SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000400440001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 119
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Policy Toward
the Middle East
A Research Paper
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SOV 86-10048X
December 1986
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Directorate ol Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Soviet Policy Toward
? the Middle East
,.
ti
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Analysts of the USSR?East
European Division of the Office of Leadership
Analysis prepared appendix C. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Third World Activities Division, SOVA[
Reverse Blank
Secret
soV 86-10048X
December 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 5 December 1986
was used in this report.
Soviet Policy Toward
the Middle East
By 1970 the Soviets had good reason to be happy with their accomplish-
ments in the Middle East during the decade and a half since their first in-
roads with the Arabs. They had developed strong relationships with
Nasser's Egypt?the most important Arab country?and with Syria, Iraq,
and Algeria. Moscow had also steadily improved its relations with the non-
Arab "northern tier" countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey.
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Since then, however, Soviet fortunes in the region have been mixed. The
USSR's position has become far stronger in the northern tier, with the
United States out of Iran and the Soviets controlling the destiny of
Afghanistan. But in the Arab-Israeli theater, the Soviets' position is
markedly inferior to that of the United States, because they have failed to
make themselves a factor in a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or to ap-
peal to the Arabs ideologically or economically.
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Thus far in the 1980s, the Soviets have not made significant progress in
capitalizing on the gains they made in the northern tier in the late 1970s or
in compensating for the setbacks they suffered in the Arab world earlier in
the 1970s. They have been unable to replace US influence in Iran with
their own or consolidate Marxist rule in Afghanistan despite seven years of 25X1
military occupation. Their increased presence in Syria, Libya, and South
Yemen has not balanced the USSR's loss of influence in Egypt.
General Secretary Gorbachev has yet to make any major innovations in
Soviet policy toward the region?save perhaps beginning a tentative
dialogue with Israel. But he has demonstrated through his military support
for Moscow's Arab and Afghan clients, his frequent meetings with Middle
Eastern leaders, and the numerous envoys he has dispatched to the area
that the Kremlin intends to be more assertive in promoting Soviet interests.
The USSR's primary policy goals in the Middle East during the rest of the
1980s are likely to be:
? Consolidating control in Afghanistan.
? Blocking any US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace settlement that leaves
Moscow out and, optimally, regaining a voice in the peace process.
? Unifying the Arabs into a pro-Soviet front by ending the isolation of the
Kremlin's Arab clients: Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
? Stemming the drift of Algeria and Iraq toward lesser dependence on the
Soviet Union and closer ties to the United States.
? Expanding influence in Moscow's key regional targets: Egypt and Iran.
? Eroding Turkey's security ties to the United States. 25X1
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Gorbachev's best chances for success seem to be in preventing a US-
sponsored Arab-Israeli settlement, in a modest expansion of Soviet influ-
ence in Egypt and Iran, and?possibly?in consolidating control in
Afghanistan:
? Regaining a major voice in the Arab-Israeli peace process?a primary
Soviet goal in the region since 1973?would greatly enhance the USSR's
ability to be a major actor in the Middle East. In particular, it would en-
able the Soviets to block any US-sponsored settlement they believed
harmful to their interests. We believe that Soviet concern about the
Syrian reaction has prevented Moscow from taking the one step?
reestablishment of relations with Israel?that would be most likely to
overcome US and Israeli opposition to Soviet participation in the peace
process
He is likely to move very gradually to give the
Arabs time to get used to the idea of better Soviet-Israeli ties before rees-
tablishing full diplomatic relations.
? The USSR faces formidable obstacles in increasing its influence in Egypt
and Iran. Soviet officials acknowledge there will be no return to the late
1960s' heyday of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Barring major inter-
nal unrest in Egypt, the best the Kremlin probably can hope for during
the next few years is a marginal improvement in bilateral ties and a
growing Egyptian disenchantment with the United States. In Iran, the
Soviets seem convinced there can be no significant improvement in
relations as long as Ayatollah Khomeini remains in power. This will not
preclude an expansion of economic ties, however, and Moscow is certain
to attempt to exploit Iranian weakness or domestic turmoil in the post-
Khomeini era, which cannot be far off.
? Gorbachev appears determined to stanch what he has described publicly
as the "running sore" of Afghanistan. His moves thus far have included a
more aggressive pursuit of the rebels, increased military pressure on
Pakistan, improved training of the Afghan military, replacement of the
Afghan leader, and a diplomatic/propaganda campaign to portray the
USSR as flexible about withdrawing. It is too early to tell whether this
strategy eventually will allow Moscow to withdraw its forces without
undermining the regime in Kabul, but it will take an adroit and
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determined effort to carry it off. The odds are still high that, barring a
collapse of Pakistani will, the Soviets will not yet have consolidated
Marxist rule in Afghanistan as the 1990s arrive.
The Soviets are likely to continue their efforts to remedy their overdepen-
dence on Syria in the Arab world by courting moderate Arab regimes.
Moscow could become more willing to buck Damascus' interests if Egypt,
other Arab moderates, or Israel make concessions to the USSR that they
have avoided thus far, or if a successor regime in Syria proves less stable or
more friendly to the West than President Assad's. Even so, Syria would be
likely to remain the Soviet Union's most important ally in the Middle East,
prompting Moscow to tailor its moves to avoid serious damage to bilateral
relations.
Soviet influence in Iraq and Algeria probably will continue to erode?
despite Moscow's importance as an arms supplier?as Baghdad and
Algiers pursue more moderate foreign policies and more Western-oriented
economic policies. These trends appear to be strategic shifts rather than
tactical adjustments, and the USSR, in our view, does not have enough to
offer economically to reverse them.
Finally, the long-term nature of Turkey's internal problems, the rivalry
between Turkey and Greece, and Ankara's doubts about the intensity of
US commitments to Turkey promise to continue to provide the Soviets
openings to exploit Turkey's weaknesses and to attempt to woo it away
from NATO. Nevertheless, Ankara, despite its frictions with Washington,
is extremely wary of its northern neighbor and is likely to remain closely
linked to the United States, barring an unforeseen breakdown in internal
order.
Despite the obstacles it faces, the Soviet Union is certain to be a major ac-
tor in the Middle East for years to come. The Soviets regard the Middle
East as the most important region of the Third World because of its
proximity to the USSR, its vast reserves of oil and gas, and its economic
and geostrategic significance to the West and Japan. The Middle East is
the Soviet Union's most volatile borderland, and its explosiveness poses
dangers because of the high stakes for the USSR and the United States in
the region and the possibility that uncontrolled events could lead to a
military confrontation between the two. At the same time, this volatility of-
fers opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence that are not present on
the USSR's other borders.
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Moscow attaches considerable importance to becoming a coequal of
Washington in the Middle East, as the statements of Soviet leaders attest.
This competition with the United States is a major determinant of Soviet
policy toward the region. Soviet writings and the public and private
remarks of Soviet officials make it clear that Moscow regards the increased
US military presence in the Middle East since the late 1970s as a major se-
curity concern and will devote considerable effort to counter it.
This superpower competition and the Soviet leaders' Marxist-Leninist
"strategic view" are common denominators that bring a degree of unity to
Moscow's policies toward the Middle East. Moreover, the USSR's position
on some major regional issues?such as the Arab-Israeli conflict?affects
its policies throughout the Middle East. Beyond these unifying factors,
however, we believe the Kremlin does not have a "grand strategy" for the
Middle East as a whole. Rather it has related but distinct policies toward
the widely divergent regions and issues of the Middle East. These policies
reflect specific Soviet equities and interests in each region and on each
issue, as well as local conditions.
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Contents
Page
Summary
111
Introduction
1
The Middle East as Seen From Moscow
1
A Key Factor: Competition With Washington
5
Overview of Soviet Fortunes In the Middle East Since 1970
6
1970-78
7
1979-86
8
The Soviet Balance Sheet Today
10
The Arab World
10
The Strategic Prize: Egypt
10
The Linchpin: Syria
13
Footholds on the Periphery: Libya and South Yemen
21
Partners of Convenience: North Yemen, Iraq,
Algeria, and the PLO
30
Friendly Moderates
47
Wary Moderates
50
Israel
52
Lack of Relations
52
Recent Developments
53
The Balance Sheet From Moscow's Perspective
53
Prospects
54
The Northern Tier
55
Iran
55
Afghanistan
60
Turkey
65
Totaling Up the Balance Sheet
69
Impact of Future Developments
70
Positive Developments From Moscow's Perspective
71
Rapprochement Between Syria and Iraq
71
Rapprochement Between Syria and Arafat
71
Rapprochement Between Syria and Egypt
71
Replacement of the Mubarak Regime in Egypt
With a Neutral Regime
71
Decision by Pakistan To End Support for
Afghan Rebels
71
Severe Instability in Turkey
72
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Developments That Could Have a Mixed Impact on Soviet Interests 72
A New Syrian-Israeli War 72
An End to the War Between Iran and Iraq 72
Negative Developments From the Kremlin's Perspective 73
A Marked Expansion of the War Between 73
Iran and Iraq
A Major Increase in Outside Support for the 73
Afghan Rebels
US-Sponsored Talks Between Israel and a Jordanian- 73
Palestinian Delegation
Death or Ouster of Assad 74
Death or Ouster of Qadhafi 74
A Major Drop in Soviet Oil Production 76
Impact of Trends in Overall US-Soviet Relations 77
Improvement 77
Deterioration 78
Appendixes
A.
Overview of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East Before 1970 79
B.
Moscow and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process 83
C.
Who's Who in Soviet Middle Eastern Policy 87
D.
Soviet Ambassadors to Middle Eastern Countries 93
E.
Estimated Numbers of Soviet Personnel in the Middle East, 1986 95
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Soviet Policy Toward
the Middle East
Introduction
Expressing a view that we share, a Soviet specialist on
US policy toward the Middle East commented to a
US Embassy officer in Moscow in October 1985 that:
Moscow's role in the Middle East has been
much smaller than it could be, given the Soviet
Union's interests in the region, its superpower
status, and the Middle East's location on the
USSR's southern borders.
This paper explores why this has been the case and
assesses the prospects for the USSR playing a more
prominent role in the Middle East under General
Secretary Gorbachev. Thus, the paper looks at the
degree of influence the Soviets wield in different
countries. Where have they developed strong influ-
ence in the country's military, ruling party, and
economic sector? What influence do they have in the
country's leadership decisionmaking, especially on
questions of foreign policy? How do the Soviets rate
the relative importance of the different countries in
the region? In which countries do they consider a
military presence vital to the projection of Soviet force
in the Middle East? In which countries might they
consider intervening militarily to protect their invest-
ment against internal threat, external invasion, or to
expand Soviet influence into a new area?
The paper also examines possible new directions in
Soviet Middle Eastern policy during the rest of the
1980s. It pays particular attention to the Soviet view
of US influence and intentions in the region?one of
the most important factors affecting the Kremlin's
formulation of policy toward the Middle East. It
concludes with a look at some developments that
could have a major impact on Soviet and US interests
in the region.
1
The Middle East as Seen From Moscow
Soviet interests in the Middle East stem first of all
from its proximity to the USSR (see foldout map
figure 9 at back). As Soviet officials have stressed to
US counterparts, Moscow considers the Middle East
to be a Soviet borderland comparable to Latin Ameri-
ca for the United States.
\ the USSR
considers the Mediterranean area to be as strategical-
ly important to the Soviet Union as the Caribbean
area is to the United States. The Soviets repeatedly
have made public declarations of their vital interests
in the Middle East since 1955, when a Foreign
Ministry statement contended that US attempts to
establish military blocs and bases in the "Near and
Middle East have a direct relation to the security of
the USSR . . . [which is] located in direct proximity"
to the region. In arguing that the entire Middle East
is their borderland, the Soviets capitalize on the
ambiguities of the geographic scope of the region and
its different connotations in Soviet and Western usage
(see inset).
Other factors that make the Middle East important to
the USSR include:
? Energy. The region's vast deposits of oil and natural
gas make it vital to the functioning of the economies
of many Western and Third World countries. The
USSR itself is self-sufficient in oil and natural gas
but frequently has considered it cost effective to
purchase these commodities in the Middle East or,
in the case of oil, to accept it as payment for arms.'
Soviet domestic oil production peaked in 1983.
'The Soviets resell most of this oil.
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"Middle" or "Near"?
The Soviets divide the Middle East into three re-
gions. They define the "Middle East" as Turkey,
Iran, and Afghanistan?the three countries of the
area that border the USSR. They classify the coun-
tries of the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Israel) and the Arabian Peninsula, along with Iraq,
Egypt, and Sudan under the "Near East," and the
rest of the countries of North Africa west of Egypt
under the term "North Africa." Correspondingly,
coverage of the region in the Soviet Foreign Ministry
is broken down into one department for the "Middle
East," and another for the "Near East" and "North
Africa." This paper examines Soviet policy in all
three areas and, for sake of clarity, defines the entire
region as the Middle East (see foldout map figure 10
at the back).
Although the downward trend was halted in 1986,
the questionable prospects for a sustained rebound
in output suggest that the Soviet Union will in-
crease its purchases of Middle Eastern oil in the
next few years.
? Hard currency. Despite the relative insignificance of
the Middle East in overall Soviet trade (about 5
percent of dollar value), arms sales to the countries
in the region have been a major hard currency
earner. Since 1955 the Soviets have signed arms
deals worth approximately $67 billion with Middle
Eastern states?about 70 percent of total Soviet
arms sales to the non-Communist Third World (see
figure 1). Earnings from these sales (in hard curren-
cy or its equivalent) have averaged about $5 billion
annually during recent years, or 15 to 20 percent of
total Soviet hard currency earnings. These earnings
have declined steadily, however, from the peak year
of 1981 both in dollar terms and as a percentage of
Soviet arms deliveries to Third World countries (see
table 1).
? Islam. Beside the natural concerns any country has
with a neighboring region, the USSR has the added
concern that the Middle East contains many of the
same religious and ethnic groups found within its
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Figure 1
Soviet Arms Deliveries to the
Middle East, 1981-86
Billion US $
Legend
I I
Iran
Kuwait
Jordan
INN
North Yemen N Libya
South Yemen "" Iraq
"'Algeria "I Syria
7
6
5
4
1981 82 83 84 85 86
August
2
310736 10-86
own borders (see figure 2). The approximately 45
million members of Islamic ethnic groups in the
Soviet Union (roughly 16 percent of the total Soviet
population) by and large have not been a security
threat to the Communist regime since it subdued
the Central Asian Basmachi rebels in the 1920s.
Since the late 1970s, however, signs of increasing
religious awareness among Soviet Muslims, coupled
with the upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism in
Iran, have prompted Soviet leaders to pay closer
attention to the "Islamic factor" and to increase
anti-Islamic propaganda. Just how seriously Soviet
leaders regard the threat of "contamination" of
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umni_
Soviet Muslims at Friday prayers in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan
their Muslim population is unclear.
that concern over the impact that Islamic funda-
mentalism in Afghanistan and the Middle East as a
whole could have on Soviet Muslims played a role
in the Kremlin's decision to intervene. At any rate,
it seems safe to conclude that the primarily Slavic
leaders in the Kremlin view this issue with some
concern. It gives a foreign policy question a domes-
tic security angle and decisions about the treatment
of a domestic minority implications for Soviet
relations with Muslim countries.
? Western and Japanese involvement. Beyond its in-
trinsic value, the Middle East takes on added
significance for the USSR because of the longstand-
ing interest the Western powers and Japan have had
in the region. The West European colonial powers
dominated the Middle East until World War II, and
the United States has been the predominant outside
power since. Turkey represents NATO's southeast-
ern flank, and the Levant and North Africa lie
opposite NATO's entire southern flank. The West
and Japan are vitally interested in the Middle East
because of its vast reserves of oil and natural gas
and its geostrategic location at the confluence of
Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Western military
presence?mainly US?is a primary concern to
Moscow.
3
Table 1
Soviet Arms Deliveries to Middle Eastern Countries
Value
(billion US $)
As percentage of
Soviet Arms
Deliveries to the
Non-Communist
Third World
1978
4.3
67
1979
7.1
80
1980
5.8
70
1981
6.3
75
1982
6.6
74
1983
5.3
68
1984
4.6
61
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1985
3.3
57
1986
1.4 .
a Through August.
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For all these reasons, we believe the Soviets regard
the Middle East as the most important region in the
Third World. Yet, in the context of overall Soviet
foreign policy, the Middle East takes a backseat to
control over Eastern Europe, the strategic competition
with the United States, the relationship with China,
and relations with Western Europe.
The potential security threat to the Soviet homeland
from the Middle East pales in comparison with those
faced from the USSR's Central European and Far
Eastern border regions. The overwhelming bulk of the
Soviets' conventional forces and all of their intermedi-
ate-range nuclear missiles are stationed in these areas.
The Middle East, however, is the USSR's most
volatile borderland. The region's explosiveness poses
potential dangers to the Soviets because the high
stakes both the USSR and the United States have in
the area mean that uncontrolled events could precipi-
tate a military confrontation between the two super-
powers. At the same time, the Middle East's volatility
offers potential opportunities for rapid expansion of
Soviet influence that are not present on the USSR's
other borders.
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Figure 2
Muslim Peoples in the Soviet Union
*MOSCOW
?
R. S. F 3S. R.
undary representation is
necessarily authoritative.
Novosibirsk
litiograd
23
21
mian
Caspian
21
21 \ Sea
Arme?tfl
YerTin.
Shevchenko Sea
.--,,
8 .
Ntikus
18 Uzbek
I S.S.R. Ta
4 , Baku
A.erbaijan Krasnovodsk 0
S,- .S.R.1:? Turkmen
Y'
as. p.
.hkhabad
0 220 490 690 Kilometers
1
0 200 400 600 Miles
Iran
Afghanistan
China
Indian
claim
Pakistan
Cease-Fire sdinese line, I
ol control Sr
India
Turkic
Peoples
1979 Population
(in thousands)
Peoples
of the Caucasus
1979 Population
(in thousands)
Uzbeks
12,456
20
Chechens
756
Kazakhs
6,556
21
Kabardians
322
3
Tatars
6,317
22
Ingush
186
4
Azerbaijanis
5,477
23
Adygeys
109
Turkmens
2,028
24
Abkhaz
91
Kirghiz
1906,
25
Cherkess
46
7
Bashkirs
1,371
26
Abazins
29
a
Karakalpaks
303
27
Dagestani peoples:
9
Kumyks
228
Avars
483
10
Uighurs
211
Lezgins
383
11
Karachays
131
Dargins
287
12
Balkars
66
Laks
100
13
Nogays
60
Tabasarans
75
Rutuls
15
Iranian Peoples
1979 Population
Tsakhurs
14
Tajiks
(in thousands)
2,898
Aguls
12
14
15
Osetins
542
I I
Non-Muslim people
.16
Kurds
116
1,17
Iranians
31
18
Tats
22
.19
Baluch
19
Sparsely populated or uninhabited
areas are shown in white.
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The Ideological Dimension
The Middle East has not proved to be fertile ground
for the export of Marxism-Leninism. Only in South
Yemen and Afghanistan have Marxist regimes
emerged, and even in those countries ideological roots
do not run deep. The Communist parties in most of
the other countries of the region have been largely
irrelevant. The Soviets continue to support Commu-
nist parties and leftist movements in the region and
undoubtedly seek the establishment of additional
Marxist regimes. They have consistently shown, how-
ever, that they are willing to tolerate the suppression
of the left if a Middle Eastern regime adopts a pro-
Soviet foreign policy.
A Key Factor: Competition With
Washington
A leading Soviet expert on the United States told a
Kuwaiti newspaper in December 1984:
When Kissinger was dealing with the Middle
East, he did not consider Israel, Egypt, or
Saudi Arabia, but he considered only the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union. This is the view
of the current US Administration.
We believe this bipolar perspective also has long been
the view of the leaders in the Kremlin. The Soviets'
desire to erode US influence and replace it with their
own has played a major role in most moves they have
made in the Middle East since the decline of British
influence in the region following World War II.
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located thousands of kilometers from this region." A
quarter of a century later, then Foreign Minister
Gromyko stated during a speech two months after the
Carter Doctrine was pronounced that US foreign
policy circles
. . . are stressing more and more often and with
greater importunity the "vital interests" of the
USA. It is asserted that in the Persian Gulf
and, for that matter, anyplace where there are
sources of oil are areas where US "vital inter-
ests" are involved . . . . It is said that the same
"vital interests" are present in the Middle East.
In all parts of Asia?south of our borders?it is
the same thing.
Gorbachev made a similar remark in October 1985 in
the joint press conference he held with French Presi-
dent Mitterrand during their meetings in Paris.
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Despite this resentment, Soviet leaders clearly recog-
nize that the United States is, indeed, vitally interest-
ed in the Middle East. Soviet commentaries note the
importance US presidents have attached to the region
dating from the Truman Doctrine of the 1940s,
through the Eisenhower Doctrine of the 1950s, and
the Carter and Reagan Doctrines of the 1980s. One
scholarly Soviet study of US Middle Eastern policy in
the 1970s highlights President Nixon's statement to
Congress in May 1973 that "no other crisis region of
the world has greater importance or priority for the
USA than the Middle East."
For decades the Soviets have expressed open resent-
ment and ridicule of Washington's claims that the
United States has vital interests in the Middle East.
The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 1955 as-
serting that the Middle East was vital to Soviet
security because of the USSR's proximity went on to
state that the same could not be said "about the USA,
5
The Soviets attach vital importance to the increased
US military presence in the Middle East that began in
the late 1970s. Ignoring US concerns over the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and possible Soviet exploita-
tion of turmoil in post-Shah Iran, Moscow has por-
trayed all the recent deployments of US forces to the
Middle East as "bridgeheads" for the future use of
US military power in regional states and against the
USSR itself. Soviet propaganda, for example, depicts
the battalion of the US 82nd Airborne Division that
participates in the Multinational Force of Observers
monitoring the Egyptian-Israeli border in the Sinai as
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a "shock unit of the US 'Rapid Deployment Force'"
(RDF). A 1983 Soviet study of US policy in the Third
World claims that the Reagan administration's goal is
the establishment of US military control over
the resources of the Near and Middle East; the
creation of a hotbed of tension close to the
Soviet border; the imposition of constant pres-
sure on the USSR from the south.
Despite the self-serving exaggeration of such rhetoric,
the Soviets have apparently regarded Washington's
actions as a serious challenge to their position in the
region. Lebanon is a case in point. Brezhnev stated
publicly just prior to the formal US announcement
that a contingent of Marines would be deployed to
Beirut in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of 1982
that the Soviet Union was "categorically opposed" to
such a move, which, if it occurred, would force the
USSR "to build its policy taking this fact into
account." The Soviet decision to deploy SA-5 surface-
to-air-missile (SAM) units to Syria was taken shortly
after Brezhnev's warning. The Kremlin probably
would have sent the SA-5s even without the US
military deployment given the damaged state of
Syria's defenses and Soviet-Syrian relations, but the
Marine deployment may have erased any doubts the
Soviets had about the necessity of such a move
The creation of the RDF and later the US Central
Command (CENTCOM) appears to be a particularly
worrisome development for Moscow.
/Soviet
media continually focus on CENTCOM's activities in
the Middle East, particularly on its alleged creation of
bridgeheads for future military action against region-
al countries?including the USSR.
In addition to the US forces in this region, the Soviets
also have to consider the military potential of US
allies France, Great Britain, and Italy, not to mention
Turkey. The Soviets realize, however, that the United
Secret
A US B-52 bomber drops bombs in Egyptian
desert during last day of joint US-Egyptian
"Bright Star" exercise
States and the West Europeans do not always agree
on Middle Eastern matters, thus reducing the useful-
ness to Washington of the West European forces in
the region. Moreover, Moscow's own East European
and Cuban allies have numerous military, security,
and economic advisers in Middle Eastern countries
who complement the USSR's presence and give the
Kremlin another lever with which to influence region-
al governments, insurgents, and terrorist groups. Un-
like Washington's allies, though, none of these Soviet
allies?with the possible exception of Cuba?is capa-
ble of force projection in the Middle East.
