GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALCOHOL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000200200003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Against Alcohol
Gorbachev's Campaign
SOV 86-10019X
April /986
Copy 3 5 0
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T
Directorate of
Intelligence
Against Alcohol
Gorbachev's Campaign
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA,
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared byl Ithe
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
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Secret
SOV 86-10019X
April 1986
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Gorbachev's Campaign
Against Alcohol
Key Judgments The antialcohol campaign under way since May 1985 constitutes the most
Information available serious and determined effort to curtail alcohol abuse in the USSR since
as of 3 March 1986 the World War I prohibition. Gorbachev is making the antialcohol
was used in this report.
program a test of his leadership, both for its potential economic and health
benefits and as a highly visible sign that he intends to force the pace of
change.
Gorbachev's concern over alcohol abuse is well founded. We estimate that
per capita alcohol consumption in the USSR has doubled over the past
30 years; current levels of hard liquor consumption are the highest in the
world. The average age of alcoholics has dropped, and women are drinking
more heavily than in the past. Alcohol abuse is contributing significantly to
industrial accidents and worker absenteeism, and it is involved in a high
percentage of violent crimes. It is a leading cause of the country's declining
life expectancy and rising infant mortality rates and a principal factor in
the growing divorce rate in Slavic areas.
Such problems have been recognized by previous leaders, but their
campaigns against Russia's historical plague have failed, partly from the
lack of strong Politburo commitment to sustained enforcement in the face
of popular resistance and partly from the leadership's own ambivalence
about alcohol abuse. The recognized adverse consequences for labor
productivity and national health were apparently counterbalanced by
liquor's function of diverting citizen frustrations into apolitical channels as
well as providing a substitute for consumer goods in short supply.F25X1
Gorbachev recognizes that alcohol abuse is a major impediment to his
overall effort to tighten social discipline, strengthen law enforcement,
improve worker output, and shore up popular respect for the regime's
ability to deal forcefully with domestic problems. Gorbachev's antialcohol
program is appropriately wide ranging in its scope. It specifically includes
intensified law enforcement, reduced availability of alcohol, increased
penalties for alcohol offenses, holding supervisors responsible for behavior
of subordinates, expanded treatment facilities, a public opinion campaign,
and better recreational and consumer alternatives. This program, more
broadly gauged than previous campaigns, contains some new elements,
such as the movement to dismantle large numbers of distilleries. The key
ingredient that distinguishes this campaign from its predecessors, however,
is not the specific measures adopted but the vigor with which the regime is
enforcing them. Especially noteworthy has been the widespread firing of
officials for personal violations and lax enforcement.
iii Secret
SOV 86-10019X
April /986
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The campaign has already achieved considerable success, as demonstrated
by a number of economic indicators and changes visible to foreign
observers. Sales of alcohol have dropped by a fourth and public drunken-
ness has been sharply reduced in Moscow and most other cities. According
to articles in
the Soviet press, drinking on the job has been eliminated in some
enterprises and curtailed in others;
KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov, in his November Revolu-
tion Day speech, credited the crackdown with a decline in the crime rate.
Although Gorbachev's efforts are being supported by an increasingly
concerned Politburo, there appears to be some tension or uncertainty
within the leadership over how far to push the campaign. Gorbachev's
objectives seem limited to curtailing the worst abuses, especially drinking
on the job. He has publicly ruled out passing a "dry law."
officials have been seriously remiss in enforcing the new measures, as
Soviet media have acknowledged.
the US Embassy in
Moscow has received reports of worker unrest in several cities. While a
core of concerned citizens and officials strongly support the campaign in
toto and almost everyone claims to favor eliminating the worst alcohol
abuses, there are major societal obstacles to sustaining the campaign's
momentum. Heavy drinking habits are deeply ingrained among the Slavic
population. The campaign has become a new source of tension in every
segment of society, and it will probably combine with other popular
frustrations to spark further spontaneous protests.
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Gorbachev's continued aggressive support of the antialcohol campaign is
necessary to cut through this resistance. However, even if the regime
resorts to sterner measures than those already adopted-involving greater
police intrusion into the private lives of citizens-it will not be able to
monitor and control consumption of homebrew, which Western experts
estimate accounts for about a fourth of total consumption. Home brewers
and black marketeers have been intimidated to some degree by the burst of
law enforcement activity, but over time they will probably expand their
supply networks to respond to the tremendous demand caused by decreased
availability of liquor in state stores.
How well Gorbachev manages resistance to the campaign could have a
significant effect on his political fortunes. If social unrest expands or
violation of the liquor laws becomes rampant, he would be under strong
pressure to moderate the campaign or even to abandon it altogether. He
would probably be able to deflect some of the blame to Ligachev, but his
own reputation for tough and effective leadership would suffer.
Public concern about alcohol abuse appears sufficiently widespread, and
Gorbachev's commitment to corrective measures sufficiently firm, howev-
er, to ensure that the attack will be sustained for some time on the more
conspicuous and damaging forms of abuse-drinking on the job and public
drunkenness. Demonstrable success in these areas will further Gorbachev's
larger policy objectives-both economic and social-and in our judgment
will strengthen his political position.
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The Russian Drinking Pattern
1
Labor Productivity
4
Family Stability
5
Past Regime Ambivalence
5
The Samogon Specter
8
Escape Valve for Discontent
8
Growing Supp
ort for Tougher Measures
8
Shape of the I
nitiative
9
Curtailment of Opportunities To Purchase Alcohol
10
Expanded Treatment of Alcoholics
11
Accountability of Managers and Officials
11
Provision of Alternatives for Amusement and Consumption
12
Comparison
With Past Campaigns
12
Impact on Att
itudes and Consumption
14
High-Level S
upport for the Program
16
Maintaining
Momentum
18
Political Impl
ications for Gorbachev
19
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Gorbachev's Campaign
Against Alcohol
The Soviet Alcohol Problem
Heavy drinking has been common among the Slavic
and Baltic peoples for centuries. According to popular
legend, the ruler of the first Russian state converted
to Christianity rather than Islam in the 10th century
because Islam prohibited alcohol and "drink is the joy
of the Russians." Drinking became such an ingrained
habit of life in Russia that some students of history
think the czarist government's passage of a prohibi-
tion law in 1914 helped pave the way for the 1917
revolution. At least until recently, a bottle of vodka
was the most common bribe or token of gratitude for
a personal favor.
The Russian Drinking Pattern. Experts tend to agree
that various factors have combined to account for the
deeply rooted drinking habits of Russians. They assert
that heavy drinking is encouraged by:
? The lack of alternative means of releasing personal
emotions in the repressive environment of an au-
thoritarian political system.
? The need to endure the historically low standard of
living.
? Its traditional central cultural role in allowing Rus-
sians to overcome sexual and other inhibitions. Even
more than in most other societies where heavy
drinking is accepted, the ability to consume prodi-
gious quantities of vodka is regarded as a sign of
masculinity.
swings from extreme passivity to violent activity-
predisposes people to drink to exces
Like their Scandinavian neighbors, Russians have
developed a style of drinking that is particularly
damaging physically and conducive to addiction. Rus-
sians typically use alcohol not as an adjunct to food or
as a mild mood elevator, but for the purpose of losing
control-to obtain the maximum escape and libera-
tion as quickly as possible. Drinking large quantities
of vodka on an empty stomach and binge drinking are
more common in the USSR than in many other
countries that have high alcohol consumption rates.
