SOVIET FORCE GENERATION METHODS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)
Imagery Analysis Report
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)
Imagery Analysis Report
Comments or queries regarding this report are
welcome. They may be directed tCE:=
25X1
Tactical Forces Division,
25X1
Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC, or~--
25X1
The
25X1
authors wish to thank
for his
25X1
contributions to this report. (C)
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Tnn CPrrPt
NPIC is engaged in a long-term and comprehensive analysis of the sta-
tus, readiness, and force-generation capabilities of Soviet motorized rifle
and tank divisions. The purpose of this analysis is, in part, to assist the Intel-
ligence Community's efforts in monitoring and understanding the process
of divisional mobilization and the Soviet capability to generate additional
formations and units. (S/WN)
(S/WN)
The following studies have been published so far: Soviet Divisional Ma-
teriel Support Battalions (S), Z-14017/84, Mar 84; Soviet "Second Table of
Organization and Equipment" (Mobilization Base) Divisions (S), SC-
628367/85, May 85; Soviet Strategic Mobility: Potential Wartime Functions
of Heavy-Lift Formations (S), Z-15009/85, Jun 85; and Soviet Combat Ma-
neuver Divisions: An Imagery Perspectiv Aug 86.
This study continues the analysis and presents the results of an exami-
nation of two historical cases in which the Soviets created new combat units
out of elements drawn from existing peacetime forces that had been de-
ployed outside the Soviet Union and followed one of their published force
generation methods. (S/WN)
In addition to the references cited in this report, a large number of oth-
er sources is available for studying force generation issues. A list of these
sources is available from the authors. (U)
Reverse side blank
iii
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Summary and
Key Findings
All applicable satellite
Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)
Soviet military thought describes four methods for expanding peace-
time military forces to create new units. Illustrated in Figure 1, they may be
described as duplication, expansion, second TO&E, and mobilization of ci-
vilian organizations. Elements of all four methods are probably used to cre-
ate new units. The duplication and expansion methods are documented
(ion of this report. (S/WN) here. (S/WN)
These methods differ in detail and purpose, but all have two common
elements. First, they depend on existing active units for key personnel or
key organizational elements to form the basis of new units. Second, these
methods depend on the use of strategic reserves of both men and equip-
ment for expanding these units to their full strength. (S/WN)
Three of the force generation methods have been evaluated on imag-
ery, and one of them, second TO&E, has already been published. Elements
of both the duplication and expansion methods have now also been stud-
ied, based upon a review of imagery and collateral intelligence acquired
during two past Soviet military force deployments-the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In both cases an
existing active unit was divided into two or more subunits, each with the
structure and core capabilities of the original unit. These units were subse-
quently expanded to the size of the original or parent unit with men and
equipment drawn from reserves. (S/WN)
The expansion process was similar in both cases. Motorized rifle divi-
sions were mobilized first and deployed across the Soviet border. These de-
ployments made use of early deploying regiments (one regiment per divi-
sion) for security along the border. These regiments later returned to
garrison without their parent divisions to form the basis of the new division
and were replaced by regiments from other divisions as the mobilization
developed. (S/WN)
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
The study indicates that the force generation of peacetime divisions in
deployments is consonant with published Soviet writings and that these
methods of force generation can now be distinguished from other activities.
This study also develops a context within which future changes in ground
force structure can be analyzed. (S/WN)
25X1
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)
In generating new military units during deploy-
ments, the Soviets have repetitively demonstrated that
the overall numbers and strengths of their forces have
not been reduced. The units from which new units are
drawn continue to retain their active status and the
potential for further generation of new units. The Sovi-
et force generation methods observed on imagery ap-
pear to follow Soviet writings (Appendix A). The impli-
cations of these are that imagery can reveal not only
the obvious and major indicators associated with mo-
bilization, but also the more subtle indicators that a
new unit is being generated from an existing one.
(S/WN)
Force generation is a process that could be rapid
or could take months or years during a deployment to
accomplish. When observed it has been evidenced by
the following indicators.