Overview of Soviet Fortunes in the
Middle East Since 1970
To evaluate the Soviets' current position in the Mid-
dle East, their past record in the region should be
examined, especially during the period since the
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height of Soviet influence in 1970.2 The Soviet suc-
cesses in the late 1960s in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq,
coupled with the steady improvement in relations with
the northern tier countries, gave Moscow the stron-
gest position it has ever enjoyed in the Middle East.
The comment of one Western scholar that the
USSR's status in the region at the start of the 1970s
"can only be regarded as a singular triumph from the
perspective of the past" is representative of the gener-
ally held view in the West at that time.'
1970-78
Nasser's death in September 1970 marked the begin-
ning of the decline of Soviet influence in Egypt and in
the Arab world in general. His successor, Anwar
Sadat, did not share his view of the importance of
Soviet support for Egypt and resented Moscow's
intrusive presence in the country. Sadat?at first
tentatively, then decisively?moved to reduce Soviet
influence. His first step in May 1971 was to remove
the pro-Soviet faction headed by Ali Sabry, who
sought to replace Sadat.
Moscow had high hopes that Ali Sabry eventually
would take power.
Two months after Sabry's removal, the Soviets suf-
fered another blow, this time in Sudan. The Sudanese
Communist Party?then the largest and most influen-
tial in the Middle East?backed a military coup
against President Nimeiri and subsequently was deci-
mated after he managed, with Sadat's help, to restore
control. Soviet influence in Sudan declined precipi-
tately.
'For background on Russian/Soviet involvement in the Middle
East prior to 1970, see appendix A.
' Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East, Studies in
International Affairs No. 14 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1970), p. 37.
7
Before the break: Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat and Soviet leaders in the Kremlin, October
1971
Over the next few years, Sadat made a decisive break
with Moscow and threw Egypt's lot in with the United
States. He sent most of the Soviet military personnel
stationed in Egypt home in July 1972 and deprived
the Soviets of the use of Egyptian air bases and most
naval facilities.' Although Soviet weapons enabled
Egypt to score early gains in the October 1973 Arab-
Israeli war, Sadat turned to Washington at the end of
the fighting to obtain a settlement with Israel. Soviet-
Egyptian relations steadily deteriorated as the United
States brokered Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreements in 1974 and 1975. The process culminated
in Sadat's abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friend-
ship and cooperation treaty in 1976 and his decision a
year later to seek a separate peace with Israel using
the United States as a middleman. Within a short
span, the Soviets saw their premier relationship in the
Middle East?one that had taken 15 years and exten-
sive military and economic aid to build?crumble and
Washington pick up the pieces, and they were unable
to do anything to prevent it.
The loss of Egypt forced the Soviets to shift their
support to the more radical Arabs, who also opposed
Sadat's willingness to negotiate unilaterally with
Israel. Syria and the PLO became the USSR's prima-
ry clients in the region beginning in the mid-1970s.
Moscow also developed closer ties to Libya and
Sadat completely cut off Soviet use of Egyptian naval facilities in
1976.
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Soviet Sverdlov-class cruiser in Syrian port of
Tartus
Algeria, while South Yemen became the first Arab
country to be ruled by a Marxist regime when 'Abd
al-Fattah Ismall seized power in 1978. Although Iraq
was a major Soviet arms client and signed a friend-
ship and cooperation treaty with the USSR, by 1978
it had begun buying arms from the West and cracking
down on the Iraqi Communist Party.
The Soviets were unable to duplicate elsewhere in the
Middle East the naval and air facilities they lost in
Egypt (and in Somalia in 1977). Through wider use of
port facilities in Syria, South Yemen, and other
countries and greater dependence on replenishment at
sea, however, they continued to maintain sizable naval
contingents in the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean.
The Afghan Marxists' seizure of power in 1978 was a
breakthrough for Moscow in the northern tier. Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan, already extensive, grew
markedly under the Taraki regime. The Marxist
takeover in Kabul, however, strained Soviet ties to the
Shah of Iran. The cordial relations they had devel-
oped in the 1960s and early 1970s had already begun
to sour as a result of Iran's expanding military ties to
the United States and more assertive regional policy,
which often clashed with Soviet interests. With Tur-
key, on the other hand, the Soviets managed to
continue and even broaden the detente of the 1960s.
Secret
Bilateral trade soared, and the two signed an accord
on "Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation" in
1978.
1979-86
Since 1979 the Soviets have improved their position in
the northern tier and benefited from US setbacks in
the Middle East as a whole. Moscow's position in the
Arab-Israeli arena, however, has not markedly im-
proved.
The USSR received a strategic windfall in the north-
ern tier in 1979 with the demise of the Shah and the
loss of US influence in Iran. An article in the Soviet
scholarly journal Narody Azii i Afriki in 1979 stated
that:
As a result of the Iranian Revolution, a change
has taken place in the balance of power in the
Near and Middle East. The liquidation of the
pro-Western. . . regime of the Shah and the
collapse of the military-political bloc, CENTO,
has weakened the economic and strategic posi-
tion of the West, and especially that of the
United States, in the region and in the entire
world.
Instead of an Iran that acted as a US "gendarme" in
the region and allowed Washington to maintain lis-
tening posts to monitor military activity in the south-
ern USSR, the Soviets now had a neighbor that was
viscerally opposed to the United States. Moscow,
however, was able to make little headway of its own in
Tehran during the first three years of Ayatollah
Khomeini's rule. By the spring of 1982, the Soviets?
evidently concluding that as long as Khomeini was in
power their prospects for increasing influence in
Tehran would remain poor?abandoned attempts to
court the regime and tilted toward Iraq in its war with
Iran. Since then, relations have remained frigid.
The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 put
Soviet forces in control of Kabul for the first time.
The Afghan resistance, however, grew even stronger
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Soviet troops in armored personnel carrier in
downtown Kabul, Afghanistan
after the invasion and prevented the Soviets from
consolidating control, much less capitalizing through-
out the region on their military presence. The inva-
sion, in fact, made most Middle Eastern states even
more suspicious of Soviet intentions and, coupled with
the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the war
between Iran and Iraq, convinced some Arab coun-
tries (as well as Pakistan) to increase military coopera-
tion with the United States.
The Soviets reaped some benefits from the anti-US
backlash generated by the 1978 Camp David accords
between Egypt and Israel and by Washington's abor-
tive attempt to establish a pro-US central govern-
ment in Lebanon following Israel's 1982 invasion. The
USSR and Syria moved even closer together than
they had been prior to the late 1970s. They signed a
friendship and cooperation treaty in 1980, and
Moscow qualitatively increased its involvement by
sending two SA-5 SAM units to Syria in 1983
manned by approximately 2,000 Soviet personnel.
The USSR's other main Arab client, the PLO, under-
went a serious decline beginning in 1982 with the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was aimed at
eradicating PLO influence in that country. The jolt of
the PLO's defeat led to a rift within Fatah, the PLO's
main faction, and a falling out between PLO leader
Arafat and Syrian President Assad. Moscow's failure
9
to help Arafat during the invasion and its unwilling-
ness to jeopardize its relationship with Damascus by
stepping in forcefully to resolve the Arafat-Assad feud
strained its relations with the PLO chief. Arafat's
setbacks led him to consider a political solution to the
Palestinian problem through joint action with Jordan
and?potentially--cooperation with the United
States, a move that further chilled Soviet-PLO rela-
tions. The USSR moved no closer to its goal of being
included in Arab-Israeli negotiations on the Palestin-
ian issue but took solace from Washington's inability
to convince other Arabs to join the Camp David
framework for peace talks with Israel.
Libyan leader Qadhafi's growing fear of US inten-
tions after US Navy jets shot down two Libyan
aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 prompted him
to grant the Soviets wider access to Libyan naval and
air facilities. That same year, Muslim fundamental-
ists in Egypt assassinated the Soviets' most formida-
ble opponent in the Arab world, Anwar Sadat. The
death of such an important US ally was a windfall for
Moscow, but Egyptian President Mubarak has main-
tained his country's close links to Washington. Mu-
barak has avoided Sadat's outspoken anti-Sovietism
but moved much more slowly in normalizing relations
than the Soviets had hoped. Although ambassadorial
ties were resumed in the summer of 1984, there has
been no significant improvement in overall relations.
Perhaps one of the USSR's most significant achieve-
ments in the Arab world over the last few years has
been its improvement in relations with Iraq. Seeing no
prospects for gains in Iran and fearing an Iranian
victory over Iraq, the Soviets began in 1982 to provide
Baghdad with the weaponry it required to pursue the
war. Political relations have improved as a result, but
the legacy of past disputes has only been put aside, not
forgotten. The relationship remains narrowly based on
the supply of arms, and the Soviets continue to be
worried about Iraq's increasing political, economic,
and military contacts with the West?including the
United States.
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Moscow similarly has been concerned over Algeria's
drift Westward since President Bendjedid took over in
1979. The Soviets have tried hard to arrest the drift
but with little success. The care and thoroughness
with which Bendjedid has shifted Algeria's economy
away from the socialist model and its foreign policy
from a heavily pro-Soviet "nonaligned" stance suggest
that these are strategic rather than tactical moves.
On the Arabian peninsula, the Soviet Union main-
tained its position in South Yemen despite the ouster
of the staunchly pro-Soviet Ismall in 1980 and the
bloody coup against his successor, Hasani, in January
1986. The Soviets also managed to move closer to the
regime in North Yemen without reducing their sup-
port for the South. Moscow and Sanaa signed a major
arms deal in 1979 and a friendship and cooperation
treaty in 1984. That positive trend has been jeopar-
dized, however, by the frictions that the most recent
coup in Aden has generated in Soviet?North Yemeni
relations.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the war
between Iran and Iraq initially prompted most of the
conservative Gulf states to increase security coopera-
tion with the United States and shun establishing
relations with the USSR. By 1985, however, the
effects of these shocks had lessened, and the Gulf
states' disenchantment with US support for Israel had
increased to the point where Oman and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) established relations with the
Soviet Union. The other Gulf states appear to be
moving in the same direction, although suspicion of
Soviet complicity in Hasani's ouster is likely to slow
the process.
Gorbachev's record since assuming power in March
1985 suggests that the United States can expect a
more activist and tactically flexible Soviet policy in
the Middle East than it has faced since the early
1970s. He has yet to make any major innovations in
Soviet policy toward the region?save, perhaps, begin-
ning a tentative dialogue with Israel. But he has
demonstrated through his military support for
Moscow's Arab and Afghan clients, his frequent
meetings with Middle Eastern leaders, and the nu-
merous envoys he has dispatched to the area that the
Kremlin intends to be much more assertive in promot-
ing Soviet interests.
Secret
The Soviet Balance Sheet Today
The Arab World
The Strategic Prize: Egypt
The Soviets have yet to recover fully in the Arab
world from their loss of Egypt. Soviet influence in
Syria, Libya, and South Yemen hardly replaces the
loss of influence in Egypt, which Moscow openly
acknowledges, in the words of one Soviet scholar, as
"the key and most important country of the Arab
world." The Arabs' chances of winning or even hold-
ing their own in a war with Israel without Egyptian
participation are slim.
Recognizing Egypt's strategic importance in the
Middle East, the Soviets are devoting considerable
effort to rebuilding their influence there or, at least,
reducing Cairo's dependence on the United States.
Since the return of ambassadors in the summer of
1984, the foreign ministers have met at the United
Nations and the two sides have had several exchanges
of high-level messages. Moscow also has toned down
its media criticism of Egyptian policies.
Mubarak also sees normalized ties to the
USSR as strengthening his hand in bargaining with
Washington,
Obstacles to Closer Relations. Egypt's estimated $2.5
billion debt for past military purchases from the
USSR appears to be the most immediate obstacle
hindering an expansion of bilateral ties. The
Egyptians have not serviced the debt since 1977, when
Sadat unilaterally declared a 10-year moratorium on
payments. the Soviets
have made resolution of the debt a precondition for
meeting Egyptian requests for expanded trade and
military equipment. Moscow, in our view, does not
expect to recover the entire debt, but it wants the
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Factsheet on Soviet-Egyptian Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Gennadiy Zhuravlev (assumed post in September 1986)
Egyptian Ambassador: Salah Hasan Bassiouni (assumed post in September 1984)
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel Estimated Number of Egyptian Personnel
in Egypt (excluding dependents) Receiving Military Training in USSR
Diplomatic a 170 1980 0
Military advisers and technicians 0 1981 0
Economic advisers and technicians 200 1982 0
Total 370 1983 0
1984 0
1985 0
Soviet Trade With Egypt (million US $) b Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended
Exports Imports Total (million US $)
1975
364
623
987
1975
0
1980
266
325
591
1980
0
1981
339
372
711
1981
0
1982
302
417
719
1982
0
1983
345
482
827
1983
0
1984
341
332
673
1984
0
1985
338
364
702
1985
0
Military Sales (million US $) Facilities Used by Soviet Military
Deliveries
1980 2 None
1981 7
1982 12
1983 5
1984 14
1985 2
Total 42
a All officials] who
work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.
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Egyptians to begin making at least minimal payments
on the principal before it is willing to engage in major
new transactions. Although bilateral trade is likely to
expand, Egypt's growing financial difficulties and the
USSR's own economic stringencies limit both sides'
ability to compromise on the debt issue and probably
will constrain any significant expansion of overall
trade.
Despite Cairo's hope to use the "Soviet card" in
bargaining with Washington, Egyptian leaders have
repeatedly stated in public that they are not about to
reduce Egypt's strong political, military, and econom-
ic ties to the United States. Although the Egyptians
need spare parts to keep their Soviet weapons pur-
chased in the 1960s and 1970s functioning, they have
made the expensive and disruptive shift to dependence
on Western arms and do not appear anxious to
purchase major weapon systems from the Soviets.
Such purchases would not only create more logistic
problems for the Egyptians and risk making them
dependent on Moscow again but also might under-
mine their access to US arms. Cairo is likely during
the next five years to purchase relatively small
amounts of Soviet weapons and only those types that
do not require a sizable Soviet advisory presence in
Egypt.
Fundamental political differences between Moscow
and Cairo also stand in the way of a major improve-
ment in relations, and those differences are unlikely to
abate significantly. The two sides take different ap-
proaches to resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Al-
though the Egyptians endorse the concept of an
international conference on the question?the
Kremlin's pet project?they see greater merit in
direct negotiatons between the parties (what the Sovi-
ets criticize as "separate deals") to pave the way for a
comprehensive settlement. In addition, Egyptian offi-
cials have stated that they see the USSR's role more
as one of a guarantor than as an active participant in
the formulation of a final settlement.
Moscow's ties to Syria and Libya?Cairo's two main
rivals?also impose some limits on any significant
improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations. The Sovi-
ets probably would justify any move closer to Egypt
by trying to convince Damascus that they were
Secret
t!:*
Security ties to the United States: Egyptian
troops during August 1985 "Bright Star"
exercise with US forces
drawing Cairo away from Washington. The prospects
for major Soviet advances in Egypt during the next
few years are unlikely to be good enough, however, for
the Soviets to risk undermining their position in Syria,
which has taken so long to build. Moscow is less
concerned about upsetting Libyan leader Qadhafi but
still will not want to jeopardize its growing military
access to Libya for uncertain gains in Egypt.
Moscow's Goals. The Soviets are likely to downplay
these political differences with the Egyptians,
the two sides agree to disagree on
political issues for the time being and concentrate on
achieving progress in the economic sphere.
It appears, however, that Moscow, although the suit-
or, is not prepared to give something for nothing.
Karen Brutents, senior Middle Eastern specialist in
the CPSU Central Committee's International Depart-
ment, noted in an interview in October 1984 that the
improvement of bilateral relations "depends more on
Egypt." That view apparently holds today. The
Soviets' immediate aims seem to be:
? Poisoning US-Egyptian relations.
? Undermining Egypt's commitment to the Camp
David accords.
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? Achieving at least minimal progress in economic
relations.
? Fostering a rapprochement between Cairo and
Damascus.
Achievement of these goals would clear the path for a
broader improvement in bilateral ties and minimize
the risk of undercutting Soviet relations with Syria.
The Soviets apparently do not expect major progress
any time soon in realizing these oals.
We believe that Egypt, while giving greater emphasis
to its nonalignment, will almost certainly remain in
the US camp for at least the next few years. Further
limited improvement in Soviet-Egyptian ties is proba-
ble, but?as a Soviet diplomat acknowledged to US
State Department officials in August 1985?there
will be no return to the close relationship of the late
1960s. The Egyptians have made it clear that they do
not intend to repeat that experience.
The Linchpin: Syria
Syria has been central to the Soviets' interests in the
Middle East since the early 1970s. Their relationship
with Syria?by far the most powerful Arab "confron-
tation" state opposing Israel?has provided them
entree into the Middle East and influence in the
Arab-Israeli dispute. Moscow and Damascus have
been drawn together by some common objectives?
above all, to prevent Israel and the United States
from achieving separate peace settlements between
Tel Aviv and each of its Arab neighbors?as well as
by the USSR's lack of alternative avenues of influ-
ence in the region and Syria's lack of alternative
sources of military support. To achieve their objec-
tives, they have had nowhere else to turn but toward
each other. In our view, it is this mutual dependence
rather than affinity or ideological compatibility that
has solidified the relationship.
13
Military Backing: The Tie That Binds. The dominant
factor in the Soviet-Syrian relationship is Moscow's
willingness to provide military support. The Soviets
have delivered almost $17 billion worth of weapons
through 1985 to Syria, more than to any other Third
World client. The USSR and its East European allies
provide Syria with virtually all of its arms and, in
recent years, have ensured that it is among the first to
receive newly exported versions of Soviet weapons.
The dollar value of Soviet weaponry delivered has
decreased since the peak year of 1980,7 but the decline
probably will be reversed soon./
Beyond the approximately 3,000 Soviet military ad-
visers and technicians with Syrian forces
the USSR has some independent military
units of its own in Syria. The most significant were
the two SA-5 SAM units the Soviets sent to Syria in
early 1983. There were some 2,000 Soviet personnel
manning the SA-5 complexes at Hims and Dumayr
until they began leaving in October 1984.
' See figures in inset on page 18
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Figure 3
Selected Weapon Systems the Soviets Might Provide
Syria During the Rest of the 1980s
Description
Introduced in
Soviet Forces
Air/Air Defense Systems
SA-10
oonm=t.
Transportable, medium-range (100 km) SAM. Newest, most capable 1980
Soviet system. Effective against aircraft at all altitudes. Radar can
be used with other SAMs against low-altitude targets.
SA-11
Mobile low-to-medium altitude, medium-range (30 km) SAM. 1982
MIG-27 Flogger D/J
Improved MIG-23 ground attack aircraft with greater payload and 1975/1978
better navigation system. J variant equipped with laser range-
finder and target designator.
MIG-29 Fulcrum
Latest Soviet combat aircraft. Designed for close air-to-air combat. 1984
May also serve as a fighter-bomber. Only small number produced
thus far.
SU-25 Frogfoot
Latest Soviet ground attack aircraft. In use with Soviet forces in 1981
Afghanistan and exported to Iraq in 1985.
Ground Forces Systems
T-80
Latest Soviet medium tank with gas turbine engine, improved
armor protection, and better mobility than earlier tanks. Able to
fire antitank guided missile through gun tube.
1981
Naval Systems
F-Class Submarine
Diesel-powered attack submarine. Already exported 1958
to several countries outside the Warsaw Pact.
Note: Data based on information as of November 1986.
310738 10-86
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Soviet Military Advisory Presence
To assist the Syrians in operating and maintaining
Soviet equipment, as well as to train them in general
military tactics and doctrine, Moscow maintains
approximately 3,000 military advisers and techni-
cians in Syria. They are present at virtually every
level of the Syrian armed forces, from battalion to
general command.
15
,.. _
Soviet-built Euphrates Dam in northern Syria
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Economic Aid. Soviet economic assistance to Syria
has been highly visible but, when compared to Arab
and Iranian aid, relatively modest. Since the late
1950s, the Soviets have focused their assistance on
such large-scale projects as the Euphrates hydroelec-
tric complex, the Tartus-Hims railway, the Syrian oil
industry, and land reclamation. Today there are
approximately 1,000 Soviet economic technicians
working in Syria. Moscow has extended about
$2 billion in economic credits since 1957. (By way of
comparison, Arab government disbursements to
Damascus since 1979 have averaged $1.3 billion
annually, and Iran has provided an average of $1
billion a year since 1982.) The Soviets did not extend
any credits to Syria from 1977 through 1982, but the
more than $1 billion provided since then and the 25X1
recent negotiations over building a nuclear power
reactor and research center in Syria are leading to a
significant expansion of Soviet economic involvement
in the country. 25X1
The Syrian Quid Pro Quo. In return for this assis-
tance, the Syrians have granted the Soviets some
access to the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia and
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Soviet F-class submarine and repair ship in
Tartus, Syria
the military airfield at Tiyas. The Soviet Mediterra-
nean Flotilla regularly receives support from Soviet
logistic ships stationed in Tartus. The Soviets have
used Tiyas airfield since 1972. They deployed two
IL-38 antisubmarine warfare and naval reconnais-
sance aircraft there for the first time in 1981 and have
done so eight times since mid-1983 on what now
appears to be a regular basis. TU-16 Badger recon-
naissance aircraft also deployed to Tiyas once in 1981
and six times since early 1985.
Outside the military sphere, the Soviets receive Syrian
support in international forums on many issues, in-
cluding Afghanistan and Moscow's perennial "peace"
offensives. In addition to the hard currency the
Soviets earn from arms sales to Syria, the Syrians also
apparently give Soviet bids on economic projects in
Syria preferential consideration because of the
USSR's importance as a source of arms.(
Limited Soviet Influence. Despite the wide scope of
their presence in Syria, the Soviets have little sway
over important decisions made by the Assad regime.
17
Soviet Arms: How They Are Paid For
We know relatively little about the terms of payment
for Soviet arms sold to Syria, except that it apparent-
ly receives no grants. The Syrians evidently pay a
substantial amount of the total bill in hard currency
as a downpayment and the rest according to a
payment schedule that can extend a few years or
more. Most of the funds for the arms have come from
Saudi and other Gulf Arab subsidies to Damascus?
Moscow has given the Syrians especially lenient
payment terms for arms purchased since the war in
Lebanon in 1982. A Syrian Central Bank official told
US Embassy officers in February 1985 that Damas-
cus has been using the annual trade surplus it has run
with the USSR in the past few years as a partial
means of repaying its arms debt. Our rough estimate
for the current size of that debt is $7 billion.
A major factor behind the USSR's lack of influence
over Syrian policymaking is the mutual distrust that
has marked relations since Assad's seizure of power in
1970. The Soviets favored the man Assad ousted,
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Factsheet on Soviet-Syrian Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Aleksandr Dzasokhov (assumed post in 0
Syrian Ambassador: Muhammad Ali Halabi (assumed post in
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel
in Syria (excluding dependents)
Diplomatic a
Military advisers and technicians
Independent Soviet military units
Economic advisers and technicians
Total
90
3,000
400
1,000
4,490
Soviet Trade With Syria (million US $) b
Exports Imports Total
ctober 1986)
March 1983)
Estimated Number of Syrian Personnel
Receiving Military Training in USSR
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
50
75
100
NA
1,500
NA
Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended
(million US $)
1975
138
96
234
1975
7
1980
258
236
494
1980
0
1981
387
350
737
1981
56
1982
291
415
706
1982
o
1983
277
405
683
1983
273
1984
306
271
577
1984
820
1985
384
227
611
1985
0
Military Sales (million US $)
Deliveries
1980
2,316
1981
2,048
1982
2,030
1983
1,869
1984
1,187
1985
825
Total
10,275
a All officials vho
work in the Embassy and Consulate (Aleppo), as well as media and
trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.