Growth of Alcohol Abuse. The cataclysmic events of
Soviet history-collectivization, the purges, World
War II, and the postwar reconstruction-produced
severe societal stresses that led to heavier drinking.
Industrialization and urbanization uprooted large
numbers of people and led to a breakdown in rural
traditions that confined drinking largely to holidays
and festive occasions. In recent years shortages of
consumer goods, a waning of ideological faith, and a
general worsening of popular morale ' have given
further impetus to increased drinking.
The leading Western expert, Vladimir Treml, esti-
mates on the basis of available evidence that the
USSR ranks first in the world in per capita consump-
tion of hard liquor. A number of authorities on
alcohol problems, moreover, believe that hard liquor
tends to be more destructive than wine and beer to the
fabric of society and the health of the individual. This
is largely because hard liquor consumption usually,
although not invariably, is more associated with
drinking to the point of intoxication. Heavy drinking
is especially prevalent in Slavic and Baltic regions.
People in these areas consume on a per capita basis
more than twice the quantity of alcohol consumed by
people in Central Asia and other Muslim areas of the
USSRF-___1
Soviet and Western specialized studies establish that
consumption grew steadily from World War 11 until
1979, with a modest improvement in the situation in
the early 1980s:
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Severe data problems make it impossible to track
Soviet alcohol consumption patterns with any preci-
sion or to make exact quantitative comparisons be-
tween the alcohol problem in the USSR and that in
other countries. Published Soviet statistics on alco-
hol consumption and abuse are highly selective,
providing information for particular localities rather
than for the country as a whole. In recent years, the
USSR has steadily reduced the availability of com-
prehensive data on alcohol production, sales, and
price. This concealment of comprehensive statistics
on alcohol has been consistent with a broader pattern
of withdrawing information about other societal ills
as disturbing trends appear.
In addition to the paucity of statistics, a lack of
standardized definitions makes it difficult to mea-
sure the extent of the alcohol problem. For example,
Soviet specialized literature often employs various
terms such as "clinically alcoholic" and "registered
alcoholic" that in some cases have unclear meanings
and in other cases have no equivalent in Western
terminology
Even if complete alcohol consumption figures were
available, it would be difficult to establish scientifi-
cally to what extent alcohol consumption contributes
to such social and economic problems as crime,
divorce, and low labor productivity. Many factors are
involved in causing these problems and it is impossi-
ble to isolate the impact of alcohol as an independent
variable, although it is possible to show a correlation
between alcohol abuse and other social ills
In addition to officially published Soviet statistics,
there are numerous sources for assessing the extent of
alcohol abuse, the level of official concern about the
problem, and the attitudes of the Soviet public to-
ward it. These sources include.'
? Studies by Western experts who have compiled
Soviet statistics, subjected them to reliability tests,
and arrived at independent estimates.
? Reporting by US Embassy officials and Western
journalists based on discussions with Soviet offi-
cials and ordinary citizens,
with regard to drink-
Lectures given by regime spokesmen at Znaniye
Society meetings, which US Embassy officers at-
tend and which often provide franker appraisals of
internal conditions than do Soviet media.
? Speeches of Soviet leaders, which must be used
cautiously but which reflect sensitivities about soci-
etal problems.
? Soviet published polls about popular habits and
attitudes, which usually suffer from methodologi-
cal flaws but which can often be compared with
other data to assist in establishing general trends.
Using these various sources, we can arrive at a good
approximation of the scope and character of the
alcohol problem and an informed evaluation of the
Gorbachev campaign against it.
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Figure 1
USSR: Estimated Total and Illegal Alcohol Consumptions
(Per Capita for Persons 15 and Older)
16
Total consumption
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1955 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
a Source: Vladimir Treml, Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study,
Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982, and unpublished draft,
Alcohol Abuse and Quality of Life in the USSR, 1986. Treml's estimates
were partially confirmed by an article in a Soviet sociological journal,
which stated that per capita consumption of pure alcohol in 1980 was 11.3
liters, a figure close to Treml's estimate of per capita consumption of state-
produced alcohol. The Soviet figure did not include samogon (homebrew).
? Treml's calculations indicate that per capita con-
sumption in the USSR grew by an average of 3.3
percent a year between 1955 and 1979, more than
doubling, and declining slightly since 1980.
a Soviet research
team that conducted a national survey in the 1970s
on alcohol use, estimates that between 1913 and the
1970s the percent of alcoholics in the Soviet adult
population grew from 1.6 to 9.5.
? A 1984 article in the leading Soviet sociological
journal stated that per capita alcohol consumption
increased by 10.5 percent a year in the 1950s, by
6.7 percent a year in the 1960s, and by 3.2 percent a
year in the 1970s. The article reported that imple-
mentation of preventive measures between 1980
and 1982 had resulted in a 6 percent a year decline
in consumption during that period.
Comprehensive statistics aside, data from a broad
range of Soviet open sources, emigres, Western news-
men, and other firsthand observers depict the current
alcohol problem as enormous:
? A Western expert citing Soviet data reported that
12 to 15 percent of the adult urban population in
1979 were arrested for public drunkenness and
processed through sobering-up stations. Vitaliy
Fedorchuk, Minister of Internal Affairs until his
removal in January 1986, noted in a 1982 Pravda
article that 800,000 Soviets lost their driver's
licenses that year because they were drunk when
stopped by police.
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? The Soviet newspaper Selskaya Zhizn in December
1983 reported that one-third of all registered alco-
holics began drinking before they were 10 years old,
and that the average age of alcoholics dropped by
five to seven years during the preceding decade.
? Other articles in the Soviet press reveal the spread
of alcoholism among women as well and indicate
that between 10 and 15 percent of Soviet alcoholics
are now women.
? In one recent Soviet survey, 20 percent of males and
11 percent of females admitted that they drank on
the job.
Economic and Social Costs of Alcohol Abuse
The Soviet leadership must cope with the pernicious
impact of alcohol abuse in a number of critical areas.
While the precise extent of Soviet drinking may be
open to debate, its adverse effects on labor productivi-
ty, the general health of the population, stability of
the family unit, and crime are well documented.
Labor Productivity. Drinking on the job is responsible
for losses in productivity, reduced quality of output,
and high turnover of personnel. Managers interviewed
as part of a recent survey of 3,000 Soviet emigres
(mostly Jews) blamed alcohol for a portion of produc-
tivity problems. Sixty percent of those who supervised
over 25 people said they "often or nearly always" had
problems with alcoholism and absenteeism among
workers. This view is consistent with Soviet published
statements that claim drinking lowers labor produc-
tivity by 10 percent or more, and that 60 percent of
unlawful absences from work and 25 percent of
industrial accidents are because of alcohol abuse.2 F_
Health. Soviet and Western researchers accept that
alcohol abuse in the USSR is positively linked to
several disturbing health trends:
? The USSR is the only industrial country with a
declining male life expectancy. Male life expectancy
dropped from age 67 in 1964 to age 62 in 1980.
