SOLVING THE SOVIET LIVESTOCK FEED DILEMMA: KEY TO MEETING FOOD PROGRAM TARGETS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Solving the Soviet Livestock
Feed Dilemma: Key To Meeting
Food Program Targets
PRQ7FX.Z' NU&u~ktt
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PAGE NUMBERS
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES 5S )
DISSEM DATE
EX'T'RA ODPIES
RECORD
Secret
SOV 86-10003
January 1986
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ILLEGIB
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Food Program Targets
Solving the Soviet Livestock
Feed Dilemma: Key To Meeting
Economic Performance Division, SOVAO
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
SOV 86-10003
Januari1986
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Solving the Soviet Livestock
Feed Dilemma: Key To Meeting
Food Program Targets
Key Judgments In large measure, Soviet consumers will judge General Secretary Gorba-
Information available chev's commitment to their well-being by his ability to put more meat on
as of 23 October 1985 the table. The Food Program-advanced by Brezhnev in 1982, strongly
was used in this report.
endorsed by Gorbachev, and largely repeated in recently published targets
for the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90~-calls for boosting per capita meat
consumption by 17 percent over the next five years. Such an increase would
contrast sharply with the near stagnation in meat availability over most of
the last decade. Achieving this goal-and we believe the chances are good,
barring bad weather-would go a long way toward boosting popular
support for Gorbachev's regime and, by implication, his calls for greater ef-
fort on the part of the Soviet work force.
Between 1975 and 1983 Moscow was unable to sustain annual increases in
per capita meat availability even with record imports of grains and meat.
Despite outlays of hard currency for these commodities averaging nearly
$5 billion annually since 1975, Soviet consumers have only a little more
meat than they had then. Moreover, the domestic budgetary drain has been
increasing rapidly. The leadership has insisted on maintaining stable,
relatively low prices in state retail stores even in the face of rapidly rising
costs of producing meat. As a result, subsidies paid to farms for producing
meat increased from about 13 billion rubles in 1975 to 21 billion rubles in
1984.
Chronic shortages of all types of animal feeds have been a major constraint
on domestic meat production, but meat output also has suffered from a
substantial imbalance among those feeds available-high-protein feeds
such as soybeans, concentrates such as grain, and roughages. Because of
this dietary imbalance-due, in part, to misplaced emphasis on the
importance of grain in animal diets-Soviet livestock take twice as long to
achieve market weight as those in the United States while requiring 1.5 to
2 times as much feed to do so.
To increase the output of product per farm animal, Gorbachev has moved
aggressively to implement Food Program initiatives that emphasize the use
of roughages and protein in animal diets, provide the resources-including
additional fertilizer-for increased production of these components, and
enhance feed quality by improving facilities for processing and storage of
feeds.
Secret
SOV 86-10003
Januari' 1986
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We believe that Moscow will make enough progress on these initiatives to
result at least in larger supplies of better balanced feed rations per animal.
Thus, even with little or no improvement in the rate at which farm animals
convert feed to product, larger supplies of feed per animal, together with
greater proportional use of roughages in the feed ration, should result in an
increase in meat per animal and milk per cow. This, in turn, should both
help hold down steadily rising meat production costs and put more meat on
the table.
Nonetheless, under most scenarios, Western grain will still be needed to
achieve the ambitious 1990 meat production goals. The amount of required
imports, as always, will depend in large measure on weather conditions:
? Our most likely scenario is for average weather and a continuation of the
recent trend in fertilizer deliveries. Meeting 1990 meat production
targets under these conditions would require some 40 million tons of
grain imports, even with increased quantities of domestic feed per
animal. A qualitative improvement in the composition of feed rations,
however, particularly an increase in the protein content, could lower feed
conversion ratios slightly and, in turn, reduce import demand to some 30-
35 million metric tons of grain and save increasingly scarce hard
currency.
? Very good weather, complemented by a boost in yields of grain and
roughage from more fertilizer and accompanied by a smaller share of
grain in feed rations, could totally obviate the need for Western grain
imports.
? Poor weather during the period, particularly if accompanied by failures
to boost fertilizer supplies, would force Moscow to cut back on its meat
production goals. Hard currency constraints alone would preclude im-
porting the quantities of grain needed-some $8 billion worth (in 1985
prices) in 1990-to offset domestic production shortfalls.
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Importance of the Livestock Sector
Feed: Key to Livestock Productivity
Feed Production Lags
Reducing the Protein Shortage
Gains in Feed Availability
... But Other Outcomes Are Possible
B. The Protein Content of Soviet Livestock Feed
1. USSR: Output of Livestock Products, Selected Years 2
2. Projected Fulfillment in 1990 of Soviet Plans for Feed Availability 9
3. USSR: Roughage Availability-Plan and Actual 1 1
A-1. USSR: Selected Statistics on Feed and Livestock Herds 18
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Solving the Soviet Livestock
Feed Dilemma: Key To Meeting
Food Program Targets
General Secretary Gorbachev is continuing the Soviet
leadership's longstanding emphasis on developing the
livestock sector and increasing per capita consumption
of meat. Progress toward these goals has long been
hindered by factors such as unsuitability of livestock
breeds; lack of adequate veterinary service and sup-
plies, daily care, and sanitation; shortages of skilled
labor, machinery, and equipment; and shifting gov-
ernment policies. The most limiting factor, however,
has been a chronic shortage of feeds and an imbalance
among the major feed components. The imbalance in
feed rations includes a serious protein deficit, which in
large part explains why the fattening process takes
twice as long as in the United States and requires 1.5
to 2 times as much feed.
To reduce the disparities between supply and demand
for meat, the Food Program, first put forth by Leonid
Brezhnev in 1982 and supported by his three succes-
sors, calls for boosting per capita meat consumption
from the present 60 kilograms to 70 kilograms in
1990.' Gorbachev clearly recognizes the need for
increased labor productivity throughout the economy
and sees an improved quality of diet as an important
factor in meeting that need. At an April 1985 Central
Committee plenum, he stated that the Food Program
"required particular attention" and "could not be put
aside." His numerous complaints about foot-dragging
and "departmental interests" thwarting the develop-
ment of agriculture and related industries highlight
his concern. Moreover, Food Program proponents are
encouraged by his repeated statements on the need to
improve support services not only to farm production
but also to the transportation, storage, and handling
Food accounts for about half of Soviet household
expenditures on consumer goods and services. The
availability of meat-together with increasing variety
in the diet-is a key factor by which Soviet consumers
judge their well-being. Although money incomes have
grown steadily, the leadership has continued its policy
of maintaining stable, relatively low prices in state
retail stores-where most meat is sold-in the face of
stagnating meat output. Consequently, demand for
meat has grown far more rapidly than supply. Con-
sumer dissatisfaction with the resultant queuing and
chronic shortage has negatively affected labor produc-
tivity.
Keeping retail prices constant-the last increase was
in 1962-has also led to substantial budgetary drain.
Subsidies for meat alone reached 21 billion rubles in
1984, compared with an estimated 13 billion rubles in
1975. According to one Soviet economist, the cost of
production and procurement of beef was quadruple
and that of pork double the retail price in 1983.
network.
data.
Successful grain crops allowed Moscow to increase
meat supplies during the last half of the 1960s
(table 1). In 1972, however, in an effort to sustain
annual gains in meat production in the face of a crop
shortfall, the leadership resorted to major grain im-
ports. In 1975 the USSR responded to a widespread,
drought-driven grain crop failure by importing record
quantities of grain and by reducing herds drastically
to cut the demand for grain. Smaller herds led to
reduced meat output in 1976. Not until 1978 did
meat output regain the trend level implied by 1960-75
Meat con-
sumption is stated in terms of the Soviet definition, which includes
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Table I
USSR: Output of Livestock Products,
Selected Years
Meat a
(million metric
tons)
Milk
(million metric
tons)
Eggs
(billions)
1970
12.3
40.7
1975
15.0
57.4
56.2
61.2
1978
15.5
1979
15.3
93.2
1980
15.1
90.9
67.9
1981
15.2
88.9
70.0
a In addition to beef, pork, mutton and lamb, rabbit, and game, the
Soviet definition of meat includes poultry meat, edible offals, and
slaughter fat. To be comparable to Western measures (retail
weight), the quantity should be reduced by roughly 18 percent.
b Estimated. Based on 10-month results.