Facilities Used by Soviet Military
Latakia
Tart us
Tiyas Airfield
Major port of call
Naval support/repair
facility
Used by Soviet IL-38
and TU-16 naval re-
connaissance aircraft
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Salah Jedid, the leader of the radical left wing of the
Syrian Beth Party, who, during his 1966-70 tenure,
moved Syria closer to the Soviet Union.)
Both sides have kept each other in the dark about
major issues. Former Secretary of State Kissinger
tells in his memoirs how Assad blocked the Soviets
from any involvement in the 1974 Golan Heights
disengagement agreement with Israel that the United
States had mediated.
Perhaps the most striking examples of failure to
consult were the Syrian military actions in 1976 and
1980. Syrian troops began their move into Lebanon in
June 1976 as a shocked Soviet Premier Kosygin
arrived in Damascus. Four years later a similar
embarrassment for the Soviets occurred when Syrian
troops advanced toward the Jordanian border just as
Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Kuznetsov
was about to arrive in Damascus for ratification of the
Soviet-Syrian treaty of friendship and cooperation.
19
With Friends Like These . . .
Henry Kissinger describes in his memoirs President
Assad's actions denying the Soviets a role in the
Golan Heights disengagement talks between Syria
and Israel in 1974. Kissinger, using "shuttle diploma-
cy," brokered the talks. Gromyko traveled to Damas-
cus for the express purpose of obtaining a voice in the
negotiations. But Assad, according to Kissinger, did
not want to give Moscow a voice, "as he made clear
by telling me proudly and in great detail how he had
prevented Gromyko from visiting Damascus while I
was there." Kissinger sums up the incident:
I have no idea how we could have insisted on an
exclusively American mediation had Asad cho-
sen otherwise. Nothing so much demonstrated
the weakness of the Soviet position than the fact
that Asad did not. . . . The President of Syria,
remarkably, preferred to negotiate without his
principal ally.a
Soviet-Syrian ties have become closer since 1974, but
the Soviets still worry that Assad, if he gets the right
terms, will reach an agreement with the United States
and Israel behind the USSR's back.
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1982), pp. 956, 1033-34.
Despite the 1980 Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooper-
ation treaty and all the emphasis Soviet media give to
the development of socialism in Syria, the Soviets
apparently do not see Syria as a secure base of Soviet
influence or fertile ground for socialism. They have
commented in the past that Syria is unlikely to
develop a socialist system, given the lack of an
organized working class and with the bourgeoisie
firmly in power. They also have made it clear they
have no illusions about the depth and durability of
socialism in Syria. They regard Bethist socialism as a
charade and the Syrians as traders and capitalists
whose political dependability is suspect.
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Policy Differences. On policy issues, Soviet-Syrian
differences center on the extent of Soviet military
support for Syrian strategic objectives and on specific
policy toward the PLO and Iraq and?to a lesser
extent?Egypt, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli peace
process. The Soviets have claimed that a primary
source of tension in the Soviet-Syrian relationship is
the Assad regime's attempts to broaden the 1980
treaty to commit the USSR to come to Syria's defense
militarily in the event of war. Soon after the an-
nouncement in 1981 of the US-Israeli "strategic
cooperation" agreement, the Syrians began publicly
calling for a similar accord between
Syria and the USSR. They have also sought
Moscow's backing for their goal of "strategic parity"
with Israel.
Different perspectives on the PLO have led to some of
the sharpest Soviet-Syrian differences over the past
decade. Moscow has consistently opposed Syrian at-
tempts to dominate the organization, from the Syrian
intervention against PLO forces in Lebanon in 1976
to the Damascus-backed attacks on Palestinian camps
Secret
Syrian President Hafiz Assad and Soviet
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during
their June 1985 meeting in the Kremlin (u)
there beginning in the spring of 1985.\
The Soviets, however, have
had little success in tempering Syrian moves against
the PLO
Moscow, similarly, has had no success in convincing
Assad to mend fences with Iraq and Egypt. As for
Lebanon, the Soviets have suppressed their misgivings
about Syrian policy there since the Israeli invasion in
1982, but they still oppose long-term Syrian domina-
tion of the country. They have made it clear that
under no conditions would the USSR support the
partition of Lebanon for the benefit of a "Greater
Syria."
Differing Perspectives on the Peace Process. Soviet-
Syrian difficulties over the Arab-Israeli peace process
have usually not been over the final terms of a
settlement but over how best to obtain those terms.
Moscow has sought a comprehensive settlement at an
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international conference that it would chair jointly
with Washington?the solution that would give the
USSR the greatest voice. Damascus refused to attend
the only international conference on the issue that has
ever been held?at Geneva in December 1973?and
would not support the US-Soviet call in October 1977
for reconvening the conference. The Syrians have
publicly expressed support for the USSR's current
effort to convene a conference/
The Deputy Chief of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Near East and North Africa Ad-
ministration admitted to a US Embassy officer in
Moscow in October 1986 that Syria was one of the
few Arab countries that was not showing continuing
interest in Moscow's proposed international confer-
ence.
In our view, the Soviets cannot risk endorsing any
peace initiative that does not meet most of Syria's
objectives, even if by doing so they could achieve their
main objective?gaining a voice in the peace process.
Alienating Damascus to gain entree into the peace
process would be an empty victory. The Soviets would
have a seat at the peace conference but no ally to
represent. At the same time, Moscow has not shown
the ability to convince Damascus to soften its position.
Thus, the Soviets are left with little choice but to
follow the Syrian lead, and the Syrians appear in no
hurry to engage in negotiations.
More broadly, the Soviets' overwhelming dependence
on Syria for influence in the region requires them, no
matter how much they dislike it, to follow or at least
acquiesce in Damascus' lead on most major issues in
the Arab world. In our view, as long as Syria remains
the centerpiece of Soviet strategy?which we believe
it will for many years to come unless the Soviets can
reestablish a close relationship with Egypt?Moscow
will continue to adjust its policies toward other coun-
tries to mesh with its Syrian policy. This will not
prevent improvement in the USSR's ties to Iraq,
Jordan, Egypt, or Yasir Arafat, but it will limit such
developments."
" See "Impact of Future Developments" section for discussion of
Soviet policy toward Syria after Assad and of the impact a
breakthrough in Moscow's relations with Egypt would have on
Soviet-Syrian ties.
21
Footholds on the Periphery: Libya and South Yemen 12
The USSR has devoted considerable resources to
expanding its military presence in Libya and South
Yemen and probably sees them as useful footholds for
complicating US policy and, potentially, expanding
Soviet influence in the region. Nonetheless, the fact
that the USSR's only Arab clients beside Syria are
Libya and South Yemen speaks volumes about the
decline of Moscow's influence in the Middle East
since the early 1970s. Both countries are geographi-
cally and politically on the fringes of the Arab world
and the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Libya. Libya is one of Moscow's consolation prizes in
the Middle East. When the grand prize?Egypt?
began to slip away from the Soviets in the early
1970s, they attempted to compensate for the loss
wherever they could. Qadhafi's Libya, despite its pan-
Islamic goals and virulent anti-Communism, was a
logical candidate for Soviet courting. Both states
opposed Sadat's Egypt, "separate deals" with Israel,
and the US presence in the Middle East. Qadhafi
saw, and still sees, the USSR as a primary source of
the modern weapons he believes he needs to achieve
his ambitious goals. For Moscow, Qadhafi's desire to
buy arms and Libya's vast oil wealth make the
country a lucrative source of hard currency. In recent
years, the Soviets have also begun to make greater use
of Libyan ports and airfields, although Moscow's 25X1
access hardly replaces what it lost in Egypt. Finally,
the Kremlin often benefits?without having to bear
the risk or cost?from Qadhafi's worldwide subversive
activities against friends of the United States.
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As with Syria, Iraq, and Algeria, the military compo-
nent is the core of the Soviet-Libyan relationship. The
USSR has sold more arms to Libya (deliveries esti-
mated to be worth over $11 billion through 1985?all
since 1970) than to any other Third World country
except Syria and Iraq. Tripoli paid strictly in hard
currency until 1982, when it began meeting part of its
bill in oil.? Since then Libya has provided Moscow an
average of about 115,000 barrels of oil a day, which
was worth about $1.2 billion annually before this
year's precipitate drop in the world price of oil. In
addition, the Soviets maintain approximately 2,000
military advisers and technicians throughout Libya's
armed forces.
Sub-
stantial numbers of Libyans are sent to the USSR
each year for military training.
Since mid-1981, Qadhafi has allowed the Soviets
expanded use of Libyan air and naval facilities.[
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi with
Gorbachev durin their rst meeting in Moscow.
October 1985
Soviet naval combatants
also use Libyan ports?Tobruk occasionally (for re-
pairs and replenishment) and Tripoli (for ceremonial
visits)?but the Mediterranean Flotilla makes far
greater use of Syrian and other facilities.
Despite the Soviets' military investment in Libya,
Qadhafi's mercurial personality has prompted them to
keep a certain distance. President Brezhnev told
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy in 1974, according
to the latter's memoirs: "That young man [Qadhafi] is
crazy. . . . He is an unbalanced fanatic."
13 The Soviets resell virtually all the oil they obtain from Libya.
Secret
Some of the Libyan leader's activities confirm the
belief that he is capable of undermin-
ing Soviet interests. Qadhafi:
? Publicly criticized the USSR for insufficient mili-
tary aid to the Arabs during the October 1973 War
and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
? Has given military, financial, and political aid to
Palestinian rebels bent on ousting PLO leader Ara-
fat, whom Moscow still supports.
? Signed a "union" with Morocco in 1984, over which
Soviet officials expressed concern, fearing that it
would increase Libyan-Algerian tensions.
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Factsheet on Soviet-Libyan Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Pogos Akopov (assumed post in October 1986)
Libyan Ambassador: Muhammad Humud (assumed post in November 1986)
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel Libyan Military Personnel
in Libya (excluding dependents) Receiving Training in USSR
Diplomatic a 50 1980 1,150
Military advisers and technicians 2,000 1981 1,150
Economic advisers and technicians 5,000 1982 1,150
Total 7,050 1983 900
1984 750
1985 600
Soviet Trade With Libya (million US $) b Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended
Exports Imports Total (million US $)
1975
26
0
26
1980
252
443
695
1980
0
1981
264
502
766
1981
0
1982
305
1,554
1,859
1982
0
1983
357
1,368
1,725
1983
0
1984
172
1,394
1,566
1984
0
1985
100
1,053
1,154
1985
0
Military Sales (million US $)
Deliveries
1980
1,222
1981
1,326
1982
990
1983
691
1984
1,003
1985
612
Total
5,844
All officials 1 who
work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.
Facilities Used by Soviet Military
Tobruk
Occasional use by
Soviet submarines
and submarine
tenders for repairs
and replenishment
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Some of Libya's other actions, such as the shooting of
Libyan dissidents and a British policewoman in Lon-
don in 1984, while possibly benefiting Moscow by
disrupting friends of the United States, have placed
the Soviets in awkward positions.
We estimate that Libya owes the USSR ap-
proximately $2 billion for past weapons purchases.
Frictions between the two have not prevented the
Soviets from increasing their support for Libya during
the last year. The most visible sign of this was the
delivery late last year of Soviet SA-5 missiles. The
Soviets also displayed a slightly greater readiness than
earlier to back Qadhafi during US-Libyan tensions in
January and April of this year. They sent a few ships
to the central Mediterranean?some to Libyan coast-
al waters?to monitor the movements of the US Sixth
Fleet and presumably passed tracking data to the
Libyans. This Soviet monitoring activity was more
Secret
extensive than during past crises involving Libya.
And, following the US airstrikes on Libya in April,
the Kremlin postponed a meeting between Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz.
Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued determination to
keep some distance from Qadhafi was clearly evident
during the US-Libyan clashes. Moscow was careful in
its public comments not to commit itself to take any
action in support of Libya/
The Soviets have subsequently signaled Washington
that they want to stand clear of any future US-Libyan
clash. a Soviet diplo-
mat, aware that his remarks would reach US officials,
stated in September 1986 that Moscow's backing for
Qadhafi is moral only and that the USSR has no
desire to get involved in the US-Libyan conflict.
Other Soviet officials repeated these remarks during
September.
Disputes over arms payments and concern over Qad-
hafi's unpredictability are likely to remain complicat-
ing factors in Soviet-Libyan relations as long as
Qadhafi remains in power." Moscow also will almost
certainly continue to avoid giving Qadhafi the securi-
ty commitments he apparently wants. Besides their
desire not to be drawn into a military clash with the
United States, the Soviets probably fear that giving
Tripoli such a commitment would harm their relations
'4 See "Impact of Future Developments" section for discussion of
Soviet options should Qadhafi die or be ousted.
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with Algeria and Egypt. The USSR's unwillingness to
commit itself to Libya's defense appears to be the
primary reason that the friendship and cooperation
treaty the two sides announced in principle in March
1983 has yet to be concluded. The Soviets, in our
view, have been?and remain?ready to sign an ac-
cord similar to their other friendship and cooperation
treaties with Third World countries that do not carry
security commitments. If Qadhafi agrees to this, a
treaty could be signed at any time.
Despite the frictions and the Kremlin's desire to
maintain some distance from Qadhafi, the benefits
each side derives from the relationship probably will
prompt them to continue, and perhaps even expand,
their cooperation in the next few years. Qadhafi's
heightened sense of vulnerability after the US raid in
April probably will lead him to seek greater Soviet
military backing. Although to date he has restricted
Soviet access to Libyan air and naval facilities, he
probably now would welcome an increase in that
access because of the impression it would create of a
greater Soviet willingness to defend Libya. We believe
Moscow desires increased military access but would
move cautiously to avoid giving such an impression.
The Soviets probably would seek permanent access for
their IL-38s, greater use of port facilities at Tobruk,
and?possibly?permission to station logistic ships in
Tobruk harbor as they do now in Tartus, Syria.
The Libyans periodically threaten in public?most
recently in April?to grant the Soviets independent
military bases in Libya.'
We believe, however, that Moscow probably would
not expend the resources on building independent
Soviet naval or air bases in Libya as long as Qadhafi
is in power. Apart from the high risk of being drawn
into a US-Libyan conflict and the negative impact
such a move would have on the USSR's relations with
Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, the Soviets would be
likely to calculate that the unpredictable Qadhafi
could repossess the bases and send Soviet forces home
once the US threat subsided, or that he would seek to
hold Soviet policy hostage to base privileges. More-
over, from a purely operational standpoint, the risks of
Soviet military bases in Libya might not be worth the
benefits.
25
South Yemen.' Syria is the Soviets' most important
client in the Arab world, but South Yemen is the
closest. Whereas in Syria the Soviets have a presence
throughout the military but almost nowhere else, in
South Yemen they?along with their East European
and Cuban allies?permeate the entire government,
party, and military structure. The Soviets' interests in
the PDRY?a dismally poor country of little more
than two million people?stem from its Marxist orien-
tation and its strategic location. The Soviets value the
PDRY because it is all they have to show for almost
70 years of trying to foster the growth of Marxist
regimes in the Arab world." They promote South
Yemen as a model for other Middle Eastern states to
follow and work with it to aid leftist movements in the
region. Aden is a haven for Middle Eastern Commu-
nists, leftist Palestinians, and the remnants of Marxist
insurgents who once fought in neighboring Oman and
North Yemen.
South Yemen's location at the confluence of the Red
Sea and the Indian Ocean gives it military signifi-
cance for the Soviet Union. Naval ships of the Soviet
Indian Ocean Squadron make regular use of the port
facilities at Aden,'' and Moscow keeps two IL-38
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'The USSR, however, played no role in the establishment of South
Yemen in 1967 and only a supporting role in the country's swing to
the left in the first few years after independence.
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1977, Aden grew in importance for the Soviets. Since 1980, Soviet
Indian Ocean ships have made an average of about 75 visits
annually to Aden. The port, however, is heavily congested with
commercial traffic, and Soviet combatants usually use the anchor-
age off South Yemen's Socotra Island or the port facilities the
Soviets have on Ethiopia's Dahlak Island.
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Figure 5
South Yemeni Facilities Used by the Soviet Military
Red Sea
to.
Dehalak' Des&
kM)ahlak Island)
egth.)
gamarrbr
Island U
Saudi Arabia
no defined
boundary
Yemen Arab
*SANAA
Republic
(N. Yemen)
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
(S. Yemen)
12
Bab el
andeb
Airfield
Al'An
Ethiopia
ernational
airport
ADEN
W Port
Gulf of Aden
Admininistratike\
Line (
Djibouti
DAB UTI
Somalia
naval reconnaissance aircraft at Al Anad airfield,
north of Aden, on a continuous basis.)
Oman
150KSometers
150 Miles
n'tNetysZglryesaeL;:li:;:tit.
708775 (A05003) 11-86
Party's (YSP) fractious elements together. The
Soviets may have intended Ismeil's return in 1985 as
a useful "insurance policy" to keep Hasani honest, but
we believe they did not favor his reassumption of the
top party post
The Soviets initially welcomed South Yemen's sharp
turn leftward during 'Abd al-Fattah Ismeil's 1978-80
rule. They apparently realized, however, that his
radicalism was disrupting the country?much as
Hafizullah Amin's did in Afghanistan in 1979?and,
they
acquiesced in his replacement by Ali Nasir
Muhammad al-Hasani in April 1980. From Moscow's
vantage point, Hasani, though not as ideologically
"pure" as Ismeil, probably was viewed as loyal and
more adept at holding the ruling Yemeni Socialist
Secret
Ismeil was popular with the Soviets, but they recog-
nized that he did not make a good leader, and they
accepted Hasani as the more effective alternative.
The radical Marxist coup in January that toppled
President Hasani ushered in a new and unpredictable
era in Soviet-PRDY relations. The weakening of the
YSP, the death of many top pro-Soviet figures, and
the tribal rivalries the coup inflamed have led to a
more unstable South Yemen.
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Factsheet on Soviet-South Yemeni Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Al'bert Rachkov (assumed post in July 1986)
PDRY Ambassador: Ahmad Abdallah abd al-Ilah (assumed post in November 1985)
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel Estimated Number of PRDY Personnel
in PDRY (excluding dependents) Receiving Military Training in USSR
Diplomatic a 30 1980 NA
Military advisers and technicians 1,000 1981 NA
Independent Soviet military units 300 1982 NA
Economic advisers and technicians 550 1983 2,000
Total 1,880 1984 2,000
1985 NA
Soviet Trade With PDRY (million US $) b Soviet Economic Credits' Grants Extended
Exports Imports Total (million US $)
1980
86
8
94
1980
209
1981
129
8
137
1981
1982
93
8
101
1982
1983
184
7
191
1983
1984
136
7
143
1984
1985
172
10
182
1985
Military Sales (million US $)
Deliveries
1980
386
1981
257
1982
129
1983
404
1984
92
1985
213
Total
1,481
'All officials{ who
work in the Embassy and Consulate (Al Mukallah), as well as
media and trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.
Facilities Used by Soviet Military
Aden
Naval support/repair
facility
Al Anad Airfield
Two IL-38 naval
reconnaissance/ASW
aircraft stationed
there
27
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Photograph from 1972 of the previous three
leaders of South Yemen. 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il
(center) toppled President Salim Rubayii Ali
(left) in a 1978 coup, following which Ali was
executed. Ismail died in a January 1986 attempt
to topple Hasani (right)
We believe that Moscow had no compelling reason to
seek Hasani's ouster, did not support the coup, and
was surprised by it. By 1984 it had become clear that
the Soviets and Hasani had resolved their differences
over his opening toward the West and with moderate
Arab states, as well as over the PDRY's displeasure
with the low level of Soviet economic aid that plagued
their relations in 1982-83. Hasani was the only Arab
leader granted a meeting with Gorbachev at Chernen-
ko's funeral in March 1985. Soviet leaders did not
meet with him at the funerals of Brezhnev and
Andropov in 1982 and 1984, respectively.
each independently noted the increasingly pro-Soviet
tenor in the Hasani regime's public statements during
1984-85. Hasani may have adopted this almost obse-
quious pro-Soviet posture to head off the threat to his
leadership that began to arise within the YSP in mid-
1984.
Hasani weathered the threat in 1984, apparently with
Soviet support, but?perhaps as part of a compromise
to end the party factionalism?Moscow convinced
him to accept the return to Aden and appointment to
the party secretariat of Ismall.)
Ismall returned in March 1985, shortly
after he was reinstated to the party secretariat, and
Hasani relinquished his post as head of government.
The Kremlin presumably endorsed Ismall's reinstate-
ment to the Politburo at the YSP party congress in
October 1985, but they also almost certainly backed
Hasani's reelection as general secretary.
South Yemeni expressions of fealty to the USSR
became more and more effusive during Hasani's last
year in power. The communique from the YSP Cen-
tral Committee plenum in February 1985 lauded the
"increasing development of the strategic alliance rela-
tions" between the PDRY and the Soviet Union. The
British, Canadian, French, and Chinese Ambassadors
Secret
Moscow's behavior during the coup attested to its lack
of complicity. Soviet media carried Hasani's errone-
ous announcement on the first day of the coup, 13
January, that the "counterrevolutionaries" had been
crushed and their ringleaders executed. Four days
into the crisis, Soviet media were still calling the rebel
leaders "putschists." Shortly thereafter, as the Soviets
evacuated their nationals from Aden and the fighting
shifted in the rebels' favor, the USSR adopted a
neutral public stance and attempted to mediate be-
tween the two sides. It was only 10 to 14 days into the
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Soviet trawler ctlf the coast of Aden during the
January 1986 fighting
coup, when the rebels clearly had gained the upper
hand, that Moscow threw its support to the new
regime, and even then it did so discreetly.)
/The Soviets kept
a low profile to make it easier for them to deny any in-
volvement in the fighting on the rebels' side.
Moscow's more vital support consisted of pressure on
North Yemen and Ethiopia not to aid Hasani's forces.
The new regime, nominally headed by President
`Attas," not only is beset with internal factionalism,
but forces loyal to Hasani continue to harass the
government from their safehaven in North Yemen,
and the tribal animosities that the fighting exacerbat-
ed continue to smolder. Soviet officials have acknowl-
edged that tribalism is one of the major problems the
regime faces. Leonid Zamyatin, then chief of the
CPSU Central Committee's International Informa-
tion Department, told a Lebanese newspaper in
February that South Yemen is still encountering
difficulties from the "tribal division of society." An
'"Attas, a longtime Hasani supporter and without an independent
power base, apparently is only a figurehead. Although he replaced
Hasani as president, he did not assume Hasani's more important
post of YSP secretary general. The real powers in the new regime
appear to be YSP Secretary General All Salim al-Bidh and Deputy
Secretary General Salim Salih Muhammad.
29
important Pravda article in September echoed this
view. It also blamed Hasani for precipitating the
January events?the first time the Soviets stated this
in public.
'small and other prominent rebel leaders were killed
in the fighting, but most of the key figures in the new
regime?including Bidh and Salim Salih?have a
reputation of being radical Marxists and fervently
pro-Soviet. Moscow, however, appears to be advising
the new leaders to portray themselves as moderates."
The regime has repeatedly stated in public that it
desires good relations with all its neighbors. Soviet
diplomats in Sanaa, in separate conversations with the
US Ambassador and President Salih in February,
argued that there are numerous moderates in the new
cabinet.
Despite the new regime's fervently pro-Soviet tenor,
there is the potential for Soviet?South Yemeni ten-
sions over the level of Soviet economic aid and efforts
by Moscow to expand its military access in the
PDRY. The South Yemenis have long been dissatis-
fied with the level and quality of economic aid the
USSR has provided. Many Soviet projects have taken
years to complete and have compared unfavorably
with the few Western projects that South Yemen has
contracted for in recent years. Aden was particularly
rankled by the paltry Soviet relief package following
the major floods in 1982. Moscow is unlikely to
provide significantly increased economic aid in the
years ahead because of its own economic constraints
and its probable belief that Aden is securely within
the Soviet orbit and therefore not likely to alter its
political allegiance, even if it were to obtain substan-
tial Arab or Western assistance.