Female life expectancy has also fallen, from approx-
imately age 75 in 1965 to age 73 in 1980.
Alcohol consumption also contributes to labor force shortages by
raising death rates of the adult population and by lowering birth
rates, especially in Slavic areas.0
Various reports indicate there is substantial drinking
on the job:
? According to a report from the US Embassy in
Moscow, in 1984 workers at an auto parts plant in
Latvia were unable to maintain flow of parts to the
assembly line because of frequent drunkenness.
? In 1984, of drunk drivers involved in accidents in
Moscow, approximately 30 percent were drinking
on the job,
? According to a 1984 Komsomolskaya Pravda arti-
cle, workers drank industrial alcohol glue solvent
pilfered on the job in a plant in the Smolensk
region. The local hospital has files on 412 workers
who became sick from drinking the impure product.
Komsomolskaya Pravda in April 1985 quoted a
factory manager who complained about the con-
stant round of plant parties, celebrating "Fridays,
Saturdays, birthdays, days before holidays, days
on which projects were turned over or bonuses
received.... A million everyday concerns and re-
search and production problems were discussed
over a wine glass.... Management decisions were
resolved by tipsy people. "
? A letter from a Kharkov worker to Izvestia in
March 1985 stated: "At the plant where I work
there are several people who like to take a little nip,
as the saying goes. During the shift they sometimes
Make so many nips that they can't even work. "
a construction
combine in south Kazakhstan, both men and wom-
en workers started the workday by openly drinking
vodka. Bonus money was immediately spent for
vodka.
? A June 1985 Zhurnalist article by a Soviet sociolo-
gist provided partial results of a survey of drinking
among Soviet workers. Over half of the respondents
said at least some workers considered it normal to
drink before work. Two-thirds reported at least
some drinking at their enterprises.
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Drinking at Soviet Construction Sites
Western firms involved in construction projects in the
Soviet Union have experienced Soviet drinking on the
job first hand. A French construction firm building a
hotel in Moscow for the 1980 Olympics found it
necessary to bribe its Soviet workers with alcohol to
prevent their leaving the construction site during the
day under one pretext or another in order to get a
drink. The Soviet generator operator working for the
French went on a two-day binge in the workshack
adjacent to his equipment and drank himself to
death
irm supervising Soviet contractors
found that the work atmosphere facilitated drinking
on the job. Disruptions in the work rhythm caused by
delayed supply deliveries, insufficient equipment, and
inadequate supervision enabled workers who were
hung over or slightly drunk to get by and left
substantial idle time to steal away for a drink.
Presumably because of the prevalence of drinking
among the male workers, women were the crane
operators, a job requiring responsibility.
? Deaths from alcohol poisoning (a lethal concentra-
tion of alcohol in the blood) have quadrupled since
1960 to a rate of 19.5 per 100,000 population. This
rate is about 60 times the rate of other developed
countries that collect detailed vital statistics.
? Infant deaths in the USSR, in contrast with the rest
of the developed world, rose dramatically from
22.9 per 100,000 population in 1970 to 31.1 in 1975
(the last year for which the Soviets published data),
and they have probably not improved since then.
Soviet experts attribute part of this increase to
heavy drinking among pregnant women.
? Rates of mental retardation in the USSR have been
kept secret since the mid-1970s, but Soviet re-
searchers assume the rates have gone up because of
sharply increased demand for schools for the retard-
ed. Soviet studies emphasize the relationship be-
tween alcoholic mothers and birth defects. Accord-
ing to the Moscow Psychiatric Research Institute,
one-third of all children born to such mothers are
mentally retarded.
Family Stability. Soviet experts cite alcoholism as a
leading factor in the rise of divorce rates in the
USSR. A recent study by the respected Soviet demog-
rapher Viktor Perevedentsev reported that alcohol
abuse by the spouse is cited as a contributing cause in
half of Soviet divorces. Other Soviets cite lower but
still very high figures. At the same time, as more
women drink heavily, they do not provide the ballast
in the family to the extent that they have in the past.
A Soviet newspaper article published in late 1984
reported that about two-thirds of registered women
alcoholics are divorced
Crime. Soviet sources indicate that alcohol is a major
factor in various types of crime, particularly street
crime, and that it contributes to widespread concern
among Soviet citizens that public order has eroded in
recent years:
? Various published Soviet data indicate that roughly
80 percent of robberies, 75 percent of murders and
reported rapes, and 50 percent of personal property
thefts that result in convictions are committed by
people who were intoxicated.
? In May 1985 Pravda quoted Fedorchuk as saying
that 70 to 80 percent of those convicted of disorderly
conduct or vandalism (hooliganism) were
intoxicated.
? In February 1985 the Soviet Institute for the Study
of the Causes of Crime reported publicly that nearly
three-fourths of all lawbreakers are people who
started drinking between the ages of 14 and 17.
Other Soviet sources report a strong correlation
between drinking and juvenile delinquency.
Past Regime Ambivalence
The lack of followthrough characterizing past leader-
ship campaigns to control alcohol consumption can be
largely ascribed to strong ambivalence over the issue.
As noted in 1971 in Komsomolskaya Pravda, there
has been an "extraordinary social paradox" in the
state's approach to alcohol, with the regime struggling
against drunkenness at the same time that "it pro-
duces unlimited quantities of alcohol and does every-
thing possible to deliver it." Thus, according to a
survey of emigres conducted by Radio Liberty, in the
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Military discipline and close regimentation of the
behavior of conscripts make alcohol problems in the
Soviet military somewhat easier to control than in
civilian life. But military authorities still have trou-
ble keeping alcohol from affecting troop readiness.
In general, the military is strict regarding the use of
alcohol on duty and disapproves but reluctantly
tolerates drinking off duty. Policies of individual
officers vary widely, however; some prohibit the use
of alcohol altogether and others tolerate drinking
both on and off duty.
Although the difficulties of obtaining alcohol are
greater for soldiers than for civilians, the desire to do
so is usually also greater. The average Soviet soldier
is bored and isolated, poorly housed and fed, and
lacks recreational outlets. Despite official efforts to
restrict supplies and the employment of punitive
measures, Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan use both
drugs and alcohol extensively. Soviet soldiers sta-
tioned in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan often
engage in illegal bartering to acquire alcohol, selling
uniforms, gasoline, and, in Afghanistan, even arms.
Such trading causes demoralizing corruption and
diversion of military supplies.
The most significant alcohol problem in the military
is the ingestion of "technical alcohol" and dangerous
alcohol substitutes. Conscripts frequently consume
alcohol intended for equipment cleaning and occa-
sionally antifreeze, brake fluids, glue, lacquer, and
varnish. It can be safely assumed that conscripts
make up a disproportionate percentage of Soviet
deaths from alcohol poisoning. Overall, alcohol con-
tributes significantly to health problems in the
military.
Within the officer corps alcohol abuse is common.
Officers have more money to buy liquor and more
freedom to drink off duty. On duty, officers are
generally less likely than conscripts and warrant
officers to abuse alcohol. Citations for drinking of-
fenses can seriously damage an officer's career. Nev-
heavy drink-
ing among pilots has reportedly resulted in a number
of helicopter crashes.
