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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000300340001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Ties to Soviet Industry
East European
Microelectronics:
Internal Development and
(~WMJK
PACE NUMBERS
-o3d'7-
CJ
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES
DISSEM DATE
EXTRA COPIES
R000RD CEIVER
JOB NUMBER ~a15
Seeret
SOV 86-10035X
IA 86-10044X
August 1986
Copy 4 3 9
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ties to Soviet Industry
East European
Microelectronics:
Internal Development and
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Sov
et Analysis, and
Office of Imagery Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Defense Industries Division, SOVAI
Secret
SOV 86-10035X
IA 86-10044X
August 1986
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East European
Microelectronics:
Internal Development and
Ties to Soviet Industry F_
Key Judgments The East European countries of the Council for Mutual Economic
Information available Assistance (CEMA) are trying to build up their microelectronics industries
as of 1 June 1986 rapidly-particularly integrated circuit (IC) development and production.
was used in this report.
The buildup is designed to serve fast-growing East European requirements
for microelectronics components but is also a response to considerable
Soviet pressure.
The Soviet Union's ambitious industrial modernization program, which
calls for the extensive use of computers and microelectronics systems to
improve industrial productivity, is creating heavy demands for more and
better ICs. The military focus of the Soviet microelectronics industry has
made it difficult for Soviet IC producers to ensure adequate deliveries for
commercial and industrial applications. The Soviets have therefore increas-
ingly turned to Eastern Europe to help satisfy the growing demand for ICs
and, especially, products incorporating ICs, to meet the goals of industrial
modernization.
To enhance the Bloc's efforts to acquire, develop, and produce advanced
microelectronic devices, the USSR and its East European allies have set up
an elaborate division of labor within CEMA. The development of coopera-
tive efforts in the microelectronics field has largely been driven by the .
various CEMA-level computer production programs that originated in the
late 1960s. Integration has improved the technical capabilities of the Bloc
members, reduced the duplication of effort in IC development, and
increased the level of circuit standardization. Increased Bloc cooperation
has also allowed the Soviets to better manage the legal and illegal
acquisition of Western ICs and production equipment at a time of hard
currency shortages and tightening Western export controls. The Soviets
now are pushing their East European allies to embark on an ambitious
cooperative program, known as the Comprehensive Program for Scientific
and Technical Progress to the Year 2000, to upgrade Bloc production
capabilities in microelectronics and several other key technology areas.
The East European countries began intensive development of their IC
industries only in the late 1970s, nearly 15 years after the Soviets initiated
their expansion effort. Eastern Europe's microelectronics industry is small
by Soviet, US, or Japanese standards. We have identified and located 22
major East European IC production plants, encompassing more than
220,000 square meters of production floorspace. By comparison, the United
Secret
SOV 86-10035X
IA 86-10044X
August 1986
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States, Japan, and the Soviet Union have about 200, 100, and 75 plants, re-
spectively. East European IC plants have been equipped largely with
Western technology, and almost all major ICs known to be produced by
them are based on US designs.
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia have the
most advanced industries in the region. The GDR has accounted for over
one-third of production facility growth in Eastern Europe since 1977. It has
recently constructed a new plant in Erfurt that incorporates highly
advanced vibration control and air purification systems that could allow
efficient production of the most complex devices produced in the Bloc.
Czechoslovakia also has added production buildings to all of its major IC
plants since 1980. It recently has stepped up efforts to acquire Western
technology, probably to replace equipment destroyed in a fire at its leading
IC plant in August 1985.
The rest of the Bloc is struggling to maintain a viable microelectronics base
and has only recently started to increase investment supporting domestic
production programs. Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria have all purchased
new IC production lines or constructed new production facilities since the
early 1980s. Progress in Hungary, however, has been seriously set back by
a fire in May 1986 at its main IC plant that destroyed an estimated 50 per-
cent of the country's IC production capacity. Romania has failed to keep
pace with the rest of the region and has the smallest and most technologi-
cally inferior IC industry in Eastern Europe. Romania has also been set
back by a fire in May 1984 at its most advanced IC plant and has little
hope of expanding its microelectronics base in the near term.
Because of its late start and the relatively low levels of investment, Eastern
Europe's IC technology and production capabilities lag behind those of the
United States and Japan by at least six to eight years and Soviet
capabilities by one to two years. We use as an East European benchmark
the capabilities of the region's most advanced industry-the GDR's-and
measure progress in two key device types, memory circuits and micro-
processors. Czechoslovakia lags the GDR by about two to three years, and
the other East European countries are five to 10 years behind the GDR.
We estimate that the East European countries. produced an estimated 180
million ICs in 1984, compared with nearly 1 billion in the USSR and 10.5
billion in the United States. East European users of ICs rely on large
numbers of Soviet and Western ICs to augment domestic production. We
estimate that during the early and middle 1980s the Soviets and East
Europeans obtained, both legally and illegally, at least 100 million ICs
annually from the West
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Secret
The East European IC industry supports the Soviet Union mainly through
the export of finished products, such as computers and automation
equipment, that contain both Western and domestically produced circuits.
Most East European products go to Soviet scientific and industrial users,
but the GDR and Czechoslovakia also provide the Soviets with ICs and
computer equipment that potentially have .direct military applications. The
East Europeans also participate in Soviet-managed clandestine acquisition
and trade diversion programs that provide the Bloc with large amounts of
sophisticated Western microelectronics technology.
The East European countries do not ship large numbers of ICs to the
USSR. We believe only the GDR and Czechoslovakia are exporting ICs
directly, and the quantities involved probably constitute no more than 2 to
3 percent of total Soviet consumption. Although data on shipments are
sparse, the overall volume of ICs exported to the Soviets is probably less
than 10 percent of total East European output, and these exports are
almost certainly more than offset by imports of ICs from the USSR.
Although official statements and investment patterns indicate that East
European IC industries will continue to grow, we do not believe their
production will be sufficient to fulfill the rapidly growing requirements of
IC consumers for at least the next 10 years. Thus, while the goal of
reducing imports of Western ICs and IC equipment is still part of the
CEMA development program, these imports are likely to rise, at least over
the next five years or so, as the East European nations struggle to raise the
quality and increase the quantity of their IC production. Stricter adherence
to regulations of the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy
by the Western allies could limit Eastern Europe's access to this equip-
ment, however. Limiting the availability of advanced Western technology
may force the countries increasingly to use Soviet equipment and know-
how and to improve their own development and production technology to
keep up with increasing domestic and Soviet demands.
We believe that East Germany will pull further ahead of the other East
European countries in the development and production of ICs and may
even challenge the USSR in some technology areas. Czechoslovakia will
have to pour valuable resources into rebuilding and outfitting its recently
damaged IC plant, which will hamper its efforts to upgrade production
capabilities. Poland's hard currency shortages make it unlikely that it will
substantially modernize its IC industry during this decade. The Bulgarians
have had trouble assimilating heavy infusions of Soviet and Western
technology over the past five years, and we do not foresee a significant in-
crease in their capabilities until at least 1990. We believe that Hungary
and Romania do not have the resources necessary to substantially upgrade
IC production levels during this decade. 25X1
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Although we expect CEMA cooperation in the microelectronics field to
intensify, we do not believe that these efforts will be enough to enable the
East European CEMA countries to close the gap with the West in the
development of ICs. At best, CEMA cooperation will serve to keep the gap
from getting wider, and we believe that these countries will remain heavily
dependent on Western ICs and production technology until at least the
early 1990s.
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Key Judgments
Background
Managing CEMA Development
Furthering Industrial Integration
4
Controlling Dependence on the West
7
East European IC Industries
8
Expanding Production Capacity
8
Equipping Facilities
11
Production of Integrated Circuits
13
Reliance on Western ICs
17
Relations With the Soviets
17
Eastern Europe as a Conduit for Western IC Technology
19
Products Incorporating East European ICs
20
Integrated Circuits
21
Implications and Outlook
22
Plant Data on East European IC Producers
25
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East European
Microelectronics:
Internal Development and
Ties to Soviet Industry [_
In the late 1970s the East European countries of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)'
stepped up efforts to develop their microelectronics
industries. They have particularly stressed the devel-
opment and production of integrated circuits (ICs),
the key element of microelectronics technology and a
fundamental determinant of success in industrial and
military modernization (see insets).
East European efforts are a response to growing
domestic demands and to considerable pressure from
the Soviets to modernize and expand the computer
and microelectronics industries and provide greater
support to Soviet industry. Despite impressive pro-
gress in IC development and production over the past
two decades, the Soviets have experienced difficulties
producing advanced semiconductor devices at levels
commensurate with the investment in industrial ca-
pacity or with Western production (see inset, page 3).'
One of the main factors contributing to the relatively
low output of ICs is the fact that Soviet yield' rates
have been consistently low by Western standards.
Low yield rates are primarily caused by:
? Outdated and inefficient IC production and test
equipment.
? Inadequate environmental control systems and poor
quality control procedures.
? Low-quality raw materials, including silicon, deion-
ized water, photoresists, and industrial chemicals
and gases.
? Backward management practices, including a lack
of flexibility and coordination, extraordinary com-
partmentalization of information, and overemphasis
on production quotas at the cost of quality.
' Yield is a measure of the efficiency of the chip production process
that shows the percentage of devices completed in working order.
Integrated Circuits
Integrated circuits are semiconductor devices that
combine many electronic components such as transis-
tors, diodes, capacitors, and resistors on a single chip.