The Soviets may increase efforts to obtain expanded
access to South Yemeni air and naval facilities and
possibly even an independent Soviet military base.
'9 In fact, the choice of the "moderate" 'Attas to replace Hasani as
president probably was a result of Soviet advice. `Attas, in India
when the coup began, flew to Moscow and remained there until the
rebels announced their choice of him as provisional president
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Soviet ships in Aden harbor
Neither issue?economic aid or military access?is
likely to develop into a major problem between the
two countries. The South Yemeni leaders would pre-
fer more generous economic aid but almost certainly
view it as secondary to the military assistance Mos-
cow provides. The Soviets, for their part, are not in
dire need of expanded military facilities. They can
adequately maintain their current air and naval forces
in the region with the facilities now at their disposal.
The pressure for increased access would intensify if
they decided to expand those forces.
Thus, despite the traumatic effect of the coup on the
South Yemeni ruling structure, Moscow maintains a
strong foothold in Aden and is likely to continue to do
so for at least the rest of the decade. The current
regime is even more pro-Soviet than Hasani's. Tribal-
ism and YSP factionalism are likely to remain desta-
bilizing factors, but?as the coup has shown?even
Secret
with the YSP at war with itself, there is no credible
organized threat outside the party to vie for control of
the country. The most serious potential threat could
come from Hasani's forces in North Yemen, if Sanaa
and Riyadh decide to support a massive insurgency.
Such a development could lead Moscow to become
even more directly involved in South Yemen's
defense.
Partners of Convenience: North Yemen,
Iraq, Algeria, and the PLO
North Yemen. The Soviets' ability to maintain rela-
tively good relations with a variety of regimes in
Sanaa for almost 60 years is one of their success
stories in the Middle East. Moscow has been involved
in North Yemen longer than in any other Arab
country." The treaty of friendship and trade the
Soviets signed with the feudal, theocratic regime of
Imam Yahya in 1928 was their first with an Arab
government. When the Imamate fell in 1962, the
USSR moved quickly to support the new Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR), going so far as to provide pilots to
fly combat missions in 1962-63 and to provide both
pilots and an airlift of military supplies in 1967?the
first such Soviet military interventions in crises in the
Arab world.
The Soviets adroitly managed to maintain and even
increase their influence in North Yemen under Presi-
dent Salih, who took power in 1978, despite their close
ties to Marxist South Yemen and indirect support for
the Marxist insurgency in the North during the early
1980s. The YAR's need for a reliable source of arms
and training to fend off its two neighbors, South
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, induced Sanaa to seek
Soviet support.
Soviet interest in North Yemen stems more from its
neighbors than from its intrinsic value. The YAR,
with approximately 6.3 million people, represents a
" The Soviets established relations with Saudi Arabia in 1926, two
years before their treaty with Yemen, but withdrew their envoy in
Jiddah in the mid-1930s and relations have been dormant ever
since.
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Soviet-made SA-2 SAMs being paraded in
Sanaa in 1983
potential threat to Moscow's ally, South Yemen,
which has about one-third the population. Soviet
influence in North Yemen represents some insurance
against this threat. At the same time, influence in the
YAR gives the USSR some leverage against, and a
window on, Saudi Arabia?the biggest prize on the
Arabian peninsula.
Moscow's presence in the YAR, although far less
extensive than in the PDRY, is substantial. Soviet and
East European arms compose approximately three-
fourths of the inventory of the YAR's armed forces.
About 500 Soviet military advisers and technicians
are assigned to North Yemen, and about 250 Yeme-
nis are presently receiving military training in the
Soviet Union. In addition, there are approximately
175 Soviet economic advisers and technicians in the
YAR and an embassy staff of about 150?after
Egypt, the second largest Soviet mission in the Middle
East. The Soviets may see Sanaa as the best place
available to them to collect intelligence on Saudi
Arabia, where they have no representation?thus, the
large presence in a small country.
We are not certain how much influence this large
presence gives the Soviets.1
Salih himself does not appear to be unduly
swayed by Moscow. Nonetheless, the Salih regime
publicly supports many Soviet international initiatives
31
North Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih
(wearing fur hat) being received by Soviet leaders
during his October 1984 visit to Moscow
and almost never speaks negatively about the Soviets
in its media?treatment it does not accord the United
States.
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Moscow scored a propaganda success by convincing
Sanaa in October 1984 to upgrade its longstanding
treaty to one of "friendship and cooperation." The 25X1
accord is the most vague and least binding of all such
treaties the Soviets have signed to date.2' It differs
from the 1964 treaty (the previous most recent update
of the original document signed in 1928) in several
ways; it has:
? A pledge to consult on international problems that
affect both countries' interests.
? A pledge not to take part in actions directed against
each other.
? Some anticolonialist rhetoric.
? A duration of 20, rather than five, years.
These points are common to all Soviet friendship and
cooperation treaties with Third World countries. Un-
like most of the other treaties, however, the one with
North Yemen does not have a clause calling for closer
military cooperation. Moreover, the treaty's call for 25X1
consultations on international problems does not
"The friendship and cooperation treaty with the YAR is the 13th
Moscow has signed; two?those with Egypt and Somalia?were
later abrogated by those countries.
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Factsheet on Soviet-North Yemeni Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Anatoliy Filev (assumed post in September 1984)
YAR Ambassador : Abd al-Uthman Muhammad (assumed post in February 1983)
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel
in YAR (excluding dependents)
Estimated Number of YAR Personnel
Receiving Military Training in USSR
Diplomatic a
150
1975
100
Military advisers and technicians
500
1980
1,200
Economic advisers and technicians
175
1981
500
Total
825
1982
600
1983
400
1984
250
1985
250
Soviet Trade With YAR (million US $) b
Exports Imports
Total
Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended
(million US $)
1981
32
NEGL
32
1981
55
1982
47
1
48
1982
0
1983
57
NEGL
57
1983
0
1984
14
NEGL
14
1984
0
1985
18
NEGL
18
1985
0
Military Sales (million US $) Facilities Used by Soviet Military
Deliveries
1980 518 None
1981 229
1982 175
1983 309
1984 56
1985 87
Total 1,374
All officials -I vho
work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.
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stipulate that the two sides should attempt to coordi-
nate their policies during crises, as does every other
Soviet treaty but one.
Substantively, the treaty adds more formality to the
relationship and should, the Soviets hope, help to
ensure its stability. The Kremlin's aim in such treaties
apparently is to base the relationship on legal institu-
tions, rather than on personalities, to ensure that
Soviet-YAR ties will survive Salih's departure. There
is nothing in the treaty, however, that guarantees that
this will be the case or?as Egypt's and Somalia's
abrogation of similar treaties showed?that the cur-
rent North Yemeni leadership will not have a change
of heart.
A number of issues limit bilateral ties. Perhaps the
most important is an economic one. North Yemen is a
desperately poor country and is currently unable to
meet the payments on its estimated $900 million debt
to the USSR. The servicing of this debt is a perennial
topic at meetings between high-level Soviet and North
Yemeni officials. The Soviets have apparently, for
lack of alternatives, rescheduled at least part of the
debt but are not willing to write it off as a loss.
Sanaa's inability to pay also impinges on future
purchases of Soviet military equipment. Moscow is
unlikely to let the debt grow much beyond what it is
today; the YAR is not as important to Soviet interests
as Syria.
The discovery of oil in North Yemen by a US
company in 1984 may eventually alleviate Sanaa's
financial problems and ease frictions with Moscow
over the debt. On the other hand, the newfound
wealth might enable North Yemen to purchase more
Western arms, and the involvement of a US oil
company could lead to closer ties between Sanaa and
Washington.
If weapons were available and affordable in the West,
North Yemen probably would opt for them to reduce
its dependence on Moscow
33
Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaties
With Third World Countries
Egypt a
Iraq
India
Somalia b
Angola
Mozambique
Vietnam
Ethiopia
Afghanistan
South Yemen
Syria
Congo
North Yemen
27 May 1971
9 April 1972
9 August 1972
11 July 1974
8 October 1976
31 March 1977
3 November 1978
20 November 1978
5 December 1978
25 October 1979
8 October 1980
13 May 1981
9 October 1984
a Egypt abrogated the treaty on 15 March 1976.
b Somalia abrogated the treaty on 13 November 1977.
Although genuinely worried about Sanaa's intentions,
Soviet leaders probably calculate that Salih is too
heavily dependent on the USSR for arms to down-
grade the relationship significantly. We believe that,
if the Soviets concluded that Salih were seriously
moving in that direction, they would become even
more cooperative about supplying arms and more
lenient about the terms of payment.
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North Yemen's stance toward the regime in the
PDRY will be a determining factor in Soviet-YAR
relations over the next few years. If Salih provides
significant military assistance to Hasani's forces,
Moscow is certain to increase pressure on Sanaa to
desist. Such pressure could include more visits by
high-level Soviets, threats to cut off the supply of
Soviet arms, or even a revival of the Marxist National
Democratic Front guerrillas. Relations are likely to
remain somewhat tense even if Salih eventually ac-
cepts the change of power in Aden. He already
suspects that the radicals in the regime will attempt to
destabilize North Yemen. At this point, we do not
believe the Soviets will encourage such attempts short
of major North Yemeni aid to Hasani's forces, but
they probably calculate that the threat of potential
PDRY destabilization efforts in the YAR will be a
useful lever in their dealings with Sanaa.
Iraq. Iraq is important to the Soviets because it is:
? A major actor in the Arab world and a perennial
rival with Syria and Egypt for preeminence among
the Arabs.
? A rival of Iran as the most influential power in the
Persian Gulf region.
? One of the world's major oil producers and, thus, a
lucrative source of hard currency for Moscow.
? Virulently anti-Israeli and, until recently, almost as
adamantly anti?United States.
The Soviets' relationship with Iraq has been their
most erratic in the Middle East. Relations were so
hostile under the Iraqi monarchy that Baghdad sev-
ered relations with Moscow in 1955 in response to
Soviet protests about the formation of the Baghdad
Pact. General Qasim's ouster of the monarchy in 1958
brought an immediate reestablishment and improve-
ment of relations, but ties fluctuated with the various
regimes that ruled in Baghdad through the mid-
1960s.
The Beth Party's reemergence as the ruling group in
Iraq in 1968?it remains in power today?led to
another upsurge in Soviet-Iraqi relations. The new
leaders of the Ba`th?in the aftermath of the massive
Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the June 1967
war?saw the Soviet Union as vital to the achieve-
ment of Arab aims. The Beth followed a radical
Secret
anti-Israeli, anti-US foreign policy and professed alle-
giance to a socialist internal order. Despite some
differences, the USSR and Iraq drew closer over the
next decade.
Relations began to sour again, however, by the late
1970s, as Baghdad?fearful of growing Soviet in-
volvement in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghani-
stan?cracked down on the Iraqi Communist Party
(CPI) and sought to reduce Iraqi dependence on
Soviet arms by purchasing Western weapons. The
relationship plummeted to its lowest point since 1958
when Moscow cut off arms shipments to Iraq at the
outbreak of the war with Iran in September 1980.
After attempting to capitalize on this embargo with
the Khomeini regime in Iran and failing, the Soviets
lifted it in the spring of 1981 and began to tilt
decisively toward Baghdad in the spring of 1982,
when the two sides signed their first new arms deal
since the war began.
Soviet-Iraqi ties today are the best they have been
since the heyday of the relationship in the early 1970s.
This is almost entirely due to the Kremlin's decision
to open up the arms tap to Iraq. The Soviets have
delivered military equipment worth more than
$7 billion to Iraq since ending the embargo in early
1981, making them Baghdad's largest supplier (see
figure 6)." To maintain this equipment and train the
Iraqis, Moscow has approximately 1,000 military
advisers and technicians in Iraq.
The Soviets have coupled the arms flow with a more
supportive public posture for Iraq in its war with Iran
since Iraqi forces were driven out of most Iranian
territory in June 1982. Most Soviet public statements
take a neutral stance on the war, but Soviet media are
" The Soviets have supplied Iraq with about one-third of its
weaponry (in terms of dollar value) since the war began. France is
second with over $5 billion worth of deliveries.
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? ,
Iraqi tank crews in Soviet-made T-62 tanks, a
few of the hundreds delivered since 1981
increasingly leaning toward the Iraqi position, partic-
ularly since the Iranian capture of Al Faw in Febru-
ary. They are praising Baghdad's willingness to end
the conflict through mediation and criticizing
Tehran's unwillingness to do the same.
Moscow's military support and backing for Iraq's
position on the war has led to an improvement, both
politically and economically, in the relationship.
President Saddam Husayn acknowledged in an inter-
view in October 1984 that "circumstances" at the
beginning of the war with Iran had "cast their
shadow" on Soviet-Iraqi relations but that ties were
now "good." His visit to Moscow in December 1985,
his first since 1978, highlighted the improvement in
relations, even though it revealed continuing differ-
ences.
The two countries have expanded their economic
dealings. In April 1984, the Soviets extended Iraq a
$2 billion line of credit on favorable terms for civilian
projects, according to a public statement by Foreign
Minister Tariq 'Aziz. Baghdad has awarded Moscow
major contracts since late 1983 to develop Iraq's West
Qurnah oilfield, build a pipeline between Baghdad
and Iraq's Southern Rumaylah natural gas field,
construct two thermoelectric power plants, and survey
sites to build a nuclear power plant. In addition, the
USSR has since mid-1983 accepted oil as a partial
means of payment for the arms it ships to Iraq."
" This oil is provided in two ways: Iraqi crude is pumped through
the pipeline across Turkey and picked up at the Ceyhan terminus
on the Mediterranean, and Saudi crude is picked up in the Persian
Gulf and credited to the Iraqi account with the Soviets. Moscow
resells all of this oil.
35
Figure 6
Estimated Values of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact Military Deliveries
to Iraq, 1981-85
Million US $
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1981 82 83 84 85
Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact
USSR
310739 10-86
During 1984 and 1985, the Soviets received an aver-
age of 80,000 barrels per day (b/d) of Iraqi oil and
40,000 b/d of Saudi crude, which was part of Saudi
Arabia's aid to Iraq." The Kremlin's willingness to
forgo the usual cash-on-delivery terms of Soviet-Iraqi
weapons trade is another indicator of the importance
it has assigned to improving relations with Baghdad
and preserving the Soviet share of the Iraqi market.
Even with the increased Soviet involvement in the
Iraqi economy over the past three years, however,
Baghdad is still heavily dependent on Western and
Arab trade and aid. Three-quarters of Iraqi civilian
imports continue to come from the West, while aid
provided by the Arab Gulf states dwarfs that of the
" See table on page 77.
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Factsheet on Soviet-Iraqi Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Viktor Minin (assumed post in March 1982)
Iraqi Ambassador: Sa'ad Abd al-Majid Faysal (assumed post in March 1984)
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel Estimated Number of Iraqi Personnel
in Iraq (excluding dependents) Receiving Military Training in USSR
Diplomatic a 50 1980 NA
Military advisers and technicians 1,000 1981 0
Economic advisers and technicians 5,500 1982 100
Total 6,550 1983 100
1984 200
1985 200
Soviet Trade With Iraq (million US $) b Soviet Economic Credits 'Grants Extended
Exports Imports Total (million US $)
1975
381
452
833
1975
0
1980
729
398
1,127
1980
0
1981
1,259
5
1,264
1981
0
1982
1,347
25
1,373
1982
0
1983
501
516
1,017
1983
1,000
1984
336
823
1,159
1984
45
1985
322
668
990
1985
NA
Military Sales (million US $) Facilities Used by Soviet Military
Deliveries
1980 871 None
1981 1,246
1982 1,734
1983 1,436
1984 1,868
1985 1,085
Total 8,240
'All officials1 Who
work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not reflect all military
trade.
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Gorbachev and Saddam Husayn during discus-
sions in the Kremlin, December 1985. Seated
next to them are Foreign Ministers Shevard-
nadze and 'Aziz
Soviets. In 1983, for instance, the Arabs extended
approximately $12 billion in economic aid to Iraq; the
Soviets provided $45 million.
Despite Moscow's extensive involvement in Iraq, its
record arms shipments, and the clear improvement in
relations since the spring of 1982, fundamental differ-
ences continue to separate the two sides. The minimal
time Gorbachev spent with Saddam during the lat-
ter's visit to Moscow in December 1985, TASS's
description of their meeting as "frank," and the
failure of the two sides to agree on a joint communi-
que were a reflection of these differences and the
legacy of intense enmity between the two sides.
On international issues, the Soviets and Iraqis have
long differed on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Bagh-
dad rejected the 1967 UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, which the Soviets helped formulate. Foreign
Minister 'Aziz told former US Middle Eastern envoy
Joseph Sisco in January 1985 that Moscow pressed
Baghdad hard to accept 242 in the early 1970s. The
Iraqis not only refused but also condemned the cease-
fire following the war in 1973 and the subsequent
peace conference in Geneva. Iraq also refused to
support the joint US-Soviet call in October 1977 for
reconvening the Geneva talks and is one of the few
Arab states not to endorse the USSR's more recent
efforts to hold an international conference on the
Arab-Israeli issue.
37
'Aziz Muhammad, General
Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party
of Iraq, in November 1974 in
Moscow at a time when his
party still played a public role
in Iraq's political life
Moscow and Baghdad do not see eye to eye on a
number of other international issues, including:
? The flow of Soviet-made arms to Iran through third
parties such as Libya, Syria, and the USSR's East
European allies.
? The Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of
Afghanistan. Baghdad strongly condemned the in-
vasion, but since 1983?presumably as a response to
Moscow's willingness to provide Iraq with large
amounts of weaponry?it has abstained from the
yearly vote in the UN General Assembly call for
Soviet withdrawal (see table 2).
The Soviets and Iraqis share a fundamental distrust
of each other that will not easily be eroded. The
Soviets have seen Saddam repress the Iraqi Commu-
nist Party (CPI) and have been unable to ease the
repression significantly despite repeated attempts. Al-
though the Kremlin has urged the Iraqi Communists
to cooperate with the government as a means of
increasing their influence in the country, Moscow's
eventual goal almost certainly is to oust the Beth.
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Table 2
Middle Eastern Votes on Annual UN Resolution Demanding the
Withdrawal of "Foreign Troops" From Afghanistan
January November 1981
1980 1980
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Afghanistan
Algeria
A A A
A A A
A A
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq a
0
A A
A A
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya 0
0
Mauritania
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria a
0
A
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
YAR
PDRY
Y = Yes
N = No
A = Abstained
0 = Absent
A
0
0
A
A
0
0
0
a Voting pattern has changed.
/The Soviets realize that the
CPI is weak and have welcomed the improvement in
Soviet relations with Saddam; thus, they are unlikely
in the next few years to push for his ouster.
Secret
I The Iraqis are equally distrustful of the Soviets,
resenting Soviet support for the CPI and past support
for Iraqi Kurds (see inset). The Iraqi leadership
believes that the Soviets could end CPI subversion in
a moment if they wished to, according to an Iraqi
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Moscow and Iraq's Kurds
The level of Soviet support for the Iraqi Kurds-20
percent of the population?has fluctuated with the
shifts in Soviet ties to the various regimes in Bagh-
dad. When relations are good, Soviet support has
been minimal; when relations sour, Moscow pays
more attention to the Kurds. Currently, the Soviets
keep their distance from the increasingly rebellious
Iraqi Kurds. Contact with Kurdish leaders is main-
tained through a faction of the Iraqi Communist
Party that is fighting alongside Kurdish rebels in
northern Iraq.
IMoscow
is likely to continue its contacts with Iraqi Kurds to
maintain the option of stepping up support to them
should Soviet-Iraqi relations deteriorate.
employee of the US Embassy in Baghdad, who has
ties to Iraqi intelligence. Na'am Haddad, then a
senior Beth official, called the CPI a "lackey" party
in a press conference in 1984 and said that Iraqi
leaders saw "no relationship between our stand to-
ward the Communist Party of Iraq and the Soviet
Union. Therefore we reject that this or that should
have any involvement in drawing up our internal
policy."
Moscow's embargo of arms to Iraq in the early days
of the war with Iran has had a lasting effect on Iraqi
views of the Kremlin. A Soviet diplomat in Baghdad
told a US official shortly after the embargo was
imposed that Saddam was "furious" over the arms
cutoff.
39
Libya's provision of Soviet surface-to-surface missiles
to Iran in 1985 heightened Baghdad's mistrust of
Moscow.26 Foreign Minister 'Aziz told US officials
that Iraq has complained repeatedly to the Soviets.
Although Gromyko assured 'Aziz in March 1985 that
Moscow had issued a stiff warning to Qadhafi, Iraqi
officials were skeptical that the Soviets would press
Tripoli very hard.
Beyond the policy differences and the mistrust, the
USSR's interests in Iraq are limited by its relation-
ship with Syria and desire for influence in Iran.
Moscow has long sought a reconciliation between
Baghdad and Damascus with no success. The Soviets'
stake in Syria prevents them from moving too close to
Iraq, although, as Soviet officials have made clear in
the past, Moscow will not give up its influence in
Baghdad simply to please the Assad regime.
A Soviet diplomat in the Middle East told a US
official in June 1984?claiming that he was drawing
from an official briefing given to his embassy?that,
in the long run, the Soviets see Iran as more important
than Iraq. He stated that, although Moscow hopes to
avoid having to make the choice, it was prepared, if
forced, to sacrifice its influence in Iraq for the chance
to gain influence in Iran. Although the diplomat may
have been exaggerating for effect, the Intelligence
Community has long held that the Soviets see Iran as
the greater strategic prize.
" Iran fired some of these missiles into Baghdad in the spring of
1985 and resumed firing in August 1986.
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During the rest of the decade, the Soviet-Iraqi rela-
tionship is likely to remain a wary one, based almost
solely on the arms supply link. Moscow might become
even more cooperative in the quality, quantity, and
financing of arms supplied to Iraq to counter
Baghdad's growing ties to the West, particularly the
United States. Such a Soviet step would be more
likely should the war with Iran end," which would
ease Iraq's acute need for Soviet weaponry and allow
it the breathing space to shift to greater dependence
on Western suppliers?a move under way before the
war began.
If Saddam were to die or be ousted, the effect on the
relationship would depend upon the nature of the
regime that replaced him. From Moscow's standpoint,
only an Iranian-dominated Shi`a regime or a more
Western-oriented leadership would be worse alterna-
tives than Saddam. If Saddam were simply replaced
by his chief lieutenants, which is the most likely
scenario, chances are they would share his distrust of
the Soviets, although they probably would not allow
this to dominate Iraqi policy toward the USSR. The
Kremlin might seek to ingratiate itself with the new
leaders by offering better credit terms on arms pur-
chases as well as some of the more advanced weapon-
ry it has been reluctant to provide, and possibly
intelligence and security support to help maintain
them in power. The relationship might become less
acrimonious in this case but would probably not differ
markedly from that which prevails under Saddam.
Algeria." The USSR has valued Algeria as an influ-
ential member of the Arab community and Third
World and as a country developing along an "anti-
imperialist" and "progressive" socialist path. Al-
though the Soviets largely stayed aloof from Algeria's
struggle for independence from France during 1954-
62, they developed a close relationship with Algiers
under its first two leaders, Ben Bella and Houari
Boumediene. Algeria purchased virtually all of its
military equipment from the Soviet Union and its
East European allies, and Moscow and Algiers saw
eye to eye on most international issues. The relation-
ship reached its peak in the 1970s, when Boumediene
met with the Soviet Ambassador on almost a weekly
basis and party-to-party contacts were frequent.
