INDICATIONS OF INSTABILITY IN SOVIET-SUPPORTED THIRD WORLD REGIMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Directorate of Sec I
Intelligence 25X1
Indications of Instability
in Soviet-Supported
Third World Regimes
DI CIQ 86-002
June 1986
Copy 6 3 0
,i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
in Soviet-Supported
Third World Regimes
Indications of Instability
suggestions are welcome and may be directed to
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
Secret
DI CIQ 86-002
June 1986
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 I! 9 I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Summary: Developments and Trends
Part 1. Perspective:
25X1
Country Indicators and Briefs 3
Afghanistan: Najibullah's Challenge Ahead 33 25X1
25X1
Libya: Qadhafi After the Airstrikel 37 25X1
25X1
Appendix: Methodology Notes 41
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
in Soviet-Supported
Third World Regimes
Indications of Instability
This quarterly is designed to provide warning of political change in 14
Third World countries that are closely associated with the USSR. The
publication applies a set of indicators on a regular basis to monitor a
variety of pressures on the leaderships of these regimes as well as regime
capabilities to respond to these pressures. Analysts have made their
evaluations of a country's vulnerability to instability, irregular leadership
change, or major policy shift based on events during February-May 1986.
The 14 countries included in this book represent a range of regime types
and ties to the USSR. At one end of a continuum lie totalitarian systems
that exert near-total control over society and politics; at the other end lie
personalist, authoritarian regimes that are imperfectly in control of the
society and potential political opponents. These 14 countries can be viewed
along a second continuum that measures the extent of their dependency,
ties, and mutual interests with the Soviet Union. By developing indicators
that capture these varied dimensions, we have sought to lay the ground-
work for studying the complex interplay of factors that affect a Third
World country's domestic stability and superpower relations. The goal,
over time, is to be able to define the most important variables and
interrelationships in explaining political, social, and economic dynamics
within a country, pressure for change in that political system, and the role
of key international actors.
Secret
DI CIQ 86-002
June 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Il l!
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Summary Indicators
Marxist-Leninist
Regimes
Middle East
Clients
Ethiopia
Angola
Nicaragua
Syria
Iraq
Legend a
Very high
? High
Moderate
O Low
Negligible
Increase from last quarter
Decrease from last quarter
Instabilitj /Irregular
Leadership Change
Pressure
during:
Feb-May
1986
a For the prospects judgments.the following probabilities were assigned:
Very high=90 percent or higher probability
High=h5-90 percent probability
Moderate=35-65 percent probability
Low=10-35 percent probabilty
Ncgligihle/none=0-10 percent probability
Insurgency
(if applicable)
Threat to
regime or
current
policies
Prospects for success
in achieving goals
Feb-May
1986
I year
2-3 years
?
0
G
0.
?.
0
0
0
?
0
G
?
Q
?
0
0
0
0
G
0
0
0
Relations With the
Soviet Union
Tension
during:
Prospects for major
deterioration within:
Feb-May
1986
1 year
2-3 years
G
G
G
?
0
0
O
0
0
G
0
G
G
0
G
0
O
O
0
0
G
0
0
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Summary
in Soviet-Supported
Third World Regimes
Indications of Instability
Developments and Trends
and acceptable regime, in our view.
During February to May 1986-the time period covered in this publica-
tion-the leadership in South Yemen and Mozambique faced substantial
pressure on a number of fronts-ethnic/regional tensions, economic deteri-
oration, perceived threats of border hostilities, increasing factionalism
among the elite, and a deteriorating security situation. In South Yemen we
rate the prospects for open conflict and an irregular change in leadership
very high in the coming months. The new regime has failed to consolidate
its position, to gain foreign support, or to resolve serious contentious issues
within the ruling elite. We judge that the outcome of any conflict would be
highly uncertain because of the fragmented nature of the leadership and
the armed forces, the questionable capability of former President Hasani's
exiled forces, and the degree of Soviet involvement. While we believe that
there are substantial strains in the current South Yemen-USSR relation-
ship, over the longer term Moscow is determined to keep Aden in the
Soviet fold and will work behind the scenes to bring about a more stable
to be high.
We judge that prospects for an insurgent military victory or a sudden
regime change in Mozambique are less than even over the next year. In our
opinion, the government's deteriorating military position, however, may
lead Machel to cool relations with the West in an effort to acquire a
significant increase in Soviet military aid. If, as we expect, substantial new
Soviet military assistance is not forthcoming, we judge the longer term
prospects for a victory by the insurgents or an irregular leadership change
power.
Libyan leader Qadhafi appears to be in control and has approached
Moscow for increased military assistance. The US retaliatory strike in
April weakened his political standing among the military and the populace,
in our judgment, by humiliating the Libyan Armed Forces and stimulating
West European governments to cooperate with Washington in isolating
Qadhafi. These developments strengthen a climate that was already
conducive to coup plotting. Prospects for Qadhafi's political survival
depend largely on the ability of his elaborate security apparatus to keep the
Army in check. revolutionary committees
inserted into the armed forces remain loyal and serve effectively as
watchdogs against discontent. If the security apparatus breaks down and
Qadhafi is removed, a period of instability is likely, as competitors vie for
Secret
DI CIQ 86-002
June 1986
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
The Government in Angola is uncertain about its best military strategy,
Government forces, but-
tressed by increased Soviet military deliveries, were positioned in late May
for a repeat of last year's offensive against UNITA.
launching a massive offensive against UNITA's southeastern stronghold
have been tempered by fears of South African intervention and worries
about high levels of UNITA activity in the north. On balance, increased
fighting is likely, but the military situation and prospects for insurgent
success will not shift dramatically in the near term, in our judgment.
We judge that the effectiveness of the Afghan regime may improve in the
short term, following the replacement in early May of Babrak Karmal by
the even more pro-Soviet ex-intelligence chief Najibullah. Insurgents,
however, have continued to demonstrate an effective capability against
Afghan army forces, moving quantities of supplies from Pakistan, despite
intensified Soviet-Afghan military operations.
We believe that tension in Soviet-client relationships was notable only in
the case of South Yemen during the past four months.
we believe that Aden is unhappy with what it perceives as a
lack of substantial Soviet materiel and economic assistance. For their part,
the Soviets appear frustrated with continued factional infighting in Aden
and probably have strong doubts about the regime's continued viability,
according to our Embassy in North Yemen.
Generally, we believe Moscow enjoyed good or improving relations with
the other regimes during this period:
? After initial protests by students and supporters of Babrak Karmal,
Afghanistan's new leader appears to be controlling dissidents and
consolidating his power base.
? Strains in Ethiopian-Soviet relations that developed in the wake of the
South Yemen coup have been papered over; Moscow recently lowered the
price it charges Addis Ababa for oil.
? Libyan and Syrian delegations visited Moscow seeking closer defense ties
and new military equipment in an attempt to deter US or Israeli hostile
actions.
? Iraq, according to Embassy reports, received Moscow's agreement to
reschedule a portion of its debt and to provide additional credits for
civilian imports.
? Cuba and Vietnam received new economic pledges from Moscow.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Part 1. Perspective
Gorbachev's Third World Policy Dilemma
The Soviet Communist Party congress in February and the new party
program appear to highlight Moscow's desire to hold down the cost of its
Third World involvements. In his congress address, Gorbachev soft-
pedaled Moscow's internationalist obligations and merely expressed "pro-
found sympathy" for Third World aspirations. The CPSU program
adopted at the congress stressed that the construction of socialism by Third
World states must occur "mainly through their own efforts." Gorbachev's
address to the congress, as well as the party program, underscored the
centrality of the US factor in Soviet foreign policy priorities, particularly
as they relate to arms control and related security issues.
Recent Soviet military and economic assistance commitments to key Third
World clients, however, suggest that Moscow's support for a core group of
key Third World friends will remain strong, and, in some cases, even
increase. Record levels of military deliveries to Luanda, new economic aid
pledges to Vietnam and Cuba, and continuing military and economic aid to
Nicaragua attest to the Soviet Union's intention to backstop its important
clients, and to fend off the challenges by Washington.
Gorbachev thus faces a basic contradiction in his desire to hold down the
cost of Moscow's Third World involvements while holding onto, and
consolidating, Third World gains achieved in the 1970s. Moreover, his
effort to institute major economic reform and reach some arms control
modus vivendi with Washington will be hampered to the degree that Third
World involvement diverts Soviet economic resources and increases the
potential for US-Soviet confrontation.
The presence of such unpredictable variables as Libyan leader Qadhafi
adds to Gorbachev's problems. Private Soviet comments made after the US
airstrike on Tripoli in mid-April suggest that Moscow does not want events
in Libya to undercut its efforts to engage Washington in a dialogue; still,
the USSR felt compelled to take some action to demonstrate that US
assertiveness against Soviet interests will affect other aspects of the
bilateral relationship. Postponement of the Shultz-Shevardnadze summit
1 Secret
,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 li V
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
secret
preparatory talks was a low-cost gesture, but it nonetheless established a
linkage between US behavior in the Third World and US-Soviet relations.
Moscow rejected such linkage when Washington sought to impose it on
Moscow during the 1970s.
Gorbachev himself described the attack as "a link in the chain of
provocative actions," while Foreign Minister Shevardnadze asserted there
was an "organic link" between the attack on Tripoli and US nuclear
testing in Nevada. The Soviet media commented on other parts of this
"chain" of events: US naval operations in the Black Sea, press reports that
Stinger antiaircraft missiles would be sent to guerrillas in Angola and
Afghanistan, continued US nuclear testing despite Moscow's continuing
testing ban, and the US-imposed reduction of the Soviet UN staff.
Moscow's perception of pressure from the United States and the Soviets'
felt need to respond-such as in the Libyan episode-underscore how
difficult it will be for Gorbachev to isolate Third World problems from his
broader policy agenda. Statements by various Soviet leaders are critical of
Gorbachev's strategy of engaging a US administration that is aggressively
challenging the Soviet position across the board in the Third World. To
quiet critics, Gorbachev may decide to bolster Soviet support for besieged
clients. He might also work more assertively against US interests in those
Third World regions of sensitivity to Washington.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
hjfl t Ol
Part 2. Country Indicators and Briefs
The indicators have been grouped into three catego-
ries to guide the analyst in reaching a judgment about
the extent of:
? Pressure for instability or irregular leadership
change.
? Insurgent threat to regime or current policies.