Many ICs are fabricated on thin wafers of semicon-
ductor material, usually silicon, and they are subse-
quently separated and packaged individually. The
wafers are processed in clean rooms-specially de-
signed sections of microelectronics production facili-
ties that have temperature, humidity, and dust con-
trol systems. As ICs become more complex, stringent
clean-room environmental control, as well as vibra-
tion control, becomes vital to achieving efficient
production.
ICs can be defined by their relative levels of integra-
tion, that is, the number of circuit functions incorpo-
rated in the chip. The level of integration is usually
defined by the number of transistors per chip. Tran-
sistors are semiconductor devices that act primarily
as electrical switches. The levels of integrated circuit
complexity (Western lexicon) are shown in the follow-
ing tabulation:
Category
Transistors
Per Chip
Representative
Device Types
Small-scale
integration (SSI)
Less than 1,000
256-bit memory
Medium-scale
integration (MSI)
1,000-9,999
1 K a memory
Large-scale
integration (LSI)
10,000-99,999
4K and 16K memories;
8-bit microprocessor
Very-large-scale
integration
(VLSI)
100,000 or more
64K, 256K, and
1-megabit memories;
32-bit microprocessor
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The Impact of Microelectronics: Applications of
Integrated Circuits
Soviet and East European statements and articles
suggest that rapid US and Japanese advances in IC
technology are causing increasing concern about the
Bloc's ability to compete in the military arena and to
implement industrial modernization efforts.
Integrated circuits (especially microprocessors) are
the critical components in modern factory automa-
tion systems-consisting of robots, computer numeri-
cally controlled (CNC) machine tools, minicomput-
ers, and microcomputers-that are helping to fuel
economic growth in the West. In the Soviet Union, the
widespread introduction of automated management
and process control systems into industrial plants has
been given a high priority in the 12th Five-Year Plan
(1986-90) and is the primary goal of the program for
the development, production, and use of computer
technology up to the year 2000, endorsed by the
Politburo in January 1985. In Eastern Europe, indus-
trial modernization has also been accorded a high
priority as part of plans to increase industrial effi-
ciency and output and make more efficient use of raw
Developments in microelectronics also have improved
the performance of military systems since the late
1970s. Advanced military systems in the West incor-
porate a wide range of complex microelectronics or
As a result, IC shortages appear to persist throughout
the Soviet Bloc. Some much needed advanced IC
types are manufactured only on a pilot basis at best,
and a large share of annual Soviet IC output (perhaps
as much as one-half) does not meet design require-
ments or quality standards. Complaints from low-
priority Soviet users as well as from Eastern Bloc
countries indicate that the Soviets still have not been
able to satisfy the demands within CEMA for even
the most basic circuits.
This paper analyzes the growing capabilities of the
East European CEMA countries to produce IC de-
vices and their attempts to meet Soviet requirements
optoelectronic devices that are often based in large
part on integrated circuits. The increasing sophistica-
tion of these devices has made possible a variety of
systems, including aerospace automated controls,
missile guidance and delivery systems, fire control
computers, "smart" munitions, and satellite naviga-
tion systems. In the area of land arms fire control
systems, for example, increased use in the West of
digital computer technology based on increasingly
complex integrated circuits has led to a dramatic
reduction in computer size, weight, and power con-
sumption; the ability to operate under adverse condi-
tions; and reduced repair time through the use of
built-in test equipment.
In a May 1984 interview in Krasnaya zvezda, Mar-
shal Nikolay Ogarkov, then Chief of the Soviet
General Staff, acknowledged the leap in the range
and destructive powers of conventional weapon sys-
tems through the development of automated recon-
naissance strike complexes, high-accuracy terminally
guided combat systems, and electronic control sys-
tems. In the strategic arena, countering or emulating
the US Strategic Defense Initiative will impose large
demands on Soviet advanced sensor and computer
technologies-both of which depend on complex IC
for ICs and associated products. It examines the
political and managerial framework established in
CEMA to further integration and specialization in
Soviet Bloc microelectronics production. It then ex-
amines the development of East European integrated
circuit producers, the specific contributions of these
producers to Soviet users, and how these contributions
are changing over time. The appendix describes, in
tabular form, all identified East European microelec-
tronics plants.
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Soviet Microelectronics: Playing Catch Up
The Soviet microelectronics industry has expanded
rapidly over the past two decades in both technologi-
cal and production capabilities. The Soviets began a
large-scale construction program in the early 1960s
to establish a viable and more unified microelectron-
ics industry. The keystone in this expansion effort
was the construction of a large microelectronics
center in Zelenograd, approximately 40 kilometers
northwest of Moscow. The Soviets refer to Zeleno-
grad as their version of the US Silicon Valley. This
center was established to help close the gap in
microelectronics technology between the USSR and
the United States; to coordinate development, plan-
ning, and training for the Ministry of Electronics
Industry; and to boost the production of advanced
semiconductor devices to satisfy military objectives.
Throughout the 1960s, Soviet efforts to produce
microelectronics devices were hampered by inade-
quate manufacturing facilities and shortages of reli-
able production equipment. Obtaining Western preci-
sion machinery and IC production technology in the
1960s enabled the Soviets, in the early 1970s, to
achieve series production of their first successful
family of IC devices, the Logika-2. The Soviets have
continued to make the acquisition of foreign technol-
ogy an integral element of their microelectronics
program, and they have benefited substantially by
examining and often copying advanced Western
technologies.
The Soviets have about 3 million square meters of
productionfoorspace at the 74 microelectronics
plants identified through imagery. If these ICfacili-
ties were fully equipped with Western production
equipment operated at Western standards, we believe
that the USSR could process up to 40 million wafers
annually for discrete semiconductor devices and ICs.
Actual Soviet wafer processing capability probably is
substantially lower.
Although Soviet IC production capacity has grown
steadily,foorspace growth rates in the mid-I 980s
had declined to about 10 percent of the peak rates
attained in the late 1960s. According to recent policy
statements, the Soviets are now concentrating on
equipping existing facilities with more advanced pro-
duction equipment instead of constructing additional
plants. They may have difficulty implementing this
shift in the near term, however, because of deficien-
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Managing CEMA Development
The Soviets are seeking to develop viable and compet-
itive microelectronics industries throughout CEMA
by emphasizing specialization and maximizing stan-
dardization. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
East European countries developed their microelec-
tronics industries using independent development
strategies-most of them involving heavy flows of
Western technology-which resulted in a significant
duplication of effort and the production of incompati-
ble products. Specialization was advertised as a way
to enable CEMA countries to expand their markets
and realize the efficiencies of larger production runs,
which result in lower costs and higher quality in IC
production.
Increasing Bloc integration affords additional benefits
for Moscow. It fosters greater political and economic
interdependency among the CEMA countries, with
the eventual goal of lessening the reliance on Western
technology. The Soviets also are able to shift some of
the IC research, development, and production burden
to their East European allies, increasing supplies and
allowing Moscow to concentrate on more advanced IC
programs. In addition, greater electronics standard-
ization may increase the combat effectiveness of the
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Furthering Industrial Integration
The development of cooperative efforts in the micro-
electronics field has largely been driven by the various
CEMA-level computer development programs that
originated in the late 1960s. To produce a compatible
family of mainframe computers it was necessary to
standardize the component base throughout the par-
ticipating countries. Thus, CEMA's cooperation in
the production of computer equipment opened the
door to the creation of a unified microelectronic
element base.
Although the Permanent Commission for the Radio
and Electronics Industry has been a part of CEMA
since 1963, Bloc microelectronics cooperation did not
begin in earnest until the 1970s. The foundation was
laid in December 1969 when Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR
signed an agreement of cooperation in the develop-
ment of a family of compatible mainframe computers.
The program outlined and approved by the partici-
pants foresaw the creation of several computer types.
Although differentiated by such characteristics as
productivity, memory capacity, and range of peripher-
als, these computers have in common a unified base of
fundamental elements, from peripheral units to inte-
grated circuits, that constitute the building blocks of
The agreement boosted the production of computers
and, consequently, the demand for integrated circuits
in the Bloc. According to Soviet production figures,
from 1970 to 1980 the volume of output of the
computer industry in CEMA as a whole rose more
than 600 percent. The early models, which did not
even use semiconductor memory, were probably
equipped predominantly with Soviet and some West-
ern chips for logic and input and output functions. By
the end of the 1970s, when production of CEMA's
minicomputer line started and the second generation
models of the Ryad family began to appear, the East
European countries were importing a wide variety of
Western devices (most of them illegally) for incorpora-
tion in their computer systems and other products.
Eastern Europe has subsequently made a concerted
effort to increase domestic production capabilities for
these ICs to meet the growing demands of its domes-
tic users and reduce its reliance on imports.
All CEMA cooperative computer efforts are coordi-
nated by the Intergovernmental Commission for Co-
operation in the Field of Computer Technology, estab-
lished in 1969. This body, which is always chaired by
a Soviet, includes a separate council on the microelec-
tronics element base (see figure 1). The council coordi-
nates the development and production of microelec-
tronic devices for all data-processing equipment and
serves as a forum for the member countries to discuss
such issues as improving the quality and reliability of
integrated circuits and developing the division of labor
for circuit production among the Bloc nations.
