, transfer lines, welding and
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Manipulator. A device that moves material, parts, or
tools through limited, preset motions to perform
simple tasks, such as single-point spot welding and
simple materials handling (stacking or point-to-point
transfer).
Industrial robot. A reprogrammable multifunction
manipulator that moves material, parts, tools, or
specialized devices through variable programed mo-
tions to perform a variety of tasks.
Numerically controlled (NC) machine tool. An auto-
mated machine tool whose movements and functions
are controlled by numerical information recorded on
paper tape, punch cards, or magnetic tape. Readers
convert this information into signals that operate
servomotors, which move the machine along each of
its axes.
Computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine
tool. An advanced NC machine tool in which a
computer is substituted for the command portion of
the machine tool's control system. Advantages are
online program revision, automatic correction of ma-
chine inaccuracies, and the elimination of tape or
card handling. A computer may control several ma-
chines and incorporate them into an integrated manu-
facturing system.
Machining center. A complex NC machine tool,
usually under computer control, which performs all
the production functions of a machining operation,
including machine axis control, tool changing, work-
piece changing, and machine scheduling.
Transfer line. A series of machine tools each of which
performs a specific operation linked by conveyors and
holding devices equipped with automatic controls.
Gear cutting lines are common examples.
Mechanized line. Any combination of machine tools
or processes linked by common mechanical material
handling systems such as conveyors.
Automated or automatic line. Either a transfer or
continuous production line with automatic controls.
Flexible manufacturing system (FMS). An integrated
system of several CNC machine tools and robots,
often with automated material handling and ware-
housing, which performs several machining, transfer,
and inspection functions automatically under com-
mon control of a host computer.
Automated management systems (ASUs). Computer-
ized systems for the management of a wide variety of
production and planning operations for processing
information in accounting, analysis, planning, orga-
nizing, and design. ASUs, in theory, are implemented
at the ministerial or production association level.
Automated management systems for technical pro-
cesses (ASUTP). Used for the management of a
particular production process.
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painting robots, and process controls-and away from
new major production lines and plants. Soviet indus-
try publications claimed that in 1983 at least 80
percent of all manufacturing processes and 90 percent
of foundry processes were either automated or mecha-
nized. The introduction of more productive automated
processes and equipment reportedly replaced some
22,000 jobs in the automotive industry during 1981-
83 alone. Specific examples included:
? At Gor'kiy and ZIL, welding lines incorporating
some 1,000 robots were installed during 1981-85,
although many were essentially manipulators and
not programmable. In 1985 a Soviet automotive
industry journal estimated that each Soviet robot
can replace between a half and one and a half
production workers.
? At Kama and Volga, 88 percent of all casting and
96 percent of all stamping operations were automat-
ed by 1985. At ZIL, Kama, Volga, and Ul'yanovsk
new high-speed automated lines were producing
3,000 hot stampings per hour and reportedly were
up to 10 times more productive than the processes
they replaced.
? During 1981-84, introduction of microprocessor-
controlled, automated hot stamping lines reportedly
eliminated the need for 1,300 jobs industrywide.
? Another 9,500 jobs were reportedly eliminated in
1981-84 by improvements in automated control of
material handling and warehousing systems.
? The total number of automated process control
systems in use in the industry nearly doubled to 72.
Unlike the technology introduced in the late 1960s to
middle 1970s-which depended heavily on purchases
of Western technology-the more broadly based mod-
ernization effort since then has drawn more evenly
from Western, East European, and domestic sources.
Identified orders for Western automotive production
technology totaled about $1.6 billion during 1976-85,
less than one-half of total purchases during 1971-75,
when Kama and Volga were being equipped. In
contrast to the 1970s-when integrated turnkey lines
were imported to establish basic manufacturing capa-
bilities-purchases in the early 1980s were more
selective and specialized. Robots, digital process and
conveyor controls, gear cutters, machining centers,
and transfer lines were most frequently purchased.
Although the United States and West Germany sup-
plied a large share of Western technology to the
industry during the 1970s, Japan, Italy, and France
became the leading Western suppliers by the early
1980s (see table 2).
Eastern Europe has also been a large supplier of
production technology to the Soviet automotive indus-
try since at least the 1960s. For example, during the
10th FYP (1976-80) about 125 metal-cutting and
-forming lines-reportedly more than 10 percent of
all such lines installed in the industry during this
period-came from East Germany. As the pace of
Western acquisitions slowed after the mid-1970s,
Eastern Europe became a more important supplier of
technology. During the early 1980s, CEMA countries,
mainly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, exported
to the USSR thousands of NC tools and hundreds of
transfer lines for machining and forging. In 1984, for
example, East Germany supplied 20 transfer lines to
the Minsk truck plant and six automated press forg-
ing lines to the Moskvich car plant. East Germany
also has supplied process controls for automated lines
and components for flexible manufacturing systems.
In 1984 it was slated to deliver a flexible manufactur-
ing system (FMS) for shaping gears-consisting of 20
automated lines controlled by computer-and agreed
to supply a complete flexible manufacturing facility
worth 23 million rubles.
The Soviet automotive industry also further developed
its own capabilities to produce advanced manufactur-
ing equipment. During 1976-80, production of manu-
facturing equipment for internal use reportedly in-
creased rapidly, with industrial robots, manipulators,
and automated welding lines accounting for most of
the growth. In 1985, industry production of FMSs
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Table 2
Identified Soviet Orders for Western Automotive Technology, 1976-85
Major Equipment Orders
Date
Country
Value
(million US $)
Engine and cylinder-head assembly lines
April 1982
Italy
25.0
Piston-ring manufacturing equipment
February 1983
Japan
25.2
Expansion of Moskvich car plant and design of Moskvich
2104 car
also began.' The Volga and ZIL associations have
emerged as the industry leaders:
? Volga reportedly increased its output of production
equipment for use in the automotive industry by 20
times during 1980-84. Since 1979, Volga has be-
come the largest Soviet manufacturer of industrial
robots. By 1985 it produced 7,000 units-about 15
percent of the USSR's total production. These
robots are used in welding, machining, casting, and
" We are unsure of the total production of machine tools by the
motor vehicle industry. As in the West, because of requirements for
dedicated, sophisticated machinery-like robots and flexible manu-
facturing systems-vehicle makers build some of their own equip-
ment. F___1
assembly operations throughout industry. The total
value of production equipment manufactured at
Volga during the 11th FYP reportedly was 190
million rubles.
earmarked for ZIL.