? Tension in relations with the USSR.
Each of the indicators is keyed to a set of questions
that appears in the appendix.
In reaching their bottom-line judgments-which in
the following charts are highlighted with gray tones-
analysts were asked to undertake a two-step process.
The first step involved an assessment of the actual
level of activity or presence of the indicator in their
country during the relevant time period; these assess-
ments are resented in the following individual coun-
try chart
s.~~
In a second step, analysts were asked to evaluate the
importance of the event or activity described by the
instability indicator in judging pressure for instability
or irregular leadership change in their country. The
chart in the appendix presents these evaluations.
In evaluating the impact of indicators of discord with
the USSR on the overall Soviet-client relationship,
analysts were asked to evaluate the strength of their
country's ties to and dependency on the USSR; these
assessments are tabulated in the lower half of the
charts entitled "Relations With the Soviet Union."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Afghanistan
Legend
Very high
High
Moderate
O Low
Negligible/none
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
?
Population flows/elite emigration
U
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
0
Foreign exchange shortages
0
0
External factors Regional/border hostilities
0
0
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
W
0
Western efforts to promote policy change
0
0
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
0
Shortfalls in military aid
0
0
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
0
^
Protests, strikes, rallies
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
U
U
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
U
Inefficacy of political/social control
U
Excessive repression/ brutality
U
Popular grievances over material welfare
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
vulnerabilities
Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
0
U
Officers discontent with government actions
0
0
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change'
O
V
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
V
V
Leadership confidence/unity
0
0
Military capabilities
0
Rural control
0
0
Urban activities
Foreign military support
0
0
Foreign political support
?
0
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
0
Leadership confidence/unity
0
0
Military capabilities
0
0
Rural control
0
0
Urban control
W
W
Foreign military support
a
0
Foreign political support
0
0
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
0
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
0
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
O
CEO
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Moscow's new puppet, ex-intelligence chief Najibullah faces a formi-
dable challenge in developing the Afghan army to allow for a reduced
Soviet role, improving party discipline and performance, and sup-
pressing the insurgency. Najibullah has held a series of highly visible
meetings with key military, party, and tribal groups in what we
believe is an effort to energize political institutions, dampen factional-
ism, and project an appearance of control.
= however, his appointment has brought to the surface divisions
within the dominant Parchami wing of the party. Opposition to
Babrak Karmal's ouster as Secretary General forced Najibullah into
a nominal triumvirate with Babrak as President of the Revolutionary
Council and Prime Minister Soltan Ali Keshtmand. Students at
Kabul University and local high schools staged widespread demon-
strations in support of Karmal upon the announcement of his ouster.
Legend
X Present
We believe that tension between Karmal and Moscow centered on
levels of Soviet military support and Soviet negotiating posture at the
Geneva talks on Soviet troop withdrawal. While we judge that the
pro-Soviet Najibullah will attempt to meet Soviet demands, it is
unclear at this point whether he will be successful and whether, as a
result, he will enjoy smoother relations with Moscow. The insurgents
suffered the destruction of a major base camp and heavy casualties 25X1
during a three-week Afghan/Soviet assault in April. They have since 25X1
reoccupied the base, however, with the withdrawal of the Afghan
army.
discussion.
Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Legend Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
0 Strong
. Moderate
O Weak
. Negligible/none
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet., surrogate geopolitical interest
"Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instahility/leadership change. See appendix for details.
bincludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
25X1
25X1
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Legend
Very high
High
w Moderate
O Low
Regional/border hostilities
External factors
? Negligible/none
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
Population flows/elite emigration
Food, energy. consumer goods shortages
W
S
Foreign exchange shortages
U
U
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
rr
Western efforts to promote policy change
r
0
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
0
Shortfalls in military aid
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
0
W
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
r+
S
Terrorism and sabotage
~+
r
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political/social control
r'
Excessive repression/ brutality
r
Popular grievances over material welfare
W
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
rr
S
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
U
Factionalism within military
Officers discontent with government actions
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changes
O
?
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
G
O
'
Leadership confidence/unity
5
0
Military capabilities
W
Rural control
0
Urban activities
U
Foreign military support
0
Foreign political support
V
r
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
rtr
Leadership confidence/unity
'V
Military capabilities
0
Rural control
rr
'r
Urban control
0
0
Foreign military support
qtr
Foreign political support
S
S
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Since seizing power in January, the current regime has so far failed to
consolidate its position and gain support either at home or abroad.
The security situation remains unstable, and there is little popular
confidence in the regime, according to Embassy reporting from North
Yemen. Embassy 0 reporting indicates that the collective
leadership is deeply divided by competing ambitions and internal
squabbling; it appears paralyzed without a dominant leader able to
manipulate a stable, broadly based coalition. Continuing sources of
contention include: dealing with former South Yemeni President
Hasani and his supporters who-according to our Embassy in North
Yemen-are receiving military training in North Yemen, the deterio-
rating economic situation, and Aden's inability to obtain foreign
diplomatic and financial support.
In our judgment, growing hostility between the competing factions in
the Aden leadership coupled with mounting security and economic
problems may soon lead to the resumption of open conflict. If fighting
breaks out in Aden, the outcome would be highly uncertain because
of the fragmented nature of the regime and the armed forces. In
addition, Hasani's exiled forces would be likely to intervene. Their
ability to affect the outcome of hostilities in Aden is questionable,
however, because they lack decisive leadership and adequate foreign
military support, according to Embassy reports.
Legend
X Present
A critical unknown is the role of the Soviet Union in the leadership
struggle. There are indications, however, of strong tensions in the
relationship. Aden is unhappy with what it perceives as a lack of
substantial Soviet materiel and economic assistance, according to a
source of our Embassy in Sanaa who recently visited South Yemen.
the Soviets are frustrated with the
Aden leadership's unceasing factional infighting and probably have
strong doubts about its continued viability. Given Moscow's strong
will to keep South Yemen in the Soviet fold, we judge that it will
continue to work behind the scenes to bring about a more stable and
acceptable regime in Aden.
Legend Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
0 Strong
w Moderate
O Weak
? Negligible / none
Client military dependency
Client economic dependency
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
"Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual bincludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
Secret
,t Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Ethiopia
Legend
? Very high
High
Moderate
Q Low
Negligible/none
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
Population flows/elite emigration
Q
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
?
S
Foreign exchange shortages
0
0
External factors Regional/border hostilities
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Q
Western efforts to promote policy change
vp
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
0
Shortfalls in military aid
0
0
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
r
W
Protests, strikes, rallies
Q
0
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Q
O
Terrorism and sabotage
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
0
0
Inefficacy of political/social control
Q
O
Excessive repression/ brutality
Popular grievances over material welfare
0
O
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
Q
0
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
r
Q
Factionalism within military
0
0
Officers discontent with government actions
Q
Q
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changed
O
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
O
O
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
f:PLF it Ill I
I Fl I y I P1 I
Leadership confidence/unity
r
Military capabilities
rr
Rural control
rr W
r r
Urban activities
0 Q
O 0
Foreign military support
0 0
O 0
Foreign political support
0 0
O 0
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
r
W
Urban control
W
W
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
0
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
0
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Chairman Mengistu continued to expand the party's influence,
according to the US Embassy, with newly trained cadres assuming
watchdog roles in government ministries and political structures.
Party cadre play a leading role in famine relief operations and
government villagization and resettlement programs; Mengistu uses
these programs to increase control over an independent-minded
peasantry and push toward the collectivization of agriculture. The
Embassy reports that in September Mengistu intends to announce a
new constitution that will establish a "people's democracy" and
legalize the present order.
Ethiopia told the EC this spring that it would initiate limited
agricultural reforms in exchange for additional development assis-
tance, according to Embassy reporting. We believe that Addis Ababa
probably consented to the changes because of continued declines in
agricultural productivity and living standards and the refusal of
major donors to commit funds to agricultural projects without policy
reform. In addition, Moscow reportedly has encouraged Chairman
Mengistu to improve agricultural performance before proceeding
fully with collectivization. We believe the Ethiopian leadership
probably views these reforms as a temporary measure and will pursue
collectivization further as soon as the current crisis eases.
The Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) stepped up its military
activity in mid-April, although it has been unable to seize and hold
major towns or to resist determined government counterattacks. The
Legend
X Present
Tigrean offensive, however, has inflicted heavy government casualties
and may disrupt Addis Ababa's plans for an offensive in Eritrea
Province, according to the US Embassy. Reliable Embassy reporting
indicates the regime may need to shift troops from Eritrea to reverse
Tigrean gains-a move that might lead to new attacks by the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), in our view. Mengistu
reportedly believes the autonomy clauses in his proposed constitution
will help end the insurgencies.
The strains in Ethiopian-Soviet relations that developed in the wake
of the South Yemen coup appear to have been papered over in recent
months. Both sides seem anxious to avoid further bilateral tensions,
and Moscow recently lowered the price it charges Addis Ababa for
oil. Mengistu, nonetheless, has resisted Soviet pressure to recognize
the new Aden regime and continues to lend political support to
deposed President Hasani. In addition, he has allowed Hasani,
members of his Politburo, and several hundred followers to stay in
Ethiopia. In our view, Mengistu probably calculates that token
political support for Hasani will not disrupt Ethiopia's relations with
the USSR. We believe Mengistu sought increased military aid during
his February visit to Moscow,
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Legend Tics and dependency
0 Strong
w Moderate
O Weak
? Negligible/none
"Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
btncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
,I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Angola
Legend
? Very high
High
Moderate
Q Low
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
External factors Regional/border hostilities
? Negligible/none
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
0
Population flows/elite emigration
rr
W
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
W
Foreign exchange shortages
0
0
0
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
W
0
Western efforts to promote policy change
W
?r
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
Shortfalls in military aid
Q
0
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
0
W
Protests, strikes, rallies
Q
Q
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
0
0
vulnerahilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political/social control
Excessive repression/brutality
W
Popular grievances over material welfare
0
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
?
0
vulnerahilities Discipline/training problems within military
Q
0
Factionalism within military
Officers discontent with government actions
0
0
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changea
V
V
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
0
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
V
?
V
?
Leadership confidence/unity
?
Military capabilities
Rural control
?