The first of the major accords that applied directly to
CEMA microelectronics integration came in 1975,
when Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary,
Poland, Yugoslavia,' and the USSR signed an agree-
ment covering specialization in semiconductor instru-
ments and 10 types of ICs. The agreement called for
the signatories to exchange over 10 million ICs be-
tween 1975 and 1980 as part of various reciprocal
trade agreements to be worked out among the partici-
pating countries. A follow-on accord known as the
Agreement on a Common, Standardized Base of
Components for Radioelectronics, Communications,
and Computer Hardware was signed at the 35th
CEMA Council session held in Sofia in 1981. It called
for a unified system of standardized parts, special
equipment, semiconductors, and special materials for
their production. An accord on microprocessors was
also signed at this time, possibly as part of the above
agreement. In line with the general agreement, spe-
cialists from the five original CEMA signatories
began to develop a more standardized base of compo-
nents including, among other products, radioelec-
tronic and communications equipment and computer
At the 36th CEMA Council session, held in June
1982, the CEMA nations signed an agreement on
multilateral specialization and cooperation in the
development and production of microelectronic com-
ponents (including microprocessors) and pure materi-
als for microelectronics. According to a Soviet journal
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Figure 1
The Intergovernmental Commission for Computer Technology
Permanent Chairman
Coordinating Center
Leaders of National Sections Economic Council
Council of Head Designers of ES (Mainframe) Computers
Bulgaria Council of Head Designers of SM (Mini) Computers
Hungary Temporary Working Group on Production Equipment
GDR and Test Apparatus
Cuba Council on Microelectronics Element Base
Poland Council on Computer Applications
Romania Council on Integrated Servicing of ES Computers
USSR Council on Standardization of Computer Hardware
Czechoslovakia
article, the goal of the accord is to achieve the "widest
possible fulfillment of demands for microelectronics
devices of the member countries through the deepen-
ing of the international socialist division of labor."
Some of the specific areas of concentration outlined in
the agreement include:
? Computer-aided design (CAD): Bulgaria and the
USSR.
? Instrumentation and test methods: Hungary.
? Precision optomechanics: GDR.
? Semiconductor material processing equipment:
Romania.
? Large-scale and very-large-scale integrated circuit
(LSI and VLSI) production equipment: USSR.
? Analysis, inspection, and metrology facilities:
Czechoslovakia and the GDR.
The signatories also agreed to adopt or develop stan-
dardized processes and equipment to produce semi-
conductor substrates; design, produce, and test LSI
and VLSI circuits, including 16- and 32-bit micro-
processors and very-high-speed ICs (VHSIC); and
mount ICs in various types of packages. The USSR
and the GDR have been relatively successful in
developing equipment related to their areas of special-
ization, but other programs are still in their formative
stages.
Finally, in December 1985, the Soviet Politburo
adopted-and the CEMA Executive Committee en-
dorsed-an ambitious program for science and tech-
nology cooperation, known as the Comprehensive
Program for Scientific-Technical Progress to the Year
2000, that calls for a restructuring of CEMA
scientific-technical (S&T) and production ties. Under
this program, according to Soviet Prime Minister
Ryzhkov, new Soviet interbranch S&T complexes will
orchestrate work on CEMA projects in priority areas
and will be authorized to conclude contracts directly
with counterpart East European organizations. Mi-
croelectronics has already been identified as one of
the five priority areas for CEMA cooperative efforts,
although the exact structure for any projects under
this new program remains to be publicized. The East
Europeans' official response to this program has been
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the part of the East Europeans-primarily because of
funding concerns. It is also possible that many East
European countries are worried that this program is
aimed primarily at speeding up Soviet modernization
efforts and will not benefit their own economic situa-
tions in the near term.
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The CEMA countries are increasingly entering into
bilateral cooperative development and trade accords
based on reciprocal agreements for specialized pro-
duction of IC products. Moscow has negotiated agree-
ments with each of its East European CEMA allies to
formalize joint development projects and IC ship-
ments.
the GDR and the Soviet Union cooperated on a
project to develop the 64K dynamic random access
memory (DRAM) circuit in the belief that parallel
efforts in both countries would speed up the design
process. These countries now have a similar agree-
ment for cooperation in the development of a 256K
DRAM. Within Eastern Europe, East Germany has
agreed to supply bipolar ICs to Czechoslovakia in
return for power transistors. Similarly, the GDR has
an agreement to supply semiconductor wafers and
chemicals to Bulgaria in exchange for memory chips.
Most of the CEMA countries have formed intergov-
ernmental commissions with their major trading part-
ners to manage CEMA-level bilateral cooperation
efforts. For example, according to a recent Polish
journal article, in late 1985 the joint Polish-
Czechoslovak intergovernmental commission signed
an agreement on future cooperation and coproduction
in several electronics fields (see inset).
There have been numerous reports in the East Euro-
pean and Soviet press on various bilateral and multi-
lateral cooperative agreements on microelectronics
development and trade within CEMA. These accords
have included specialization in both the development
of production equipment and the joint production of
devices, but information on the actual impact of these
efforts is hard to come by. In general, these agree-
ments provide the East European countries with
access to the large Soviet market for electronics,
thereby making the development of indigenous IC
technology more economically attractive to these na-
tions. The cooperative efforts also served to focus IC
development in CEMA, thus reducing duplication of
effort and saving time and resources.
In practice, however, cooperative efforts have not
always gone as planned. For example,
the East Germans and Soviets agreed
Growing Polish-Czechoslovak Cooperation
in Electronics
In October 1985, Poland and Czechoslovakia signed
an agreement on future cooperation and coproduction
in the following electronics fields:
? The Kasprzak Radio Factories in Warsaw, which
produce a variety of electronic devices, together
with Tesla in Bratislava, will jointly develop and
produce compact disks and VHS format video cas-
sette recorders. Kasprzak will produce the drive
mechanisms for the recorders, and Tesla will man-
ufacture the electronic subassemblies.
? The Scientific Production Center for Unitra-Cemi
Semiconductors in Warsaw is entering into a joint
production agreement with Czechoslovakia. This
agreement calls for the joint development of 64K
memory chips and a new family of microprocessors.
It also envisions the future development of a 32-bit
microprocessor chip.
? A Polish-Czechoslovak design team, based at the
Mera-Elwro Plant in Wrocfaw and at VUMs in
Prague, will set up a division of labor for the
production of specific types of 64K DRAM and 64K
erasable programmable read-only memory
(EPROM) circuits. The team also will be responsi-
ble for preparing the documentation for the avail-
able equipment for production of Winchester-type
and optical disk drives.
to establish parallel programs to develop a 64K
DRAM circuit, but all cooperation ended as soon as
the Soviets achieved a successful design. In addition,
the agreement to build a 256K DRAM calls for the
GDR to develop a more difficult architecture, even
though the Soviets have better computer-aided design
equipment. the Soviets have
refused to supply the East Germans with their most
advanced CAD system, which is based on a Digital
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Equipment Corporation VAX minicomputer. Cooper-
ation is also hindered by the wide differences in IC
production capabilities among the individual East
The Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls
European countries.
the less developed Bloc members have had
difficulty fulfilling the requirements of reciprocal
trade agreements because of their inability to supply
quality components. The Soviets have also had diffi-
culty keeping East European partners supplied with
certain IC devices.
Bulgaria, in 1983, started producing a
copy of the Motorola 6800 8-bit microprocessor be-
cause it was not receiving microprocessors in the
quantities promised by the Soviets.
Controlling Dependence on the West
One of the primary reasons for the push within
CEMA to develop an indigenous microelectronics
capability is the desire to lessen the Bloc's dependence
on the West for ICs and production equipment. The
Western embargo on high-technology equipment
makes it difficult for East European countries to
acquire Western technology, and economic problems
within CEMA are causing severe shortages of hard
currency for the acquisition of Western goods. For
example, Poland
in 1982 established the Coordination Commission for
National Electronics R&D in "direct response to the
embargo" (which was extended to include Poland
after martial law was declared there in December
1981). The goal of the commission was to establish a
national microelectronics industry "independent from
Western countries," with sole reliance on nationally
available raw materials, production facilities, and
electronics know-how. Although the commission
stressed self-reliance, it quickly became apparent that
Western electronics technology, especially production
equipment, would be needed. Poland has acquired this
equipment and technology from the West illegally,
The CEMA integration program has served to better
manage-rather than lessen-Bloc reliance on West-
ern technology. Specialization, by eliminating dupli-
cation of legal imports, probably has enabled some
The United States and its Western allies formed the
Coordinating Committee (COCOM) in the late 1940s
to control the export to the Soviet Bloc and China of
technology having military applications. Discussions
concerning goods that were not to be exported to the
Bloc led to the establishment of multilateral lists.
These lists (periodically reviewed and revised) serve
to guide member governments in the execution of
their national export control policies. COCOM is
currently composed of the United States, the United
Kingdom, Turkey, Portugal, Norway, the Nether-
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lands, Luxembourg, Japan, Italy, Greece, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Canada,
Spain, and Belgium. Over the past 15 years, the Bloc
countries have successfully circumvented COCOM
controls to obtain large numbers of ICs and produc-
tion equipment and related technology to help estab-
lish their microelectronics industries. The United 25X1
States convinced its allies to impose an embargo on
high-technology equipment after the Soviets invaded 25X1
Afghanistan in December 1979. The Bloc has since
found it increasingly complicated and expensive to
acquire microelectronics technology.
Nearly half of all detected trade diversions
involve microelectronics fabrication equipment and
computers. East European participation in these tech-
nology acquisition programs has increased in recent
years because of rapidly broadening collection oppor-
tunities afforded by the worldwide diffusion of ad-
vanced products and technology.
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East European IC Industries
The East European microelectronics industry includes
at least 64 integrated circuit R&D and production
facilities, about 70 percent of which are concentrated
in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
eve have identified and located 22 major IC
production plants (see appendix and figure 2). By
contrast, we have identified 74 IC production plants
in the USSR, and there are about 200 in the United
States and 100 in Japan.