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early 1980s vodka ranked first in terms of general
availability in state stores, followed by bread. In the
three campaigns since World War II-in 1958-59
under Khrushchev, in 1970-74 under Brezhnev, and in
1979-82 during Brezhnev's waning years-the regime
cracked down on law enforcement, tinkered with the
hours and location of alcohol sales, and unleased
propaganda barrages. In each case, however, alcohol
production was never cut back significantly, and the
antialcohol campaigns soon dissipated)
While undoubtedly recognizing that alcohol abuse has
adverse consequences for labor productivity and na-
tional health, past leaders were obviously unwilling to
relinquish the political benefits that came with the
problem. Specifically, alcohol provides comfort to the
population, diverts popular frustrations into apolitical
channels, substitutes for other consumer goods that
are in short supply, and brings substantial money into
the state coffers. Moreover, Soviet leaders probably
believed they would be unable to control samogon
(homebrew) production, and that the availability of
samogon would undermine any drive to curtail alcohol
consumption. Perhaps most important, Soviet leaders
have probably feared that challenging the deeply
entrenched drinking culture would produce wide-
spread popular discontent and run the risk of touching
off labor unrest.
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Chronology of Alcohol Control in the USSR Since 1914
Under the Czar and the Bolsheviks:
Prohibition began in a wave of war patriotism; it continued under the Bolsheviks
until the 1920s, when the state monopoly of vodka production resumed. Samogon
(homebrew) production and consumption remained high throughout this period.
Bolsheviks' Search for an Alcohol Policy:
? Price of vodka was raised 50 percent, then reduced.
? Samogon production rose again, despite total ban by 1928.
? Liquor sales outlets closed near places of work.
? Antialcohol propaganda was intensified.
? Society for struggle against alcoholism was formed (later disbanded).
Khrushchev Antialcohol Program:
? Vodka price was raised 20 percent; consumption fell 5.4 percent for one year.
? Hours of sale were restricted: from 1000 to 2100; sales outlets were reduced.
? Restaurant sales were restricted.
? Wine production increased; prices were reduced.
The Soviets doubled domestic sugar production and increased a surplus with
imports from Cuba; abundant sugar allowed both state alcohol production and
illegal private distilling to increase.
1962 Penalties for producing samogon were reduced.
Brezhnev Antialcohol Program:
? Hours of sale were reduced: from 1100 to 1900.
? Production of high proof vodka (over 40 percent) was prohibited.
? Samogon prosecution intensified temporarily.
? Sobering-up stations were established for cities.
? Medical-labor camps were established for problem drinkers (up to a 2-year
sentence).
? Expansion in wine and beer production was planned.
? Decrease in vodka production was planned; production declined briefly in 1972.
Antialcohol Measures at End of Brezhnev Regime:
? Alcohol price increased from 17 to 27 percent.
? Education and propaganda activities increased.
? Enforcement of existing legal measures intensified.
? State production continued to increase; samogon production sharply increased.
Andropov Discipline Campaign:
? Sanctions for absenteeism and discipline violations, many of which are alcohol
related, increased.
? Lower priced vodka line (Andropovka) was introduced.
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Fiscal Returns. Overall, the state's income from
alcohol sales is probably about 10 to 12 percent of
total revenue-the largest single source of state bud-
get revenue. From 1955 to 1979 proceeds grew an
estimated 4.7 times as state alcohol production rose
they be alcoholics than revolutionaries." Other
believe the toleration of heavy drinking has
been part of an implicit social contract between the
people and the party, in which the regime does not
interfere unduly with the private behavior of citizens
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3.8 times and prices increased by 60 percent.
An Alternative Consumer Good. By soaking up an
estimated 15 to 20 percent of family budgets, alcohol
consumption has reduced pressure on the regime to
increase the production of other consumer goods.
alcohol makes up an
especially high percentage of consumer goods sold in
small cities in remote locations. In fact, alcohol is
much easier to produce than many other consumer
commodities. The cost of production of vodka has
been estimated at from 5 to 12 percent of the retail
sales price, while the technology is simple and the raw
materials are in relatively stable and abundant supply.
The Samogon Specter. Historically, the leadership
has undoubtedly feared that a substantial decline in
state alcohol production would be replaced by produc-
tion of illegal, untaxed, and sometimes dangerous
samogon. The Soviets probably have the world's
largest illegal liquor production. In recent years Sovi-
et citizens, especially in urban areas, have come to
purchase a higher percentage of their liquor from
state stores, but samogon still accounts for an estimat-
ed 28 percent of total consumption. The process of
producing moonshine is easy to learn, and state
subsidies for the raw materials-largely sugar-make
them affordable for all but the poorest citizens. The
Soviet leadership's awareness of the samogon alterna-
tive to state-supplied alcohol has served as a check on
radical antialcohol policies.
Eveano Valve for Dke t.
the regime has permitted
excessive drinking in the belief that it keeps the
population docile and politically passive. In 1982, for
example, a Sovie
t e view that the authorities regarded alcohol as an
essential opiate for the Soviet people in general and
for blue-collar workers in particular.
as long as such behavior is apolitical in nature
jobs in other factories.
Factory managers, especially, have in the past been
loath to restrict drinking among workers and have
often distributed alcohol to workers as rewards or
bribes for better performance. In Gorbachev's words,
managers have established a "mutual forgiveness"
according to which workers accept low pay in ex-
change for security of employment, tolerance of poor
discipline, and drinking on the job. The Soviet labor
shortage has reinforced managers' fears that too
many restrictions on workers will cause them to seek
Growing Support for Tougher Measures
The growth of alcohol abuse in recent years has
increasingly caused many Soviet citizens and officials
alike to adopt a more alarmist assessment of alcohol's
devastating toll. In the early 1980s, local temperance
societies had spontaneously formed in some cities;
open discussion of the problem in general has grown
rapidly. An employee of the Siberian Academy of
Sciences, who is active in one temperance society,
argued in a public lecture in 1984 that alcohol abuse
had become a "national disaster" that was bringing
about "progressive degeneration of the nation." He
made the exaggerated claim that alcohol-related
losses to the economy were four times greater than the
45 billion rubles of annual revenue that alcohol sales
bring in. An economist and sociologist recently argued
in the Soviet press that "drunkenness is a threat to the
social well-being of the entire nation and is a threat to
the vital capabilities of the population." And the
speaker at a regime-sponsored public lecture in Lenin-
grad in April 1985 maintained that alcohol was a
greater threat to the USSR than anti-Communism.
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Soviet leaders, also, have evidently concluded that the
negative consequences of unrestricted alcohol con-
sumption are becoming intolerable.
But it was Gorbachev's personal determination to take
drastic countermeasures that reportedly accounted for
the decision to take actions
? The campaign would be compatible with, and per-
haps necessary to, other parts of Gorbachev's do-
mestic revitalization strategy. It fit in with his
overall emphasis on tightening social discipline,
strengthening public order, and spurring economic
growth. Gorbachev's hopes of boosting GNP growth
rates are heavily dependent on improvements in
labor productivity. In his speeches, he has empha-
sized the importance of "human factors" in the
economy. He is reportedly especially fearful that
drinking at the workplace will impede the introduc-
tion of advanced technology into Soviet plants.