Urban activities
0
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
0
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban control
0
0
Foreign military support
0
0
Foreign political support
0
0
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
0
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
0
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
309295A 686
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
According to a variety of diplomatic observers in Luanda, the
Angolan Government is uncertain about its military options. Ambi-
tions of launching a massive offensive against UNITA's southeastern
stronghold have been tempered by fears of a major South African
intervention on UNITA's behalf and worries about continued
government forces-buttressed by increased Soviet military deliver-
ies-remain positioned for a repeat of last year's major offensive into
the UNITA stronghold. With continued Soviet and Cuban support,
Luanda probably will not relax military pressure on the insurgents
and is likely to launch another offensive against UNITA this
summer. For its part, UNITA, is
more confident of its prospects. Since late last year, the insurgents
have sustained a high level of guerrilla activity in northern and
eastern Angola and are buoyed by US support. On balance, increased
fighting is likely, but the military situation probably will not shift
dramatically in the near term and a continued standoff appears
likely.
The drastic fall in the price of oil-which provides 90 percent of
Angola's foreign exchange-has shaken Angola's development plans
and heretofore solid creditworthiness, causing the regime to seek debt
relief and to worry about how it will pay for needed arms. Food
shortages are likely to become even more severe in the months ahead,
and industrial output will continue to fall as imports and the
nonmilitary budget are cut. According to diplomatic sources, the
government's performance and popular appeal have not improved
appreciably despite a major reshuffling of government ministries and
restructuring of the party.
Reporting from diplomatic observers in Luanda suggests that the
combined pressures have increased the dependence of the regime on 25X1
the Soviets and the Cubans. According to diplomatic reporting, senior
Angolan, Cuban, and Soviet policy-level officials held a major
strategy session in Moscow in February, and President dos Santos in
May completed a highly publicized state visit to the Soviet Union.
Preliminary readings of the visit from press accounts suggest dos
Santos got promises of continued arms aid and possibly some 25X1
concessions on Angola's substantial debt while hewing more closely to
the Soviet line on the impossibility of a US-brokered regional
settlement. Over the past few months, the quantity of Soviet arms
deliveries to Angola has reached record levels, probably in large part
to support the expected offensive.F___1 25Y
Legend Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
0 Strong
W Moderate
O Weak
? Negligible/none
Soviet /surrogate military access to client bases/ports
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instahility/leadership change. See appendix for details.
"Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual t'Includes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
Secret
Mozambique
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Legend
? Very high
High
Moderate
O Low
Negligible/none
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
U
U
Population flows/elite emigration
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
Foreign exchange shortages
External factors Regional/border hostilities
U
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Western efforts to promote policy change
0
0
Shortfalls in economic aid
O
U
Shortfalls in military aid
rr
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
0
Protests, strikes, rallies
0
r
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
?
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
V
V
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political/social control
Excessive repression/ brutality
0
0
Popular grievances over material welfare
U
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
V
V
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
0
Officers discontent with government actions
S
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changes
?
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
r
V
Leadership confidence/unity
W
V
Military capabilities
U
U
Rural control
?
Urban activities
V
V
Foreign military support
V
V
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
V
V
Leadership confidence/unity
0
V
Military capabilities
0
Rural control
0
0
Urban control
?
S
Foreign military support
0
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
US Embassy and hat the Mo-
zambican insurgents nave recovere rom last a s Zimbabwean-led
offensive, and, in our judgment, probably will gain firm control of
their traditional heartland in rural central Mozambique during the
coming year. Zimbabwean forces have reverted to a more defensive
posture but could disrupt the rebels again if ordered to resume large
counterguerrilla operations in Mozambique. According to Embassy
reports, Zimbabwean commanders are frustrated and concerned
about costs and probably will do little more than guard two transpor-
tation corridors that Zimbabwe uses. The Mozambican Army re-
mains demoralized and inept, but it will benefit from shorter supply
lines and some tribal support to continue to hold large areas of the
northeast and south as well as the major cities. US Embassy reporting
indicates that Mozambique's economic slide continued to aggravate
food shortages and to swell refugee camps. Grain marketing over the
crop year just begun is expected to total only one-tenth of require-
ments, and, in our judgment, Maputo will be unable to make
principal and interest payments on its foreign debt owed mainly to
Maputo has responded with efforts to strengthen government and
Army discipline and performance and to seek both exploratory talks
with the rebels and more military aid from the Soviets, according to
the press. An extended and, we judge, probably contentious Politburo
meeting in late February criticized the government and the military
and announced measures to enhance party supervision-
sketchy press and Embassy reporting leads us to believe
that government officials have begun secret contacts with the rebels,
but reconciliation is unlikely as long as neither side is willing to drop
preconditions currently unacceptable to the other.)
Press statements suggest that Machel received assurances of contin-
ued Soviet military support during a visit to Moscow in March, but
apparently less than he sought. Perhaps to placate the Soviets, he
placed two Marxist hardliners in party posts overseeing the economy
in April, but Machel also named moderates to head the economic
ministries and apparently intends to continue economic reforms and
cooperation with the West for now. Nonetheless, we believe that the
government's deteriorating military position may lead Machel to cool
relations with the West and to adopt a more confrontational stance
toward South Africa in an effort to acquire a significant increase in
Soviet military aid. We judge the prospects for an insurgent military
victory or irregular leadership change as less than even over the next
year. If, as we expect, substantial new Soviet military assistance is not
forthcoming, we judge longer term prospects for regime change as
Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Government-to-government relations
Client military dependency
Legend Ties and dependency
40 Strong
rr Moderate
Q Weak
? Negligible/none
Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
hlncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Legend
Very high
High
Moderate
Q Low
External factors
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
309297A 6-86
Secret
Level or magnitude
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic regional/religious tensions
Population flows elite emigration
~
_
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages ?
Foreign exchange shortages
Regional, border hostilities
0
Political /diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Western efforts to promote policy change
j
Shortfalls in economic aid
Shortfalls in military aid
Q
0
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
0
0
Protests, strikes, rallies
0
.
Reports/ of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
itimacy or confidence
l Loss of le
li
i
g
ca
t
Regime po
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite 0
0
Inefficacy of political/social control 0
Excessive repressionhrutality 0
0
0
0
Popular grievances over material welfare
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
0
0
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
0
Officers discontent with government actions
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changea
Q
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
0
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
O
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
0
Leadership confidence /unity
0
0
Military capabilities
Rural control
0
0
Urban activities
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
0
0
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
V
'/
Leadership confidence/unity
?
Military capabilities
V
Rural control
to
Urban control
?
Foreign military support
O
0
O
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Although the Sandinistas continue to face challenges from the
insurgency, a declining economy, and eroding popular support, we
judge prospects for regime change to be low in the near term.
Ongoing insurgent efforts to achieve greater unity, formulate a more
effective political strategy, and establish better links to the internal
opposition could, however, lead to more pressure on the regime.
Insurgent performance in the field improved over the past several
months, and we estimate that the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN), the main insurgent group, now has some 10,000 troops inside
Nicaragua. Rebel groups on the east coast and in the south, where
field commanders formerly loyal to rebel leader Eden Pastora forged
an alliance with the FDN, also increased their activities. For its part,
the regime's Air Force has been increasingly effective in ferrying
troops, providing fire support, evacuating casualties, and supplying
units in the field. Sandinista security forces also continue to harass
civilian supporters of the insurgents, according to US Embassy
On the economic front, Nicaragua's recent harvest was the worst this
decade, and increased Soviet Bloc help will not offset a further
decline in agricultural export earnings this year. Government officials
say that the December-March coffee harvest was one-third below last
year, and the nearly completed cotton harvest also is likely to be down
by about a third. In addition to emergency shipments of rice, the
Legend
X Present
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Legend Ties and dependency
pendency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Strong
Moderate
O Weak
? Negligible/none
USSR in the last six months committed $115 million for agricultural
development projects, but these will take at least two years to begin to
Although some domestic opponents, after months of political inactivi-
ty, took advantage of May Day celebrations to sharply criticize and
demonstrate against the regime, government controls and internal
bickering have kept them in check. Unions and political parties from
the opposition coalition held several separate rallies on May Day in
competition with the Sandinistas' celebrations. The US Embassy
reports that some 2,000 to 3,000 participants joined in a march
sponsored by an independent labor federation carrying placards and
shouting antiregime slogans. The Embassy reported, however, that
the demonstrations failed to spark any public reaction. Although the
regime tolerated the May Day events, we believe it will probably
invoke existing emergency laws against public gatherings if further
rallies are attempted. Meanwhile, US Embassy reports indicate that
some 10,000 Miskito Indians fled into Honduras earlier this year, in
part to escape regime human rights violations.
a Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
matcators of discord Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Government-to-government relations
Client military dependency
Client economic dependency
Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
,r
Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
0
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
"Includes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
,l Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part-,
art - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
Syria
Level or magnitude
Legend
? Very high
High
Moderate
Low
Regional/border hostilities
factors
External
Negligible/none
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Western efforts to promote policy change
Shortfalls in economic aid
Shortfalls in military aid
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
0
Population flows/elite emigration
Food, energy. consumer goods shortages
yr
Foreign exchange shortages
0
0
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
0
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political /social control
Excessive repression/brutality
0
Popular grievances over material welfare
0
0
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
0
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
r
0
Officers discontent with government actions
pressures for instability or irregular leadership changes
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
0,
0
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2.3
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban activities
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban control
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime Or current policiesb
prospects for success in achieving goats within next year
for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
Prospects
309298A 6.86
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
The past few months have been tumultuous for the Syrian Govern-
ment, marked by domestic bombings, continued economic deteriora-
tion, and heightened tensions with Israel. The spate of bombings and
attempted bombings that hit northern Syria and Damascus in March
and April are unprecedented in recent years. More than a dozen
incidents were reported, with one bombing resulting in over 140
killed. While the bombings have officially been ascribed to Iraq for
political convenience, Syrian high officials reportedly believe they
were the work of Lebanese Phalange elements in retaliation for
similar bombings carried out by Syrian-backed groups in the Leba-
Syrian security has increased internal surveillance and rounded up
the usual suspects, including Christians, Palestinians, and Muslim
Brotherhood elements. The crackdown undoubtedly has created ill-
will among some groups, but so far there has been no popular
backlash against the regime. If evidence implicating the Muslim
Brotherhood is found-and so far it has not been-it would be the
first indication of activity by the group since its suppression in 1982.
While there is no indication that Assad is losing control, the fact that
Assad's ubiquitous security apparatus proved permeable could offer
hope to regime opponents who have been biding their time.