The East European IC industries have been built
largely through the use of Western technology, and
almost all major ICs produced by them are based on
US designs. This strategy has allowed the East Euro-
pean countries to develop an indigenous production
capability more quickly and cheaply than would have
been the case otherwise. As Western export controls
have grown more restrictive during the 1980s, and as
IC production equipment has become more complex
and difficult to assimilate, the CEMA countries have
started to turn also to the Soviets for assistance in
modernizing their industries.
East Germany and Czechoslovakia have the most
advanced microelectronics industries in Eastern Eu-
rope. The GDR works closely with the Soviet Union
in IC development programs, and the two countries
produce approximately the same generic IC product
lines. The Soviets, however, produce more device
types and in larger quantities. The Soviets have a
great advantage over the the East Germans in that
they have been manufacturing ICs longer, have estab-
lished a larger R&D and production base, and, in
general, have more advanced IC production equip-
ment-especially CAD systems necessary for efficient
design of complex devices.
Czechoslovakia has the second most advanced IC
industry in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia and East
Germany possess similar IC technology and produce
similar product lines, but the Czechoslovaks produce
ICs in smaller quantities-primarily because they
suffer more quality-control problems than the East
Germans and consequently have lower yield rates.
Further advances in IC technology will be limited
over the next few years by a fire that destroyed a
leading Czechoslovak R&D center in August 1985.
The rest of the Bloc is struggling to maintain a viable
microelectronics base and has only recently started to
increase investment levels in indigenous R&D and
production programs. Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria
all have purchased new IC production lines or con-
structed new production facilities in recent years.
Progress in Hungary, however, has been slowed con-
siderably by a fire in May 1986 at its main IC plant
that destroyed an estimated 50 percent of the coun-
try's production capacity. Romania has failed to keep
pace and has the smallest and most technologically
inferior IC industry in Eastern Europe. Romania's
progress has also been set back by a fire in May 1984
at its most sophisticated IC production plant and has
little hope of expanding its microelectronics base in
the near term.
Expanding Production Capacity
Although Eastern Europe had established a small
production capability for discrete components by the
mid-1960s, major expansion of the microelectronics
industry did not occur until the late 1970s-nearly 15
years after the Soviets initiated their expansion effort.
The East European industry was slow in developing
because it was not faced with large military, industri-
al, or commercial demands for microelectronics de-
vices in the early-to-mid-1960s, as were the Soviet
Union and Western countries. East European demand
for ICs has increased sharply in recent years, primari-
ly because of industrial modernization efforts and in
response to technical developments in-and interna-
tional marketing opportunities created by-the West.
In addition, the USSR has stepped up its demands for
ICs from Eastern Europe.
In an effort to meet growing IC demands, Eastern
Europe increased production capacity-measured in
facility floorspace-about 130 percent between 1977
and 1985. Despite these impressive expansion figures,
the East European IC industry remains small when
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Figure 2
East European Integrated Circuit Plants
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Republic of j
Bel. Germany Erfurt2) re 1'2)'
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Hermsdorf
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Federal East Bs?
(East Berlin
Yugoslavia
Union
)Buc'2'est
Wgavia
Stara
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AO-
Le United States Govetnmefiihas~not ,ocogad
flho ineororation of Eetonia,Latviaaiid Lithuania
into the Spviot Union Other bouady representation
iv not necessatily authoritative,
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Figure 3
East European IC Production Floorspace
by Country, 1986
GDR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Hungary
Bulgaria
Romania
East Germany has accounted for over one-third of the
expansion in Eastern Europe's microelectronics indus-
try since 1977. It has added production floorspace to
all existing IC plants and built branch plants in Erfurt
and Dresden. The newly constructed Erfurt Southeast
Plant is the most sophisticated in Eastern Europe. It
has been constructed with highly advanced vibration
control and air purification systems to allow efficient
production of VLSI devices. The Soviets probably do
not yet have VLSI production facilities adequate to
satisfy anticipated defense-industrial needs, and=
they have sent
several high-level delegations to tour the Erfurt
Southeast Plant to examine its layout and clean-room
design, perhaps in the hope of incorporating its unique
design into their own future buildings.
compared with the Soviet industry. As of 1986 the
Soviets had about 3 million square meters of floor-
space at known plants available for the production of
semiconductor devices, compared with the roughly
220,000 square meters available for IC production at
the 22 identified East European plants (see figure 3).
The development of Eastern Europe's integrated cir-
cuit industry also has been much different from the
USSR's. Analysis of Soviet microelectronics facilities
has revealed that the Soviets erected a series of
standardized production buildings during the 1960s
and the 1970s. The Soviets may have attempted to
incorporate improved clean-room design and vibration
control in their buildings to allow for more efficient
production of increasingly complex ICs. Eastern Eu-
rope does not follow similarly standardized construc-
tion procedures, and it chose not to copy Soviet
designs. Its IC production facilities are a mixture of
indigenous and Western designs, although the Soviets
may have aided in the design of some plants. Analysis
of East European plants revealed few similarities in
building designs either within or between countries.
Both Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have greatly in-
creased IC production floorspace in recent years. All
of Czechoslovakia's major IC plants added production
buildings in the early 1980s, both in response to
growing demands and to raise the technological level
of their products. The Bulgarians recently have begun
an expansion drive to increase IC production floor-
space dedicated to growing computer and disk drive
production efforts. The Memory Disk Plant in Stara
Zagora is being expanded and an IC production
capability is being added. The Stara Zagora facility
was externally complete in 1984, but plant contractors
have reportedly experienced difficulty with clean-
room design and equipment installations. Because of
these delays, the production startup date is uncertain.
The Bulgarian IC plant in Botevgrad also is being
expanded.
Construction of new IC fabrication facilities in East-
ern Europe peaked in the late 1970s and again in
1982 and 1983 but dropped sharply in 1980 (see
figure 4). Possible explanations for the decline
include:
? Shortages of hard currency-triggered by the high
trade deficits in many East European countries in
the late 1970s-which may have limited the acquisi-
tion of Western technology needed to outfit new
plants.
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Figure 4
East European IC Production
Floorspace Under Construction,
1975-85
Thousand square meters
? The general cutback in investment programs in
Eastern Europe that was initiated to make more
resources available for consumption and to generate
the export surpluses necessary to service the region's
large foreign debt.
Poland was particularly hard hit during this time. It
had established a strong microelectronics base during
the 1970s by purchasing a French turnkey plant and
importing a mixture of Western technology. Poland's
intensive start in microelectronics was largely offset
by its economic crisis, the subsequent collapse in
investment, and the strengthening of the Western
embargo. Poland has over one-third more IC produc-
tion floorspace than Czechoslovakia but now lags that
country in both output and technology. Since 1983,
Eastern Europe's construction effort has again de-
creased sharply, and, as of 1986, expansion is occur-
ring only at Erfurt Southeast and the Dresden ZFTM
branch plant in the GDR, and at the Hungarian MEV
plant in Budapest.
Equipping Facilities
The East Europeans have established their IC indus-
try primarily through the acquisition of Western
know-how and equipment. Although the patterns for
each country are different, an initial practice for
many was to purchase Western turnkey facilities and
licenses. Poland and Hungary established their micro-
electronics base by contracting with French and US
firms, respectively, for technology, facility design
assistance, equipment, and personnel training. Roma-
nia has always been strongly reliant on Western
technology and has licensed French, West German,
and British IC designs.
although the countries prefer Western, and
especially US, technology, they have also imported
Soviet and East German equipment-primarily be-
cause of Western trade restrictions, but also to save
hard currency and to support Bloc cooperation pro-
grams (see table 1). Continuing acquisition of Western
technology, however, indicates that the East Europe-
ans must still rely on Western know-how and equip-
ment to produce more advanced devices with greater
efficiency and in larger quantities. The USSR and
Eastern Europe have acquired at least several thou-
sand pieces of major microelectronics fabrication
equipment from the West during the last 10 years.
This equipment has been used throughout the entire
production process-from materials preparation to
the final testing apparatus needed for sophisticated
production lines.
As an example of recent activity, during the latter
half of 1985 Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria sharply
increased acquisition efforts in the West. The Czecho-
slovaks reportedly placed orders during this period for
more than $250,000 worth of wafer carriers and other
equipment. This represents a fivefold increase over
purchases of such equipment in any previous year.
The Bulgarians reportedly have also purchased record
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Table 1
Selected Technology and Equipment
Acquisitions by Eastern Europe
Plant Description
Date of
Information
Origin
VEB Halbleiterwerk Frankfurt-Oder High-purity water system.
1985
Japan
VEB Erfurt Southeast Mask aligner.
1985
United States
ZFTM, Dresden Nine wet-etch chemical acid processing systems.
1983
United States
Czechoslovakia
Tesla Piestany 16K DRAM production line.
1978-80
Japan
Tesla Piestany (probable) Four-inch wafer carriers.
1985
United States
Tesla Roznov Photolithography equipment.
1983
East Germany
United States
VUST, Prague Sentry-7 measuring and test system.
1982
United States
Bulgaria
Stara Zagora Memory Disk and IC Plant Construction of IC fabrication line. Design of air
conditioning systems and clean rooms.
1985
Japan
Design and construction of new facilities includ-
ing clean rooms. Sale of IC technology and
numerically controlled machine tools.
1984
Japan
Production line for 16K DRAM complementary
metal-oxide semiconductors.
1985
USSR
TEWA Semiconductor Factory, Warsaw Construction of IC plant. Sale of IC technology
and equipment.
1978
France
Cooperative development of VLSI production
line.