? The Consumer Goods and Services Program and the
Food Program offered some hope of delivering on
the promises for increased alternatives to alcohol as
a consumer item and source of satisfaction.
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In addition to the well-
established reasons for addressing the problem,
several factors probably impelled him to embark on a
concerted drive against alcohol abuse:
? The campaign would demonstrate his personal pow-
er.
? The campaign would demonstrate the regime's ca-
pacity for vigorous change, without involving a
major commitment of material resources. It would
shore up popular respect for the system and allay
elite concerns about the top leadership's will to act.
Yet it would not require any major institutional
restructuring or shifts in investment policy.
? The political environment was propitious. New offi-
cials beholden to Gorbachev had been put into key
positions and other members of the elite, to protect
their jobs, had become more anxious to implement
regime policy faithfully. The law enforcement appa-
ratus had been purged of many corrupt elements
and its powers enhanced since Brezhnev's death.
Large segments of the public, including both drink-
ers and nondrinkers, had come to believe that
alcohol abuse had gotten out of hand, and they
would respond favorably to a program of alcohol
control. A campaign against alcohol could also
provide a pretext for moving against political oppo-
nents, as had the campaign against corruption.
Shape of the Initiative
The alcohol control initiative was initially approved at
a Politburo meeting held on 4 April 1985, less than a
month after Gorbachev's accession, at which "over-
coming the monstrous phenomenon of alcoholism"
was labeled a top national priority. On 17 May a
Communist Party Central Committee decree declared
that the problem of drunkenness had worsened within
the country in recent years and called for an intensi-
fied struggle against alcoholism. Simultaneously, the
USSR Council of Ministers decree set forth a
28-point set of marching orders to implement the
program, and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet enacted a statute significantly stiffening every
area of the Soviet legal code dealing with alcohol
consumption, sale, and production. A series of further
measures, including a tough internal party memoran-
dum and an assertive Central Committee decree in
September, have supplemented these initial actions.
The main thrust of these measures has been to:
initiate a law enforcement crackdown, reduce the
availability of alcohol, increase penalties for alcohol
offenses, make supervisors responsible for the behav-
ior of their subordinates, expand facilities for treating
alcoholics, marshal public opinion through propagan-
da and citizen organizations, and provide better recre-
ational and consumer alternatives to drinking.
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Law Enforcement Crackdown. The decrees ordered
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to organize a
struggle against drunkenness in every district of the
country. The MVD police were reprimanded for past
laxity and were directed to pursue violators aggres-
sively, the Procuracy to prosecute criminal cases more
vigorously, and the judiciary to sentence severely. The
police were empowered to levy administrative fines
and penalties summarily. In Moscow, the militia has
begun making late-night sweeps of the streets, some-
times arresting as many as 350 violators a night. The
Minister of Internal Affairs reported 15,000 "expo-
sures" of alcohol sales violations and 200 firings of
sales clerks in the first six weeks of the campaign. 7
Alcohol production and sales have been removed from
trade enterprise targets for 1986. Goals for sugar beet
production have been reduced in the 12th Five-Year
Plan partly because
the state needed less sugar for alcohol production.
In August, prices for vodka, brandy, and wine were
raised by 20 to 30 percent, and the price of beer
increased by a lesser amount. Even before the price
hike, the average Soviet worker had to work eight
times as long as his American counterpart to earn
enough money to buy a bottle of liquor. With the
price rise, a half liter of vodka costs seven rubles,
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Persons who are judged to be incorrigible drinkers can
be involuntarily committed for one to two years to
corrective "therapy and labor rehabilitation centers"
administered by the MVD. Capacity of existing
camps of this type is to be expanded into a large
nationwide network capable of accepting unlimited
commitments.
Curtailment of Opportunities To Purchase Alcohol.
Sale hours for state alcohol stores have been reduced
by four hours-from 1400 to 1900 weekdays. Accord-
ing to the USSR Central Statistical Administration,
from June to September the number of shops selling
liquor decreased by 52 percent. Liquor outlets have
been closed near workplaces, schools, transportation
and health facilities, public recreation and vacation
sites, and most other areas where people congregate.
In major cities as many as two-thirds of liquor outlets
have been closed. Liquor sales in many restaurants
have ended, even though this was not required by the
decrees. At remaining liquor outlets, lines are long
and the average wait is one to two hours
Cutback in Production. The decrees called for a
progressive decrease in alcohol production over a
number of years, beginning in 1986. But, by the fall of
1985, over 600 state liquor production enterprises had
been ordered to convert to other products. The Deputy
Food Minister publicly stated in August that beer
plants were operating at 75-percent capacity and that
a majority of distilleries are to be permanently reori-
ented to other production.
roughly the equivalent of a day's wages
Increased Penalties for Violations. Persons who are
drunk in public can now be fined 20 to 30 rubles for
the first offense, 30 to 50 rubles for the second offense
in the same year, and 50 to 100 rubles for additional
offenses (the average worker's monthly wage is
185 rubles). Repeat offenders can also be fined 20 per-
cent of their wages for two months and "administrati-
vely" jailed for 15 days. Incorrigible alcoholics are to
be confined for up to two-year sentences in "treat-
ment-labor camps" where a punitive prisonlike regi-
men is to be maintained. The MVD is to build more
camps to increase the capacity for this kind of
confinement.
Serving alcohol at officially authorized parties at
work has been strictly forbidden. Workers found
drinking or drunk at work can now be fined 30 to
50 rubles. Drunk workers can be deprived of bonuses,
and free vacations, and displaced to the bottom of
waiting lists for housing. The decrees imply that
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Fines for drunk driving have been doubled to 100 ru-
bles or the loss of one's driver's license for one to three
years. Repeat offenses in the same year carry penal-
ties of one- to two-year prison terms or fines of up to
acceptance by managers of drinking on the job.
Especially severe penalties have been established for
300 rubles.
The legal drinking age has been raised from 18 to 21.
Parents or others getting a minor drunk can be fined
or imprisoned. The number of persons so charged with
inciting minors to drunkenness has increased 14
times.
Curtailment of Homebrew Production and Sales. An
aggressive campaign against illegal distilling is under
way. Penalties for making, selling, and purchasing
homebrew have been increased. At the outset of the
campaign, some 2,500 known homebrew distillers in
one province were given warnings, thousands of stills
were reported confiscated in raids, and large numbers
were voluntarily turned in. The price of yeast-a key
ingredient in moonshine-has been raised. Because of
the increased risk and expense of producing and
marketing samogon, as well as increased demand, the
price of illegal alcohol is said to have doubled
Expanded Treatment of Alcoholics. The antialcohol
decrees call on the Ministry of Health to expand and
elaborate the network of "narcological" treatment
centers covering every city and rural region. These
would provide outpatient and inpatient treatment on a
fee basis as well as support education programs within
enterprises. (Presumably, the existing city and plant-
based alcohol treatment centers would be incorporat-
ed into this system.) The educational system is to
increase the training of staff for these institutions, and
the pharmaceutical industry is to supply them with
more drugs for treatment. In October 1985 the Peo-
ples' Control Committee reprimanded the Ministry of
Health for deficient work in detoxification assistance
and rebuked the official responsible for this
department.