Assad continues to grapple with the worst economic crisis since he
came to power 16 years ago. Skyrocketing inflation and shortages of
housing, food, and consumer goods place persistent popular pressure
Legend
X Present
Legend
Strong
rr Moderate
0 Weak
Negligible/none
on the regime, while aid from moderate Arab states is declining.
According to the Embassy, Assad anticipates an increase in oil
revenue in the not-too-distant future, and, we believe, therefore, he is
not likely to carry through with meaningful economic reform-
including urtailment of expensive, but popular, bread subsidies.
Publicity over Syrian involvement in the April El Al bombing attempt
and fears of possible military retaliation have soured relations with
new equipment and renewed guarantees of military support. Moscow
was almost certainly embarrassed by the failure of the SA-5 missile
it has probably upgraded the SA-5 missile system in Syria to
prevent similar failures in the future. High-level Syrian-Soviet talks
held in Moscow in late May stressed reconciliation between Syria and
Iraq, improving Syrian-PLO relations, and the possibility of Israeli
attacks against Syrian forces in Lebanon, according to press reports.
Damascus probably believes that close ties to the Soviet Union
increase its ability to deter Israeli or US military attacks on Syria.
I
Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Government-to-government relations
Client military dependency
Client economic dependency
Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
an
g prospects or
f
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
a Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual b[ncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
indicators in assessing pressures on the re ime
d
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Legend
Very high
High
Moderate
O Low
External factors
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
Level or magnitude
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
40
- 0
Population flows/elite emigration
0
0
Food, energy. consumer goods shortages
0
W
Foreign exchange shortages
W
0
Regional/border hostilities
?
40
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
0
0
Western efforts to promote policy change
0
0
Shortfalls in economic aid
O
Shortfalls in military aid
O
O
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
O
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
W
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
0
Inefficacy of political /social control
0
0
Excessive repression /brutality
Popular grievances over material welfare
O
O
/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
Militar
0
y
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
W
Factionalism within military
O
O
Officers discontent with government actions
0
O
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changea
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
Q
r
O
Leadership confidence/unity
W
W
Military capabilities
W
Rural control
?
Urban activities
0
Foreign military support
W
- W
Foreign political support
0
0
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
W
Leadership confidence/unity _
?
Military capabilities
W
W
Rural control
W
Urban control
?
Foreign military support
?
W
Foreign political support
?
0
0
0
O
0
Q
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Iran's capture of Al Faw on the west bank of the Shatt at Arab in
February together with continued economic deterioration have fur-
ther weakened civilian morale, in our judgment. According to the US
Embassy in Baghdad, there is popular disgruntlement, largely reflect-
ing frustration over the protracted war. Discontent is not organized,
however. In addition, senior commanders have complained about
Saddam's handling of the war, but the
security services' tight surveillance of the armed services makes any
coup plotting difficult, in our view. The growing unhappiness with
Saddam, nonetheless, increases the chances of an assassination. For
their part, Kurdish insurgents resumed attacks against urban centers
this spring, stirring the usual antigovernment feelings and protests
among the local Kurdish population. Baghdad, however, has commit-
ted additional troops to the Kurdish areas, and this has temporarily
checked the rebels' operations, according to the Embassy.
Legend
X Present
The sharp decline in world oil prices has severely weakened Iraq's
financial position, forcing Baghdad to announce new austerity mea-
sures and delay payments on its foreign debt. The defaults on short-
term debt have begun to affect Baghdad's ability to finance civilian
imports, a key factor in maintaining wartime morale. While the
USSR and France-Iraq's largest arms suppliers-are not likely to
restrict critical military supplies, financial aid from Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait probably will not be enough to completely offset current
payment problems and will eventually prompt even greater spending
cuts. According to Embassy reports, Moscow has agreed to resched-
ule a portion of Iraq's debt and to provide additional credits for
Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Government-to-government relations
Legend rigs and dependency
0 Strong
w Moderate
0 Weak
? Negligible none
Client military dependency
Client economic dependency
Soviet surrogate military access to client basest ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
s a tic
_. .. g p .. e e n n regime and prospects for
instability leadership change. See appendix for details.
"Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual htnetudes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
indicators in assessin ressur'
11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Legend
Very high
High
Moderate
O Low
External factors
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
3093004 686
Secret
Level or magnitude
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
Population flows/elite emigration
i
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
l
Foreign exchange shortages
Regional/border hostilities
o
O
Political /diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
W
W
Western efforts to promote policy change
Shortfalls in economic aid
O
0
Shortfalls in military aid
rr
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
0
0
Protests, strikes, rallies
0
0
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
W
W
Terrorism and sabotage
0
O
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
_
0
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political/social control
0
0
Excessive repression/brutality
W
Popular grievances over material welfare
0
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
W
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
O
Factionalism within military
Officers discontent with government actions
0
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changes
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
O
_
?
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban activities
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban control
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Libyan leader Qadhafi remains in charge, but the US airstrike has
damaged his ability to rally the public and the military, in our view.
Libya's political climate was already highly coup prone before the
attack, in our judgment, and a precipitating event, such as Western
military or economic retaliation for another Libyan-sponsored terror-
ist activity, could provoke conspirators to act. For the time being,
however, we believe that Qadhafi's pervasive security forces remain
loyal and have effectively neutralized the capability of the regular
Army to mount a coup. Economic difficulties-generated largely by
the US freeze on Libyan assets last January and the fall in oil
prices-also continue to contribute to Qadhafi's domestic problems.
In the aftermath of the US strikes,
tensions were raised between Tripoli and Moscow over what Qadhafi
considered inadequate Soviet support. The visit by Libya's number-
two man Jallud to Moscow in late May, however, may signal closer
ties. We judge that the extensive involvement of Defense Minister
Sokolov in the talks and the announcement of a Soviet military visit
to Tripoli this month strongly suggest that Moscow offered the
Libyans additional military assistance. Moscow apparently turned
down a Libyan request for a friendship treaty and publicly repri-
manded Tripoli for overtly promoting terrorism.
alternative future scenarios.
Legend
X Present
Legend Ties and dependency
0 Strong
v Moderate
O Weak
? Negligible/none
a Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual bincludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986 Feb-May 1986
Legend
Very high
High
V Moderate
O Low
al factors Regional/border hostilities
Negligible/none
External
factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
Population flows/elite emigration
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
0
Q
Foreign exchange shortages
0
V
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Q
Q
Western efforts to promote policy change
0
4
Shortfalls in economic aid
Q
0
Shortfalls in military aid
Opposition activities Strength /appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political/social control
Excessive repression //brutality
Popular grievances over material welfare
0
0
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
Officers discontent with government actions
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changea
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban activities
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban control
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
secret
Economic difficulties continued to mount during the past few months,
largely because of reduced hard currency earnings from sugar and oil.
In April Havana threatened to suspend debt repayments owed to
Western banks and governments and asked Western creditors to
reschedule debts falling due in 1986 and 1987; Havana has since
backed off its threat to suspend interest payments. There is some
evidence that disillusionment with the regime over economic issues is
on the rise. Castro has sharply criticized worker apathy, and official
Cuban statistics show street crime is rising. Moreover, we believe that
Castro's decision in late May to abolish the farmers' free markets will
increase disenchantment among consumers. Havana is responding to
its economic difficulties and public dissatisfaction over economic
matters with greater regimentation of government, party, and society,
and the use of the alleged threat from the United States to justify
ever-greater sacrifices on the part of the population. Tougher stances
on hard currency assistance by both Western creditors and Moscow
may lead Castro to delay or even to renounce some hard currency
Castro's acquiescence to Gorbachev's call for improved Third World
economic performance has provided the catalyst for a warming trend
in Soviet-Cuban relations. Paralleling Gorbachev's call for economic
reforms at the 27th CPSU Congress, Castro devoted much of his
speech at the Third Cuban Communist Party Congress in February
to criticism of economic shortcomings, stressing the need to meet
export commitments to CEMA, adopt new technologies, improve
Legend
X Present
productivity, and continue austerity. Moscow, for its part, sent its
second-ranked Politburo member Ligachev to the Havana congress
where he told the Cubans they could depend on the Soviet Union to
fulfill its commitments to Cuba.
Despite the mutual protestations of solidarity, there are signs that
frictions in the relationship-particularly over economic aid-still
persist. The Cuban media trumpeted Cuban-Soviet economic agree-
ments signed in early April that call for a 50-percent increase in
Soviet development credits over the span of Cuba's 1986-90 economic
plan. Development credits account for only about 10 percent of
Moscow's economic aid to Cuba, however, and no details were
released on the value of the much larger Soviet trade subsidies or on
the future of the oil agreement that allows Cuba to sell the Soviet oil
In his speech at the Soviet CPSU Congress, the Cuban leader made
an impassioned plea for Soviet economic assistance to the Third 25X1
World. In our opinion, his comments suggested concern that Mos-
cow's focus on strategic issues could negatively affect its long-term
economic commitment to Cuba and Soviet Third World allies. Given
the mutual benefits of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, we believe that
economic frictions will not fundamentally alter the strong alliance
between the USSR and Cuba over the next few years.
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Differences over party structure/role; relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Legend Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
49 Strong Government-to-government relations
W Moderate
Q Weak
? Negligible/none
Client economic dependency
Soviet /surrogate militarv access to client bases ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet surrogate geopolitical interest
?Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual hIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details
i nstahility/leadership change. See appendix for details.
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
Secret
Legend
Very high
High
Moderate
0 Low
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
factors Regional/border hostilities
External
? Negligible/none
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
Population flows/elite emigration
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
0
0
Foreign exchange shortages
0
0
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Western efforts to promote policy change
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
0
Shortfalls in military aid
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
0
0
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political /social control
Excessive repression /brutality
0
0
Popular grievances over material welfare
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
0
0
Officers discontent with government actions
then *P
IJX tart $;
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
1
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban activities
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban control
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
ttt t r t ttx pol" b
-ft is wit sec
fir` ;in a w t 2` '
3093@A 686
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
In mid-May, a high-ranking Politburo member publicly stated for the
first time that Kim Chong-il would succeed his father, Kim 11-song,
who is 74. This announcement may herald a new phase in Kim
Chong-il's increasing consolidation of wer
The younger Kim, recognizes
the country's economic difficulties. Although we lack firm economic
data , we perceive increasing efforts by the regime to
grapple with the many bottlenecks that impede economic growth.