This report examines elements of two methods of
Soviet force generation described in a June 1966 arti-
cle by a former Soviet officer who had been an instruc-
tor at the Frunze Academy.2 These methods involve
separating a unit from its parent unit and expanding it
until it has reached the level of the parent unit from
which it was drawn. These methods are two of four
described by the Soviets. (U)
One method, the use of State assets to form new
units, would probably occur only during general mobi-
lization. (A glossary and an explanation of some perti-
nent Soviet terms is presented in Appendix B.) (S/WN)
Russian and Soviet methods of forming new units
and replacing combat losses during wartime have
evolved since at least World War I. The creation and
deployment of new or additional units result from the
traditional Russian emphasis placed on strategic re-
serves and force generation capabilities. The key ele-
ment in each of these methods is the detachment of a
subordinate unit from a larger unit. The detached unit
then becomes the basis for a new unit similar to the
parent unit. These four methods are summarized be-
low. 3,4 (U)
Method 1-Duplication: An active military unit or
formation, upon mobilization, divides into two or
more independent units, which are then expanded
and brought up to wartime strength. As an example, a
regiment can divide and then be reconstituted into
two regiments. This usually occurs within independent
regiments and brigades. (U)
Method 2-Second TO&E: A military unit, in shift-
ing from peacetime to wartime status, retains its basic
organization and loses part of its peacetime comple-
ment as cadre to form another unit or formation. The
new unit or formation then expands to wartime
strength. This process is referred to by the Soviets as
activating the Second Table of Organization & Equip-
ment (TO&E) unit or formation. (S/WN)
Method 3-Expansion: An active unit or formation
may expand into the next higher level unit or forma-
tion. For example, a regiment expands to become a di-
vision, or a battalion expands to become a regiment.
The filling out of such units is accomplished by the
callup of reservists or transfers of active personnel. This
method is used for the mobilization of all types of
ground forces, special troops, and rear service units
and formations. (U)
Method 4-New Formations: Units are formed
from existing state organizations, such as from special-
ists in organizations such as the Committee for State
Security (KGB), Ministry of Communications, and Min-
istry of Internal Affairs. Personnel activated then con-
tinue their previous specialties as members of new mil-
itary units or formations. This method is probably
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Figure 1. Soviet Methods of Force Generation (Expanding military units from peacetime to wartime strength)
D
Peacetime unit or formation, upon mobilization,
Retains its basic
formation
U
Detaches cadre to new unit
or formation
En
Peacetime unit Expands or deploys
U
Divides into several independent
units or formations, which are
then brought up to strength
IN
Expands or deploys
01
- Into next higher unit
or formation
Unit or formation Formed by State
organizations
employed only in time of war or other major mobiliza-
tion and has not yet been observed on imagery.z,s (U)
Methods 1 and 3, the duplication and expansion
methods, are documented here. (U)
Two case studies are documented here, involving
three Soviet motorized rifle divisions imaged during
events culminating in the deployment of the divisions
beyond Soviet borders. The analysis revealed that, fol-
lowing the deployment, new divisions were formed in
their place. (S/WN)
The first case study describes the procedures used
to form a new motorized rifle division in the Odessa
Military District following the 1968 Czechoslovakian
invasion. The units involved were the 48th Motorized
Rifle Division (MRD), housed in garrisons in Bolgrad
and Kagul, and a motorized rifle regiment from the
86th Guards MRD in Kishinev.6 25X1
25X1
The second case study examines a more recent ex-
ample in the Central Asian Military District, following
mobilization for the Afghanistan invasion in late 1979.