Figure 1
USSR: Availability of Meat
Per Capita, 1960-84 a
Kilograms
60
Domestic
output
a Soviet official statistics on meat production are adjusted to conform to Western
definitions of retail weight (trim, including slaughter fat and hone. is removed).
During 1979-82, annual meat production lagged be-
low the 1978 peak. High import levels of grain could
not offset a four-year period of poor-to-mediocre grain
crops. The regime-anxious to avoid a repetition of
the 1976-78 experience-chose to sacrifice growth in
meat production to maintain herd numbers, accepting
the lower animal productivity associated with smaller
feed rations. Only by importing record quantities of
meat-an average of about 900,000 metric tons annu-
ally during the 1980-82 period-did Moscow keep per
capita meat consumption close to the previous record
achieved in 1975 (figure 1).
The shift in emphasis from distress slaughter to herd
maintenance was a gamble; disease or bad weather
could have killed large numbers of animals weakened
by reduced feed rations, particularly as production of
other feeds also stagnated. The gamble paid off. Meat
output reached a new high in 1983, aided by record
forage production in 1982 and 1983, a better grain
crop in 1983, and large imports of grain. In 1983 per
capita meat availability-domestic production of 16.4
million tons, adjusted for slaughter fat and trim, plus
an increase of net imports to 960,000 tons-rose by
almost 6 percent. Further growth occurred in 1984,
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Figure 2
USSR: Growth in Cost of Production of
Livestock Products, 1975 and 1984a
Collective farms
180
a Derived from Soviet statistics on the ruble cost of producing 1 ton of
liveweight gain. 1 ton of milk, and 1.000 eggs.
with meat output reaching 17.0 million tons. Yet, just
to maintain per capita availability at roughly the 1983
level, production was again supplemented by large
imports.
Feed: Key to Livestock Productivity
Livestock feed comprises concentrates (feeds with
high nutritive content such as grain and oilseed meals)
and roughages (feeds with high cellulose and/or water
content such as hay, silage, potatoes and other feed
roots, and pasture) (see inset).' Animals gain weight
more rapidly and require less feed per unit of gain
2 Concentrates as reported in Soviet sources exclude those that are
of animal origin-meat and bonemeal, fishmeal, milk, and so on.
State farms
180
when the feed ration contains sufficient energy (calo-
ries) and is correctly balanced between concentrates
and roughages as well as in nutrient content-protein,
minerals, vitamins, trace elements, and so on. A
ration is considered fully balanced when it achieves
the maximum output of product for a given quantity
of feed units in the most economical combinations.'
' There is no one balanced ration for each animal or group of
animals. The same output can be achieved through varying combi-
nations if adequate supplies of needed feeds and supplements are
available. This is not the rule for Soviet farms, which often are
forced to feed uneconomical rations because elements are not
available. In market economies, farmers adjust their feed rations
according to relative cost of the various feeds and supplements, thus
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Feeds Glossary
Concentrates
"Crop "feeds containing a large percentage of digest-
ible nutrients and relatively small percentages of
water or fiber:
? Grain.
? Oilseed meals.
? Milling byproducts.
? Dried residues of the starch, beet sugar, and
brewing-distilling industries.
? Dried grass meals.
Roughages (Forages)
"Crop "feeds high in moisture or fiber content and
relatively low in digestible nutrient content:
? Coarse feeds- "crop "feeds with a high fiber
content:
- Hay.
- Haylage-chopped green feed partially dried
after cutting. Must be stored in airtight facili-
ties to preserve quality.
- Straw.
- Stover-cornstalks.
? Succulents-"crop"feeds with a high water
content:
- Silage.
- Green chop-chopped green feeds such as
grasses and tops from root crops, fed directly as
they are produced.
- Potatoes.
- Sugar beets.
- Forage roots such as turnips.
- Melons.
- Wet beet pulp.
- Distiller's mash.
? Summer green feed-a Soviet category offeed that
includes pasture and succulent feeds such as silage.
Animal and Synthetic Feeds
Surplus animal products, byproducts of the meat,
dairy, and fish processing industries, and industrially
produced protein supplements.
? Milk.
? Skim milk.
? Buttermilk.
? Whey.
? Fishmeal.
? Meat and bonemeal.
? Single-cell protein.
Balanced Ration
A ration that provides the needed proportion and
amount of all the required nutrients to produce the
maximum quantity of product per unit of feed con-
sumed in the most economical combination.
Energy
Derived from feed and used to meet daily mainte-
nance needs. Any surplus is used for growth or work.
Energy is usually evaluated in terms of calories and
is primarily supplied by carbohydrates (organic com-
pounds composed of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen)
and fats, but also by protein.
Calorie
The amount of energy as heat required to raise the
temperature of 1 gram of water by 1 degree Centi-
grade.
Protein
Essential to all plant and animal life. Comes, in
varying amounts, from plant, animal, and industrial
sources.
Feed Unit
The USSR defines a feed unit as containing the
quantity of energy available in a kilogram of oats.
Other feeds are converted to "oat-equivalent "feed
units by relating their energy content to that of
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rations, without addressing the need to improve pro-
Moscow's need for grain imports results largely from
the size of the domestic grain crop, although a
number of other factors-such as size of animal
inventories, availability of other feeds, changes in
feeding efficiencies, and quantities of meat, milk, and
eggs to be produced-help determine the need. Quan-
tities of grain needed for seed, food, and industrial
needs have been relatively stable over the past two
decades and are not likely to change much through
the 1980s. The effect on grain requirements of a
steady decline in per capita consumption of grain
products is being offset by the increasing share of
higher quality flour being produced, a trend that is
expected to continue. More high-quality white bread
and assorted bakery goods needing low-extraction
grades offlour are now available.
In contrast, the livestock sector has been expanding
rapidly since Brezhnev launched his first program to
improve consumer diets in 1965. The emphasis on
increased feeding of concentrates led to a more than
doubling in quantities of grain feed since 1965. In the
face of lagging grain output, central planners until
recently did not emphasize the production of other
feed crops sufficiently to meet the growing demand
for feed. Consequently, Moscow has resorted to im-
ports of grain to make up part of the shortfall in
needed energy. Grain is widely traded, easily trans-
ported, and to an extent can be substituted for other
types of feed in many feed rations. Roughly 55
percent of total available grain (production and im-
ports) is now used as livestock feed. Clearly, the
USSR's longtime goal of agricultural self-sufficiency
is secondary to that of producing ever larger quanti-
ties of meat.
Rations that are out of balance add substantially to
the cost of livestock products, because larger daily
feed rations are required to achieve the same amount
of product-meat, milk, and eggs. Soviet writers
estimate the cost of feeding unbalanced rations may
be higher by more than one-third. In an attempt to
match US livestock feeding efficiencies, Soviet animal
nutritionists have stressed-too strongly in our opin-
ion-the importance of increasing the absolute
amounts and the share of concentrates in livestock
tein content.
Moreover, costs of meat, milk, and egg production
have risen substantially since 1975 (figure 2). In part
this results from the increasing cost of feed, which
makes up roughly 50 percent of the cost of production.
For example, special prices for mixed feeds sold to
state and collective farms were abolished in 1975. At
the same time, however, Soviet agricultural research-
ers note that over the last decade most of the growth
in production of livestock products has been achieved
by increases in numbers of animals. This, in turn,
requires additional expenditures for buildings, for
operation of facilities, and for labor, which have
contributed to the production-cost escalation.