Accountability of Managers and Officials. A key
ingredient in the campaign is the principle of execu-
tive accountability for results and strict personal
compliance by the elite with the antialcohol measures.
The decrees stipulate fines and dismissals for factory
managers who tolerate drinking by subordinates.
Thus, the decrees strike at a major obstacle in
enforcing previous antialcohol campaigns-the tacit
bosses of drunk drivers.
Sobriety in public and moderation in private drinking
have become prerequisites for party membership,
according to US Embassy in Moscow sources. A
number of officials have been dismissed from their
jobs or received public reprimands either for personal
drinking lapses or for failing to enforce the antialcohol
measures.
Gorbachev may also have used the alcohol issue as a
political weapon against two leaders who have lost
their jobs since his accession. US Embassy in Moscow
sources report that former party secretary Romanov's
personal reputation for excessive drinking was a fac-
tor in his removal, and that at the January 1986
Moscow city party conference former Moscow party
chief Grishin was criticized for weak implementation
of the antialcohol measures. Such reprisals have
doubtless had a sobering effect on other senior
officials.
Mobilization of Public Opinion. The propaganda
apparatus has produced an intense blitz against the
evils of alcohol. Educational institutions and mass
organizations such as the Komsomol and trade unions
have been instructed to intensify antialcohol propa-
ganda. To encourage voluntary participation in the
antialcohol campaign, an all-union temperance soci-
ety and sobriety clubs for reformed alcoholics have
been formed. Citizens are being urged to inform
authorities about antialcohol violations.
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Figure 2. "Don't lose face!" With a play on
words, this poster attempts to change the atti-
tudes of Soviet youth by warning them that
alcohol can take away personal identity. Such
posters are part of the antialcohol campaign's
effort to change the belief that a man expresses
his courage through the heavy drinking rituals
prevalent in Russian culturer-___1
Provision ofAlternatives,for Amusement and
Consumption. The 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90) is
to include construction of more recreation facilities-
movie theaters, clubs, gyms, and so on. The anti-
alcohol decrees call on the Trade Ministry to expand
tearooms and family restaurants. Local government
and enterprises are to jointly plan recreation facilities
in all districts and are authorized to use housing rent
proceeds to do so. Attention is to be focused on areas
of particular bleakness-rural communities and the
newly built-up areas on the outskirts of cities.
The regime has lowered the average price of fruit
juice by nearly one-fourth and expanded nonalcoholic
"juice bars" in Moscow. Soft drink production, in part
through US licenses, is to be expanded. Gosbank has
been directed to set up direct deposit procedures into
savings accounts (in a society where wages are paid in
cash) to reduce payday binges.
In October the regime unveiled a comprehensive
Consumer Goods and Services Program.
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2 Al
Although, in the past, Soviet media concealed the
proportions of the alcohol problem, propagandists now
may be exaggerating it to persuade the public that
drastic measures are required. At the same time, some
propagandists and academics appear to be portraying
the crackdown on alcohol abuse as a panacea for
problems in Soviet society that actually have multiple
causes, some of which the regime would prefer not to
acknowledge or deal with directly.
in September explicitly acknowledged that both the
volume of sales and the quantity of consumer goods
must be improved as an alternative to alcohol
consumption
Comparison With Past Campaigns
Many components of Gorbachev's program differ
little from measures other Soviet leaderships have
taken in the past. Nearly all of the specific offenses
spelled out in the decrees have been on the books
going back to the 1920s. While the decrees double
penalties for most of these offenses, similarly heavy
penalties were stipulated for some offenses-such as
samogon brewing-in the period from the 1920s
through the 1950s. Changes in the number and
location of liquor outlets, including directives to close
shops near factories, have also been part of previous
campaigns.
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Nevertheless, the current program contains new ele-
ments that, taken together, constitute the most com-
prehensive attack on alcohol abuse since World War I
prohibition:
? Especially noteworthy has been the movement to
dismantle a large majority of liquor factories. In
none of the earlier campaigns were steps taken to
cut back significantly on production capacity for
distilled spirits.
? A second unique and critically important feature is
the principle of elite accountability. The failure to
punish managers and officials for personal violations
and lax enforcement was a major deficiency of
earlier antialcohol drives.
? The current campaign is more broadly gauged than
previous efforts and explicitly acknowledges the
linkage between the alcohol problem and popular
dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of
available consumer goods, and it gives more atten-
tion to the need to improve medical and recreational
facilities (although so far this part of the program
has been put in operation only to a limited degree).
Most important, the current campaign is being exe-
cuted more vigorously than previous campaigns, re-
flecting both stronger leadership resolve and stronger
support from the public. The leadership's evident
commitment to sustain the antialcohol measures and
to institutionalize them as a permanent ongoing policy
is by far the most striking and significant feature of
the current campaign.
Impact on Attitudes and Consumption
The antialcohol campaign has had some initial suc-
cess, as Gorbachev indicated when he met with US
Secretary of Commerce Baldridge in December:
? In the second half of 1985, the Central Statistical
Agency reported alcohol sales were down by a
quarter from the comparable period of 1984. Ac-
cording to US Embassy
as well as Soviet media, public drunkenness has
sharply declined in Moscow and many other cities.
? KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov in his November
Revolution Day speech credited the antialcohol
measures with a decline in the crime rate, and
Secretary Ligachev in a November Kommunist
article said the percent of crimes that were alcohol
related dropped by 16 percent between June and
September.
? While the Soviet press has noted some failures in
the battle against workplace drinking, drinking on
the job has been eliminated in many factories,
This change, to-
gether with the discipline campaign, probably con-
tributed to the economy's recovery from its first-
quarter slump this year.
The campaign has focused the entire country's atten-
tion on the alcohol problem. The Central Committee
could truthfully say in September that "no member of
our society has remained indifferent to the party's
efforts to overcome this colossally dangerous evil."
Embassy reporting indicates that the antialcohol ini-
tiative has a large constituency of supporters.
Some Soviet polling has indicated that
many workers disapprove of their colleagues drinking
One local temperance society in July even carried out
a public protest that the Gorbachev program did not
go far enough
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The following comments of Soviet citizens illustrate
the extent to which attitudes about the campaign are
polarized. Some citizens are basically positive about
the antialcohol measures:
? An agricultural worker from Central Asia: "It is
high time something was done, because here on the
state farm 80 persons died last year because of
their drinking. We will see if the new law works."