This activity led to the formation of a new, unidentified
motorized rifle division at Dushanbe that occupies gar-
risons and other facilities vacated by the 201st MRD by
at least January 19807 (Figure 2). (S/WN)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Figure 2. Soviet Installations Involved in Formation of New Units During the Czechoslovakian
and Afghan Invasions
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
Figure 3. Activities Leading to a New Motorized Rifle Division, Odessa Military District, 1968-1986
48th Motorized
Rifle Division
Bolgrad
Headquarters
AB Division-AB
AL-1
(one tank
regiment, two
motorized rifle
regiments)
Kagul Army
Barracks AL-1,
Reserve
Equipment
Storage
(one motorized
rifle regiment)
Kishinev Army
Barracks West
AL-2
(one motorized
rifle regiment)
*Beginning formation of new MRD
Secret/WNINTEL
? Ammunition loading
? Mobilization begins
? One MRR deploys to
Romanian border
. MRD (less one MRR)
deploys to
Czechoslovakia
? One MRR returns to
Bolgrad
? Ammunition loading
? Mobilization begins
Aug ? MRR deploys to
Czechoslovakia with
48th MRD
Jun ? New barracks/adminis-
tration building under
construction
Oct ? New facilities under
construction
? First evidence of air-
borne unit (98th GABD)
in garrison (moved from
Far East MD)
Sep ? New barracks under
construction
. Airborne unit (98th
GABD) in garrison
Both case studies include descriptions of the Case Study 1: Odessa Military District
events that led to regeneration of new units, a chro-
nology, and imagery examples of the activities ob- This case study describes the events that led to the
served. Some differences were detected in the two formation of a new motorized rifle division in the
cases studied, in particular the length of time for the Odessa Military District. Activity observed included
process to be completed. (S/WN) the preparation for deployment, departure of units,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
---------- -------------- -
Permanent home of
98th GABD (two regi-
ments)
ipr
. Seven new buildings
under construction *
Mar
? New ammunition stor-
age area under
Jun
? Engineer unit added;
additional support
1986
ul
lov
? One tank battalion artil-
lery regiment in
garrison
? Additional buildings un-
Jun
constructions
? Additional buildings un-
der construction
ildi
-B
t
ti
-
Sep
equipment added
? Divisional artillery,
antitank regiment
i
der construction
u
ng cons
ruc
on
continues
? New tank regiment, riv-
er-crossing unit, AAA
regiment, HQ support
unit in garrison
arr
ve
? New buildings com-
plete; unidentified
MRD HQ
pr ? Additional airborne
units (98th GABD) in
garrison
jI ? 14th Army HQ also
here
eventual return of units, and final relocation of the
new division. (S/WN)
The 328th Motorized Rifle Regiment from the 48th
MRD at Bolgrad departed garrison to participate in the
1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. The regiment later re-
turned to Bolgrad after the invasion and subsequently
relocated to Kagul to form the basis of a new motor-
ized rifle division (Figure 3).8,9 Other divisions in the
Odessa Military District were also involved in this pro-
cess and are included in the analysis. Two motorized
rifle divisions were involved in this transition.
(S/NF/WN)
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
In June 1968, a convoy of trucks was being loaded
with ammunition in the garrison at Bolgrad, and addi-
tional equipment had been pulled out of the vehicle
storage buildings. In July, the 328th MRR mobilized
and deployed to the Romanian border in preparation
for the Soviet deployment to Czechoslovakia.8 (This
regiment was probably deployed to conduct covering
force operations, in which units garrisoned in border
military districts are temporarily stationed near the
borders to protect deployment of other units and for-
mations in the military district.) In August the remain-
der of the 48th MRD began deploying to Czechoslova-
kia. Subsequently, the 328th MRR returned to Bolgrad
in October 1968, two months after the invasion, and its
equipment was placed in covered storage. No equip-
ment was observed in the garrison when Bolgrad was
imaged in December of 1968, and no changes were
observed in the garrison until late 1969. The 328th
MRR eventually relocated to Kagul in mid-August
1971.
Another, but unidentified, motorized rifle regi-
ment of the 48th MRD, also housed at Kagul Army Bar-
racks deployed to Czechoslovakia in
August. Prior to its deployment, increased activity was
observed in the vehicle park and in the local training
area. (S/WN)
While the 48th MRD was deploying into Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, it was still one motorized rifle
regiment short of a full-strength division, since the
328th MRR remained on the Romanian border. Finally,
in early September, a third motorized rifle regiment
was called up from the 86th Guards MRD at Kishinev
Army Barracks AL-2 also in the Odes-
sa Military District, to permanently join the 48th MRD
as it deployed to Vysoke Myto, Czechoslovakia.'0
In October 1969, the 98th Guards Airborne Divi-
sion relocated from Belogorsk in the Far East Military
District to Bolgrad and Kishinev, occupying garrisons
vacated by the 48th MRD. This occupation indicated
that the 48th MRD would not return to its original gar-
risons.6
Top Secret
With the establishment of a new motorized rifle
division in the Odessa Military District, and prior to its
eventual formation, facility upgrades at Kagul were
necessary to accommodate the new division. In May
1971, new buildings were under construction at Kagul.