Feed Production Lags
Despite some growth in production of nongrain feeds,
Moscow has also been forced in recent years to import
large quantities of other feedstuffs as well as grain
(see inset).' During the five-year period of 1979-83,
imports of nongrain feedstuffs averaged nearly $675
million per year and totaled over 7 million tons of
soybeans, almost 3 million tons of soybean meal, 0.75
million tons of mixed feed, and 0.50 million tons of
manioc.5 Imports thus effectively constituted about
one-fourth of total concentrates fed during the 1979-
83 period.'
Even with these imports, feed-in terms of energy
available per animal-was still nearly 20 percent
below announced Soviet standards.' The Soviets may
have overshot their aim by focusing on expanding the
use of grain in feed rations. Such increases did not
of feed.
` Problems in the use of manioc (tapioca), the cessation of the US
partial embargo on sales of grain and other feedstuffs to the USSR,
and the world surplus of grain and consequent favorable grain
purchase prices combined to turn Moscow away from continued
large imports of manioc.
thus releasing domestically produced grain for feed.
' Soviet standards appear reasonably comparable to US standards.
Soviet feeding texts indicate 33 quintals of feed units annually per
standard animal (cow equivalent): US feeding guides suggest 32 to
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Figure 3
Structure of Soviet and US
Livestock Herds, 1982-83a
Figure 4
?~ r-opnok n nnrlexn~p Hn n
C TaKON renewnON Hain KOr1XO3 6e3 KOPMOB He OcTaHeTCA!Is
,~ l/narr tarot rnrtn0,rn m:Clrri lrrd Pinratrrrnrni hrr ~nnr llrri llrldrA lb, v~ttr
frill prnridr.
Cattle, excluding cows rations Poultry, rations are 85-to-
are less than 20-percent 95-percent concentrates
concentrates
a Total numbers of cows. cattle excluding cows, hogs. and poultry including broilers
for each countre are weighted by relative Soyiet feed requirements per type of
animal to derive share of total herds Sheep and goats are not included in the
calculations because they are primarily forage consumers these animals account
for nearly 10 percent of Soviet herds but less than I percent of US herds.
~'"Wfill such tecluutlogy, Out kolkhoi won't he left without Iced
this rear."
result in corresponding increases in average animal
productivity because of the continued shortage of
energy and inefficiency of rations in terms of balance!
For example, during 1971-80 the use of grain for milk
production rose by 17 percent, or nearly twice as fast
as milk output; the use of grain for cattle feeding
increased by 35 percent, while beef production grew
by only 22 percent. The share of concentrates is now
about 34 percent in the Soviets' overall livestock feed
supply-close to the share in the US supply, which
has ranged from 34 to 41 percent since 1975. Howev-
er, the herd structure in the USSR differs markedly
from that in the United States (figure 3). A simplified
' Our analysis also indicates that productivity gains from the
proliferation of large-scale specialized livestock production facili-
ties, which improve feeding efficiency by as much as 50 percent,
according to Soviet agricultural specialists, were largely offset by
lower efficiency in the remainder of the livestock economy, which
suffered shortages of important feed supplements because the
calculation indicates that, if cows, other cattle, hogs,
and poultry in the USSR were fed the same concen-
trate-roughage balance as their US counterparts,
concentrates would account for only 25 percent of the
total-a reduction in their use from the 142-million-
ton average fed during 1980-83 to 110 million tons.
Perhaps recognizing that the steady increases in
feeding of concentrates had not helped to achieve
targets, Soviet leaders in recent years have stressed
the importance of feeding forage crops and even of
reducing quantities of concentrates fed. At the July
1978 agricultural plenum, then General Secretary
Brezhnev highlighted the need to improve the quality
and quantity of forage crops. But the several decrees
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that followed had little effect as even a cartoon
published in Krokodil, the Soviet satirical journal,
illustrates (figure 4).
By late 1982, however, the priority that farms gave
roughage production apparently was upgraded. Three
general factors undoubtedly contributed to this
change:
? The Food Program directed that increased quanti-
ties of chemical fertilizer and additional investment
in machinery and storage facilities be allocated to
expanding roughage production.
? The repeated warning to farms not to count on state
stocks of grain to cover onfarm feed shortages,
combined with the series of poor grain crops, could
have caused farms to devote more effort to produc-
tion of harvested roughages.
? Good weather in 1982 and 1983 led to a quick
payoff from increased emphasis on forage produc-
tion, giving farmers the confidence to continue
expanded production and use of forage.
According to the Soviet agricultural press, farm man-
agers are well aware of the improved animal produc-
tivity that can be achieved by feeding better balanced
livestock rations. At the same time, Gorbachev's
complaints about foot-dragging suggest he feels that
forage production has not been stressed sufficiently.
Improving the Protein Content
Although the USSR has recently made progress in
achieving larger per head feed rations and a better
balance between concentrates and roughages, head-
way in improving protein content has been lagging.
Soviet livestock specialists indicated that feed rations
in 1980 were roughly 15 percent short of the quantity
of protein needed for fully balanced rations. Since
then, protein content
has been slowly increasing.' To have eliminated the
protein deficit with soybean meal-a readily available
high-protein feed-would have required almost 11.5
protein content was up to 100 grams, about 10 percent short. (We
think this calculation refers to mid-1984.) See appendix B for a
million tons of imports in 1980, far in excess of the
438,000 tons imported. Upgrading the protein content
to the norm would have, in turn, reduced the 20-
percent calorie deficit to 5 percent or less. The
improved balance in the ration would have raised
productivity, in turn lowering the ruble cost of pro-
duction. Although the resulting reductions in amount
of feed required and length of the period needed to
bring animals to market weight cannot be quantified,
the direction toward improved efficiency is clear.
Western observers have long urged Soviet imports of
soybeans and soybean meal as a "simple and quick"
solution to the protein deficit.'? Moscow, however,
refused to do so until the end of the 1970s, perhaps
because the mixed-feed industry did not have ade-
quate mixing facilities and trained workers to process
the meal efficiently. Moreover, shipping and handling
losses could be substantial. The sharp reduction in
soybean meal imports from 2.3 million tons in 1983 to
an estimated 200,000 tons in 1984 indicates Moscow's
earlier reluctance to import large quantities was well
founded. Major domestic sources of high-protein
feeds-those containing 20 percent or more of their
weight as crude (total) protein-include nonprotein
nitrogen (which converts to protein in the digestive
process), oilseed meals, animal products such as meat
and bonemeal, and single-cell protein." Less concen-
trated but valuable sources of protein include milk
and crops such as pulses, alfalfa, and clover.
The USSR lacks the agronomic conditions to produce
large quantities of soybeans; production averages
about 500,000 tons annually compared with over a
50-million-ton average US crop during the 1981-84
"? D. Gale Johnson, The Soviet Impact on World Grain Trade,
British-North American Committee, USA, May 1977, pp. 12-19.
" Crude protein refers to all the nitrogenous compounds in feed;
digestible protein refers to protein utilized by the animal and is
estimated by coefficients derived over time from feeding trials.
Single-cell protein is a collective term including protein-rich micro-
organisms such as bacteria, algae, and fungi (yeast and molds)
grown on byproducts of oil, on methanol, or on organic wastes from
agriculture and industry. For a discussion of high-protein feeds, see
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period. Substantial amounts of other oilseed meals
(particularly sunflower and cottonseed) are produced,
but the quantity is far less than needed to fully
alleviate the protein deficit.
To increase domestic supplies of high-protein feed, the
USSR, over two decades ago, chose to develop the
single-cell protein (SCP) industry (see inset). Although
both startup and operational costs are high for this
specialized product, the long-run gains for the USSR,
with its aversion to becoming dependent on the West,
are substantial:
? Protein content of feed rations is increased with no
dependence on foreign suppliers.
? The product is handled and stored with little diffi-
culty and can be easily incorporated into feeds.
? Finally, there is an increasing body of test results in
the United States indicating that the payoff in
improved efficiency per gram of protein from SCP
is higher than that from oilseed meals. Experimen-
tal work has not yet been able to explain this
phenomenon.