Even under Boumediene, however, the Soviets were
unable to develop the kind of influence in Algeria that
they had, for example, in Egypt in the late 1960s. The
Algerians maintained a certain distance and fiercely
guarded their independence.
Since President Chadli Bendjedid came to power in
1979, the Soviet-Algerian relationship has become
steadily more distant, and Moscow has been unable to
reverse the trend. The Soviets clearly preferred
Bendjedid's leftist rival, Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, as
a replacement for Boumediene, who died in December
1978
" See pages 72-73 for a discussion of Iran-Iraq war scenariosd
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Reliable
sources of the US Embassy in Algiers claim that
Soviet support for Yahiaoui has colored Bendjedid's
attitude toward Moscow.1
40
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Factsheet on Soviet-Algerian Relations
Soviet Ambassador: Vasiliy Taratutu (assumed post in April 1983)
Algerian Ambassador: Abdel Madjid Allahoum (assumed post
Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel
in Algeria (excluding dependents)
Diplomatic a
Military advisers and technicians
Economic advisers and technicians
Total
80
800
6,000
6,880
in October 1984)
Estimated Number of Algerian Personnel
Receiving Military Training in USSR
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
NA
NA
200
300
100
100
Soviet Trade With Algeria (million US $) b
Exports Imports Total
Soviet Economic Credits 'Grants Extended
(million US $)
1975
156
187
343
1975
0
1980
143
96
239
1980
315
1981
157
117
274
1981
300
1982
183
64
247
1982
0
1983
217
16
233
1983
250
1984
175
180
355
1984
0
1985
158
328
486
1985
340
Military Sales (million US $)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Total
Deliveries
410
1,102
1,114
394
349
202
3,571
'All officials who
work in the Embassy and Consulates (Annaba and Oran), as well
as media and trade representatives.
b From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.
Facilities Used by Soviet Military
None
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Gorbachev with Algerian President Chadli
Bendjedid during his March 1986 visit to the
USSR
resent the USSR's willingness to provide their rival,
Libya, with large amounts of sophisticated weapons.
Bendjedid has:
? Lessened Algeria's overwhelming dependence on the
USSR for arms. Algiers has begun to purchase
major weapon systems from Western countries, and
the level of Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria has
dropped off markedly since 1982, although a report-
ed new arms deal signed this spring would reverse
this decline.
? Sharply reduced the number of Soviet military
advisers and technicians in Algeria. From a high of
1,500 in 1981, the presence is now down to approxi-
mately 800.
Curtailed regular consultations with the Soviets.
The visit by the Algerian President to the USSR
this spring was only his second since assuming
office, and he has not followed Boumediene's prac-
tice of frequent meetings with the Soviet Ambassa-
dor. r
? Dropped many senior-level pro-Soviet Algerian of-
ficials. The Algerian President replaced them with
people who support his policy of lessening depen-
dence on the USSR.
? Begun to modify Algeria's "socialist" economy.
This has included some decentralization, expansion
of the private sector, encouragement of foreign
Secret
Algerians parade Soviet-built SA-6 SAMs on
1 November (Revolution Day) 1984
investment, and a shift of emphasis from heavy to
light industry. These policies were reflected in the
FLN's revision of the Algerian national charter in
December 1985./
/An Algerian diplomat confirmed this
Soviet view in a conversation with a US Embassy
official in Moscow in February. The Algerian
claimed that the Soviets are seeking assurances
from FLN officials that Algeria will continue to
adhere to socialist economic practices.
? Improved relations with Western countries. The
Algerian President's more positive relationship with
the United States appears to worry the Soviets the
most. One African diplomat told a US Embassy
officer following Bendjedid's visit to Washington
last year that: "Your Soviet friends are worried they
are losing influence here to you."
The Soviets have exerted considerable effort to stem
Algeria's drift away from the USSR under Bendjedid,
especially over the past two and a half years. The
Kremlin has sent a host of high-level officials to
Algeria to shore up ties (see inset)./
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High-Level Soviet-Algerian Contacts, 1984-86
May 1984
September 1984
October 1984
November 1984
December 1984
July 1985
August 1985
December 1985
March 1986
June 1986
August 1986
Shevardnadze?then Georgian party chief and a candidate Politburo member?
represents the USSR at the congress of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Organization (AAPSO) in Algiers. Received by Bendjedid.
Gromyko?t hen Foreign Minister?and Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi meet
while in New York for opening of fall session of United Nations General
Assembly.
Ponomarev?then candidate Politburo member and Chief of the CPSU Central
Committee's International Department?has talks in Algiers with senior FLN
and Algerian Government officials. Received by Bendjedid.
Soviet candidate Politburo member Demichev has talks in Algiers with Minister
of Culture and with senior FLN official Messaadia.
Admiral Gorshkov?then Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy?has talks in
Algiers with senior Algerian defense and other government officials.
Algerian Navy Commander in Chief Cheri>. visits USSR and has talks with
Admiral Gorshkov.
Algerian Prime Minister Brahimi has talks in Moscow with then Soviet Prime
Minister Tikhonov.
General Ivanovskiy, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces and
Deputy Defense Minister, visits Algiers for talks with Algerian military and
political leaders.
Bendjedid makes his second visit to Moscow as president.
Major General Benloucif, then Algerian Army Chief of Staff, visits the USSR and
has talks with Soviet military officials.
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov visits Algiers and has talks with
Messaadia and with Algerian Foreign Ministry officials.
43
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Natural gas liquefaction complex in Algeria built
with Soviet assistance
Despite Algeria's slow drift from the USSR, it re-
mains a valuable Soviet friend. It is still strongly
nonaligned and anti-Israeli and continues to differ
with the United States on many international issues?
most important, on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The relationship with Algiers also provides
Moscow with influence in North Africa beyond its
ties to the mercurial Qadhafi regime. The Soviets,
moreover, continue to earn valuable hard currency
from arms sales to Algeria and still have more
economic advisers and technicians there (approxi-
mately 6,000) than in any other less developed coun-
try. Whatever Bendjedid's long-term plans are, they
will be heavily influenced by the fact that Algeria's
armed forces remain overwhelmingly Soviet equipped.
Secret
We believe, however, that the carefully
planned nature of Bendjedid's policy changes indicate
they are unlikely to be reversed while he remains in
power. The broad-based support within the FLN for
Bendjedid's shift away from the USSR makes it likely
that the policy would even survive his departure.
Thus, the Soviets almost certainly will not be able to
restore the relationship during the rest of the decade
to the closeness that characterized it under Boume-
diene. This represents an important setback to Mos-
cow's position in the Maghreb and in the Middle East
as a whole.
The PLO-29 The Soviets, by identifying themselves
since the early 1970s with the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (see table 3), have attempted to gain:
? Enhanced stature among the Arabs, most of whom
regard a country's position on the Palestinian issue
as a litmus test of its support for the Arab world.
? An edge with the Arabs over the United States,
which does not recognize the organization.
? An added means of leverage on Israel.
? A potential tool with which to hinder a US-spon-
sored Arab-Israeli settlement and a right to claim
for themselves a role in any settlement.
? A source of influence in the region beyond estab-
lished governments
Moscow, however, has never been comfortable with
the ideologically diverse PLO, which depends on
support from such conservative, anti-Soviet Arab
governments as Saudi Arabia. As one scholar noted in
a 1980 study of the Soviet-PLO relationship, the PLO
is "far too unstable, uncertain and divided, far less
Marxist and yet far too extremist to be Moscow's
preferred partner." " Palestinian disunity, in particu-
lar, has contributed to the USSR's hesitation to take a
definitive stance and has led to its numerous shifts in
policy toward the PLO. Despite the PLO's importance
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Table 3
Groups Within the Palestine Liberation Organization a
Leader
Headquarters
Size
Pro-Arafat
Fatah loyalists
Yasir Arafat
Tunis
6,000 to 8,000 scattered
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
'Abd al-Rahim
Ahmad
Baghdad
300 to 500 in Iraq
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) b
Muhammad 'Abbas Tunis
(Abu al-Abbas)
50 to 100
Neutral
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (Marxist)
Nayif Hawatmah
Damascus
1,200 to 2,000 scattered
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) b
Ta'alat Yaqub
Damascus
Approximately 150
Pro-Syrian
Palestine National Salvation Front
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Marxist)
George Habbash
Damascus
1,500 to 2,000 scattered
PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Ahmad Jibril
Damascus
800 to 1,000, mostly in
Syria and Lebanon
Sa'iqa
Qadi
Damascus
500 to 1,000
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Shamir Ghawshah
200 to 300 scattered
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) b
'Abd al-Fattah
Ghanim
Damascus
Approximately 150
Fatah rebels
Said Muragha
(Abu Musa)
Damascus
500, mostly in Syria and
Lebanon
a The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) is not a member of the
PLO. In recent years, the PCP has cooperated closely with
Hawatmah's DFLP. The Abu Nidal faction also is not a PLO
member.
b Also known as the Palestine Liberation Front.
to Moscow, the fact that it is not an established
government allows the Soviets to pursue a more
tactical policy toward it.
This tactical flexibility toward the PLO has been
especially evident since the Israeli thrashing of PLO
forces in Lebanon in 1982. The USSR's cautious
reaction to the Israeli action strained Soviet-PLO
45
relations. Ties between Moscow and Arafat have been
further complicated by the Soviet unwillingness to
take forceful action to convince Syrian President
Assad to abandon his efforts since 1983 to oust Arafat
and gain control of the PLO. Although the Soviets
have made their displeasure with this Syrian policy
known to Assad, they have been careful not to allow
the issue to jeopardize relations with their most
important ally in the Middle East.
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The Leftist Alternative
Nay if Hawatmah, head of the
Democratic Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine (DFLP)
Moscow has long maintained support for the Pales-
tinian leftists, even while its relations with Arafat
were good. The Palestinian Communist Party is the
faction closest to the Soviets, but its influence among
Palestinians has been limited. The much more influ-
ential Democratic Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine (DFLP)?a Marxist group?has cooperated
closely with the Kremlin for years.1
IThe Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)?also
Marxist?has had its differences with the Soviets
because of its more militant stance toward Israel.
George Habbash, head of the
Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine (PFLP
It does not appear that the Kremlin views the leftists
at this point as a replacement for Arafat. A Soviet
Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer
in 1983 that neither DFLP leader Hawatmah nor
PFLP chief Habbash seemed ready to step into
Arafat's shoes. We believe this assessment still holds.
Nonetheless, Moscow probably sees the leftists as a
corrective influence on the "bourgeois" Arafat and as
potential candidates for future leadership of the
Palestinian movement. Soviet support for the leftists
seems designed to reunite the PLO on a basis that
curtails Arafat's ability to pursue talks with Arab
moderates, the United States, and?eventually?
Israel. Moscow also apparently ho es the 1 tists can
help mend the Arafat-Assad rift.
The Soviets have been torn by conflicting interests in
the Arafat-Assad dispute. Although the USSR agrees
with some of the criticism directed at Arafat by Assad
and the Syrian-backed PLO factions, it does not want
to see the PLO come under Syrian control. Such a
development would force the Soviets to deal with the
Palestinians through fiercely independent Damascus.
Arafat's moves in late 1984 to form a joint PLO-
Jordanian delegation for peace talks with Israel,
however, prompted Moscow to move closer to the
position of Syria and Arafat's PLO opponents. The
Secret
Soviets' primary reason for opposing the Arafat-
Hussein accord was the fear that it might have
facilitated US-sponsored talks between the joint PLO-
Jordanian delegation and Israel that excluded both
Syria and the USSR.
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Former Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov and PLO
leader Yasir Arafat during his last official visit
to Moscow in January 1983
The unraveling of the Arafat-Hussein accord in late
1985 and early 1986 has prompted the Soviets and
Arafat to once again move closer: Arafat, because he
is increasingly isolated; and Moscow, because it evi-
dently senses that Arafat's weak position leaves him
no choice but to improve relations with the USSR on
its terms. Gorbachev apparently met with Arafat
during the East German party congress in April 1986,
according to PLO radio
This was the first time a Soviet leader held
talks with the PLO chief since 1983. The Soviets are
also stepping up efforts to reunify the PLO.
The Soviets, however, do not appear convinced that
Arafat has totally abandoned hopes of collaboration
with King Hussein. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official
told a US Embassy officer in February that he would
not rule out Arafat's future cooperation with Hussein.
He also was pessimistic about reconciliation among
PLO factions. Moscow's failed attempts in the sum-
mer and fall of 1986 to broker PLO unity bore out his
pessimism.
The Palestinian issue is likely to remain the central
one in the Middle East, regardless of who wins the
power struggle within the PLO, and the Soviets will
47
continue championing the cause. But the PLO's value
as a vehicle for advancing Soviet interests in the
region probably will remain much diminished. The
PLO's internal rifts and feud with Syria put the
attainment of Arab unity, which the Soviets consider
essential, even further away. It will be difficult for the
Soviets to achieve one of their primary goals in the
Middle East?a major role in an Arab-Israeli peace
conference?without close ties to a strong PLO that
cooperates with Syria. Moscow would be unable to
parlay its role as a benefactor of the PLO to obtain a
seat at such a conference if the mainstream of the
PLO remains at odds with Syria and the Palestinians
themselves remain badly divided.
Friendly Moderates
Moscow has long sought, as a part of its broader
Middle Eastern strategy, to cultivate ties to the
"moderate" Arab regimes. The Soviets have had their
most success with three monarchies (Jordan, Kuwait,
and Morocco), a military dictatorship (Mauritania),
and three ostensible parliamentary democracies
(Tunisia, Sudan, and Lebanon). Although the Krem-
lin's long-term objective is developing Soviet influence
in these countries, its more immediate and realistic
goal is eroding US influence. The Soviets have had
their setbacks?most notably in Sudan under Ni-
meiri?but on balance their patient courting has paid
some important dividends. Most, if not all, of these
countries have:
? Acknowledged publicly that the USSR has an
important role to play in the Middle East.
? Endorsed (albeit not necessarily enthusiastically)
Moscow's call for an international conference on the
Arab-Israeli dispute.
? Muted concerns about Soviet policies, particularly
on Afghanistan.
The key to Moscow's success has been its identifica-
tion with the Arab cause, especially on the Palestinian
question. The Soviets have also used arms sales to
make inroads with some of the "friendly moderates."
They signed minor arms deals with Morocco and
Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s and briefly were
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Sudan's primary source of arms in the early 1970s.
More recently, the USSR has provided Jordan and
Kuwait with air defense weapons, capitalizing on the
US Congress' reluctance to sell those countries cer-
tain arms. Although the Soviets have not sold arms to
Tunisia, it is the one "friendly moderate" that allows
Soviet naval ships regular access to its ports."
Trade and economic assistance have played only a
minimal role in Moscow's relations with these coun-
tries. The only exceptions are Morocco, where the
Soviets have invested heavily in the development of
phosphates and have a profitable fishing agreement,
and Mauritania, where they have a similar arrange-
ment to fish in coastal waters in return for helping
develop the Mauritanian fishing industry. Recent
Soviet discussions with Kuwait on a variety of eco-
nomic projects are likely to result in Kuwait's joining
the list of exceptions.
Lebanon is important to the Soviets because of the
Palestinian and Syrian presence and the US interest
in it rather than for its intrinsic significance. They do
not have major interests at stake there. They have
sought influence with both the central government
and the various political and religious factions but
have never been a major actor. Moscow's closest ties
are to the Lebanese Communist Party. The USSR
also has a long history of dealings with such minor
leftist groups as the Communist Action Organization,
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Murabi-
tun. Since the Israeli invasion of 1982, the Soviets
have focused attention on two of the most influential
factions, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
of Walid Junblatt and the Shia Amal of Nabih Barri.
They have become particularly close to the PSP,
providing it with the bulk of its arms.
Similarly, the Soviets have attempted?unsuccessful-
ly?to play some role in the international efforts to
resolve the Lebanese problem. This has stemmed
more from a desire to head off a US-brokered solution
and find another entree into Middle Eastern affairs
The Moroccans apparently are easing their restrictions on Soviet
naval visits. A Soviet guided-missile frigate and a minesweeper
called at Casablanca in September, the first such port call in
Morocco in a decade.
Secret
than from a genuine interest in getting involved in the
Lebanese quagmire. Although the Soviets do not want
to see Lebanon controlled by Syria, the importance of
their relationship with Damascus is likely to prompt
them to continue deferring to Syrian interests in
Lebanon during the rest of the decade.
Kuwait, like Lebanon, is an Arab moderate that has
provided Moscow a safehaven from which to operate
in the Middle East.
Soviet officials
accredited to Kuwait often travel to other Gulf states
with which Moscow does not have relations.
The Soviets have also attempted to establish above-
board intelligence contacts in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti
Ambassador to Moscow told US officials in Septem-
ber 1986 that the Soviets were seeking to post a KGB
liaison officer in Kuwait./
It appears that Moscow is also beginning to see an
economic rationale for its presence in Kuwait. During
the visit to Kuwait in July of Konstantin Katushev,
Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations, the two sides neared agreement
on a host of economic deals. According to sources of
the US Embassy in Kuwait and Kuwaiti newspapers,
such deals include:
? A Kuwaiti loan to the USSR of $150 million at a
favorable interest rate for construction of a natural
gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Greece.
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? A swap of oil, whereby Kuwait would provide oil to
Soviet customers in Asia and East Africa while
Moscow would do the same for Kuwaiti clients in
Western Europe.
? A similar swap involving ammonia deliveries.
? Kuwaiti assistance in oil refining, exploration, and
drilling techniques for joint projects in the USSR.
The last deal, in particular, could provide Moscow
access to advanced oil technology denied to it by the
West.
Moscow received a windfall in Sudan with the ouster
of the anti-Soviet Jaafar Nimeiri in April 1985. The
Soviets dealt cautiously with the transitional regime
of General al-Dahab, probably out of uncertainty over
its longevity and in deference to the Ethiopians, who
strongly opposed the regime. At the same time, the
Kremlin stepped up aid to the Sudanese Communist
Party
The Soviets probably will continue their current dual-
track approach with the new government headed by
the Umma Party's Sadiq al-Mahdi. As his August
visit to the USSR indicated, Moscow is likely to try
currying favor with his government, while keeping a
certain distance so as not to jeopardize relations with
a possible successor should Sadiq's rule prove short
lived. The Soviets may offer to repair Sudan's aging
inventory of Soviet arms and possibly sell new weapon
systems once they believe Sadiq has consolidated
power, provided Khartoum first curtailed assistance
to Ethiopian insurgents. Libya's ties to Sadiq could
provide the Soviets an opening, but they are likely to
tread carefully to avoid a backlash should Qadhafi's
intrigues backfire.
Should Sadiq's rule lead to increased instability, or
should the SPLA score significant gains, the Soviets
would be likely to step up aid to the Communists and
to Garang's forces. They would attempt, however, to
49
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Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov greeting Suda-
nese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi upon his
arrival in Moscow, August 1986
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Cairo. Egypt is far more significant to Soviet interests 25X1
in the Middle East than is Sudan, which is likely to
remain an economic and political basket case during
the next five years regardless of who is in control in
Khartoum.
Despite the inroads Moscow has made with the
friendly moderates, virtually all maintain good rela-
tions with Washington. Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia
retain important military links to the United States.
Moreover, all of the friendly moderates remain skepti-
cal about Soviet intentions. Morocco, for example,
continues to suspect that the Soviets are aiding the
Polisario rebels in the Western Sahara (see inset).
The Soviets are certain to continue their low-cost
efforts to woo the friendly moderates away from
dependence on Washington. In most cases, Moscow
has little to lose, and in those areas?such as
Lebanon?where Soviet ties to more important Arab
countries impinge, preserving those ties will continue
to take precedence. Internal instability in some of
these countries is likely to offer Moscow the best
opportunities for advancement. Instability in Lebanon
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Moscow, Rabat, and the Polisario
The Soviets sympathize with the cause of the
Polisario rebels, who are seeking an independent
state in the Western Sahara. The Kremlin supports
Saharan "self-determination"?as opposed to inde-
pendence?in international forums and sanctions the
traneer of Soviet arms to the rebels by Algeria and
Libya.\
Moscow, however, refrains from direct contact with
the Polisario and has neither accorded it the status of
a national liberation movement nor recognized the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). Even
the staunchly pro-Moscow Moroccan Communist
party (the Party of Progress and Socialism) backs the
Moroccan Government's claim to sovereignty over the
Western Sahara.
The Kremlin's caution stems from its desire to
maintain good relations with Moroccan King Hassan
as well as an apparent judgment that the Polisario 's
chances of establishing an independent state any time
soon are slim. In response to a question at a public
lecture in 1982 in Moscow as to whether the Soviet
Union recognized the SDAR, a Soviet specialist on
North Africa from the Academy of Sciences' Africa
Institute claimed the issue was "complex" because
the Soviets had to "take into account our good
relations with Morocco."/
and Sudan during the past three years already has
eroded US influence and brought in regimes much
more willing to deal with the Soviets than their
predecessors had been. Domestic unrest in Morocco
and Tunisia is likely to grow over the next few years,
potentially providing the USSR with fertile ground to
expand its influence or at least undermine that of the
United States. And in Mauritania, where a military-
led coup occurred in 1984, the chronic instability of
the central government may eventually offer the
Soviets opportunities in that far-off corner of the
Middle East.
Wary Moderates
The only states the USSR does not have diplomatic
relations with in the Middle East are the Persian Gulf
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monarchies of Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.32
The Soviets scored their first breakthroughs in the
region in years in the fall of 1985, when they estab-
lished relations with Oman and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE).
Moscow's primary objective in the Persian Gulf re-
gion, in our view, is the elimination of the US military
presence. Soviet propaganda incessantly criticizes the
conservative Gulf countries for cooperating militarily
" Neither the Soviets nor the Saudis ever formally severed diplo-
matic relations when Moscow withdrew its emissary from Saudi
Arabia in the late 1930s. Thus, technically they still have relations,
but in fact there have been no ties for almost 50 years.
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with Washington. All but Qatar have some form of
military agreement with the United States?ranging
from the pre-positioning of military equipment in the
UAE and Oman, to granting US naval ships access to
port facilities in Bahrain, to the stationing of US
AWACS aircraft and a 500-man support unit in
Saudi Arabia. Moscow's December 1980 proposal
that the major powers eliminate military bases in the
Persian Gulf region was designed, in part, with these
agreements in mind, and Soviet officials continue to
tout the proposal. However, the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan and the war between Iran and Iraq have
prompted the conservative Gulf states to be even more
receptive to military cooperation with Washington.
Saudi Arabia's oil wealth, ties to the United States,
growing military power, and influence over the other
shaykhdoms make it Moscow's prime target on the
peninsula. Since the early 1970s, the USSR has
sought unsuccessfully to interest Saudi leaders in
reviving relations. Although in recent years the Saudis
have gradually allowed an increase in official and
unofficial contacts, and Saudi leaders occasionally
make public statements leaving the door open for
resuming relations, there has been no significant
movement in this direction. The Saudis have publicly
linked the resumption of full relations to a Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, but we believe they
would be willing to finesse the issue, particularly if
they were left as the only Arab state without relations
with the USSR.
The Soviets have made some headway in Bahrain but
thus far have nothing to show for their efforts with
Qatar. They sent their Deputy Director for Tourism
to Bahrain in August 1985, the first visit ever by a
Soviet official. Bahraini Prime Minister Shaykh
Khalifa gave two interviews in the summer of 1985
suggesting that Bahrain was taking another look at
the question of establishing formal ties to the Soviet
Union. Since then, however, there has been no signifi-
cant movement toward establishing relations.
Kuwaitis, suspected that the Soviets were behind the
coup. We believe Oman and the UAE are likely to
move more slowly in allowing the USSR to establish a
full diplomatic presence in their capitals. Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar probably will reassess the
advisability of normalizing relations with the Soviet
Union. The Soviets appear to be advising the new
regime in Aden to avoid pursuing a radical foreign
policy, which would almost certainly compel the Gulf
conservatives to move closer to the United States.