Cabinet changes in early February were the third since October and
centered on economic management. Fuel shortages continue to affect
all sectors, including the military, according to our Embassy in South
Korea. P'yongyang has continued to seek Western contracts for
equipment and technology but suffers from a legacy of an abysmal
repayment record during a similar turn to the West in the mid-1970s.
press reporting, the North Koreans also are disappointed
with lukewarm Soviet support for their demand to cohost the Olympic
Games. We believe Kim Chong-il, nonetheless, recognizes his coun-
try's reliance on sophisticated Soviet weaponry and its importance for 25X1
maintaining the North's military edge. We expect Kim Chong-il will 25X1
visit the Soviet Union in the near future, perhaps as early as July,
when the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship will be
celebrated in Moscow.25X1
I Assessments of instability indicators are based on limited information, but
we believe that in most cases there is negligible antiregime activity in this
particularly repressive state.
25X1
LZDAI
Soviet-North Korean relations continued their two-year warming
trend with the signing of a military trade and technical agreement in
February. There is evidence of some discord in the relationship,
however. Moscow has not publicly blessed P'yongyang's dynastic
succession, and, despite widespread public and diplomatic specula-
tion, Kim Chong-il did not accompany the North Korean delegation
to the February 1986 Soviet Communist Party congress. According to
Legend
X Present
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Legend Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
0 Strong
r Moderate
0 Weak
- Negligible/none
Government-to-government relations
Client military dependency
Client economic dependency
Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
a Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual btncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 1! il~ I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
Secret
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Legend
Very high
0 High
Moderate
O Low
External factors
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
W
Population flows/elite emigration
0
0
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
W
Foreign exchange shortages
W
W
Regional/border hostilities
W
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Western efforts to promote policy change
0
0
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
0
Shortfalls in military aid
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
W
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
Inefficacy of political /social control
Excessive repression/brutality
Popular grievances over material welfare
W
W
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
Officers discontent with government actions
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership changes
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban activities
Foreign military support
?
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
Leadership confidence/unity
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban control
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
309303A 6.86
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Health problems among Vietnam's aging leaders have spurred wide-
spread rumors of changes in the top leadership.
fluidity of the succession process. We expect the leading candidates
will be Politburo members, and the succession will be orderly. We
believe that a new leadership in Hanoi is not likely to be more
There has been evidence in recent months, however, of a bitter debate
within the regime over the direction of economic policy. "Reformers"
gained the upper hand near the end of last year and attempted to
revive Vietnam's moribund economy by eliminating some egalitarian
payment-in-kind subsidies for civil servants and cadres, instituting a
merit pay system, and realigning prices to reflect market forces. The
regime also hastily enacted a drastic monetary reform that contained
many loopholes and resulted in soaring inflation. In the past few
months, the regime has backtracked and reintroduced rationing of
several consumer necessities, published strong criticisms of the
economic disruption caused by the reforms, and fired Vice-Chairman
of the Council of Ministers Tran Phuong for the failures of the
monetary reforms.
Legend
Ties and dependency
0 Strong
W Moderate
0 Weak
? Negligible none
we detected no discernible change
in the internal security situation. A foreign journalist, however,
reported open criticism of the leadership by citizens of Hanoi, ranging
from pedicab drivers to minor government officials and party cadres.
China continues to pressure Vietnam in the border area with periodic
ground attacks and daily artillery shellings~
Indicators of discord Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Improved relations by either party with China or the West
Diplomatic rebuffs
Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Government-to-government relations
?
Client military dependency
Client economic dependency
Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
0
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
0
"Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
[Includes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
25X1
25X1
25X1
7.x1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Legend
^ Very high
9 High
Moderate
Low
External factors
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
4
?
Population flows/elite emigration
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
Foreign exchange shortages
W
W
Regional/border hostilities
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
0
0
Western efforts to promote policy change
Shortfalls in economic aid
0
0
Shortfalls in military aid
Q
0
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
0
W
Protests, strikes, rallies
Q
0
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
0
0
Inefficacy of political/social control
0
0
Excessive repression/ brutality
W
W
Popular grievances over material welfare
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
W
Factionalism within military
0
0
Officers discontent with government actions
0
0
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change
O
O
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within tuft 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
W
0
W
Leadership confidence/unity
W
Military capabilities
W
W
Rural control
W
Urban activities
W
W
Foreign military support
W
W
Foreign political support
rr
W
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
W
W
Leadership confidence/unity
W
W
Military capabilities
W
W
Rural control
W
W
Urban control
0
0
Foreign military support
0
0
Foreign political support
?
0
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
0
O
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3years
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Communist Democratic Kampuchea resistance forces-the Khmer
Rouge-continue to be active throughout the interior, attacking local
government offices, Vietnamese and People's Republic of Kampuchea
military positions, and major transportation routes,
They also launched small-scale attacks against major
population centers, including several provincial capitals and targets
on the outskirts of the capital city of Phnom Penh. Non-Communist
resistance forces stepped up their operations, infiltrating several
thousand troops. Most are operating in the border region, but several
hundred have moved deep into the interior,
Communist resistance forces should be able to sustain their
current level of activity throughout the May-November rainy season.
The non-Communists, however, will continue to be inhibited by
supply, leadership, and sporadic discipline and morale problems and
will play a minor role on the battlefield, in our judgment.
In our view, the continuing higher level of insurgent activity poses no
immediate threat to Vietnam's dominant military position in Cambo-
dia, and Hanoi does not appear overly concerned with the deteriorat-
ing security situation that is, in part, a byproduct, of its current
military strategy. Hanoi is keeping most of
its forces along the Thai-Cambodian border to block infiltration, and
disrupt guerrilla operations there. It also continues to supervise the
construction of barriers along the border designed to further restrict
guerrilla movement. As construction projects are completed, we
expect Vietnam to redeploy some units to the interior to improve
Legend
X Present
Legend
40 Strong
w Moderate
0 Weak
? Negligible/none
security. In the meantime, however, Vietnamese forces available for
internal security are stretched thin, thereby facilitating resistance
operations in the provinces.
The Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime continues to face
economic shortages and a serious lack of qualified cadre with which
to build government and party institutions. Moscow largely bankrolls
Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and, given Gorbachev' s pledge
of increased military aid to Vietnam, we expect current levels of
support to continue.
Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs
Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence
Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations
Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Differences over party structure/role/relations
Diplomatic rebuffs
Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Government-to-government relations
Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Mutual foreign policy support
Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest
Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
bincludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
25X1
25X1
LOA"I
25X1
LAX"I
'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Legend
Very high
High
Moderate
Q Low
Negligible/none
Level or magnitude
Nov 1985-Jan 1986
Socioeconomic factors Ethnic/regional/religious tensions
r
Population flows/elite emigration
W
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
0
Foreign exchange shortages
rr
r
External factors Regional/border hostilities
W
Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc
Western efforts to promote policy change
Shortfalls in economic aid
Shortfalls in military aid
Opposition activities Strength/appeal of opposition groups
Protests, strikes, rallies
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
Regime political Loss of legitimacy or confidence
vulnerabilities Factionalism within ruling party or elite
0
0
Inefficacy of political/social control
rr
rr
Excessive repression/brutality
Popular grievances over material welfare
W
rr
Military/security Deficiencies of internal security forces
.+
b
vulnerabilities Discipline/training problems within military
Factionalism within military
Officers discontent with government actions
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change'
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years
The insurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
O
Leadership confidence/unity
0
0
Military capabilities
Rural control
Urban activities
Foreign military support
0
0
Foreign political support
The counterinsurgency effort Political performance and capabilities
0
0
Leadership confidence/unity
0
Military capabilities
W
W
Rural control
0
0
Urban control
0
0
Foreign military support
Foreign political support
Insurgent threat to regime or current policiesb
O
0
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Vietnamese military support and the lack of a viable opposition
ensure that the Lao People's Democratic Republic will remain in
power for the foreseeable future. US diplomats reported slight
increases in resistance activity in isolated areas-largely because of
the government's inability to police its long border with Thailand-
but the military capability of the resistance remains weak. Limited
information indicates that they are unable to garner the support of a
generally indifferent populace.
Poor economic conditions continued to undermine public morale in
Vientiane, according to the US Embassy. Prices for staple goods rose
sharply this spring, and rice and poultry were in short supply. The
government has been trying to increase its control over the small
private sector by pressuring private merchants in the capital to join a
joint state-private trading company. If economic conditions continue
to deteriorate, we expect increased refugee flows to Thailand.
I Assessments are based on limited information, particularly with regard to
indicators of military/security vulnerabilities.
Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance
Legend Ties and dependency Party ties with USSR or surrogate
Strong Government-to-government relations
Soviet /surrogate military access to client bases/ports
Prospects for major deterioration within next year
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years
a Includes a judgment about the relative importance of individual bincludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's
indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.
instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.
'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Part 3. Country Essays
Afghanistan:
Najibullah's Challenge Ahead
? The replacement on 4 May of Babrak Karmal as
General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) by the even more pro-
Soviet, ex-intelligence chief Najibullah will almost
certainly strengthen Moscow's influence. Nonethe-
less, we believe Najibullah probably will not make
any immediate headway against the insurgency nor
in improving the performance of the party, which is
plagued with divisions.
? Stepped-up Afghan ground and air border viola-
tions, subversive activities using dissident Pakistani
tribesmen, and bombings in Pakistani cities have
been aimed at forcing a shift in Pakistan's Afghani-
stan policy.
? Although increased Soviet-Afghan military pressure
in Afghanistan's eastern provinces is part of a
determined effort to cut off insurgent supplies and
infiltration from Pakistan, the terrain favors the
insurgents, who continue to move men and large
quantities of supplies through the many mountain
passes.
? In keeping with Kabul's efforts to assume a larger
role in the war, several largely Afghan army opera-
tions were conducted over the past several months
with limited Soviet support; only one resulted in a
significant success.
We judge that the Soviets probably selected the KGB-
trained Najibullah because he has proved an effective
and pragmatic administrator. Prior to becoming party
chief last November, he
was responsible for building the Afghan intelligence
service (KHAD) into a more efficient tool of Soviet 25X1
policy and for organizing regime support among
Pashtun border tribes in an effort to build legitimacy
for the Kabul regime. The Soviets almost certainly
hope that Najibullah can reinvigorate the under-
manned, demoralized, and generally ineffective Af-
ghan Armed Forces and allow the Soviets to reduce
their role in the war. They presumably also want
Najibullah to improve the discipline and performance 25X1
of the PDPA. His appointment, however, has brought
to the surface divisions within the dominant Parchami
wing of the party, and, in our view, his reputation for
ruthlessness against the rival Khalqi faction is bound
to arouse opposition to his appointment in the mili-
tary, where the Khalqis dominate.