? ZIL continues to fill its traditional role as the
proving ground for state-of-the-art automotive pro-
duction technology such as FMSs. One of the first
domestically developed and produced FMS cells-
consisting of several forge presses supported by
automated feeding and transport systems-was in-
stalled in 1984 for forging the crankshafts and axle
beams for the ZIL- 130 truck. In addition, many of
the Western FMSs that the Soviets have purchased
or are seeking for the automotive industry are
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Overall, Moscow has substantially raised the techno-
logical level of its automotive industry, but we believe
the industry remains about 10 years behind the West.
For example, in the most modern facilities the Soviets
installed a large number of welding robots in the early
1980s to increase productivity and quality, almost a
decade after a similar thrust in the West. Materials
handling, heavily mechanized or automated in the
West since the early 1970s, is still quite labor inten-
sive in many parts of Soviet industry.
The Soviet preference for "hard automation" also
impedes production flexibility. In 1985 a typical
Soviet transfer line consisted of a series of permanent-
ly installed machine tools linked by mechanical con-
veyors to move work pieces from one tool to the next
using pneumatic or electrohydraulic control mecha-
nisms. An electrical "status board" might display, but
not control, the manufacturing process. A great many
manual operations remained, and continuing operator
intervention was needed. Because converting to a
significantly different product would require major
reconstruction, the usual arrangement of the produc-
tion line encourages the high-volume and long produc-
tion runs that characterize Soviet vehicle programs.
In contrast, Western automakers are installing flexi-
ble lines that can produce a variety of similar parts.
Quick die change press lines pioneered by the Japa-
nese have become commonplace in the West, reducing
part changeover times from hours to minutes as well
as reducing the number of presses needed. Since
presses can be set up quickly, factories can carry
smaller inventories of pressed parts, which also helps
to reduce plant space. Emphasis on quality, induced
by increased competitive pressure, has also taken
workers completely out of the process for some opera-
tions in Western facilities such as body welding and
painting, now done in advanced plants entirely with
robots.
Advanced Soviet automotive facilities use mainframe
computers to help manage inventory control, material
handling, and production scheduling, but generally do
not use networks of interactive minicomputers and
mainframes to integrate manufacturing operations.
Information is updated periodically at a remote loca-
tion rather than processed immediately on the plant
floor. In contrast, Western automotive plants by the
early 1980s were already using computer-operated
local area networks and information management
systems to both monitor and control processes in near-
real time and to plan and schedule production. Com-
puter links to certain suppliers enable a "just-in-time"
material flow, and computers and advances in manu-
facturing technology allow almost total automated
inspection at many stages, with inspection systems
often using machine vision and robots. Western state-
of-the-art computer integration is represented by
General Motors' Manufacturing Automation Proto-
col. This effort promises to provide for almost total
integration of each factory's burgeoning number of
computers and computer-controlled operations into a
comprehensive network for better and more timely
management of manufacturing operations.
Since the late 1970s, expansion in the Soviet automo-
tive industry, the introduction of new vehicle models,
and the installation of advanced automated produc-
tion technology have yielded small gains in produc-
tion, large gains in quality, and uneven gains in
efficiency. New automated assembly, molding, ma-
chining, forging, welding, and materials handling
lines, as well as NC tools and machining centers, have
reportedly raised output, reduced labor requirements,
and cut inventories of work in progress. These newer
technologies also allow the Soviets to fabricate more
complex, varied, and precise parts. Moreover, quality
control has become a more integral part of the
manufacturing process because product specifications
must be closely monitored to allow automated systems
to function smoothly. This improves overall vehicle
quality and probably has contributed to the signifi-
cantly improved performance, service life, and fuel
efficiency of Soviet trucks, cars, and buses.
Production
Over the past decade the Soviets have continued to
emphasize long production runs of a few basic vehicle
models, relying on numerous minor modifications and
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The ZIL-131 Medium Truck:
Reaping the Benefits of Long Production Runs
Some Soviet vehicle production runs, especially those for trucks,
have lasted 20 years. Except for the Kama heavy truck
program, nearly all of the general purpose truck models now
in production are based on a dozen or so basic chassis
designs that date from the 1960s or earlier. The com-
ponents of these basic designs are modified frequently,
and the basic models are often fitted with a variety,
of bodies and freight platforms for special appli-
cations. Because each configuration usually has
its own model designator, about 250 variations
of truck models are in production at any given time."
Long production runs have important advan-
tages. First, production lines can be equipped
with less expensive, fixed tooling optimized for
high output of a single product. The Soviets
realize economies of large-scale production
and, for at least the first several years of a new
production program, benefit from `learning"
effects as process flows, machining, fabrication,
and assembly practices are improved and save
Estimated Annual Production
of ZIL-131 Trucks, 1968-85
60
labor and materials. Because Soviet plant labor
and fixed capital allocations usually vary little
from year to year, such improvements generally 50
yield increasing production over the first several
years of a program. A good example is the
production profile of the ZIL-131-an all- 40
wheel-drive medium truck that entered
production in 1966 and makes up a significant
share of the Soviet military truck inventory. We
fitted a learning curve to annual production 30
estimates
ZIL-131 production demonstrated an
80-percent learning effect. In other words, each
doubling of cumulative production coincided 20
with a 20-percent decline in the man-hours and
machine hours required to produce a single
truck.
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special bodies to accommodate particular applica-
tions. For example, only four basic designs-the ZIL-
130 and -131 and the GAZ-53 and -66-accounted
for two-thirds of all trucks produced in 1975. The new
heavier Kama truck line is used in the same way, with
numerous configurations built on three chassis de-
signs. In 1985, ZIL, Gor'kiy, and Kama trucks ac-
counted for over two-thirds of all trucks produced.
Although this high degree of standardization proba-
bly imposes some costs on users, it enables the Soviet
producers to realize the benefits of high-volume, long
production runs (see inset).