While courting the Gulf monarchies, the Soviets also
have been maintaining ties to local leftist forces.
Moscow backs Marxist groups opposed to the regimes
in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. The Soviets
provided arms via South Yemen to the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) during its revolt
against Sultan Qaboos in the mid-1970s. Although
the PFLO has been largely dormant since 1976, its
members still travel to the USSR frequently and
participate in Soviet-organized gatherings of Middle
Eastern leftists. Two other participants at such gath-
erings are the Saudi Communist Party and the
National Liberation Front of Bahrain.)
The radical Marxist coup in South Yemen in January
has complicated Moscow's efforts to court the conser-
vative Gulf regimes. Most Gulf leaders, including the
51
None of these three groups, however, now pose?nor
are they likely to pose any time soon?a major threat
to the regimes in Riyadh, Muscat, and Manama.
Nevertheless, the prospect of internal unrest in these
countries may offer Moscow opportunities to advance
its interests, and the Soviets are certain to keep the
Marxist opposition groups viable to be in a position to
capitalize on such instability. There have been no
indications thus far that the Soviets are urging the
Marxist groups to collaborate with Muslim funda-
mentalists?the real threat to the Gulf regimes. In
fact, the disastrous results that Iran's Tudeh
(Communist) Party suffered from cooperation with
Khomeini's Muslim fundamentalist regime may have
soured the Kremlin on such a strategy. Should the
Muslim opposition gain strength, however, the Soviets
may become more receptive to cooperation as the best
way to increase the influence of the Marxist forces.
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Israel
The USSR's relationship with Israel has been a
paradoxical one. Since as far back as Lenin, Soviet
Communists have intensely distrusted Zionism, which
they regard as reactionary and "bourgeois" despite its
socialist element. Nonetheless, the Soviets were
among the first to recognize the new Jewish state in
1948; but they have severed relations with it twice
since then, in 1953?for five months?and in 1967.
Israel's existence and US support for it have provided
the Soviets their best entree for influence in the Arab
world; yet their self-inflicted inability to talk with
Israel has put them at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis
Washington?which has influence with both sides of
the Arab-Israeli conflict."
The presence of over 2 million Jews in the Soviet
Union, many of whom desire to emigrate, and the fact
that Israel sees the protection and eventual emigration
of Soviet Jews as a vital national interest add a
volatile factor that is not present in the USSR's
relationship with most other countries. The interest of
American Jews and the US Government in the plight
of Soviet Jews has had repercussions in US-Soviet
relations. The collapse of the deal between Washing-
ton and Moscow in January 1975 that would have
given the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trading
status was a direct result of the Congress' Jackson-
Vanik amendment, which required that the Soviets let
a certain number of Jews leave each year?a pledge
the Kremlin refused to make.
Moscow, in addition, has to factor into its Israeli
policy the strong US commitment to the existence of
Israel and the increasingly close security relationship
between Washington and Tel Aviv. The Soviets have
displayed concern over the US-Israeli "strategic
cooperation" agreement?signed in 1981 but not im-
plemented until 1983?particularly its focus on coun-
tering the USSR in the Middle East (see inset).
The US-Israeli Military Relationship
For years, Moscow's propaganda has depicted Israel
as a US 'gendarme" in the Middle East, and the US-
Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement of 1981 only
reconfirmed that view. The USSR's special concern is
that the US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding on
strategic cooperation is specifically aimed at counter-
ing potential Soviet military moves in the Middle
East.
The Kremlin also has been worried by the exchange of
military technology and know-how between Israel and
the United States. The Soviets, for example, issued an
official TASS statement in May 1986 condemning
Israel's decision to participate in research for the US
Strategic Defense Initiative. In addition, Moscow has
long been concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons
potential-
Lack of Relations
The Soviets have long acknowledged in private to US
officials that it was a mistake to break
relations in 1967 at the end of the Six-Day War.)
" Another irony of Soviet policy toward Israel is that, although
Israeli society and policies come under harsher criticism from
Moscow than those of any other Middle Eastern state, Israel is the
only country in the region where the Communist Party has some
influence in the national legislature (it holds four seats in the 120-
seat Knesset) and can legally criticize the government.
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/Some Soviets
have called the Kremlin's decision to break relations
an "emotional act" and others, a rash move "in the
heat of the moment."
At the same time, Moscow has continued since 1967
to emphasize that Israel has the right to exist. The
Soviets have stated this explicitly in most of their
"peace plans" for an Arab-Israeli settlement.
Gromyko made one of the most emphatic Soviet
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public statements on this issue in a news conference in
Moscow on 2 April 1983, when he declared that: "We
do riot share the point of view of extremist Arab
circles that Israel should be eliminated . . . [this is
both] unrealistic and unjust."
Within two years of the break in relations, the Soviets
were probing for ways to renew ties./
Soviet officials
leaked numerous stories about an imminent resump-
tion of Soviet-Israeli relations. In the reverse of
today's situation, it was the Israelis who played hard
to get and denied in public any movement toward
restoration of ties. The Camp David accords in 1978
ended the USSR's courting of Israel, although period-
ic contacts have continued.34
Recent Developments
There has been an increase in Soviet-Israeli contacts
since Gorbachev's accession to power. The Kremlin
almost certainly approved Poland's agreement with
Israel to open interest sections in Warsaw and Tel
Aviv. One of the most significant Soviet steps was the
decision to meet with Israeli officials in Helsinki in
August 1986 to arrange for a Soviet consular delega-
tion to go to Israel to review the operation of the
Soviet interests section run by the Finnish Embassy
and handle some consular matters. Although the
Soviets abruptly ended the meeting when the Israeli
side attempted to discuss Soviet Jewry and demanded
that an Israeli delegation be allowed to go to Moscow,
the meeting served as a signal to the Arabs that the
USSR has the ability to develop its own independent
3? The foreign ministers met?on Israel's request?at the opening
sessions of the UN General Assembly in 1981 and 1984; Shevard-
nadze met then Prime Minister Peres at the 1986 session; and
Soviet and Israeli ambassadors in the major capitals meet occasion-
ally. In addition, each May on the anniversary of the victory over
Nazi Germany, Moscow sends a low-level delegation to Israel and
Israeli leftists go to the USSR.
53
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (left) and
then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (right)
after their meeting at the United Nations, Sep-
tember 1986
policy toward Israel. Foreign Minister Shevardnad-
ze's meeting with then Prime Minister Peres, at the
latter's request, in September at the United Nations
reiterated the point, even though Moscow went out of
its way to criticize Israeli positions in its media
coverage of the meeting.
The Balance Sheet From Moscow's Perspective
When Soviet leaders weigh the merits of resuming ties
to Israel, they probably calculate that, on the credit
side, reestablishing relations would provide an entree
into Arab-Israeli negotiations from which they have
been excluded since 1973. Specifically, Moscow
would hope to convene its long-proposed international
conference. Israeli (as well as US) opposition has been
the biggest obstacle to holding such a gathering. Such
a step would probably also improve the atmosphere in
US-Soviet relations and possibly even lead to an
easing of US restrictions on trade with the USSR.
On the debit side, reestablishing formal ties would
alienate Moscow's Arab friends, most importantly the
Syrians and Palestinians. Gromyko cited this as the
primary reason for not taking this step when former
Soviet UN official Arkadiy Shevchenko broached the
issue with him in 1976.\
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Moscow's concern about Syria's reaction appears to
be well founded. President Assad's spokesman said in
a public statement in November 1985 that "nothing
justifies" the resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations as
long as Israel continues to occupy Arab territories.
Syria's severence of diplomatic relations with
Morocco in July 1986 for hosting a visit by Peres
indicates the intensity with which Damascus regards
the issue.
Moscow could argue with its Arab allies that having
relations with the Israelis will give it leverage over Tel
Aviv, which could be used to obtain a favorable peace
settlement. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets
would gain such leverage or that the Arabs would be
placated by Moscow's argument. Israel has not been
willing in the past to compromise on vital issues in
return for better treatment of Soviet Jews and is
unlikely to begin doing so simply because it has
diplomatic relations with the USSR. Gromyko made
this point with Shevchenko in 1976, as did Vladimir
Polyakov, chief of the Foreign Ministry's Near East
and North Africa Administration, in talks with US
officials in June 1986.
Some in Moscow would probably argue that the
Arabs have nowhere else to turn and thus would have
to acquiesce in a Soviet move to renew relations, no
matter how distasteful. Most Soviet officials, howev-
er, probably are not that confident about the USSR's
position with the Arabs. They are likely to worry that
the damage in relations with the Arabs would be deep
and lasting, possibly even severe enough to convince
some?such as the Syrians and Palestinians?that
there was no choice but to throw in their lot with the
United States, as Egypt did, to get the best available
deal with the Israelis. At the same time, these Soviets
probably would argue that restoring relations is likely
to encourage the moderate Arabs to reach an accom-
modation with Israel.
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An added complication for the Soviets in restoring ties
would be the opening of an Israeli Embassy in
Moscow that would be a magnet for "refuseniks"
(Soviet Jews who have applied to emigrate but have
not been allowed to leave) and the Soviet Jewish
population in general.(
Prospects
Israeli flexibility on an international conference and
the level of tensions between Israel and Syria are
likely to determine the pace of Soviet moves to
normalize relations, regardless of whether the hard-
line Likud or the more moderate Labor Party is in
power. It would be difficult for the Soviets to convince
Syria of the necessity for renewed Soviet-Israeli rela-
tions if Israel continues to hold to its current positions
on the Palestinian question and the Golan Heights or
new Syrian-Israeli hostilities erupt. Moscow's official-
ly declared position is that relations will not be
restored until Israel returns all of the lands seized in
1967, but we believe it is likely to take further steps
toward better ties even without such Israeli conces-
sions.
The Soviets probably will move very gradually to give
the Arabs time to get used to the idea of better Soviet-
Israeli ties before reestablishing full diplomatic rela-
tions. And Likud leader Shamir's scheduled tenure as
prime minister until late 1988 is likely to hinder
progress in Soviet-Israeli relations. It appears, howev-
er, that the Gorbachev foreign policy team?possibly
prodded by CPSU International Department Chief
Dobrynin, who reportedly has long favored restoring
ties?is determined to find a way to correct the
blunder Moscow made in 1967 by breaking relations.
An easing of tensions between Moscow and Washing-
ton will not automatically lead to improvement in
Soviet-Israeli relations, but the last serious Soviet
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efforts to improve ties occurred during the heyday of
detente. The Kremlin probably would hope that one
benefit from improved US-Soviet relations would be
cooperation on issues such as the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
The Gorbachev regime's view of the USSR's internal
security?specifically, the extent to which dissent and
emigration are to be tolerated?also will color its
policy toward Israel. If Gorbachev continues his
current tough policies toward Soviet Jews, this proba-
bly would indicate that he has no real intention of
softening the Soviet position on Israel." On the other
hand, an easing of restrictions on Soviet Jews would
not necessarily mean Moscow was planning to rees-
tablish ties to Israel. Such a liberalization could be
directed more at influencing policy in Washington
than in Israel.
The Northern Tier
Iran
Just as Egypt is the key Soviet target of opportunity in
the Arab world, so Iran is in the northern tier. Its size,
location, and oil wealth give it key significance in
Soviet strategy toward the Middle East. Although we
assume Moscow's ultimate goal has been and remains
the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Tehran,
its more immediate concern has been to prevent its
adversaries from achieving predominant influence
there. Soviet concern over British and German ascen-
dancy in Iran and how those powers might use their
position in the country to threaten the USSR played a
role in prompting the Soviet occupation of parts of
northern Iran in 1920-21 and again from 1941 to
1946. The Shah's overthrow in 1979 ended a period of
more than 30 years during which the Soviets faced an
extensive US presence in Iran. Capitalizing on this
strategic windfall has been Moscow's primary aim in
Iran.
35 Although Gorbachev freed dissident Anatoliy Shcharanslciy, who
has settled in Israel, he has not eased up on overall Jewish
emigration. The number of Jews allowed to leave the USSR in
1986 is running at a rate that would put the yearend total lower
than any year since 1970. In addition, Gorbachev's regime has
stepped up its repression of Jewish "refuseniks."
55
Iranian leader Ayatollah
Khomeini
The Soviets have had almost no success in replacing
US influence in Iran with their own. Soviet-Iranian
relations have deteriorated sharply since 1982, when
Moscow abandoned its efforts to court Ayatollah
Khomeini's regime and tilted toward Baghdad in the
war between Iran and Iraq. Since 1984 Tehran has
shown signs of desiring a halt to the slide, but Moscow
has not been convinced of the Khomeini regime's
sincerity and has maintained a tough posture toward
Iran. Soviet media criticism of Iranian policies contin-
ues almost unabated." The visit to Tehran in Febru-
ary of then First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
was the highest level Soviet visit to Iran since the
Shah's fall, but by most accounts neither side showed
a willingness to compromise on the basic issues divid-
ing them. Similarly, the visits to the USSR in the
summer of 1986 by two Iranian ministers, despite the
positive handling in both sides' media, yielded few
results?save, perhaps, in the energy sphere (see
page 57).
Despite this lack of success, the Soviets probably are
satisfied that Washington also has not been able to
reestablish itself in Iran. Concern that the United
States will do so has evidently been high in Moscow.
" Moscow may have slightly softened its stance by stopping in
September the operations of the "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI),
a radio station that has broadcast in Persian and Azeri to Iran out
of Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan since 1959. The significance of this
step, however, is undercut by the fact that the Moscow-controlled
Tudeh (Communist) party continues to broadcast anti-Khomeini
propaganda to Iran from a radio station in Kabul, Afghanistan?
"Radio of the Iranian Toilers."
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For example, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official ex-
pressed his worry to a US Embassy officer in 1983
that Iran was increasingly turning to Western tech-
nology and that its leaders were at heart oriented
toward the Western economic system. This theme is
expressed more directly in Soviet scholarly and jour-
nalistic writings on the Islamic regime. For instance,
Soviet media gave extensive coverage to the US
acknowledgment in November that it had secretly
provided some arms to Iran.
Policy Differences. The trend in Soviet policy toward
Iran since 1982 and the continued hostility of
Khomeini toward the USSR strongly suggest that
there will be no significant improvement in bilateral
relations as long as the Ayatollah remains in power.
Beyond the basic ideological differences separating
the two regimes and Iran's traditional fear of its
powerful northern neighbor, the issues hindering bet-
ter relations today are:
? Moscow's military support for Iraq.
? The continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and Iran's support for the Afghan rebels.
? Tehran's occasional hostile treatment of Soviets
accredited to Iran and Moscow's withdrawal in
1984 and 1985 of most of its economic advisers and
technicians from Iranian industries.
? The Khomeini regime's repression of the Tudeh
Party.
? The public criticisms the two sides exchange in their
media.
The first two issues are the most significant and the
ones on which changes in Soviet and Iranian positions
are least likely over the next few years. Moscow has
gone to great lengths to improve its position in Iraq
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Soviet Reassessment of the Iranian Revolution
An article in the July 1982 edition of the CPSU
journal Kommunist was a landmark in the Soviets'
reappraisal of the Iranian revolution. The author,
Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy, a deputy chief of the CPSU
Central Committee's International Department and
one of the USSR's senior specialists on the Third
World, stated that the fundamentalist clerics' con-
solidation of power in the summer of 1981 marked
the end of the revolution's "genuinely people's
antiimperialist" nature and the beginning of an
"illusory" quest for an Islamic "third path" between
capitalism and socialism.
Ul'yanovskiy claimed the February 1979 revolution
was "bourgeois democratic" and could have moved in
an "anticapitalist" (that is, pro-Soviet) direction.
Unfortunately, he lamented, the complete triumph of
the Shia clergy stifled the revolution's 'Progressive"
tendencies:
The more the new organizations's power with its
specifically Islamic features strengthened, the
more rapidly the foundations of the revolution
as a truly people's antiimperialist and democrat-
ic revolution were eroded.
The article was a rationalization and, at the same
time, a confirmation of the negative shift in the
USSR's view of Khomeini's Iran. Articles and books
by Ul'yanovskiy and others emphasizing the same
themes in even more strident terms continue to
appear in Soviet media.
since 1982 and, as long as the war continues, is not
likely to lessen its military support for Baghdad unless
a clear prospect for major Soviet gains in Iran were to
arise. The Soviets are not likely to pull out of
Afghanistan entirely any time soon, and the Iranians
are becoming bolder in their support for the rebels.
Soviet media in February criticized Tehran for send-
ing a clerical delegation into Afghanistan to meet
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Afghan refugees on streets of Tehran in Decem-
ber 1985 during annual demonstration on anni-
versary of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
with rebels and claimed "the Iranian officials' inter-
vention in Afghanistan's domestic affairs is becoming
more blatant and overt."
talks with Soviet officials in Moscow in August
yielded no meeting of the minds on Afghanistan. And,
in December, Izvestiya, in one of the hardest hitting
public Soviet criticisms of the Khomeini regime to
date, accused it of cooperating with the United States
in an "undeclared war" against the Marxist govern-
ment in Afghanistan and in denigrating the USSR's
"international assistance" to the Najib regime.
Possible Areas for Improvement in Relations. Even
without movement on these issues, however, a lessen-
ing of the current high state of tensions is possible
while Khomeini is in power
Tehran's primary goals are to lessen Soviet
military support for Iraq and convince Moscow to sell
Iran major weapon systems. Although the Soviets
have dragged their feet in responding to Iran's over-
tures, and bilateral trade in 1985 dropped to its lowest
level since the early 1970s (see table 4), economic
discussions are continuing. Both governments have
indicated that some Soviet economic advisers and
technicians are likely to return to Iran in the near
future. Iran's Minister of Petroleum claimed after his
August 1986 visit to Moscow that the two sides would
conduct a three-month study to assess the possibility
of resuming Iranian natural gas exports to the
57
Table 4 Million US $
Soviet-Iranian Trade
Soviet Imports
From Iran
Soviet Exports
to Iran
1975
317
391
1980
116
399
1981
653
567
1982
260
795
1983
509
755
1984
298
297
1985
163
245
Source: Soviet trade statistics, rounded to nearest million US
dollars.
USSR." Tehran terminated such deliveries in 1980
because of difficulties over pricing. Even if the two
could agree on pricing, refurbishing the IGAT I
pipeline would take six months to a year.
The Soviets also might be willing, in return for
Iranian concessions on other issues, to increase their
arms sales to Tehran. Moscow already has allowed its
East European allies to boost arms sales to Iran. Such
sales increased by a factor of six in 1984 to almost
$400 million, but dropped off again in 1985 (see
figure 7). Direct Soviet deliveries of small arms and
ammunition to Iran have continued, but only at a
trickle. Moscow has rebuffed Iranian requests for 25X1
advanced weaponry r 25X1
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/The Soviets' refusal to provide major weapon
systems probably stems from two factors: they do not
want to enable Iran to expand the war, and they want
to avoid antagonizing Iraq."
" The Soviets have made no public mention of such an agreement.
"The sale of small arms and ammunition can be concealed from
Baghdadl
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Figure 7
Estimated Values of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact Military Deliveries
to Iran, 1981-85
Million US $
500
Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact
1981 82 83 84 85
310740 10.86
After Khomeini. Although the Soviets are unlikely to
soften their stance on Iran significantly as long as
Khomeini is in power, they probably would mount a
major effort to court a successor regime even if it were
run by other fundamentalist clerics?the most likely
development. (Khomeini is around 87 and reported to
be in failing health.) If the new regime adopted a less
hostile policy toward the USSR than Khomeini's, the
Soviets would be likely to follow a policy of induce-
ments aimed at improving state-to-state relations and,
ultimately, increasing Soviet influence in Iran. They
tried this for three years before giving up on
Khomeini.
Should a successor regime prove to be as anti-Soviet
as Khomeini's or, on the other hand, should a major
power struggle ensue, Moscow almost certainly would
use the potential levers it has both inside and outside
Iran to promote the establishment of a pro-Soviet
regime in Tehran. Ideally, the Kremlin would hope
for a regime headed by the staunchly pro-Soviet
Tudeh (Communist) Party. The Tudeh, however, has
Secret
Former General Secretary of
the Tudeh Party, Nuredin
Kianuri, imprisoned by the
Khomeini regime since 1983
not been a major factor in Iranian politics since the
1940s, and its ability to operate in Iran has been
drastically reduced since the Khomeini regime de-
clared the party illegal in 1983 and arrested many of
its leaders, who remain in jail. The remnants of the
party leadership fled to the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and elected a new general secretary, Ali
Khavari, to replace the imprisoned Nuredin Kianuri.
The Soviets presumably recognize the Tudeh's weak-
ness, and they have been calling for a united front of
leftists (including the Fedayeen-e Khalq, Mujahedin-e
Khalq, and Paykar parties) and disaffected minorities
(see inset). Not all of these groups, particularly the
strongest?the Mujahedin?are interested in cooper-
ating with either the Tudeh or the Soviets, however,
and the prospects for such a united front seizing
power or even wielding major influence are likely to
remain slim for some time to come.
Moscow has two other levers?economic and mili-
tary?with which to influence Iran. Iran's need for
Soviet assistance in operating key components of the
steel and power industries has already been noted. In
addition, approximately 13 percent of Iran's imports
currently transit Soviet territory, according to Iranian
trade data. A Soviet ban on this transit trade would
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Moscow and Iran's Minorities
The Soviet Army helped install the short-lived leftist,
separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and
Kordestan in 1945, and Moscow has maintained
relationships with the Azerbaijani and Kurdish Dem-
ocratic Parties, which remain influential in their
respective regions (see foldout figure 12 at the back).
The Soviets have spoken out openly since 1982 for
Kurdish autonomy, and the media in the USSR's own
Azerbaijani Republic often issue veiled calls for
"reunification" of Soviet and Iranian Azeris. In
addition,
the Soviets maintain some
contacts in Iranian Baluchistan, and Soviet me
occasionally call for autonomy for the Baluch.
over Iran
Soviets have
The
the equivalent of five or six divisions in
Afghanistan. The divisions in the Turkestan, Trans-
caucasus, and North Caucasus military districts are
amofig the least-well-equipped Soviet forces in the
USSR's border regions. We believe, however, that
these forces are sufficient, if mobilized, to mount
either a limited or full-scale invasion of Iran on
relatively short notice without substantial reinforce-
ment from Soviet forces opposite NATO or China."
We believe concern about Western intervention will
continue to shape Moscow's policy toward Iranian
minorities as long it views the regime in Tehran as
antagonistic toward Washington. Should an Iranian
government begin to turn back toward the United
States, the Soviets probably would try to stir up the
minorities on the assumption that instability is pref-
erable to an Iran that is again in the US camp.
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Any of the following developments, in our view,
probably would lead the Soviets to consider military
intervention in Iran:
? Moscow perceived that the United States was itself
preparing to intervene.
? Central power in Iran broke down and the country
began to fragment.
create economic hardships for Iran, but almost cer-
tainly not enough to force it to alter its basic policies.
Moreover, by wielding such a lever, Moscow risks
pushing Tehran closer to the West out of economic
need.
Military Pressure. The presence of substantial Soviet
military forces in the southern USSR and Afghani-
stan gives Moscow its most powerful potential lever
59
" We believe that a full-scale invasion of Iran would require some
20 Soviet divisions and at least a month of preparation. Alternative-
ly, an invasion with a limited objective such as Azerbaijan could be
launched by about five to seven divisions after two to three weeks of
preparation.i
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Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Signed
at Moscow, 26 February 1921
Article 5
The two high contracting parties undertake
(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their
respective territories of any organizations or groups
or persons, irrespective of the name by which they are
known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility
against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of
Russia. They will likewise prohibit the formation of
armed troops within their respective territories with
the aforementioned object.