We expect that Najibullah's domestic agenda will
center on broadening the base of the regime; last
month he held a series of highly visible meetings with
the regime-supported Islamic clergy, tribal chiefs, and
representatives from the Hazara, Uzbek, and Turk-
men ethnic groups in an attempt to build popular
25X1
25X1
'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Recent Border Fighting
support for the government. We believe Najibullah
will use his Pashtun origins and good tribal connec-
tions in heightened efforts to subvert border tribes and
blunt insurgent activity.
Fighting in the past quarter year has generally fo-
cused on areas closer to the Pakistani border; in May
there were almost daily air violations. Soviet and
Afghan Government offensives in Nangarhar and
Paktia Provinces demonstrated a new determination
to prevent insurgent resupply and infiltration from
Pakistan. We judge that efforts were largely unsuc-
cessful and that it is probably impossible to seal the
Pakistani border with the manpower available.
The three-week Afghan/Soviet assault in April,
which resulted in the overrunning of Zhawar Killi, a
major insurgent base camp in southern Paktia Prov-
ince, is being portrayed by the regime as a major
Afghan army victory over the insurgents. Although
the camp was destroyed and the insurgents suffered
heavy casualties, insurgents have reoccupied the de-
stroyed base and surrounding areas after the Afghan
army withdrawal. Regime and Soviet forces also took
heavy casualties,
Several predominant Afghan operations in eastern
Afghanistan preceded the assault on Zhawar Killi but
were much less successful. In our opinion, Afghan
forces continue to demonstrate a weak capability for
holding territory in insurgent-dominated areas; earlier
this year Afghan forces were ousted from newly
established outposts in the Nazian Valley.
We believe that the border incidents plus continued
Afghan Government support of dissident Pakistani
tribes and bombings in Pakistani cities have increased
domestic pressure for Islamabad to reexamine its
Afghan policy. Resistance leaders fear that Pakistan
will accept a Communist government in Afghanistan
as part of an overall peace settlement. We believe that
insurgent forces are probably stockpiling arms and
ammunition inside Afghanistan as a precaution
against an unacceptable political solution between
Pakistan and Afghanistan at the Geneva peace nego-
tiations on a Soviet troop withdrawal. In the event of a
negotiated settlement that is rejected by insurgents,
we believe that the insurgents would be able to
continue their fight at a lesser intensity with the
movement of small arms ammunition across the bor-
der.
Key Indicators to Watch
Most Likely Scenario: The regime's ability to reduce
its dependency on Soviet troops does not improve
significantly; the insurgents step up activity; faction-
alism builds and Najibullah's power base frays.
? Predominant Afghan operations are launched
against insurgent targets but fail to reduce insur-
gent activity.
? Pakistanis remain sympathetic to insurgent views,
despite Kabul's increased use of dissident Pakistani
tribesmen on the border and more bombings in
Pakistan.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
? Najibullah's ruthlessness toward dissenters aggra-
vates factionalism; further splits occur within the
Parchami wings of the PDPA and opposition from
the Khalqi faction builds.
? Najibullah's efforts to increase popular support for
the regime's economic and social policies meet with
continued resistance.
Alternative Scenario: Najibullah improves the capa-
bility and performance of both the PDPA and the
Afghan Armed Forces; Najibullah consolidates his
power.
? Najibullah purges the rival Khalqi faction of the
PDPA, or Moscow forces an accommodation be-
tween rival factions.
? Najibullah improves the prestige, recruitment rate,
and efficacy of the Afghan Armed Forces, which
mount large operations with some success and slow-
ly pacify and garrison additional areas.
? Najibullah gains the cooperation of border tribes in
exchange for regime favors; insurgent infiltration of
men and supplies becomes increasingly difficult.
? Border fighting and increased bombings of Paki-
stani territory create domestic problems for
Islamabad.
? Najibullah obtains the support of key military,
party, and tribal leaders, and the party operates
more effectively at the local level.
11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Libya: Qadhafi
After the Airstrike
? We judge that the US retaliatory strike last April
weakened Qadhafi's political standing by humiliat-
ing the Libyan Armed Forces and stimulating closer
cooperation between Washington and West Europe-
an governments on isolating his regime.
? Despite Qadhafi's dissatisfaction with Soviet sup-
port during the crisis, his narrowing room to maneu-
ver on the domestic and international scene has
prompted renewed attempts to draw closer to Mos-
cow. We believe that Qadhafi may even be willing
to offer the Soviets increased access to Libyan air
and naval facilities in exchange for more sophisti-
cated weaponry than Moscow has so far been
willing to provide.
? We judge that the chances are slightly better than
even that Qadhafi's elaborate security precautions
will continue to ensure his political survival over the
next six months. In our judgment, the environment
is highly coup prone, however, and a precipitating
event, such as another poor Libyan military perfor-
mance, could provoke conspirators to act.
Impact of US-Libyan Tensions
Domestic reactions to the clash between US and
Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra last March and the
following month's retaliatory US airstrike confirm the
extent to which Qadhafi's political position has eroded
in recent years. Reported incidents of insubordination
or outright mutiny by individual military units during
the US-Libyan confrontation demonstrated Qadhafi's
diminished authority among the Armed Forces. At
the same time, frequent emotional expressions of
support for Qadhafi and stage-managed demonstra-
tions by his minority of hardcore loyalists have not
procession in Tripoli for those killed in the US strike
attracted only several thousand marchers out of a
local population of about 900,000, according to press
foreign policies.
Washington's humiliation of the Libyan military,
which was caught offguard by the US attack and
proved unable to protect Qadhafi even at his best
defended residence, strengthens the political climate
in Libya that was already conducive to plotting.
Qadhafi has emphasized military strength as a means
of expanding his international influence and protect-
ing his regime since coming to power in 1969. In
support of these objectives, he has acquired large
quantities of arms from several countries, including
about $15 billion from the Soviet Union, his principal
supplier. In our view, the US strike has deflated
Libyan pretensions of military prowess and discredit-
ed claims of exceptional military performance in
defending Libyan-claimed waters in the Gulf of
Sidra. the Libyan military
failure has increase criticism among Libyans of
Qadhafi's large weapons expenditures and provocative
Qadhafi may make senior
officers scapegoats for the poor Libyan showing
against US forces. Such a crackdown, in our view,
probably would aggravate existing antiregime senti-
ment in the officer corps. Many officers oppose
Qadhafi's aggressive foreign ventures and resent their
loss of influence to zealots in the revolutionary com-
mittees supportive of his radical policies,
Qadhafi's curtailment of officers'
privileges-part of an attempt to conserve increasing-
ly scarce government financial resources-has also
contributed to dissatisfaction.
generated extensive public support,
The US strike prompted most Libyans-
apparently including even some regime supporters-
to flee the larger cities in anticipation of another
attack rather than rally around Qadhafi. The funeral
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
q Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
(1) The Jamahiriya (Libya
We judge that Qadhafi's failure to attract significant
foreign support for his anti-US posture-particularly
among Arab states-is eroding popular support. Re-
cent expulsions of Libyans involved in terrorist activi-
ties by West European governments and limits on the
official Libyan presence contradict Qadhafi's claims
of widespread international support and US interna-
tional isolation, as well as his denials of terrorist
involvement. In our view, Qadhafi's failure to convene
an extraordinary Arab League summit have under-
mined his attempts to persuade Libyans of US blame
for the confrontation. In response, Qadhafi has her-
alded the benefits of self-reliance and labeled unsup-
portive West European and Arab states as "lackeys"
of the United States.
have been the root cause of Qadhafi's declining
domestic fortunes. wide-
spread unhappiness with the deteriorating standard of
living. Improved living conditions during the 1970s-
considered by most Libyans as one of the principal
fruits of Qadhafi's revolution-have been replaced by
declines in medical care and education and shortages
of food, water, and electricity
Qadhafi Counters
Qadhafi has responded to increased foreign and do-
mestic isolation and his country's military failures by
renewing approaches to the Soviet Union. During a
visit to Moscow by Libya's number-two leader, Jallud,
The US freeze on Libyan assets last January, which
deprived Tripoli of about $750 million in foreign
exchange, and the fall in oil prices are further aggra-
vating Libyan economic difficulties, which we believe
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
late last month, we believe the Soviets promised
Tripoli additional military assistance, given the exten-
sive involvement of Defense Minister Sokolov in the
talks and the announcement of a Soviet military vi it
in June.
Moscow apparently turned down a Libyan request for
a friendship treaty and Gorbachev publicly repri-
manded Tripoli for overtly promoting terrorism. We
doubt that Moscow will extend the kind of explicit
security guarantees Qadhafi is seeking, but may agree
to replace damaged equipment or conduct joint Sovi-
et-Libyan naval exercises. For his part, Qadhafi prob-
ably will offer the Soviets increased use of Libyan air
and naval facilities-as he has threatened to do
during past confrontations with the United States-in
exchange for the facade of a Soviet-Libyan defense
Qadhafi's new approach to Moscow is being accompa-
nied by domestic political initiatives designed to stave
off potential threats.
Qadhafi has given a 'more prominent role to several
members of the popular and more pragmatic group of
senior officers who supported him during the 1970s.
He probably hopes that identifying these officers
more closely with his regime will ensure the support of
the Armed Forces in any military action with the
United States and deter potential coup plotters.
Qadhafi may have shifted several
radicals from senior positions in the internal security
service. Meanwhile, Qadhafi is blaming food short-
ages on mismanagement and hoarding by local "fat
cats." Increased food imports during recent weeks
apparently are timed to coincide with Ramadan, the
Muslim holy month. In addition, policy pronounce-
ments include new references to Islam-an apparent
attempt to appeal to popular Islamic sentiments. F_
Despite these measures, Qadhafi ultimately relies on
an efficient and pervasive security apparatus to main-
tain power. He has neutralized the regular Armed
Forces by gradually replacing them with a part-time
citizen army; by infiltrating revolutionary ideologues
into their ranks to act as watchdogs for antiregime
activity; by periodically rotating military officers to
prevent them from developing a loyal following; and
by dispersing Army units to prevent the consolidation
of a potentially threatening force.
he has assigned five separate military,
paramilitary, and popular control organizations spe-
cific security missions, probably including monitoring
each other's activities, in our opinion.
such controls have quashed numerous coup
plots and largely stifled open expressions of discon-
tent. They have not, however, precluded sporadic
clandestine distribution of antiregime literature or
incidents of antiregime sabotage.