We estimate that between 1975 and 1985 the total
number of vehicles produced in the USSR increased
by only about 15 percent-or at about 1.5 percent per
year-reaching 2.3 million vehicles. Growth proceed-
ed slowly in trucks, automobiles, and buses, with only
the Kama truck plant and Riga bus plant registering
sizable increases (see figure 4 and table 3). (We
estimate production by plant on the basis of published
Soviet production statistics,
Truck production
stagnated during 1978-82 an en declined, while
automobile and bus production declined slightly after
1981 as new models were introduced. Truck and car
output rose following the decline. This indifferent
quantitative performance-as opposed to a continued
boost in qualitative indicators-may have led the
Soviets to discontinue publishing truck production
statistics in 1982 and bus statistics in 1983. F_
We believe these trends reflect a major transition in
the motor vehicle industry:
Figure 4
USSR: Estimated Motor Vehicle
Production, 1924-85
? During the early and middle 1970s, massive invest- ? In the early 1980s, the Soviets began the withdraw-
ment in Kama probably preempted some investment al of obsolete vehicles, and the wide-ranging effort
in new plant and equipment elsewhere in the indus- to modernize equipment will support increased pro-
try, thereby retarding overall productivity duction of new vehicles in the middle and late
improvement. 1980s.
? By the late 1970s, nearly all production programs Vehicle Quality
under way in the industry had matured and largely From an analysis of reported Soviet vehicle perfor-
exhausted the potential to increase production be- mance characteristics, we calculate that the perfor-
cause of "learning" effects and economies of scale. mance and durability of trucks entering Soviet fleets
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Table 3
USSR: Estimated Motor Vehicle
Production by Plant
Gor'kiy
264.4
232.0
Ul'yanovsk
120.0
130.0
Ural
29.2
35.0
Kama River
115.0
Ustinov
173.7
196.0
Zaporozh'ye
123.2
149.0
Gor'kiy
63.2
72.5
Lutsk
12.0
17.0
.5
Subtotal
1,201.7
L'vov
13.5
16.0
Subtotal
67.0
83.0
Total
1,964.7
2,263.0
Figure 5
Estimated Improvement in
Soviet General Purpose Trucks, 1975-85
L
0 Life-cycle Service Payload Fuel
ton- life efficiency
kilometers
trucks (the tons of payload that a vehicle can carry
over its projected service life) added to the fleet in
increased markedly from 1975 to 1985. The average 1985 increased nearly 70 percent over the 1975 level
service life of all trucks produced in 1985 was about (see figure 5).
45 percent greater than the average for trucks pro-
duced in 1975. While the average gross vehicle weight Most of the increase in lifetime carrying capacity was
of newly produced trucks increased by less than 10 represented by the growing share of Kama trucks. A
percent between 1975 and 1985, the average vehicle Kama heavy truck has roughly double the life-cycle
payload, or carrying capacity, rose by 25 percent, and carrying capacity of the 1975-era medium truck that
fuel efficiency rose slightly. Because of this combina-
tion of longer average service life and greater carrying
capacity, the average lifetime carrying capacity of
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it typically replaces. Kama vehicles-although only
15 percent of all new trucks-accounted for about 45
percent of the total life-cycle carrying capacity of
Soviet trucks produced in 1985. This improvement
will be sustained as Kama production reaches its
planned capacity of 150,000, probably about 1990.'
In addition, because of higher output of light trucks,
vans, and heavy trucks, the fleet is more flexible and
better able to meet the transport demands of the
economy, particularly on long-haul intercity and ur-
ban routes. In the past, for short urban hauls the
Soviets relied predominantly on medium trucks that
would typically carry only a small fraction of their
payload capacity. Light trucks require less fuel to
operate and, given Soviet motor transport inefficien-
cies, generally carry a much larger percentage of their
rated payload than that of the medium trucks while
moving the same freight. Similarly, heavy trucks
moving large payloads over long hauls consume less
fuel per ton of freight moved than do medium trucks.
In investment terms, the life-cycle procurement cost
per ton of payload-or the factory wholesale price
divided by the number of ton-kilometers the vehicle
could move over its service life-actually fell by more
than 15 percent between 1975 and 1985. While the
average current wholesale price of a truck rose by
more than 70 percent, much of the increase reflected
the introduction of higher quality trucks with greater
carrying capacities and longer service lives.' The
longer lives and less frequent routine maintenance
needs of the new trucks also significantly reduce
outlays for spare parts, maintenance supplies, facili-
ties, and personnel per ton-kilometer of freight moved.
' This relationship is expressed in current-year rubles with no
adjustment for the implicit inflation we believe exists. Therefore, in
real (constant price) terms, the increase in procurement costs is
probably overstated and cost savings per ton-kilometer are likely to
The large gains in fuel efficiency have significant
implications for energy conservation in the USSR.
Although the new trucks are on average heavier and
can carry larger loads than older ones, we estimate
that their average fuel consumption per kilometer
traveled is lower. We estimate that savings for gaso-
line-powered trucks averaged less than 5 percent, due
mainly to slightly more efficient engines. The growing
share of diesel trucks in total production had a greater
impact because they consume 25 to 30 percent less
fuel per kilometer than gasoline-powered trucks. The
largest gains in fuel efficiency were recorded in
models with the greatest carrying capacity, so on the
average 25 percent less fuel was required per ton-
kilometer of freight moved for trucks produced in
1985 than for those produced in 1975. More impor-
tant, because diesel trucks now represent a much
larger share of the trucks produced and diesel fuel is
much less costly than gasoline in the USSR, the fuel
cost to move a ton-kilometer of freight fell even more.
gasoline-powered trucks they replace.
Deliveries of these larger and more efficient trucks to
the Soviet military have already yielded significant
gains in greater lift capacity, fuel efficiency, and
simplified logistics. Kama trucks outperform the gaso-
line-powered ZIL and Ural medium and heavy trucks
they are replacing. For example, during 1981-84
alone, deliveries of Kama trucks to Soviet units
stationed in East Germany raised the lift capacity in
identified units by 60 percent." Combined with in-
creases in fuel stores held in forward areas, this
significantly improves the sustainability of motor
transport support to military operations. Moreover,
because the Kama trucks have longer service lives,
they can operate for longer periods between routine
maintenance, and, using the same fuel as many
armored vehicles, they are easier to support than the
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The succession of new Soviet truck models introduced
over the past decade has narrowed the technology gap
with the West. From Western technical studies of the
quality and performance of key vehicle components,
we estimate that Soviet trucks produced in 1985
roughly equal Western standards of 1975. In contrast,
Soviet truck models produced in the mid-1970s were
roughly equivalent to Western models of about
1960-a lag of about 15 years. Currently, automatic
transmissions and diesel engines are the two compo-
nent technology areas in which the Soviets are fur-
thest behind.