(2) Not to allow a third party or any organization
whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other
contracting party, to import or to convey in transit
across their countries material which can be used
against the other party.
(3) To prevent by all means in their power the
presence within their territories or within the territo-
ries of their allies of all armies or forces of a third
party in cases in which the presence of such forces
would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers,
interest, or safety of the other contracting party.
Article 6
If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy
of usurpation by means of armed intervention in
Persia, or such power should desire to use Persian
territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if
a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of
Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the
Persian Government should not be able to put a stop
to such menace after having been once called upon to
do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to
advance her troops into the Persian interior for the
purpose of carrying out the military operations neces-
sary for its defense. Russia undertakes, however, to
withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as
the danger has been removed.
Secret
? A leftist faction seized power and appealed to the
USSR for help.?
Although the USSR has the capability to intervene
militarily, the decision to intervene would be an
agonizing one. Even a limited intervention into Azer-
baijan would face fierce Iranian resistance and major
terrain and logistic problems. A US military response
would be difficult in this scenario, but Soviet leaders
probably would judge there would be a strong likeli-
hood of a US move to occupy parts of southern Iran.
A full-scale invasion would present exponentially
greater operational difficulties and risks of a major
confrontation with the United States. Such a cam-
paign would be on a scale larger than any the USSR
has waged since World War II. In the best of
circumstances?limited Iranian resistance and no
US intervention?we believe it would take Soviet
forces six to 12 weeks to seize the oil-rich Khuzestan
region on the Persian Gulf littoral. Soviet leaders
would anticipate that a full-scale invasion of Iran
would prompt a major US military response.(
Afghanistan
Ever since Russia's expansion into Central Asia in the
19th century, Afghanistan had been a buffer between
the Russian, then Soviet, domains and South Asia,
controlled until 1947 by the British. Moscow's inva-
sion of December 1979 changed Afghanistan's status
from that of a buffer to a potential integral part of the
Soviet imperium. The invasion not only marked the
4? If the Soviets were to intervene, they would be likely to cite
Articles 5 and 6 of their 1921 Treaty of Friendship with Iran as
legal justification for any intervention, just as they did in 1941.
Article 6 states that should a third party intervene militarily in Iran
or use Iranian territory as a base of operations against the USSR:
"Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian
interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations
necessary for its defense." The Shah unilaterally abrogated Articles
5 and 6 of the treaty in 1959, and the Khomeini regime reiterated
the abrogation in November 1979. The Soviets have ignored the
Iranian moves and still speak publicly and privately of the entire
treaty being in force.
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Afghan insurgent stands guard over downed
Soviet helicopter in the Panfsher Valley
USSR's first occupation of a Middle Eastern country
since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran in
1946, but also the first expansion of Soviet control in
the region since the reconquest of Central Asia
during and after the 1918-21 civil war. In addition,
the invasion rescued the only Marxist regime?other
than the one in South Yemen?in the Middle East.
The Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan has enhanced
their ability to exercise influence beyond Afghan
borders. They are in a better position to put military
pressure on Iran and Pakistan. Thus far, Moscow has
conducted only limited raids from Afghanistan into
Pakistan and Iran against Afghan insurgent targets,
and Soviet forces in Afghanistan as now constituted
do not pose a major military threat to Pakistan or
Iran. Moreover, before the Soviets could effectively
use their presence in Afghanistan as a staging base for
large-scale military operations beyond Afghan bor-
ders, they first would have to quell the insurgency and
make massive logistic improvements (roads, airfields,
fuel lines, communications). Nonetheless, Iran now
faces Soviet forces on two flanks, Pakistan has to
contend for the first time with a Soviet military
presence on its border, and Soviet tactical airpower
61
Panisher Valley insurgent leader Ahmad Shah
Masood addressing his forces
has the potential to move some 400 kilometers closer
to the Strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, the Soviets' invasion and continuing
occupation of Afghanistan has had negative repercus-
sions for them in the region and beyond. The occupa-
tion of a Middle Eastern, Islamic, and nonaligned
nation has sparked resentment against Moscow from
each of these constituencies (most Middle Eastern
states are members of all three). Even some of the
Soviet Union's friends in the region, such as Syria,
Iraq, Algeria, and the PLO, were disillusioned by the
invasion, although?for the most part?they have
muted their displeasure. Perhaps even more impor-
tant, the Soviet move has made some regional states
more receptive to an increased US military presence
in the region.
The Situation Today. Before the Soviets can even
contemplate capitalizing on their military presence in
Afghanistan, they must first establish control over the
countryside, a goal they appear to be little closer to
achieving than when their troops first entered the
country in December 1979.
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The Soviet Withdrawal
The Soviet leadership has made a decision which I will officially announce today.
By the end of 1986, six regiments?one tank regiment, two motorized rifle
regiments, and three antiaircraft regiments?along with their established
equipment and weapons will be returned from Afghanistan to the motherland.
[Applause] These units will return to the regions of their permanent deployment in
the Soviet Union, and in such a way that all those for whom this may be of
interest may be easily convinced of this.
?Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev
in Vladivostok, 28 July 1986
People living in this city [Konduz] today bid a ceremonial farewell to the last of
the six Soviet regiments being returned home in keeping with a joint decision by
the governments of the USSR and Afghanistan.
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?Moscow TASS in English, 27 October 1986
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Over the past two years, the Soviets have attempted to
redress the situation by augmenting their forces in
Afghanistan, pursuing a more aggressive strategy
against the insurgency, stepping up military pressure
on Pakistan and Iran, improving training of Afghan
military and political cadres, and replacing the
Afghan leader. The USSR has some 116,000 men in
Afghanistan, up about 30 percent since 1980./
!
The more aggressive Soviet pursuit of the insurgents
has led to higher than usual casualties on both sides.
Although Soviet forces have fought more effectively,
and at least some Afghan forces have shown tenative
signs of improvement, the regime remains unable to
stand on its own.
In for the Long Haul. The Soviets, despite their minor
troop withdrawal in October, appear to be prepared
for a protracted struggle in Afghanistan.
throughout the Soviet
party, government, and military there is a general
resignation to the fact that the USSR would be in
Afghanistan for a "generation or more." In conversa-
tions with Westerners, Soviet officials often cite the
fledgling Bolshevik regime's long fight against the
Central Asian Basmachi resistance as an indicator of
Moscow's capacity to persevere against the Afghan
The Soviet domestic media have given
much more extensive coverage to the war during the
past two years, which suggests the leadership is trying
to prepare the public for a long struggle.
From Moscow's perspective, the costs of withdrawing
are high. the conse-
quences of a premature withdrawal would be even
63
A Reason To Hang Tough
The Soviets probably believe that the international
costs of staying in Afghanistan are diminishing with
time. Despite the continuing broad support for the
annual vote in the UN General Assembly calling for
the withdrawal of "foreign" troops from Afghanistan,
most countries that condemned the invasion or even
imposed sanctions against Moscow have returned to
business as usual with the USSR. Oriental Institute
department chief Gankovskiy told US Embassy offi-
cers in August 1985 that US involvement in Afghani-
stan is a passing whim of the Reagan administration.
Although Gankovskiy probably was exaggerating for
effect, and the Soviets are still quite concerned with
US and other support for the insurgents, on balance
most Soviet policymakers probably would agree with
his basic point: US involvement is not likely to last
indefinitely because Afghanistan is not of vital inter-
est to the United States?as it is to the USSR.
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more catastrophic than those of failing to intervene in
1979.1
/The Soviet Union's prestige as a superpower
would be tarnished.
The ideological rationale for not leaving is also com-
pelling from a Soviet perspective. A major factor
behind the initial invasion was the desire to avert the
collapse of a Marxist regime. An article published in
Novoye Vremya shortly after Soviet forces moved in
asserted that: "To refuse to use the potential which
the socialist states possess [to aid the Afghan Marx-
ists] would mean, in fact, avoiding an internationalist
duty." The Soviet Ambassador to France, in a speech
in April 1980, said the Soviets could not "permit the
transformation of Afghanistan into a new Chile,"
where the Marxist regime of Salvador Allende was
toppled in 1973 and the Soviets were powerless to
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prevent it. The Soviets probably fear that allowing the
Marxist government in Afghanistan to collapse would
set a dangerous precedent and raise questions about
their willingness to support Marxist regimes else-
where.
Despite the reasons to stay, some Soviet officials have
indicated that the
Kremlin would seriously consider withdrawing its
forces if reasonable terms could be worked out that
preserve the nature of the Afghan regime. Some of
these officials have actually claimed that a decision to
withdraw has already been made. They may have
been referring to Gorbachev's July announcement of a
limited withdrawal. We doubt that a decision on a full
withdrawal has already been made.
The conflicting signals coming from the Soviets might
simply be a smokescreen to ease international pres-
sure on the USSR to withdraw
They could also be a reflection of a belief
that the more aggressive strategy against the insur-
gents, the replacement of former Afghan leader
Babrak Karmal with Najib, and Moscow's more
flexible approach to the UN "proximity talks" with
Pakistan will eventually lead to a resolution of the
Afghan problem that would permit a withdrawal of
most Soviet forces. If so, the Soviets are likely to stick
with this policy course, which would probably involve:
? More aggressive attempts to eradicate rebel bases of
support within the country and across the border in
Pakistan and Iran.
? Intensive training of Afghan military and political
cadres, coupled with a broader campaign to win
domestic acceptance of the Najib regime.
? Diplomatic and subversive efforts to weaken outside
support for the insurgents (especially in Pakistan)
and widen international acceptance of the Marxist
regime.
Skillful implementation of such a policy could, in our
view, lay the groundwork for the Soviets to remove a
substantial part of their forces within two to three
years, provided that Pakistan could be convinced to
end its support for the rebels?an exceedingly diffi-
cult task.
Secret
Sayid Mohammad Najib:
Moscow's New Man in Kabul
An Ahmadzai Pushtun . . . probably born in Kabul
tlb-Tefly in military, civil service . . . briefly
Deputy Minister of Interior after April 1978 coup . . .
exiled as Ambassador to Iran by Khalqi faction of
Afghan ruling party . . . accused of plotting to kill
Khalqi leader Taraki . . . fled to Eastern Europe,
joining former Afghan leader Babrak Karmal and
others from Parchami faction
Ireplaced
Babrak Karmal as Afghan party Secretary General in
May 1986 . . . about 38 years old.
What Moscow evidently hopes to achieve in Afghani-
stan, as a Soviet official told US Embassy officers in
March 1985, is the establishment of a regime as
subservient and secure as the one in Mongolia. If the
Soviets eventually succeed, they will have extended
the borders of the Soviet imperium and enhanced
their ability to exercise influence in South and South-
west Asia. For at least the next few years, however,
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Afghanistan is likely to remain a major headache for
the Kremlin, whether or not the Soviets withdraw
their forces.
Turkey
Strategically, Turkey is the most important country in
the Middle East from Moscow's perspective. It is the
only state in the region that is a NATO member and
that grants US forces permanent basing rights. The
Turkish armed forces are by far the largest in the
Middle East, and Turkey controls the choke point to
the Black Sea./ I
/the United States has given Turkey:
the role of a "barrier," isolating the Soviet
Union from territorial contiguity with the coun-
tries of the Arab East and from direct access to
them, [and] the role of NATO's "guard," con-
trolling the gate leading from the Black to the
Mediterranean Sea.
Undermining the Link to Washington. Moscow has
attempted to take advantage of Ankara's dissatisfac-
tion with the level of US support since the 1960s.
Turkey's anger over Washington's willingness to bar-
gain away US missiles based on Turkish soil?with-
out consulting Ankara?for the Soviet missiles
Khrushchev placed in Cuba in 1962 and over US
condemnation of Turkish moves during the crisis in
Cyprus in 1964 led to the first warming of Soviet-
Turkish relations in the postwar period. Moscow
similarly capitalized on the US criticism of Turkey's
military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the
resulting US embargo of arms to Turkey. Turkish-
Greek disputes over Cyprus and sovereignty in the
Aegean also provide opportunities for the Soviets, but
Moscow is constrained from moving too blatantly in
using these disputes to woo Turkey away from NATO
because of Soviet interests in cultivating Greece.
Soviet concern about Turkey's security ties to the
United States has grown since the late 1970s. When
Washington and Ankara were renegotiating their
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in
1979, Krasnaya Zvezda warned that in the event of
another war: "Turkey, where a substantial number of
65
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US military installations are located, could undergo
the tragedy of Hiroshima."(
/
the Soviets have issued the \ arning to
Turkey in their media over Ankara's alleged desire to
participate in research under the US "Strategic De-
fense Initiative." Moscow also has shown concern over
Turkey's potential usefulness to US military efforts in
the Middle East. In December 1983 Vasiliy Safron-
chuk, then chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's
Middle East Department, criticized the reported es-
tablishment of US "Rapid Deployment Force" bases
in Turkey during an interview with a Turkish newspa-
per.
Current Status of Relations. Despite the harsh Soviet
criticism of Turkey's security ties to the United
States, Moscow?by and large?has succeeded in
maintaining a stable, if not always cordial, relation-
ship with the various regimes in Ankara during the
past two decades. The height of Soviet-Turkish
cooperation came in 1978 with the signing of a
"Political Document on Good Neighborly and Friend-
ly Cooperation." The military takeover in Ankara two
years later led to a cooling of relations that lasted
until 1984.
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Moscow and the Turkish Straits
The Bosporus Strait, as viewed from the Topkapi
Palace, Istanbul
Control over the Turkish Straits has been an objec-
tive of Russian rulers since Tsarist Russia became a
Black Sea power in the late 18th century (see figure
8). Even after the Russians won the right from the
Ottoman Turks in 1774 to navigate the Black Sea
and pass through the Straits, Russia's southern fleet
was confined to the Black Sea for all but two brief
periods until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1921. Great
Britain and France awarded Russia the Straits and
Istanbul on paper in a secret treaty in 1915, and the
USSR asked for the same in talks with Germany in
1940 to divide up Europe and the Middle East.
Stalin made a final bid for control of the Straits at
the end of World War II through appeals to his
Allied partners for revision of the Montreux Conven-
tion of 1936 and, when those failed, through direct
pressure on Turkey?also unsuccessful.
Turkish control of the Straits places restrictions on
the movement of Soviet warships in and out of the
Black Sea in peacetime and could bottle up Soviet
naval and merchant ships in times of tensions or
hostilities. The Montreux Convention requires that
the Soviets provide the Turks eight days' notice
before sending any warship over 10,000 tons through
A Soviet merchant ship passes under the
Bosporus Bridge, just north of Istanbul.
the Straits, and only one may transit at a time. No
Soviet aircraft carrier or submarine may transit,
except, in the case of the latter, for repairs. Soviet
civilian, but not military, aircraft are allowed to
overfly the Straits.
Despite these restrictions, Moscow has managed to
stretch and sometimes circumvent the Convention's
provisions. For example, since the late 1960s the
Soviets have made it a practice to declare transits of
warships, whether or not they intend to use them.
This allows them to augment their Mediterranean
Flotilla more quickly in times of crisis. Moscow also
has contended?and the Turks have accepted?that
its Kiev-class aircraft carriers are actually antisub-
marine warfare cruisers, thus enabling it to circum-
vent the ban on carrier transits. The Soviets also have
flown military transport aircraft?claiming they were
civilian flights?over Turkey to resupply clients in
the Middle East and Africa. The Turks have reluc-
tantly allowed such flights on a limited basis, possi-
bly because of concern about Moscow's capability to
restrict Turkish flights to Western Europe across
Bulgaria.
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Figure 8
The Turkish Straits
Blackfl
Sea
,Bosporus
'bridge
r
Military airfield
Naval base
? Road
,Railroad
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50 Kilometers
50 Miles
708788 11-86
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Premier Ryzhkov (second from right) holding
talks with Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
(second from left) during his July 1986 visit to
Moscow
Former Soviet Premier Tikhonov's December 1984
visit to Ankara?the first by a Soviet leader in almost
a decade?put the relationship back on a more
cooperative course, although tensions remain. Soviet
media commentary on the strictly bilateral aspects of
the relationship has been more positive since the
Tikhonov visit, as reflected most recently by their
favorable coverage of Prime Minister Ozal's July
1986 visit to the USSR.
The economic sphere historically has been the most
productive area of Soviet-Turkish relations. The focus
of Tikhonov's 1984 trip was the signing of a trade
agreement for the 1986-90 period that sets a target of
$6 billion in total trade between the two countries.
Bilateral trade increased by 20 percent in 1985,
according to official Soviet trade statistics.
Moscow has extended Ankara more credits?$3.4
billion since 1958?than any other non-Communist
country. To date, Turkey has drawn only about $860
million of this amount, but it has used the aid to
develop some important sectors of its economy. Soviet
assistance has been crucial to construction of the
Iskenderun iron and steel works (the largest in Tur-
key), the Seydisehir aluminum smelting plant, and an
oil refinery in Izmir. The Soviets have approximately
1,500 economic advisers and technicians working at
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Metallurgical works in Iskenderun, Turkey,
built with Soviet assistance
these and other facilities in Turkey. In February the
two sides signed a 25-year natural gas agreement that
calls for the USSR to provide Turkey a peak of 4
billion cubic meters annually by 1992. This would
equal almost 90 percent of Turkey's natural gas needs
and about 5 percent of its energy needs.
We believe that Moscow maintains contacts with
various Turkish leftwing and Kurdish extremist
groups and has provided funding and probably some
small-arms support through intermediaries.
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Soviet support, however, appears to have been rela-
tively low level. Moscow, pursuing its traditional dual-
track policy, apparently wants to be in a position to
stoke the fires of Turkish internal unrest?which is
indigenously generated?without damaging its state-
to-state ties to the Turkish Government and provoking
a confrontation with a NATO member.
The evidence of Soviet support for the Turkish
Communist Party (TKP), in contrast to the circum-
stantial evidence of support for terrorist groups, is
unquestionable. The USSR is the prime financial
backer of the TKP, which follows the Moscow party
line. The party, which has been illegal in Turkey since
1925, has its headquarters in East Berlin. With Soviet
funding and technical assistance, the TKP operates
two clandestine radio stations ("Our Radio" and
"Voice of the Turkish Communist Party") out of East
Germany that broadcast in Turkish to Turkey and
Western Europe. The TKP, however, is a bit player in
Turkey and has only a tiny following and a minimal
ability to influence events there.
Continuing the Dual-Track Policy. The long-term
nature of Turkish internal unrest, West European
criticism of human rights abuses in Turkey, the
rivalry between Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus prob-
lem, and Turkish doubts about the intensity of the US
commitment to Turkey promise to continue to provide
the Soviets with openings both to exploit Turkey's
weaknesses and to try to woo it away from the
Western alliance. With the success the military re-
gime and the subsequent civilian government of Prime
Minister Ozal have had in stabilizing the country
69
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since 1980, the Soviets are likely to put more empha-
sis on improving state-to-state ties and less on subver-
sion during the next five years, unless the internal
situation suddenly deteriorates. They will continue to
cultivate their clandestine assets, both as a hedge to
the future and a reminder to Ankara that they can
cause trouble. The Soviets almost certainly recognize,
however, that Turkey continues to be a bulwark of
NATO on the USSR's southern flank, and they are
likely to act with appropriate restraint.
Totaling Up the Balance Sheet
This survey of Soviet policy has shown that the
USSR's position in the Middle East today is strong in
the northern tier and much less strong in the Arab-
Israeli theater. Whereas Moscow has the edge over
Washington in all of the northern tier except Turkey,
the United States retains greater influence than the
Soviet Union in most of the Levant, the Arabian
Peninsula, and North Africa.
Moscow's influence in Syria, as well as in Libya and
South Yemen, has not balanced its loss of influence in
Egypt. The relationship with Syria?the USSR's
most important in the Arab world?ensures Moscow
a role in the region's central issue, the Arab-Israeli
conflict. However, the Soviet position in the Arab-
Israeli theater will remain inferior to that of the
United States as long as Cairo maintains close ties to
Washington, and it seems likely that?barring a
major political upheaval in Egypt?those ties will
continue to be strong during the rest of the 1980s.
The USSR is recognized as an important actor by
most of the Arabs, who value its support for a
Palestinian state. The pro-US Arab states also see
relations, or at least contacts, with the Soviet Union
as a useful tool to ensure that Washington does not
take them for granted. For most of the Arabs, howev-
er, the USSR's atheistic ideology, aggressive penetra-
tion efforts, and invasion of Afghanistan are ample
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reason to keep a certain distance. Even in the pro-
Soviet states?the PDRY excepted?local Commu-
nist parties are either proscribed or thoroughly tamed,
and the Soviets have shown little ability to sway the
internal political order.
In the northern tier, the USSR has been able to exert
major political influence only in Afghanistan. Despite
decades of trying, the Soviets have had no success in
the postwar period in steering political events inside
Turkey and Iran. The Communist parties of both
countries are illegal and have been?with the excep-
tion of the Tudeh in the 1940s?bit players in Turkish
and Iranian politics.
Military power remains Moscow's strongest card in
the region. The military forces the Soviets have
deployed in the southern USSR opposite the Middle
East, their naval and air operations in the Middle
East, their willingness to use force in Afghanistan and
deploy their own air defense forces in Syria, and their
provision of large amounts of modern weapons to their
clients all indicate that the USSR will be a force to be
reckoned with in the Middle East for years to come.
Beyond the northern tier, however, the Soviets still
cannot match the power-projection capabilities of the
United States and its NATO allies, and, in fact, US
improvements in this field since the late 1970s threat-
en to leave Moscow even further behind. The Soviet
Union lacks the aircraft carriers or access to regional
airbases necessary to operate fighter aircraft beyond
the bordering regions of the southern USSR. Without
fighter cover, the Soviets would not be able to mount
a contested deployment of ground forces to the region
or protect their Mediterranean Flotilla and Indian
Ocean Squadron from Western carrier-based aircraft.
The Soviets are working to remedy these deficiencies
by developing full-size aircraft carriers and the capa-
bilities for long-distance air refueling for their fight-
ers. They are likely, however, to have only one of these
new carriers by 1990, and they are still years away
from perfecting long-distance fighter refueling.
Economically, the USSR continues to lag far behind
the West, Japan, and now even increasingly active
South Korea in the Middle East. For Moscow's
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clients or countries such as Iraq, which are temporar-
ily strapped for the hard currency to pay for
Western goods, Soviet economic aid and bilateral
trade are important. Even countries as close to the
Soviets as South Yemen and Syria, however, have
been dissatisfied with the level and quality of Soviet
aid and have been looking to the West and Japan to
provide the consumer goods, technology, hard curren-
cy, and know-how that the Soviet Union generally
lacks. Thus, the gap between Soviet and Western/
Japanese/South Korean involvement in the Middle
East is likely to widen.
The Soviets still have trouble turning their military
strength into commensurate political influence in the
Middle East. They remain frozen out of discussions to
resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Obtaining a voice in
the peace process?which would signify acceptance by
the United States and the regional states involved of a
major Soviet political role in the Middle East?
continues to be one of Moscow's major goals (see
appendix B). The USSR's prospects of realizing that
goal in the next five years are not good.
Impact of Future Developments
We believe the USSR's primary policy goals in the
Middle East during the rest of the 1980s are likely to
be:
? Consolidating control in Afghanistan.
? Blocking any US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace set-
tlement that leaves Moscow out and, optimally,
regaining a Soviet voice in the peace process.
? Unifying the Arabs into a pro-Soviet front by
ending the isolation of Moscow's Arab clients:
Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
? Stemming the drift of Algeria and Iraq toward
lesser dependence on the USSR and closer ties to
the United States.
? Expanding Soviet influence in Moscow's key Middle
Eastern targets: Egypt and Iran.
? Eroding Turkey's security ties to Washington.