Today, the USSR is by far the world's largest produc-
er of SCP. By 1983, output had reached 1.3 million
tons, and SCP supplied 22 percent of the protein
available from high-protein feeds (figure 5).'2 In con-
trast, only comparatively small amounts of SCP are
produced in the West, because the cost of production
is at least double that of soybean meal, making it
uneconomic for Western feeding operations. There
also are widespread fears of the possible carcinogenic
properties of SCP produced from hydrocarbon
sources. Soviet specialists argue these fears are base-
less.
"Soviet sources indicate that only a negligible amount of SCP is
being used experimentally to develop foods suitable for human
Development of Single-Cell
Protein in the USSR
The USSR began experimental production of cellu-
lose-based single-cell protein (SCP) from hydrolyzed
straw in 1936. A Soviet textbook reports that by 1943
industrial production had begun. The initial impetus
was to provide high-protein food for human ingestion.
After World War II, the emphasis shifted to supple-
menting annual feed. Experiments to produce SCP
from liquid paraffin (obtained from crude oil) began
in the mid-1960s.
The USSR is in a good position to undertake devel-
opment of the SCP industry. Raw materials, particu-
larly hydrocarbon and agricultural wastes, are readi-
ly available. Until recently, however, production fell
far short of plan. Average annual output during the
1976-80 period, for example, was at least 25 percent
short of plan, and press comment noted that output in
1981 and 1982 also 'failed to meet plan. " In mid-
1984, however, a Soviet official claimed that 1983
production-1.3 million tons-had exceeded the plan
by 10,000 tons and that first-half 1984 production
had met the plan. Output reached 1.4 million tons in
1984.
Meeting the 1985 target of 1.9 million tons is not
likely. In common with most industrial experience in
the USSR, growth in production of SCP has been
hindered byfailure to commission new capacity on
time and by shortfalls in supplies of raw materials,
frequently because of transportation difficulties.
Many of the raw materials corn cobs, rice husks,
straw, wood shavings, and sawdust-are compara-
tively bulky but lightweight, and trucking enterprises
(which are paid by weight) are unwilling to haul them.
Shortfalls have also occurred in deliveries of hydro-
carbon raw materials. Finally, production of SCP has
been held back by problems with equipment corrosion
and the aging of the older plants.
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Figure 5
USSR: Importance of Single-Cell
Protein in Supplies of High-
Protein Feeds, 1965, 1975, and 1984a
Percent
Oilseed meals
0 Single-cell protein
Plans To Increase and Improve Feed Supplies
Growth in Production
The 1981-85 Five-Year Plan called for increasing the
supply of feed to 500-509 million tons of feed units by
1985, and the Food Program extended the goals to
540-550 million tons by 1990. Achieving even the
lower end of the targets for 1985 (500 million tons)
and 1990 (540 million tons) is unlikely. Feed use
during the 1981-84 period averaged nearly 415 mil-
lion tons of feed units annually, far short of the 1985
target." Late in 1985, supplies of feed-from a 200-
million-ton grain crop, a new record in production of
Table 2
Projected Fulfillment in 1990 of
Soviet Plans for Feed Availability a
Total feed
Concentrates
At Least 50 to Less Than
90 Percent 89 Percent 50 Percent
of Plan of Plan of Plan
Concentrate- X
roughage balance
Protein content b X
Other high- X
protein crops
Single-cell X
protein c
a Given our most likely scenario, grain imports of 40 million tons
and no soybean imports
b Norm level rather than plan. Total protein content is closer to
plan than the components listed because several important compo-
nents, such as milk and fishmeal, that already are in adequate
supply are not included.
Assumes planned growth for 1986-90 is the same as that in the
revised 1981-85 Plan.
harvested roughages, and roughly 40 million tons of
grain imports (calendar year)--suggest that total feed
used during the year will be up roughly 3 percent over
1984."
Current feed conversion ratios indicate that about 500
million tons of feed units would be sufficient to
produce the livestock products and support the herd
growth targeted for 1990. Because this quantity is
" Our estimated 40 million tons of grain imports in calendar year
1985 includes 28 million tons imported during January-June,
needed because of the lower 1984 grain crop, and 12 million tons
Total feed use reached a record 410 million tons of feed units in
1978 and then fell back to about 400 million tons for the next four
years. Increased supplies of both grain and roughages in 1983
boosted reported feed use to a new record 424 million tons, which
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somewhat less than the Food Program target, we may
understate the Soviet potential to increase livestock
production in the sections ("Concentrates" and
"Roughages") that follow." Alternatively, the Soviets
may not attempt to rigorously follow an integrated
plan. In a recent television interview, a leading acade-
mician of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences said,
"We have not had balanced plans for years," and that
the plan is used primarily to exert pressure on manag-
We believe that the Soviets will have mixed success in
carrying out their ambitious plans for increasing the
availability of feed. Our estimates of the likely degree
of plan fulfillment for both the quantity and quality of
major categories of feed are summarized in table 2. If
Moscow continues importing large quantities of grain,
roughly 90 percent of the 1990 target for availability
of total feed will be achieved. Protein content will also
come close to its target but will still be 5 to 8 percent
short of the Soviet norm. Milk, meat and bonemeal,
and fishmeal will continue to be major sources of high
protein supplements, but availability of protein from
domestically produced oilseeds, other high-protein
crops such as pulses, and SCP will fall well below
plan. A more detailed review of each of these feed
categories is presented below.
Concentrates. The share of concentrates in total feed
used dropped from 36 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in
1982 and to just under 34 percent in 1984.
"The difference may arise from a number of reasons. Perhaps the
plans for feed production are not derived from planned product
output but from plans for herd growth and normed quantities of
feed per animal; perhaps feed production plans and feed consump-
tion plans are not checked for consistency, particularly those for the
private sector, which still produces about 30 percent of total meat,
milk, and eggs; perhaps the current reported feed conversion ratios
do not represent real averages but a better-than-normal situation.
(Soviet animals are still largely marketed at lower weights than
most Western animals and gain weight slowly, although, according
to Soviet textbooks, weight is one of the criteria used in planning
feed needs.)
Finally, it is also unlikely that feed for livestock not included
in the calculation-camels, oxen, buffalo, mules, and reindeer
account for much of the difference. On I January 1971, the most
recent data available, there were fewer than 4 million such animals,
and well over half of these were reindeer. There were 7.5 million
The goal of maintaining the one-third share of con-
centrates in the overall livestock feed supply during
1986-90 implies an absolute increase planned in con-
centrate feeding of 13-14 million tons from 1985 to
1990 (including 1 1-12 million tons of grain). But if the
grain area harvested remains constant and if our
"most likely" estimate of the increase in grain yields
is correct, grain production would increase only by
some 10 million tons from the 1985 trend level (190
million tons) over the next five years.16 Consequently,
in the absence of improvements in feeding efficiency
or adjustment to differing needs for concentrates
among different classes of animals, grain imports
associated with the 1990 crop would have to be
roughly 10 million tons higher than the 30 million
tons associated with the 1985 crop."
" Long-term weather patterns and trends in fertilizer delivery to
agriculture suggest that Soviet grain production during the 1986-90
period probably will average 195 million tons annually, reaching
rou hly 200 million tons in 1990.
Largely because of unusually favorable
precipitation during the crop season, we estimate 1985 grain output
was about 10 million tons above the long-term trend. The estimate
falls well within the 95-percent probability range or within 15
million tons of the projected crop (op. cit., p. 11).
" These calculations are sensitive to assumptions about feeding
efficiency-the change in quantity of feed required per unit of
output. In view of the relatively stable feed conversion ratios in the
USSR since 1970, we believe the conversion coefficients are likely
to remain close to current levels for the balance of the decade unless
plans to increase supplies of domestically produced high-protein
feeds are at least partially achieved. If, however, feed conversion
ratios for each type of meat, for eggs, and for milk were to improve
by 0.5 percent per year over the five-year period, the decreased
need for feed would reduce the requirement for grain imports by
some 10 million tons in 1990. A 0.5-percent annual improvement is
roughly the rate achieved by several West European countries in
production of pork and eggs over the first half of the 1970s.