More modern production methods and equipment
have also contributed to raising the quality of passen-
ger automobiles, mainly in the Volga, Moskvich, and
Ustinov facilities. New Soviet automobiles also have
longer service lives and greater fuel efficiency than
the vehicles they replace. Most of these quality gains
are rooted in Western technology. The Volga plant is
a complete Western turnkey facility producing an
Italian-designed car. The Moskvich automobile, pro-
duced at the Moskvich and Ustinov plants, is of
French design and is manufactured with large
amounts of equipment imported from the West.
Qualitative improvement of Soviet buses has not been
a high priority over the decade. Nevertheless, the
advances in service life and fuel efficiency for Soviet
trucks have carried over to buses, since truck plants
provided some chassis and engines for buses. Buses
produced at the Kurgan plant probably made the
largest gains in service life and efficiency, largely
because they use engines produced at Kama.
Allocation of Vehicle Production
During the virtual stagnation in vehicle production
between 1975 and 1985, we detected no major shift in
the allocation of vehicles to major customers. The
military continued to receive a large share of the most
modern productive trucks. Sustained annual produc-
tion of over 1 million passenger cars brought them for
the first time within reach of large numbers of Soviet
citizens. The Soviets continued to be net exporters of
vehicles, delivering trucks to client states and earning
some hard currency with cars.
Mainly on the basis of Soviet statistic 25X1
we estimate that about 10 percent of all 25X1
Soviet vehicles produced between 1975 and 1985 were
delivered to the military (almost all of them trucks),"
16 percent were exported (mostly cars), and the
remaining 74 percent were delivered to primarily civil
uses-government agencies, civilian industry, agricul-
ture, transport, and private citizens. Exports have
fluctuated widely since 1975, declining to about
260,000 in 1982 from more than 425,000 in both 1978
and 1979 (see figure 6).
The Soviet military relies primarily on medium ZIL,
Gor'kiy, and Ural cargo trucks, but heavy trucks-
many from the Kama plant-have accounted for a
rising share of its acquisitions since the early 1980s
(see inset). Overall, we estimate that deliveries to the
military rose from about 195,000 trucks in 1975 to
220,000 trucks in 1985, less than the 1.5-percent
annual growth in total truck production. We estimate
that during this period the inventory of trucks in the
Soviet military increased by more than 10 percent to
nearly 1.2 million vehicles (see figure 7 and
appendix B).
We estimate that total Soviet truck, car, and bus
exports have declined by about 10 percent since 1975
and now account for about 15 percent of total vehicle
production:
? On the basis of an analysis of Soviet trade data, cars
accounted for about 85 percent of the 300,000
vehicles exported in 1985, and about 90 percent of
total vehicle exports since 1975. Most of these were
from the Moskvich and Volga plants and a majority
were sold to Eastern Europe.
? Analysis of Soviet trade data and Soviet automotive
industry publications indicates that only about 5
percent of Soviet truck production was exported in
1985. Most were general purpose cargo vehicles, but
25X1
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I
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Figure 6
Estimated Shares of Deliveries of
Soviet Motor Vehicles, 1975-85
exports included jeeps and heavy mining trucks
from the Belorussian truck plant. Most were ex-
ported to Eastern Europe and other Soviet client
states such as Cuba and Syria.
? Buses valued at 17 million rubles were exported in
1985, which we estimate represents several hundred
buses.
Export, less than I
Military, 1
Civilian, 99
Declining exports reflect the obsolescence of Soviet
vehicles, Soviet difficulty in providing a reliable sup-
ply of spare parts and maintenance services, and
domestic shortfalls that probably induced the Soviets
to scale down exports to allies.
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Standardization in Soviet Truck Design:
Military and Civilian Applications
The USSR generally builds both highway (limited-
mobility) and o,Bhighway (heightened-mobility)
trucks from the same basic design. The highway
models are primarily for the civilian sector, and the
offhighway models are primarily for the military, as
Figure 7
USSR: Deliveries of Trucks
to the Military, 1975-85
well as the agriculture, mining, and timber industries Thousands of trucks
(see figure 8). The military uses limited-mobility 250
trucks for logistic support in rear areas on paved
roads and highways, and heightened-mobility models
usually go to tactical or forward-area units. The
military also uses significant numbers of trucks 200
adapted for special purposes, including petroleum,
oil, and lubricant (POL) tankers; rocket and missile
launch vehicles; box-bodied trucks filled with com-
munications equipment; and maintenance vans.) 150
The military offhighway variants usually have all-
wheel drive, winches, reinforced frames, locking dif-
ferentials, all-terrain tires, heavy-duty generators,
hermetically sealed assemblies and electrical equip-
ment for deep fording, and tire inflation and deflation
systems controlled by the driver from the cab. These
features allow the trucks to operate year round on a
variety of terrains.
Even though most of the vehicle components are the
same, military variants are normally produced about
three to five years after the civilian models. As a
result, many of the unforeseen design and manufac-
turing problems that normally arise in the early
stages of new production programs are solved before
military production begins, and military production
programs benefit from the resulting learning effects
and economies of scale, which tend to lower produc-
tion costs. Nevertheless, because military all-wheel-
drive trucks are generally more complex and capable
of operating under a variety of conditions, they
usually cost more than civilian versions.
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Figure 8:
Limited- and Heightened-Mobility Trucks
Kam AZ-5320 limited-mobility general purpose
cargo truck
ZIL-130 limited-mobility general purpose
cargo truck
Kam AZ-4310 heightened-mobility general purpose
cargo truck
ZIL- 131 heightened- mobility general purpose
cargo truck
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There have been fewer imports of vehicles-except
buses-than exports. On the basis of an analysis of
Soviet trade data, we estimate that 10,000 trucks
were imported in 1985. Probably more than one-half
of these were medium and heavy Tatra trucks, as well
as other trucks and vans from Czechoslovakia. The
Soviets also imported large mining, construction, and
lumbering trucks from the United States and Japan.
A small number of cars are probably imported for
R&D and official or other special uses, although,
according to Soviet trade data, none were imported.