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We have assessed Moscow's prospects for achieving
these tasks and have concluded that in most cases
they are not promising. Gorbachev's best chances for
success seem to be in preventing a US-sponsored
Arab-Israeli settlement, expanding influence in Egypt
and Iran, and, possibly, consolidating control in Af-
ghanistan. What remains to be examined are some
developments that would have a major impact on
Soviet policy in the region?as well as important
implications for the United States?and prompt us to
alter our assessments.
Positive Developments From Moscow's Perspective
Rapprochement Between Syria and Iraq
The Soviets have attempted for years to get Assad
and Saddam to bury their differences, but with no
success. Jordan's King Hussein claimed to have made
major progress mediating between the two rivals this
spring, but a Soviet diplomat in Baghdad, in a
conversation with a US counterpart in March, flatly
ruled out a Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation so long as both
Assad and Saddam remain in power. A rapproche-
ment between the two would be likely to strengthen
the hardline Arabs vis-a-vis Israel and bolster opposi-
tion to a US-sponsored settlement of the Arab-Israeli
question. The Soviets, too, would hope that Syria
could draw Iraq closer to the USSR, although both
Damascus and Baghdad would remain fiercely protec-
tive of their independence from Moscow.
Rapprochement Between Syria and Arafat
The Soviets have tried even harder to bring Assad and
Arafat together?also to no avail. This development
would almost certainly end US hopes of achieving
resolution of the Palestinian question without Syrian
or Soviet participation. It also would be likely to
ensure that neither Jordan nor Egypt dominated the
PLO. An Assad-Arafat rapprochement probably
would lead to closer Soviet-PLO ties and might
facilitate the Soviet proposal for an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli question. That propos-
al stands no chance of going anywhere as long as
Syria, Moscow's closest Arab ally, and the PLO, the
representative of the people whose future is being
negotiated, remain at odds.
71
Rapprochement Between Syria and Egypt
A Syrian-Egyptian detente based on anti-Israeli, anti-
US policies would give more of a boost to Soviet
fortunes in the Middle East than any other single
development. Such a reconciliation, although unlikely
any time soon, probably would lead to a significant
improvement in Soviet ties to Egypt. It would not only
end US hopes of achieving a settlement of the Pales-
tinian question without Syrian and Soviet participa-
tion but also probably would lead to the unraveling of
the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement and revive the
two-front threat to Israel.
Replacement of the Mubarak Regime in Egypt
With a Neutral Regime
Such a development probably would lead to a sharp
reduction or possibly to a cessation of US-Egyptian
military cooperation and might result in Egypt's
abandonment of the Camp David accords. Either step
would be a major windfall for the Soviets, whether or
not they were able to replace US influence in Cairo
with their own. Moscow would step up its efforts
toward that end, possibly offering to settle Egypt's
military debt to the USSR on favorable terms and
provide Cairo with major new weapon systems. The
Soviets probably would encourage Syria and Libya to
adopt a positive line toward the new regime in Cairo,
hoping this would ease the way to better Soviet-
Egyptian relations. If Damascus and Tripoli balked,
however, Moscow would not be likely to be deterred
from courting the new regime. The benefits from
increased Soviet influence in Egypt probably would
outweigh, in Soviet eyes, the costs of incurring Syrian
and Libyan wrath.
Decision by Pakistan To End
Support for Afghan Rebels
This would deal a shattering blow to the rebels.
Although the insurgency would be likely to continue
for at least a few more years, the Soviets probably
could quickly ensure that the rebels would be no more
than a nuisance. Moscow would be likely to bring the
bulk of its forces home, while leaving a sizable
contingent in Afghanistan. Iran probably would
sharply curtail its support for the rebels, not wanting
to bear the brunt of Soviet wrath alone.
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Severe Instability in Turkey
Moscow probably would attempt via Bulgaria to
resume funneling small arms to Turkish leftists, step
up financial and propaganda support, and criticize the
Turkish Government's efforts to control such instabil-
ity and US support for Ankara's efforts. The Soviets,
however, would act with prudence to avoid sparking a
major US response.
Developments That Could Have a Mixed
Impact on Soviet Interests
A New Syrian-Israeli War
This would be a wild card for Moscow. Washington's
relations with the Arabs would stand to suffer unless
they viewed US pressure on Israel as responsible for
ending the fighting. The war would offer the Soviets
the opportunity to bolster their stock with Syria and
the Arabs as a whole by providing timely military
resupply. And, no matter what their actual behavior
during the war, the Soviets would move as they have
after past wars to restock the Arab military inventory
and increase Arab dependence on Soviet weapons.
The Syrians might even agree, as they did after their
defeat in Lebanon in 1982, to station Soviet combat
forces in Syria.
At the same time, a Syrian-Israeli war would entail
major risks for the USSR?the most serious being a
US-Soviet military confrontation, something Moscow
has always sought to avoid. Slightly less serious, but
potentially more humiliating, would be a clash be-
tween Soviet forces sent to Syria and Israeli forces.
The Soviets probably have a healthy respect for
Israeli military prowess. They only have to recall the
one direct clash between Soviet and Israeli forces,
when Israeli pilots?with no losses of their own?shot
down four Soviet-piloted MIG-21s over the Suez
Canal in July 1970.
Moscow would also stand to lose if the Arabs per-
ceived Soviet support to be insufficient, as they did in
the 1967 and 1982 wars. Quick resupply of arms to
the Arabs after the danger had passed rescued the
Soviet position in those cases, but there is no guaran-
tee that this strategy would work again. Moreover,
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there is the risk that, should the United States prove
successful in bringing about a cease-fire, the Syrians
might come to view cooperation with Washington?as
the Egyptians did after the 1973 war?as the best
means of obtaining what they want from Israel.
An End to the War Between Iran and Iraq
The Soviets consistently have called for an end to the
war, but they would be likely to view its cessation with
mixed feelings. On the one hand, they probably would
welcome an end to a major and unpredictable war on
their border that has already had some favorable
repercussions for the United States. A negotiated
settlement would:
? Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants
in Soviet-Iranian relations?Moscow's weapon sales
to Baghdad.
? Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous
about Iranian expansionism, decreasing their need
and willingness to cooperate militarily with the
United States.
? Possibly improve prospects for an Iraqi-Syrian
rapprochement.
An end to the war, however, would also carry poten-
tial liabilities for the Kremlin:
? We believe Iraq, without as acute a need for Soviet
weaponry, would accelerate its diversification of
weapon suppliers.
? Iraq probably would further improve its relations
with the United States as it looked to rebuild its
economy after the war.
? Although a dramatic improvement in Iranian ties to
Washington is only a remote possibility, Moscow
might worry that the absence of the unifying factor
of the war could weaken the present fundamentalist
regime and bring in more pragmatic clerics, who
might not be as averse to dealing with the United
States.
? Iran would have a freer hand to increase aid to
Afghan insurgents.
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An Iranian soldier uses poster of Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn for target practice after
Iranians capture Al Faw, Iraq, in February 1986
Negative Developments From
the Kremlin's Perspective
A Marked Expansion of the War
Between Iran and Iraq
The greatest risk in this scenario is that a major
threat to the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf could
prompt US military intervention. Such a move?
whether protection for convoys of oil tankers or, in the
most extreme case, occupation of Iranian territory?
would pose significant difficulties for the Soviets.
Beyond the immediate problem of deciding what kind
of military response they would have to make, the
Soviets would face the longer term prospect of an
expanded US military presence in the Persian Gulf
region. The conservative Gulf states almost certainly
would look to Washington for protection.
The Soviets, in our view, also would not want either
Iran or Iraq to emerge as a clear victor. Moscow has
long preferred a relative balance between the two
countries. If either state gained predominance, it
would make it more difficult for the USSR to exert
influence in the Persian Gulf region. A victorious
Saddam would almost certainly be apt to act even
more independently of Moscow than he does today. A
defeated Iran would look for outside help. It might
seek Soviet assistance, but, if the Khomeini regime
collapsed as a result of losing the war, the Soviets
73
would have to worry that the new leaders could turn
toward the West, which has the economic wherewith-
al to rebuild the war-damaged Iranian economy. A
victorious Iran would undermine Soviet influence in
Baghdad and probably make the Khomeini regime
even less susceptible to Soviet inroads or pressure.
Moreover, the Kremlin would not want to see an anti-
Soviet Iranian regime, whose Islamic fundamentalism
might potentially attract adherents among the
USSR's own Muslims, spreading its influence beyond
Iranian borders.
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A Major Increase in Outside Support
for the Afghan Rebels
This would compel the Soviets either to abandon their
current strategy of shifting the burden of the fighting
to the Afghan military or to risk the Marxist regime's
collapse, which we believe they are not prepared to 25X1
accept. A major expansion of Soviet involvement in
the war against the rebels?possibly including in-
creased cross-border raids into Pakistan?would carry
significant political and economic costs. Moscow
probably would come under heavy criticism from
West European, Middle Eastern, and Third World
governments. The increased Soviet involvement would
especially complicate Soviet relations with China and
India, not to mention the further chill it would have
on US-Soviet relations.
US-Sponsored Talks Between Israel and a
Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation
Although such talks today appear unlikely following
the split between King Hussein and PLO leader
Arafat, the two leaders could quickly reconcile. US
success in working out a settlement of the Palestinian
question without Soviet participation would be the
most significant blow to Moscow's position in the
Middle East since its loss of Egypt. The Kremlin, in
our view, would go to great lengths to block the
achievement of such a settlement. Soviet efforts would
center on backing Syria's moves to intimidate its
neighbors against reaching an agreement. Moscow
probably would even provide military support for
Syrian saber rattling aimed at Jordan or Israel, but
the Soviets would advise Damascus against moves
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that would provoke a full-scale war with Israel or
push Amman toward closer security cooperation with
Washington. If these Soviet and Syrian efforts failed
to prevent a settlement from being reached, Moscow
almost certainly would work to subvert the accord.
Even if the accord held together, the Soviets would
not be likely to drop their opposition and recognize a
US fait accompli during the next five years.
Death or Ouster of Assad
Soviet-Syrian relations have been close for over 30
years, and Moscow should be able to maintain its
influence in Damascus after Assad's departure, pro-
vided the Beth Party remains in power. Any Syrian
regime would have as its top priority the confrontation
with Israel, for which Soviet military support is all but
indispensible. Assad's successor probably would come
from the military and therefore would be all the more
likely to value ties to the USSR.
Assad, however, has brought 16 years of stability to a
country that was previously unstable, and the Soviets
would fear that his departure might lead to more
instability. Assad's regime is based on the small Alawi
minority, which might not be able to continue its
dominance without his commanding presence. A con-
tentious struggle for power in Syria or?less likely?
the accession to power of a group that is not favorably
disposed toward the USSR would seriously jeopardize
Moscow's long-term investment in Syria and, thereby,
the overall Soviet position in the Middle East.
whom among the
current regime the Soviets regard as their favorite to
succeed Assad. They have had long experience, how-
ever, dealing with the most likely candidates?Direc-
tor of Military Intelligence Ali Duba, Chief of Air
Force Intelligence Muhammad Khuli, Defense Minis-
ter Talas, Chief of Staff Shihabi, and Vice President
Khaddam?and probably could adjust quickly to any
of them as head of Syria. We cannot identify any
centers of influence in the Syrian leadership, however,
through which the Soviets could sway a succession.
The one current Syrian leader Moscow probably
would not want to see succeed Assad is his brother,
Vice President Rif 'at Assad./
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Former Soviet leader Konstantin tnernenico at
a meeting in the Kremlin with Syrian Vice
President Rifat Assad, May 1984
Since the late 1970s, he
has adopted a thinly veiled anti-Soviet posture, and
Moscow is suspicious of his extensive Western con-
tacts.r
A
friend of Rif 'at told a US diplomat in Damascus
around the same time that the Soviets were pressuring
Assad not to allow Rif 'at to assume any significant
post because they cannot work with him. At a mini-
mum, Rif `at's accession to power would add a major
degree of uncertainty to the Soviet-Syrian relation-
ship.
Death or Ouster of Qadhafi
Moscow's relationship with Libya, more than any
other in the Middle East, is dependent on one man.
Qadhafi has revolutionized almost every aspect of
Libyan Government and society and refashioned them
in his own unique style. Without him, the odds would
be against this system surviving for long in anything
like its current form. Whether the Soviet position in
Libya would survive the upheaval likely to follow
Qadhafi's departure is an open question]
As with Syria, the Soviets almost certainly would not
be able to sway a Libyan succession, but the long-
standing arms relationship will give whatever regime
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Rivals for Libyan Leadership
'Abd al-Salam Jallud
About 42. . . number-two man in regime . . . informally heads radical Revolution-
ary Committee structure. . . frequent Qadhafi emissary to USSR . . . other Arab
diplomats see him as pro-Soviet . . . strong supporter of regime's radical poli-
cies . . . has attempted to place fellow Magarha tribesmen in key positions, but
has many enemies in the military and elsewhere. . . close associate of Qadhafi
since secondary school . . . . . reputedly 25X1
has amassed a fortune overseas.
Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi
Deputy Chief of Staff and
Chief of Military Intelligence
About 42. . . a senior internal security officer since the revolution. . . lacks
proven leadership abilities and strong personal power base . . . Qadhafi loyalist,
often sent overseas as an emissary. . . ally of Inspector General Kharubi and
longtime enemy of Jallud . . . public statements in early 1970s suggest he is anti-
Communist.
Mustafa Muhammad Kharubi
Armed Forces Inspector General
Age 43 . . . a leading moderate who competes with Jallud for influence with
Qadhafi, but influence has declined in recent years . . . demoted from Chief of
Staff in 1984 . . . has criticized some regime policies, including terrorism . . .
popular with the military . . . military classmate and revolutionary colleague of
Qadhafi, Jallud, and Humaydi . . .former head of intelligence. . received
military training in the United States . . . reputation as incorruptible, devout
Muslim.
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that comes to power in Tripoli reason to pause before
reorienting its policy away from Moscow. For that
reason, the Soviets probably would hope that a mili-
tary man replaces Qadhafi.
The Soviet-Libyan relationship might survive the
succession relatively well should Qadhafi's de facto
second in command, Major Jallud, assume the reins
of power and hold the country together (see inset). The
Soviets have dealt with Jallud longer and more exten-
sively than with any other Libyan leader. (
A Major Drop in Soviet Oil Production
The slight increase in Soviet domestic oil production
in 1986, which reversed a two-year decline, all but
assures that the USSR will not become a net importer
of oil during the next five years. The Soviets, however,
have already increased their purchases of Middle
Eastern oil in recent years (see table 5) and are likely
to obtain even larger amounts throughout the rest of
the 1980s."
Should the USSR's domestic oil production drop off
much more sharply than we anticipate, the Soviets
might become major consumers of Middle Eastern oil
during the next five years. Such a development would
give the Middle East even greater importance for
Moscow and put the USSR in competition with the
West and Japan for Middle Eastern oil.
" In most cases, the Soviets accept the oil as payment for arms and
resell it to their oil customers.
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The Soviets would face major problems in coping not
only with decreasing hard currency earnings from oil
sales?currently about 35 percent of total Soviet
annual hard currency earnings?but also in coming
up with the countertrade or, as a last resort, hard
currency to pay for oil imports. Moscow probably
would attempt to increase aims sales to OPEC coun-
tries to finance the oil, but those countries can only
absorb so many weapons, and their hard currency
reserves have dropped markedly since the early 1986
decline in the world price of oil. There are few other
commodities the Soviets could offer to trade for the
oil, but they might attempt to expand their participa-
tion in economic development projects in the Middle
East, accepting oil as payment for their services.
The USSR would have added incentive to improve
relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia?two of the
countries that have the reserve capacity for meeting
the oil needs of the Soviets and their East European
allies." The Soviets might decide to adopt a more
conciliatory policy toward Iran even while Khomeini
remained in power, and they would be likely to work
harder for normalized relations with Saudi Arabia.
This need for oil would not force the Soviets to forgo
opportunities to increase their influence in those
countries and erode that of the United States. But
Moscow would be likely to pursue those opportunities
more cautiously while adopting a friendly posture
toward the Iranian and Saudi Governments.
We do not believe the Soviets' need for oil would
prompt them to try to seize Middle Eastern supplies
during the next five years. Even if such considerations
as the military and economic costs involved in con-
quering Iran, for example, and the risks of sparking a
war with the United States are put aside, the cost of
ruling the country would far outweigh that of buying
" The Soviet oil production drop would hit Moscow's East
European allies especially hard. All but Romania are overwhelm-
ingly dependent on Soviet supplies. Politically, the Soviets could not
allow their allies' economies to collapse and would have to keep
providing some oil.
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Table 5
Soviet Purchases of
Middle Eastern Crude Oil, 1980-85 a
Thousand bid
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Libya
34
34
119
118
125
96
Iraq
36
0
2
46
77
65
Algeria
0
0
0
0
15
29
Saudi
Arabia b
0
0
0
21
38
48
Iran
0
45
18
44
25
15
Syria
5
6
14
15
10
9
Oman
0
0
0
0
1
2
Total
75
85
153
244
291
264
Derived from official Soviet trade statistics.
b Saudi Arabia sells crude to the USSR on behalf of Iraq.
the oil. Such a move would be a military-strategic
gain, but it could not be justified nor prompted by
economic need
Impact of Trends in Overall US-Soviet Relations
We believe the USSR will continue to pursue its
longstanding strategic interests in the Middle East
regardless of the state of US-Soviet relations. The
central position the US-Soviet rivalry holds in
Moscow's policy toward the Middle East, however,
means that improvement or deterioration of the over-
all relationship between Moscow and Washington can
have major consequences for that policy.
Improvement
A revival of US-Soviet detente will not necessarily
prompt the Kremlin to moderate its behavior in the
Middle East because Moscow highly values potential
gains in the region for their own sake and sees them as
furthering its position in the superpower competition
with Washington. Detente did not prevent the Soviets
during the October 1973 war from mounting a mas-
sive arms resupply effort for their Arab allies and
threatening to intervene unilaterally in the closing
moments.
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The most direct impact a US-Soviet detente is likely
to have on Moscow's policy in the Middle East is in
prompting the Soviets to intensify their efforts to be
included in regional negotiations. The USSR almost
certainly would center its efforts on convincing the
United States to return to a joint US-Soviet initiative
to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, preferably an
international conference chaired by Washington and
Moscow. To obtain US approval for such a course, the
Soviets?under these conditions?might be willing to
reestablish relations with Israel and attempt to con-
vince Syria and the PLO to attend such a conference.
In an atmosphere of detente, the Soviets might give
greater consideration to the impact their arms sales
could have on regional stability. The USSR refrained
from giving the Egyptians all they wanted in the early
1970s and might do so again with its current regional
arms clients if it believed that the sale of a particular
weapons system risked sparking an Arab-Israeli clash
that could damage US-Soviet relations and if it
believed Washington would act with similar restraint.
The Soviets probably would be less worried about US-
Soviet tensions over the Middle East than about the
effect this might have on other, more important, areas
of the bilateral relationship. They would want to
avoid, for instance, a repeat of the effect their inva-
sion of Afghanistan in 1979 had on East-West rela-
tions. It tilted the balance in Congress against ratifi-
cation of the SALT II Treaty and steeled NATO's
determination to proceed with the deployment of
intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.
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Moscow also would be likely to refloat a host of
proposals designed to limit superpower arms sales and
military deployments in the region?such as the
Brezhnev Proposal of 1980 banning military bases in
the Persian Gulf region, the plan to limit naval
deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian
Ocean, and schemes for nuclear- and chemical-weap-
ons-free zones. Of course, Moscow would design such
proposals to have only minimal restrictions on its own
military activities, but it might agree to some limita-
tions if an overall agreement hindered US ability to
deploy military power in the Middle East.
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Deterioration
Soviet behavior in the Middle East since the decline of
detente in the mid-1970s?including the invasion of
Afghanistan, deployment of Soviet air defense forces
to Syria, sale of increasingly more lethal arms to
regional clients, and constant fanning of anti-US and
anti-Israeli sentiment among Middle Eastern states?
gives an indication of the types of actions Moscow
could take if US-Soviet relations deteriorate further.
The Soviets, for example, might press harder for
Syria, Libya, and South Yemen to grant permanent
naval and air bases to Soviet forces. They also might
provide those countries and other regional clients with
the latest and longest range versions of Soviet weap-
ons complete with all of the most sophisticated elec-
tronics they often withhold. In addition, they could
urge OPEC states to embargo oil sales to the West
and step up aid to insurgents and opposition groups in
pro-US countries.
Soviet behavior would still be constrained by objective
factors, such as the risks of a major Arab-Israeli war,
Israel's military superiority, and US advantages over
the USSR in deploying forces to most of the region. In
a period of deteriorating US-Soviet relations,
however, Moscow almost certainly would be more apt
to exploit rather than work to control regional crises.
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Appendix A
Overview of Soviet Involvement
in the Middle East Before 1970
When the history of Soviet and US involvement in the
Middle East is compared, it is easy to see why the
Soviets often view the Americans as upstarts. The
United States has been directly involved in the Mid-
dle East for roughly half a century; the USSR and its
Russian predecessors for more than a millenium. The
first "Russian" involvement in the area occurred in
860, when a Kievan Rus army briefly laid seige to
Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire,
which encompassed much of what is today the Middle
East. "Russia" and "Turkey" battled each other
many more times over the centuries. From 1676 to
1914, alone, the Russian and Ottoman Empires
fought 11 wars. During the same period, the Tsars
also fought three wars with Iran.
Beginning in the late 18th century, with the decline of
both the Ottoman and Persian realms, Great Britain
became Russia's main rival for influence in the
Middle East. The Russians and the British, in seeking
to expand and protect their empires, vied for predomi-
nant influence in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Ottoman
Empire, which held nominal sway over the Levant,
North Africa, and the western rim of the Arabian
peninsula. The growing power of Germany in both
Europe and the Middle East prompted Russia and
Britain to cooperate in the region during the last
decade of Tsarist rule, but the traditional rivalry
reemerged after the Bolsheviks took power in 1917.
Despite the Bolsheviks' revolutionary rhetoric about
igniting the colonial East against its "imperialist
oppressors," the USSR under Lenin and Stalin exert-
ed influence only in the northern tier borderlands.
Khrushchev claims in his memoirs that Stalin consid-
ered the Arab world a British sphere of influence.
Stalin believed that the USSR was too weak militarily
in the region to challenge British hegemony, and
indeed it was.
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World War II, however, created new opportunities.
As the captured German documents from Nazi-Soviet
negotiations of November 1940 indicate, Moscow
hoped to supplant Great Britain as the predominant
power in the Middle East. At the war's end, Stalin
used the Soviet Army's occupation of northern Iran to
establish "people's republics" in the Kurdish and
Azeri regions. He also attempted through direct
threats to obtain from Turkey a military base on the
Straits and the return to the Soviet Union of two
provinces in eastern Turkey that the Bolsheviks had
ceded in 1921. Strong resistance by the Iranian and
Turkish Governments and by the United States and
Britain foiled each attempt and prompted Stalin to
return to a conservative strategy in the region.
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The most significant legacy of World War II for the
Middle East was the weakening of the main colonial
powers of the region, Britain and France. This devel-
opment eventually led to the emergence of indepen-
dent and strongly nationalistic regimes in the Arab
world that distrusted the West and were willing to
cooperate with the USSR.
1955-67
The Soviets were not ready to take advantage of this
opening until 1955. By then Stalin and his ideological
aversion to dealing with local nationalists in the Third
World were gone, and a confluence of interest had
emerged among the USSR, Egypt, and Syria aimed
at undermining the alliance system the United States
and Britain were establishing in the region?the
Baghdad Pact. Egypt's Nasser opposed the pact be-
cause he saw it aimed at splitting the Arabs and
isolating his regime. The Soviets opposed it as another
link in the Western alliance system along their bor-
ders and as an impediment to the expansion of their
influence in the Arab world. Khrushchev was prag-
matic enough to recognize the opportunity and devise
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