Although the West European countries were generally at higher
levels of feeding efficiency in 1970 than are currently observed in
the USSR, many of their practices such as the ways in which
roughages were stored were similar to present Soviet operations.
While there is much room for improvement in feeding efficiency,
we believe that some of the gains anticipated from, say, increased
protein in the feed ration-could be offset by failure to improve
other factors that have been affecting feed quality. For example.
given past practice, upgrading and expansion of storage facilities
sufficiently to preserve nutritional content of increasing quantities
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Table 3
USSR: Roughage Availability-
Plan and Actual
1975
Plan
Actual
Coarse feed
251
238
Hay and haylage
142
NA
Of which:
Hay
NA
79
Succulent feed
449
502
Of which:
Silage
258
171
Pasture fed
NA
387
Summer green feed
762
NA
Succulent and summer green feed
1,211
NA
Succulent feed and pasture fed
NA
888
Gosudarstvennvy pyatiletniv plan razvitiva narodnogo kho-
zravstva SSSR na 1971-1975 godv, Moscow, 1972, p. 175.
h Narodnove khozvav.stvo SSSR v 1980 g., p. 253.
G. C. Gaponenko, Osnovnvve napravleniya razvitiva sel'skogo
khozvavstvo v desvatov pvatiletke, Moscow, 1976, p. 76.
d G. P. Rudenko, Razvitive agropromvshlennogo kompleksa v
odinadtsatov pyatiletke, Moscow, 1982, pp. 42, 44. Ya. P. Ryabov,
.Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoye razvitive SSSR v odninadtsatoy pva-
tiletke, Moscow, 1981, p. 41.
Includes a portion of summer green feed.
Million tons expressed
in physical terms
1980
1985
Plan
Actual
Plan ,i
248
232
NA
159
NA
187 to 192
NA
79
NA
436
586,
NA
254
199
260 to 275
NA
363
NA
747
NA
690
1,183
NA
NA 949
Roughages. Coarse feeds, primarily hay and haylage,
are to supply 20 percent of total feed units in 1985-
an increase from the 15-percent share in 1980. To-
gether with the planned increase in availability of
total feed units, this share implies a growth in coarse
feeds of about two-thirds from 1980 to 1985. Plans for
the second major category of roughages, succulent
feeds, are difficult to interpret because of terminology
and overlapping categories. Succulent feed reported
by the Soviets as "used" includes silage and "summer
green feed" but excludes pasture grazed. The plan
category "summer green feed" in Soviet planning
parlance, however, appears to include the "pasture
fed" category of feed use (table 3). Plans for feed
grazed from pasture are seldom published, nor (except
in rare cases) do data appear on total summer green
feed used. Consequently, any conclusions about meet-
ing plans for these categories are highly tentative. The
1985 plan calls for the share of feed units from
succulent and summer green feed to be roughly the
same as that actually supplied by succulent and
pasture in 1980, implying an increase of about one-
fourth in supply.
The supply of roughages will probably improve, al-
though targets are likely to remain out of reach. As in
the past, several factors militate against meeting
plans:
? Planned fertilizer deliveries are not yet sufficient to
raise yields to the levels needed to meet output
goals.
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? Yield increases from land improvement (irrigation
and drainage) are slow in coming.
? Specialized equipment for harvesting continues in
short supply.
? Storage facilities are woefully insufficient even for
current production levels.
Nonetheless, the shortfall from plan in availability of
roughages is likely to decline from 20 percent in 1980
to an estimated 12 percent in 1990.
A continued slow improvement in supplies of crucial
inputs is probable. Conservatively, growth in produc-
tion of harvested roughages will average about 2
percent annually, somewhat less than the unusually
high average of 2.8 percent achieved during the 1981-
84 period, but above the 1.1-percent average regis-
tered during the 1971-84 period. Quantities of feed
from pastures-which will probably continue to be
the residual claimant for fertilizer, seed, pesticides,
irrigation equipment, and water supply-probably
will be relatively unchanged.
Reducing the Protein Shortage
An obvious short-term solution to the Soviets' live-
stock-feed protein shortage is imported soybean meal;
however, as we have noted, very large quantities
would be required. Such imports would be expen-
sive-for example, 10 million tons at mid-1984 prices
would cost about $1.7 billion, an annual cost that
Moscow could expect to repeat indefinitely-and
would confront the mixed-feed industry with the
technical difficulties inherent in incorporating the
meal into feed rations. Reportedly, problems with
handling, solidification during storage, and high
"shrinkage" (losses) did cause Moscow to draw back
sharply in 1984 from the 2.3-million-ton level posted
by soybean meal imports in 1983. High-level Soviet
officials continue to state, moreover, that the USSR
does not want to become dependent on soy imports.
Moscow plans to increase the protein content of
animal rations in the longer term through three major
domestic production efforts: oilseed meals; other crops
that have a comparatively high-protein content, such
as pulses, alfalfa, and clover; and single-cell protein.
Plans for production of all three groups are ambitious,
and goals appear to be beyond reach. Moreover, we do
not expect substantial increases in the supply of
animal-based protein feeds. If plans to supply the
meat-processing industry with updated and complete
equipment for processing byproducts are carried out,
output of meatmeal and bonemeal could be increased
by at least one-fourth, adding the equivalent of a few
thousand tons of soybean meal as meat production
continues to increase.
Oilseed Meals. The area sown to oilseed crops-
sunflowers, cotton, soy, rape, and so on has been
fairly constant, averaging 10 million hectares annual-
ly during the 1979-84 period. Yields, however, have
shown no increase during this period. The sunflower
and cotton crops supply seed for roughly 85 percent of
oilseed meal produced from domestic resources.
Production of sunflower seed averaged 5.1 million
tons during 1981-84-well below the nearly 6-million-
ton crops of the early I 970s and even further below
plans to produce an average of 6.7 million tons during
the 1981-85 period. Persistent hopes to improve sun-
flower yields have been thwarted by a lack of high-
yielding and disease-resistant hybrid seeds; weather
difficulties (particularly drought during periods cru-
cial to growth); and increasingly frequent outbreaks of
disease (mold and mildew), which are possibly the
result of incorrect crop-rotation practices. For these
reasons, plans to produce 7.2-7.5 million tons of
sunflower seed annually during the 1986-90 period
appear to be too optimistic.
In contrast, cotton production during 1981-84 aver-
aged 9.4 million tons, somewhat above the 1981-85
plan for 9.2 million tons annually. Although currently
available at roughly the planned level, cottonseed is
not so desirable a source of oilseed meal as sunflower
seed because it is low in lysine and several other
important elements. It also contains the substance
gossypol, which is toxic to nonruminant animals such
as hogs and causes mottling of egg yolks if fed to
laying hens.
Soybean production continues to disappoint Soviet
agricultural planners. Agroclimatic conditions are
generally unsuitable; where production is possible,
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yields are less than one-third US yields. Moreover,
incentives for soybean production are lacking. Earlier
plans to produce 1.4 million tons annually during
1981-85 and 2.2-2.3 million tons annually during the
1986-90 period were based on unrealistic expecta-
tions; production averaged only 530,000 tons annually
during the 1981-84 period." The 1986-90 Plan may
be scaled down.
The USSR has usually used rape, which provides
excellent forage, for grazing and green feed; it has
used both the spring crop and an unreported but
probably large area of the winter crop. Soviet plans
call for output of rapeseed to increase to 500,000 tons
in 1985 and 1.5 million tons in 1990. These goals, too,
appear to be overly ambitious; winter rapeseed pro-
duction reached a high of 35,000 tons in 1983;
production of spring rapeseed is not published, but
regional press reports indicate it is insignificant. We
believe rapeseed meal will not add large quantities of
protein to animal rations through the 1980s.