Conversely, in 1984, buses worth about 450 million
rubles were imported, including at least 6,000 Hun-
garian Ikarus buses and probably at least several
hundred buses from Poland, East Germany, and
Czechoslovakia. These large imports probably reflect
inadequate Soviet bus production capacity, as well as
the CEMA decision to have Hungary specialize in
manufacturing buses.
We estimate deliveries to civilian customers by sub-
tracting military deliveries and net exports from total
production. This calculation indicates that civilian
customers received nearly three-quarters of all trucks
and cars and nearly all of the buses produced in the
USSR between 1975 and 1985. The share of produc-
tion directed to the civilian economy has been roughly
stable over the period.
We cannot precisely estimate the distribution of new
trucks among industrial and agricultural users. Ac-
cording to the Soviet Central Statistical Administra-
tion, an annual average of 220,000 trucks were deliv-
ered to agriculture from 1975 to 1982, but this
probably includes used military trucks. A Soviet
automotive industry journal reported that 196,000
newly produced trucks were delivered to agriculture
in 1981 (versus 216,500 total deliveries reported)-or
about 25 percent of total production. By applying this
share to the 1975-85 period, we estimate that agricul-
ture received about 192,000 new trucks per year-
reasonable given the 220,000 figure above. The re
maining 45 percent of truck production is delivered to
common-carrier fleets, industrial ministries, plants,
and the construction industry. Most of these are
general purpose cargo and tractor trucks but also
include special-purpose vehicles for mining, lumber-
ing, and geological work. The gains from larger
deliveries of higher quality vehicles to the civilian
truck inventory have yet to be fully captured by Soviet
transport services, however (see inset).
Passenger cars that are not exported or used by
officials are generally available to the population. The
personal automobile has consistently been used as an
incentive. Workers with an exceptional performance
record and those who accepted work on priority
projects in undesirable locations are given priority on
waiting lists for cars. Without such priority, Soviet
citizens eagerly wait four or more years to spend the
equivalent, on average, of 40 months of the average
industrial wage-in cash-on a basic Zhiguli automo-
bile from the Volga plant."
Manufacturing Productivity
Labor productivity, or output per worker, is a key
performance indicator in national, ministry, and en-
terprise planning. Plan targets specify desired in-
creases in labor productivity, and meeting these plan
targets influences employee compensation. The Sovi-
ets frequently express the benefits of advancing tech-
nology in terms of workers freed for other duties. F_
We are not able to estimate labor productivity for
Soviet vehicle manufacture as a whole, but data on
individual plants suggest that productivity is consider-
ably lower than Western levels.
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Declining Soviet Highway Freight Traffic.
An Apparent Contradiction
Figures released annually by the Soviet Central
Statistical Administration indicate that Soviet high-
way freight traffic-measured in tons hauled-de-
clined in 1983, 1984, and 1985. In terms of ton-
kilometers, traffic declined in 1984 and then
recovered slightly in 1985. We believe that highway
freight traffic includes all common-carrier and indus-
trial deliveries, and some from the agricultural sec-
tor. It does not include any military traffic, and we
believe it does not include intrafarm hauling.
These figures indicate that production during the
1980s of more efficient vehicles with larger load
capacities has yet to support an increase in freight
traffic. We believe the Soviets have taken several
measures that retard growth in freight-carrying
capacity:
? Many of the new trucks are delivered to defense
and agriculture, and their services are not reflected
in the highway freight figures.
Billions Annual
of Tons Growth Rate
(percent)
? The Soviet truck fleets represented in the statistics
may be slightly shrinking as older and smaller
trucks are replaced in some instances on a less than
1-for-I basis.
? Frequent complaints in the press suggest that
trucks are used inefficiently. Occasional fuel short-
ages reportedly disrupt transport operations, as
may ongoing attempts to further centralize control
of motor transport. New trucks, because of a lack
of trained maintenance personnel or parts short-
ages, may be at least initially relatively difficult to
maintain.
At the same time, the numbers may reflect some
Soviet progress in making motor transport more
efficient. More important, however, the newer trucks
will increasingly have an impact on transport opera-
tions over the late 1980s. By then, these larger and
longer lived trucks should make up a majority of the
fleet.
Billions of
Ton-kilometers
Annual
Growth Rate
(percent)
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We are able to provide a measure of capital productiv-
ity in the truck industry by comparing the size of each
plant's capital endowment to its output. We use
production floorspace as a surrogate for capital en-
dowment, and, indeed, physical output per unit of
production floorspace is a commonly used planning
factor in the West. While we believe that employment
levels at the major truck plants have changed very
little over the past decade, the Soviets invested sub-
stantially in capital equipment. In these conditions,
the technological capability of a truck plant's capital
equipment and the effectiveness of its use have largely
governed trends in output. To adjust for differences
between plants in the level of vertical integration, we
use only final-assembly floorspace, regardless of
whether it is located at a single facility or spread
among several facilities (see inset).
We use a variety of measures to quantify plant output.
The value of output-the sum of the current ruble
wholesale price for all vehicles produced-provides an
approximate measure of resource cost of production.
But we believe that implicit inflation tends to distort
these prices over time. Therefore, we also provide
three alternate physical measures: the lifetime vehicle
carrying capacity represented by annual production,
reflecting the potential usefulness of the product to
the economy; the total weight of trucks produced,
reflecting a plant's ability to process material inputs;
and the number of trucks produced, reflecting a
plant's ability to organize production throughput.
In general, the relationship between output and floor-
space reflects managerial performance in using capi-
tal. But it is also affected by:
? Plant design and the potential for economies of
scale. Soviet literature indicates that in smaller
plants some of the necessary equipment is under-
utilized so that as plant size decreases the ratio of
floorspace to output should increase.
? Increasing sophistication and flexibility of manufac-
turing technologies, which generally means that less
floorspace is needed for a given level of output.
? Savings in direct labor and materials, where fewer
tools, smaller inventories, and consequently less
space may be required to achieve a given level of
output.
The capital productivity measures suggest that the
strides the Soviet motor vehicle industry have made
have stemmed largely from design innovations that
have increased average vehicle payloads and service
lives. For example, life-cycle ton-kilometers-a surro-
gate for economic utility-produced per square meter
of production floorspace increased everywhere except
at the Kutaisi and Ural plants (see figure 9). Both
kilograms and trucks produced per square meter
increased everywhere except at the Gor'kiy, Kutaisi,
and Ural plants.