1978
USSR
CEMI Organization Attempt to obtain IC production line.
1985
Japan
Hungary
Microelectronics Enterprise, Budapest Two IC production lines-each with annual
capacity of 10 million ICs.
1982, 1984
USSR
License of IC assembly and test technology. Later
attempts to acquire production technology failed.
1977
United States
Mask-making machinery, step and repeat
cameras on order.
1980
East Germany
Diffusion furnaces, etching equipment, air condi-
tioning systems and clean rooms for metal-oxide
semiconductor IC plant.
1980
1980, 1977
Holland
United States
Austria
IPRS Baneasa License of IC production technology.
1971
China
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amounts of IC production equipment totaling
$210,000, probably to be installed in their new IC
fabrication facility in Stara Zagora. The types of
machines and the size of the orders are consistent with
the requirements of a full-scale production line.
We believe, however, that the East Europeans may
have difficulty importing the technology they need to
enhance productivity because of COCOM restrictions
and hard currency constraints. Moreover, although
the Bloc countries have been able to obtain COCOM-
controlled equipment and technology, they have had
difficulty, main-
taining and repairing Western equipment and obtain-
ing necessary spare parts. COCOM restrictions have
made acquisition of Western technology much more
expensive and difficult than in the past and have thus
limited the scope and effectiveness of East European
acquisitions.
The East Europeans may now be forced to rely
increasingly on the Soviets for the production technol-
ogy to upgrade their integrated circuit industry. Hun-
gary was almost totally dependent on Western IC
technology and equipment throughout the early years
of the industry's development but has found Western
firms reluctant to transfer production technology in
recent years. It has thus been forced to turn to the
USSR for imports of technology and equipment.
Since 1982, Hungary has purchased two production
lines from the Soviet Union-one for metal-oxide
semiconductor (MOS) ICs and another for bipolar
ICs-each with a reported annual production capaci-
ty of 10 million devices. (If these production levels are
actually reached, Hungarian IC production will in-
crease 175 percent over 1982 levels.) In 1980 Bulgaria
purchased a 4K RAM production line from the
USSR. Acquisition of Soviet equipment and technol-
ogy by East European countries will help them meet
internal and trade demands for devices but probably
will not increase their technological capability greatly.
The Soviets are unlikely to sell their most advanced
engineering instrumentation and production technol-
ogy to Eastern Europe unless they are involved in a
joint development program in which they are likely to
obtain new technology.
Figure 5
Estimated East European IC
Production, 1980-85
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250 300
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Production of Integrated Circuits
While the performance of individual countries has
been mixed, Eastern Europe as a whole has shown a
steady average annual growth rate in IC production of
about 15 percent since 1980 6 (see figure 5). Most of
the growth can be attributed to East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, whose IC output has increased on an
average annual basis by 21 and 22 percent, respective-
ly, during this period. The domination of the GDR
and Czechoslovakia in total East European produc-
tion has actually grown from 56 percent in 1980 to 70
percent in 1984 (see figure 6). Although IC production
growth is expected to remain strong for East Germany
and Czechoslovakia, we expect their share of total
East European IC output to start declining as new IC
fabrication lines in Hungary and Bulgaria come on
line.
Table 2 presents estimates of IC production for the
individual East European countries during the 1980s.
Most of these figures were taken from the statistical
6 This figure appears more impressive than it really is because the
IC industry in Eastern Europe is still in its infant stage, and total
output figures are relatively low.
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Figure 6
Shares of Total East European IC
Production by Country, 1980 and 1984
yearbooks published by the countries. Czechoslovak
IC output was estimated by using published produc-
tion growth rates to extrapolate a single data point
provided by a knowledgeable source. Bulgarian IC
output was estimated by taking published figures on
semiconductor production and attributing a percent-
age of this to IC devices (using the semiconductor-to-
IC ratio of other East European countries as a rough
guide). Romania is not included in this table because
its IC output is too inconsequential to have any
impact on total East European production.
Per capita IC production figures provide a better
understanding of the East European countries' posi-
tion relative to that of the West and the USSR in the
production of ICs. We estimate that as of 1984
Poland was producing about one IC per person;
Hungary, about two; Czechoslovakia and the USSR,
three to four; and the GDR four to five. By contrast,
per capita production in the United States and Japan
in 1984 was 45 and 57 ICs, respectively. It should be
noted, however, that these figures refer only to the
quantity of production and not to the quality or
technological level of ICs. If these factors were taken
into account, the gap would be even wider. The
leading CEMA microprocessor and memory ICs cur-
rently in full series production-the 8-bit micro-
processor and the 16K DRAM, respectively-are
based on US chips that were introduced almost 10
years ago. The United States has started full series
production of 32-bit microprocessors and a 1-megabit
DRAM, and Japan will soon begin series production
of 1-megabit DRAM chips. Thus, not only are the
United States and Japan achieving a much higher per
capita production rate, but they are also producing
chips of a higher level of technology than their East
European counterparts.
In absolute terms, Eastern Europe's output of an
estimated 181 million ICs in 1984 was far below that
of Western Europe-2.9 billion-and the United
States-10.5 billion (see figure 7). Eastern Europe's
share of world IC production has also decreased from
an estimated 1.2 percent in 1980 to 0.8 percent in
1984 (see figure 8). Thus, despite some impressive
gains in East European IC production since 1980, the
gap between the CEMA countries and the West in
overall output of integrated circuits is extremely wide
and growing wider.r
Eastern Europe's low IC production levels can be
explained by a combination of low capacity and poor
yield rates. A late start in the production of ICs and
the lack of an established electronics production base
on which to build have hampered industrial develop-
ment. In addition, the East Europeans are hindered by
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Table 2
East European IC Production by Country, 1980-85
Country
1980
1981
Hungary 9
15.6
15.6
Bulgaria b
4.0
4.1
Total c
111.0
119.0
Reported in national statistical yearbooks.
b Estimated.
c Columns may not add to totals given because of rounding.
1982 1983 1984 1985
128.0 144.0 181.0 230.0
longstanding problems at the plant level that have
contributed to low yield rates-especially for the more
advanced circuits. Primary problems include:
? Poor-quality-and often outdated-production
equipment.
? Low-quality raw materials used in wafer processing,
including electronics-grade silicon, industrial chemi-
cals and gases, and deionized water.
? Shortages of skilled labor.
Western IC industries have paid great attention to
developing precise environmental and process con-
trols-not only to increase product yield rates, but
also to ensure plant safety. Microelectronics fabrica-
tion requires the use of pressurized gases as well as
chemicals that are toxic, explosive, or both. Strict
observance of safety procedures is thus extremely
important. Inadequate safety and process control, as
well as possible building design flaws, can have
catastrophic consequences, as evidenced by the recent
fires at IC plants in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and
Hungary (see inset).
even East Germany is
suffering low yield rates on its microprocessor chips.
As of April 1984 the East German VEB Karl Marx
Plant in Erfurt was achieving a yield rate of 11 to 12
percent using 3-inch wafers for the U880 micro-
processor (a copy of the Zilog Z-80 chip, introduced in
Figure 7
IC Production by Major World
Region, 1984
Eastern Europe
USSR
Western Europe
Japan
United States
the United States in 1978). The early yield rate for 25X1
the GDR's next generation of microprocessor, the
16-bit U8000, was 2 to 3 percent for initial production 25X1
lots at the Erfurt plant.' By contrast, Western IC
' Production of the U880 using 4-inch wafers was to start at the
new plant in Erfurt Southeast in May 1984, so these yield rates
have probably dropped somewhat while technical problems involved
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Figure 8
Share of World IC Production
by Country or Region, 1980 and 1984
The Impact of Inadequate Safety Standards:
The Hungarian Industrial Accident
Percent On 26 May 1986 afire destroyed Hungary's largest
and most advanced integrated circuit producer-the
main Microelectronics Enterprise (ME V) plant in
Budapest. This plant was considered a showplace
facility, and General Secretary Gorbachev reportedly
was to visit it in June 1986. The Hungarians have
estimated total damages from the fire at $30-45
million, including the cost of two recently acquired
Soviet IC production lines. Although authorities are
still investigating the cause of the fire, we believe it
may have resulted from inadequate safety and pro-
cess control-an area in which the East European
microelectronics industries have historically been
USSR Eastern Europe
4.7 0
8
.
United States
49.2
At the time of the fire, MEV was stepping up
production on the two Soviet lines-each of which
had a rated annual capacity of 10 million ICs-and
was constructing a new production building that was
intended to produce chips of even greater sophistica-
tion. We estimate that in 1985 Hungary produced
about 23 million ICs, and we believe that output may
now drop 50 percent as a result of the fire. Hungary's
two other IC plants probably will not be able to make
up for the lost production, and the country will be
hard pressed to meet domestic demands-especially
in the computer, telecommunications, and industrial
machinery industries.
manufacturers typically cannot afford to mass-
produce a circuit unless they can achieve at least an
85-percent yield rate. At rates below this, a firm
would not be able to offer the chip at competitive
prices. Czechoslovakia has also been plagued with
quality problems in the manufacture of ICs.
the Tesla
Piestany Plant was achieving a yield rate of only 5 to
10 percent in 1982 on its copy of the US Intel 8080
microprocessor.
Within days of the fire, the Hungarians began con-
tacting officials in the USSR, East Germany, and
Czechoslovakia, as well as West European firms, to
negotiate joint ventures and equipment-leasing
schemes to replace equipment destroyed in the fire
and to obtain ICs to help meet domestic require-
ments. Nevertheless, we estimate that, even with
large-scale government support, it will take the Hun-
garians a minimum of two years to rebuild the plant,
acquire new production equipment, and gear up to
previous production levels. This accident has severely
set back Hungary's electronics development program
and will hurt its long-range economic plans to become
a major exporter of microelectronics-based equip-
ment by 1993.