Pulses and Other High-Protein Crops. Plans to in-
crease area sown to pulses to 7.0-7.5 million hectares
in 1985-roughly 50 percent more than was sown in
1980-came close to being achieved. Preliminary
data indicate 6.8 million hectares were planted to
these valuable crops. Much of the increased area is in
the Ukraine where yields have run as much as 50 to
80 percent higher than the countrywide average.
Larger plantings in higher yielding areas and good
moisture raised average yields to an estimated 14
quintals in 1985, only 5 percent short of the record
yield achieved in 1970. Nonetheless, to meet the 1990
production target of 18-20 million tons, a yield in-
crease of about one-third over the 1985 estimated
level would be needed even if the area devoted to
pulses reaches the previous record (10.8 million hect-
ares in 1963). Yields will, however, remain relatively
low, because chronic difficulties in seed selection and
in maintaining seed purity are not likely to be over-
come soon.
Similarly, longer range plans to raise the alfalfa area
to 10 million hectares and the clover area to 8-9
million hectares by 1990 (from 1984's 6.8 and 6.2
million hectares, respectively) are not likely to be met.
Another, perhaps key, factor slowing expansion of
these crops is the limited development of high-yielding
and disease- and pest-resistant varieties. Until recent-
ly, shortages of good-quality seed also hindered pro-
gress. The establishment of specialized seed-produc-
ing farms in the past few years, however, apparently
has been beneficial. In December 1984, TASS report-
ed that collective and state farms' needs for alfalfa
seed will "now be basically satisfied." "
Single-Cell Protein. During the 1981-85 Plan period,
nearly 3 billion rubles were scheduled to be invested
in further development of the microbiological indus-
try. The share to be directed to producing SCP has
not been published, but it undoubtedly is large. SCP
accounts for an estimated two-thirds of the value of
the microbiological industry's production.
Production of single-cell protein was slated to reach
1.9 million tons by 1985-more than double the 1980
level and about one-third more than was produced in
1984. No plans for 1990 have been published. The
numerous chronic shortages of raw materials (particu-
larly of paraffins) for growing SCPs, the slowness in
commissioning new capacity, and "acute problems in
using available capacity" suggest that 1985 plans will
not be met.
Although SCP is not a panacea for the protein deficit
in livestock feed, it will contribute to raising the
protein content of feed rations toward the established
target. For many years to come, however, the avail-
ability of domestically produced oilseed meals and
animal products (particularly milk and skim milk) will
be more important determinants of the overall protein
content of the feed supply.
"This is noteworthy if true. In January 1984, Sei'ska' a rhi:n,
the central agricultural organ, reported that the majority of farms
producing seed failed to meet plans for selling seed to the state. The
article did not quantify the extent of the short fa I
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Gains in Feed Availability
The Food Program's emphasis on expanding forage
crop production and increasing meat output has not
yet had a marked effect on productivity, that is, on
the changing relationship between inputs of feed units
and output of meat, milk, or eggs. When examined in
quantitative terms by comparing aggregated livestock
output with the appropriately weighted quantities of
feed required to produce it, productivity increased by
only 1.2 percent over the 1981-84 period. Since 1980,
feed conversion ratios (state and collective farms only)
for milk have gone up slightly, those for beef have
been relatively constant, and those for pork have gone
Because herds are planned to grow only slowly and we
believe farm managers will adhere to this plan, this
scenario implies a substantial gain in feed per animal
and a slowdown in the rapid rise in production costs
noted since 1975.20 Moreover, the share of concen-
trates would be slightly under 33 percent, suggesting
a further, albeit slight, improvement in achieving a
concentrate-roughage balance similar to that which
exists in the United States. If, in addition, plans for
domestic production of high-protein supplements are
partially achieved, the protein content will also in-
crease. Achieving half the planned increases would,
for example, raise protein content from the present 25X1
estimated 98 grams to 100 to 102 grams per feed unit.
Nonetheless, because programs of the past few years
appear to be having an impact on increasing domestic
supplies of feed, although to only a limited degree per
animal so far, we believe that substantial progress
toward meeting meat production goals may well
occur. Indeed, if paired with good weather the de-
mand for imported grain may be substantially re-
duced. Because the development of the farm sector to
1990 will depend strongly on weather and on how
Gorbachev carries out his stated intentions, we pre-
sent three scenarios: first, a most likely scenario and
the gains for the consumer implied by this outcome,
and then two alternatives, favorable and unfavorable.
A more suitable concentrate-roughage balance and
increased protein content should lead to improved
efficiency. If herd growth is kept to the planned rate,
the shortage of energy per animal would be cut in
half, to about 10 percent. The increased protein
content would also improve utilization of the available
feed. As a result, producing the targeted quantities of
livestock product would probably require grain im-
ports of less than 40 million tons. Although quantities
cannot be estimated precisely, the reduction could be
as much as 5-10 million tons. At the same time, much
of the gain from increased protein content may well
be offset by other factors such as the lack of adequate
storage facilities for maintaining high-quality harvest-
The most likely scenario for livestock feed availability
by 1990 suggests the USSR would have roughly 500
million tons of feed units-somewhat less than plan
but enough to meet planned meat, milk, and egg goals
and to support planned herd growth-if:
? Grain production increases at 2 million tons per
year, the rate we project, on the basis of long-term
weather patterns (average) and the trend in fertilizer
delivery to agriculture.
? The supply of harvested roughages increases about 2
percent a year, somewhat slower than the nearly 3-
percent growth achieved during 198 1-84 but above
the long-term rate.
? Current feed conversion ratios are unchanged.
? Grain imports equal roughly 40 million tons in
1990.
ed roughages through the winter months.
Gains for the Consumer
Achieving the recently announced 1990 meat-output
goal of 21.0 million tons would mean a 17-percent
gain in production per capita from 1984, an average
of about 3 percent annually.21 Per capita meat avail-
ability, however, would grow less rapidly-2 percent
"'Gorbachev has consistently argued the need to improve animal
productivity, and planners appear to be incorporating this convic-
tion into their plans. For example, according to the Soviet press.
three-fourths of the gain in milk output during the 1980s is
scheduled to come from increasing milk yield per cow.
In Soviet terms, meat includes poultry and is defined as slaughter
weight, including slaughter fats and edible offals. To be comparable
to Western retail measures of meat, roughly 18 percent of the
total--slaughter fat and trim- should be deducted. This goal
represents a slight reduction from the 21.7 million tons announced
in the Food Program but is still sufficient to cover the per capita
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annually-unless Moscow continues to import meat
at the record near-million-ton level of recent years.
Even this lower rate of growth far exceeds the 1-
percent growth in availability achieved since 1975 and
would help reduce shortages and queuing for meat.
The leadership, in turn, would benefit from having
proved its ability to successfully implement a program
based on improving levels of living.
More Favorable Than Earlier Estimates ...
This scenario presents a far more favorable outlook
for the USSR than our previous analysis predicted.
This outlook is based largely on the excellent rough-
age outturns of the past few years. Continuing the
roughage expansion will require steady yield in-
creases, a continuation of the current government
policy that allocates resources toward their produc-
tion, and continuation of current incentives for farms
to produce roughages.22
... But Other Outcomes Are Possible
In the first alternative scenario, unusually good
weather throughout the balance of the 1980s would
allow increases in production of all crops. Very good
weather and the meeting of planned targets for
fertilizer deliveries and application-up 6 percent a
year-would increase grain production to 230 million
tons, about 30 million tons higher than our most
likely scenario, thus substantially reducing the need
to import grain for feed.23 Because Moscow would
continue to emphasize the necessity to produce rough-
ages and to direct resources toward that end, the
scenario also assumes that roughage output plans-as
well as those for adequate harvesting and storage of
these crops-would be met. These levels of grain and
roughages production would provide more than
enough feed units to produce-at present feed-conver-
sion ratios-planned output of meat, milk, and eggs.