Of the three largest Soviet truck plants-Kama, ZIL,
and Gor'kiy-by our measures ZIL was the most
productive in 1985. We attribute much of this im-
proved performance at ZIL to a much larger influx of
new production technology there, as well as differ-
ences in the structure of production operations. ZIL is
also probably relatively more efficient because most
of the truck models built there were designed in house
and have been in production much longer than the
trucks manufactured at Kama. Therefore, more time
and engineering support have been spent in learning
how to best employ production resources. Moreover,
the ZIL association has well-established sources of
parts and subassemblies, so supply does not constrain
final-assembly operations as much as may be the case
at the Gor'kiy and Kama plants.
Kama continues to be hampered by the failure to
bring the plant up to rated design capacity. Assembly
operations are constrained by problems in reaching
rated capacity for manufacturing engines and other
components, about three-quarters of which are pro-
duced at the main plant. Much of the technology at
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Figure 9
Productivity at Selected Soviet
Truck Plants, 1975 and 1985
Trucks produced annually
Gor'kiy Kama River" Kremenchug Kutaisi Minsk Ulyanovsk Ural ZIL Plant Average
0.8
2,000
1,000
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Kama dates back to the late 1960s and early or
middle 1970s and is probably generally less produc-
tive than some of the newer equipment installed at
ZIL. In addition, engineering support capabilities are
relatively limited at Kama as compared with ZIL.
Of the three plants, productivity grew least at Gor'kiy
in 1976-85. This record undoubtedly contributed to
the Soviet decision to undertake the planned massive
modernization program recently announced for
Gor'kiy. The Soviets openly admit that the level and
quality of capital equipment at the plant is far behind
the industry standard. For example, 40 percent of the
plant's equipment is 25 years old, and some equip-
ment dates from the late 1920s, when the plant was
built. In addition, we believe that production of trucks
at the plant has been decreasing for the past several
years.
In the car industry, manufacturing productivity gains
during 1975-85 were mixed. None of the four major
plants-Moskvich, Ustinov, Volga, Zaporozh'ye-
was able to increase car production in terms of square
meters of production floorspace. In terms of ruble
value, Volga and Ustinov increased slightly their
output per unit of final-assembly floorspace. By the
same measure, output at Moskvich fell by 35 percent
and at Zaporozh'ye by 55 percent (see figure 10).
Plans and Prospects
Soviet Goals
According to a recent article in the official journal of
the Ministry of the Automotive Industry, Moscow
would like to bring the Soviet automotive industry up
to world standards, presumably in both quality of
output and in manufacturing efficiency. To achieve
this, the ministry will be under increasing pressure to
modernize its facilities and to introduce new, more
fuel-efficient, productive, durable, and maintainable
vehicle designs. In the past the industry has been
regarded as a traditional leader in technology develop-
ment. Appointment of the first deputy director of the
Automotive Ministry to be a deputy director of the
new Machine Building Bureau-a new organization
the Politburo created to oversee interministerial coop-
eration in development of machine-building technol-
ogy-suggests that Moscow still holds this view.
Overall, the gross value of industry output is projected
to double during 1986-2000. (The gross value of
industry output also doubled from 1971 to 1985.)
In keeping with Secretary Gorbachev's emphasis on
refurbishing existing rather than building new facili-
ties, the industry has plans for a large infusion of
more modern and productive machinery in old plants.
According to the deputy minister of the Ministry of
the Automotive Industry, the 1986-90 Plan calls for
installation of 2,000 automatic lines, more than 300
flexible manufacturing systems, 5,500 robots (includ-
ing 200 robotic complexes), and a "large amount" of
new metal-cutting, forging, pressing, and casting
equipment throughout the industry. In addition,
40,000 pieces of existing machinery are to be "moder-
nized," increasing their productivity by a projected 15
to 20 percent. As a result, industry labor productivity,
which is slated to more than double, will grow about
20 percent more than in the economy as a whole. The
Soviets expect the greatest labor productivity im-
provements from mechanization and automation of
warehousing and assembly operations. Warehousing
reportedly accounts for about 15 percent of the
automotive industry labor force, and assembly, about
25 percent. In warehouse transport operations alone,
13,000 workers will reportedly be released for other
duties.
We judge that Eastern Europe and the West will still
help tool and equip new and existing facilities, but
Moscow is increasingly stressing domestic sources of
high-technology production equipment. During 1986-
90, in addition to serving as the proving ground for
more efficient technologies, the motor vehicle industry
is tasked to increase its production of machine tools,
flexible manufacturing systems, and robotics-key
technologies highlighted in Gorbachev's call for accel-
erated technological progress. For example, the Volga
car plant is slated to increase its output of production
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Figure 10
Productivity at Selected Soviet Car Plants,
1975 and 1985
Moskvich Ustinov Volga Zaporozh'ye Average Volga, 55
2.5 Other, 06
Ruble value of cars produced
Thousands of rubles
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equipment by 80 percent, including 930 welding
robots, 75 complete automatic lines, and 6,500 manip-
ulators. At the Minsk truck plant, machine tool
production is to be tripled, and 60 percent of the
capital stock will reportedly be modernized.
The Gor'kiy plant has been directed (in a Politburo-
endorsed announcement) to assume a much greater
role as a technology supplier and is to be completely
reconstructed and retooled by 1990. The 12th FYP
calls for the plant's output of production equipment
for the motor vehicle industry to triple. As part of this
effort, Gor'kiy has begun to produce a new domesti-
cally designed flexible manufacturing module, the
IR500, on license from the Ivanovo Machine Tool
Plant, a leader in Soviet machine tool development.
Production reportedly began in November 1985, and
six units were scheduled to be built by February 1986.
An official-in a speech at the 27th CPSU Congress
in March 1986-indicated that reconstructing and
retooling at Gor'kiy would cost 1.2-1.4 billion rubles.
Committing such massive resources to refurbish an
existing plant is unprecedented in the Soviet motor
vehicle industry.
This industrywide infusion of new equipment is to
support a wave of new basic vehicle designs during
1986-90 that will probably be in production until after
the year 2000. New programs include:
? Two basic new general purpose diesel trucks sched-
uled to enter production at the ZIL and Gor'kiy
plants.