Elements subordinate to the 328th MRR-derived MRD
were first identified in August 1971, when at least one
tank battalion and a probable artillery regiment were
present (Figure 4). The presence of the divisional
equipment and the construction of new buildings were
clear indicators that a new formation was forming at
this installation. (S/WN)
No increase in equipment was observed at Kagul
from late 1971 through mid-1972, although construc-
tion of new buildings continued. By March 1972 a new
ammunition storage area was constructed in the local
training area. (S/WN)
In October 1973, a significant change in the 25X1
equipment composition was observed. Additional di.,-
sional elements included a tank regiment, an assault
river-crossing unit, an antiaircraft artillery regiment,
and a probable headquarters service and support 25X1
(commandant) unit (Figure 5). The equipment for these
units probably came from military district or central re-
serve storage depots. No additional equipment was
deployed there until mid-to-late 1974. (S/WN)
By June 1974, the newly forming division was
nearly complete, six years after its inception. An engi-
neer battalion and additional divisional support equip-
ment were present. In September, divisional artillery
assets and an antitank regiment were added. It ap-
peared that most divisional elements were present, 125X1
cluding three tank battalions, and the barracks/adm...
istration buildings were in the late stages of
construction. No significant changes occurred be-
tween late 1974 and early 1986, when a major recor25X1
guration of the installation, completed in mid-1986,
was begun. All units were relocated within the garri-
son, but no new equipment was observed (Figure 6).
(S/WN) (Text continued on page 13)
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Figure 7. Activities Leading to a New Motorized Rifle Division, Central Asian Military District, 1979-1984
Aug ? Build-up of BMPs Ian ? BMPs depart garrison
(August-November) ? Reservists to Termez
May ? 118 BMPs in open
storage
Dushanbe Army
Barracks AL-2/HQ
MRD
Kurgan Tyube Army
Barracks AL-1
Jan ? Tank regiment and mo-
torized rifle regiment
departed; little activity
? Tank regiment returned
Apr ? Motorized rifle regi-
ment returned
Jun ? Motorized rifle regi-
ment departed
------------------------
Jun ? Extensive construction
under way; facility no
longer functions as
SAM support facilit25X1
Top Secre
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Aug ? Covered vehicle storage
for about 300 vehicles
? Armored vehicles
observed
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
This new, unidentified motorized rifle division is
probably retaining its low-strength-cadre status, since
it still had not received any armored personnel carriers
by March 1987. (S/WN)
Case Study 2: Central Asian Military District
This case study describes events before and after
the Afghanistan invasion. These events resulted in the
formation of a new division (Figure 7). Activity ob-
served in Dushanbe included preparation for deploy-
ment, departure of units, and return of the same units
(or arrival of similar units) to the garrisons. (S/WN)
In 1979 the motorized rifle regiments of the 201st
MRD were located at Dushanbe Army Barracks North-
west AL-1 Dushanbe Army Barracks
AL-2 and Kurgan Tyube Army Bar-
racks AL-1 with a tank regiment also
at Dushanbe AL-2. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion,
all maneuver regiments of the division were assessed
to be low-strength-cadre units, and little activity was
observed at any of the garrisons. Typical is Dushanbe
AL-1 (Figure 8). (S/WN)
By late 1979, a gradual buildup in the number of
armored personnel carriers (BMPs) was observed at
Dushanbe AL-1. By the divisional units
in the area (two motorized rifle regiments and one
tank regiment) had departed.
The tank regiment from the 201st MRD that had
been sent to Termez probably deployed into Afghani-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
By a BMP-equipped motorized ri-
fle regiment was in open storage at Dushanbe AL-1,
and by 18 BMPs were present (Figure 9). Ac-
The motorized rifle regiment that had been at Du-
shanbe AL-2 was observed back in garrison on
However, by F ] the equipment was no long-
Top Secret
er resent, and no activity was observed. On_____
a motorized rifle regiment was observed for tl25X1
first time at Kulyab SAM Support Facility0 LOA"I
probably. the unit previously observed at Dt25X1
shanbe AL-2. This unit probably relocated from Du- -- -
shanbe to Kulyab for two reasons. First, the garrison at
Kulyab could provide more space for future growth
than the facility at Dushanbe AL-2. Second, the pres-
ence of a regiment at Kulyab distributes forces more
effectively along the southern border of the Central
Asian Military District. (S/WN) 25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Kurgan Tyube AL-1 housed a motorized rifle regi-
ment subordinate to the 201st MRD that probably de-
ployed to Afghanistan when the 201st departed in De-
cember 1979. This could not be confirmed because no
imagery of this facilit was available during the period,
bu no equipment was observed.