11 The overall area devoted to roughages cannot be expanded
substantially except at the cost of other crops, although limited
gains can be achieved through shifting crop patterns. This calcula-
tion assumes a 2-percent annual increase in feeding of roughages,
somewhat less than the 2.8-percent average growth achieved during
the 1981-84 eriod, but equally above the 1971-84 average rate.
11 I The likelihood of this
outcome-which implicitly assumes that equipment, labor, and
facilities to handle these large crops are available-is estimated to
Indeed, the increase in availability of roughages
would be sufficient to offset the need for any grain
imports if planners finally realize the extent to which
an increased share of roughages in a larger ration can
improve the balance and thus raise milk and meat
yields. Under these circumstances, farmers would be
told to reduce the share of grain in feed rations
substantially below current planned levels. Moscow,
in turn, would be able to reallocate domestic grain
from feed to stock building and possibly to export.
Gains in efficiency arising from ample supplies and
better balance of feed per animal would ultimately
make even more grain available for alternative uses. It
is unlikely that Moscow would use this dividend to
boost meat and milk production in the next five to six
years; processing and handling even the planned
quantities may strain the system.
In the second alternative scenario, unfavorable
weather would approximate conditions like those in
1961-65, with precipitation equal to the lowest five-
year average of the 1961-65 Plan period. Grain
production would be 30 million tons less than our
most likely estimate. Moscow would talk about the
importance of roughages but fail to continue increas-
ing the allocation of resources necessary to their
production. Growth in availability of roughages would
continue at the 1971-84 rate of roughly 1 percent.
Consequently, output would be some 20 million tons
(in terms of feed units) less than if the supply grew at
the 1981-84 rate. The likelihood of this outcome is
estimated to be less than I in 20. Even with the
ongoing improvement of port capacity, the USSR
probably could not handle the more than 75 million
tons of grain imports that would be needed-in the
absence of marked improvement in feed efficiency-
to compensate for both lower production of grain and
slower growth in availability of roughages. Purchases
of such magnitude would have a marked upward
effect on world grain prices, further increasing the
USSR's hard currency burden.
As in the past, the consumer would bear the brunt of
the adjustment. Growth in per capita production of
meat would be noticeably slower than planned growth
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of disposable money income, and the current gap
between supply of and demand for meat would widen.
Measures to cope with the situation and curb consum-
er discontent might include providing large quantities
of other desired goods to reduce the demand for meat,
expanding even further the specialized food distribu-
tion networks, and increasing meat imports substan-
tially above the nearly 1-million-ton average of the
early 1980s, The last alternative would not necessarily
add substantially to hard currency spending because
only one-third of the meat now imported is from hard
currency trading partners.
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Appendix A
Production of Livestock Feed
Production of livestock feed, in terms of energy
available per animal (feed units), is still nearly 20
percent below announced Soviet standards. It has
consistently fallen short of the target. The impact on
the average feed ration of those gains in total avail-
ability of feed that did occur has been largely offset
by the strong emphasis on expanding livestock herds
(table A-1). Soviet farms, however, did come fairly
close to meeting targets for feeding concentrates
throughout the 1970s. In part, this was possible
because of the substantial growth in grain production
before 1979 (table A-2). Since then, of course, massive
grain imports have played a key role. Growth in
production of roughages was much slower, and farms
fell far short of roughage feeding targets. These crops
were slighted in allocation of yield-enhancing fertiliz-
ers and pesticides and suffered from a lack of special-
ized equipment for harvesting. Moscow apparently
did not realize that the growing imbalance between
roughages and concentrates-particularly in rations
for cattle (which require substantial quantities of
roughages for efficient use of concentrates)-was as
much a hindrance to increasing animal productivity
as the chronic shortages of feed.
Soviet animal nutritionists used to stress the impor-
tance of increasing the quantities of concentrates fed
to livestock, both in absolute amounts and as a share
of the ration. Brezhnev's initial agricultural programs
outlined in 1965 and 1966-particularly the pur-
chase-price increases for livestock products and the
removal of sliding-scale crop purchase prices-en-
couraged farms to do so. From 1965 to 1980, the
quantity of concentrates fed more than doubled, and
the share increased from about 23 percent (in terms of
feed units) to 36 percent. According to the Soviet
press, in some areas (such as Estonia) the share of
grain-the major concentrate fed-per standard ani-
mal reached 60 percent of the feed rations.21 Such
rations are not only expensive but also lead to serious
digestive problems and poor reproduction. These ex-
tremes occur because of a lack of other feeds (includ-
ing other concentrates) particularly in winter and
early spring.
In the late 1970s-perhaps finally recognizing that
the traditional stress was misplaced-Soviet state-
ments began to emphasize the importance of forage
crops and the need to reduce the use of grain. Pravda,
20 June 1978, stated: "The use of concentrates to
make up for shortages of hay, silage, haylage, and
root crop in feed is unacceptable." At a July 1978
agricultural plenum, Brezhnev again stressed the im-
portance of improving the quality and quantity of
forage crops, as he had done repeatedly since 1964.
The several decrees that followed this plenum, howev-
er, had no more effect than earlier exhortation.
Feeding of harvested roughages increased by only 40
percent during the first 15 years of Brezhnev's leader-
ship. Reported feed derived from pasture declined by
3 percent despite an 8-percent increase in total farm
pasture area (figure 6).25
z? Animals are aggregated to standard units according to feed
requirements. A standard unit is equivalent to a cow. Various
technical publications indicate that Soviet animal nutritionists
consider the optimum concentrate share for cattle rations to be
about 20 percent; for hog rations, about 75 percent; and for poultry
rations, about 80 percent. These percentages imply an average
concentrate share of about 30 percent-given the current Soviet
herd structure-but planners continue to reiterate the 33-percent
share. 0
zs Official statistics on feed from pasture must be used with caution
because, according to Soviet textbooks, they are partly approximat-
ed and may overstate or understate true quantities used. F_
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Table A-I
USSR: Selected Statistics on Feed and
Livestock Herds a
Total Feed Used Feed per Standard Animal h Growth in Livestock Herds,
(million feed units) (quintals offeed units) Yearend (index. 1970=100)
278.5
22.5
92.1
1970
24.8
100.0
1971
24.8
103.6
1972
344.1
24.6
103.5
1973
366.2
25.6
106.6
1974
387.0
26.3
109.7
1975
368.5
25.1
106.4
1976
365.0
25.5
107.7
1977
403.0
27.3
1 12.1
1978
409.6
26.9
1 14.4
1979
403.3
26.1
1 15.6
1980
398.1
25.7
115.7
397.5
25.5
116.6
402.6
25.6
118.4
1983
424.0
26.4
121.2
1984
431.4
121.9
a Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1984 g., Central Statistical
Administration, Moscow, 1985, pp. 279, 293, and earlier years.
n Animals are aggregated to standard units according to feed
requirements. For example, a standard unit is equivalent to a cow,
and a hog being raised for slaughter is given an equivalent weight of
0.5.
Cattle, hogs, sheep and goats, and poultry weighted by respective
average prices paid all producers in 1970.
During 1981 and 1982, absolute quantities of both
concentrates and roughages fed remained essentially
constant. By the end of October 1982, however,
procurement data indicated record quantities of for-
ages were going to be harvested. In part, this resulted
from a longer, more favorable growing season that
year, but it was also a result of increased quantities of
chemical fertilizer and specialized machinery being
overall supplies of feed even though concentrate feed-
ing remained constant. Late October procurement
statistics indicated that a new forage crop record was
being achieved in 1985. Apparently, the Food Pro-
gram emphasis on increased supplies of fertilizer and
equipment, combined with slowly expanding storage
facilities for forage crops, continues to have a positive
allocated to forage production
In 1983 and 1984 forage production continued to
expand. Indeed, the supply of harvested roughages in
1984-despite a later start to the harvest and some-
what less favorable weather conditions-was still
some 6 percent larger than in 1982. The increased
availability of forage meant a substantial increase in
Proper storage facilities for harvested forages are
crucial, because the nutrient value of forages depends
not only on initial quality but also on final quality
when fed. In the USSR, proper storage facilities are
limited, and physical losses as high as 40 percent have
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Table A-2
USSR: Production of Grain and
Selected Feed Crops b
Corn for Silage and Feed Roots
Green Feed
Hay and Green Feed Excluding
Corn, in Hay Equivalent''
82.5
1970
110.3
115.8
223.8
131.2
1977
195.7
135.3
1978
151.7
1979
38.4
134.4
1980
41.6
148.0
1981
158.0 c 232
149.0
1982
180.0
294
160.0
1983
195.0
298 48.1
1984
180.0
312
58.3
Narodnove khozvaystvo SSSR v 1980 g., Central Statistical
Administration, Moscow, 1981, pp. 201-203, and other years.
n Several feeds combined on the basis of Soviet equivalent feeding
values.