? New specialized trucks, including an agricultural
truck with tilting bed at Kutaisi and heavy dump
trucks for construction and roadbuilding at ZIL,
Kremenchug, and Minsk.
? Two new front-wheel-drive cars of foreign design for
production at Volga and Moskvich. A third domesti-
cally designed car will be jointly produced by Kama
and Volga. Volga officials plan to introduce a new
car every five years, three years faster than it
currently takes.
Construction activities to support this ambitious mod-
ernization effort are already under way. Given the
size, pace, and likely purpose of identified construc-
tion projects under way, we estimate that Soviet
motor vehicle industry production floorspace will con-
tinue to expand substantially through 1990. We pro-
ject that during 1986-90:
? Total production floorspace at the 16 major vehicle
plants will expand by an estimated 10 percent-to
almost 12 million square meters (see figure 11).
? Nearly all truck plants will expand, resulting in a
targeted 13-percent overall increase. Two-thirds of
the floorspace is being added for final-assembly
operations at six plants preparing to introduce new
trucks.
? Automobile production facilities are slated to grow
about 6 percent, reflecting expansion to accommo-
date new models and higher production rates at all
but one of the six car plants. The Moskvich plant
will expand by more than 30 percent, and the Lutsk
and Zaporozh'ye plants will each increase by 20
percent. Volga will grow by less than 5 percent but
will account for 50 percent of the floorspace that
will be added.
? Growth in the bus industry will be limited to a
nearly 50-percent expansion of the Pavlovo plant,
which will assemble a new diesel bus.
In addition, the Soviets plan to build at least two new
major final-assembly plants. According to Soviet
press reports, construction of a new light truck plant
began in 1985, in Kirovobad in the Azerbaijan Re-
public. It will be part of the Ul'yanovsk production
association and probably rely on the main plant in
facility will reportedly be complete by 1990, and when
it reaches rated capacity-probably a few years after
that-it will manufacture 40,000 to 50,000 general
purpose, all-wheel-drive, 1.5-ton trucks and vans per
year.
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Figure 11
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Estimated Soviet Motor
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Vehicle Plant Floorspace, 1985 and 1990a
I I I I
0 4 8 12
a These data are only for the 20 motor
plants listed in figure 1. They do not reflect any additions
to floorspace from the Kirovabad and Ivanovo plants.
new truck plant was being built in Ivanovo, 150 miles
northeast of Moscow. the plant will
be completed by the end of the decade and will have
an annual capacity of 150,000 trucks.
Ivanovo shows an extensive ground
clearing-about 30 square kilometers-which, on the
basis of our understanding of Soviet construction
leadtimes, probably is for the truck plant.
the plant will
probably assemble medium or heavy trucks and
We believe that these new facilities will not be
completed by 1990-the projected deadline. If the
Soviets follow their standard construction practices
and pace, we estimate that the plants will not be
operational until the early or middle 1990s and
probably will not reach rated capacity until at least a
few years later.
Given the size of the clearings at Kirovobad and
Ivanovo, the types of vehicles that are likely to be
assembled there, and the ratio of floorspace to the
total plant size at existing Soviet motor vehicle plants,
we estimate that the Kirovobad facility will comprise
roughly 250,000 square meters of production floor-
space, and the Ivanovo facility roughly 450,000
square meters. If these estimates are accurate, com-
pletion of these two facilities
would increase total motor vehi-
cle production floorspace by an additional 8 percent
and truck production floorspace about 13 percent.
Moreover, ZIL officials-in late 1985-approached a
US machine tool and automation company with a
proposal for turnkey equipment of the plant. If Mos-
cow chooses to equip the plant with Western technol-
ogy, we estimate outlays could exceed $1 billion. The
Soviets spent in excess of $1.5 billion 10 years ago to 25X1
equip the vertically integrated Kama River plant-a
facility of comparable capacity.
The Soviets expect new longer lived, higher quality
vehicle designs to be significantly more fuel efficient
and require less maintenance support than current
models, thereby contributing to greater productivity
in transport operations. Current plans call for diesel-
powered trucks to account for 85 percent of all truck
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production by 1990, although these trucks reportedly 25X1
represented only about 25 percent of 1985 output. 25X1
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Kama heavy trucks can travel more than 50
percent farther between routine checkups and 25
percent farther between major overhauls. As a result,
the productivity of motor transport in the economy
should improve in two ways: maintenance support
overhead in terms of equipment and personnel will be
lower per vehicle, and each driver will be able to move
more freight per hour worked given larger average
vehicle payloads and less downtime for maintenance
and repairs.
Outlook
We expect that total vehicle production will grow
moderately until 1990 and then more rapidly as plant
renovation is completed. If the Soviets maintain the
momentum of current production programs and suc-
ceed in bringing Kama up to rated capacity, we
estimate total output could rise from 2.3 million
vehicles in 1985 to 2.5 million vehicles in 1990. We
project truck output may increase more than 10
percent, from 810,000 to 900,000 units; cars nearly 10
percent, from 1.4 million to 1.5 million; and buses
about 20 percent, from 83,000 to 100,000. By the
early 1990s, production growth should increase as the
many new programs are assimilated, as more efficient
manufacturing technology begins to pay off, and as
the new Kirovobad and Ivanovo facilities come on
line. In an optimistic scenario, by the late 1990s, truck
production could reach 1.1 million units; cars, nearly
2 million; and buses, 125,000-a total of more than
3.2 million vehicles.
We estimate that deliveries of Kama and other new
trucks probably will support a moderate expansion of
the Soviet military truck fleet over the next 10
years-from 1,174,000 in 1985 to more than
1,335,000 in the mid-1990s. The annual growth may
be slower than in the 1970s and 1980s, and annual
deliveries of trucks to the military may actually
decline slightly-from about 220,000 in 1985 to about
205,000 in the mid-1990s. (This assumes no major
change in the structure or size of the Soviet military
by the mid-1990s; that older trucks will be replaced
with newer ones on a 1-for-1 basis; and that trucks
will continue to be used at about the same rate and in
the same manner as they are now.) We believe that
the current fleet of trucks will be almost completely
recycled by the early 1990s and that the newer, longer
lasting vehicles will not need to be replaced as rapidly
as those now in the fleet
The primary beneficiaries of any reduced deliveries of
trucks to the military would probably be the agricul-
tural sector and the construction industry, which, like
the military, rely heavily on all-wheel-drive vehicles.