Byt on elements of a motorized rifle regiment,
probably newly formed, were seen in open storage. Imagery of revealed an artillery regi-
The additional equipment consisted of a tank battal- ment and antitank battalion had arrived at Dushanbe
ion, an artillery battalion, and some support elements. Ammunition Depot DA-1 These units
(S/WN)
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
departed the depot in July 1983 and relocated to Du-
shanbe Training Area South TA-1 by
(S/WN)
The equipment, strength, and activity level of the
new division in the Dushanbe area remained relatively
static in the years following its regeneration, like its
predecessor division in this area before the invasion.
Thus, the 201st MRD, which deployed to Afghanistan,
was replaced by a division of equal strength. The rapid
formation of this new division ensured that no reduc-
tion of force strength occurred in this vulnerable bor-
der zone. (S/WN)
Since 1983, the new, unidentified MRD has under-
gone several changes. By July 1983 the BMP-equipped
regiment at Dushanbe AL-1 departed garrison. In May
1984 the tank regiment at Dushanbe AL-2 also depQ5X1
ed garrison. These two regimental units remained u25X1
located until imenhen two tanks and 125X1
probable BMPs were observed at Dushanbe SAM Sup-
port Facility Extensive constructioi25X1
which had begun in 1981, was also observed at this fa-
cility. A review of imagery indicated that the garrison
had not functioned as an active SAM support facility
since 1981. . 25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
Appendix A
Since before World War I, the Russian military has
placed great emphasis on force generation capabilities.
The methods for replacing military units and creating
new ones are described in various documents, from
which the following quoted material is taken. (S/WN)
Handbook on USSR Military Forces-'
Units may be expanded from peacetime strength
to full mobilization strength by one of four methods:
? A peacetime military unit or formation may retain
its basic organization, lose part of its peacetime
complement as cadre to other units, and expand
to wartime strength.
? A peacetime unit or formation may expand into a
next higher unit or formation.
? A unit may be formed at wartime strength by cad-
res detached from peacetime units and reservists.
? A peacetime military unit or formation may, on
mobilization, be divided into several independent
units, which are then brought up to wartime
strength. (Service units also are formed by civil-
ian's Peoples' Commissariats.) (U)
Military Review'
Four methods of mobilization for the Ground Forces
are described:
? Method 1: The strength of peacetime units are
brought up to a war footing by the callup of re-
servists. (U)
? Method 2: A unit is expanded and converted to
the next higher level, such as expanding a division
to a corps. The filling out of such units normally is
accomplished by the callup of reservists of group 2
(up to 45 years of age). This method temporarily
depletes the operational capability of the convert-
ed regular unit by 70 percent because it takes time
for the training and consolidation of the expanded
unit. This method is normally used for mobiliza-
tion of all Ground Forces units other than techni-
cal units. (U)
? Method 3: One battalion is detached from a full
strength regiment, its place being taken by reserv-
ists. A new regiment is formed with the detached
battalion as the nucleus and from the requisite
personnel drawn from the reserves. This method is
mainly used for engineer, artillery, armor, and sig-
nal units. (U)
? Method 4: This method is used to activate com-
pletely new units. Personnel are drawn from
groups 2 and 3 (up to 50 years of age) of reservists.