Unofficially reported.
been cited in Soviet literature dealing with agricul-
ture. According to Soviet specialists, total annual
storage losses for silage and haylage average 20
million tons (physical units) and for hay, 6 million tons
(physical units). These losses are equivalent to 8
percent of total average annual silage and haylage use
and to 7 percent of average annual hay use, respec-
tively. In 1980, for example, only 40 percent of silage,
80 percent of haylage, 10 percent of root crops, and 8
percent of hay were stored in facilities intended for
that purpose.
One part of roughage production is still neglected-
pasture. In the USSR, pastures occupy well over 300
million hectares-roughly half the total agricultural
land-and reportedly provide about 18 percent of
Million tons e.vpressed
in physical units
animal feed (nutrient value)." Soviet agricultural spe-
cialists have long noted that little chemical fertilizer is
used on pasture, that manure is applied at half the
recommended rates, and that the large sums devoted
to providing water for pasture have had only limited
results. Indeed, lack of attention to pasture in the
desert and semiarid parts of the country-about two-
thirds of total pasture-has caused serious declines in
feed quality and yields, slowing growth of mutton and
beef production. In 1983 one-third of Kirghizia's
natural pasture was "covered" with harmful grasses
that livestock would not eat. The Soviets are likely to
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Figure 6
USSR: Feeds Used by Major
Category, 1965-84 a
Million tons
500
Coarse and
succulent
0 1965 70 75 80 83 84
a Feed supplies are aggregated in Iced units, using oats as the standardthat is.
one feed unit contains the nurticnt equivalent of I k ilografl of oats
be slower to change pasture management than they
have been in recognizing the need to increase harvest-
ed roughages. According to the USSR Minister of
Agriculture, there is "widespread opinion that pastur-
ing of livestock has lost its importance now that
animal husbandry is being conducted on a more
industrialized basis."
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Appendix B
The Protein Content of
Soviet Livestock Feed
In 1980 a Soviet livestock specialist wrote that the
average feed ration contained 95 grams of digestible
protein per feed unit, compared with the long-estab-
lished Soviet norm of 105 to 110 grams. According to
a later source, in most areas of the country the protein
content was up to 100 grams (probably in mid-1984).
Our calculations suggest that average protein content
reached 98 grams per kilogram of feed units in 1983.
fed to cattle, even though they have different require-
ments for various supplements.27
In the USSR the major sources of high-protein
feeds-those containing 20 percent or more of their
weight as crude (total) protein-are nonprotein nitro-
gen (which converts to protein in the digestive pro-
cess), oilseed meals, animal products such as meat and
bonemeal, and single-cell protein.28
The Soviet focus on average or "norm" protein con-
tent probably is misguided. Providing the correct
quantity of protein for the specific animal is far more
important in raising productivity. Rough calculations
indicate the Soviet protein norm is reasonably compa-
rable to the recent average ratio of protein content to
total feed in the United States. If adjusted for herd
structure, however, the Soviet norm is somewhat high
according to our estimates of a US recommended
average for each class of animal. US textbooks on
feeding present protein needs according to weight,
age, type of animal, and desired productivity rate; the
needs are not aggregated or averaged, and recom-
mended amounts vary from 44 grams per kilogram of
metabolizable energy for dairy cows to as much as
300 grams or more for young poultry. Recently, US
specialists have questioned the validity of listing ag-
gregate protein requirements. Crude measures of the
amount of protein do not take quality-the amino
acid composition-or digestibility into consideration.
In the United States, major feed users and the many
centralized computer systems for individual farmers
are determining least-cost feed rations increasingly on
the basis of amino acid content (basic components of
protein) rather than protein. In the Soviet Union,
systems to help farms mix their own feeds most
efficiently do not exist. In addition, the farms do not
have direct relations with suppliers but are forced to
take the feeds allocated to them. In 1984, for exam-
ple, about half the mixed feed prepared for hogs was
Nonprotein nitrogen. This feed, mainly urea, is used
routinely in rations for ruminants (cud-chewing ani-
mals such as cattle) in the United States and Western
Europe to replace small amounts of plant protein.
Western authorities note that the USSR makes little
use of this feed because of the risk of poisoning and
even death from its incorrect addition to rations or
overdoses. During the 1980-83 period, the USSR used
annually an average 115,000 tons (nutrient value) of
urea in feed, or about 15 percent of the quantity used
in the United States, which had a 2-percent smaller
cattle inventory during the period. Because urea is
used most efficiently in well-balanced, high-energy
rations-and not as a supplement to low-quality
roughages-the USSR, given its generally poorly
balanced and energy-deficient feed rations, is proba-
bly wise not to strive for substantial increases in urea
use.
Oilseed meals. These feeds currently make up about
one-third of high-protein feeds, down from about 44
percent in 1965. For much of the period, oilseed meal
from sunflower and cotton accounted for over 90
percent of total oilseed meal. From 1978 to 1983, the
'e Crude protein refers to all the nitrogenous compounds in feed;
digestible protein refers to protein utilized by the animal and is
estimated by coefficients derived over time from feeding trials.
Single-cell protein is a collective term including protein-rich micro-
organisms such as bacteria, algae, and fungi (yeast and molds)
grown on byproducts of oil, on methanol, or on organic wastes from
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importance of soybean meal increased to a peak of
nearly 45 percent in 1983.29 The cutback in imports of
both soybeans (which are processed into meal) and
soybean meal in 1984 reduced the share to an estimat-
ed 30 percent.
Animal products. These feeds-mainly whole and
skim milk, buttermilk, whey, meat and bonemeals,
and fishmeals-supply about half the estimated pro-
tein available from high-protein feeds in the USSR.
The USSR uses roughly 11-12 million tons of whole
milk (12 percent of total production) and more than 20
million tons of fluid skim milk, buttermilk, and whey
annually in feeding livestock, roughly the same quan-
tities used in 1970. Efforts to reduce these quanti-
ties-considered unjustifiably large by Soviet special-
ists-have not been successful. Growth in production
of starter feeds and fluid milk substitutes has been
slow in the USSR. By 1983, for example, annual
production of fluid milk replacers such as dried skim
milk and whey had reached only 310,000 tons, equiva-
lent to 2.4 million tons of milk.
Production of fishmeal, meatmeal, and bonemeal
grew steadily from 1965 to 1975, but it has held
constant since then. Fishmeal output has been con-
strained by the effects on Soviet fishing of other
countries' expansion of offshore economic zones in
recent years. Meatmeal and bonemeal output have
been limited not only because of the relative stagna-
tion in meat output in some years (notably 1979-82)
but also because more than one-fourth of the meat-
processing enterprises lack facilities and equipment to
process these byproducts. Complaints in the press and
in the technical journals about the resulting waste are
common.
The USSR chose to develop the SCP industry because
domestic sources of high-protein feed supplements are
limited. Moscow is firm in its desire to remain free of
permanent dependency on foreign suppliers.
2 The increase was a result of large soybean and soybean meal
imports. Imports of soybeans during the early 1970s were more
closely related to the need for vegetable oil than to that for oilseed
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