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Overall, we judge that Eastern Europe's IC produc-
tion capabilities lag those of the United States and
Japan by at least six to eight years and Soviet
capabilities by one to two years. We use as an East
European benchmark the capabilities of the region's
most advanced industry-the GDR's-and we mea-
sure progress in two key device types, memory circuits
and microprocessors (see inset). Czechoslovakia lags
the GDR by two to three years, and the other East
European countries are five to 10 years behind the
GDR.
Reliance on Western ICs
The East European countries import large quantities
of ICs from the West to augment domestic produc-
tion. These imports, which we believe to be larger
than Soviet deliveries, include advanced circuits used
for reverse engineering and for direct use in domestic
computers and automation equipment, as well as large
numbers of standard logic chips (see figure 9). We
estimate that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
now obtain over 100 million ICs annually from the
West. One of the several important Western sources
for these circuits has been the Swiss firm Allimex,
which, has been offer-
ing increasing numbers of US and Japanese ICs to the
GDR since at least September 1983. Earlier ship-
ments by Allimex were relatively small, but allegedly
contained COCOM-controlled chips. In 1984 Allimex
increased the quantities and the level of sophistication
of ICs offered to the East Germans. The quantities
shipped that year totaled in the millions and included
advanced 16-bit microprocessors. The Swiss firm has
also sold hundreds of thousands of COCOM-
controlled memory circuits to the GDR, including
sophisticated 256K EPROMs, 256K DRAMs, and
64K static RAMs.
Other evidence of CEMA's increased use of Western
ICs and equipment is provided by a recent article on
the Hungarian IC industry in a British journal.
According to the article, Hungarian IC imports from
the United States, Japan, and West Germany more
than doubled (in value terms) in 1984 from the
previous year. More than 70 percent of Hungarian
semiconductor imports now come from hard currency
sources. This trend is likely to continue as Hungary
attempts to make up for lost production capacity as a
result of the fire at its leading IC plant.
Figure 9
IC Imports and Exports for
Eastern Europe
GDR and Czech
microprocessors
and logic chips
Microprocessors
and memory chips
Advanced ICs and
standard logic
chips
There is a substantial flow of microelectronic devices
from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, and the
level of support has increased significantly in recent
years. Although the total quantities involved do not
represent a large proportion of total Soviet IC con-
sumption, they fill an important niche in providing
circuits that, go pri- 25X1
marily into civilian applications. This allows the Sovi-
ets to concentrate scarce development and production
resources on higher priority IC projects-including
those for which the Soviets cannot rely upon foreign
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Comparative Levels of East German, Soviet,
and US IC Technology
Memory and microprocessor integrated circuits are
generally the trendsetters for microelectronics ad-
vances, and production technologies developed in
these fields are usually applied to other types of ICs.
Memory ICs store large volumes of information in
the form of electrical charges, while microprocessors
are ICs that provide, in one chip, functions equivalent
to those contained in the central processing unit of a
computer-arithmetic capabilities and some memo-
ry. To understand more fully the differences in
microelectronics state of the art between the United
States, the Soviet Union, and East Germany, it is
useful to compare these technologies individually.E
The 64K DRAM is the most advanced memory
device serially produced in the Soviet Bloc. Initial
production of this device began in the United States
in 1978, and full series production started in 1980.
The Soviets achieved initial production of a 64K
DRAM in 1979 and began small-scale series produc-
tion prior to 1984. The Soviets probably have suffi-
cient quantities of these chips to satisfy high priority
military requirements, but we believe that production
problems have prevented their widespread use in
civilian applications. The East Germans achieved
initial production of their version of the 64K DRAM
in 1982 and began low-volume series production at
the Erfurt Southeast Plant in 1985. Thus, the Soviet
Bloc lags the United States by two to four years in
64K DRAM production. The gap is even wider when
the higher quality and quantity of US production are
factored in, and the United States is increasing its
lead in the development of more advanced DRAM
circuits. The United States achieved series produc-
tion of the 256K DRAM in 1984 and recently started
full series production of a 1-megabit chip. Neither the
USSR nor East Germany is known to have achieved
even small-scale production of either chip, and they
will probably have to either produce or acquire more
advanced production and testing equipment and over-
come problems in quality and process control and
materials purity to master the complexity of ad-
vanced VLSI production.
The 16-bit device is the most advanced type of
microprocessor produced in volume in the Soviet
Bloc. The USSR probably achieved limited series
production of its 16-bit microprocessors by the early
1980s. These products-the K581, K586, and
K588-include indigenous and copied Western archi-
tectures. The most advanced Soviet 16-bit micro-
processor, the K1810-based on the US Intel 8086
chip-entered initial production in 1983 and may
now be in low-volume series production. The East
Germans took a different approach from the Soviets,
copying the US Zilog Z8000 16-bit microprocessor
and achieving initial production of their U8000 in
1984. As of early 1985 the East Germans were
producing pilot lots of 1,000 of these devices a month
at the Erfurt Microelectronics Plant. The US firm
Intel achieved initial production of its 16-bit 8086
microprocessor in 1977 and started full series pro-
duction in 1978. Thus, the Soviet Bloc lags the
United States in the production of 16-bit micro-
processors by six to seven years. The US lead over
the Bloc countries is even wider when the develop-
ment of more advanced microprocessor devices is
factored in. The United States achieved series pro-
duction of 32-bit microprocessors in 1985, whereas
the Soviets and East Germans are not known to have
achieved even initial production of an equivalent
device. Microprocessors are much more difficult to
design and produce than memories, and this field is
even more dependent on computer-aided design sys-
tems-an area in which we believe the USSR and
East Germany are at least 10 years behind the West.
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sources of supply. In general, East European contribu-
tions to Soviet microelectronics capabilities take three
primary forms:
? Reexport of Western ICs and IC manufacturing
equipment.
? Shipments of electronic products such as radios,
computers, computer peripherals, robots, and nu-
merically controlled machine tools that incorporate
ICs.
? Direct shipments of domestically produced integrat-
ed circuits.
The East European countries rely on the Soviet
market to sell their ICs and related products to help
offset their purchases of Soviet goods such as energy
and raw materials. Despite the increased reliance,
however, we do not believe that the Soviets have
become dependent on Eastern Europe for any critical
integrated circuit types. We have no evidence that
Eastern Europe produces any major IC type that the
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Although information in this area is insufficient to
make hard judgments, we believe that the most
significant East European contributions to Soviet
microelectronics capabilities come in the first two
categories. Although the East European countries-
struggling to build up their own industries rapidly-
use much of the technology acquired from the West
for their own development activities, we believe that
they funnel significant amounts of Western technol-
ogy directly to the Soviets for reverse engineering and
other purposes. In addition, the East Europeans incor-
porate Western ICs in their computers and other
electronics-based products to increase the quality and
reliability of these goods, many of which are shipped
to Soviet users. Thus, the Soviets benefit from these
cooperative arrangements through the increased ac-
cess to Western technology and the delivery of more
reliable East European machinery and equipment
t The East Euro Pans in turn gain from
? Export of indigenously manufactured products con-
taining Western IC technology.
? Reexport of Western ICs and IC manufacturing
technology as part of Soviet clandestine acquisition
and trade diversion programs.
East European computer equipment, machine tools,
robots, and other microelectronics-based products im-
ported by the Soviets contain varying amounts of 25X1
Western circuits and technology.
Bulgaria and Hungary still rely al-
most exclusively on Western circuits and other tech-
nology in the production of this equipment.
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greater access to Soviet markets and technology, East European foreign trade organizations are also 25X1
which allows these countries to develop their IC active in acquiring ICs and'related equipment for the
industries more rapidly than they would be able to do Soviets.
on their own.
Eastern Europe as a Conduit for
Western IC Technology
Eastern Europe is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant source of Western microelectronics technology
for the Soviets. The primary forms that these trans-
fers take include:
the Hungarian trade organization Elektromo-
dul reexports almost half of the electronic parts it
' USSR-East European joint development of Ryad mainframes and
SM minicomputers resulted from CEMA cooperative programs
begun in the early 1970s.
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acquires to the Soviet Union and other CEMA coun-
tries. Bulgaria, tried to
purchase 500 IBM PC/XT personal computers in
1985, most of which were to go to users in Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, and the USSR.
A primary purpose of the CEMA-wide efforts to
acquire Western technology has been to exploit a wide
variety of Western IC technology to determine what
designs best meet the needs and production capabili-
ties of the individual countries. The Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe have been very successful in exploit-
ing this technology to produce copies of Western
circuit designs.
=the Soviets have been pressing their allies to
standardize in key IC areas but are meeting resistance
from some East European countries that have expend-
ed significant resources in developing programs based
on alternate technologies.
Products Incorporating East European ICs
As part of CEMA's cooperative program to develop
and produce a compatible family of mainframe com-
puters and minicomputers, each East European coun-
try ships computer systems or peripheral units to the
USSR (see figure 10). According to a recent Soviet
journal article, the volume of computer trade within
CEMA rose by a factor of 32 from 1970 to 1983. This
equipment is produced using a combination of Soviet,
East European, and Western ICs. For example,0
Poland's highest quality
floppy disk drive and printer are produced exclusively
for the Soviet Union and are not available to Polish
users. In addition, approximately 90 percent of the
Polish-made Mera-60 minicomputers are shipped to
Soviet users. The Mera-60 is built with a Soviet
processor and logic chips as well as some Czechoslo-
vak ICs. However, the Poles are now using more and
more chips from the US firm Texas Instruments,
which, can often be pur-
chased at -half the price" of Soviet ICs.