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
L~DA"I
11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Key Indicators To Watch
Most Likely Scenario: The chances are slightly better
than even that Qadhgfi's elaborate security precau-
tions will ensure his political survival over the next
six months.
? Open expressions of antiregime sentiment remain
minimal.
? Disaffected military officers focus-as they have in
the past-on securing their position in the post-
Qadhafi period instead of actively plotting to re-
move him.
? Dissidents in exile fail to strengthen their popular
standing or to undertake even limited covert opera-
tions inside Libya.
? The Libyan military improves its performance in
countering another challenge by US forces or in
defending Libyan territory by neighboring
aggressors.
? Qadhafi continues to attract a sufficient number of
Western technicians to maintain oil production at
current levels.
? Increased Soviet political and military support gen-
erates a new sense of confidence among Libyan
military officers.
Alternative Scenarios: Plotters succeed in penetrating
the security apparatus and killing Qadhgfi, but are
too weak to consolidate authority quickly; a period of
instability ensues.
? Morale and efficiency of the internal security forces
break down.
? Political infighting breaks out among members of
Qadhafi's inner circle, including members of his
tribe, over his unwillingness to compromise his
radical policies or in jockeying for position in antici-
pation of Qadhafi's removal.
? Exiled Libyan dissidents increase significantly their
antiregime activity as the result of increased foreign
support and an expanded network of contacts inside
Libya.
? Qadhafi initiates another aggressive foreign venture
or terrorist attack that provokes retaliation.
? Military units headed by would-be plotters gain
access to currently restricted ammunition supplies.
? Qadhafi is removed, armed conflict breaks out, or
surviving senior officers establish a military council
as a facade for behind-the-scenes political maneu-
vering.
There is the lesser possibility that Qadhafi will shore
up his domestic position by making significant ad-
justments to unpopular domestic and foreign policies.
? Qadhafi delegates increased authority to senior
military officers at the expense of the revolutionary
committees.
? Qadhafi withdraws Libyan forces from Chad and
curtails Libyan military support for Iran, his two
most contentious foreign policy issues.
? Qadhafi sustains currently higher levels of food
imports.
? Oil prices increase, permitting Qadhafi to favor
consumer economic priorities.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Appendix: Methodology Notes
Instability Indicators
Analysts were asked to use the following questions as
a guide in assessing the level of activity/magnitude of
the instability indicators that appear in the country
charts. They also indicated the importance they at-
tach to individual indicators in monitoring and assess-
ing threats to the regime. The chart following the
questions tabulates these ratings of importance. These
two steps formed the basis for judgments on pressures
and prospects for instability/irregular leadership
Food, Energy, Consumer Goods Shortages
Did economic deterioration, natural disaster, or com-
modity sales abroad affect the government's ability to
meet consumer needs? Did the government undertake
rationing or new fiscal measures that may have
diminished store supplies?
Foreign Exchange Shortages
Did international economic shocks adversely affect
foreign exchange receipts and force the government to
undertake austerity measures? Did the government
fail to make foreign debt repayments on time? Was
the government unable to line up foreign financing
needs or obtain debt relief from creditors? Did a
Ethnic/Regional/Religious Tensions
Was there disagreement or conflict among ethnic/
regional/religious groups or evidence of growing mis-
trust and dislike? Did religious or ethnic leaders
criticize the government? Were they active in anti-
government activities? On the other hand, was there
any evidence of cooperation or reconciliation? Did
leaders participate in a dialogue with the government
or indicate a willingness to resolve differences in a
cooperative manner?
Did the government implement policies detrimental to
the status of any group; for example, did it increase
religious intolerance or suppress the use of a minority
language or culture? On the other hand, did the
government take any action that attempted to allevi-
ate ethnic/regional/religious tensions; for example,
did it move to improve the social status of minority
Population Flows/Elite Emigration
Was there rural-urban migration or an influx of
refugees? Did the government carry out forced collec-
tivization or relocation programs that involved move-
ment of large numbers of people?
Did expatriates necessary for their expertise or mem-
bers of the country's intelligentsia flee the country?
foreign payments crunch impair trade flows?
Regional/Border Hostilities
Did the government come under threat of incursions
or subversion by neighboring foreign elements? Did
the government provide a greater share of resources to
border or regional hositilities?
Political/ Diplomatic Differences With the Soviet Bloc
Was Soviet or Cuban criticism of the regime evident?
Were there major policy differences or instances of
diplomatic rebuffs by either party?
Western Efforts To Promote Policy Change
Did Western governments attempt to directly influ-
ence regime policy? Did foreign government diplo-
matic or financial support for opposition groups in-
Shortfalls in Economic Aid
Were government requests for increased foreign eco-
nomic aid refused or ignored? Did the gap between
the government's perceived needs and actual aid levels
widen? Did government officials complain privately
or publicly about the level of economic support?
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Shortfalls in Military Aid
Did the military fail to acquire suitable weapons,
transport, or support equipment to meet perceived
defense needs? Did government officials complain
privately or publicly about the level of external mili-
tary support? Did the support provided by the Soviet
Union or its surrogates-including equipment, train-
ing, and advisers-meet defense needs? Did personnel
complain of inadequate supplies and provisions? C
Opposition Activities
Strength/Appeal of Opposition Groups
Did influential nongovernmental organizations-
churches, unions, schools-or political opposition
groups gain supporters? Did the insurgents gain sup-
porters? Did coordination/ contact among opposition
groups increase either overtly or through an under-
ground press or informal communications network?
Did the opposition improve its leadership capability?
Did opposition groups attract foreign financial or
political support? Did officials from foreign embassies
meet with opposition leaders? Did foreign nongovern-
mental agencies send humanitarian, logistic, or finan-
cial support to opposition groups?
Protests, Strikes, Rallies
Did citizens refuse to cooperate with government
regulations-for example, hiding draft-age men or
agricultural surpluses? Were there antigovernment
strikes and demonstrations? Were participants from
different segments of the population?
Reports/Rumors of Military Coup Plotting
Were there meetings of dissident military officers or
development of concrete opposition plans? Were there
reports of coup plotting and did the plotters include
commanders of key forces?
Did coup plotters meet with representatives of the
former regime? With key opponents of the regime?
With dissident elite members? Did coup plotters
solicit or receive external support?
Terrorism and Sabotage
Were there destructive terrorist or sabotage incidents
against the regime? Were there unexplained industri-
al or urban accidents?
Regime Political Vulnerabilities
Loss of Legitimacy or Confidence
Were there any indications that the head of govern-
ment may have to step down because of age, loss of
public support, ill health, or Soviet displeasure with
him? If so, did the political elite perceive a succession
crisis and was there evidence of political jockeying by
potential successors?
Did the Soviets display support for a rival head of
government or party chief? Did they signal displea-
sure with the current leaders?
Did the ruler's style change in such a way that lessens
his ability to rule? Is there evidence of increased
disenchantment over government policies or acts on
the part of powerful interest groups? Was the ruler
increasingly isolated from advisers or party elite?
Did the public engage in antiregime activities? Did
government programs, such as land reform, national-
ization, rent control, cooperatives, or tax collection
meet local opposition? Did the leader fail to use
security forces effectively or take measures against
dissidents or the opposition?
Factionalism Within Ruling Party or Elite
Within the ruling party, were there conflicts over
ideology, control of the security forces, or other key
policy issues? Did regime officials issue conflicting
policy statements? Were personal animosities evident
among the elite? Did any elite members defect from
the government?
Inefficacy of Political/Social Control
Was the leadership of cell or block committees chal-
lenged? Do large segments of the population remain
loyal to the deposed regime?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Did officially sanctioned unions, media, schools, or
churches retain or grow in autonomy and popularity?
Did officers disobey orders? Were communications
unable to keep field units in touch with headquarters?
Were there changes in size or regularity of field
exercises? Did senior officers move toward redefining
Did youths refuse to participate in indoctrination
programs or donate time in service to the regime? Did
students criticize foreign training programs? F__1
Did regime efforts to secularize society and consoli-
date power meet resistance from the populace or
ethnic/regional/religious groups? F__1
On the other hand, did the ruling party increase its
membership and local control?
Excessive Repression/ Brutality
Did the government indiscriminately use force against
the populace? Were reports of regime brutality widely
known by the public?
Popular Grievances Over Material Welfare
Was the government unable or unwilling to undertake
programs that would provide material benefits at the
local level? Did people criticize government perfor-
Regime Military/Security Vulnerabilities
Deficiencies of Internal Security Forces
Did government security forces fail to adequately
protect the rural or urban populace?
Did civilians display hostility against or express mis-
trust of local police forces? F___1
Did the government successfully recruit soldiers for
service in internal control? Did the military assume
more internal police functions?
Was there evidence of weakening protection of the
leadership?
Discipline/Training Problems Within the Military
Did soldiers refuse to go on patrol or to the frontlines?
Did they complain of incompetent commanders?
Were there incidents of insubordination? Were there
defections, desertions, or a decline in the number or
quality of recruits?
the nature of the military threat?
Did military intelligence perform badly?
Did Soviet or Cuban officials make pessimistic state-
ments about the regime's capabilities, effectiveness, or
Factionalism Within the Military
Were interforce rivalries or leadership splits present?
Did they hamper security or impede coordination of
plans or strategies?
Were there reports that some of the high command
held over from the old regime is still loyal to it? C
Did officers express resentment against the regime's
elite security force? Did they refuse to cooperate with
Officers' Discontent With Government
Actions/Policies
Did officers criticize government leadership or poli-
cies? Did they balk at orders from civilian officials or
foreign military advisers? Did officers complain about
a lack of headroom or pay?
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Importance of Individual Indicators in Assessing Pressure
for Instability/Irregular Leadership Change.'