? A citizen from a small north Caucacus town: "A
strict but very necessary law was put into effect on
7 June.... Hard times are dawning for the alcohol-
ics.... There are no drunks to be seen, and even
our uncle is afraid to go on the street when he is
drunk. It is rumored that the vineyard is to be
cleared away, which is good because it would be
better to grow grain. "
? An office worker in Moscow: "The propaganda is
working and there is a new attitude.... Now people
look at drunkards on the street in a new way, with
disgust. "
? A resident of a small town in Moldavia: "Because
of the crackdown, workers who drink at work can
be fined 50 rubles and the factory boss can be fined
100 rubles. Better controls of alcoholic beverages
have been necessary for a long time. "
Other citizens are either negative or ambivalent:
? A resident of Odessa: "The dry law will become
effective 1 June 1985. We are very concerned, but
we will distill our own alcohol. "
? A Moscow pensioner waiting in a long line to
purchase liquor: "What are they accomplishing
here? It's just demagoguery. Only one in a thou-
sand is a drunkard, but we are all made to suffer. "
? A Leningrad worker: "A worker here who celebrat-
ed his 50th birthday became drunk and was fired
from his job and kicked out of the party. Every-
where workers are being checked closely for alcohol
consumption.... People have to hold parties behind
locked doors for fear of being arrested. "
? A Soviet Aeroflot employee: "I think Gorbachev's
idea is a good one. Too many people drink too
much ... and that is bad for society. But I don't
think the authorities are going about it in the right
way. Unfortunately many people are going over-
board ... significantly reducing the number of
places where the average Russian can buy his
booze. So, people leave work for longer periods of
time to stand in longer lines and buy more whenever
they can. Being Russians, as soon as they get home
they consume all that they bought ... and miss
more work because they are hung over. In the past
it seemed to be more spread out. Russians are going
to drink no matter how hard the state makes it for
them. "
? A resident of a small town in Kirgizia: "There has
been a crackdown on drinking. Nevertheless,
drunks abound, and, when the beverage stores open,
long lines form. Frequently, the police question
those in line concerning their intended use of the
alcoholic beverages."
? A resident of a small town in Bashkiria: "Those
who cannot live without alcohol have found a new
source. They buy sweetened condensed milk and
they mix it with paint thinner. Many who drink this
mixture end up in the hospital. "
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Vigorous enforcement of the antialcohol measures,
however, is encountering significant resistance from
some segments of the public. Fedorchuk has acknowl-
edged a "widespread pattern of evasion." Long lines
at liquor stores are reportedly filled with sullen, angry
Suspicion of
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workers defiantly absent from their jobs.
When stocks run out or service is slow, resentment of
those in queues has sometimes boiled over into vio-
lence. According to US Embassy reporting, worker
disturbances related to the alcohol campaign have
been reported in five Soviet cities.
Within society as a whole, many moderate drinkers-
irritated by the everyday inconveniences caused by
the antialcohol measures-are complaining that the
campaign should be limited to attacking excessive
rather than "normal" drinking. Not surprisingly, the
campaign has led some citizens to turn to illegal
suppliers to acquire alcohol, despite the increased
penalties and heightened risk of being caught. Many
city dwellers immediately sought new liquor sources
among taxi drivers, sales clerks, and samogon brew-
ers. The more compulsive or reckless resorted to the
old Russian alternative of perfume and industrial
fluids, with a resulting increase in poisonings, as
reported by Izvestiya.
Within the elite, complaints about the antialcohol
campaign have focused on three issues:
anonymous informers has reportedly increased, as
officials fear they may be maliciously denounced by
colleagues bearing private grudges.
? The Embassy reports that Soviet economists are
worried that the cutback in alcohol production and
sales could produce economic problems. The reduc-
tion of a major source of state revenue and the
disruptions caused by the retooling of liquor plants
have probably created considerable distress within
the Moscow economic bureaucracy, while some
local managers and officials are more directly con-
cerned by the sharp revenue losses of their own
enterprises. A Soviet economic official told US
Embassy officers in January 1986 that the economic
benefits of reduced industrial accidents had been at
least partially offset by the closings of some fac-
tories, reduced wages at others, problems in dealing
with production of grapes and other fruits and
vegetables suitable only for alcohol distilling, and
complications in trade relations with Mediterranean
countries from which the USSR previously import-
ed large quantities of alcoholic beverages.
strong political reasons for wanting the campaign to
High-Level Support for the Program
Despite disgruntlement within the broader elite, the
antialcohol initiative appears to maintain the backing
of a strong Politburo coalition. Gorbachev himself has
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The central core of Gorbachev's allies on the
Politburo-Secretary Ligachev, Premier Ryzhkov,
KGB Chairman Chebrikov, and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze-probably also support the antialcohol
initiative. Some leaders not allied with Gorbachev
may also favor the campaign-such as Kazakh party
boss Kunayev who as a Muslim does not represent a
"constituency" of heavy drinkers. Three Politburo
members (Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, and First Depu-
ty Premier Aliyev) have been closely identified with a
tough law-and-order policy in recent years. Two
members (Chebrikov and People's Control Chairman
Solomentsev) have current responsibilities that give
them a vested interest in advancing programs that
expand the role of the apparatus responsible for law
enforcement and elite discipline. Two others (Liga-
chev and Ryzhkov) have backgrounds in supervising
the economy, which doubtless make them cognizant
of the connection between alcohol abuse and low labor
productivity.'
Among Politburo supporters of the campaign, howev-
er, there appears to be uncertainty or disagreement
over how far to carry it. Gorbachev's objectives
appear limited to curtailing the worst alcohol abuses
that are most damaging to the economy and the
But Ligachev is evidently pushing the antialcohol
campaign harder than Gorbachev and defining its
goals in a more sweeping fashion. Some Western press
reporting indicates that Ligachev, said to be an
abstainer, is playing a key role in directing the
' Former MVD Chief Fedorchuk, judging from his speeches, would
also seem to have been a supporter of the campaign. His removal in
January, however, suggests the possibility that he has been held
responsible for shortcomings in police enforcement of the campaign.
maximal approach to the alcohol problem is consistent
with Ligachev's reputation as a promoter of "puritani-
cal" measures to purify the system and to tighten
discipline
Some regime pronouncements have espoused similarly
ambitious goals, perhaps reflecting Ligachev's influ-
ence. The September Central Committee resolution,
for example, stated that "the campaign for sobriety is
only just beginning" and "must continuously and
consistently be expanded." Moreover, some actions
taken so far-especially the cutback in production of
soft liquors such as wine and beer, instead of promot-
ing these as alternatives to vodka-suggest an effort
to curtail drinking generally, rather than to encourage
a shift to less damaging types of alcohol. Some
localities, presumably with Moscow's sanction, have
established "dry zones" on an experimental basis.
Soviet media report that a top Ministry of Health
official has been censured for urging "sensible moder-
ation" in drinking instead of taking a more aggressive
stance
To a certain extent, the maximal character of the
campaign in action doubtless reflects the Soviet style
of implementing high-priority policy initiatives. In the
typical Soviet campaign, the regime often engages in
excesses or overkill in its effort to achieve full mobili-
zation to attain a sharp, immediate impact. Gorba-
chev may even think it politically expedient to have
Ligachev drawing the fire on such an issue. But the
disparity between the goals enunciated in the original
decrees in May and the escalation of the campaign
since then may reflect some tension within the leader-
ship about objectives and tactics
In contrast to strong support at the center, reporting
indicates considerable regional resistance in imple-
menting the antialcohol measures. Although in many
areas strict enforcement is the rule, US Embassy
officers have observed lax enforcement in other local-
ities. In January, Izvestiya reported that investigative
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raids into three Russian provincial areas-Perm',
Arkhangel'sk, and Kuibyshev-revealed that the
campaign's momentum appeared to be "drying up"
and lambasted local officials for attempting to "sabo-
tage" the campaign while hiding behind a facade of
formalistic compliance. Other Soviet newspaper arti-
cles have criticized shortcomings in enforcement else-
where in the Russian Republic-including Novgorod,
Bryansk, and Vladimir.