According to an East German journal, 60 percent of
the total exports of the GDR's Robotron Combine go
to the USSR. These shipments have included over 450
mainframe computers since 1975. Of the 322
ES-1055 and ES-1055M mainframe computers-the
GDR's latest models-produced by the end of 1983,
Figure 10
Intra-CEMA Flow of Computer
Equipment
? Mainframe
computers (GDR)
' Magnetic tape
drives (GDR)
' Printers (Poland)
? Minicomputers
(Poland, Hungary)
? Card readers
(Czechoslovakia)
? Computer
terminals
(Hungary)
? Magnetic disk
drives (Bulgaria)
almost 90 percent were exported, mostly to the
USSR. The GDR has also started exporting personal
computers to the Soviets. According to an East Ger-
man open-source article, the first of 5,000 PCs des-
tined for the USSR was delivered in May 1986.
Czechoslovakia shipped over $750 million worth of
computer equipment to the Soviets during the period
from 1981 to 1985, including photoelectric punch
tapes and disks, card punch units, digigraphs, key-
boards, plotters, and other computer hardware.
Eastern Europe also exports to the Soviets a wide
variety of other electronic equipment that incorpo-
rates ICs. Two of the most important examples are
radio and television transmitters and digital controls
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for machine tools. As of early 1981 more than 800
radio and TV transmitters produced by Czechoslova-
kia's Tesla Hloubetin Plant were operating in the
USSR. According to a Czechoslovak trade journal,
the latest transmitters contain semiconductor devices
throughout, including ICs. As an example, the new
Tesla SRV 10 medium-wave transmitter employs the
MDA 2020 amplifier IC produced at the Tesla
? Bulgaria has a licensing agreement with Fanuc/
Fujitsu of Japan to produce CNC controllers. In
fact, Bulgaria provides full service for all Fanuc
controllers sold throughout CEMA.
Bulgaria supplies 40 percent of
CEMA's electronic controls requirements. Bulgaria
also has a license with the US firm Prab to manu-
facture robots and has developed a capability to
produce 1,000 robots annually, many of which are
Roznov Plant.
Eastern Europe has been a major exporter of machine
tools but, in the past decade, has encountered prob-
lems competing because control systems produced in
the region were viewed as below world state of the art.
In response to this problem, the East European coun-
tries have focused more attention on the design of
such systems and the need for incorporation of micro-
electronic devices. Eastern Europe still lags considera-
bly behind the West in this area, but, according to
reports in various East European journals, several
countries have developed microprocessor-based con-
trol systems in recent years, some of which have been
delivered to Soviet users:
? Poland has developed a microcomputer (the SM
50/40) that is reportedly suitable for controlling
machine tools.
? The Czechoslovak firms ZPA Kosire and Tesla
Kolin, working in conjunction with the Tesla VUST
and VUOSO Prague research institutes, have devel-
oped the NS series of CNC control systems based
on the Intel 8080A microprocessor.
? The Romanian firm ITC Cluj-Napoca is offering its
three-axis SPL-400 machine tool with a control
system based on the Intel 8080 chip.
? The East German firm VEB Numerik Karl Marx
produces the CNC 600 numerical control system,
which uses a multiprocessor structure based on the
U880 microprocessor.
? Hungary's Electronic Measuring Instrument Works
produces the Hunor line of microprocessor-based
CNC control systems. Hunor control systems have
been exported to a number of countries, including
the Soviet Union.
shipped to the Soviets.
We believe the East European countries are running
an overall trade surplus with the USSR in the areas of
computers and other microelectronics-based products.
Eastern Europe uses these exports to offset purchases
of Soviet energy and raw materials. The surplus in
this trade category is likely to increase over the next
five to 10 years as CEMA-level cooperative efforts
expand in other areas dependent on microelectronics,
such as robotics and flexible manufacturing systems.
On the basis of reported East European shipments of
computer equipment to the Soviet Union, we estimate
that as much as 75 percent of the region's ICs end up
in products exported to Soviet users. This figure
differs, of course, by country. Those CEMA members
that are heavily oriented toward the Soviets, such as
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, probably export an
even higher percentage of their IC output. The East
Germans, who use relatively more indigenously devel-
oped IC technology for domestic applications than
other East European countries, probably ship a lower
percentage of their ICs to the Soviets.
Integrated Circuits
We estimate that direct exports of integrated circuits
constitute only a small portion of total East European
IC output. We believe that only the GDR and
Czechoslovakia currently are producing ICs for direct
use in the Soviet market. Although data on shipments
are sparse, the overall volume of exported ICs is
probably less than 10 percent of total East European
output. a large number
of the ICs produced in East Germany either are
exported directly to the USSR or sent there as
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components in other GDR-manufactured equipment.
For example, more than 70 percent of the MOS
circuits 9 produced in the GDR are exported to the
Soviet Union. The quantities involved represent only a
small percentage of total Soviet IC consumption.
the East Germans
shipped from 6 million to 12 million ICs to the Soviets
during 1984. This equates to less than 1 percent of
estimated Soviet IC production that year.
the Soviets have been
exerting considerable pressure on East German and
Czechoslovak IC producers since the second half of
1984 for a significant increase in the delivery of ICs.
The East German VEB Microelectronics Karl Marx
Plant in Erfurt and the VEB Halbleiterwerk in
Frankfurt-Oder were asked to quadruple deliveries to
the USSR in 1984, for a total shipment of 6 million
devices. The ICs that are probably involved in these
deliveries include the U880 microprocessor made at
the Erfurt plant and low-power Schottky transistor-
transistor logic (LSTTL) devices produced at the VEB
Halbleiterwerk Plant.
the
GDR and the USSR have an agreement stipulating
that the East Germans will develop LSTTL devices,
while the Soviets would develop complementary
metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) chips. The GDR
shipped 4-6 million LSTTL ICs to the Soviets in
1983, but in 1984 was informed that the Soviets had
developed their own LSTTL capability and therefore
needed only 3-4 million pieces. This requirement was
later raised to 12 million when the Soviet devices
proved to be markedly inferior to those produced in
To bolster domestic IC consumption, East European
countries import a substantial number of chips from
the USSR. Most East European countries do not
manufacture the full range of ICs needed for the
production of computer systems and peripherals, and
they therefore purchase microprocessors, 16K
DRAMs, and other circuits from the Soviets. For
example,) I the GDR
obtains about 50 percent of the chips it uses from the
Soviets, including a 16-bit microprocessor that the
East Germans plan to use in their latest personal
computer, the A7100,10 which was displayed at the
1986 Leipzig Spring Fair. In addition, the Czechoslo-
vaks rely on Soviet 16K DRAMs and other LSI
memory chips in the production of their SM-4 mini-
computer.
The East European countries will increase their
microelectronics production capacities through capital
investment and imports of manufacturing and test
equipment and technology. We believe, however, that
production of ICs in Eastern Europe will not be
sufficient to fulfill the rapidly growing requirements
of computer and automated equipment producers
throughout CEMA, at least over the next 10 years.
While the goal of reducing the dependence on West-
ern IC technology is still part of the CEMA develop-
ment program, acquisitions are likely to rise, at least
over the next five years or so, as the East European
nations struggle to raise the quality and increase the
quantity of their IC production. Stricter adherence to
COCOM regulations by the Western allies could limit
Eastern Europe's access to this equipment, however.
Limited availability of advanced technology from the
West may force the countries to increase their reli-
ance on the USSR and to improve their own R&D
efforts and production technology to keep up with
increasing domestic and Soviet demands.
Within Eastern Europe, the microelectronics indus-
tries of each country have progressed quite differently
and must be viewed separately to anticipate future
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developments and problems. By 1990, we expect the
following for the six countries:
? East Germany. The recent push to increase micro-
electronics production will be intensified. If plans to
add three new production buildings to East Ger-
many's most sophisticated IC plant are realized, the
country's capability for producing advanced devices
will at least triple. Although the GDR will continue
to lag behind the USSR in IC technology, the rapid
progress of its microelectronics industry will make
East German products increasingly attractive to the
Soviets-possibly for military use. East Germany
will probably pull further ahead of the other East
European countries and continue to dominate devel-
opment and production in the region.
? Czechoslovakia. Resources earmarked for industry
improvement will need to be diverted to repair the
Tesla Piestany Plant-severely damaged in an Au-
gust 1985 accident. This will hamper Czechoslova-
kia's IC design capabilities for the next few years
and will divert resources that could have been used
to upgrade IC production.
? Poland. Antiquated plants and production equip-
ment will make it difficult for Poland to improve its
technological base. Hard currency shortages will
make it impossible to modernize its industry sub-
stantially in the near term, causing Poland's techno-
logical level to continue to slip relative to levels in
the West, the USSR, the GDR, and Czecho-
slovakia.
? Bulgaria. Bulgaria has recently doubled its IC
production floorspace and has embarked on a plant
modernization program that includes purchases of
Western equipment to increase production capacity
and improve IC reliability. Past efforts to incorpo-
rate Western technology have met with little suc-
cess, however, and we do not foresee a significant
increase in domestic capabilities until at least 1990.
? Hungary. Hungary's early lack of commitment to
its IC industry will force it to play catchup with the
Bloc and the West. Although recently purchased
Soviet production lines may increase production
nearly 200 percent over 1982 levels, device sophisti-
cation will remain relatively low. Moreover, a fire
in May 1986 at Hungary's Microelectronics Enter-
prise seriously damaged manufacturing capabilities
there, and Budapest has been seeking Soviet and
Western assistance to offset production shortfalls.