Larger numbers of used trucks in better condition will
also be available for agriculture and industry. Cou-
pled with increased production of special-purpose
vehicles designed for agriculture, this suggests that
motor vehicle transportation bottlenecks in agricul-
ture may lessen in the early or middle 1990s. More-
over, motor transport generally will be in a better
position to take on a larger share of Soviet freight
shipments.
The dual benefits that the introduction of new, more
fuel-efficient front-wheel-drive automobiles are likely.
to provide in the late 1980s and beyond may force the
Soviets to choose between competing demands. On the
one hand, these high-quality, compact, stylish cars-
some of West European design-could be competitive
on export markets (see figure 12). Such sales would
generate hard currency needed to purchase advanced
Western technology for industrial modernization. As
an experiment along these lines, the Soviets an-
nounced in mid-1985 that the Volga car plant now has
the authority to use almost half of its hard currency
export earnings to purchase Western technology. In
the spring of 1986, the Soviets announced that the
experiment was successful and being expanded to
other plants throughout industry. Conversely, the
availability of more automobiles domestically would
afford a very attractive incentive to energize Soviet
workers, a key tenet of Gorbachev's modernization
initiative.
Soviet plans nevertheless entail great challenges, par-
ticularly because of the required high investment
levels. For example, we estimate that reconstruction
of the Gor'kiy plant and construction and equipping of
the Ivanovo and Kirovobad facilities-key projects for
the next 10 years-probably will cost the equivalent
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Figure 12. The New Lada-2108.
This car was designed by the
German car manufacturer
Porsche, and was put into se-
ries production in 1985 at the
Volga Motor Vehicle Plant in
of several billion dollars. Simultaneously addressing
the extensive modernization needs at other motor
vehicle plants could drive investment requirements
well above levels committed during previous cycles of
modernization. By way of comparison, the USSR
spent 7 billion rubles (roughly equivalent to $10
billion) during 1971-75, when the giant Kama River
and Volga car plants were being equipped.
Even investment on this scale probably would not be
sufficient to bring the Soviet automotive industry up
to Western levels, where industry is modernizing at a
rapid pace. For example, during 1980-85, US motor
vehicle and parts manufacturers reported that they
spent an estimated $57 billion on new plant and
equipment, including $14 billion in 1985 alone. More-
over, turning to the West for large infusions of
technology could strain hard currency resources and,
on the basis of the poor performance with the Kama
plant, would not guarantee that the Soviets would
reap the full productivity benefits that new technol-
ogies have provided in the West. Even Western
automotive manufacturers have experienced serious
problems assimilating and training workers for new
facilities employing plantwide automation. For exam-
ple, the new $600 million General Motors Ham-
tramck car assembly plant-which opened in 1985
and is equipped with 250 robots, 50 automated guided
vehicles, and computerized and laser inspection sys-
tems-is still producing at only one-half of its rated
capacity because of problems assimilating the new
equipment. The Soviets probably will confront such
challenges of plantwide automation no earlier than
the mid-1990s.
On balance, we believe that the modernization pro-
gram of the last decade-albeit heavily oriented
toward "hard" automation-will yield significant
gains in product quality and productivity into the
1990s. Moreover, the cycle of modernization is well
timed to support Gorbachev's broader objectives of
economywide industrial modernization. To achieve
the more ambitious objective of raising the motor
vehicle industry to world standards, however, the
Soviets must move to flexible forms of automation
that can more easily accommodate rapid product
change. To do this, they must overcome or circumvent
deficiencies in key technologies that support factory
automation, including arrays of linked minicomput-
ers, sophisticated software engineering, vast numbers
of microprocessor-operated controls, and high-speed
telecommunications networks.12 In addition, the Sovi-
ets will have to accommodate associated changes in
organization, management, and employment that
have been confronting Western automotive manufac-
turers for at least the past decade. Progress in the
West, combined with Soviet deficiencies, suggests
that the Soviet motor vehicle industry probably will
not attain the standards of Western industry in this
century.
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Appendix A
Primary Motor Vehicles Currently Produced by Plant
and Model and Soviet Vehicle Designations a
a Until 1966, Soviet vehicle designation was based on a simple
system of naming a vehicle by indicating the plant at which it was
produced and assigning it a design number that was in an allotted
batch of numbers for that plant. For example, for trucks made at
the Gor'kiy plant, the abbreviation GAZ and any number from 1 to
99 were assigned (for example, GAZ-66). In 1966 a new system was
developed, but it did not affect any models already being produced,
only those to be put into future production. The new designators
provide information on vehicle weight, type, design number, modifi-
cation state, and export status. The plant abbreviation was retained.
535 543
537
The new system consists of up to six digits following the abbrevia-
tion, with four being the usual (for example, KamAZ-5320). For
trucks, the first digit indicates the gross weight range into which
the vehicle fits:
l-below 1,200 kg
2-1,201 to 2,000 kg
3-2,001 to 8,000 kg
4-8,001 to 14,000 kg
5-14,001 to 20,000 kg
6-20,001 to 40,000 kg
7-over 40,000 kg
7510
7420
7525
549
5320
5410
695
699
2137
2140
For light vehicles and cars, though, the first digit refers to the "engine size":
I-less than 1.2 liters
2-1.2 to 2 liters
3-2 to 4 liters
4-more than 4 liters
The second digit for all vehicles denotes the vehicle type:
I-passenger cars
2-buses
3-trucks with sides
4-tractors
5-dump trucks
6-tanker trucks
7-vans
8-(not allotted, in reserve)
9-special vehicles
The third and fourth digits refer to the design sequence, usually starting with 01, but
there are special sequences for high-mobility models. The fifth digit is used to identify
modifications to the basic design or product improvements. For example, KamAZ-53212
designates a long-wheelbase version of the 5320. The sixth digit applies to types of export
models. See Jane's Military Vehicles and Ground Support Equipment-1985, Jane's
Publishing Company Limited, London, pp. 437-438.
b These are only the primary models or family of vehicles produced at the major plants.
This list does not include the numerous modifications of each vehicle, or any prototypes
or vehicles not in series production.
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