In general, regional lapses in enforcement probably
merely reflect tension between policymakers in Mos-
cow and lower level operatives saddled with the
onerous burden of carrying out a policy that taxes
local resources and provokes popular complaints. But,
in one case, local noncompliance may reflect resis-
tance to the program, or to Gorbachev himself, within
the Politburo. US Embassy officers traveling in the
Ukraine have observed substantial noncompliance in
that republic, where party boss Shcherbitskiy has
reportedly been at odds with Gorbachev on a number
of issues. A recently published report of a Ukrainian
Central Committee discussion of the antialcohol cam-
paign gave unusual emphasis to the upgrading of
consumer alternatives and neglected the law enforce-
ment thrust of the campaign-perhaps suggesting a
desire among Ukrainian officials to deemphasize pu-
nitive aspects of the campaign.
There are also reports of lax enforcement in the
Caucasus republics of Georgia and Armenia. It is
possible that the regime is not attempting to push the
campaign as hard in these republics because alcohol
abuse is less of a problem than in the Slavic republics.
But speeches of officials from these republics, where
the Soviet wine industry is centered, indicate that
economic adjustments necessitated by the campaign
are creating hardship for some localities, and these
difficulties may have given rise to local evasion
Maintaining Momentum
In coming months the regime will be confronted with
serious challenges as it attempts to consolidate and
expand its successes in the antialcohol campaign. The
decreased availability and increased price of state-
supplied alcohol has increased incentives for black
marketing and corruption. Although the regime's
increased vigilance against illegal alcohol dealers so
far appears to have had some deterrent effect, black-
market networks are beginning to adjust to increased
public demand for samogon. With illegal liquor sell-
ing for two to three times the state price, private
operators will certainly move in to fill at least some of
the gap in state supplies. The bribes offered to
officials who cooperate with illegal traders will un-
doubtedly increase. Not only the antialcohol policy,
but also the regime's campaigns to curtail corruption
and shore up law and order, will be tested by the
increased profitability of trafficking in illegal alcohol.
The antialcohol measures have also increased the
chances of spontaneous outbreaks of protest, especial-
ly among factory and construction workers who are
among the heaviest drinkers and who regard the right
to drink as part of the implicit social contract between
state and society. The threat of industrial disorder will
increase if Gorbachev moves to adopt other policy
changes under discussion-such as a more differenti-
ated wage structure or incentives or requirements for
managers to fire redundant labor-that would jeopar-
dize worker benefits and job security
Decreased purchases of alcohol will increase the
surplus of money chasing an inadequate supply of
consumer goods, which could have a strong inflation-
ary effect. Gorbachev must find a means of soaking
up excess purchasing power and of making up the
budgetary deficit created by declining liquor sales.
The hike in liquor prices announced in August will
facilitate the economic readjustment, but other mea-
sures may also be necessary. Price increases or cur-
rency reforms are available options in theory, but such
measures would be politically difficult in practice.
They would require the regime to remove subsidies on
basic commodities that the population has come to
'take for granted.
These challenges will severely test the leadership's
commitment. The possibility cannot be excluded that
societal tensions will mount to the point of pressuring
the regime to abandon the campaign altogether
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Figure 3. Soviet Samogon Production a Kitchen
Handicraft-Schematic of an Apparatus
Translation:-Are we brewing?-Of course not!
On balance, however, there is a reasonably good
chance that the regime will be able to sustain the
antialcohol campaign at its current level for some
time. The Gorbachev program commands broader
support than any previous Soviet campaign against
alcohol. Although Gorbachev recognizes there are
major limits to his ability to effect social changes, he
also knows that many Soviets believe vigorous initia-
tives in domestic policy are long overdue, that his
allies and clients constitute a majority on the Politbu-
ro, and that the personnel changes he has made so far
have increased the incentive of lower level officials to
heed Moscow's directives.
Given continued leadership resolve and intelligent
management of the campaign, the regime has an
opportunity to realize what appear to be its minimal
objectives: sharply curtailing public drunkenness,
drinking on the job, drunk driving, and conspicuous
alcohol consumption by elites. Such an achievement
could have a significant effect on labor productivity,
result in lower crime and mortality rates, and improve
family life in general
and control samogon consumption effectively.
If the leadership attempts to move beyond these
minimal objectives to pursue a prohibition program, it
will surely fail. Public opinion strongly opposes a
policy of abstinence. One study conducted by Soviet
sociologists in 1985 indicated that 97 percent of those
surveyed approved moderate drinking. Another Soviet
poll in 1982 found that 90 percent of the women and
95 percent of the men questioned were opposed to
prohibition. A prohibition policy would alienate the
public at large, lead to pervasive citizen defiance, and
overwhelm the capacity of the police to enforce the
law. Even if the leadership embarked on a course of
extreme repression-sharply expanding police powers
and personnel, extending and systematizing networks
of citizen informers, rationing sugar-the barriers to
eradicating drinking altogether would be insurmount-
able. In particular, it would be impossible to monitor
Political Implications for Gorbachev
The stakes in the antialcohol campaign are high for
Gorbachev personally. He has set for himself the
ambitious objective of reviving Soviet socialism-by
revitalizing the economy, the society, the ideology,
and the party itself. Sustaining the antialcohol cam-
paign at its current level would reinforce other mea-
sures he is taking to shore up public and elite
confidence in the system, demonstrating that the
leadership had the will to tackle difficult problems
and that the days of regime inertia under Brezhnev
were over. Achieving the minimal objectives of the
campaign would also facilitate the achievement of
Gorbachev's goals in particular areas-law enforce-
ment, labor discipline, and economic productivity.
Gains in controlling the alcohol problem would give
Gorbachev a political boost even if they proved impos-
sible to sustain over the long haul.
If the antialcohol measures produce widespread social
unrest or lead to large-scale removals of culpable
officials, private grumbling within the elite could
expand into politically dangerous opposition to the
campaign. Under these circumstances, Gorbachev
would probably be able to back away from the
campaign without losing face altogether. He has
allowed Ligachev to assume a prominent public role in
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promoting the campaign, and Ligachev's close identi-
fication with the drive against alcohol would probably
enable Gorbachev to deflect some of the blame for
failure. Gorbachev would not need to renounce the
campaign publicly but would probably distance him-
self from its excesses, by claiming they were the
consequence of overzealous party operatives, and al-
low the campaign to wind down. Past Soviet leaders
have used this tactic to change unpopular policies.
Thus, Stalin slowed down collectivization in the 1930s
by publicly expressing regret that lower officials had
become so "dizzy with success" as to resort to extreme
measures.
Nevertheless, Gorbachev would not be able to escape
political damage if the campaign failed. Soviet elites
and many Soviet citizens are paying close attention to
Gorbachev's early policy initiatives, some of them
hopeful that he will be able to deliver on his promises,
some of them skeptical that he will turn out to be
much different from his predecessors. If the campaign
dies, Gorbachev's reputation for tough and effective
leadership will suffer. Popular respect for him will
decline and lower level elites will be given a signal
that directives from Moscow can, in some cases, be
evaded.
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