We believe, therefore, that Hungary will be forced
to continue importing large quantities of more
advanced ICs from the West to fill domestic
demands.
? Romania. Romania's inability to foster independent
R&D efforts, and its strong reliance on Western
technology, will ensure its last place standing in
Eastern Europe in IC production. Furthermore,
because of its poor economic situation, Romania will
have great difficulty replacing the equipment for
MOS large-scale IC production that was destroyed
in the recent fire. As a result, we do not foresee
Romania gaining an LSI capability by 1990.
We believe that, as a whole, Eastern Europe will be 25X1
able to maintain its IC production growth rate at
levels similar to those achieved during the first half of
the 1980s. The GDR and Bulgaria will probably show
the greatest growth in production because of recent
investment programs. The dominance of East
Germany and Czechoslovakia in overall East Europe-
an IC output will probably start to fall as they shift
production to the next generation of microprocessor
and DRAM memory chips and as the new production
programs accelerate in Hungary and Bulgaria.
To increase production and improve the quality of its
ICs, Eastern Europe will remain dependent on the
West both for equipping existing plants and for
developing specialized buildings for VLSI production.
Eastern Europe's lack of standardized IC production
facilities may hinder its ability to diffuse technology
and produce VLSI devices. Western industry has
found it necessary to develop completely new building
types with improved clean-room design and vibration
control for these types of circuits. East Germany's
new building design at the Erfurt branch plant may
consequently become the standard for the region as
other countries begin production of VLSI devices.
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We expect continued and possibly increased Soviet
demand for East European microelectronic devices.
Eastern Europe may grow increasingly reluctant to
part with its ICs because of growing domestic de-
mands and industrial modernization efforts. Despite
CEMA's endorsement of the Soviet-sponsored S&T
2000 program, the East European countries may
resist strong Soviet management of domestic R&D
programs in an effort to maintain some autonomy
over the development of their own industries.
We expect that the delivery of computers and other
microelectronics-based products will continue to be
the dominant East European electronics-related con-
tribution to the Soviets. CEMA cooperative computer
production programs are expanding rapidly, and East
European shipments are likely to continue growing in
this area. In addition, the Soviets are pushing their
CEMA allies for increased cooperation in other areas
such as robotics and the development of flexible
manufacturing systems that will require heavy contri-
butions from East European IC producers. These
developments probably will push the Soviet-East
European trade balance for these products even fur-
ther in favor of Eastern Europe. The Soviets' own
output of ICs and related products will be increasing-
ly needed to support Gorbachev's ambitious modern-
ization program and therefore will not be widely
available for export.
CEMA cooperation efforts have enhanced the IC
production capabilities of the East European countries
by allowing them, through increased specialization, to
concentrate their limited resources on a narrower
range of development and production activities. Intra-
CEMA trade in microelectronics equipment has risen
steadily as countries increasingly enter into bilateral
production and reciprocal trade agreements. On the
negative side, however, the wide disparity in the
technical levels of the East European countries has
offset some of these benefits, as the less developed
countries have not always been able to supply their
trading partners with reliable equipment and ICs. The
effectiveness of CEMA cooperation efforts has also
been constrained by the unwillingness of the Soviets
to share their own technology fully with their East
European allies. Soviet and East European state-
ments, the ambitious goals of the S&T 2000 program,
and the increasingly costly challenge of keeping pace
with Western developments all suggest that CEMA
microelectronics cooperation and specialization will
intensify. It is doubtful, however, that these efforts
will enable these countries to close the gap with the
West in IC development and production. At best, we
believe that the cooperative efforts of the CEMA
countries will serve to keep the gap from getting wider
and that most of the region will remain heavily
dependent on Western ICs and production technology
throughout the 1980s.
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Appendix
Plant Data on East European IC Producers
Plant Name/Geographic Coordinates Alternate Name (Production IC Product Lines a Total Produc-
Association) tion Building
Floorspace
(square
meters) b
Bulgaria (Ministry of Electronics and Ma-
chine Building)
Botevgrad
Botevgrad IC Plant 4254 15N 0234730E
Botevgrad Science Production
MOS, 4K RAM, 4k
11,324
Combine for Semiconductors
DRAM
2,872 U/C
Computer Memory Disk and IC Plant c
422529N 025391E
OZZU/Association of Plants for
Memory Devices
Czechoslovakia (Ministry of Electrical
Engineering)
Lanskroun
Tesla Lanskroun
Tesla Combine
HY
7,122
495438N 0163609E
Piestany
Tesla Piestany d
Tesla Combine
CMOS, 16K DRAM
9,323
483540N 0174920E
NMOS, 8-bit MP
Prague
VUST/A. S. Popov Research
Tesla Combine
CMOS, SSI, MSI,
827
Institute for Communications Equipment
LSI
500145N 0142553E
Roznov
Tesla Roznov
Tesla Combine
RAM, ROM, MP,
18,800
492743N 0180739E
TTL, MOS, BP, LSI
East Germany (Ministry of Electrical
Technology and Electronics)
Berlin
VEB Television Electronics Plant
Microelectronics Combine
HY, OE
12,855
522724N 0133157E
ZFTM/Center for Research and Micro-
Formerly Institute for Microelec-
16-bit MP; 64K,
5,099
electronics Technology
510805N 0134645E
tronics, Dresden Microelectronics
Combine
16K, and 4K RAM;
VLSI
ZFTM Branch/Center for Research and
Microelectronics Combine
5,280
Microelectronics Technology
3,188 U/C
510743N 0110053E
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Plant Data on East European IC Producers (continued)
Country
Plant Name/Geographic Coordinates
Alternate Name (Production
Association)
IC Product Lines a
Total Produc-
tion Building
Floorspace
(square
meters) b
VEB Mikroelektronik "Karl Marx"
Erfurt
505826N 0110053E
Formerly Funkwerk Erfurt Micro-
electronics Combine
MOS, CMOS, MP,
EPROM, RAM,
ROM
10,525
VEB Erfurt Sued Ost (ESO)
505700N 0110503E
Microelectronics Combine
MOS, LSI,
16K/64K DRAM,
8/16-bit MP
6,755
6,755 U/C
VEB Halbleiterwerk Frankfurt-Oder
(HFO)
521730N 0142825E
Microelectronics Combine
TTL, CMOS, MP,
SRAM (over 200
product types)
26,148
Hermsdorf
VEB Ceramics Plant Combine Hermsdorf
505355N 0115100E
Electrical Engineering Combine
HY, IC
1,865
REMIX Radio Engineering Enterprise
472922N 0190748E
Microelectronics Enterprise d
473442N 0190547E
HY, MP, NMOS
BP, OE
5,168
1,350 U/C
Tunsgram/United Incandescent Lamp
and Electric Company (EIVRT)
473455N 0190430E
4K DRAM, TTL,
4K PROM, LN
9,702
Poland (Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine
Building)
Krakow
Krakow Unitra-Telpod Electronic Works
500255N 0195750E
Scientific Production Center of
Hybrid Microelectronics and
Resistors
LSI, HY
29,356
Warsaw
Plant Ratuszowa
521531N 0210152E
Tewa Semiconductor Factory
521054N 0210008E
MP, BP, MOS,
TTL, LSI (8080 MP)
10,908
Unitra-Dolam, Research and Production
Center for Electronic Components and
Equipment
HY
5,329
510537N 0170348E
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Plant Data on East European IC Producers (continued)
Romania (Ministry of Machine Building
Industry)
Bucharest
Plant Name/Geographic Coordinates Alternate Name (Production IC Product Lines a Total Produc-
Association) tion Building
Floorspace
(square
meters) b
Electronics Parts Plant IC, MP 2,651
442631N 0260915E
1. Radio and Semiconductor Plant
All organized under the Industrial
TTL, LN, BP (over
4,327
Baneasa (IPRS)
2. Microelectronics d
Center for Electronics and Com-
puter Techniques
200 types)
MOS, LSI, OE
9,821
3. Center-of Scientific Research and Engi-
RAM, ROM, LSI
6,176
neering Technology for Semiconductors
(CCSITS)
443101N 0260656E
a IC Product Lines
BP - bipolar integrated circuit
CMOS - complementary metal-oxide semiconductor
DRAM - dynamic random access memory
EPROM - erasable programmable read-only memory
HY - hybrid integrated circuit
IC - integrated circuit, specific device type unknown
LN - linear device
LSI - large-scale integration IC
MOS - metal-oxide semiconductor
MP - microprocessor
MSI - medium-scale integration IC
NMOS - N-channel metal-oxide semiconductor
OE - optoelectronic device
PROM - programmable read-only memory
RAM - random access memory
ROM - read-only memory
SRAM - static random access memory
SSI - small-scale integration IC
TTL - transistor-transistor logic
VLSI -very-large-scale integration IC
b U/C-Indicates new production building under construction.
c Plants externally complete, but work in progress on clean rooms
and air purification systems.
d Building destroyed or damaged by fire.
e IPRS, Microelectronica, and CCSITS are one plant and are
collocated. The Romanians, however, refer to them as three
separate entities.
NOTE: The following cities reportedly have IC production plants,
but the plants have not been confirmed on imagery:
Bulgaria - Stara Zagora East Germany - Berlin
Czechoslovakia - Blatna Poland - Gdynia
Hradec Kralove
Liptovskiy Hradek
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Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/15: CIA-RDP87T00787R000300340001-6