Legend
Kcy
? High
Moderate
Some
Negligihlc
Sttcioecono III Iv'
Ethniciregionali religious tensions
external 1 actors
Population flows/elite emigration
Ioi'eign exchange shortages
Regional border hostilities
Differences with USSR or surrogates
players Opposition groups
Public dissatisfaction
Regime
vulnerabilities
Marxist-Leninist Regimes
Middle East
Clients
Communist
Regimes
c
c
t^
Ll
LZ <
0
z
_
q
a
,
-
z
>
L
E
-~
Q
?
0
Q
V
V
?
Q
0
V
V
O
C)
0
0
0
V
Food, energy. consumer goods shortages
Q
0
V
01
0
C)
'D
0
O
0
0
0
0
Q
0
V
?
0
O
.
?
0
0
V
?
?
0
0
U
0
V
Q
V
?
Q
^
?
0
0
.
.
U
U
U
Q
?
0
?
0
?
V
U
Q
V
Q
?
?
O
Q
Q
0
0
0
0
Military
??
U
?
U
O
^
Q
U
Q
U
Leadership rivals
?^
0
Q
?
Q
Q
U
U
Lack of popular legitimacy
?
0
0
V
?
V
O
0
V
0
0
0
0
Ruling part) factionalism
?
?
0
9
?
?
Q
0
?
?
-
0
Weakened political/social control
?
0
T
V
?
V
0
?
.
.
Indiscriminate use of force
V
?
O
Q
V
.
.
0
0
Failure to provide popular benefits
0
0
0
V
?
V
O
?
V
0
.
0
0
Deficient security forces
?
?
V
?
^
V
?
V
^
.
.
V
Problems with military discipline
?
V
V
V
U
V
V
V
0
0
Factionalism within military
?
?
V
?
?
0
?
0
.
.
Officers ' grievances
V
?
V
?
?
0
?
V
?
.
.
Shortfalls in economic aid
V
V
V
?
?
V
U
0
Shortfalls in military aid
0
V
V
?
?
V
0
V
0
0
V
'14nalvsts were asked to indicate how important they believe the
above tactors or pl:i ers arc or could he over the next 2-3 years
in monitoring and assessing threats to the current regime leadership.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Insurgency Indicators
Analysts were asked to use the following questions as
a guide in assessing the level of activity/magnitude of
both the insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts.
Judgments about the insurgency's threat to the re-
gime or its policies were based on evaluations concern-
ing its success in using its capabilities to the detriment
or expense of the government during the relevant time
period. Prospects for insurgent success in the future
were based on broader judgments concerning the
conflict's setting and origins, overall goals and strate-
gy of each side, and which side is in the best position
to sustain a drive toward its overall goal.
Political Performance and Capabilities
Did the insurgents capitalize on public grievances and
effectively use propaganda, mobilize and organize
local support, and provide material benefits to sup-
porters?
Leadership Confidence/Unity
Did the insurgents develop more effective and unified
leadership?
Military Capabilities
Did arms caches increase? Were weapons more so-
phisticated? Did the insurgents gain more recruits?
Did training and discipline improve? Were casualties
and equipment losses fewer after each encounter with
government forces? Did the insurgents employ appro-
priate tactics and strategy?
Rural Control
Were they able to better secure "liberated" areas?
Did insurgents gain control over more territory? Was
sanctuary-either in a neighboring country or in a
local area denied to the government-available to the
insurgents?
Urban Activities
Did the insurgents increase attacks on government
personnel and buildings, utilities, or symbolic targets
in urban areas? Did they infiltrate the government,
labor unions, or political parties? Did they increase
their propaganda activities? Did they sponsor riots,
strikes, or demonstrations?
Foreign Military Support
Did foreigners channel greater amounts and more
sophisticated weapons, materiel, and military training
to the insurgents?
Foreign Political Support
Did more foreign governments recognize the insur-
gents? Did foreigners provide more funds or political
assistance? Did they promote insurgent efforts with
their allies or in international forums?
The Counterinsurgency Effort 25X1
Political Performance and Capabilities
Did the government implement actions to deal with
popular grievances? Were government coercive tac- 25X1
tics effective in maintaining popular loyalty or at least
Leadership Confidence/ Unity
Was government leadership united and confident in
its ability to maintain control and the initiative
against the insurgency?
Military Capabilities
Did the government employ strategy, tactics, training,
and weapons appropriate for counterinsurgency? Did
the military leadership demonstrate competency? Did
recruits increase and attrition rates stabilize or im-
prove?
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
,I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 I! I I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Rural Control
Did the military maintain control of secured areas,
and increase extent of secured areas? Was it able to
provide security for the population in these areas?
Was the military able to deny sanctuary to the
insurgents?
Urban Control
Were government security forces able to maintain
security of urban areas and economic targets and
limit infiltration of insurgents? Did they improve
their intelligence apparatus?
Foreign Military Support
Did foreigners channel greater amounts and more
sophisticated weapons, materiel, military training, or
combat troops to the government?
Foreign Political Support
Was the government able to maintain or improve its
legitimacy among foreign governments? Did any pre-
vious supporters express reluctance to maintain their
support of the regime? Did levels of foreign financial
support, political training, military training, or techni-
cal assistance change?
Overall Assessment of Insurgent Threat to Regime or
Current Policies
Did the insurgents obtain the support or neutrality of
critical segments of the population?
Did the insurgents limit the ability of the government
and enhance their ability to provide services and
material benefits?
Did the insurgent organization increase its domestic
and international legitimacy at the expense of the
government?
Did the insurgents affect the self-confidence or unity
of government leaders and cadres?
Did they reduce and neutralize government coercive
power while strengthening their coercive capabilities?
Prospects for Insurgent Success in Achieving Goals
Are insurgent goals and strategy appropriate to the
conflict's setting and origins and to the counterinsur-
gency's overall strategy? Which are in the best posi-
tion to sustain a drive toward their overall goal? Can
the insurgents maintain the initiative over time?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Relations With the Soviet Union
For each indicator of discord, analysts were asked to
mark with an "X" those that were present in Soviet-
client relations during the relevant time period.
Client Dissatisfaction With Soviet or
Surrogate Interference in Local Affairs
Were any Soviet, Cuban, or Vietnamese personnel
expelled or replaced by client government? Did the
client accuse the Soviets or their surrogates of anti-
government activities, such as support of opposition
groups, espionage, or subversive activities? Did client
leadership reject Soviet domestic policy recommenda-
tions? Were there disagreements over domestic policy
Popular Opposition to Soviet or Surrogate
Presence or Influence in Client Country
Did Soviet personnel or leadership denigrate counter-
parts in client government? Did segments of the
population-such as students or labor-voice discon-
tent, refuse to participate in, or protest Soviet-spon-
sored programs, including training, scholarships, or
relocation? Were there any incidents of public protest
or resentment of Soviet personnel in client country?
Were anti-Soviet editorials or literature evident? F_
Disagreement With Soviet Third-Country
Action or Foreign Policy Stance
Did client express displeasure with Soviet action or
policy vis-a-vis a third country or the Third World in
general, for example, Soviet support of rival leader-
ship in a third country, Soviet overtures to the West,
or lack of Soviet support on North-South policy
issues?
Differences Over Party Structure/Role/Relations
Did the client government purge or suppress the pro-
Moscow faction of the party? Did the client govern-
ment refuse to structure the party along Soviet re-
quests? Was there disagreement on party direction,
consolidation, or leadership?
Improved Relations by Either
Party With China or the West
Did closer USSR-China or USSR-US relations ag- 25X1
gravate the USSR-client relationship? Did client gov-
ernment seek trade, economic, or technology from the
West or China? Did client support Chinese or the
West in international forums? Were there any high-
level visits or significant exchanges between client and
the West or China?
Soviet or Client Diplomatic Rebuffs?
Did Soviet or client press or other reporting indicate
diplomatic "snubs" of visiting officials? Was the
client leadership angered at Soviet pronouncements
they perceived to be insensitive or detrimental to their
interests?
Disagreement Over Soviet
Military Support or Relations
Did client purchase or seek arms elsewhere? Did
client criticize Soviet supplies, equipment, or train-
ing? Did Soviets turn down client military aid re-
quests? Was there any disagreement over the nature
of Soviet or surrogate military commitment? Was
there any disagreement over military strategy or
client use of Soviet weapons? Did the client deny
access to or refuse Soviet requests for military facili-
ties or ports of call?
Client Dissatisfaction With
Soviet Economic Aid or Relations
Did the Soviets turn down any client requests for
loans or aid? Did they refuse to reschedule debts? Did
client express unhappiness with levels or type of
Soviet assistance or with Soviet-style economic plan-
ning? Did client seek assistance from the West? Did
client resist Soviet requests/ suggestions for new eco-
nomic initiatives or reorganization?
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 Declassified in Part-'
art - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87TOO685ROO0300540002-6
Secret
For each category below, analysts were asked to
evaluate the strength of the Soviet-client ties or
dependent relations as strong, moderate, or weak.
Party Ties to USSR or Surrogate
Has the client country proclaimed the establishment
of a Communist or vanguard party? Are there recip-
rocal party visits and agreements between Moscow
and the client country?
Government-to-Government Relations
Are there reciprocal visits of high-level government
officials? Has the Soviet Union extended a friendship
treaty to the client? Are there significant information
or cultural agreements? Does the client have student
trainees in the USSR?
Client Military Dependency
Is the client dependent on the Soviet Union for the
major share of its weapons arsenal? Or significant
items? Are Soviet or surrogate troops and/or advisers
present in client country?
Client Economic Dependency
Is the client a member of CEMA? Does the client
have significant trade relations with the Soviet Bloc?
Is the client dependent on the Soviet Union for the
bulk of its aid? Has the client adopted a Soviet-styled
economy? Do the client and the USSR have impor-
tant financial or hard currency relations?
Soviet Military Access in Client Country
Does the Soviet Union have aircraft basing or naval
rights in client country? Are there Soviet signal
intelligence sites in client country?
Mutual Foreign Policy Support
Does each party support the other on issues of impor-
tance to the particular party? Is there strong mutual-
ity of an anti-US policy posture?
Soviet Geopolitical Interest
In your judgment, what is the strength of the Soviet
geopolitical/ strategic interest in your country?
Given the strength/ weakness of bilateral ties and
current points of discord, would you judge tension in
the overall relationship as strong, moderate, or weak?
What are the prospects for a weakening of ties and
dependencies in the future or a divergence in interests
that might lead to a major deterioration or shift in the
relationship?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
 i.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300540002-6