Officers are drawn mostly from the reserves; how-
ever, active service officers are assigned to the
principal command (division, regiment, and battal-
ion) and staff positions. (U)
While units organized under method 4 can be formed
in large numbers in short order, it takes a long time for
their training and consolidation. The Soviet experi-
ences in World War II were that, even under favorable
conditions, it took 6 to 8 months to get units of this
type ready for combat. (U)
Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces3
The Soviets use a number of methods to mobilize and
expand units. First, a peacetime unit may retain its or-
ganization, release part of its personnel as cadre for
new units, and expand to wartime strength. Second, a
peacetime unit may expand and convert to the next
higher level. Finally, new units may be formed directly
from the reserves. (U)
19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
Appendix B
Glossary of Soviet Terms
The sources for these terms can be found in the NPIC
report entitled Soviet "Second Table of Organization
and Equipment" (Mobilization Base) Divisions,
cited in the Preface. (S)
Cadre. Loosely defined as the key group of officers and
enlisted men necessary to establish and train a new
military unit. (U)
Covering troops (forces). Covering troops (forces) are
large units or formations of the border military districts
deployed on favorable lines near state borders for re-
pulsing invasions. They also provide favorable condi-
tions for deploying forces of the first strategic echelon
and for the conduct of these operations at the begin-
ning of the war. The combat missions of these covering
forces are usually carried out by an active defense of
designated lines on important axes pending the ap-
proach of major forces. Covering troops (forces) are
regiment- and division-sized units. (U)
Military district (voyennyy okrug). The highest military-
administrative level of military units, training institu-
tions, military establishments of the various services,
and local military registration-mobilization offices (mil-
itary commissariats), disposed in a particular area. A
military district is headed by the officer commanding
the troops of the district; he takes measures in consul-
tation with the military council, staff of the district, dis-
trict directorates, and local authorities. (U)
Top Secret
Military unit number (voyskovaya chast, V/Ch). A des-
ignator for any military unit, and a corresponding num-
ber with which it is uniquely associated. The code des-
ignator conceals the real name of the unit or
establishment. (U)
Mobilization deployment (moblizatsionnoye razverty-
vaniye). Transition of the armed forces from peacetime
to wartime tables of organization and equipment. Mo-
bilization deployment includes: bringing units up to
strength with personnel, combat material, armament,
and transport; providing troops (or naval or air force
personnel) with all types of personal belongings, ra-
tions and provisions, fuels and lubricants; assigning
permanent force personnel to activate new subunits,
units, and formations; bringing naval vessels into com-
mission from a state preservation (i.e., mothballing),
and conscripting merchant vessels for naval duty; and,
also, organizing the prompt departure of mobilized
troops for their operational destinations. (U)
Second table of organization and equipment (TO&E) di-
vision (diviziya povtoromu shtatu) is the Soviet term fnr
an inactive, unmanned division collocated with an ac25X1
tive 'parent' division. A second TO&E division's equip-
ment set is either prepositioned (collocated with an ac-
tive division's equipment) or stored at military district
reserve storage depots. The predesignated cadre (key
personnel) for the second TO&E division occupy offi-
cer, noncommissioned officer, and specialist positions
within the active division. Upon its activation (mobili-
zation), a second TO&E division draws its cadre and
equipment from its parent division and receives a divi-
sion banner, a true unit designator, and a military unit
(Voyskovaya chast or V/Ch) number. The newly acti-
vated division may also receive reservists and/or con-
scripts. The second TO&E division may either relocate,
remain collocated with its parent division, or replace a
relocated parent division. (S/WN)
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
2. Artemiev, Vyacheslav P., "Soviet Mobilization Doctrine", Military
Review, Jun 66 (UNCLASSIFIED)
3. DIA. DDB-2680-40-78, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces,
Feb 78 (UNCLASSIFIED)
4. DIA. IIR 2-227-0232-77, Soviet Preparations and Mobilization for
War (U), 10 Aug 77 (UNCLASSIFIED)
5. U.S. Army. TM 30-430, Handbook on USSR Military Forces, Nov 45
(UNCLASSIFIED)
6. DIA. DDB-1100-374-85, Warsaw Pact Ground Force Structure
Troop List, Southwestern TVD (U), Volume IV, Jun 85
7. DoD. IIR 2-218-4383-81, Dushanbe, Military Movements and Inci-
dents (U), 18 Jun 81. (CONFIDENTIAL)
8. DoD. IIR-2-240-0014-79, Recall of Reservists to the Bolgrad Mech-
anized Rifle Division, Moldavian SSR, 21 Sep 79
(CON FIDENTIAL/NOFORN)
9. DoD. IIR 2-322-0240-82, Kagul, Cadre Motorized Rifle Division
(C), 15 Sep 82 (CONFIDENTIAL)
11. DoD. IIR Report No. 2-218-3590-81, Mobilization Of Reservists for
Afghanistan (U), 24 Apr 81 (CONFIDENTIAL)
(U),19Jan81
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7
Top Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP87T00758R000206120001-7